

Tuesday, 27 May 2025

(10.30 am)

LADY HALLETT: Ms Cartwright.

MS CARTWRIGHT: My Lady, the gentleman by the witness box is Ben Dyson, could I ask for him, please, to be sworn.

MR BEN DYSON (affirmed)

Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY FOR MODULE 7

MS CARTWRIGHT: Good morning, could you please tell the Inquiry your full name.

A. Benjamin Paul Oakley Dyson.

Q. Mr Dyson, you have provided four witness statements for Module 7 providing, essentially, the corporate position of the Department of Health and Social Care. Can we, firstly, identify each of those four statements, please.

If we can turn, first of all, to what we are going to call statement A, INQ000587292. Could I ask for us, please, to go to page 42. Thank you.

It's the first statement, dated 27 March 2025, and can I ask you to confirm, are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it right to say that essentially this statement gives context as to the structures, the key individuals, and gives an overview chronology?

A. That's correct.

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truth. It's dated 11 April 2025. And can I ask you to confirm, are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. Thank you. Now I think although you're the signatory to these witness statements, it's right, isn't it, that essentially a large volume of individuals have assisted in the preparation of these four statements, but you are the person to speak to them?

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. Can we then, please, deal with you and your background, please. It's right, isn't it, that you personally held four roles in relation to the pandemic response. Is it right that you were first director of the reasonable worst-case scenario team from March to April of 2020?

A. Yes.

Q. You then were director of policy for NHS Test and Trace from May of 2020 to June of 2021?

A. That's correct.

Q. You then were director of cross-cutting policy for NHS Test and Trace from June of 2021 to October of 2021?

A. Correct.

Q. And then you were director of cross-cutting policy and public and parliamentary accountability at the UKHSA

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Q. Thank you. Can we then, please, move to the second witness statement, which is INQ000587347. Can we please turn to page 85. It's dated 4 April of 2025, and are the contents of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. Thank you. And I think this statement principally deals with the scaling up of testing?

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. If we can then move to witness statement C, please, INQ000587346. Could I ask you to turn to page 106, please, in that witness statement. It's dated 11 April 2025 and again, is this statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. It is.

Q. And I think this statement essentially gives full details as to the scaling up of the contact tracing by the department?

A. And it deals with self-isolation and other matters.

Q. Thank you. So adjunct matters dealing with tracing and isolation and support for isolation?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Finally then, please, if we can turn to witness statement D, INQ000587345. Can we turn to page 70, please, where we there see your statement of

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from October of 2021, when UKHSA was established, to the March of 2022?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And I think it's right, isn't it, that since then, you returned to the Department of Health and Social Care on 14 March of 2022 to take up the post of director of prevention services?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. And you're currently a director for the Better Care Fund and Hospital Discharge, a role you've held since December of 2022?

A. That's all correct, yes.

Q. Thank you. And you're still in that position as at the present day?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And Mr Dyson, can we thank you for the obvious care that's gone into these four comprehensive statements, but also you being the person to speak to them.

Can we then start, please, with providing some context in respect of what you say relating to development of testing, please. I want to go, please, into your statement B, which is then, please, at paragraph 4 so that's INQ000587347, and go to paragraph 12 on page 4, please.

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1 That's INQ000587347, page 4., paragraph 12.
 2 Now, I'm just going to move through these
 3 paragraphs, because it's right, isn't it, that you deal
 4 with testing for pathogens prior to the pandemic and if
 5 we move, then, to paragraph 13, but essentially the role
 6 of the Department of Health and Social Care, is it
 7 correct, pre-pandemic, was mainly limited to its
 8 oversight of Public Health England?
 9 **A.** Yes, the department didn't have a direct role in testing
 10 at that point.
 11 **Q.** And I think -- throughout the statement I think you
 12 similarly make the observation that the Department of
 13 Health and Social Care didn't pre-pandemic either have
 14 rule for contact tracing; is that correct?
 15 **A.** Not an operational role.
 16 **Q.** Again, I think you identify that sat with Public Health
 17 England?
 18 **A.** Mm-hm.
 19 **Q.** But also the involvement of Directors of Public Health;
 20 is that correct?
 21 **A.** Yes.
 22 **Q.** Can I then seek your assistance, please, and necessarily
 23 our time together today will be focused on specific
 24 areas and specific topics -- by reference to scaling up
 25 of testing, please. And linked to an earlier operation,

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1 to scale up testing, and according to other evidence we
 2 have, PHE had never been resourced to scale up testing.
 3 Do you accept or does the department accept that
 4 they were aware that there would be need for both
 5 planning and capacity to scale up testings as one of the
 6 lessons learning from Operation Alice?
 7 **A.** Yes, that is clearly one of the lessons, as we see here.
 8 I think it's worth bearing in mind that this was an
 9 exercise about MERS, which is a -- doesn't have the same
 10 level of infectiousness as Covid-19. So I think it's
 11 important not to see this as a blueprint for the scale
 12 of testing that it -- that we went on to need during the
 13 Covid-19 pandemic. So yes, this is about scaling up
 14 capacity, but I don't think there's anything in the
 15 report that really envisages the industrial-scale level
 16 of testing that we did during Covid-19.
 17 **LADY HALLETT:** Can I just interrupt there. I understand the
 18 level that was needed, because of Covid-19, but if MERS
 19 is not as infectious, yet still Exercise Alice said you
 20 needed to scale up testing, surely there's all the more
 21 reason that capacity to scale up should have been
 22 increased?
 23 **A.** I agree. I agree. The recommendation was to include
 24 a plan for a process to scale up capacity, as it says
 25 here, and as has been reflected in my Lady's report on

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1 the Operation Alice.
 2 And can I ask, please, to be displayed INQ000090431.
 3 Thank you.
 4 And I think you've had an opportunity to consider
 5 this document as part of your preparations.
 6 And if we move through the report, please -- we can
 7 see it's a Public Health England report but if we move,
 8 please, through to page 10, thank you, we can see that
 9 action 4 was that -- the requirement for the development
 10 of a MERS-CoV serology assay procedure to include a plan
 11 for a process to scale up capacity.
 12 And if we can, please, just continue to move through
 13 to appendix A, I think -- on page 16, we see that
 14 summary of lessons and actions identified. Thank you.
 15 And also, just to identify the involvement of the
 16 Department of Health, please, can we turn to page 18,
 17 appendix C, which is the list of participants, but
 18 there's a large number of Department of Health
 19 individuals that were part of that exercise. Thank you.
 20 And so can we then move back, please, to the
 21 recommendation, please, which is on page 10. Thank you.
 22 As we can see there, one of the actions from
 23 Exercise Alice was to develop a MERS-CoV serology assay
 24 to include a plan for a process to scale up capacity.
 25 Can you assist, despite this, no plan was put in place

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1 Module 1, we didn't have a plan in place for the
 2 industrial-scale expansion of capacity that we went on
 3 to adopt during the Covid-19 pandemic.
 4 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Can I ask you, then, leaving aside the
 5 industrial-scale capacity that was needed, bearing in
 6 mind that MERS-CoV was a coronavirus, and Exercise Alice
 7 had identified the need for a process to scale up
 8 capacity using an assay, was there any planning done by
 9 the Department of Health and Social Care to essentially
 10 plan to scale up capacity informed by this exercise?
 11 **A.** I don't have any direct knowledge of the work done at
 12 the time. So I'm afraid I can't answer the question
 13 very directly. What I would say is that, at the start
 14 of the pandemic, PHE, having developed a coronavirus
 15 test, did then expand capacity to some extent, but what
 16 was clear, and certainly became clear later on, was that
 17 it didn't have the capacity to go beyond that.
 18 **Q.** Thank you.
 19 Can I then ask, then, in terms of asking about the
 20 learning or the action from Operation Alice, were the
 21 department aware that there would need to be planning
 22 and capacity to scale up testing, but they failed to
 23 ensure these were in place by the time of January 2020?
 24 **A.** As we've seen, the exercise report has a clear set of
 25 actions and recommendations. I can't say -- again,

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1 because I wasn't involved at the time, I can't say how
2 far there was awareness within the department, but
3 certainly I would imagine that the Emergency
4 Preparedness Team would have been more than aware of all
5 these recommendations.

6 And I come back to the fact that there were clearly
7 some systems in place to allow what I would call
8 a moderate scaling of capacity and that's the work that
9 we saw PHE did in the early stage of the pandemic.
10 I would say that there weren't the plans in place to
11 move beyond that.

12 **Q.** Thank you.

13 Can I then ask questions again in the context of
14 lack of scale-up of capacity.

15 Could we please display -- it's paragraph 104 of
16 a statement of Mr Hancock. It's INQ000587294. That's
17 INQ000587294, please. And it's paragraph 104, please,
18 at page 31. Thank you.

19 Now, within this paragraph, we can see that
20 Mr Hancock is detailing his frustration by the lack of
21 scale-up capacity, given Public Health England's early
22 assurances that they had the best system in the world.

23 Now can you assist, had the Department of Health and
24 Social Care allocated the development of -- had they
25 allocated resources to the development of such a system

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1 Obviously at the start of the pandemic, the
2 department made clear that -- or the government made
3 clear that resources were not to be an obstacle to
4 further scale-up. So, as soon as it became clear that
5 more contact tracing would be needed, resources became
6 available.

7 **Q.** Thank you.

8 Can I then, please, building on the scaling up of
9 contact tracing, please, can we move into your
10 statement C, so INQ000587346, please, and it's
11 paragraph 40 at page 12, please.

12 Thank you.

13 You detail, and now we're just after the January in
14 the paragraph before:

15 "... contact tracing was considered likely to be
16 more effective in the early stage of the pandemic, when
17 the focus was on preventing wider community
18 transmission."

19 And we can see the paper reference there.

20 It noted that:

21 "... contact tracing ... would no longer be
22 effective and should cease where there was sustained
23 community transmission."

24 Can I ask you, was that the position? Was it linked
25 to the sustained community transmission or was the

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1 for scaling up testing? Or at this stage, in February,
2 was it still that it had been left as the responsibility
3 of Public Health England?

4 **A.** May I just clarify, that's a question about testing or
5 tracing?

6 **Q.** Well, this is obviously the context of testing, but
7 also, and we'll come on to deal with it separately,
8 through the prism of tracing, please.

9 **A.** So, to the best of my knowledge, the department hadn't
10 provided additional resources to allow scaling up of
11 testing, certainly not to the extent that we saw during
12 the pandemic, no.

13 **Q.** Thank you.

14 Then in terms of, again, in the context of the
15 scale-up needed of contact tracing, which we'll come on
16 to look at a little bit more together, what was the
17 position of the department in terms of what was there to
18 assist with scaling up on contact tracing?

19 **A.** Again, I can't speak to exactly what the department
20 would have done prior to the pandemic. I think what
21 this statement is telling us is that the PHE had -- it
22 certainly had the protocols in place for contact
23 tracing. As it says here, it didn't have the -- it
24 didn't have the ability to scale up beyond a certain
25 point.

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1 reality that there simply wasn't the capacity available
2 for doing the contact tracing? Can we just be clear as
3 to why the contact tracing stopped?

4 **A.** It's worse -- well, I'll come on to the answer to that
5 question, it's just worth emphasising that contact
6 tracing didn't stop entirely; it continued in high-risk
7 settings, most obviously. But as this indicates, the
8 view, of I think both SAGE and Public Health England at
9 the time, was that neither contact tracing nor testing
10 would be effective in -- when it came to the point of
11 widespread community transmission. But as I say,
12 notwithstanding that, it continued in high-risk
13 settings.

14 You ask whether this was because there weren't the
15 resources for it. That's not my understanding. My
16 understanding is that the position was that, other than
17 in those high-risk settings, it wouldn't be effective in
18 controlling widespread transmission once it's covering
19 the whole population.

20 **Q.** Thank you. And obviously you've sought clarification
21 that contact tracing did continue --

22 **A.** Mm-hm.

23 **Q.** -- in high-risk settings. So can I perhaps use the
24 decision of 12 March when the government move from the
25 'contain' -- sorry, from the 'delay' to the 'contain'

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phase, and so can you just be clear because I think you wanted to make some clarification about the fact that contact tracing did still continue in those high-risk settings and can we just be clear, then, where you say contact tracing continued after the move from -- into the 'contain' phase, please.

A. Yes, that's the case. So Public Health England managed contact tracing largely through its regional health protection teams who often worked in conjunction with local authority public health teams, and throughout the pandemic, including this early phase, they would have used contact tracing as a way of looking to control and manage outbreaks in settings such as care homes or prisons.

Q. Thank you. Can we then ask a question through the prism of scaling up of testing, please. And can I have displayed, please, the statement of Professor McNally, which is INQ000587245, please. And it's paragraph 11, please.

Now, Mr Dyson, the Inquiry has heard some evidence that -- I know you've identified about the scaling up of testing, perhaps the context I want to give to this is before we move to the Lighthouse Project there is evidence that the Inquiry has heard that other resources were available, including through academic institutions,

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homes, but the aim throughout March, and this intensified from mid-March onwards, but the aim throughout March was to grow testing as quickly as possible.

And my understanding, I can't comment on individual offers of help, but my understanding was that at this point, Public Health England was working with both commercial and academic partners to do that.

So yeah, I appreciate there is frustration here and in other evidence from people who clearly felt they could have helped more. It is entirely possible that if things had been done slightly differently, then there could have been some more testing at that point.

The other -- but the other thing I'd just emphasise is that this was at a time when it wasn't just laboratory capacity that was the issue; it was also the supplies needed for testing, particularly reagents. So we could easily have been in a position, and I think this was the case throughout March and April, where even if we'd had more diagnostic laboratory capacity available, we wouldn't necessarily have been able to source all the supplies, including reagents, needed to use that capacity.

Q. Thank you. Can we then give some context to some questions I want to ask you, please, by reference to the

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universities, and other research facilities, that were offering their laboratories to assist with the scaling up of testing.

Now, this is one example of the context and, in fact, we've heard from Professor McNally, where he was essentially detailing that the UK universities had the equipment and expertise to help but it fell on deaf ears, and he's given some evidence about what would have been possible through the University of Birmingham by way of scaling up of testing and, similarly, the Inquiry has heard from some others, such as the Crick, as to what was feasible in the early stages of scaling up, also.

Can you provide any view from the department as to why these offers were not taken up of smaller institutes that could have assisted with the scaling up of testing in the January, February, March and onwards?

A. Again, I don't have any direct knowledge of this, because I wasn't involved at the time. My understanding is that from -- well, throughout March, Public Health England was very much looking to expand testing, and I think the phrase here about "the scrapping of testing for patients" is misleading, that there was a decision taken to prioritise testing for hospital patients and, indeed, for outbreaks in residential settings like care

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devolved nations. Can we, first of all, deal with the context, please, and can we display your statement A, INQ000587292, please, and it's paragraph 83, please, at 22.

