Inquiry Recommendations

Dylai llywodraethau’r DU, yr Alban, Cymru a Gogledd Iwerddon ill dau symleiddio a lleihau nifer y strwythurau sy’n gyfrifol am baratoi ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil system gyfan a meithrin cydnerthedd iddynt.

Dylai'r strwythurau craidd fod fel a ganlyn:

• un pwyllgor gweinidogol ar lefel y Cabinet neu bwyllgor cyfatebol (gan gynnwys yr uwch weinidog sy’n gyfrifol am iechyd a gofal cymdeithasol) sy’n gyfrifol am barodrwydd a gwydnwch system gyfan ar gyfer argyfwng sifil ar gyfer pob llywodraeth, sy’n cyfarfod yn rheolaidd ac sy’n cael ei gadeirio gan arweinydd neu ddirprwy arweinydd y pwyllgor perthnasol. llywodraeth; a
• un grŵp trawsadrannol o uwch swyddogion ym mhob llywodraeth (sy’n adrodd yn rheolaidd i’r Cabinet neu bwyllgor gweinidogol cyfatebol) i oruchwylio a gweithredu polisi ar barodrwydd a gwytnwch ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil.

Dylid rhoi hwn ar waith o fewn 12 mis i gyhoeddi'r Adroddiad hwn.

O fewn 6 mis i greu’r grŵp o uwch swyddogion, dylai gwblhau adolygiad i symleiddio a lleihau nifer y strwythurau sy’n gyfrifol am barodrwydd a gwydnwch system gyfan ar gyfer argyfwng sifil.

Yn dilyn hynny, o fewn 24 mis i gyhoeddi’r Adroddiad hwn, dylai’r pwyllgor gweinidogol resymoli a symleiddio is-grwpiau neu grwpiau cynorthwyol a phwyllgorau sy’n gyfrifol am barodrwydd a gwytnwch system gyfan ar gyfer argyfwng sifil. Dylai fod gan unrhyw grwpiau a phwyllgorau sy'n cael eu cadw neu eu creu i gefnogi'r strwythur craidd hwn ddiben clir a dylent adrodd yn rheolaidd ar gynnydd a chwblhau'r tasgau a neilltuwyd iddynt.

Dylai llywodraeth y DU a’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig gydweithio i ddatblygu dull newydd o asesu risg sy’n symud i ffwrdd o ddibynnu ar senarios achos gwaethaf posibl unigol tuag at ddull sy’n:

• yn asesu ystod ehangach o senarios sy'n cynrychioli'r gwahanol risgiau ac ystod pob math o risg;
• yn ystyried atal a lliniaru argyfwng yn ogystal ag ymdrin â'i ganlyniadau;
• yn darparu dadansoddiad llawn o'r ffyrdd y gall effeithiau cyfunol gwahanol risgiau gymhlethu neu waethygu argyfwng;
• yn asesu risgiau hirdymor yn ogystal â risgiau tymor byr ac yn ystyried sut y gallant ryngweithio â'i gilydd;
• cynnal asesiad o effaith pob risg ar bobl agored i niwed; a
• yn ystyried gallu a galluoedd y DU.

Wrth wneud hynny, dylai llywodraeth y DU a’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig gynnal asesiadau risg sy’n adlewyrchu’r amgylchiadau a’r nodweddion sy’n benodol i Gymru, Lloegr, yr Alban, Gogledd Iwerddon a’r DU gyfan.

Dylai llywodraeth y DU a’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig gyda’i gilydd gyflwyno strategaeth argyfwng sifil system gyfan ar gyfer y DU gyfan (sy’n cynnwys pandemigau) i atal pob argyfwng a hefyd i leihau, rheoli a lliniaru ei effeithiau.

