

DBT Draft Pandemic Response Plan

[This plan is in draft and will be updated in early 2026 following lessons learned from Exercise Pegasus]

Contents

Introduction	2
Pandemic Scenario	2
Phases of a Pandemic	5
Command and Control (C2)- HMG Structures, DBT Role, and Response Phases	6
Emergence (Acute Crisis Response):	6
Transition from an acute crisis to enduring response:	6
Delay and Mitigate (Enduring Response):	6
Central Co-Ordination	7
DBT Pandemic Playbook	7
The role of DBT analysts during a pandemic	11
Team Capabilities	12
Healthcare UK (HCUK)	13
Annex A: Departmental Roles & Responsibilities	23
Annex B: NSRA Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios	27
NSRA - R78 - Pandemic	27
NSRA - R79 - Outbreak of an emerging infectious disease	29
NSRA - R80b - Major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza	31
Annex C: Analytical Capabilities	33
Annex D: Available intervention schemes	36

Introduction

1. This playbook outlines the key capabilities and teams within DBT and how they may be used in a pandemic.
2. This document is aimed at DBT response staff including Senior Responsible Owners, Response Golds and those entering a pandemic response.¹
3. Across UK Government, pandemics are described as a 'Catastrophic Risk' which suggests a whole system challenge requiring significant focus from all departments.
4. Assumptions:
 - a. This is not a comprehensive plan due to the varied possible characteristics of a pandemic response but provides a handrail for the type of options available to seniors.
 - b. The Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) are the Lead Government Department (LGD) for pandemics; however there is an assumption that DBT and all other departments will still be required to stand up a response.
 - c. Due to the scale of a pandemic, there will be significant central co-ordination, which is outlined within the COBR Unit **Pandemic Concept of Operations [link here]**.
 - d. For further information on DBT's response plans please refer to the Emergency Response Coordination Team's (ERCO) Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Background

Pandemic Scenario

5. Pandemics are disease outbreaks that infect a large number of people and spread across multiple countries or continents. Often pandemics are caused by pathogens which are new to humans, often originating from animals (for example Covid-19 or HIV), or new variants of existing pathogens (for example influenza), which can sometimes rapidly infect large proportions of the population because people have little or no immunity to them. The Covid-19 pandemic has not lessened the risk of a new pandemic occurring.
6. The UK adopts a 'Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario' (RWCS) approach to assess national security risks. The RWCS represents a single, plausible yet challenging manifestation of a risk (high impact, low likelihood), which informs planning and capability building across Government.
7. There are three RWCSs in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) that are relevant to pandemics and the potential risk trajectory for animals and humans: R78 (Pandemic); R79 (Outbreak of an emerging infectious disease); and R80b (Major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza). The impacts of these RWCSs range from significant to catastrophic. These RWCSs are useful to inform generic pandemic preparedness (led by DHSC) and preparedness for high-consequence avian influenza outbreaks on animal health (led by Defra). Further information can be found in Annex B.

¹ DG SRO and Crisis Gold (Director- level) are responsible for providing strategic leadership within DBT in times of crisis.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

8. DHSC is the LGD for planning for and responding to pandemics and emerging infectious diseases in humans and responsible for preparedness and response for the health and care system and supporting this across government. As we saw in Covid-19, a response to a severe pandemic requires a whole of government response.
9. DHSC's new pandemic approach (informed by lessons from Covid-19) focuses on five transmission routes:
 - a. **respiratory**, which includes diseases such as influenza, tuberculosis and Covid-19;
 - b. **oral**, which includes diseases such as typhoid and cholera;
 - c. **sexual/blood**, which includes diseases such as HIV (the last major pandemic before Covid-19) and syphilis;
 - d. **contact**, which includes diseases such as Ebola virus disease;
 - e. **vector**, which includes diseases such as malaria, bubonic plague and Lyme disease.
10. An important element across all five transmission routes will be population behaviour which will impact heavily on government actions. There are ten common public behaviour changes that the UK Health and Safety Agency (UKHSA) expect to be seen during a pandemic (see next page).

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

<p>1) Information seeking behaviours</p>	<p>The uncertainty associated with a novel disease will drive an increase in information-seeking and media monitoring.</p>	<p>6) Pro-social and anti-social behaviours</p>	<p>There is a likelihood of a rise in community-minded behaviours, as well as rule-breaking, stigmatisation of groups and public order issues.</p>
<p>2) Healthcare seeking or avoiding behaviours</p>	<p>An increase in demand for healthcare services, advice and guidance, but also the avoidance of these too, is likely to accompany the emergence of a novel pandemic disease.</p>	<p>7) Behaviours in relation to public health guidance</p>	<p>Public health guidance will be issued regarding hygiene practices that should be followed to reduce the likelihood of transmission of the disease.</p>
<p>3) Behaviours in workplace and education settings</p>	<p>Workplaces and education settings may see an increase in absenteeism and presenteeism, affecting productivity and services.</p>	<p>8) Behaviours in relation to public health and social measures</p>	<p>Public Health and Social Measures (PHSMs) are actions or measures taken by individuals, institutions, communities, local and national governments to reduce the transmission of disease in a pandemic.</p>
<p>4) Travel-related behaviours</p>	<p>People may avoid modes of transportation or crowded spaces perceived to be associated with an increased risk of exposure to a new pandemic disease.</p>	<p>9) Behaviours in relation to test, trace and isolate systems</p>	<p>Test, trace and isolate systems will be needed and compliance with each stage will rely on a range of factors.</p>
<p>5) Consumer-related behaviours</p>	<p>Consumer-related behaviours may change in a future pandemic scenario driven by a real or perceived risk of the disease, and/or a change in the supply of goods and service.</p>	<p>10) Behaviours in relation to vaccination and treatment uptake</p>	<p>Vaccines and antivirals may be used during a pandemic or infectious disease outbreak as an intervention.</p>

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Phases of a Pandemic

11. The below table outlines the conceptual phases of a pandemic, government actions are suggested but these may cut across phases in a real world scenario.

Pandemic Phase	DBT's Role	Key actions for HMG*
<p>Emergence Reliable international or UK intelligence reports the emergence of a known or unknown pathogen with human-to-human transmission and minimal population immunity to the pathogen or strain.</p>	<p>In the first stage of the pandemic, ERCO will need to engage teams to contribute to HMG 'framing' (para. 14, below) and developing a Reasonable Worst Case. Supply chain analysis, business vulnerability analysis, and predictive modelling of economic impact may be required. Business engagement and intelligence structures may begin to be stood up. Vulnerable sectors will need to be identified. DBT should be assessing and developing triggers for moving to an Enduring Response (para. 15-18), if not fully transitioning. In the event of PHSMs being implemented businesses may require bespoke advice (for example how does social distancing occur in different settings etc.). An equality impact assessment should be highlighted to understand where workers are particularly vulnerable.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> surveillance systems activated implementation of public health and social measures (PHSM) and existing countermeasures to contain the spread of infection the pathogen is likely to be identified and treated as a High Consequence Infectious Disease (HCID) standing up structures to coordinate a response structure to co-ordinate R&D including into existing and new countermeasures (including PHSM, therapeutics, vaccines and diagnostics), protecting vulnerable groups and mitigating impact.
<p>Delay and mitigate The pathogen spreads to the wider population and there is evidence of sustained and then widespread community transmission</p>	<p>Significant PHSMs in place. DBT are likely to be delivering Grant and Loan mechanisms. Analysis will be required to understand efficacy of support. Significant business engagement will be required, carried out by Business Engagement Unit and Sector Teams. Utilisation of business sectors to deliver health priorities (vaccines etc.) may require DBT involvement.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> scaling diagnostic testing capacity continued implementation and adaptation of PHSM in response to evidence of effectiveness and the evolving understanding of social and behavioural considerations available therapeutics and vaccines rolled out to priority groups research scaled up including to improve existing and develop new countermeasures (including therapeutics, vaccines and diagnostics)
<p>Recover, Prevent and Prepare There are high levels of population immunity, and sustained levels of low transmission or reduced disease severity</p>	<p>In the final stage support to businesses may still be required. Targeting of support may be focussed on priority sectors. Likely that response structures will begin to be stood down.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> structures that have coordinated the response are stood down, whilst additional recovery structures used and coordinated nationally (for example to conduct de-briefs and identify lessons learned) integration of pandemic-specific surveillance and interventions into routine practice as required, or scaled down or ceased if the health impact has reduced or can be managed structures and interventions may be stood up again in anticipation of further waves of transmission in specific geographic regions research, including evaluation of aspects of the response and evidence synthesis to embed lessons learnt and prevent future outbreaks

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

**there will likely be overlap in the activities and phases, such as, for example, activities to delay and mitigate the spread of a pathogen being considered within the emergence phase*

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Command and Control (C2)- HMG Structures, DBT Role, and Response Phases

12. Teams such as COBR, Cabinet Office's central emergency response team, DBT ERCO, DBT Business Continuity and the Emergency Response Team (ERT) within DBT are designed to respond to the initial **acute crisis response** (2-6 weeks). Experience has shown that for longer term responses different structures are required to utilise a broader range of capabilities within departments and free up crisis response resource for concurrent emergencies.
13. For pandemics there is a significant chance that HMG will need to deliver some form of response for three or more months, this is known as an **enduring response**. COBR has established a 'Pandemic Taskforce Model' which will be activated within 2-4 weeks to co-ordinate the long-term cross-Whitehall response. It is likely that this will take place between Emergence and Delay and Mitigate phases of a pandemic.

Emergence (Acute Crisis Response):

14. It is unlikely that a pandemic would be a 'no notice' event. Instead, it is likely that UKHSA will be tracking a novel pathogen, which if deemed a risk would lead to DHSC activating their response structures (as LGD). At this stage there is likely to be a **framing** process where COBR develop (with others) a document outlining thresholds for further response and likely primary and secondary impacts.
15. DBT will be delivering a response through an ERT which will be stood up by the Emergency Response Co-ordination Team (ERCO) and supported by a cadre of crisis response volunteers (the Emergency Response Group). They will be responsible for co-ordinating Business As Usual (BAU) teams to deliver a response alongside DBT Business Continuity, helping to ensure DBT is feeding into XHMG discussions and that our interests are reflected.

Transition from an acute crisis to enduring response:

16. Transition will require significant input from the Permanent Secretary, ExCo, Response Gold, and HR Director. DBT has a bespoke plan for this, known as the **Enduring Response Operational Guide (EROG)**, which should be referred to.