I think it's a point you make across the four statements. You say:

"Whilst health and social care policy is largely devolved to the Welsh and Scottish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive, the Department has some reserved policy areas with UK-wide responsibility, including international relations. Public health is a devolved matter and each of the Devolved Administrations was responsible for its own testing, contact tracing, and self-isolation strategies and operations. This meant that certain arrangements to respond to the pandemic could be and indeed were made separately by the Devolved Administrations."

And I think you go on to deal with the work that took place for collaboration.

Could I ask you just to give an overview and a summary about what steps had been taken, particularly when there were differences in strategies, to try and ensure that there was an understanding of what each of the devolved nations was doing by reference to testing, contact tracing, but also then support for

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1 self-isolation?

2 **A.** Certainly. If I may, I'll take those in turn. And then
3 make a general point about collaboration.

4 **Q.** Thank you.

5 **A.** So on testing, although, as the statement says, policy
6 on testing and, indeed, responsibility for operations
7 was a devolved matter, in practice, the -- all four
8 countries chose to have a UK-wide testing programme that
9 provided essentially the infrastructure, the laboratory
10 capacity, the procurement of tests and so forth.

11 So in practice, although Wales, Scotland and
12 Northern Ireland could have chosen to go a different
13 way, in practice the infrastructure was organised on
14 a UK-wide basis, and that obviously required constant
15 close collaboration across all four countries.

16 On contact tracing, the operations were largely
17 separate, with the exception of the app, which I suspect
18 we may come on to, but the app was, as we know, shared
19 between England and Wales. The other issue on which
20 there was close collaboration was arrangements for
21 cross-border tracing, where you have somebody who has
22 tested positive one side of the border with contacts the
23 other side. So there were protocols in place for that.

24 Then on self-isolation, although again this was
25 a devolved matter, in practice through most of the

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1 Can I ask you, obviously that statement recognises
2 that, as public health is devolved, and information --
3 if we look at paragraph 83, information and experience
4 was widely shared, can you help, certain aspects of the
5 different policies across the devolved nations diverged
6 markedly in timing and decisions, and one example that's
7 been explored with a number of witnesses is the Welsh
8 Government's response in respect of -- testing in
9 respect of asymptomatic.

10 And perhaps -- obviously the UK Government announced
11 on 28 April 2020 that there would be testing of those
12 that -- in care -- expansion of testing to all staff and
13 residents in care homes in England whether exhibiting
14 symptoms or not. However, the testing of asymptomatic
15 workers and residents was not adopted in Wales until
16 16 May 2020. And obviously you identify in your
17 statement that testing for infectious disease is
18 particularly important, where infection has non-specific
19 symptoms.

20 So are you able to assist? And there are also other
21 examples of people's views on how this developed and
22 also the thinking linked to testing of those with no
23 symptoms. Are you able to assist as to whether the
24 scientific advice in relation to asymptomatic testing
25 was captured to ensure it was the same across the four

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1 pandemic -- there were some exceptions, but through most
2 of the pandemic the self-isolation rules were the same
3 because they were based on the consistent advice of the
4 four UK chief medical officers. And if I could just add
5 the Joint Biosecurity Centre, which is possible we may
6 come on to, provided advice across all four nations.

7 And just the final point I'd make is that, in
8 addition to what I've described, there were, from
9 memory, if not daily, then, I mean, at least weekly
10 and -- very frequent calls between us and the devolved
11 administrations to share insights on everything to do
12 with testing, tracing, self-isolation, and other aspects
13 of the pandemic response.

14 I remember, I think it was in June when there were
15 outbreaks in both Leicester and Wrexham, people came
16 together to compare notes and understand how best to
17 respond.

18 **Q.** Thank you.

19 Now, you've just referenced the role of the Chief
20 Medical Officer. Can we move to your paragraph 87,
21 please, which is on the next page. Thank you.
22 Obviously you detail there the role of the chief medical
23 officers, chief scientific advisers and the deputy chief
24 medical officers, but also the collaboration that took
25 place.

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1 nations in April 2020 and for the remainder of the
2 pandemic? So if something was identified of
3 a significant scientific matter, to ensure, then, that
4 it was cascaded and dealt with in the same approach
5 across the four nations.

6 **A.** Particularly for that early stage of the pandemic, I'm
7 afraid I don't have any direct insights into the exact
8 nature of how scientific advice was shared across the
9 four nations. Although, as it says here, I'm confident
10 it's saying that there was collaboration and
11 coordination. And certainly in all the time that I was
12 involved in test and trace, not only was scientific
13 advice being shared, but we were having regular
14 conversations with colleagues in the devolved
15 administrations to understand how you then marry up that
16 scientific advice with the practicalities of different
17 interventions and the policy implications.

18 And the other thing I'd just say briefly is that
19 it's worth bearing in mind that understanding -- or
20 scientific understanding of asymptomatic transmission,
21 and I think Chris Wormald touches on this in one of his
22 earlier statements, scientific understanding of both
23 asymptomatic transmission and the role that testing
24 could play in relation to asymptomatic transmission
25 evolved gradually over the -- certainly over the first

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1 few months and beyond of the pandemic.

2 **Q.** Thank you.

3 Can we, please, then move -- there are some
4 questions, please, based on your statement B,
5 INQ000587347.

6 Can we start, please, at page 22, just with
7 displaying the table which is a different way we've
8 looked at the five pillars but I think where you've
9 identified what each of the pillars were, and also the
10 organisations responsible for the five pillars of the
11 testing strategy from April of 2020.

12 But then, having looked at that, because it is going
13 to be relevant to questions I ask you now, please,
14 linked to Pillar 1 and 2, can we move, please, to your
15 paragraph 126 at page 27, please.

16 This is under the subheading of "Testing NHS and
17 Social Care Workers". And you detail within the
18 statement:

19 "... that there were 71,961,000 Covid-related
20 absences in hospital trusts on 25 March 2020 ..."

21 And that:

22 "... the submission recommended that the initial
23 priority needed to be the testing of NHS staff and
24 social care workers, given the importance of health and
25 social care services, particularly for older and

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1 go back to your witness statement, please, so it's the
2 INQ000587347, and it's, please, paragraph 135. Thank
3 you. So paragraph 135, please. Page 29.

4 Thank you for your patience, Mr Dyson, as we move
5 across these documents. You identify that:

6 "Thanks to the successes of implementing Pillars 1
7 and 2 of the testing strategy, eligibility for testing
8 was expanded again on 20 April ... to include anyone
9 over the age of 65 with symptoms, anyone with symptoms
10 whose work could not be done from home and all social
11 care workers and residents in care homes (with or
12 without symptoms)."

13 Can I ask you, then, with that having been
14 identified and also, then, allocation of testing, having
15 regard to allocation of testing between the four
16 nations, was test capacity then increased to the four
17 nations in light of the fact that there would then be
18 testing of those without symptoms? So to ensure,
19 essentially, each of the four nations had the
20 appropriate test to do this testing of those without
21 symptoms?

22 **A.** That is a good question. And the first thing to say is
23 that I don't know for sure what the precise arrangements
24 are. As we've seen in one of the other exhibits that
25 you've shown, the agreement was that the chief medical

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1 vulnerable people."

2 And in fact there's a submission that's been
3 provided, please, which was a submission from
4 Julia Dudley and Kathy Hall, "Approach to Keyworker
5 Prioritisation for Covid-19 Testing", which is one of
6 the documents in your pack, dated 28 March 2020. Can we
7 turn to that, please, for a moment, which is
8 INQ000546879. That's INQ000546879. Thank you.

9 Can we move forward, please, in respect of this
10 submission, to paragraph 8. Go back, sorry. It's
11 paragraph 6. Sorry, paragraph 6. Thank you. Thank
12 you.

13 We can see that this paper from 28 March identified:
14 "Once we reach more than 1,000-2,000 tests per day,
15 we will move into a new mode. The legal position is
16 that Devolved Administrations ... have autonomy over
17 testing decisions. As tests are being purchased on
18 a UK-wide basis, the Chief Medical Officers will agree
19 an overall allocation for each nation based on the
20 current disease profile and activity profile. The DAs
21 will then prioritise key worker testing as best meets
22 their needs. In some cases and for some groups, 2 or
23 more of the 4 nations may choose to align their
24 prioritisation approaches."

25 Can I ask then, you've obviously identified, if we

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1 officers across the four countries would allocate
2 testing based on both population size and relative need,
3 but I'm afraid I can't say exactly what arrangements
4 were made to factor in asymptomatic testing.

5 **Q.** But are you able to help, was there someone within the
6 department that had a role for looking at issues such as
7 that?

8 **A.** To look at issues vis à vis the -- well, certainly the
9 testing team, from all the time I worked in Test and
10 Trace, our testing team had a dedicated team responsible
11 for working with the devolved administrations. So they
12 would have looked both at the operational aspects of
13 testing and any associated policy issues.

14 **Q.** Thank you. I thank you for your assistance, Mr Dyson,
15 because certainly the Inquiry has heard evidence from
16 the Covid bereaved that this was a concern particularly
17 where there was not the standard testing of care home
18 workers, and even in the second wave, for example we've
19 hearing from Hazel Gray of that being an issue linked to
20 her parents and, similarly, it's an issue that a number
21 of the Covid bereaved statements addressed their
22 concerns. So I wonder whether you could assist with
23 ensuring that, essentially, the Barnett consequentials
24 to ensure the appropriate testing were increased in line
25 with an identified need for testing of those without

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1 symptoms.

2 **A.** As I say, I'm afraid I can't offer more on the detail.
3 I can reaffirm the principle that, as you say, under the
4 Barnett principles, the firm intention was to make sure
5 that there was a fair allocation of testing capacity
6 across the four nations based on both population size
7 and the relative needs of the four countries.
8 **Q.** Thank you. Can we then, please, staying in your
9 statement B, please, move to paragraph 305, please. And
10 that's at page 67, please -- in fact, before we go to
11 paragraph 305, can we start, please, at paragraph 297,
12 page 66. And I think perhaps this is an important
13 distinction to make.

14 You tell us by reference to adult social care
15 testing:

16 "The Department's role in testing for the adult
17 social care sector is referred to at various points in
18 the statement ..."

19 But essentially you identify that there's
20 a difference by reference to adult social care and the
21 department.

22 And can you, perhaps, give the clarity, and I think
23 it's linked to where the responsibility for adult social
24 care sits within local authorities; can you just clarify
25 the position, please?

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1 there was any particular discussion with the devolved
2 nations about how this rollout and testing priorities
3 would operate across the four nations, or was that
4 solely for the devolved administrations?

5 **A.** That would have been a matter for the devolved
6 administrations.

7 **Q.** Thank you. Thank you. Can we then, please, move back
8 to another topic, please, on international cooperation,
9 please, and can we move back into your first statement,
10 please, INQ000587292.

11 It's at page 28, please, at paragraph 113. Thank
12 you.

13 Now, you tell us that:

14 "Throughout the pandemic, the Department interacted
15 with other countries and international partners to
16 identify best practice with regard to testing and
17 contact tracing."

18 And if we can move to the next paragraph, please,
19 you identify that:

20 "The Department [also] established the Testing and
21 Contact Tracing International Forum to share insight and
22 learning from other countries' testing and contact
23 tracing programmes ..."

24 And you detail the attendees there.

25 Can I ask, because it's identified as

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1 **A.** To clarify the position as regards the department's
2 relationship with the social care sector?

3 **Q.** Please. Thank you.

4 **A.** Yeah, so the department has overall responsibility for
5 policy in relation to adult social care, but funding for
6 adult social care is a combination, broadly speaking --
7 there are some exceptions to this, but broadly speaking,
8 of funding allocated by what at the time was the
9 Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities,
10 and also locally-raised revenue. So local authorities
11 have -- also have much greater flexibility, if you like,
12 to decide how to deploy funding and what policies to
13 follow. Notwithstanding that, we may come on to this,
14 the department did play a very active role in working
15 with the adult social care sector throughout the
16 pandemic to support testing, amongst other
17 interventions.

18 **Q.** Thank you. Can I then, please, having identified that,
19 can we move to paragraph [306], which is the creation of
20 a digital portal. Thank you.

21 You refer to the creation of this digital portal to
22 facilitate the rollout of the testing programme in adult
23 social care from 13 May 2020 and to allow care home
24 workers to access tests.

25 And I think the -- can you assist, please, whether

26

1 representatives from the United Kingdom; would that also
2 include representatives from the devolved
3 administrations?

4 **A.** I don't know whether the devolved administrations did
5 attend some or all of these meetings. What I can say is
6 that, at the same time as these international forum
7 meetings were taking place, we were meeting, I suspect,
8 on almost a daily basis with the devolved
9 administrations. So if they were not at these meetings,
10 and if significant issues had arisen in them, I have no
11 doubt that we would have discussed them with the
12 devolved administrations.

13 **Q.** And that's the follow-on. What was the way to cascade
14 knowledge and learning? Is that from what you've just
15 said in the meetings that followed?

16 **A.** Yes. There were multiple forums through which we worked
17 with the devolved nations. My team, which was a policy
18 team, had a, we had dedicated leads for liaising with
19 counterparts in the devolved administrations, so we were
20 regularly discussing policy issues in relation to
21 testing and contact tracing, but there were
22 complementary arrangements for operational cooperation
23 through the testing programme, and as I've mentioned,
24 the Joint Biosecurity Centre was providing advice, on
25 the epidemiology and understanding how Covid was

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1 spreading, to all four nations.
 2 **Q.** Thank you. Can I then ask you some questions, please,
 3 around the development of the app, and perhaps before
 4 doing that, can we just contextualise. We know that
 5 there's reference to the contact tracing app in the May
 6 strategy that it was hoped that it would be available
 7 "in a few weeks' time", but as it happened, the Inquiry
 8 has heard quite a lot of evidence about the development
 9 of app 1 and app 2, so I don't want to spend time going
 10 over that chronology we've heard, but we know, as it
 11 happened, it wasn't until the September time that the
 12 app was available, and I think utilised in England and
 13 then Wales.

14 **A.** Mm-hm.

15 **Q.** That was not until the end of September. So can you
 16 assist when it was anticipated that there would be
 17 a contact tracing, an app that would have a contact
 18 tracing function, what impact that delay in it being
 19 operational had on the scaling up of contact tracing,
 20 please?

21 **A.** To the best of my recollection, it didn't alter the
 22 plans we were making for scaling up of what's sometimes
 23 called manual contact tracing, although I think "manual"
 24 is a slightly misleading term because even standard
 25 contact tracing does rely to some extent on digital

29

1 pathogen. This includes both forward and backward
 2 contact tracing, with forward tracing forming the
 3 primary approach during the pandemic."

4 We can see that principally, I think, a forward
 5 contact tracing approach was taken rather than backward
 6 contact tracing. Can you assist as to the consideration
 7 of that, as to the effectiveness, please, of contact
 8 tracing by the department?

