

Government economic response. I was therefore rarely engaged directly in the detail of the schemes themselves and am not well placed to offer detailed views.

88. Summary information on the UK economic policy response was regularly presented to the CEMG and other decision processes, for example, as appropriate in SGORR meetings. The teams responsible for the overview of economic support (Directorate of International Trade and Investment, the Economy Hub and subsequently the Directorate for Covid-19 Business Resilience and Support) and the Office of the Chief Economist were tasked with ensuring that an up to date log of the different schemes was available, and in due course, tracking their operation and impact in Scotland where disaggregated data allowed this. These updates included the CJRS.
89. I am asked if I consider that I or others in the Scottish Government were consulted adequately and effectively in design, delivery and the review, amendment and cessation of the CJRS. I have referred to some of the challenges with uncertainty and lack of information on the duration of the CJRS earlier in paragraph 82.
90. As a general principle, I believe the design of UK wide schemes benefits from collaboration between the UK Government and the devolved administrations, particularly on areas such as the economy where there is a complex interplay of reserved and devolved powers and in the case of an initiative as critical and far-reaching as the CJRS. This requires consultation or indeed, co-production. I did not see levels of consultation or engagement between the UK and Scottish Government on the CJRS that I would view as optimal. The impact of this was most detrimental to the Scottish Government's ability to mount an effective economic response with respect to the review, amendment and cessation of these schemes. A lack of knowledge about their duration together with little ability to apparently influence these decisions had