Delay and Mitigate (Enduring Response):

17. DBT will need to establish new structures which bring in larger number of staff, help to deliver a wider range of activities (with a likely shift away from information capture and analysis, towards delivery), and co-ordinate with new central taskforces.
18. Within Cabinet Office, two new committees supported by a Pandemic Taskforce will be established:
 - a. The Head of the Pandemic Taskforce would report to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Prime Minister.
 - b. The Taskforce would provide the Secretariat for two Cabinet Committees - the **Pandemic (Strategy) Committee**, and the **Pandemic (Operations) Committee**. These will be supported by cross-Whitehall Officials meetings prior to the Ministerial meeting. Membership of these committees will be agreed and published upon the inauguration of the Taskforce.
19. Within the taskforce, there will be an SCS2 (Stability and Equality) with an SCS1 covering Economic Stability who will be a key contact for DBT.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Central Co-Ordination

20. Within DBT, central co-ordination will initially be carried out by the Emergency Response Team (ERT) before shifting to a bespoke Co-Ordination Cell. This process is managed by ERCO.
21. The functions of the ERT/ Co-ordination Cell are:
 - a. Providing governance and co-ordination for all the department's efforts.
 - b. Providing strategic direction to the wider department, drawing together multiple policy work strands and commissioning new work that is needed in response to events or Cabinet office commissions.
 - c. Co-ordinating engagement with the centre (either COBR or new structures) by briefing seniors, tracking actions and commissions from the centre, and coordinating DBT's contributions to centrally held situational awareness.
 - d. Maintaining the department's 'Single Version of the Truth' through information collection from across the department and communicate this through SitReps etc.
 - e. Co-ordinating corporate functions such as communications, Parliamentary and public engagement (FOIs, PQs etc.) which are relevant to the response.
 - f. Keeping ExCo and other seniors updated.

DBT Pandemic Playbook

22. Although it is difficult to exactly predict the nature of any pandemic, there are certain tools and capabilities which DBT can expect to have to use.
23. There are draft objectives which DBT could seek to achieve during any pandemic response. **These are proposed objectives and should be amended based on the specifics of any pandemic response:**
- a. **Capture information picture to understand, articulate and communicate impacts** of the pandemic and government actions on UK businesses, consumers, supply chains, trade, and workers through utilisation of data analysis, and business intelligence networks.
 - b. **Design, implement, and evaluate support and mitigation measures** to UK businesses and consumers to reduce economic harm, ensuring support is flexible to real world impacts; and disproportionate impacts fully considered through equality impact assessment.
 - c. **Enable collaboration with businesses** to provide solutions and support to HMG efforts to combat the pandemic.
 - d. **Ensure DBT staff are safe and supported** in the UK and overseas during the pandemic.
24. These should be amended, depending on when the specific pandemic scenario and response. The below table outlines how these objectives should be delivered.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Objective	Teams	Description	Covid Examples
<p><i>Objective. 1</i></p> <p>Capture information picture to understand, articulate and communicate impacts of the pandemic and government actions on UK businesses, consumers, supply chains, trade, and workers through utilisation of data analysis, and business intelligence networks.</p>	<p>Business Intelligence, Sector Teams, Healthcare UK, Life Sciences, Advisory Service, Exports Directorate, ISTR, SBG, National Security Team, Office for Product Safety and Standards</p>	<p>Within any response it will be vital to collate a unified information picture based upon business intelligence and analysis.</p> <p>During a pandemic, the Business Intelligence Unit will commission and collate information from teams engaging with businesses to understand the real-time impact of the pandemic and government mitigation actions.</p> <p>Sector teams, HCUK, Life Sciences, Advisory Service, and regional/ international teams will collect business intelligence through existing engagement mechanisms. The National Security team will provide intelligence on supply chains and global contexts.</p> <p>Analysis will be co-ordinated by the Analysis Directorate to avoid duplication and ensure join-up across DG group analysis teams. Analytical input would be required from teams embedded within policy areas. Analytical teams in ESTR, Employment Rights Directorate and Business Group being especially impacted.</p>	<p>As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, the Business Intelligence Unit (BIU) played a critical role in gathering real-time intelligence on how businesses across different sectors and regions were being impacted. The BIU commissioned sector teams, international trade advisors, regional teams like the Cities and Local Growth Unit, and other engagement mechanisms to collect insights from their interactions with businesses. This intelligence was then collated into weekly reports for ministers, officials, and policy teams to understand evolving impacts and inform the government's operational response. The National Security team also provided assessments on essential supply chains and global contexts. During the crisis, the BIU exemplified DBT's ability to rapidly build new capabilities to meet emerging needs.</p>
<p><i>Objective. 2.</i></p> <p>Design, implement, and evaluate support and mitigation measures to UK businesses and consumers to reduce economic harm, ensuring support is flexible to real world impacts; and disproportionate impacts fully considered through equality impact assessment.</p>	<p>Grants Delivery Directorate, Business Growth Directorate, Sector Teams, Business Support Policy, Export Digital Enquiry Service, Employment Rights</p>	<p>Support to ensure businesses stay viable are likely to be required. Subject to the nature of disruption, Grants and Loans teams may need to be stood up at national and local level to establish optimal support mechanisms. Feedback loops will need to be established to ensure support is targeted most effectively, this will include analysis, intelligence, and regional inputs. Finance teams and broader expertise (fraud etc.) will be required to support delivery.</p> <p>Teams like Business Support Policy and EDES will provide direct advice and guidance to businesses. For example on how to implement PHSMs.</p> <p>Employment Rights teams will need to provide advice and guidance to ensure that workers are protected including supporting any legislative measure.</p> <p>All DBT support proposals, as well as any sector facing advice must fully consider disproportionate impacts including worker</p>	<p>With businesses facing severe cash flow disruptions, DBT utilized its expertise in grants and lending to provide economic relief. The Grants Delivery Directorate quickly set up and administered several grant schemes totalling £22.6 billion for 1.4 million businesses, delivered through local authorities. In parallel, the Business Growth Directorate and British Business Bank led efforts to encourage greater lending to companies through large-scale financing programs. Sector teams engaged industries to gather feedback and ensure support met their specific needs. The Business Support Policy team and Export Digital Enquiry Service also provided direct guidance to businesses navigating the tumultuous landscape. DBT's employment rights experts worked across government on policies like furlough schemes to support workers impacted by lockdowns and workplace disruptions.</p>

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Objective	Teams	Description	Covid Examples
		vulnerability across sectors; Ministerial advice must include public sector equality duty assessment.	
<p><i>Objective. 3.</i></p> <p>Enable collaboration with businesses to provide solutions and support to HMG efforts to combat the pandemic.</p>	Sector Teams, OPSS, Employment Rights Directorate, Chemicals	<p>Collaboration with businesses may be vital in delivering health priorities such as vaccine development, sourcing of PPE and medical equipment etc.</p> <p>Sector teams and the Business Engagement Unit will be vital for providing communication channels to businesses for this. OPSS can introduce regulatory easements for critical products like PPE. Competition Policy can enable greater business collaboration to exempt from competition law. International and supply chain teams will be key for identifying key products or 'critical' goods which may be required, some of these may be novel or new products.</p>	<p>Maintaining close collaboration with the private sector was vital for addressing key priorities during the pandemic response. Sector teams served as the main conduit, working with companies and trade groups to communicate needs around essential products like PPE, ventilators, and medical supplies. The Office for Product Safety and Standards introduced temporary regulatory easements to accelerate supply while still ensuring safe products reached the market. Competition authorities utilized exemptions and interventions to facilitate greater business cooperation that may have otherwise violated competition law. Teams also coordinated with industries on enacting public health measures like social distancing within their operations. This public-private partnership exemplified DBT's role in convening industry to address national challenges.</p>
<p><i>Objective. 4.</i></p> <p>Ensure DBT staff are safe and supported in the UK and overseas during the pandemic.</p>	HR	Protecting staff and ensuring they are safe will be vital for any pandemic response. This will need to be led by the Chief Operating Officer within DBT. This could include repatriating staff, changing office conditions (social distancing etc.) or enabling working from home etc.	<p>With DBT employees on the frontlines of the pandemic response while also facing disruptions in their personal lives, providing assistance and services to support staff well-being became paramount. The HR Operations team, including HR Advisory, Health & Wellbeing, and Payroll & Pensions, took the lead in this effort. They advised managers, implemented work-from-home policies and equipment provisions, conducted personal risk assessments for vulnerable employees, shared wellbeing resources, and ensured continuity of payroll. The Business Continuity and Estates teams also played a role in enabling DBT to continue operating effectively and safely despite the challenging conditions brought on by COVID-19. Supporting the department's workforce was critical for sustaining DBT's broader emergency response efforts.</p>

The role of DBT analysts during a pandemic

25. Across all 3 phases of the pandemic, analysts will integrate data from various sources, build econometric forecasting models, produce frameworks and dashboards to inform decisions, and ultimately evaluate their own work. Their role will evolve from initial risk assessment to impact mitigation to recovery/restructuring - providing structured decision-support while ensuring better preparedness.
26. **As per the Analysis Ways of Working, analysis will be required to happen across teams before being co-ordinated and brought together in order to avoid duplication and provide join up across the department and HMG.**
27. In the **Emergence Phase** sector teams and experts alongside BI, BCP, SCI&A and GSCIP analysts will play a crucial role in developing critical supply chain mapping and modelling to identify potential chokepoints, dependencies, and economic impacts. While maintaining existing tools such as the **DBT Vulnerability Framework Product Report Cards**. Access can be obtained by completing this: [Access Form](#)
28. Efforts would focus on balancing goods needed for the pandemic response versus keeping economic activity going. Teams will need to scope additional data requirements and secure access to datasets as required. There should be coordination and alignment of analytical workstreams across departments to ensure a shared and commonly agreed evidence base.
29. As the response moves into the **Delay and Mitigate phase**, analysts will need to assess which goods can shift to domestic production versus imports. Modelling the impacts of interventions and public compliance is important, as well as identifying priority companies and sectors for potential government support. Examining policies of other countries would allow for better international coordination.
30. In the **Recovery phase**, analysts will evaluate longer-term impacts - analysing workforce gaps using BIA and BCP internal data, hardest hit regions/sectors, and whether any economic, structural and behavioural changes are permanent. They may assess opportunities for reshoring supply chains and high-profit products determining if fundamental economic shocks occurred that require restructuring. Collaboration between business facing teams and analysts will be needed in order to form a coherent common picture this is due to business facing teams having access to real time business intelligence that is coming in. Analysing policy response will also be needed in this phase to gauge value for money.
31. It is worth noting that the emergence phase will be a peak period of uncertainty, and there will be a very high demand for analysis. This analysis will often draw from partial information sources. The availability of data is likely to improve in subsequent phases, and the focus of the analysis will likely shift to increased emphasis on appraisal of policy responses.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Team Capabilities [To be Updated]

Business Intelligence

32. Business Intelligence will be required to commission and collate information provided by teams engaging with business. This will need to be responsive to real world events and adaptive to capture intel on the impact of any government mitigating actions etc. (see later points for Advice in Business Support section).
33. Business Intelligence will be responsible for collating this information and reporting intelligence to Ministers, senior officials and relevant policy, analytical and response teams across government.
34. It is likely that the BIU would require resource to be surged in to deal with increased demand. Sufficient capacity for business facing colleagues to engage with businesses and report back intel gathered a key dependency.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

35. The BEIS Business Intelligence Team was created at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, providing a weekly overview of how businesses across different sectors across the economy, regions and the DAs were being impacted by the pandemic.
36. The DIT Business Intelligence Unit provided regular Covid-19 specific business intelligence reports based on the intelligence sourced from the DIT network's interactions with businesses (investment and export promotion) and intelligence on overseas market conditions impacting DIT equities (from HMTC network).
37. The BI reports were utilised to understand impacts on businesses of the evolving situation in close to real time in order to inform policy and operational response.