Fel isafswm, dylai’r strategaeth:

• bod yn hyblyg;
• cynnwys adrannau wedi’u neilltuo ar gyfer pob argyfwng sifil system gyfan posibl – er enghraifft, un ar bandemig gydag esboniad clir o rolau a chyfrifoldebau llywodraeth y DU, gweinyddiaethau datganoledig a’u hadrannau/cyfarwyddiaethau yn ogystal ag ymatebwyr lleol;
• ystyried ystod eang o senarios posibl ar gyfer pob math o argyfwng;
• nodi'r materion allweddol a nodi ystod o ymatebion posibl;
• nodi sut y bydd y strategaeth yn cael ei chymhwyso i sicrhau bod unrhyw ymatebion posibl yn gymesur ag amgylchiadau penodol yr argyfwng;
• cynnwys asesiad yn y tymor byr, canolig a hir, yn seiliedig ar fodelu cyhoeddedig, o effeithiau iechyd, cymdeithasol ac economaidd posibl yr argyfwng a’r ymatebion posibl i’r argyfwng ar y boblogaeth ac, yn benodol, ar bobl agored i niwed; a
• cynnwys asesiad o’r seilwaith, y dechnoleg a’r sgiliau sydd eu hangen ar y DU i ymateb yn effeithiol i’r argyfwng a sut y gallai’r anghenion hynny newid ar gyfer gwahanol senarios.

Dylai'r strategaeth fod yn destun ailasesiad sylweddol o leiaf bob tair blynedd i sicrhau ei bod yn gyfredol ac yn effeithiol, gan ymgorffori gwersi a ddysgwyd rhwng ailasesiadau.

Dylai llywodraeth y DU, gan weithio gyda’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig, sefydlu mecanweithiau ar gyfer casglu, dadansoddi, rhannu’n ddiogel a defnyddio data dibynadwy yn amserol er mwyn llywio ymatebion brys, cyn pandemigau yn y dyfodol. Dylid profi systemau data mewn ymarferion pandemig.

Dylai llywodraeth y DU hefyd gomisiynu ystod ehangach o brosiectau ymchwil yn barod i gychwyn os bydd pandemig yn y dyfodol. Gallai'r rhain fod yn astudiaethau 'gaeafgysgu' neu'n astudiaethau presennol sydd wedi'u cynllunio i gael eu haddasu'n gyflym i achos newydd. Dylid annog gwell gweithio gyda phartneriaid rhyngwladol. Dylai hyn gynnwys prosiectau i:

• deall pa mor gyffredin yw firws newydd;
• mesur effeithiolrwydd ystod o wahanol fesurau iechyd y cyhoedd; a
• nodi pa grwpiau o bobl agored i niwed sy'n cael eu taro galetaf gan y pandemig a pham.

Dylai llywodraeth y DU a’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig gyda’i gilydd gynnal ymarfer ymateb pandemig ledled y DU o leiaf bob tair blynedd.

Dylai'r ymarfer:

• profi’r ymateb trawslywodraethol, cenedlaethol a lleol ledled y DU i bandemig ar bob cam, o’r achosion cychwynnol i donnau lluosog dros nifer o flynyddoedd;
• cynnwys ystod eang o'r rhai sy'n ymwneud â pharodrwydd ac ymateb i bandemig; a
• ystyried sut y bydd ystod eang o bobl agored i niwed yn cael eu helpu os bydd pandemig.

Ar gyfer pob ymarfer brys sifil, dylai llywodraethau’r DU, yr Alban, Cymru a Gogledd Iwerddon yr un (oni bai bod rhesymau diogelwch cenedlaethol dros beidio â gwneud hynny):

• cyhoeddi adroddiad ymarfer sy'n crynhoi'r canfyddiadau, y gwersi a'r argymhellion, o fewn tri mis i ddiwedd yr ymarfer;
• cyhoeddi cynllun gweithredu yn nodi’r camau penodol a fydd yn cael eu cymryd mewn ymateb i ganfyddiadau’r adroddiad, a chan ba endid, o fewn chwe mis i ddiwedd yr ymarfer; a
• cadw adroddiadau ymarfer corff, cynlluniau gweithredu, a chynlluniau a chanllawiau brys o bob rhan o’r DU mewn un archif ar-lein ar gyfer y DU gyfan, sy’n hygyrch i bawb sy’n ymwneud â pharodrwydd, gwydnwch ac ymateb brys.