9 **A.** It's worth saying there was some backward contact
 10 tracing undertaken, particularly from, I think, the
 11 summer of 2020 onwards. So one of the changes we made
 12 within the contact tracing service was to ask people
 13 who'd tested positive not just about who they'd been in
 14 contact with in the previous two days, but to ask them
 15 to think back, I think it was, seven or ten days, about
 16 who they'd come into contact with, and provide some
 17 clues or indications as to where they may have become
 18 infected. And that enabled Public Health England and
 19 local authorities to start to identify where there might
 20 have been outbreaks associated. So essentially where
 21 you have multiple people testing positive in the same
 22 setting or in the same area, that can then lead you back
 23 to how you manage outbreaks.

24 But it's certainly correct to say that at the start,
 25 the big focus was on forward contact tracing as a way of

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1 support. So essentially during April and May, PHE,
 2 together with the department, the business services and
 3 authority -- the Businesses Services Authority and
 4 others, were working to make sure that we had sufficient
 5 standard contact tracing capacity, if I can call it
 6 that, to deal with the projected number of positive
 7 cases and contacts there would be.

8 So from the best of my recollection, I don't think
 9 that was affected by the timing of the introduction of
 10 the app.

11 And although you're absolutely right that -- I think
 12 at that point in the pandemic, there was perhaps greater
 13 emphasis being placed upon the importance of the app,
 14 sometimes, I think, to the exclusion of people thinking
 15 about the benefit of standard contact tracing, certainly
 16 we geared up to make sure that we had a standard contact
 17 tracing service able to deal with all positive cases and
 18 their contacts.

19 **Q.** Can we then just deal with it as a topic, please, using
 20 your third statement, please, INQ587346. If we start
 21 really with the purpose of contact tracing,
 22 paragraph 10, please, on page 4. You tell us that:

23 "Contact tracing is a longstanding public health
 24 measure used to identify individuals at risk of having
 25 been infected with -- and manage the spread of -- a

30

1 essentially identifying people who -- individuals who
 2 had come into contact or were thought to have come into
 3 contact with a person who had just tested positive and
 4 then to advise them to self-isolate.

5 **Q.** Can I ask you, you detail within the witness statement
 6 essentially the process of the scale-up --

7 **A.** Mm-hm.

8 **Q.** -- and how then the Public Health England teams and then
 9 the involvement, latterly, of the local authority
 10 Directors of Public Health, but certainly one of the
 11 issues and themes in the Inquiry is the
 12 under-utilisation of the local contact tracing and the
 13 skills of the Directors of Public Health. I think you
 14 just identified how there was some backward contact
 15 tracing that started in the summer of 2020. Do you
 16 identify that link as to when the contain framework was
 17 established in the July of 2020 and essentially looking
 18 to use more of those local resources by the Directors
 19 of Public Health?

20 **A.** So there are a number of issues here. I mean, first
 21 off, can I say I think it's a critical piece of learning
 22 from the pandemic that we understand, as far as we can,
 23 the -- how you get the best balance between local and
 24 national. And certainly in hindsight there are things
 25 which I think a number of us wish we'd done slightly

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sooner, to strengthen the local element of that relationship.

It's also worth saying that -- and we've touched a bit on this already, that from the start, there was certainly local authority involvement in the more complex cases. So even before the introduction of test and trace, where there was an outbreak in a care home or a prison, it would very often be the public health protection team, that's a regional team, working with local authorities to take appropriate action in that setting.

So there had been an element of local contact tracing from the start, and indeed, when we established the test and trace service on 28 May, it was built into the model from the start that you have essentially a three-tier system and the first tier is where the person who's tested positive is from -- say, somebody who works in a care home or a school or a prison, and straight away those cases would be referred to health protection teams who would then often work with local authorities.

So that is context in terms of what was done from the start.

The big change in from around June/July onwards, was to start to look at people who'd tested positive and

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needed for that central contact tracing, or who thought a centralised approach was the best way to go initially?

A. The -- so, again, I think there are a number of questions caught up in that.

In terms of who thought the centralised system was the way to go, ultimately that was a ministerial decision, but it was based on the -- as I recall, the firm recommendations of both Public Health England and the team within the department that was responsible for what became test and trace, it was called I think the Test, Trace and Certify programme at the time.

So the team in the department and Public Health England, supported by the NHS Businesses Services Authority, had identified that the most efficient and effective way of scaling up contact tracing at the start would be through that three-tier model. The first being the local for the high-risk cases and the more complex contact tracing; the second element being health professionals -- doctors, nurses and other health professionals that were brought in to act as people who interviewed the person who had tested positive. And then finally the third tier was the contact tracers who essentially phoned people who were identified as contacts.

Q. Can I ask you, would you agree that if the local level

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whose details had therefore come into the contact tracing system, and where the central tracing teams were unable to reach them. So the central tracing teams would have routinely emailed, texted, and then, where they didn't get a response, they would seek to phone them. But we were finding that some people with either not engaging or were engaging later than was ideal. And so the approach taken at that time was to start to ask local authorities to do the tracing of positive cases for those who the central service had been unable to reach.

And I think that was an important step in, if you like, harnessing the -- what local authorities could bring to contact tracing with the greater efficiency that you could get from doing more straightforward contact tracing on a national basis.

Q. And can I ask you, in terms of the central service and the building up of that from scratch, I've described it as call centre contact tracers, albeit they may have been operating virtually as a call centre, but who in the department had an input into the numbers or that centralised model initially before the skills of the local authorities and local contact tracing was identified as really being the preeminent skill? Can you help as to who identified the numbers that were

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infrastructure of contact tracing was utilised from the outset, it would have increased test and trace capacity?

A. Um, so certainly it would have been advantageous. There is no doubt about this. It would have been advantageous if, early on, it had been possible to adopt the blended tracing model that we did.

I think it's still the department's view that where you have what I'm going to call straightforward cases -- and essentially by that, I mean somebody who has tested positive who is ready to engage, ready to share information about their contacts, and then it's relatively straightforward to get in touch with those contacts and pass on advice. For those more straightforward forms of contact tracing, I think the department's view still is that there are obvious efficiencies in doing that on a national basis. But yes, I agree that particularly where there are people who are perhaps either more reluctant to engage with the national service or are taking time to engage with the national service, it would have been beneficial to have the local tracing element in place sooner.

Q. Thank you.

Then can I ask you, why did it take until July for this to be established and only then, I think initially, on a pilot level in certain local authorities?

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1 **A.** Partly for the -- I mean, for the obvious reason, and
 2 this is, I think, another key lesson, that we didn't
 3 have plans in place before the pandemic, and
 4 certainly I, you know, my personal view -- yeah, my
 5 personal view is that that should be a key learning for
 6 the future: that you plan in advance for the type of
 7 local, national blend that you're likely to need.
 8 I think the other thing I'd draw out is that there
 9 may have been a degree of optimism bias, if I can call
 10 it that, in terms of how successfully the national
 11 service would be able to get in touch with people and
 12 get in touch with them quickly. It did do that for the
 13 majority, indeed the great majority, for most of the
 14 pandemic of people who tested positive, but I don't
 15 think anybody had quite anticipated that there would be
 16 a sizeable minority of people who were either not
 17 engaging or really taking time to come back and engage
 18 with the National Tracing Service.
 19 **Q.** Thank you.
 20 Now, I'm not going to go through the aspect of your
 21 statement that deals with the local outbreak management
 22 plans and essentially the allocation in June of 2020 of
 23 the 300 million to local authorities to develop local
 24 outbreak management plans, but can I ask you, was lack
 25 of resources also an inhibiting factor to the

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1 **Q.** Thank you. Can I then ask you, on the app, please, in
 2 your statement, please, at paragraph 127.
 3 So this is in the INQ000587346 statement, please.
 4 That's INQ000587346, statement C. It's paragraph 127.
 5 It's just a question on the use of the contact
 6 tracing app.
 7 **A.** Mm-hm.
 8 **Q.** And obviously you give the detail within the statement
 9 about that development and rollout.
 10 If we could go though, please, to INQ000587346 at
 11 paragraph 127. Thank you.
 12 You deal there with:
 13 "Interoperability with the devolved administrations
 14 was discussed at an early stage. Wales chose to join
 15 with England in adopting the NHS COVID-19 app, while
 16 Scotland chose to develop its own contact tracing app.
 17 Northern Ireland joined with the Republic of Ireland in
 18 adopting a test and trace application. The NHS COVID-19
 19 app was interoperable with the Northern Irish
 20 StopCOVIDNI app because it was also based on the
 21 Google/Apple system and became interoperable with the
 22 Protect Scotland app in November 2020."
 23 Are you able to assist as to liaison that took place
 24 with the Welsh Government as to why they stuck with the
 25 NHS Covid-19 App and didn't develop their own contact

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1 establishment of a localised system of contact tracing?
 2 **A.** As I say, the -- I don't think it was ever considered,
 3 and I think it's still the department's view that it
 4 would be unwise to consider a system where you put all
 5 of contact tracing responsibility with local
 6 authorities. So that model would certainly not have
 7 been possible, but nor do I think would it have been
 8 desirable.
 9 It is certainly the case that as we started to roll
 10 out local tracing partnerships, there were times when
 11 local authorities were unable to deal with the volume of
 12 cases that were being referred to them, and we had to
 13 adopt a very flexible model whereby we could adjust the
 14 thresholds that you use to determine which cases a local
 15 authority takes on, and which cases the national service
 16 continues to operate.
 17 So yes, it's possible that certainly at the margins,
 18 additional resources would have been helpful.
 19 It's worth emphasising, though, that the money
 20 allocated to local authorities under the Contain
 21 Outbreak Management Fund, which you've referred to, was
 22 definitely intended to give them as much flexibility as
 23 they needed in deciding how to -- how best to use that
 24 resource to tailor testing, tracing and support for
 25 self-isolation to the needs of local communities.

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1 tracing app?
 2 **A.** I didn't have any direct involvement on this particular
 3 issue so I can't, I'm not sure I can add much in terms
 4 of the specific conversations that took place with
 5 devolved administrations, but I -- I'd reiterate what,
 6 I think, both Matthew Gould and Simon Thompson have said
 7 in previous sessions about the regular contact we had
 8 with all four nations throughout the development of
 9 the -- of the app 1 and app 2.
 10 **Q.** Thank you.
 11 And if we could go back a page to your
 12 paragraph 125, thank you, you deal there with the
 13 analysis from the NHS Covid app by reference to the
 14 Nature article of May 2021 and so, essentially, you
 15 identify the positive things that the UK -- sorry, the
 16 app that was rolled out and used in England and Wales
 17 had by reference to preventing a million cases, of
 18 44,000 hospitalisations, and saved 9,600 lives.
 19 But can I ask as to whether you can assist in
 20 identifying the analysis of the data from the app,
 21 whether you can help with the trend that was also picked
 22 up in at Nature article which is -- please can we go to
 23 that very briefly, INQ000475153 and it's internal
 24 page 27, please, INQ000475153 -- thank you. And could
 25 the map be expanded.

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1 So obviously there's been some review of the article
2 but, obviously, no reference to this universal trend of
3 low uptake across Wales. Had that -- has that been
4 spotted at any point by the department and can you cast
5 any light on why there appears to be the low uptake of
6 16-20% or even lower in one area, almost universally
7 across Wales, please?

8 **A.** So on the first question I'm afraid I can't be
9 absolutely sure. I do know that as a -- well, as a test
10 and trace service within the department, we were very
11 alert to what we knew to be the risks of different
12 levels of uptake in different communities, but I'm
13 afraid I don't recall any specific discussions about
14 this strikingly low uptake in Wales.

15 And sorry, the second part of the question was?

16 **Q.** Whether there had been any analysis of it.

17 **A.** Whether there'd been any analysis. Um, I don't know,
18 I'm afraid.

19 **Q.** Okay, thank you.

20 **LADY HALLETT:** I should just say I think -- was it

21 Mr Drakeford or somebody questioned the accuracy of the
22 map.

23 **A.** Mm-hm.

24 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Can I ask you bearing in mind the department
25 has relied upon the data to identify those positive

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1 **A.** I -- my recollection is that this would have been
2 considered throughout April and May. Certainly when
3 I was involved in both April and May we were thinking
4 about the impact of -- that would arise once we are --
5 once we are testing on a much more widespread basis and
6 contact tracing on a widespread basis, and therefore
7 asking thousands of people to self-isolate.

8 **Q.** Thank you.

9 And then can we move forward, it's a paragraph
10 that's within reflections and lessons learning. It's
11 paragraph 203, please, at page 65, and just on this
12 theme of isolation, support for isolation and
13 enforcement, you say this:

14 "Some of the individuals culled in the development
15 of this statement reflected that, for any future health
16 threat, it will be important to consider carefully the
17 balance of potential benefits and risks in making rules
18 on self-isolation and other public health measures
19 legally enforceable, taking account on the one hand the
20 value of reinforcing the critical importance of these
21 rules and on the other hand the potential impact on
22 uptake of testing and engagement with contact tracing
23 and the challenges of enforceability. Some individuals
24 consulted in the development of this statement also
25 reflected on the potential advantages, subject to public

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1 things that the app had identified, has the department
2 identified any issue with the data that fed into this
3 Nature article?

4 **A.** Not that I'm aware of, but I am not familiar with any
5 work that's been conducted since the pandemic which
6 could have touched on that.

7 **Q.** Thank you. Can I then move on to a separate topic,
8 please, which is support for isolation and then the
9 enforcement of isolation.

10 And to contextualise the question, can I ask you, if
11 we look in your statement D, please, INQ000587345, and
12 can we go to paragraph 109 at page 35 of statement D,
13 please. Thank you. Thank you.

14 You deal with the rollout of the contact tracing and
15 also, at paragraph 110, that the department recognised
16 that, for some people, self-isolation was likely to have
17 an impact in respect of loss of income, concerned about
18 job security, loneliness.

19 And I think if we look at paragraph 108 also,
20 please, I think it had already been identified by the
21 department in May of 2020 the inequalities that
22 self-isolation would cause to individuals.

23 Can I first of all capture when the department had
24 identified that there was going to be a disproportionate
25 impact of isolation on many?

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1 health advice, and behaviour insights, of encouraging
2 and enabling individuals to take a greater personal role
3 in giving information to their close contacts (to
4 complement the role of contact tracing teams) and of
5 exploring how to strike the right balance in terms of
6 the detail and specificity of self-isolation rules
7 (bearing in mind the possibility that what are perceived
8 as overly restrictive rules could limit adherence).
9 This requires understanding both the science behind how
10 any future pandemics operate and behavioural insights
11 into how people are likely to respond to rules or
12 guidance and applying that knowledge to implement
13 tailored measures specific to the threat. These
14 reflections are not Departmental policy but have been
15 included in this statement so that lessons learned by
16 individuals who worked on testing, contact tracing and
17 self-isolation policy during the pandemic can be
18 documented."

19 And so obviously -- that's obviously a clear view
20 that is not attributed to any one individual, but did
21 you have an input in that particular paragraph, and is
22 that expressing your own personal views, Mr Dyson?

23 **A.** It expresses a number of views and it's probably worth
24 saying that these reflect views of people who were
25 involved in the Department of Health and in Test and

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1 Trace. I suspect you would get somewhat different views
2 if you spoke to people in other parts of government, but
3 certainly the -- this reflects I think both my views and
4 a number of my colleagues' views at the time.