Sector Teams

38. Sector teams will collect intelligence from business and ensure that HMG messages are relayed out. Sector teams will engage with industry helping to articulate the specific issues faced within HMG decision making and mitigation design whilst also helping to translate government action into the specifics of each sector. There may be issues around enhanced Health and Safety, requirements for PPE, regional restrictions etc. Reporting of intelligence gathered from engagement with industry will be done by the Business Intelligence team (see previous point) to support policy development and inform advice to business.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

39. Retail sector team established specific new engagement mechanisms during Covid. This included specific Local Authority/MHCLG/Business roundtables. Retail sector teams set up Ministerial roundtables with frequency reflecting urgency and need alongside the Retail Sector Council and re-opening groups.
40. Sector teams established a group comprising public health teams, enforcement bodies and policy makers to develop guidance.
41. Determination of "essential" goods if limitations are placed on sale. Continuity of supply and working closely with Defra on food security.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Healthcare UK (HCUK)

42. HCUK contributed as per advice from HCUK sponsors (DHSC / NHS) noting limitations also of DBT funded resource. Healthcare UK to contribute as per advice from HCUK sponsors (DHSC / NHS) noting limitations also of DBT funded resource.

Covid Examples / Interventions

43. Engaged with overseas network on products advised as essential (during Covid this was PPE and ventilators) by DHSC.

Life Sciences

44. Life Sciences contribute to business engagement and business intelligence via relationships with account managed businesses or relationship managed sectoral organisations. Some engagement likely to be in coordination with Posts (where engagements with global HQs required) or OGDs. Life Sciences contribute to business engagement and business intelligence via relationships with account managed businesses or relationship managed sectoral organisations. Some engagement likely to be in coordination with Posts.

Advisory Service

45. The Advisory Service is a team of international trade advisers (ITAs) who provide export support to businesses across England (the service currently excludes London and the nations). ITAs work with an account manage a large number of companies.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

46. The Advisory Service provided a range of case studies for use across government about how their clients were responding to the pandemic. ITA's can sign post their clients towards the relevant government and local support to help them manage their business.
47. They provided ongoing support to help companies continue to trade throughout the pandemic.
48. Advisors provided real time business intelligence about how businesses were coping and what their main issues were.

Exports Directorate

49. The Export Digital Enquiry Service (EDES) could be a point of contact if a pandemic of any nature broke out in the UK, the team could be a point of contact if export rules change, and restrictions are placed on certain products originating from the UK.
50. The Export Digital Enquiry Service (EDES) can be a point of contact for companies if a pandemic impacts international business, operations can support businesses by triaging enquiries via its webpage. The team can either respond directly using approved lines or direct them to the right team without DBT. It can also help by tracking the types of requests helping to highlight common issues by using a ticketing system and formally 'tag' themes within business questions and responses.

International Strategy and Trade Relations team (ISTR)

51. Co-ordinate international reporting from post helping to answer international queries. ISTR will hold the relationship with FCDO, DBT overseas networks, and any necessary contacts with foreign governments (including embassies). They will use these contacts and information to deploy to support HMG response.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

52. ISTR will need to input any regional updates, either through their regional knowledge or connections with the HMTC network.
53. ERCO will coordinate briefing in the majority of cases with ISTR acting as the cross cutting 'policy brain' on inputs. Where an issue is on a specific policy area, the relevant team will brief directly. the issue at hand.
54. If there is a role to engage with business, this should be managed by the relevant sector/BE teams, with ISTR feeding in.

National Security Team

55. There may be significant elements of concurrent national security risks which impact upon Governments ability to respond, or a requirement to utilise intelligence structures to understand supply chains and global contexts.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Sector Analysis

72. Sector analysis will be vital for providing insights into the impact of a pandemic on specific sectors and should inform decisions around restrictions, financial support, and broader decision made by HMG.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

- 73. During Covid, Sector Analysis extended previous sector vulnerability work to cover the intersection of EU-exit and Covid-19 on sectors. This was joint with ESA analysis team and included place-based impacts based on criteria of potential impact. ESA still hold these legacy regional impacts analysis frameworks, but the Economic Shocks team are reviewing these for local economic impacts of shocks.
- 74. Collated external reports from accountancies, trade groups, consultancies, think tanks & other organisations on the business impacts of Government Policy, covid, Future Economy, EU Exit and Russia-Ukraine
- 75. Collected raw intel of aerospace and aviation support being offered by governments during the pandemic
- 76. Created summary slides of government support from USA, France, Germany, Brazil, Singapore.
- 77. Assessed the impact of Covid on the sector's finance and resilience using Experian data, financial modelling and interviews with key stake holders.

OPSS

- 78. During live incidents or emergencies, OPSS produce a weekly Situation Report based on recent incident related activities. Information contained will vary depending on the nature of the incident but may include a summary of activity undertaken and summary data.
- 79. OPSS has policy ownership for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to ensure safe and effective products are placed on the GB market by requiring manufacturers to show how their products meet the 'essential health and safety requirements'. For PPE intended for workplace use, HSE is the enforcement authority. Local trading standards authorities enforce in relation to PPE retained for private use or consumption.
- 80. The Product Regulation and Metrology (PRAM) Bill will provide for an enabling power that will allow Government, in response to an emergency, whilst maintaining high safety standards, temporarily disapply or modify product regulations, thereby providing an expediated process by which critical products are able to reach the market, in order to sustain the adequate supply of such products.
- 81. OPSS has policy ownership and is the regulator of face masks (products that claim 'protection', placing these PPE category), face coverings (under General Product Safety Regulations 2005 and enforcement by local authorities).
- 82. OPSS's role in hand sanitisers extend only to hand sanitisers that are considered to be cosmetic products (products primarily used to clean, protect, and condition skin or any other cosmetic enhancement while providing a secondary antimicrobial effect). HSE are the policy and enforcement owners of hand sanitisers if considered biocides (products primarily claiming to kill germs, disinfect or sanitise using an active antimicrobial ingredient such as the hand sanitisers used in hospitals).
- 83. OPSS chairs the National Regulators Forum to build operational-level relationships with national regulators, enabling exchange of challenges, best practices, and opportunities. This activity is underpinned by the Regulation on Accreditation and Market Surveillance No 765/2008 ("RAMS") (Article 25).

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

84. OPSS supports Local Authorities across the UK at their ports and borders to enhance their capacity and capability to take action to detect, deter and disrupt trade in unsafe and non-compliant goods.
85. Competition Policy levers e.g., Block Exemption Orders, and Public Policy Exclusion Orders would enable greater collaboration and co-ordination between businesses by exempting them from prohibitions under competition law.
86. Public Interest Interventions would enable Ministers to intervene and approve, or block, merger transactions which fall under specific criteria. These would enable greater Government control over specific transactions, enabling faster consolidation if required.
87. All of these could be delivered via secondary legislation. Sector teams provide expert knowledge and a feedback loop with business.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

88. OPSS Produced daily / weekly Situation Reports as required.
89. OPSS introduced regulatory easements designed to facilitate the production and supply of essential Covid related PPE. To support the easements, OPSS wrote to key stakeholders and issued guidance for businesses.
90. OPSS also facilitated coordination between the key regulators initiating a Regulatory Coordination Cell.
91. OPSS initiated Operation Safeguard - a risk based, and intelligence led enforcement operation at UK ports that provided support to local authority Trading Standards teams dealing with non-compliant PPE.
92. Competition law exclusion orders relating to coronavirus (COVID-19) - GOV.UK
93. A new PII was created relating to responding to public health emergencies (enterprise-act-2002-guidance-merger.pdf)

Grants

94. The protracted nature of a pandemic response may mean that grant delivery starts relatively soon during a response and continues throughout including through the recovery phase. The Grant Delivery Directorate (GDD) owns capabilities which have been used for Covid 19 and during flooding recovery and has connections with MHCLG and Local Authorities. They possess the required specialist expertise for the development of new schemes, overseeing delivery of schemes full lifecycle & providing guidance on application requirements, due diligence, monitoring to ensure outcomes are met, reconciliation, assurance, and recovery of HMG funds as necessary, thereby ensuring DBT meets all Cabinet Office Grant functional standards.
95. The GDD works closely with the Government Grant Management Function (GGMF) within Cabinet Office to remain compliant with GOVS15 Functional Standard for Grants and the Grants Functional Blueprint. It is likely that GDD will require specialist resource to be surged in to deal with increased demand. Key ministerial direction will be needed on the risk appetite for schemes in order to balance the trade-off between speed and assurance (for example on the levels of fraud which are acceptable). Monitoring and assurance checks will also be required to ensure that grants are having the desired impact and to inform any amendments.
96. Local authorities have the local knowledge on businesses in their area and are therefore likely to remain a critical delivery partner in the business support element of any future pandemic response. S31 Local Government Act 2003 vires provides the mechanism for such delivery. Grants & Loans Analysis Team created the Project Birch toolkit analysis toolkit to quickly appraise mixture of emergency grant and loan support for significant

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

struggling businesses. Enabled BCR calcs for economic case to determine potential max grant size. This is a legacy product.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

