

<b>Leadership Team</b>	
<b>Title:</b>	<b>Mobilisation Model for Airports &amp; Ports</b>
<b>Authors:</b>	<b>NR Jayne Robinson/ NR</b>
<b>Purpose:</b>	<b>Discussion/Steer</b>

<p><b>Meeting Date:</b> 4<sup>th</sup> May 2020  <b>Deputy Director:</b> Sarah Smith</p> <p><b>Steer needed:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Is the proposed model of support and resourcing right?</li> <li>b. Is upscaling an operational delivery model the right approach with limited enforcement powers?</li> <li>c. Can Leadership Team support the use of staff from across teams to endorse the Airports &amp; Ports Mobilisation Team (APMT) approaching other FTLs' colleagues for mobilisation of team members to APMT</li> <li>d. Do we need to consider other ways to deliver OPSS responsibilities and objectives?</li> </ol>
<p><b>Background</b></p> <p>1. This document has been assembled to propose a Covid-19 related resourcing plan for temporary OPSS operations at East Midlands Airport (EMA) and for the potential extension (scaling up) of operations to other airports, including London Heathrow (LHR) and Stansted (STN). It will factor in the back-office requirements from engineering and technical and logistics.</p> <p><b>Problem Statement:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Based on intelligence from Border Force, high volumes of potentially non-compliant, ineffective or unsafe PPE equipment is entering the UK through airports, including East Midlands Airport (EMA), London Heathrow (LHR, Stansted (STN) and Manchester (MAN) using fast parcel operators. This has come from an unprecedented demand for personal protective clothing for the NHS and key workers, in a government response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This is further exacerbated by increasing numbers of imported sub-standard, non-compliant "PPE" products addressed to non-NHS supply chains, intended for use by the general public.</li> <li>3. OPSS is about to issue grants to a number of local authorities operating at border points to cover work for the financial year 2020 – 21, however a mixed picture is emerging regarding the capacity and priorities of local authorities. In the case of Leicestershire County Council, they have suspended all physical operations at East Midlands Airport, hence OPSS's involvement. Volumes of goods entering via LHR have increased significantly and local authorities have limited capacity to respond effectively and in the case of Southampton port, they have indicated that they are unable to accept any new SPoC referrals at the current time as they are dealing with a significant issue relating to the safety of electric fans.</li> <li>4. In the case of LHR, usual intervention involves five different local authority Trading Standards Teams: Hillingdon; Hounslow; Ealing; Slough and Bucks and Surrey. This is due to the way air freight is cleared through transit sheds (ETSFs) located at different geographic locations. The approaches adopted by these local authorities varies. The Ports and Borders Team is continually engaging with these local authorities and Border Force to understand the changing position.</li> <li>•</li> <li>5. The following table, which has been collated using data from Border Force and HMRC referrals shared with the SpOC team, provides a snapshot of the current situation:</li> </ol>

25.

**Table: Support levels**

Support Levels	Conditions at the border point (Intel-based)	OPSS involvement
Low	26. Trading Standards Teams who are undertaking port interventions where they are managing the number of referrals.	27. Remote presence 28. Maintain intel gathering position 29. This can be done by providing technical assistance and advice on potentially unsafe products, possibly through video calls and follow up support with access to testing and additional technical assistance 30.
Medium	31. TSS undertaking port interventions where they are not managing the volume of referrals. OPSS could mobilise it's staff physically on site to support port intervention work and access to technical expertise	32. Occasional On-site presence 33. Regular interaction
High-level	34. Regular On-site presence 35. Severe under-resourced Border Force and local TSO presence 36. High volumes of PPE entering via the border point 37. Desk-top interventions only	38. Regular On-site presence 39. Constant interaction with Border Force and local teams 40. Working collaboratively with Border Force and / or the local authority, OPSS will lead physical interventions

Commented [RJ(fPSa55)]: Bit confused with this?

Commented [AD(6)]: Not sure we need this table. @Frisaxxi: Heena (Office for Product Safety and Standards) did you insert this? I think it is trying to set out a high, medium and low risk approach to providing support to local authorities? Was this the intention? If so, does it complement the text in the body of the paper?

Commented [RJ(fPSa57R6)]: Need to decide if this stays in as I have not renumbered or reformatted.

Commented [AD(8)]: Not sure we need this table?

**Key Current Known Risks**

There is a risk that..	We will mitigate by..
<b>Enforcement: Interception:</b> Unsafe PPE not being intercepted at points of entry into the UK due to limited enforcement capacity at UK ports and borders.. This is compounded by the lack of joined-up action between agencies or limited access to intelligence & analysis.  <i>Impact:</i> Unsafe PPE entering the market	Daily PPE working group meetings to review progress and determine the action needed.  <b>01/05</b> – A team has been on site at East Midlands Airport this week, with regular presence planned from w/c 04/05/20
<b>Regulatory Clearances:</b> Compliant PPE not receiving regulatory clearances as rapidly as needed for supply to frontline due to inadequate capacity at the borders for clearance.  <i>Impact:</i> A lack of supply of PPE to the frontline.	Daily PPE working group meeting to review progress and determine the action needed.  <b>w/c 27/04</b> – A team have been on site at East Midlands Airport this week, with regular presence planned from w/c 04/05/21. Work continues to clear any items being held at Daventry.
<b>Capacity of other ports agencies:</b> Other UK ports and borders have insufficient capacity to intercept unsafe PPE or adequate capacity at the borders for clearance resulting in potentially non-compliant, ineffective or unsafe PPE equipment entering the UK.	<b>w/c 04/05</b> – Preparation for scaling up the operations based on intel and assembling capable resources to mobilise the operation to other sites.
<b>Resource:</b> Demand for resources at all levels of the mobilisation to airports and ports will exceed current resources with OPSS	<b>30/04</b> – Identifying the functional and competency requirements to respond. Investigating current skills capability and capacity within OPSS, including TSOs with investigation experience and other officers willing and able