5 **Q.** Now, you deal with the history around the development of
6 the self-isolation payment that came in at the end of
7 September alongside the legal enforcement of isolation.
8 And we -- I think in fact you led on the policy for
9 isolation support payments?

10 **A.** Mm.

11 **Q.** And we're going to hear some evidence I think from
12 Baroness Harding on Thursday that identifies a pitch
13 that was made to make the scheme equivalent to the jury
14 service payment, where essentially you could claim
15 £64.95 per day for the ten days.

16 Can I ask you, just by way of overview, can you help
17 as to why it took, when it was identified that people
18 need financial support to isolate, and that certainly
19 seemed to have been identified as early as May, if not
20 earlier, why it took to almost the end of September
21 before there was a scheme, leaving aside the Statutory
22 Sick Pay, that provided a scheme for financial support
23 for isolation?

24 **A.** Yeah. You have said leave aside Statutory Sick Pay, so
25 I'll only touch on that --

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1 So it's partly they felt we weren't providing firm
2 enough evidence that it would have a positive impact,
3 and second, they were concerned, from memory, that there
4 are difficulties in providing financial support when you
5 can't verify that people are then self-isolating, people
6 could be paid but not self-isolate.

7 **Q.** Thank you. And can I ask you, having looked at what you
8 say about the May of 2020, the Inquiry has also heard
9 evidence from Professor McKee that detailed that
10 isolation is a key element of a pandemic control
11 strategy and was a weak link in the United Kingdom, with
12 a key element being financial vulnerability due to
13 comparatively low Statutory Sick Pay, at 29%, and
14 inadequate emergency payments, leaving many without
15 adequate financial protection?

16 Would you agree that by May of 2020 there was
17 a recognition within the Department that there was lack
18 of adherence to self-isolation advice which undermined
19 the efficacy of the Test and Trace Programme?

20 **A.** This is an important point, and I haven't got the --
21 I haven't got Professor McKee's statement in front of me
22 but, from memory, he refers to reported evidence that
23 only 20% of people were self-isolating, and the point
24 I just want to emphasise is that that was a statistic
25 based on people who had symptoms of Covid, and sadly,

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1 **Q.** It is -- and it's more this specific fund that gave
2 support to individuals to isolate.

3 **A.** The reason why I think both Statutory Sick Pay and other
4 benefits is relevant in this context, because certainly
5 the view of Treasury at the time was that the
6 combination of Statutory Sick Pay and the eligibility
7 that some people on low incomes would have through other
8 benefits, income support, housing benefit, and so forth,
9 coupled with the furlough scheme, provided, in their
10 view, a reasonable and proportionate response.

11 That was not our view within the department and with
12 Test and Trace, and throughout June, July and August we
13 worked with Treasury colleagues and others to seek to
14 identify some different possible ways of specifically
15 opening up financial support to, or more generous
16 financial support to people on low incomes, and the
17 reason those weren't initially successful was, I think,
18 primarily, primarily a view within Treasury, amongst
19 Treasury ministers, that first off, they were
20 unconvinced that this would have the impact we claimed
21 it would. We felt this was very important, particularly
22 in getting people to come forward for testing in the
23 first place, where we knew that the financial
24 disadvantages they would face if they tested positive
25 and were then asked to self-isolate were a barrier.

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1 through most of the pandemic, and certainly at this
2 time, I think fewer than 30% of people with symptoms
3 were getting tested.

4 The surveys that we were doing within Test and
5 Trace, and these were borne out later by studies done by
6 the Office for National Statistics, showed that if you
7 did come forward for a test and you tested positive or
8 if you were identified by Test and Trace as a contact,
9 you were likely to self-isolate. So very, very
10 different results for people with symptoms versus
11 confirmed cases and their contacts.

12 And what we also found from our surveys and from the
13 ONS surveys was that even if some people said that they
14 weren't following the strict letter of the rules, the
15 great, great majority reported that they avoided contact
16 with other people. So they might leave the house to go
17 for a walk, but they were not going to work, they were
18 not going to bars or restaurants. So I think there's
19 a crucial distinction between self-isolation for people
20 with symptoms and self-isolation for people who tested
21 positive.

22 But I think that reinforces what was then our view
23 that, given one of the critical elements of the
24 successful testing and tracing service is people's
25 willingness to come forward for testing in the first

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place, if you know that the financial consequences of testing positive and then self-isolating might be a deterrent, then that is certainly something we felt we needed to test, and that was borne out by pretty much all our conversations with local authority, Directors of Public Health.

Again, they couldn't provide the hard and fast evidence that Treasury colleagues were looking for but I think it's fair to say that every local authority Director of Public Health we spoke to said this is a big issue, particularly in more disadvantaged communities.

Q. Now, having asked you to put aside Statutory Sick Pay, can I ask you, do you agree that the lack of Statutory Sick Pay infrastructure around the Test and Trace system, and inadequate emergency payments compared to other countries undermined the Test And trace system's efficacy?

A. We don't have, I think it's important to emphasise we still don't have good hard and fast evidence on this. I still don't think we know how far -- how far either the level of SSP, which I think was -- is about 90, 94, £95 at the time per week, we don't know how far the level of SSP or eligibility for SSP was a factor, so we can't quantify it, but certainly, as I say, our concern and that of local authorities and Directors of

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specific impact on any group in society, and I think you've had an opportunity just to review that paragraph of Professor Machin's report.

Can you assist, what steps were taken by the Department to ensure that vulnerable communities, including ethnic minority groups, were properly informed of and supported in accessing support for self-isolation?

A. So, again, I agree, this is a critical issue. And from the start, the -- and I'm not saying we always got this right by the way, but from the start the department and the test and trace service were looking to understand how we could make sure that you have a combination essentially of three things. One is good comms and engagement to make sure that people understand not just what the rules or guidance say, but also why it's important to self-isolate, so to provide the motivation to do so when you're asked.

The second is the practical, social and emotional support.

And the third, which we've touched on already, is the financial support.

And throughout the work we did, we were trying to strike a -- we were trying to get a balanced package across all those three elements. That's reflected in

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Public Health, were, first off, that the level of Statutory Sick Pay was unlikely to be enough to encourage everybody who needed to, to self-isolate. And second, that there were key groups, like people on lower incomes, the self-employed, people on zero-hours contracts and so forth, who wouldn't benefit from it.

Q. Thank you.

Can I then, please, still in your statement D, please, INQ000587435, turn to your page 112 please -- sorry paragraph 112, page 36.

And it details the self-isolation equality issues identified by the Department in its May and September 2020 equality impact assessments and the mitigations which were put in place to address them, and also references then the equality impact statements -- impact assessments shared with ministers on 21 May 2020. Thank you.

Can I ask you, because the Inquiry has an expert report of Professor Machin, and the view taken by Professor Machin is that the equality impact assessment completed in England was inadequate and the evidence it presents is inconsistent with established knowledge on the disproportionate impact of self-isolation on certain groups in society, and the report continues: a clear rationale has not been provided for why there is no

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part in the work that we did with local authorities, starting with the contain framework which you've mentioned, and the funding given to local authorities under the Contain Outbreak Management Fund, which was designed in part to enable then to communicate and engage with different communities working with voluntary organisations, faith groups, Community Champions and so forth, but was also designed to enable them to offer or partner with the voluntary sector and others to either offer or signpost people towards support.

What we found when we were looking at this in the autumn of 2020 was that although there were some excellent examples of what local authorities had done, there was also some inconsistency, and that led to the decision to develop a framework governing practical, social, and emotional support, and to give additional funding, which I think began in January of 2021, to local authorities to enable them to go further in either offering or mobilising offers of practical support for people self-isolating.

But I -- having said all that, I think the main point I would make is that I think lots of us working on Test and Trace at the time would, with hindsight, say that we wish it had been possible to do more, sooner, and I think this is a critical element of preparedness

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1 for future pandemics: that however technically good your
2 testing and tracing systems, they're only as good as the
3 willingness of people to -- the willingness and ability
4 of people across different communities to use them.

5 **Q.** Thank you.

6 **LADY HALLETT:** Sorry to interrupt, what would you have done
7 sooner? You've been through one or two things. Do you
8 have a list of what you and your colleagues to feel
9 could have been done sooner?

10 **A.** I can give some examples of that. The -- I've mentioned
11 the framework that we developed, which was -- you know,
12 it was just a framework, but all the local authorities
13 we've worked with said that they found it a helpful
14 framework for understanding the different elements of
15 practical, social and emotional support you should
16 offer, and being given additional targeted funding to
17 help with mobilising that support. We did that in
18 January 2021, I think. I wish we'd done it sooner.

19 Similarly, it was about that time that we introduced
20 the medicines delivery scheme for people self-isolating
21 which had already been in place for people who were
22 shielding but it wasn't until 2021 that we extended that
23 to people self-isolating, and again, with the benefit of
24 hindsight, I wish we'd done that sooner.

25 But more broadly -- I think the broader thing

53

1 And finally on lessons learned and recommendations,
2 please, Mr Dyson, a good part of witness statement D, at
3 pages 50-69, deals with lessons learned and reflections
4 and recommendations. But can I ask you, in respect of
5 data, if we can just display page 64, please -- sorry,
6 62, "Diagnostics and Data Are Crucial in a Pandemic
7 Response", but can I ask you specifically first of all,
8 and if there's time a follow-up question: how did the
9 department's shortcomings in respect of the collection
10 and evaluation of data exacerbate the inequalities faced
11 by ethnic minority healthcare workers and communities in
12 relation to test, trace and isolate policies, please?

13 **A.** The -- so -- first to say that, again, data sharing is
14 important, and was recognised as such from a very early
15 stage. So I -- there were some features of the way that
16 we had to establish initial services at huge pace and at
17 scale, that meant that the right data sharing
18 arrangements weren't in place at the start, but from,
19 I think, May onwards it was an explicit role of the
20 Joint Biosecurity Centre within Test and Trace to work
21 with local authorities to improve data sharing. But I'm
22 very aware that there have been a number of criticisms
23 about the speed at which that happened, and the scale at
24 which it happened.

25 What I can't do is -- I think it would be -- I'm not

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1 I would say is -- and I believe there's some evidence
2 from the UKHSA on this, and this is work that UKHSA have
3 done since the pandemic, but what they found, and I hope
4 this is a fair characterisation of their work, is that
5 some of the things we did to communicate and engage
6 better worked, some worked less well. So it was quite
7 mixed. And the things that work best is where you are
8 working through local groups. It may seem a very
9 obvious point but having local authority Directors of
10 Public Health and their team, able to work with those
11 voluntary organisations, faith groups, Community
12 Champions and so forth, is probably the most important
13 thing when it comes to cutting through and making sure
14 that people not only have got the support they need, but
15 also that they understand the importance of engaging
16 with testing and self-isolation, and so forth.

17 And I think a critical part of future preparedness
18 for pandemics is having the protocols in place from the
19 start to understand how you -- essentially how -- at the
20 same time within the first hundred days that you are
21 building up your testing and contact tracing capacity,
22 within those first hundred days, how are you working
23 with local communities to build trust and willingness to
24 be part of the response?

25 **Q.** Thank you.

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1 sure that anybody could do this -- is to pinpoint the
2 quantitative difference that that made, to ask the
3 "what if?" What if this data had been available sooner,
4 can we quantify the impact that would have? I suspect
5 that would be very difficult and I certainly can't
6 provide an answer on that.

7 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Thank you.

8 My Lady, that's my time up, and so there are Core
9 Participant questions from Covid Bereaved Families for
10 Justice Cymru.

11 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.

12 Ms Parsons, I don't know whether Ms Cartwright has
13 left you ... I think she may have pinched at least one
14 of your questions.

15 **MS PARSONS:** She has, my Lady. In fact, both our permitted
16 questions have been covered by this witness but I wonder
17 whether I might be able to follow up, just briefly, on
18 the first of those topics, that's scientific advice on
19 asymptomatic transmission?

20 **LADY HALLETT:** Certainly.

Questions from MS PARSONS

22 **MS PARSONS:** Thank you.

23 Good morning, Mr Dyson. I ask questions on behalf
24 of the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru.

25 Your statement describes good levels of coordination

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1 and collaboration between the scientific communities of
 2 the four nations. I want to ask you about scientific
 3 advice on asymptomatic transmission.
 4 **A.** Mm-hm.
 5 **Q.** And I do appreciate the limitations that you've given in
 6 your evidence this morning on what you can help us with,
 7 but the Inquiry heard last week from Mr Hancock that he
 8 received advice, scientific advice, on 14 April 2020,
 9 and that advice marked a major change of approach. In
 10 short, it meant that asymptomatic transmission became
 11 a baseline assumption for policy making and decision
 12 making.

13 Can you help at all with whether that scientific
 14 advice would have been shared among the four nations?
 15 **A.** I'm afraid I can't. I'd only refer back to what I said
 16 before, that certainly the principle throughout the
 17 pandemic, I've no reason to suppose it was different at
 18 the time, the principle was to work very closely across
 19 the four countries in relation to both scientific advice
 20 and public health advice, but I'm afraid I can't shed
 21 further light on what specific information was shared at
 22 that point in relation to asymptomatic testing.

23 **LADY HALLETT:** It seems likely, doesn't it?

24 **MS PARSONS:** It does.

25 Thank you.

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1 **LADY HALLETT:** Dame June, thank you for coming back to help
 2 us.

3 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

4 **MS MALHOTRA:** Could you state your full name, please.

5 **A.** June Munro Raine --

6 **Q.** Now, Dame Raine, you've --

7 **LADY HALLETT:** Dame June, I think.

8 **MS MALHOTRA:** Dame June, you have provided a witness
 9 statement dated 2 April 2025. We can see the date there
 10 in the top right and on the final page as well.

11 Have you had an opportunity to familiarise yourself
 12 with your witness statement recently?

13 **A.** Yes, I have.

14 **Q.** I am very grateful.

15 Can you confirm that the contents of that statement
 16 are true?

17 **A.** I can confirm that.

18 **Q.** Now, this is a corporate witness statement on behalf of
 19 the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency,
 20 I'm going to refer to it as "the agency", meaning,
 21 effectively, that you've had the input and the benefit
 22 of a number of other individuals in preparing this
 23 witness statement; is that right?

24 **A.** I have, very much so.

25 **Q.** And this is your Module 7 witness statement, I believe

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1 Thank you, Mr Dyson.

2 **LADY HALLETT:** Well, given how much the CMOs were working
 3 closely together.

4 **A.** Yes, I'm perhaps being over cautious in not speculating
 5 about things that I don't know. I would find it very
 6 surprising, but I've been warned not to speculate too
 7 much about things. I can't be sure.