97. 8 grant schemes were administered by local authorities across England operating at different times between March 2020 and March 2022 in response to national and local restrictions, to support businesses with their non-wage costs and safeguard their survival.
98. Initial schemes reached a broad mix of sectors, whilst later schemes were more focused on the industries that were most disrupted.
99. £22.6bn in grants was paid to an estimated 1.4 million businesses.
100. DBT published an evaluation report in October 2024 on Gov.UK. The report by Ipsos UK, Steer Economic Development, and George Barrett incorporates a process, impact, and economic evaluation of these schemes. Local Authority COVID-19 Business Support Grants: evaluation report - GOV.UK

Business Growth Directorate (specifically the SME Finance and British Business Bank)

101. During a pandemic it is likely a reduction in trading impacting companies' finances and cash flow, meaning a greater need to borrow at the same time as lenders/investors would ordinarily be less likely to be willing to lend. Therefore, a large-scale programme to encourage lending/investing would likely be needed to stave off large scale insolvencies amongst businesses. This would likely be the case both during response and recovery.
102. This will be led through the Business Growth Directorate (specifically the SME Finance and British Business Bank).
103. In designing any loan scheme, the team would ensure that they minimise any losses from the scheme and potential for fraud, which are likely to be higher than usual due to tight turnaround on setting up such a scheme. This could be done through requiring that borrower checks are done or sharing data with or between lenders to allow identification of fraudulent applications such as applying when the borrower has already received a loan. For any fraud and irregularities that are detected, Counter Fraud team would deploy various tools to identify, and maximise recovery of, irregular payments or funds obtained through fraud. These would cover things such as data analytics, a post-claims assurance process and regular audits, and working with enforcement partners to make recoveries against serious fraud.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLs)

104. The Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLs) was launched in May 2020 and was introduced to help smaller businesses impacted by coronavirus. It aimed to assist businesses to borrow between £2,000 up to 25% of a business' turnover, and the maximum amount available was £50,000.
105. The Government covered any interest payable in the first 12 months through a Business Interruption Payment to the lender, and lender benefited from a 100% government-backed guarantee.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

106. The interest was set at 2.5% per annum and the repayment term is fixed at six years. No repayments were due during the first 12 months. Businesses remain 100% liable to repay the full loan amount, as well as interest, after the first year.

BBL Pay as You Grow:

107. In September 2020, 'Pay As You Grow' measures for borrowers came into play who accessed the Bounce Back Loan Scheme. These measures provided borrowers with the option to:
108. Extend the length of the loan from six years to ten, at the same fixed interest rate of 2.5%.
109. Make interest-only payments for six months, with the option to use this up to three times throughout the term of the loan.
110. Request a six-month repayment holiday once during the term of the loan.
111. Businesses used these options either individually or in combination with each other, as well as having the option to fully repay the loan early and face no early repayment charges for doing so.

Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS)

112. The Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan scheme (CBILS) was launched on 23 March 2020 in response to the unprecedented financial challenges many businesses found themselves in during the Covid-19 pandemic. The scheme closed to new applications on 31 March 2021. Scheme features:
113. The maximum value of a facility provided under the scheme was £5m, available on repayment terms of up to six years.
114. Invoice finance and asset finance facilities were available from £1k to £5m on terms up to three years. Loans and revolving credit facilities were available from £50k to £5m on terms up to six years.
115. No guarantee fee for SMEs to access the scheme. Lenders paid a fee to access the scheme.
116. The Government made a Business Interruption Payment (BIP) to cover the first 12 months of interest payments and any lender-levied fees, so smaller businesses benefited from no upfront costs and lower initial repayments.
117. The scheme provided the lender with a government-backed, partial guarantee (80% against the outstanding facility balance).
118. Personal guarantees of any form were not permitted under the scheme for any facilities below £250k. A borrower's/guarantor's Principle Private Residence could not be taken as security to support a personal guarantee or as security for a CBIL backed facility.

Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS)

119. The Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS) was launched on 20 April 2020 and closed to new applications on 31 March 2021. Scheme features:
120. CLBILS provided facilities of up to £200m. The scheme supported term loans, revolving credit facilities (including overdrafts), invoice finance and asset finance facilities.
121. Loan had terms of up to three years, but lenders were allowed to make variations to the loan and extend up to 6 years from the initial drawn down date.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

122. Companies borrowing more than £50m through CLBILS were subject to further restrictions on dividend payments, senior pay, and share buy-backs during the period of the loan.

Future Fund

123. The Future Fund was established to ensure a flow of capital, at the height of the pandemic, to companies that typically rely on equity investment and were unable to access government support schemes because they were pre-revenue or pre-profit.
124. Funding was available from £125,000 to £5 million, subject to at least equal match funding from private investors.
125. The investment took the form of convertible loans, which convert into equity when the company raises further capital. If the company had not undergone a conversion event within 3 years, the loan matures.
126. In 2022, Ministers agreed to permit eligible companies to extend their loan by 2 further years.

Business Support Policy

127. The Business Support Policy team supports domestic businesses with advice and guidance and would be required to deliver services directly to businesses for example through the Business Support Service which is a front-line contractor led phone service (including a crisis response mechanism which can be stood up if required). The Business Support Service is also accessible through email, webchat and social media, with a WhatsApp channel planned for 2025.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

128. Business Support Service (then called the Business Support Helpline in BEIS) – at the start of the pandemic, the Business Support Service's Emergency Response Plan was enabled, and the service was scaled up by 85 advisers (against a usual FTE of 16) to meet the sudden and unprecedented demand, which increased from around 500 contacts per week, to around 3,000 (in the first weeks). Advisers were ringfenced to deal with COVID specific enquiries. The supplier engaged a sub-contractor to take overspill contacts. This added a further 20 advisers. BEIS also called off Serco from the relevant framework for further adviser support.
129. A key learning was the consistent flow of up-to-date and cleared information from the centre, which proved critical to ensuring businesses had the most accurate details of initiatives, government interventions, guidelines and regulations. Many of these were changing daily.
130. The Business Support Helpline number was published and the service received calls from businesses who could help. Advisors took details, recorded them on a spreadsheet and shared the sheet with BEIS and DHSC. This was for a limited time until a specific number / email was created for businesses to contact about ventilators.
131. Any outreach required to business on products DHSC have identified as essential. In the covid pandemic HCUK acted as a first stop for enquiries and produced a newsletter for industry.
132. Working with the overseas network to check reliability of companies, then check availability of products and whether they met the criteria needed, using guidance produced by DHSC.
133. Business engagement UK and international was part of the Covid response.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

134. Sharing information and advice with UK operating businesses was part of the Covid response.

Employment Rights

135. The Employment Rights team would be responsible for any Employment Rights issues that came up as a result of pandemic interventions, such as (but not limited to) interactions with policies such as the furlough scheme; self-isolating/household isolation; parental leave due to schools/early years closures; annual leave impacts on busy industries, volunteering leave. Some of these issues, will require primary and emergency legislation, some will be contributions to non-legislative policy interventions or guidance. Ministers would need to approve these policy decisions, working often with their xWH counterparts and potentially seeking collective agreement.
136. They also have operational elements that need to be considered, e.g. sponsoring ACAS who run a helpline for employees and employers which is likely to get extremely busy/potentially overwhelmed by any workplace-based restrictions. There is also an operational element (EAS) whose work may be interrupted by any social distancing restrictions/workplace closures.
137. There are significant xWH policies which the team have a direct interest in, but do not hold policy levers for, such as Statutory Sick Pay (in the event of having to self-isolate for infection or risk of infection) and with HSE in terms of workplace safety.
138. Engagement with xWH partners would be critical, as would engagement with Unions and Business Representatives.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

139. Labour Markets Directorate (as was, now ERD) was responsible for a wide variety of work during the Covid 19 Pandemic. There were legislative changes, such as the change to enable those in Covid hit industries to make changes to their annual leave provisions for those work forces that could not accommodate the usual annual leave due to an influx of demand, e.g. healthcare workers, supermarket workers etc were able to roll over more leave in to the following year to ensure that those workforces could be maintained.
140. There was also extensive work to be done on the policy interactions with the furlough scheme (run by HMT) and various employment rights, e.g. things like people returning from or going on parental leave.
141. There was a lot of cross Government work on things like SSP which was a very urgent issue for things like receiving SSP for self-isolation but also issues like when SSP would kick in which disincentivised low paid workers from staying home if they were symptomatic or believed they had been exposed. LM also supported a substantial effort of collaborating with both Unions and Businesses which was critical to getting policy decisions made in quick time.
142. There were also operational considerations, particularly around ACAS and the ability for the ACAS helpline to provide the right level of service at a time of hugely increased demand. There was also a high risk of things like large scale redundancies etc due to the pressures of the economic situation. LM at the time also did extensive analytical work on the impacts of the crisis and interventions on the labour market itself, supporting ExCo etc.
143. In terms of resources and capability, LM was a much smaller Directorate and was a recipient of the mobilisation that occurred in 2020 and brought in a lot of staff to help support the policy work needed. (now) ERD has grown substantially since the general election due to ministerial ambition in this area. However, they are already working at

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

maximum capacity, so if they were to be able to support a similar type of effort, they would need to seek Ministerial agreement to pause all of our existing work to allow for it.

Chemicals

144. CNI Chemicals sites (there are 15 under DBT's LGD remit) are designated on risk to life (i.e. should toxic liquid gases be released in the event of a malicious attack) not on the basis of provision of an essential service. Accordingly, it is not a CNI requirement that sites remain running during a pandemic. Emergency response plans would apply in the event of a malicious attack.
145. Non-malicious incidents (i.e. accidents and hazards) at all COMAH sites (1000+ sites which includes but is not limited to CNI Chemical sites) form a separate NSRA risk and are managed by HSE, not DBT. However, ERCO would be informed of such incidents should they occur at a CNI Chemical site, per emergency response plan protocol for these sites.
146. While some CNI Chemical sites may form part of the broader supply chains for other CNI sectors, their upstream supply chains do not form part of DBT's CNI remit – relevant LGDs are responsible for ensuring the resilience of their CNI supply chains.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

147. Chemical sector as a whole were designated as key workers during Covid.

HR

148. HR Operations Team will be heavily involved in supporting staff throughout the response and who may be suffering from the direct impacts of the emergency, BCP's will show mitigations and minimum staffing levels and locations. The HR Operations team would be responsible for delivering HR operational services for DBT. HR Ops has three main functions, HR Advisory & Casework Service, Health & Wellbeing, and Payroll & Pensions. This could include supporting Line Managers, delivering wellbeing, and supporting staff overseas.