Dylai llywodraethau’r DU, yr Alban, Cymru a Gogledd Iwerddon ill dau gynhyrchu a chyhoeddi adroddiadau i’w deddfwrfeydd eu hunain o leiaf bob tair blynedd ar barodrwydd a gwydnwch system gyfan ar gyfer argyfwng sifil.

Dylai’r adroddiadau gynnwys o leiaf:

• mae'r risgiau y mae pob llywodraeth wedi'u nodi yn debygol o arwain at argyfyngau sifil system gyfan;
• yr argymhellion a wnaed i bob llywodraeth i liniaru’r risgiau hynny, ac a yw’r argymhellion hyn wedi’u derbyn neu eu gwrthod;
• dadansoddiad cost a budd yn nodi costau economaidd a chymdeithasol derbyn y risgiau yn hytrach na chymryd camau i liniaru'r risgiau;
• pwy all fod yn agored i'r risgiau a pha gamau sy'n cael eu cymryd i liniaru'r risgiau hynny;
• cynllun yn nodi'r amserlenni ar gyfer gweithredu'r argymhellion a dderbyniwyd; a
• diweddariad ar y cynnydd a wnaed ar weithredu argymhellion a dderbyniwyd yn flaenorol.

Dylai llywodraethau’r DU, yr Alban, Cymru a Gogledd Iwerddon ill dau gyflwyno’r defnydd o dimau coch yn y Gwasanaeth Sifil i graffu ar yr egwyddorion, y dystiolaeth, y polisïau a’r cyngor sy’n ymwneud â pharodrwydd ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil system gyfan a’u gallu i wrthsefyll. Dylid dod â'r timau coch i mewn o'r tu allan i'r llywodraeth a'r Gwasanaeth Sifil.

Dylai llywodraeth y DU, mewn ymgynghoriad â’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig, greu corff annibynnol statudol ar gyfer parodrwydd a gwytnwch system gyfan ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil.

Dylai’r corff newydd gael cyfrifoldeb am:

• darparu cyngor annibynnol, strategol i lywodraeth y DU a’r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig ar eu cynllunio ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil system gyfan, eu parodrwydd ar eu cyfer a meithrin cydnerthedd iddynt;
• ymgynghori â'r sector gwirfoddol, cymunedol a menter gymdeithasol ar lefel genedlaethol a lleol a chyfarwyddwyr iechyd y cyhoedd ar amddiffyn pobl agored i niwed mewn argyfyngau sifil system gyfan;
• asesu cyflwr y cynllunio ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil system gyfan ledled y DU, a’u parodrwydd ar eu cyfer a’u gwydnwch; a
• gwneud argymhellion ar y capasiti a’r galluoedd y bydd eu hangen i baratoi ar gyfer argyfyngau sifil system gyfan a meithrin cydnerthedd iddynt.

Fel mesur interim, dylid sefydlu’r corff newydd ar sail anstatudol o fewn 12 mis i’r Adroddiad hwn, fel y gall ddechrau ar ei waith cyn i ddeddfwriaeth gael ei phasio.

The Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should reconstitute the role of the Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland as an independent advisory role. The Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland should not have managerial responsibilities within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland).

The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should develop and maintain a register of experts across the four nations of the UK who would be willing to participate in scientific advisory groups, covering a broad range of potential civil emergencies.

During a whole-system civil emergency, the UK government and devolved administrations should each routinely publish technical advice on scientific, economic and social matters at the earliest opportunity, as well as the minutes of expert advisory groups – except where there are good reasons that prevent publication, such as commercial confidentiality, personal safety or national security, or because legal advice privilege applies.

The Government Office for Science (GO-Science), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should each develop standard terms of appointment for all participants in scientific advisory groups. These terms should include:

• clarity around the nature of an individual’s role and the extent of their responsibility, as well as the likely time commitment;
• payment where their time commitment means that they have to spend time away from their substantive role;
• access to support services; and access to advice on personal and online security, with procedures for escalating specific concerns.

The UK government should bring into force in England section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, implementing the socio-economic duty.

The Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision within section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.

The UK government should introduce legislation to place child rights impact assessments on a statutory footing in England.

The Northern Ireland Executive should consider an equivalent provision.