8 **LADY HALLETT:** Right. Thank you very much indeed for your
 9 help, Mr Dyson, and for providing the reflections from
 10 you and some of your colleagues. It has been extremely
 11 helpful. And I repeat what I've said many times to
 12 other people from government departments, particularly
 13 the DHSC: I am so acutely aware of the burden that we've
 14 been placing on you and your colleagues, so thank you
 15 very much for what you've done and your colleagues have
 16 done to help us.

17 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you.

18 **LADY HALLETT:** Very well, I shall take the break now and
 19 return at 12.10.

20 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Thank you.

21 (11.54 am)

(A short break)

23 (12.11 pm)

24 **MS MALHOTRA:** The next witness, my Lady, is Dame Raine, CBE.

DAME JUNE RAINE (sworn)

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1 your fourth to the Inquiry. You've previously provided
 2 written evidence in Module 3, Module 4, and Module 5 and
 3 you've also given evidence in Module 4, so you'll be
 4 certainly familiar with the process. Could I just
 5 invite and remind you to keep your voice up and to speak
 6 into the microphone, please.

7 Now, you were the chief executive of the agency
 8 until 31 March of this year; is that right?

9 **A.** I was.

10 **Q.** Now, at paragraphs 5 to 10 of your statement you give
 11 details of your professional background and your
 12 statement will be published, as you know, on the website
 13 so that the public will have the full context of your
 14 witness statement and your professional background. So
 15 I hope you will forgive me for not repeating it now.

16 With regard to your roles and responsibilities as
 17 chief executive of the agency, you say at paragraph 5 of
 18 your statement, page 2, that you were accountable to
 19 health ministers for ensuring that the agency took all
 20 possible steps to ensure that medicines, medical devices
 21 and blood products for transfusion meet appropriate
 22 standards of safety, quality, effectiveness and
 23 performance; is that correct?

24 **A.** That's correct.

25 **Q.** And the -- just in terms of the regulator, the agency,

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1 it's an executive agency of the Department of Health and
2 Social Care; is that correct?

3 A. It is.

4 Q. And it takes decisions on behalf of the Secretary of
5 State; is that so?

6 A. It does.

7 Q. And the function of the agency is wide and your
8 statement touches upon various aspects of it. For the
9 purposes of why you're here today to give evidence with
10 regards to Module 7, it's with respect to Test, Trace
11 and Isolate. As succinctly as possible, could you
12 please summarise for us the role that the agency played
13 with regard to testing of Covid-19?

14 A. Well, thank you. The agency played the role as it does
15 with all medical devices, from clinical investigations,
16 these are proposals to undertake studies, right through
17 to looking at surveillance. The important point the
18 agency undertook during the pandemic was to be flexible
19 and adaptable, and one of the key tools is the
20 exceptional use authorisation when there is no available
21 product and a medical need arises.

22 Part of the flexibility and adaptability was also to
23 use the very extensive scientific resource the agency
24 has to produce target product profiles to drive up
25 industry, scientific endeavour to produce the best

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1 notified body or from an approved body, as now we can
2 issue a UK CA mark. But as I have tressed, during the
3 pandemic, we were able to use the power to exempt
4 companies from meeting those standards and requirements
5 by issuing an exceptional use authorisation.

6 So I hope I've helped with the distinction there
7 that the generality is that we do not approve, but in
8 this case, we were capable of making judgements about
9 the circumstances and the data needed to exempt
10 a product from CA mark -- CE marking, or UK CA marking.

11 Q. And, in fact, there were 17 occasions when the use of
12 exceptional authorisations was made; is that right?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Now, there are three topics, time permitting, that I'd
15 like to explore with you. The first is wastewater
16 testing; the second is issues with those diagnostic
17 tests that we've outlined; and thirdly, recommendations
18 for the future.

19 So starting with wastewater testing, please. The
20 agency played a role in wastewater testing; is that
21 right?

22 A. That's correct, but building on experience as a WHO
23 collaborating centre for polio, where there's
24 a long-established monitoring role looking for any
25 fragments of the polio virus that might hint that this

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1 possible products to benefit the public's health.

2 And it's very good to know that those target product
3 profiles, including for self-testing of asymptomatic
4 people, had benefits worldwide, so a flexible and
5 adaptable agency focusing on the access safely to
6 innovative diagnostics.

7 Q. And so with regard to diagnostics, that were used during
8 the course of the pandemic that we're concerned with,
9 LFD tests and PCR tests, what was the role of the agency
10 with regard to those two tests?

11 A. The lateral flow device tests and the PCR, the
12 polymerase chain reaction tests, are both medical
13 devices, and as just mentioned, we would be concerned
14 with any clinical investigations that were to be
15 conducted and we would also conduct surveillance. And
16 in respect of our tool that we used extensively in the
17 pandemic, exceptional use authorisations, we used that
18 for those particular types of diagnostics.

19 Q. Now, in your witness statement -- I needn't take you to
20 it -- you say that the agency didn't approve testing
21 kits, but it regulated them. Could you perhaps explain
22 the distinction, please?

23 A. The generality is that a medical device, and that
24 includes a diagnostic like a lateral flow test, receives
25 a conformity assessment mark, either from a European

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1 was coming back, which is clearly something our
2 immunisation policy colleagues would wish to prevent.
3 There was evidence in the pandemic that the SARS-CoV-2
4 virus particles, the ribonucleic acid, could be picked
5 up in a similar way. So what our scientists did was to
6 look back to ask the question: did what we might pick up
7 in the wastewater, the sewage, mirror clinical
8 infections?

9 Q. Just coming to that, then, you set it out in your
10 witness statement page 26, paragraph 82, that, by
11 testing waste water samples from a North London sewage
12 site serving 4 million people retrospectively, the
13 agency was able to ascertain that on 11 February 2020,
14 so three days before the first case of Covid-19 was
15 reported in the sewage plant catchment area, low levels
16 of SARS-CoV-2 viral ribonucleic acid was present, so RNA
17 was present; is that right?

18 A. That's correct. And further samples showed an increase
19 in concentration as Covid took hold in that area.

20 And more importantly, my Lady, is we were able to --
21 the agency scientists were able to pick up variants when
22 the genetic sequence changes. So, overall, an important
23 piece of work, although, as counsel is saying,
24 retrospective at that stage.

25 Q. Can you help us with whether it was possible to

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1 undertake the testing of wastewater samples prior to
 2 July 2020?

3 **A.** It would have been possible, particularly as the
 4 technology and the research team had already used that
 5 methodology, that kind of research, for polio, and it
 6 was important that that continued. The discovery that
 7 SARS-CoV-2 fragments had been detected in other
 8 countries was what triggered the piece of research we're
 9 talking about.

10 **Q.** So do I understand it then that the reason why it was
 11 done in July 2020 as opposed to earlier was because of
 12 what the agency was viewing happening overseas?

13 **A.** Yes.

14 **Q.** And that prompted then -- for the retrospective
 15 investigation.

16 Can you help us, then, if that information had been
 17 known in realtime, sort of, say, for example, in
 18 March 2020, how could that have been used in responding
 19 to the threat posed by the virus in those early stages?

20 **A.** From what we know now, it could have been an early
 21 warning, and it could have been systematically used to
 22 look for variants as they appeared well before --
 23 appreciably before clinical cases then were tested. And
 24 it's a matter of thinking that this could be done
 25 UK-wide and even internationally to help us be on the

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1 nature -- forgive me, I'm no scientist -- given they
 2 change their nature, how might you detect a novel virus
 3 like Covid-19 was, if you were doing this kind of -- or
 4 would you only start it once you knew something more
 5 about the new virus?

6 **A.** The Covid-19 was actually one of the viruses that the
 7 scientists in our laboratories had actually been ready
 8 to look for, because of the experience with SARS and
 9 MERS. As you say, my Lady the challenge is to expect
 10 the unexpected, but I think it's quite clear that there
 11 could be a hit list or a panel of multiple pathogens
 12 that, perhaps with an international agreement, would be
 13 what was systematically looked for.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** And if you're talking about -- as ever,
 15 everything comes back to resources -- what size of cost
 16 are we talking? Are we talking a huge amount of money
 17 to give the agency the kind of resources it needs? Are
 18 we talking about a reasonable amount of money? What's
 19 reasonable depends -- (overspeaking) --

20 **A.** I think I would build from the funding which CEPI has
 21 already used, and look at this study to see what
 22 a business case would look like. I'm sure that's very
 23 much in the thoughts of the scientists who are currently
 24 looking at what an international or a local system might
 25 mean.

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1 front foot and look for these early warnings.

2 So if I continue a little bit, this is a subject
 3 we're looking at carefully at the moment. You find what
 4 you look for. Should we be expanding the range of kinds
 5 of viruses that wastewater testing could look for?

6 **Q.** And just on that point, then, can you help us
 7 understand, what are the limitations to wastewater
 8 testing?

9 **A.** At the moment we have a small team, our polio team,
 10 whose names are on the paper, together with Public
 11 Health England. The reliance on grant funding; the
 12 funding from the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
 13 Innovations has been invaluable. And the need for the
 14 kind of international network -- we might come to this,
 15 considering the World Health Organization is now looking
 16 to build alignment internationally. So there are
 17 several things, the science, capability, and capacity,
 18 the funding, and the design of a system which could be
 19 switched on and scaled up as needed.

20 **LADY HALLETT:** So basically are you talking about
 21 a surveillance going on the whole time?

22 **A.** In a --

23 **LADY HALLETT:** As well as --

24 **A.** -- defined set of viruses or other pathogenic organisms.

25 **LADY HALLETT:** So, given that viruses change in their

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1 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.

2 **MS MALHOTRA:** Just -- you said there, in response to my
 3 Lady's question, that coronavirus was something that the
 4 scientists were already looking into.

5 If it was something they were already aware about,
 6 it was already on the horizon and were looking into, can
 7 you help us with why it was then only in July that there
 8 was this retrospective review?

9 **A.** I would say that the priority was to create the
 10 standards and reference materials that our laboratory
 11 scientists are expert at. They supply over 90% of the
 12 standards worldwide. And these are the materials that
 13 enabled testing, diagnostics, to be accurate and
 14 reproducible and consistent. So that really was the
 15 first priority in mind. And as I mentioned a moment
 16 ago, only when it was clear that we could adapt the
 17 environmental surveillance was that piece of work done.

18 **Q.** We've -- I've asked you about the limitations and you've
 19 given us some practical limitations to wastewater
 20 testing with regards to grant and funding and
 21 resourcing. Can you help us -- and obviously you need
 22 to know what you're looking for in order for there to be
 23 value with regards to wastewater testing, can you help
 24 us with what the real benefits of wastewater testing can
 25 be?

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1 **A.** It would, I think, enable early warning and monitoring
 2 variants. Those are the clear benefits, if scaled up
 3 and adequately resourced.
 4 I think it's worth, perhaps if we do touch on the
 5 World Health Organization agreement of last week,
 6 thinking about the pathogen access and benefit sharing
 7 group that would, I think, now need to be the basis for
 8 the design of a system, and let's look forward to
 9 countries involved putting their scientists into this
 10 work.
 11 **Q.** You've mentioned the WHO agreement that has been
 12 recently reached. I think it was last week it was
 13 signed. We've got that available.
 14 I wonder if we could bring up INQ000587665, please.
 15 This is the WHO report. And if we go to page 13,
 16 a number of articles -- it says there at the bottom of
 17 the page -- I'm not sure why it's highlighted green but
 18 that's how it's been provided:
 19 "Each Party shall strengthen its national and, where
 20 appropriate, regional regulatory authority responsible
 21 for the authorisation and approval of pandemic-related
 22 health products, including through technical assistance
 23 from, and cooperation with the World Health
 24 Organization ..."
 25 And I think, if it goes over to the next page:

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1 agile in response, including equitable access.
 2 **Q.** That can be removed.
 3 I'd like to move on to ask you about DHSC self-test.
 4 Now, the Inquiry has heard evidence the test already and
 5 I'd like to focus on the agency's role with regard to
 6 this test. Now, for context, the agency provided DHSC
 7 with support to become a legal manufacturer of
 8 self-tests, also known as the lateral flow device tests;
 9 is that right?
 10 **A.** That's correct.
 11 **Q.** And Innova was the manufacturer of the test; is that
 12 correct?
 13 **A.** Yes.
 14 **Q.** And DHSC subcontracted the provision of the supply of
 15 the kits to Innova; is that so?
 16 **A.** Yes.
 17 **Q.** And the agency seconded a member of staff to DHSC to
 18 support the efforts including ensuring that instructions
 19 for those self-tests were fit for purpose; is that
 20 right?
 21 **A.** Yes, the goal was to integrate a good understanding of
 22 regulatory requirements and to be able to look at an
 23 application from the DHSC in the shortest time possible.
 24 There was very great care taken to ensure that the
 25 staff, the teams of scientists and clinicians who would

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1 "... and other international organisations upon
 2 request and other Parties as appropriate, with the aim
 3 of ensuring the quality, safety and efficacy of such
 4 products."
 5 So, in essence, what article 8 is dealing with here
 6 is to make available and to update information on
 7 regulatory processes for authorising the use of
 8 pandemic-related health products and to promote strong
 9 regulatory systems with international alignment where
 10 possible.
 11 And can you help us whether the agency is ready for
 12 this or taking steps to be ready towards this?
 13 **A.** Well, absolutely. It happens to come at a time point
 14 when the agency, as in the statement, is already looking
 15 at changing, reforming the law on medical devices, and
 16 that includes diagnostics. But what we see here, and
 17 it's, I think, right through the agreement, is a focus
 18 on equitable access, which I think is part and parcel,
 19 as was said before, no one is safe until everyone is
 20 safe, and for that reason, the coming together to look
 21 at what an expedited pathway, like the emergency
 22 exceptional use authorisation might look like, what
 23 effective vigilance is like on an international scale,
 24 and reliance on decisions made by other regulators. So
 25 all about this -- about being better prepared but more

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1 look at the data were not involved in close advice to
 2 the department. So that separation was very
 3 fundamental.
 4 **Q.** Now, the agency granted an exceptional use authorisation
 5 on 22 December 2020; is that correct?
 6 **A.** Yes.
 7 **Q.** And that was because there was no CE marking, the CE
 8 marking you've already referred to that signifies the
 9 medical advice complies with EU legislation; is that
 10 right?
 11 **A.** Yes, and there was no alternative product available, CE
 12 marked.
 13 **Q.** And on 10 June 2021, the US Food and Drug
 14 Administration, the FDA, issued a safety notice and
 15 a recall letter with regard to those Innova LFD antigen
 16 tests; is that right?
 17 **A.** That's correct.
 18 **Q.** And if we can have up INQ000496261, we can see here, and
 19 I'll perhaps deal with it as briefly as possible, there
 20 were three reasons cited here that we can see: firstly,
 21 the tests had been distributed in the US without the
 22 food and drug administration approval; secondly, the
 23 labelling included a clinical performance section which
 24 claimed a level of sensitivity and specificity that was
 25 not matched by the evidence that the FDA had seen at the

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time of the inspection; thirdly, that there were significant failures in the quality management system in the company; and fourthly, it's dealt with in the section below, that Innova did not notify DHSC of the FDA audit and findings.