Covid Examples / Interventions:

149. Provided front line HR advice to DIT employees in line with Government Guidance
150. Was part of a COO working group to ensure that policies and processes were in place to support staff
151. developed a WFH equipment offer with H&S colleagues.
152. supported individuals who needed to work from the office for wellbeing/personal or they were deemed critical workers, when it was advised to work from home.
153. Worked closely with COO colleagues to ensure where individuals had developed symptoms for COVID/had accessed the office, that a deep clean process were carried out and individuals/seniors had been notified.
154. Developed a Personal Risk Assessment process, to support/protect those individuals who were most vulnerable to COVID, which helped assess their suitability for returning to the office aligned to Government guidance at the time.
155. Part of wider Civil Service Networks on various initiatives e.g. Lateral Flow testing/centres
156. Signposted the departments wellbeing offer at key stages throughout, ranging from loneliness through to building resilience and a range of support service.

Annex A: Departmental Roles & Responsibilities

Organisation	Roles & Responsibilities
<p data-bbox="266 436 526 468">DHSC (and UKHSA)</p> <div data-bbox="289 499 418 632">  <p>Department of Health & Social Care</p> </div> <div data-bbox="289 772 399 911">  <p>UK Health Security Agency</p> </div>	<p data-bbox="612 436 1325 499">DHSC is the LGD for pandemics and the UK health and social care sectors.</p> <p data-bbox="612 520 1356 680">DHSC will be responsible for mitigations to human health and clinical countermeasures including vaccines, testing, laboratory capacity, and PPE. DHSC will undertake preparedness and readiness work for different transmission scenarios.</p> <p data-bbox="612 701 1344 798">UKHSA will work closely with global organisations (and other departments as required) to assess the available information and the risks posed to public health.</p> <p data-bbox="612 819 1305 915">UKHSA will refresh contingency planning and consider outbreak management protocols including contact tracing and management and testing capacity.</p> <p data-bbox="612 936 1312 1033">UKHSA will scale diagnostic capability and laboratory capacity and work to enhance the digital infrastructure necessary to enable rapid expansion of diagnostic testing.</p>
<p data-bbox="266 1081 451 1113">Cabinet Office</p> <div data-bbox="277 1165 548 1262">  <p>COBR Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms</p> </div>	<p data-bbox="612 1081 1308 1211">COBR Unit is responsible for coordinating the cross-Government response to significant and catastrophic emergencies. COBR Unit will convene and secretariat COBR meetings and formally activate SAGE.</p> <p data-bbox="612 1232 1351 1425">COBR Unit will establish a rhythm of briefings to senior officials and Ministers about an emerging infectious disease that poses a risk to the UK. COBR Unit manage Continuity of Government as well as Continuity if Crisis Management plans which may become relevant if there are considerable workforce absences.</p> <p data-bbox="612 1446 1352 1543">COBR Unit will be responsible for developing and, if required, establishing a Pandemic Taskforce to oversee the longer term governance of an enduring response.</p> <p data-bbox="612 1619 1339 1715">The National Situation Centre will develop a dashboard, acquire, analyse and visualise data to support the pandemic response.</p>

<p>Defra (and APHA)</p>  <p>Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs</p>  <p>Animal & Plant Health Agency</p>	<p>Defra are the LGD for animal diseases.</p> <p>Supported by APHA, Defra will be responsible for leading the HMG response during the early phases of escalation in the event of a zoonotic or emerging animal disease.</p> <p>Defra and APHA will be responsible for engaging internationally on animal health intelligence, planning and implementing animal health control measures, leading UK risk assessment for animal diseases.</p> <p>Defra is also responsible for managing any impacts of a pandemic on the UK agriculture, food and water sectors.</p>
<p>Government Office for Science</p>  <p>Government Office for Science</p>	<p>Go-Science are responsible for coordinating and cohering scientific advice across government.</p> <p>Go-Science will convene and secretariat SAGE meetings to support Ministers in enhancing UK preparedness for emerging infectious disease and responding to the impacts of the pandemic.</p> <p>Go-Science will consider convening a Precautionary-SAGE (Pre-SAGE) meeting to agree key science questions and knowledge gaps related to an outbreak.</p> <p>Go-Science will also develop a core science brief to help ensure agreement on science issues, minimise the duplication of effort and allow consistency of science advice.</p>
<p>Food Standards Agency</p>  <p>Food Standards Agency food.gov.uk</p>	<p>The FSA are responsible for safeguarding public health and protecting the interests of consumers in relation to food.</p> <p>The FSA will develop and publish food safety rapid risk assessments as required.</p>
<p>Department for Transport</p>  <p>Department for Transport</p>	<p>DfT is the LGD for the UK transport sector.</p> <p>DfT will be responsible for managing the impacts of the pandemic on UK transport systems, including aviation, rail, buses and roads.</p>
<p>Home Office (and Border Force)</p>  <p>Home Office</p>	<p>HO is the LGD for the management of the UK border.</p> <p>HO (with Border Force) will be responsible for managing any impacts of the pandemic on UK domestic security and the integrity of the border, as well as implementing any necessary border checks and restrictions (such as the passenger locator form).</p>

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

 Border Force	
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office  Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office	<p>FCDO is the LGD for international relations and overseas risks.</p> <p>FCDO will be responsible for supporting British nationals overseas impacted by the pandemic, and supporting international engagement throughout the response.</p>
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government  Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government	<p>MHCLG is the LGD for local resilience.</p> <p>MHCLG will be responsible for coordinating support to LRFs and local government, and standing up any necessary reception arrangements or other support to British nationals returning to the UK from overseas.</p>
HM Treasury  HM Treasury	<p>HMT is the LGD for government spending, the financial sector, and economic interventions to the UK economy.</p> <p>HMT will be responsible for designing and delivering any necessary economic support packages and supporting the UK financial sector during an enduring pandemic.</p> <p>HMT will also be responsible for approving business cases as need for e.g. clinical countermeasures, diagnostics, therapeutics or vaccines as well as other departmental spending priorities.</p>
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero  Department for Energy Security & Net Zero	<p>DESNZ is the LGD for the UK energy sector.</p> <p>DESNZ will be responsible for ensuring continuity of electricity, gas and fuel supply and managing any disruption to the sector caused by workforce absences.</p>
Department for Education  Department for Education	<p>DfE is the LGD for the education sector.</p> <p>DfE will be responsible for managing impacts of the pandemic on schools, colleges and universities and ensuring continuity of children's social care.</p>
Ministry of Justice	<p>MoJ is the LGD for the justice system.</p> <p>MoJ will be responsible for managing impacts of the</p>

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY
OR MINISTERS

 Ministry of Justice	pandemic on the prison estate, and the court system.
---	--


DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

Annex B: NSRA Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios

NSRA - R78 - Pandemic

Description (scenario)

Pandemics are the result of a novel pathogen (organisms, including viruses, bacteria, fungi, uni and multicellular eukaryotes that cause disease) emerging and spreading quickly around the world due to lack of population immunity. Once the pathogen emerges it will be important to understand the spread, transmission, symptoms, severity, immunity, treatments and healthcare pathways.



The reasonable worst-case scenario is an unmitigated pandemic with an unassumed transmission route and a high attack rate, with 4% of symptomatic infections requiring hospital care and a case fatality ratio of 2.5%. It may come in single or multiple waves. Wave number depends on the characteristics of the disease, public behaviour, and government intervention. The RWCS assumes 50% of the UK’s population fall ill during the whole course of the pandemic, with around 1.34 million people requiring hospital treatment and approximately 840,000 deaths.

Key assumptions

Each pandemic is unique and will be impossible to predict when it will occur. Impacts on society depend on many different factors - transmission route, severity of disease, global travel and distribution of morbidity and mortality. The RWCS is an unmitigated pandemic and does not assume that behaviour change or government interventions are successful at reducing transmission.

Impact Dimension	Overall Score	Total Score
Behavioural	5	10/10
Economy	5	5/5
Environment	0	0/5
Essential Services	5	35/45
Human Welfare	5	30/35
International Order	5	10/25
Security	5	13/20
Final Impact Score	5	103/145

Variations

Each pandemic and the characteristics of the pathogen, its transmission route, where and the time of year it emerges, and its impact on society are different. Variations include a novel enterovirus pandemic, a novel coronavirus pandemic and novel sexually transmitted infection pandemic.

Response capability requirements

Disease surveillance and early detection, including timely and reliable data is needed. There should be procedures to support the identification and isolation of suspected cases and scalable contact tracing, as well as rapid development and procurement of pharmaceutical countermeasures with stockpiled countermeasures for known pandemic threats. Local and

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY
OR MINISTERS

national plans for managing excess deaths should be present, and arrangements for effective UK and global coordination. Plans for social, educational, and economic impacts of the pandemic and scientific and clinical advice should also be in place.

Recovery

It may take years for recovery to health and social care (due to increased pressure on them throughout the pandemic) and impacts on society, education and the economy may last several years. Recovery from one wave of the pandemic may be hampered by the arrival of a subsequent wave of the same pandemic.


DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

NSRA - R79 - Outbreak of an emerging infectious disease

Description (scenario)

The scenario is based on a novel respiratory-transmitted virus that emerges zoonotically in another country and causes a regional epidemic in that country. The scenario covers diverse zoonotic virus families, which may acquire some degree of human-to-human transmission, such as zoonotic influenza viruses, coronaviruses and nipah viruses.

There are up to 10 imported cases into the UK before border measures are applied. The pathogen is previously unknown or not normally found within the UK, resulting in an outbreak of up to 2,000 cases with a case fatality rate of 25%. Up to 200,000 contacts need to be traced and isolated or monitored depending on exposure. Non-pharmaceutical interventions, rapid isolation and contact tracing activities following the initial border measures, and limited transmissibility of the virus bring the outbreak under control. Failure to contain the outbreak would result in a large epidemic in the UK or a pandemic, which is covered under a separate risk in the NSRA. Infected individuals show identifiable and visible symptoms at the same time as, or preceding, the risk of transmission. The outbreak lasts between 2 and 6 months.



Key assumptions

The novel pathogen causing the epidemic emerges abroad and there is no effective treatment or vaccine. Infection is transmitted by the respiratory route. There is limited human-human transmissibility but there is a high case fatality rate. The outbreak is contained regionally.

Variations

There are a range of different transmission routes and disease severities, reflected in the variations of a viral haemorrhagic fever, vector-borne disease and zoonotic infection.

