Resilience and preparedness (Module 1)

About this module

Module 1 opened on 21 July 2022 and looked into the UK’s resilience and preparedness for the pandemic. It considered whether the pandemic was properly planned for and whether the UK was ready for that eventuality. You can view the Full report and In Brief documents for Module 1 below.

The report for this module was published on 18 July 2024. It examines the state of the United Kingdom’s central structures and procedures for pandemic emergency, resilience and response.

On 17 January 2025 the Inquiry Chair, Baroness Hallett, provided an update following receipt of governments’ responses:

On 18 July 2024, I published my first report for Module 1, which examined the United Kingdom’s resilience and preparedness for the Covid-19 pandemic.

In the report I set out a series of findings and recommendations which were put to the four governments of the United Kingdom – the United Kingdom government itself, and the three devolved administrations.

I set a deadline of six months for them to respond from the date of the report’s publication. Yesterday all four governments met my deadline and their responses have been published on the Inquiry’s website. I will be carefully considering all of their responses in the coming days.

Chair of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Baroness Hallett

View the report in full
View the report ‘In Brief’ summary

Recommendations

The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each simplify and reduce the number of structures with responsibility for preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies.

The core structures should be:

  • a single Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee (including the senior minister responsible for health and social care) responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience for each government, which meets regularly and is chaired by the leader or deputy leader of the relevant government; and
  • a single cross-departmental group of senior officials in each government (which reports regularly to the Cabinet-level or equivalent ministerial committee) to oversee and implement policy on civil emergency preparedness and resilience.

This should be put in place within 12 months of the publication of this Report.

Within 6 months of the creation of the group of senior officials, it should complete a review to simplify and reduce the number of structures responsible for whole- system civil emergency preparedness and resilience.

Subsequently, within 24 months of the publication of this Report, the ministerial committee should rationalise and streamline subordinate or supporting groups and committees responsible for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience. Any groups and committees retained or created to support this core structure should have a clear purpose and should report regularly about progress with, and completion of, tasks assigned to them.

The UK government should:

  • abolish the lead government department model for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience; and
  • require the Cabinet Office to lead on preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across UK government departments, including monitoring the preparedness and resilience of other departments, supporting departments to correct problems, and escalating issues to the UK Cabinet-level ministerial committee and group of senior officials in Recommendation 1.

The UK government and devolved administrations should work together on developing a new approach to risk assessment that moves away from a reliance on single reasonable worst-case scenarios towards an approach that:

  • assesses a wider range of scenarios representative of the different risks and the range of each kind of risk;
  • considers the prevention and mitigation of an emergency in addition to dealing with its consequences;
  • provides a full analysis of the ways in which the combined impacts of different risks may complicate or worsen an emergency;
  • assesses long-term risks in addition to short-term risks and considers how they may interact with each other;
  • undertakes an assessment of the impact of each risk on vulnerable people; and
  • takes into account the capacity and capabilities of the UK.

In doing so, the UK government and devolved administrations should perform risk assessments that reflect the circumstances and characteristics particular to England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the UK as a whole.

The UK government and devolved administrations should together introduce a UK-wide whole-system civil emergency strategy (which includes pandemics) to prevent each emergency and also to reduce, control and mitigate its effects.

As a minimum, the strategy should:

  • be adaptable;
  • include sections dedicated to each potential whole-system civil emergency – for example, one on pandemics with a clear explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the UK government, devolved administrations and their departments/directorates as well as local responders;
  • consider a wide range of potential scenarios for each type of emergency;
  • identify the key issues and set out a range of potential responses;
  • identify how the strategy is to be applied to ensure that any potential responses are proportionate to the particular circumstances of the emergency;
  • include an assessment in the short, medium and long term, based on published modelling, of the potential health, social and economic impacts of the emergency and of potential responses to the emergency on the population and, in particular, on vulnerable people; and
  • include an assessment of the infrastructure, technology and skills the UK needs to respond effectively to the emergency and how those needs might change for different scenarios.

The strategy should be subject to a substantive reassessment at least every three years to ensure that it is up to date and effective, incorporating lessons learned between reassessments.

The UK government, working with the devolved administrations, should establish mechanisms for the timely collection, analysis, secure sharing and use of reliable data for informing emergency responses, in advance of future pandemics. Data systems should be tested in pandemic exercises.

The UK government should also commission a wider range of research projects ready to commence in the event of a future pandemic. These could be ‘hibernated’ studies or existing studies that are designed to be rapidly adapted to a new outbreak. Better working with international partners should be encouraged. This should include projects to:

  • understand the prevalence of a new virus;
  • measure the effectiveness of a range of different public health measures; and
  • identify which groups of vulnerable people are hardest hit by the pandemic and why.

The UK government and devolved administrations should together hold a UK-wide pandemic response exercise at least every three years.

The exercise should:

  • test the UK-wide, cross-government, national and local response to a pandemic at all stages, from the initial outbreak to multiple waves over a number of years;
  • include a broad range of those involved in pandemic preparedness and response; and
  • consider how a broad range of vulnerable people will be helped in the event of a pandemic.

For all civil emergency exercises, the governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each (unless there are reasons of national security for not doing so):

  • publish an exercise report summarising the findings, lessons and recommendations, within three months of the conclusion of the exercise;
  • publish an action plan setting out the specific steps that will be taken in response to the report’s findings, and by which entity, within six months of the conclusion of the exercise; and
  • keep exercise reports, action plans, and emergency plans and guidance from across the UK in a single, UK-wide online archive, accessible to all involved in emergency preparedness, resilience and response.

The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each produce and publish reports to their respective legislatures at least every three years on whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience.

The reports should include as a minimum:

  • the risks that each government has identified are likely to result in whole-system civil emergencies;
  • the recommendations that have been made to each government to mitigate those risks, and whether these recommendations have been accepted or rejected;
  • a cost–benefit analysis setting out the economic and social costs of accepting the risks as against taking action to mitigate the risks;
  • who may be vulnerable to the risks and what steps are being taken to mitigate those risks;
  • a plan setting out the timescales for implementing the recommendations that have been accepted; and
  • an update on the progress that has been made on implementing previously accepted recommendations.

The governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should each introduce the use of red teams in the Civil Service to scrutinise and challenge the principles, evidence, policies and advice relating to preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies. The red teams should be brought in from outside of government and the Civil Service.

The UK government should, in consultation with the devolved administrations, create a statutory independent body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience.

The new body should be given responsibility for:

  • providing independent, strategic advice to the UK government and devolved administrations on their planning for, preparedness for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies;
  • consulting with the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector at a national and local level and directors of public health on the protection of vulnerable people in whole-system civil emergencies;
  • assessing the state of planning for, preparedness for and resilience to whole-system civil emergencies across the UK; and
  • making recommendations on the capacity and capabilities that will be required to prepare for and build resilience to whole-system civil emergencies.

As an interim measure, the new body should be established on a non-statutory basis within 12 months of this Report, so that it may begin its work in advance of legislation being passed.

The Inquiry received the following responses to the Module 1 report on the resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom:

UK Government

Scottish Government 

Welsh Government

Northern Ireland Executive