So I would like to ask you about the second and third of those matters, please, if we could turn to page 2. We can see here that the false negative results which may lead to delayed diagnosis or inappropriate treatment and false positive results that could lead to a delay in both the correct diagnosis and the initiation of an appropriate treatment, can you help us understand whether the agency was satisfied with the information it received about the efficacy of these tests, in particular their sensitivity and specificity?

A. Yes, I can. And I think the first thing to say in this context is that the use in the UK for asymptomatic people, people feeling okay, at home, was different from the use in the US. And what data were provided at the time of the application back in December 2020, assured us on the laboratory analytical accuracy, and on field studies and thirdly, usability. The question, of course, is always in a regulator's mind overall benefit and risk, and I'm sure even with the prism of reflection back we can all see what a change it meant to allow

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University of Birmingham. And he explains in his statement, I don't think we need to pull it up for time, but he had an official role within the agency between the March '21 and July '21 as a member of the In Vitro Diagnostics Expert Advisory Group. And he gives reference to a letter that the group wrote on 8 July 2021 to the Director of Devices at the agency, and we can see that and I will ask that that is pulled up, INQ000531145, please.

Thank you.

We can see this was the letter that was sent, and if we go to page 2, for example, he sets out, the letter sets out a number of concerns and issues. So for example, it says there at paragraph 1:

"We would advise that prior to any further extension of the Authorisation of Specialist Use [the agency] should seek independent evidence and not just rely on evidence submitted by the manufacturer."

Was this a concern that you recognised?

A. The agency always takes into account all available evidence at the time of reaching a position but what's important about Professor Deeks' letter and the In Vitro Diagnostic Expert Advisory Group is that we also have access to independent experts to, if you like, challenge our decisions. I think I could explain that at the time

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people, enable people to test at home rather than driving to a testing centre. And to have a result within 15 minutes or half an hour. So a benefit in enabling that change, big change to happen.

Of course the sensitivity of the test was very much in mind, and the fact that we've already heard, I think, from some witnesses about the debate about how infectiousness and being asymptomatic relates to amount of virus, the viral load in the body. So there were some uncertainties but the judgment that resulted in the issue of the authorisation was that about two-thirds of cases would be identified and prevented and chains of transmission could be broken, such that there would be benefit at that time.

So the reasons for the agency's decision, I think, were clear.

Having said that, absolutely inherent in that decision was very clear mitigations, and a very clear message to self-testers, to people using this test, is that a negative does not guarantee or mean that you do not have Covid. And that was always very clear. This was what we call a red light test not a green light test.

Q. Now, the Inquiry has received evidence from Professor Jon Deeks, a medical statistician at the

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of the FDA letter and recall, we paused an extension and carefully considered at that time, which was mid-'21, whether it was still justified, knowing that the company were preparing for a CE mark, and we were eagerly anticipating that they had done the work for that. We had also, the agency had also audited the company and was aware of areas that needed attention in their systems, which we may come to.

So this, I think, accords with the view of the agency. Of course, the question then later in the letter is that the changed terms of the EUA did include one off testing prior to an activity which the expert advisory group had concerns about.

Q. And that CE marking is dealt with at paragraph 4. And at paragraph 3 the letter raises the independent scrutiny of the claim that the test has 95% sensitivity for infectious people. Can you help us with whether the Innova test achieved the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval above 60%?

A. I would have to check data available at that time to assure you on that, although clearly we were monitoring, this is mid-June, work ongoing, for example, the Liverpool study.

Q. And there were a number of reports -- I needn't take you to any more -- but a number of reports and concerns

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1 about the efficacy of the tests, false positives, false
2 negatives. Should the agency have been more robust in
3 its scrutiny of the Innova and other test kits once
4 approved, given the significant risk from inaccurate
5 results?

6 **A.** I'd like to be clear that the issuance of an exceptional
7 use authorisation is really just a milestone. There is
8 a very rigorous ongoing monitoring and a set of
9 requirements, particularly around post-market
10 performance follow-up, that, if you like, we're sitting
11 on the company's tail or the legal responsible body's
12 tail all the time, fortnightly updates in this case. So
13 I would like to assure you that the approach of the
14 agency is very rigorous and ongoing.

15 **Q.** Can you help us, the agency was involved in assessing
16 the swabs, for example, and can you help us with what
17 consideration was given to those who were, for example,
18 neurodivergent or healthcare workers with regard to
19 using that method of testing? Was that within the
20 regulator or the agency's thinking?

21 **A.** Yes, it was and I know that our test team had a lot of
22 ongoing interactions, to make sure that the instructions
23 for use were as helpful as possible, available in 11
24 languages, and also a video. So multiple modalities for
25 people to understand really quite an important and very

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1 you know, that digitalisation of these end-to-end
2 processes has made a very big difference. I hope the
3 comments are helpful but in a nutshell, we wouldn't have
4 had a responsibility for this.

5 **Q.** And similarly on 13 May 2020, if we can pull up
6 INQ000511161, page 1, here there were concerns that were
7 raised, voiding of samples because of faulty kit, so
8 split tubes, two samples in the same tube, labels
9 covering lids of tubes, samples with no liquid and
10 sample tubes not being sealed correctly.

11 And then if we go to INQ000511111, page 1, there's
12 reference here to unvalidated tubes. Can you help us
13 with regard to the agency's role in swabs and sample
14 collection tubes?

15 **A.** These are as individual consumables, subject to the
16 requirements of the medical device legislation, and the
17 regulations that we oversee and give guidance on, and
18 depending on any signals we get, any harm that results,
19 as I say, we would distinguish our role to ensure that
20 products perform as appropriate and are safe. However,
21 the issues around what happens in a laboratory, the
22 standards that apply there need to be looked at through
23 the accreditation role.

24 **Q.** Just finally, I'd like to ask you about the Randox
25 tests, so sticking with that theme. The Randox tests --

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1 clearly defined set of requirements there.

2 **Q.** Did the agency have any role in regulating the
3 Lighthouse laboratories?

4 **A.** The agency doesn't have a role in regulating laboratory
5 practice, this is the UK assessment service, UKAS, that
6 does this. And will leap in, though, if products are
7 being used that are non-compliant, they don't meet the
8 standards that would be expected under the legislation.

9 And we didn't have any reports. Otherwise we would
10 have, as I say, jumped in.

11 **Q.** Now, the Inquiry has received some evidence in April of
12 2020, correspondence between the Catapult Medicines
13 Discovery (sic) and Deloitte, with regard to voiding of
14 test results caused by the use of supermarket sandwich
15 bags, and we can see that at INQ000511040 at page 2.

16 Can you help us with the agency's role with regard
17 to collection of those samples?

18 **A.** Requirements in terms of the function of the medical
19 device, in this case I think it is the PCR test, are
20 clearly described. These laboratories were working
21 under enormous pressure and, as I say, it isn't the
22 MHRA's role to step in and regulate how their processes
23 work. I'm assuming that the processes would have been
24 evolving rather rapidly and I think we've hearing about
25 Rosalind Franklin, for example, being state-of-the-art,

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1 at paragraph [146] of your statement, you explain that
2 the National Testing Programme flagged them to the
3 agency. Can you explain what the issue was that was
4 raised with you?

5 **A.** The issue was that the regulation of this kind of
6 product is a matter for the categorisation that allows
7 for self-certification, unless any part needs to be
8 sterile and in the case of these kits, the swabs needed
9 to be sterile, as you can imagine. The worry about
10 a contaminant, either making the test invalid or causing
11 patient harm. So the agency was very clear that there
12 had to be microbiological or cultures done to test if
13 there was contamination.

14 The understanding, shortly after that alert was
15 given to the agency, was that there had been
16 communication to stop use. I believe that was on
17 15 July. And that had gone out on gov.uk. The reason
18 for the recall later was that it became clear that the
19 kits were still being used and therefore they had to be
20 removed until such times the swabs were sterile.

21 **MS MALHOTRA:** Thank you. That completes my time with you,
22 Dame June, thank you.

23 I believe there are some Core Participant questions.

24 **LADY HALLETT:** Certainly, I think Mr Thomas is first.

25 Mr Thomas is over there.

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Questions from PROFESSOR THOMAS KC

PROFESSOR THOMAS: Good afternoon, Dame June, just a few questions. My name is Leslie Thomas and I'm representing FEMHO, that's the Federation of Ethnic Minority Healthcare Organisations.

A. Good afternoon.

Q. Between 3 March 2020 and 30 June 2022, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency received 3,400 adverse incident reports through the Yellow Card Scheme relating to devices using Covid-19 testing. These included reports of missing or defective kit components and possible incorrect results, and we note that all reports were triaged and assessed under normal safety surveillance processes. We would like to explore how this monitoring system functioned for healthcare workers, particularly those from ethnic minority backgrounds. So with that in mind, let me turn to my questions.

Firstly, Dame June, can you assist us with what steps were taken to ensure that healthcare workers, including those from ethnic minority backgrounds, were aware that the Yellow Card Scheme could be used to report concerns about Covid-19 diagnostic tests such as the lateral flow and the PCR tests?

A. Well, thank you, it's a really good question. Many of

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A. I participated, as someone from an executive agency of the Department of Health, in multiple interactions, largely led, I believe, through NHS England, and my laser focus was on ensuring outreach on reporting. I mentioned, I think in Module 4, as an example, working with Vaughan Gething in Wales for this. But I did also stress that more can be done, and I think for the future a planned approach will be really important.

Q. Finally this: in light of feedback that the scheme lacked transparency, or trust among some groups, what changes would the MHRA now recommend to ensure that future safety reporting systems are inclusive, responsive and actively used by those most at risk?

A. Thank you. This is a really important question and an important priority, I believe. My legacy for the agency is a yellow card strategy that does include this kind of much more facilitated interaction. The ability for our what we call interactive drug or device analysis prints to be able to search out relevant information for the health professional who is interested in a particular safety issue is at the heart of that.

And I think there will be a lot more that you will see as that important strategy moves forward.

I think that a key development and a key milestone in our reform of legislation for medical technology is

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the healthcare workers will have received messages about reporting for medicines, but in fact the Yellow Card Scheme took reports on medical devices, including diagnostics, since 2014, I believe. So they would have known that they could report. But the important point is that a Covid portal was set up by the May, and that was particularly to invite reports, not just about medicines or vaccines, but about medical devices.

Q. Were any of the 3,430 reports linked to patterns of concern raised by frontline health or care staff, and did the MHRA analyse this data in a way that captured occupational or demographic context, including ethnicity?

A. We do capture the reporter's specialty or profession, and -- that's really part of the analysis that's done. I'm not aware that the scheme actually looks into the demographics, ethnicity, and so forth, of the reporter. We do that for the patient.

So I think that's a gap you've highlighted, and would like to look further into it.

Q. Okay.

What engagement took place with NHS bodies, professional associations or community health networks, to promote participation in the scheme among healthcare workers from minority ethnic backgrounds?

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coming into force of post-market surveillance requirements, which is the middle of June. So a lot is happening, and more will be done.

PROFESSOR THOMAS: Dame June, thank you.

LADY HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Thomas.

Ms Maragh is just there.

Questions from MS MARAGH

MS MARAGH: Thank you, my Lady.

Good afternoon, Dame June. I am Thalia Maragh and I ask questions on behalf of the Covid Bereaved Families for Justice UK.

Two topics, if I may, starting with the Yellow Card reporting and online system of surveillance to which you were taken just now.

And, my Lady, with your leave, if I could just tailor my question in light of the matters explored with Dame June with Mr Thomas.

And it's this: you mentioned moving towards equitable access. And bearing in mind that the online reporting system, it was digital, it was online, would you agree that the exclusive use of online platforms for reporting lost, late or incorrect test results potentially excluded sections of the populations such as those -- the elderly and the digitally excluded?

A. Thank you for your question. It's really important.

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1 The agency has kept alive different ways of reporting
 2 and it's quite clear that someone can report on your
 3 behalf, so you just need to tell someone that you've got
 4 a concern or a worry, and your health professional or
 5 a member of the family can do that for you. But it's
 6 still possible to phone or to use a paper report,
 7 a card. So I hope that is of some reassurance, but
 8 digital exclusion we do understand is a very important
 9 issue.

10 **MS MARAGH:** And I think, my Lady, that deals with the second
 11 question in terms of forward planning.

12 Dame June, may I move to my next topic briefly,
 13 which is NHS Digital, which you touch on at paragraph 63
 14 of your statement.

15 In short, the MHRA software team worked with
 16 NHS Digital in the Covid-19 app in relation to the
 17 development of contact tracing and the lateral flow
 18 device reader.

19 Knowing, as we now know, that there were -- by the
 20 time the NHS app was rolled out, there were more than
 21 three symptoms which were known to detect Covid-positive
 22 symptoms, however the app only captured fever, cough and
 23 shortness of breath.

24 Firstly, was the NHS app subject to the MHRA
 25 regulatory oversight and scrutiny?

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1 trust in experts, including government, isn't a taken as
 2 read.

3 **MS MARAGH:** Thank you.

4 My Lady, that's as far as I will take that point in
 5 light of Dame June's answer.

6 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much indeed.

7 Dame June, that completes the questions. I think it
 8 probably completes your assistance to the Inquiry, so
 9 thank you very much indeed for all that you've done to
 10 help the Inquiry and, of course, your colleagues, who
 11 have helped prepare the statement.

12 **THE WITNESS:** And the agency as a whole, my Lady, has made
 13 an immense and outstanding effort in this time of
 14 crisis -- with results.

15 **LADY HALLETT:** I'm really grateful to everybody, and may
 16 I wish you luck in your so-called retirement. I suspect
 17 it won't be retirement if you're anything like me, but
 18 thank you very much for your help.

19 **THE WITNESS:** I'm very grateful to you, my Lady.

20 **LADY HALLETT:** I shall return at 1.55.

21 **(12.57 pm)**

22 **(The Short Adjournment)**

23 **(1.55 pm)**

24 **LADY HALLETT:** Ms Nagesh.

25 **MS NAGESH:** My Lady, the next witness is Dr Robin Howe.

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1 **A.** The app needed to conform to the requirements as
 2 a medical device, yes.

3 **Q.** So in light of the limitation at the start of the
 4 rollout of just the three symptoms, was there regulatory
 5 oversight over the period of the life of the app, in
 6 terms of data updates?

7 **A.** I'm very confident there will have been. I can't give
 8 you a date as of today as to when a change in taste or
 9 smell might have been added in there as a symptom, but
 10 the coherence of the different sources of information is
 11 a really important one, and the app was clearly very
 12 well used, as we heard earlier from the previous
 13 witness.

14 **Q.** Right. It's just that during the life of the app, there
 15 were known to be more than the three symptoms, however,
 16 it was not updated. And so the question and the issue
 17 for you, if you can assist us, is whether the failure to
 18 pick up on the additional symptoms could be considered
 19 as a gap in the regulatory framework?