Impact Dimension	Overall Score	Total Score
Behavioural	4	7/10
Economy	5	5/5
Environment	0	0/5
Essential Services	5	17/45
Human Welfare	4	10/35
International Order	1	4/25
Security	3	5/20
Final Impact Score	4	48/145

Response capability requirements

The capability response focuses on containment (stopping further transmission and reducing cases to zero). This includes quickly implementing appropriate border measures, with a focus on isolation capabilities, disease surveillance and early detection. There will be a need for personal protective equipment supplies, scalable testing and decontamination services in place to prevent cases from rising. A national communications plan is needed to increase awareness and encourage good hygiene.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY
OR MINISTERS

Recovery


Long term impacts will not be understood until several months or up to years later with possible long-term consequences on the health and social care system.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

NSRA - R80b - Major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza

Description (scenario)

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a severe, highly infectious influenza causing significant morbidity and mortality in susceptible avian species. Avian influenza is primarily a disease of birds but can be transmissible to humans. All strains of HPAI are legally notifiable if suspected in the UK. This RWCS deals with an outbreak of HPAI which is unlikely to transmit to humans.



The RWCS assumes an outbreak of a highly virulent strain of HPAI where disease is introduced into multiple large-scale poultry businesses, through direct or indirect contact with wild birds. Viral spread from both wild-birds and infected premises would be expected, leading to an outbreak with a 6-8 month duration, resulting in up to 8 million poultry and captive birds either killed by the virus or culled for disease control and export restrictions on trade. Multiple mass-die-off events in wild bird populations are likely.

Key assumptions

For a strain of HPAI readily transmissible to humans, the public health impact would be handled by DHSC.

Variations

If the RWCS had greater potential for transmission to humans, it could prolong the outbreak and have serious impacts on poultry workers and those with close contact to wild birds. Significant numbers of severe casualties and mortality of around 60% in infected human cases could be expected, causing impacts on food safety and essential services, and altered control measures.

Impact Dimension	Overall Score	Total Score
Behavioural	4	7/10
Economy	3	3/5
Environment	3	3/5
Essential Services	4	6/45
Human Welfare	4	4/35
International Order	0	0/25
Security	0	0/20
Final Impact Score	3	23/145

Additional scenarios

Animal disease - major outbreak.

Response capability requirements

Specialist staff including vets, trained poultry catchers and culling teams, disposal transport and access to rendering or incineration would be required to conduct surveillance and dispose of infected animals. In addition, sufficient laboratory capacity to monitor the situation, Local Authority staff to conduct enforcement activities, and modelling experts and trained policy staff

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY
OR MINISTERS

to support would be needed. Sufficient PPE, RPE and approved disinfectant would be necessary across government and operational partners.

Recovery

The minimum period to regain disease free status for international trade is 28 days from completion of secondary C&D at the last infected premises. Exports to the EU can resume following the completion of enhanced surveillance in the restricted region, 90 days after effective C&D. Given the size and duration of the RWCS there would be long-term impacts on trade, the environment, poultry sector, and rural economy.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

Annex C: Analytical Capabilities

	Emergence	Delay and Mitigate	Recover, prevent and prepare
Key Policy Questions (demand signal)	<p>Summary In the emergence stage we would need to develop a critical goods list to understand supply chain dependencies and potential chokepoints, as visibility is currently lacking in the middle of cross-border supply chain journeys. Analysis efforts would likely be coordinated between DBT and the Cabinet Office, focused on balancing goods needed for a pandemic response versus keeping the economy open. Modelling efforts must account for both primary and secondary pandemic impacts, especially economic effects across sectors. All analysis and modelling teams must work from the same scenarios and assumptions. Improved coordination, data sharing, and centralised leadership are vital for pandemic preparedness across the government.</p> <p>Key Questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are our economic interests in this country/what do we trade? • Routes of transport (sea, land, air), what are the economic impacts, stockpiles, surge capacity, who produces what? • Could we use a B2B database? • How might dual usage goods, medical goods, chems goods be impacted? • Keeping it light touch, supply chains framework, looking at how source 	<p>Summary In this stage we would need to know what goods can be produced quickly in the UK vs products you can't switch quickly. Ideally this would be something we would have in place prior to a pandemic, likewise we are not aware / have no record of which company is producing what however other countries do keep a list of this for their own stockpiles. While predictive modelling would need to be in place prior to this stage.</p> <p>Key Questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is impact of govt action and levels of compliance? • What frameworks do we have that would help build resilience? • What are we able to say publicly using the data we have? • What questions would we get from businesses – what support available? Help with locked up shipments etc? Would govt be willing to relax standards? • How do we use data from companies/create infrastructure so we can use it? • How and when are we engaging? • What are other countries doing? How are we aligning/linking in/co-ordinating with other countries? • Priority companies list – what are international counterparts doing? • What companies would have conflicting 	<p>Summary At this stage the department would be focused on companies and the economic impacts from the pandemic. It is vital that we know which key regions have been affected and how this may impact the economy. We need to have a plan for support that could be given in both short-term shocks and longer-term systemic issues.</p> <p>Key Questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workforce data – what are the skill gaps we have and how can we close them? • Have any behaviours changed permanently? • What key regions have been affected? • What sectors have been most impacted? HMRC data • Where are the supply chains opportunities? Where are the supply chains we can now access faster than other countries? • What would we do to establish new supply chains? • Has there been a structural shock in the economy? • Which products have high profit margins and can afford to take a hit?

	<p>country is responding – e.g. are they trying to keep econ activity going?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could we use trade data (HMRC) to predict supply chain issues? • How useful is GDP when modelling in this situation? What is the question we are trying to answer and why are we looking at GDP? What is it telling us vs what are we trying to answer? 	<p>interests and/or legal obligations to other countries? And impacts of that?</p>	
<p>Data/ Information Available</p>	<p>Summary Better links with HMRC are needed as trade data isn't granular enough in comparison. A list of priority companies is needed to help understand how many companies are producing key products in the UK.</p> <p>Key Questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is there a way to prevent lag in receiving HMRC data? • 	<p>Summary Macro models and integrated models with DHSC and OGD's would be used with an overarching macro model that looks at different impacts and effects that ties in with sector analysis.</p> <p>Key Questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would it be important to get credit card transaction data? • Can we compel companies to provide information needed for analysis/modelling? • How do we communicate limitations/figure out what you can't do? 	<p>Summary A wide variety of data from previous phases and pre-pandemic could be used for this stage.</p>

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY; NOT CLEARED BY DBT PERMANENT SECRETARY OR MINISTERS

Possible Products /Analysis

Summary
In this stage DBT may need to carry out supply chain mapping for specific products, as well as producing a country-based vulnerability framework and a business intelligence picture.

Summary
DBT would need to produce new data for a sector impact pack / dashboard and would need to update and maintain any products that were stood up in phase 1.

Summary
DBT would need to produce an evaluation of the products used in the previous stages alongside any lessons learnt. These products would be shared xHMG to influence future pandemic planning and preparation.

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

Annex D: Available intervention schemes

TABLE A – ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS ON IMMEDIATE CASH FLOW SUPPORT MEASURES TO BUSINESS

Type of Intervention	Programme	Policy	New / Exists Tiers 1-5	Fiscal	Pros	Cons
Emergency credit guarantees and loans	Growth Guarantee Scheme	Delivered by the British Business Bank (BBB) provides guarantees across a wide range of products, covering term loans, overdrafts, asset finance and invoice finance. c.50 accredited lenders that can deliver loans of up to £2m per business group (£1m in NI). The scheme provides lenders with a government-backed 70% guarantee for which they pay a fee.	Existing 2	Y (FT)	Keeps liquidity flowing and can be repaid once exports recover, potentially minimising long-run cost so long as loans are repaid.	If scenario persists, loans might default, leaving HMG with losses. Relies on lenders being willing to lend, they may be unable to assess viability.
	Bespoke finance guarantee scheme(s)	Would be implemented through BBB using the existing GGS accredited lenders, to deliver loans to companies that had been significantly impacted by the new tariffs with changes to the terms of the facility including the level of guarantee (which would likely need to be higher) and the amounts that could be borrowed. Could be a single offer or more generous terms for smaller businesses.	New 4	Y (FT) and some RDEL	Encourages firms to continue operations (producing for inventory or alternate markets) rather than ceasing immediately. Builds on existing products and lessons learned from Covid-19 loan schemes.	Execution risk – ensuring SMEs know about and can access these schemes quickly. Firms may not have the capacity to borrow if their balance sheet is already stretched.
	UK Export Finance	Support from UKEF such as General Export Facility, Export Insurance and Export Guidance.	Existing 2	Y (FT)		
Tax relief and cost reductions	Defer VAT, NICs, biz rates	Tax holiday on NICs for manufacturers hit by tariffs. Increase rebates on fuel duties for logistics companies in the supply chains.	New 4	Y	Quick lever to pull and can be scaled to the level of distress (e.g. bigger breaks for bigger drops in exports).	Reduces HMG revenue and if prolonged could distort the market (to certain firms). Might not be enough on its own to save a deeply affected company (so better used in combination with other measures).
	In-put cost support	Short-term relief on energy bills or carbon costs to help Energy Intensive Industries (e.g. Chemicals) stay competitive	New 4	Y	Usually doesn't violate trade rules as domestically focused.	
	Export tax rebates	Increase rebates for exporters as a buffer against tariffs. Refund more VAT for exporters	New 4	Y		

		or accelerate VAT rebate processing to get cash in firms' hands.				
Wage subsidies and short-time work schemes	Targeted version of furlough	HMG subsidises portion of workers' wages or facilitates reduced hours – a version of German intervention (Kurzarbeit). E.g. a car factory facing a sudden export collapse could put staff on three-day weeks with the government paying a portion of the lost two days' wages.	New 4	Y	Keeps workers attached to their jobs and preserves skills, ready to ramp up when conditions improve. Avoids social/mental costs of unemployment.	If shock endures or industry needs to restructure, wage subsidies can delay necessary adjustments – effectively keeps workers in jobs that may not be viable. Issue of fairness for those not covered (new hires or gig workers).
Direct financial aid	Targeted at firms	Grants or compensation for lost revenue (e.g. US farm bailout; UK £23m seafood compensation fund)	New 5	Y	Quick infusion of cash can prevent panic closures and buy time for adjustment.	Can be very costly, disproportionately benefit larger firms if not capped. Risk of moral hazard – firms might expect HMG rescues in the future. If tariffs persist, fiscally unsustainable.
Special situation support	Deploy the economic shock toolkit	Policy departments working with the DBT shocks team / HMT special situations team can deploy the economic shock toolkit, which includes signposted support for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People – DWP rapid response, Job Centre Plus, skills training, insolvency service etc. • Companies – supply chain analysis, existing business support schemes, BBB, diversifying their exports to new markets to decrease reliance on the US etc. • Places – location-specific response, local business support via local authorities or Mayoral Combined authorities / regeneration; creation of a taskforce. 	Existing 2	N (subject to available departmental funds)		