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each agree a framework that identifies people who would be most at risk of becoming infected by and dying from a disease and those who are most likely to be negatively impacted by any steps taken to respond to a future pandemic. The framework should set out the specific steps that could be taken to mitigate the risks to these people.

Equality impact assessments should form part of this framework. Where they cannot be undertaken in a national crisis, they should be reinstated as soon as possible.

Each government should agree and publish in its response to this Report how it will ensure that this framework is embedded into emergency decision-making and who will be responsible for ensuring these issues remain under consideration throughout a national crisis.

The Northern Ireland Executive and UK government (in consultation with the Irish government where necessary) should review the structures and delegated powers of government in Northern Ireland to consider:

• the empowerment of the First Minister and deputy First Minister jointly to direct the work of other ministers and departments during an emergency;

• the empowerment of the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service in relation to the allocation of civil servants to departments or to civil contingency structures during an emergency; and

• how decisions that would usually be subject to ministerial approval would be taken should an emergency occur during the suspension of power-sharing arrangements.

The UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4) how decision-making will work in a future pandemic.

This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK government and devolved administrations will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the  emergency will be longer-term.

It should include provision for longer-term decision-making structures in the UK government which consist of:

• a strategy group to set the overall approach to each stage of the pandemic and take decisions on major interventions (eg entering and exiting lockdown); and

• an operational group to take decisions on the implementation of the agreed strategy throughout the pandemic.

The design of these structures should include an outline of decision-making procedures for each group.

The strategy should make express provision for the involvement of the UK Cabinet in the decision-making of the strategy and operational groups.

It should also provide that longer-term decision-making should be conducted primarily by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Cabinets and the Northern Ireland

Executive.

Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard.

The UK government and the devolved administrations should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be unable to undertake their duties for any reason.

The response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and facilitation of decision-making processes. In preparation, the UK government and the devolved administrations should each design the operating procedures for these taskforces, including, but not limited to, identifying the key roles needed to run the taskforces and how those roles would be appointed.

The UK government should also identify the role of its taskforce in supporting decision-making procedures within the strategy and operational decision-making structures.

These arrangements should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).

The Executive Office should amend the Ministerial Code to impose a duty of confidentiality on ministers that prohibits the disclosure of the individual views of ministers expressed during meetings of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.

The UK government and the devolved administrations should each develop action plans for how government communications will be made more accessible during a pandemic.

As a minimum, these should include making provision for the translation of government press conferences into British Sign Language (and Irish Sign Language in Northern Ireland) and the translation of key announcements into the most frequently spoken languages in the UK.

The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide- ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation.

Any departure from this procedure should be the exception, with clear criteria and safeguards in place to prevent the bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny. These safeguards should include:

• ‘sunset clauses’ for regulations made using the made affirmative procedure, specifying a clear expiration date, typically within two months; and

• a duty on ministers to report to their respective legislatures every two months on the exercise of emergency powers.

The UK government should undertake a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess its potential role in managing future civil emergencies, including pandemics, and whether it could be employed as an interim emergency framework until more specific legislation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards is passed.

The review should:

• examine the conditions under which the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 may be invoked in a public health emergency;

• consider any adjustments to the Act’s safeguards, such as the triple lock test or time limits, that would make it more adaptable to pandemics; and

• produce clear guidance on the Act’s application for use in civil emergencies, including pandemics, to support its use as an emergency measure in advance of specific legislation – such as a dedicated pandemic bill – being passed.

The UK government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should develop an online portal for use in future civil emergencies, where members of the public can access information on the legal restrictions that apply in their area and any associated guidance.

This portal should be easily accessible and its content should be written in straightforward and unambiguous language.

The UK government should invite the devolved administrations, as a matter of standard practice, to nominate relevant ministers and officials to attend COBR meetings in the event of relevant whole-system civil emergencies that have the potential to have UK-wide effects.

While intergovernmental relations should be facilitated through COBR in the initial months of any future pandemic, the UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that a specific four-nations structure, concerning pandemic response, is stood up at the same time as the transition away from COBR to nation-specific decision-making structures. This should meet regularly during a pandemic and be attended by all heads of government.

Arrangements for these four-nations meetings should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).