20 **A.** Well, those additional symptoms -- as we know, Covid had
 21 a different manifestations in different people, really
 22 important point. I would be surprised if the app wasn't
 23 updated, but I stand corrected if you're able to speak
 24 with confidence on that one. It's something consistency
 25 between information sources, really important, otherwise

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1 Could the witness please be affirmed or sworn.

2 **DR ROBIN HOWE (sworn)**

3 **Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY**

4 **MS NAGESH:** Dr Howe, thank you for coming to give evidence
 5 to the Inquiry. May I ask you, please, when you're
 6 answering questions just to keep your voice up and to
 7 direct the answers towards my Lady.

8 Now, Dr Howe, you have produced, helpfully, two
 9 witness statements for the Module 7 of the Inquiry. The
 10 first you'll see on screen is a corporate witness
 11 statement, and we can see in the first line two names:
 12 Dr Giri Shankar and yourself, Dr Robin Howe. That's
 13 because this statement is jointly signed by both of you;
 14 isn't that right?

15 **A.** That's correct.

16 **Q.** And just to put things into context, you were both
 17 professional lead consultants for Public Health Wales
 18 during the pandemic, and Dr Shankar was the professional
 19 lead consultant in health protection and you were the
 20 professional lead consultant in microbiology.

21 **A.** Correct.

22 **Q.** Now, but as this is a corporate witness statement, not
 23 only have yourself and Dr Shankar contributed to the
 24 statement, but where matters you've been asked about
 25 fall outside your or Dr Shankar's personal knowledge or

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1 experience, is it right that you've sought input from
 2 others within the organisation?
 3 **A.** Yes, correct.
 4 **Q.** If we could turn, please, to the last page, which is
 5 page 132 of the statement. Can you see at the top of
 6 the page there's what's headed as "Statement of Truth"
 7 attesting to the facts in the witness statement being
 8 true to the best of your knowledge or belief. Does that
 9 remain the case today?
 10 **A.** Yes, that's correct.
 11 **Q.** And is it the case that although only you attend to give
 12 evidence today, you are able to speak to all matters in
 13 this statement?
 14 **A.** Yes.
 15 **Q.** Thank you. And the second statement is a statement
 16 you've produced individually on behalf of yourself,
 17 dated 2 May 2025, and that's on screen as well. And
 18 again at page 24, do we see a statement of truth which
 19 you've signed attesting to the facts in the witness
 20 statement being true to the best of your knowledge and
 21 belief?
 22 **A.** Yes, correct.
 23 **Q.** And again, does that remain the case today?
 24 **A.** Yes.
 25 **Q.** Thank you. Now, both statements and their exhibits are

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1 **A.** Yes.
 2 **Q.** So following that interest you were chair of the British
 3 Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy Standing
 4 Committee for antimicrobial susceptibility testing since
 5 2012?
 6 **A.** Yes.
 7 **Q.** And then from 2014, you were working within Public
 8 Health Wales as the national clinical lead for the
 9 microbiology division, which meant that you were
 10 providing overall clinical leadership for the Public
 11 Health Wales microbiology service?
 12 **A.** Yes, that is correct.
 13 **Q.** And then in February 2020 you, alongside Dr Giri
 14 Shankar, became an incident director for the Public
 15 Health Wales Covid response?
 16 **A.** Yes.
 17 **Q.** And outside your role as incident director, your main
 18 role during the pandemic was focused on Covid testing
 19 and you were the lead for the team delivering laboratory
 20 testing across Wales and also advising on operational
 21 and scientific matters.
 22 **A.** [No audible answer].
 23 **Q.** Then, finally, in April 2022, you were appointed to the
 24 new role of director of Infection Services in Public
 25 Health Wales; is that correct?

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1 with the Inquiry and the statements will be published,
 2 but -- so please rest assured that the Inquiry will be
 3 taking everything in those very full witness statements
 4 into account. But for today's purposes, if I may,
 5 I want to just focus on some specific topics and ask for
 6 further clarification or assistance with those as far as
 7 you're able.
 8 So let's start, please, with your professional
 9 background. You qualified in medicine in 1989 having
 10 trained in Cambridge and Newcastle upon Tyne; is that
 11 right?
 12 **A.** Correct.
 13 **Q.** You then trained in microbiology at Sheffield and
 14 Bristol and became a consultant senior lecturer at
 15 Bristol University and North Bristol NHS Trust in 2002?
 16 **A.** Correct.
 17 **Q.** In 2025 you moved to Cardiff to undertake the role of
 18 consultant microbiologist and head of the Welsh
 19 Antimicrobial Resistance Programme for the National
 20 Health Protection Service which was the predecessor to
 21 Public Health Wales?
 22 **A.** Yes.
 23 **Q.** And your particular area of professional interest has
 24 always been -- or has been, all aspects of the
 25 antimicrobial resistance?

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1 **A.** Correct, yes.
 2 **Q.** And so if we can just then go through a broad overview
 3 of Public Health Wales, it was established in 2009,
 4 wasn't it, as an independent NHS body in Wales, is
 5 that --
 6 **A.** Yes, correct, yeah.
 7 **Q.** And is it right that its overarching function is to
 8 provide professionally independent public health advice
 9 and services?
 10 **A.** Yes, correct.
 11 **Q.** One of those services is public health related
 12 specialist advice to the Welsh Government and its
 13 ministers?
 14 **A.** Yes.
 15 **Q.** And in order to provide those services there is, within
 16 Public Health Wales, a health protection division?
 17 **A.** Correct, yeah.
 18 **Q.** And that encompasses within itself several teams
 19 including, for example, the Communicable Disease
 20 Inclusion Health Programme and the All Wales Acute
 21 Response team?
 22 **A.** Yes, correct.
 23 **Q.** And as we've touched upon so far as your role during the
 24 pandemic is concerned, in relation to the Inquiry and
 25 this module in particular, you provided advice in

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1 relation to Test, Trace and Protect services in Wales?
 2 **A.** Yes.
 3 **Q.** But importantly, you weren't the decision maker in
 4 relation to any test, trace or protect services. I use
 5 the word "advice" because you provided advice to the
 6 Welsh Government and they were the ultimate decision
 7 maker?
 8 **A.** Yes, because Public Health Wales is part of the NHS and
 9 not part of Welsh Government.
 10 **Q.** Thank you. So that's an overview of your role. If we
 11 can move, then, on to one specific task which you had
 12 relatively early on during the period in which we're
 13 looking, which was the development of a health
 14 protection response plan.
 15 And just so we can see what it is can we have up,
 16 please, INQ00056350, page 1, thank you.
 17 So is this the "Public Health Protection Response
 18 Plan", which you led the development of, and we see
 19 a publication date of 5 May 2020?
 20 **A.** Yes, that's correct.
 21 **Q.** If we can turn to page 3 of that same document, please.
 22 There's an introduction, and going down the page we can
 23 see the heading "What needs to happen", and it says:
 24 "The Plan outlines three major activities for
 25 concerted public health action at scale. These are:
 93

1 I believe, a seven working day consultation with its
 2 stakeholders?
 3 **A.** Yes, that's correct.
 4 **Q.** What I wanted to ask you about that timeframe is this:
 5 with just under two weeks for the development of the
 6 plan and then something like 11 days before the
 7 publication of the Welsh Government Test, Trace, Protect
 8 strategy, do you consider that gave adequate time for
 9 the development of, and consultation on, the plan?
 10 **A.** It was a very challenging timetable, although Public
 11 Health Wales had already been in discussion with
 12 colleagues in Welsh Government and also been doing some
 13 work in the background on thinking about, you know, the
 14 TTP programme that would be required.
 15 But nevertheless, those -- I think it was ten
 16 working days, were very challenging, both to pull
 17 together the breadth of the document and then have some
 18 consultation. And in fact, the consultation that we
 19 were able to have with colleagues, stakeholders across
 20 Wales was really only 24 to 48 hours. But we did get
 21 helpful feedback that then -- that did play into the
 22 response plan.
 23 **Q.** Thank you. Now, we know, of course, you developed the
 24 plan but the Welsh Government were responsible for
 25 delivery of the plan. During the development process,
 95

1 "1. Preventing the spread of disease through
 2 contact tracing and case management ...
 3 "2. Population surveillance ..."
 4 And then over the page, please:
 5 "3. Sampling and Testing different people in
 6 Wales ..."
 7 So the language sounds relatively familiar to us now
 8 here at Module 7 of the Inquiry, and is that because
 9 this Public Health Protection Plan formed the basis of
 10 Test, Trace, Protect strategy in Wales?
 11 **A.** Yes.
 12 **Q.** Now we'll return to its contents a little later but if
 13 we could just take it off the screen, please, I want to
 14 ask you a few questions first, if I may, about the
 15 development to that plan.
 16 You were instructed, I believe, to create the plan
 17 on 22 April 2020?
 18 **A.** Yes, that's when we had a formal instruction from the
 19 CMO Wales.
 20 **Q.** Thank you. And then on 4 May, so I think less than
 21 two weeks later, you submitted a final version of that
 22 plan to the CMO?
 23 **A.** Yes, correct.
 24 **Q.** Then the Welsh Government published its final Test,
 25 Trace, Protect strategy on 13 May 2020 following,
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1 to what extent, if at all, was there any involvement of
 2 the Welsh Government in the development, or was it
 3 purely Public Health Wales developing the plan and
 4 handing it over effectively?
 5 **A.** As I said, there was at this point a lot of informal
 6 discussion between colleagues in Public Health Wales and
 7 in Welsh Government so it was not -- there wasn't
 8 a formal working together on this, but informally, we
 9 knew from, you know, what we had shared with them, and
 10 vice versa, that this was -- the direction was going to
 11 be appropriate.
 12 **Q.** Now, we mentioned, of course, that the plan -- you were
 13 given the instruction by the CMO to develop it on
 14 22 April. Are you able to help us with why -- the --
 15 why 22 April, why there was no Test, Trace, Protect
 16 strategy or plan before 22 April or even before the
 17 pandemic?
 18 **A.** I'm not -- I don't recall why particularly there was
 19 a question raised on 22 April. Prior to that time, we
 20 had already started working on a TTP plan, and
 21 colleagues in Health Protection had drafted the, you
 22 know, the outline plan a couple of weeks earlier than
 23 that.
 24 Prior to that, and prior to the pandemic, the
 25 emergency response plans that we had worked through more
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1 usual health protection response levels, and didn't
2 have -- didn't take account of the extent of a pandemic
3 response such as this. They had been appropriate for
4 previous pandemics, such as the 2009 pandemic, but
5 needed a different approach.

6 **Q.** I see. Thank you.

7 Now, we've touched upon the fact that you, obviously
8 your main role was to give guidance to the Welsh
9 Government, and you helpfully mentioned that during the
10 development of the plan there was some informal
11 discussions. In relation to the guidance and advice
12 that you provided to the Welsh Government, did it
13 largely take the form of informal or formal discussions?
14 How did you provide the advice?

15 **A.** At this point and during these -- the development of the
16 plans, they were informal discussions with colleagues
17 within, predominantly, the CMO's office.

18 **Q.** And generally speaking, when you would provide advice to
19 the Welsh Government, what form would that take in the
20 early stages of the pandemic?

21 **A.** Well, there were a lot of meetings, and I think you've
22 heard previously, in previous modules, about meetings
23 between colleagues in Public Health Wales, the CMO, and
24 other colleagues in Welsh Government. And at lower
25 levels in the organisation, people such as myself would

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1 "Note: Public Health Wales had advocated contact
2 tracing to commence on the basis of symptom onset rather
3 than test results, but this was assessed as being not
4 practicable."

5 So is that one example of a time when you had
6 provided guidance and it wasn't followed by the Welsh
7 Government?

8 **A.** Yes, I think so. I mean, we felt that contact tracing
9 on the basis of symptom onset meant that it could
10 occur -- it could commence two days, on average, earlier
11 rather than waiting for a positive test. That meant
12 that contacts could be advised two days earlier to
13 modify their actions and that we felt it would have
14 a bigger impact. There was a contrary issue that,
15 without a test result, it was possible that we would be
16 contact tracing and isolating people who actually didn't
17 have Covid but had symptoms due to something else, and
18 so there was that concern about the -- that system being
19 more sensitive but less specific. And at this point in
20 the pandemic, we were looking to come out of lockdown,
21 and it was felt that putting a lot of people into
22 contact isolation potentially, when wasn't justified,
23 was not the direction we want to go.

24 **Q.** If we just turn to another piece of advice that you gave
25 to the Welsh Government at INQ000056323, page 3, please.

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1 be meeting with colleagues in the CMOs office.

2 **Q.** And then I think, am I right that from about
3 October 2020, you set up a system which you called the
4 CMO advice notes?

5 **A.** Yes.

6 **Q.** And what was that?

7 **A.** So prior to October 2020, there were a lot of informal
8 and sometimes more formal interactions, but coming into
9 Public Health Wales were a number of queries from
10 different parts of Welsh Government and other
11 organisations, and there was clearly a challenge in
12 ensuring that the Public Health Wales response was
13 collated in Public Health Wales and also directed into
14 a single point in Welsh Government, because there was
15 a danger of disparity in advice, or, you know, where it
16 landed in Welsh Government.

17 So we set up the system of advice notes whereby the
18 questions should come from CMO and the advice would be
19 given to CMO.

20 **Q.** Thank you. I'd like to just ask you, if I may, about
21 instances when the guidance you provided to Welsh
22 Government wasn't followed. First of all, paragraph 585
23 of your statement, oh thank you.

24 If we're looking at the second line, and the
25 bracketed line, you say:

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1 Thank you.

2 You've said at the top here:

3 "The Public Health Wales IMT has discussed the
4 changes from 14 days quarantine of contacts to 10 days."

5 Then in the third paragraph you explain that:

6 "Reducing the quarantine period from 14 days to 10
7 days will mean that an increased number of contacts will
8 be mixing when they are infectious ..."

9 And you finish by saying:

10 "However, we are concerned that the increased risk
11 of COVID-19 transmission is significantly greater risk
12 for individuals who work with vulnerable people,
13 specifically care home workers and healthcare workers."

14 So were you there advocating for self-isolation for
15 healthcare workers especially to stay at 14 days rather
16 than be reduced to ten days?

17 **A.** Yes, for health and social care workers to continue
18 contact isolation for 14 days.

19 **Q.** Thank you. And then if we just turn to page 1 of that
20 same document, please. And just going down to the
21 email:

22 "Robin, CMO has responded to say that we need to be
23 careful not to divert from agreed 4 nations approach on
24 this. If [Public Health Wales] have a different view,
25 they should discuss with [Public Health England]

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1 colleagues ..."

2 So again, is that another example of there being
3 pushback on your guidance, if I can put it that way?
4 **A.** Yes, I mean, there was an important principle of trying
5 not to divert from agreed four nations approaches, and
6 really, this was a situation where it was a risk
7 balance, and we felt the risk was in favour of
8 maintaining 14 days. There were a number of colleagues
9 in England who had similar reservations, particularly in
10 the world of infection control, and a paper -- following
11 this exchange, a paper was put together by colleagues in
12 England and taken to the Senior Clinicians Group. That
13 then led to an agreement that contacts would have
14 reduced isolation to ten days if they were healthcare or
15 social care workers, but that residents and patients
16 would maintain contact isolation for 14 days and we
17 accepted that view.