TABLE B – ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS ON IMMEDIATE SECTOR WIDE SUPPORT TO REDUCE COSTS TO BUSINESS

NB: All regulatory interventions listed would require regulatory change

Type of Intervention	Programme	Policy	New / Exists Tiers 1-5	Fiscal	Pros	Cons
Regulatory	Advanced Manufacturing	Reform of ZEV Mandate: options (i) response pulled forward, (ii) allow a no conditions exemption for Small Volume Manufacturers through to 2035, (iii) changing the trajectory or maxing out other flexibilities e.g having no or minimal cap on non-ZEV flexibility.	New 3	N (Y plug in grant)	ZEV mandate – consultation done and can move quickly	Plug in car grant – cost implications
		Alongside ZEV mandate, plug in car grant eligible for all EVs to stimulate demand.	New 3	N		
	Life Sciences (Pharma)	Wider regs reform – smaller regs under review, for example new legislative framework for space industry. Resolve the current issue with the headline payment rate under VPAG – which will deliver on the commitment made to industry that the Mid Scheme Review has been brought forward to be completed by June as opposed to the autumn.	New 3	Y	Would respond to the principal concern of pharmaceutical companies on the UK's commercial environment and improve IS sector plan reception	If not supported financially by HMT, would create additional fiscal pressures on the DHSC budget
Data	Life Sciences (MedTech)	Publish statement of intent to deliver SI's to enable international recognition of devices entering the UK	Exists 2	Y	Reduces industry regulatory burdens	Delays with information sharing data base, which might require funding to resolve
	Life Sciences (Pharma and MedTech)	Confirm the creation of a health data research service to create an improved research environment in the UK	New 4	Y	Ready to announce immediately and will send strong message on UK attractiveness	Cost implications (£603m from 2026-30); industry commitment of £100m available.
	Life Sciences (MedTech)	Announce commitments to improve procurement landscape for the NHS enabling passporting of compliance documents	Exists 2	N	Reduces cost to serve the NHS and	Delivery timescales

		Commit to a cross-system framework for real world evidence generation for med tech to support approvals premarket and adoption on the market.	Exists 3	N	improves ROI certainty for Industry Improved industry environment	Requires SI
Fiscal	Automotive	Announce DRIVE35 (the new £2bn future auto innovation and investment programme), setting out the focus, shape and composition of the investment programme and pitching this as a brand-new offer which will deliver faster support for automotive investors. An announcement will build on the Autumn Budget commitment of £2bn for zero emission vehicle manufacturing and supply chains in the autumn budget.			Mature scheme, with design due to conclude in April.	Cost implications
Fiscal	Automotive	Announce the investment of £49.8m in capital funding to develop a fully integrated EV manufacturing cluster in the North East, in partnership with the NE Mayor.			Developed proposition with work ongoing with the North East Combined Authority.	Cost implications and dependency on North East Combined Authority Plan for Growth.
Procurement	HMG can temporarily increase, or bring forward, orders of domestic products from affected sectors	E.g. Pharma – NHS could purchase a larger stockpile of UK-made medications or vaccines. Food - HMG or LAs buy up surplus for food banks, schools or freeze for future use. (mirrors US farm support - US govt bought surplus produce to distribute to charities). E.g. Bring defence equipment orders in the UK forward (most UK based manufacturers are at capacity so could be advanced market commitments)	N/E 4	Y	Supports producers and provides public benefit (building reserves or aiding vulnerable consumers).	Must be short-term; avoid overspending on things not needed; remain WTO-compliant (purchasing at market prices not re-exporting with subsidy).
Access to finance	Sector-targeting by Public Finance Institutions	Bring forward announcement of £3.7bn BBB Fund focused on IS sectors, uplift to UKEF's maximum commitment limit to (i) £80bn within the existing legislation; and (ii) £200bn through primary legislation (thru Industrial Strategy Bill).	New 3	Y (FT)	Increase financial support to growth sectors	Unlikely to help with day to day spending difficulties
Energy prices	Electricity support scheme	Reduce electricity prices to average European levels by introducing scheme to expand targeted policy cost relief; open to growth sectors & wider EILs (beyond British Industry Supercharger).	New 4	Y	Provides quick relief from cost pressures	Cost to Exchequer or billpayers. May require emergency legislation and design phase to

	British Industry Supercharger	Increase level of support for foundational sectors eligible for British Industry Supercharger through an uplift to the Network Charging Compensation (NCC) scheme from 60% to 90%.	Existing 3	Y		launch a government / taxpayer funded scheme.
Trade policy	Advanced Manufacturing (auto)	Initiate TRA investigation into Chinese EVs.	New	N	Welcomed by UK OEMs	Will not provide quick relief from cost pressures
Innovation & commercialisation	Advanced Manufacturing	IS policies in development to reform sectors: private-public business support schemes for Auto, Space, Aerospace, Advanced Materials & Agri-tech – including 10-year budgets for auto and aero R&D spend	New 3	Y		Cost implications

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

Table C – SUMMARY OF OPTIONS ON LONGER TERM MEASURES TO SUPPORT STRUCTURAL CHANGES

NB: All regulatory interventions listed, with the exception of the steel safeguards review, would require regulatory change

Type of Intervention	Programme	Policy	New/Exists Tiers 1-5	Fiscal	Pros	Cons
Workforce Retraining & Transition Support	UK Trade Adjustment Programme	Identify regions and sectors where tariff shocks cause layoffs and channel resources for reskilling these workers (e.g. chemicals to green tech sector). Support could also include relocation assistance if workers need to move to find work, and entrepreneurship programs for those who want to start new ventures.	New 4	Y	Worked to extent for US (TAA) and EU (EGF) - Workforce remains dynamic and employable, reducing long-term costs. Eases political pressure to bail out uncompetitive firms - human cost of adjustment is being addressed.	Lessons from US/EU - needs to involve employers in curriculum design and by rapidly deploying aid <i>before</i> unemployment leads to skill atrophy.
Export market diversification	HMG support for businesses to enter new markets	E.g. Food & Drink - initiatives like the Dairy Export Programme. Increase DBT trade promotion, trade missions into new markets, on-ground support. Look at 'Export Pivot Grant' model (Australia) to open up new markets.	New 4	N	Greater long-term resilience: if one market imposes barriers, business can fall back on others, reducing coercive power of any single tariff.	
Regulatory	Regulatory Innovation Office	Expand RIO's powers and remit to cover all growth-driving sectors.	Expanded 3	N	Recommendation of ISAC (John Kingman and Greg Clark)	DSIT preference to begin with 4 subsectors (set out Oct 2024)
	IS8 sectors	Bring forward new regulatory reform package to reduce admin burden and speed up growth markets - delivering reforms to IS8 sector-specific regulations; reform the competition framework; and assess further measures across environmental permitting.	New 3	N	Part of plan for change and target to cut administrative costs for business by 25%	New regulatory reforms (subsector specifics not yet announced). Aiming for May/June publication
	Steel	Review of Steel Safeguards due in 2026 – bring forward consideration of tariffs to prevent Chinese/other nations dumping in UK as US market is closed.	Exists 3	N		

Innovation & commercialisation	Life Sciences (Pharma)	Increase MHRA capacity and funding, which will create opportunities to draw in big names from the FDA and increase departmental Grant In Aid (GIA) for recruitment.	New 4	Y (GIA)	Improve industry sentiment and in medium/long term option to increase fees to support RDEL costs. Improve UK attractiveness for trials	GIA RDEL Cost Implications
	Life Sciences (Pharma)	Deliver the O'Shaughnessy review for Clinical Trials. Option to go further by setting a growth mandate for the NIHR and setting up the NIHR Chair and board.	New 4	N	Improve UK attractiveness for trials	
	Advanced Manufacturing (Auto)	Signal improved support for Auto Supply Chain companies through adding a requirement for bidders for capital funding under DRIVE35 to present a domestic sourcing strategy (summer)	New	N	Could increase benefits of DRIVE35 for UK-based tier 2 and 3 companies, which would bolster supply chains and resilience.	Legal and subsidy issues need to be navigated to ensure WTO compliant.
		Announce a US focused exports campaign/roadshow to bring key auto tech to the doors of US car makers. An expanded version of our AU Exports programme (summer)	New	N	Well established supply chain exports programme which could be expanded easily.	Need further development
		Global network of technology corridors on zero emission vehicle technologies starting from the UK/US (summer)	New	N	This would enable us to develop a preferential technology channel with the US while at the same time deploying our leadership in ZEV technologies to generate new markets for UK products, building optionality for our industries.	Has dependencies with the work on developing a new Automotive tech strategy which is planned for the Autumn – This would require policy development. May also require new money from HMT. May also have RoO dependencies. Deepening academic collaboration on batteries is viable but dependent on SR bid.
	Advanced Manufacturing	Expansion of Made Smarter, including robotics.	New 3	Y		
Life Sciences	Health innovation zones; Ox-Cam laboratory space through Planning & Infra Bill; Establish National Health Data Research Service & National Institute for Health Innovation;	New 3	Y			

		Life Sciences Apprenticeship Communities initiative.				
	R&D mission for technology adoption	Significantly scale R&D Missions Programme to >£1bn beyond 2025/26 to support growth sectors; Delivering recommendations set out in the AI Opportunities Action Plan, incl. Nat. Campaign on AI and AI Adoption Accelerator programme to cohorts of UK leaders in high-growth sectors.	New 3	Y		
Trade	Advanced Manufacturing (Auto)	Engage with EU to resolve the TCA 2027 Rules of Origin for batteries and EVs cliff edge (next 6 months)	New	N	Would be well received by the sector.	Contingent on multiple players - Trade policy teams in DBT, FCDO and Cabinet Office and difficult negotiations with European Commission
Skills stimulus	Skills Strategy	Unlock additional c.160k workers by 2028 by tilting additional skills support to IS sectors and places. Progress changes to Growth & Skills Levy to allow employers to upskill staff in more flexible and targeted ways, alongside increase in levy funding (e.g. overall contributions employers make to apprenticeship/training costs & proportion of receipts spent on training).	New 3	Tbc	Could be fiscal if all skills levy is re-invested in training or non-fiscal if its re-prioritising in existing budget.	Some of the interventions longer term and won't address immediate pressure.
	Migration white paper	Align Skilled Worker Visa with plans to boost domestic talent/address skills needs in priority IS sectors. (Note: there is risk current direction of travel makes this route more challenging for some key IS occupations) Increase scope of low-volume, high-end talent routes (Innovator Founder; High Potential Individual; Global Talent visa fast-track); re-introduce Investor visa. Reduce bureaucracy with short-term business mobility improvements & Trusted Trader Scheme.	New 3	N		
Energy	Private Energy Networks	Private Energy Network sandbox with low regulatory requirements targeted to IS sectors such as AI and data centres	New 5	Y	There is already demand for private networks powering data centres outside the national grid.	Very early stage, policy development required; will require local areas to accept the proposals.

Table D – SUMMARY OF COVID-19 ECONOMIC SUPPORT MEASURES AND LESSONS LEARNED/APPLICABILITY

<i>Initiative</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Scope</i>	<i>Eligibility / restrictions</i>	<i>Future use</i>
Competition & Markets				
Business Rates Relief (BRR)	1 year with extension	Businesses in the retail, hospitality and leisure sectors in England did not have to pay business rates for the 2020 to 2021 tax year. From July 2021 to March 2022, a reduced 66% BRR would be provided – up to £2 million in total per business or less if business was to remain open beyond 5 January 2021.	Retail, leisure and hospitality sector. Local Council applied the relief automatically.	Optional, depending on the nature of the crisis.
Relaxed competition rules	Variable	Under competition law, the Secretary of State for former BEIS made legislation to relax UK competition rules for certain agreements which might normally be considered anti-competitive. A number of exclusion orders were made.	Groceries, dairy, solent maritime crossing, healthcare providers. To qualify for the exclusions under the orders, agreements must be notified to the SoS. The orders require SoS to maintain and publish a register of notified agreements.	Optional, depending on the nature of the crisis.
Updates to the insolvency regime (CIGA)	03/2020 – 09/2021	Temporary suspension of wrongful trading provisions for company directors, changes to rules around Annual General Meetings and rules to help companies who were restructuring.	As per emergency legislation text.	Optional, depending on the nature of the crisis.
CMA action on unfair practices	Throughout pandemic	The CMA has responded through the provision of general guidance to consumers and businesses, and with action and guidance in respect of specific sectors.	Focus on weddings/events, package holidays, holiday lets, nurseries, airlines.	CMA can replicate their investigative practices and businesses engagement model under the tariff scenario.

<i>Initiative</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Scope</i>	<i>Eligibility / restrictions</i>	<i>Future use</i>
Loans				
Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS)	Through pandemic	<p><u>Loan amount:</u> max £5 million.</p> <p><u>Term length:</u> For overdrafts and invoice finance facilities, finance was available for up to 3 years. For loans and asset finance facilities, finance was available for up to 6 years.</p> <p><u>Interest:</u> Commercial rates. A business interruption payment was available to cover the first 12 months of interest payments and any lender-levied charges.</p> <p><u>Government Guarantee:</u> up to 80%; 75% portfolio cap to the lender's whole CBILS portfolio until April 2020.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business based in the UK; • Annual turnover max. £45 million; • Evidence that the business would be viable in the absence of the pandemic; and • Had been adversely impacted by Covid-19. • Initially, businesses had to demonstrate that they had been turned down for commercial finance. However, this requirement was removed in April 2020. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aspects of any new emergency scheme must be balanced against whether personal guarantees and a 70% government guarantee (as per current GGS) of loans would be sufficiently attractive for borrowers and lenders. • Accreditation of lenders, and ongoing management, should involve robust, proportionate, and risk-based requirements and accreditation would ensure that the right data systems and governance to manage lenders effectively.
Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS)	Through pandemic	<p><u>Loan amount:</u> max £200 million and up to 25% of a business' annual turnover.</p> <p><u>Term length:</u> 3 months to 3 years.</p> <p><u>Interest:</u> Commercial rates.</p> <p><u>Government Guarantee:</u> up to 80%; until April 2020, 75% portfolio cap to the lender's whole CBILS portfolio.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business based in the UK; • Annual turnover of over £45 million; • Had not received support under the HMT/Bank of England's Covid-19 Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) • Evidence that the business would be viable in the absence of the pandemic; • Had been affected by Covid-19; and • Evidence that the loan would enable the business to trade out of any short-term to medium-term difficulty resulting from Covid-19. 	As with CBILS

<i>Initiative</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Scope</i>	<i>Eligibility / restrictions</i>	<i>Future use</i>
Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLs)	Through pandemic	<p><u>Loan amount:</u> max £50,000. Borrowing ranged from £2,000 and up to 25% of business turnover. <u>Term length:</u> 6 years with a penalty-free early repayment option. <u>Interest:</u> no fees or interest to be paid on the loan for the first 12 months. After 12 months, the interest rate was set at 2.5% per year. <u>Government Guarantee:</u> 100%</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business based in the UK; • Established before 1 March 2020; and • Had been adversely impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. 	The 100% guarantee and accelerated approvals process meant that credit losses and losses from fraud and error were significantly greater than for CBILS or CLBILS. Any future scheme on this basis would need to be carefully designed to address these risks.
Recovery Loan Scheme (RLS) and later Growth Guarantee Scheme (GGS)	1 year 3 months for RLS, followed by GGS which is currently live.	<p><u>Loan amount:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Term loans or overdrafts of between £25,001 and £2 million per business group; • Term loans or overdrafts of between £25,001 and £1 million for businesses in scope of the Northern Ireland Protocol; • Invoice or asset finance of between £1,000 and £2 million per business group; and • Invoice or asset finance of between £1,000 and £1 million for businesses in scope of the Northern Ireland Protocol. <p><u>Term length:</u> max 3 years for overdrafts and invoice finance facilities. Max 6 years for loans and asset finance facilities. <u>Interest:</u> capped at 14.99% annual (for RLS) This cap was removed for GGS. <u>Government Guarantee:</u> 80% reduced to 70% for RLS Phase 2 and GGS.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business based in the UK; • Annual turnover of £45 million or less; • Evidence that the business was viable; and • Evidence that the business was not in difficulty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The post-pandemic Growth Guarantee Scheme, which built on the RLS, has 50 accredited lenders as of 3 February 2025. This framework could be used as a basis for new loan schemes. • CBILS considerations also apply.

<i>Initiative</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Scope</i>	<i>Eligibility / restrictions</i>	<i>Future use</i>
The Future Fund (FF)	Through pandemic	<p><u>Convertible loan amount:</u> £125,000 – £5 million subject to matching the investment made by the private investors, loans convert to equity after 3 years.</p> <p><u>Term length:</u> max 36 months.</p> <p><u>Interest:</u> 8% per annum (non-compounding) on maturity. Converted loans subject to either accrued interest or equity conversion.</p> <p><u>Government Guarantee:</u> N/A</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business based in the UK (if part of a corporate group, only parent company would be eligible); • Incorporated on or before 31 December 2019; • Business had raised at least £250,000 in equity investment from third-party investors in the last five years; • None of the business' shares were traded on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility or other listing venue; and • At least one of the following was true: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 50% or more of employees UK-based; or ○ 50% or more of revenue from UK sales. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The legal agreements that were used to underpin the Future Fund are available and could therefore be adapted in future to address specific impacts on business finance to support equity-backed companies. The legal documentation includes terms such as the maximum and minimum loan size, repayment terms, and co-investment requirements. These terms would be adapted according to the scheme requirements. • The eligibility requirements for the scheme could be adapted, depending on the crisis. A future equity scheme design would need to be better targeted to reduce fraud or irregular payments.

Insurance

Trade Credit Reinsurance	<p><i>Scheme 1:</i> 04/2020 – 12/2020</p> <p><i>Scheme 2:</i> 01/2021 – 06/2021</p>	<p>Provided cover for b2b transactions for suppliers whose buyers delay or default on payment. It is an important mechanism to facilitate trade within supply chains as suppliers can offer goods and services on credit, rather than relying on upfront cash payments buyers. In the event of</p>	<p>HMG would reinsure up to £10bn of insurers loses. In return insurers would not remove cover on any business for any reason directly related to the discernible economic impacts of Covid-19.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinsurance can be a reliable tool for stabilising the market during economic uncertainty. Future implementations should maintain this structure to ensure effectiveness. • Future implementations should focus on timely and clear communication to better understand industry needs and concerns.
---------------------------------	---	--	---	--

<i>Initiative</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Scope</i>	<i>Eligibility / restrictions</i>	<i>Future use</i>
		default of a buyer, suppliers can claim the money owed from their insurer.	For Scheme 1, BEIS received 100% of premium from participating insurers, whilst covering 90% of their losses and reimbursing insurers actual operating expenses up to an agreed cap based on their previous years audited accounts. For Scheme 2, BEIS received 90% of premium from participating insurers, whilst covering 90% of claims, and reimbursing insurers 35% of the premium ceded to BEIS to cover their operating expenses.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total value of claims made was significantly less than anticipated, likely due to the success of other government interventions. Future implementations should factor in other interventions and how they might impact the scheme's outcomes. • Stakeholders should be involved early in the process to streamline negotiations. • Regular monitoring and reporting, as done by PwC, can help track the scheme's progress and impact. Establishing a robust governance framework will ensure that the scheme is well-managed and responsive to emerging issues. • Future implementations should focus on maximising economic benefits and ensuring the scheme generates a positive net surplus.

Grants

Local Authority Grant Schemes	Through pandemic	Among the most significant measures introduced by the Government to support small businesses and improve economic confidence during the pandemic, with £22.6 billion in grants paid through eight grant schemes to an estimated 1.4 million businesses. There were 8 grant schemes delivered during the pandemic and some of these had sub-schemes. Funding was provided via Local Authorities to local businesses.	The schemes became more targeted as the pandemic progressed, focusing on the sectors which were most impacted by restrictions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In any future pandemic or similar scale crisis, clear guidance involving mandated pre-payment eligibility checks would be very strongly recommended to ministers as a requirement for grants. • Data sharing and General Data Protection Regulation compliance must be addressed at the outset of any grant scheme, with appropriate data sharing arrangements agreed between all parties. DBT now has standard terms and conditions set out in the grant funding agreement or memorandum of understanding documentation for each specific scheme, which also directs the grant recipient to DBT's privacy notice. • DBT provided Business Recovery Grants, in response to the 2023 and 2024 storms. This
--------------------------------------	------------------	---	--	---

<i>Initiative</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Scope</i>	<i>Eligibility / restrictions</i>	<i>Future use</i>
				model could be replicated for any future emergency grant 34 scheme; although it would need to be adapted to respond to scale and speed requirements of any future response

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY

DRAFT NOT GOVERNMENT POLICY