18 **Q.** Thank you. We can take that off the screen, thank you.
19 I just want to understand, using those two documents
20 as a touchpoint, how common was it for Welsh Government
21 not to follow your advice? Can you think of any other
22 key instances?

23 **A.** I can't recall other key instances. In general, Welsh
24 Government followed our advice. There were -- I mean,
25 we were trying to, you know, follow advice coming from

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1 **Q.** Thank you. Now, you mentioned in your answer about the
2 self-isolation periods, about liaison with Public Health
3 England, and I think that brings me to my next topic,
4 which is I wanted to ask you about your work with the
5 other nations, England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

6 One of the contributors -- to place this in context,
7 one of the contributors to the Inquiry's Every Story
8 Matters public engagement exercise said this:
9 [As read] "I think you have to have a standard over
10 the UK. You can't have something different in each UK
11 country. When you live so close to a border, you could
12 be working in England and living in Wales or vice versa,
13 and you've got two different guidelines."

14 So, bearing that in mind, what was the extent to
15 which Public Health Wales engaged with Public Health
16 England, and/or either of the public health agencies in
17 Scotland and Northern Ireland to try to aim for
18 consistency?

19 **A.** So we very regularly engaged, initially on a less formal
20 basis, but later on more formally, with colleagues in
21 England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and, you know,
22 there was an effort to try to keep key elements
23 consistent between their four nations, but health is
24 a devolved matter and it is the responsibility of the
25 Welsh Government and Public Health Wales's advisers to

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1 the CMO group as well.

2 **Q.** Thank you. I just want to ask you just a couple of
3 questions about your case management system, because at
4 the time the pandemic started, you operated using a case
5 management system called Tarian, T-A-R-I-A-N.

6 **A.** Correct.

7 **Q.** Which you'd had, I think, since 2017. Now, did there
8 come a point around the preparation of your report that
9 you consider that Tarian was not fit for purpose for the
10 test, trace and protect scheme?

11 **A.** Yes, when we were mapping out the likely demand and
12 workload within the system, and predicting that, we
13 could see that Tarian would not be able to cope. It was
14 server-based rather than cloud-based, and it was
15 designed to be able to have a maximum of 500 concurrent
16 users, and we mapped that we were going to need more
17 like 3,000 concurrent users. So, for those and other
18 reasons, we felt we needed to develop a new system.

19 **Q.** Was there a reason that Tarian was not tested or -- in
20 advance of the pandemic or at least an earlier 2020?

21 **A.** So Tarian was used up to the point at which we developed
22 the CRM, so it was used in the first tranche of contact
23 tracing that happened in February and March, but it
24 had -- you know, it had not been designed to fulfil what
25 was required.

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1 try to do the best for the Welsh population.

2 So, you know, we did take different approaches to
3 our contact tracing, for example, but at the level of,
4 you know, trying to, you know, have the same guidance
5 around 14 days or ten days, we did try to work together.

6 **Q.** You've said in your statement -- we don't need to bring
7 it up, but for your reference it's paragraph 155 -- that
8 Wales had limit ability to influence UK Government
9 decisions and that the largest porous border between
10 England and Wales was pretty much impossible to close.

11 Do you consider there ought to have been greater
12 account taken of Wales in decisions taken in
13 UK Government?

14 **A.** Well, I think it's an issue for the Inquiry around the
15 decision making at UK England level, and how the four
16 nations can be or should have been more closely involved
17 in that decision making, because there were clearly
18 issues with central decisions made that then, in
19 Wales -- that I can speak for, you know -- we then had
20 to process those and assess whether they were
21 appropriate for the Welsh population.

22 **Q.** Thank you.

23 Now just moving even further outside the borders of
24 the UK, you've mentioned again, we don't need to bring
25 it up, I think, but for your reference it's

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paragraph 576 of your statement, you've referenced that in April 2020, following a request from the Chief Medical Officer for Wales, you established an international horizon scanning and learning workstream, so a workstream looking specifically at international comparators.

My question about that is this: prior to the pandemic, or indeed earlier on at the start of the pandemic, had Public Health Wales undertaken any exercises to learn from comparative international examples in relation to Test, Trace, Protect?

A. So prior to the pandemic, Wales had -- Public Health Wales had engaged with IANPHI, the International Association of National Public Health Institutes, and in fact, you know, was a full member of IANPHI and the purpose of that was to share public health knowledge and understanding.

I'm not aware that TTP arrangements were discussed in that forum.

Q. Thank you. Now, can we move on then, please, to discuss testing. First, you may or may not have heard the evidence of Vaughan Gething last week, but he gave some evidence to the Inquiry about the decision to stop community testing on the 17 March 2020. He linked it to capacity and he said:

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So it was all of those three things that impacted, you know, what was available.

Q. Thank you. I actually do want to now move on to ask about asymptomatic testing, if I may. It may be helpful to anchor that, or these questions, in the timeline of the Welsh Government's testing strategies throughout the pandemic.

The first strategy, I believe, was developed in March 2020 and published in April 2020. Is it right that Public Health Wales had no formal input into that strategy but did have informal input?

A. Correct.

Q. And then 15 July 2020 was a refreshed Welsh testing strategy, and is it right that at that point, whilst the main focus was still on testing of symptomatic individuals, there was acknowledgement that testing of asymptomatic individuals may be appropriate in certain settings such as care homes?

A. Correct, yes. And in fact, a national framework for leading the NHS out of lockdown and into potentially more normal operations that Welsh Government published in 2020 also touched on asymptomatic testing in healthcare workers as well, and suggested that it -- excess capacity could be deployed to routinely test asymptomatic healthcare workers.

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"... if you're going to have sustained community transmission and community testing is going to come back, you need a much bigger testing infrastructure ..."

So he said it was about scale-up, the decision to stop community testing. And he said that scale-up didn't happen in the timeframe expected and that was partly due to the issues with Roche.

So I appreciate there's a bit to unpack there but can I invite you, please, to comment on that evidence of Vaughan Gething?

A. Yes, so at this point we had moved into the delay phase of response, and we were rapidly moving towards the first lockdown, people had already been enjoined to isolate if they had symptoms, so that actions were being taken in order to try to limit the spread and with lockdown, the most draconian of actions, to try to limit the spread was going to happen in the next week or so.

The issue of capacity was both an issue of testing capacity within the laboratories, but also sampling capacity in the community, in the health boards, and neither was in a position to be able to upscale at that point, and there was also an issue with capacity in terms of contact tracing. So if we had positive individuals, we didn't have the contact tracing symptom into place.

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Q. Thank you.

And then it may assist to look at INQ000227202, please. And page 1, thank you.

This is a written statement by the Welsh Government and in fact, more specifically, by Mr Gething. And this was a statement, as you can see from the second paragraph, is it right, to accompany the release of the Welsh testing strategy on 15 July?

A. Yes. Sorry.

Q. And then if we just turn to page 2, then. And if we look under the heading "Testing in Care Homes", we can see five bullet points. We can see there:

"All residents in care homes [at the first bullet point] were offered testing in May and June, whether they were symptomatic or asymptomatic."

Then again:

"Following the testing programme for all care home staff and residents, all staff in care homes have been tested on a weekly basis since 15 June, whether they were symptomatic or asymptomatic."

So do we see there a focus on asymptomatic testing as well?

A. Yes.

Q. So I just want to pause on that data of 15 July -- and we can take that off screen, thank you -- and just ask

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1 you about the advice that you at Public Health Wales had
2 given to the Welsh Government in relation to
3 asymptomatic testing.

4 So, first of all, when was it first appreciated by
5 Public Health Wales that asymptomatic transmission was
6 a possibility?

7 **A.** I think, and I speak personally, that I rather assumed
8 that there would be asymptomatic infection and some
9 level of asymptomatic transmission from the outset, from
10 translation from other respiratory viral illnesses.

11 It, however, became clearer during March, April,
12 May, that -- the extent of asymptomatic transmission.
13 I should say that, you know, asymptomatic transmission
14 was a little bit difficult to define, because it was
15 defined to an extent due to the definition of symptoms.
16 So that clearly there were -- and others have touched on
17 this, including Lord Vallance -- clearly there was
18 a small proportion of people who were without any
19 symptoms, but then a larger number of people who were --
20 who had -- who were pauci- or oligosymptomatic, so had
21 some symptoms but were not the typical symptoms.

22 And that confusion made it slightly difficult to
23 unpick some of the studies and the science as to exactly
24 what was asymptomatic or paucisymptomatic and how we
25 should use that information to determine our testing

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1 committee?

2 **A.** Well, so there was the technical advisory committee or
3 the Technical Advisory Group and I'm not -- sometimes
4 their names were used interchangeably. I think this was
5 the Technical Advisory Group, which fed into TAC, which
6 was the committee that was actually a Welsh Government
7 internal group that took the information from the
8 Technical Advisory Group.

9 **Q.** That's helpful, thank you.

10 So would Public Health Wales have been part of, do
11 you think, this meeting?

12 **A.** Public Health Wales, I think, were part of this
13 discussion.

14 **Q.** Thank you.

15 So if we then turn, please, to page 3 of this
16 document, if we look at the penultimate paragraph about
17 four lines from the bottom, thank you. And it's -- if
18 you can see, there's a line that starts "reconsidered?"
19 With a question mark. About four lines from the bottom.

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** Then -- it's being highlighted now, thank you -- it
22 says:

23 "TC suggested looking at the German approach, which
24 consisted the daily testing of all healthcare staff
25 regardless of symptoms."

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1 policies.

2 **Q.** Thank you.

3 Did you give any guidance to the Welsh Government,
4 either for the March 2020 testing strategy document or
5 for the July one, in relation to asymptomatic testing or
6 indeed, as you say, paucisymptomatic people?

7 **A.** So there was informal discussions around asymptomatic
8 testing that -- where we wanted to balance whether we
9 would be better concentrating on testing, or alteration
10 of the symptomatology, because we could increase the
11 number of healthcare workers who might be infected with
12 Covid. We could increase the detection of them by
13 either performing testing or by moderating the symptoms.

14 So there was that -- that was discussed, yeah.

15 **Q.** Now, just on that point, you've referred in your
16 statement to having conversations with other countries,
17 and in fact am I right that you -- for example, you had
18 conversations with contacts in South Korea and in
19 Germany?

20 **A.** [No audible answer]

21 **Q.** Now, just considering Germany in particular, could we
22 please have up on the screen INQ000338265, page 1.

23 Now, these are -- it says "TAC Notes", so that's the
24 technical advisory committee, dated 15 April 2020. Just
25 first of all briefly, what was the technical advisory

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1 So at this stage, 15 April, it was known in the
2 group that Germany was testing healthcare staff
3 regardless of whether they were asymptomatic or what
4 their symptoms were. Was this something that would have
5 come from your discussions with your German contact?

6 **A.** Yes. So I wasn't part of the specific discussions with
7 our German colleagues, so I'm afraid I don't know
8 exactly what was discussed with them.

9 **Q.** Thank you. You've said that this is more likely the
10 Technical Advisory Group which was -- which involved
11 Public Health Wales. Do you know whether this
12 information was provided by way of advice to the Welsh
13 Government in relation to asymptomatic testing?

14 **A.** I don't know, and I'm not sure whether Germany, at this
15 point, which was April 2020, was actually able to do
16 daily testing of all healthcare staff regardless of
17 symptoms.

18 **Q.** You're not sure whether Germany --

19 **A.** I'm not sure. I just don't know whether that was
20 actually the case. That was quite early in the pandemic
21 and would have required a huge resource in terms of
22 testing.

23 **Q.** Thank you. If you can take that off the screen. Thank
24 you.

25 Now, just linked to that, the Inquiry has heard, you

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1 may be aware, has heard in earlier modules about
2 a so-called "precautionary approach" that could be taken
3 in a pandemic. So effectively an approach to treat
4 risks such as asymptomatic transmission as a possibility
5 until they can be excluded.

6 Now, keeping in mind what you've said about the fact
7 that you always assumed asymptomatic transmission would
8 be a possibility and, on the face of it, the fact that
9 Germany seemed to be implementing asymptomatic testing,
10 did you consider that the Welsh Government were taking
11 a precautionary approach or not?

12 **A.** I think they were taking a precautionary approach within
13 the resources that were available at that time.

14 So, you know, in order to test all healthcare staff
15 with the PCR test -- you know, the simple testing
16 process takes some time, but the sampling process would
17 have taken a very significant amount of staff resource,
18 which would have been a challenge for the healthcare
19 institutions, which were really stretched in delivering
20 other elements of the pandemic response.

21 **Q.** Thank you. That answers my question, I think.

22 If we can move on, then, from asymptomatic testing
23 to the range of symptoms, and I'd just like to read out
24 an extract from a witness statement from
25 Anna-Louise Marsh-Rees of Covid Bereaved Families for
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1 apologies. I think page 12 is the ... oh no, sorry,
2 back to page 11. My fault there.

3 If we see at the top, there's a title "Expanded
4 Criteria for COVID Testing" and it says, "Author" --
5 your name, Robin Howe.

6 **A.** Yeah.

7 **Q.** And the date is 15 March. So this is advice from you
8 that's included in that ministerial advice.

9 **A.** Yeah.

10 **Q.** If we can turn to page 12 then, please. And in the
11 bottom half of that page, we see a line starting "If
12 symptom criteria are broadened there are a few issues to
13 resolve", and then you talk about issues to resolve in
14 relation to broadening the spectrum of symptoms, and
15 then over to page 13, please. "Recommendations", we
16 see:

17 "It is recommended that:

18 "Symptom criteria for public access to testing
19 should be broadened to include new and unexplained sore
20 throat, runny nose, sputum production, fatigue ..."

21 And you go on to list a number of symptoms.

22 So do you recognise this advice as being from
23 yourself?

24 **A.** Yes, yes.

25 **Q.** And then if we please go back to page 1 of this
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1 Justice Cymru, it's paragraph 36, page 13. I think
2 you've seen the statement.

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** Thank you. And she says:

5 "CBFFJ Cymru are aware that testing criteria in
6 Wales was limited to three cardinal symptoms -- fever,
7 cough and anosmia. The families and friends of many of
8 our members experienced a range of symptoms outside
9 these three symptoms, such as headaches, sore throat,
10 fatigue, nausea, and diarrhoea, amongst others."

11 And she goes on to say:

12 "The Welsh Government's failure to acknowledge this
13 broader range of symptoms in testing criteria, even as
14 late as March 2021, would have led to a very high number
15 of instances of symptomatic people continuing to spread
16 the virus."

17 Now, just pausing there and moving on to another
18 document that's linked to it, if we can have up on
19 screen, please, INQ000116616, first of all at page 1 to
20 place the document in context.

21 This was ministerial advice dated 23 March 2021, for
22 a decision by the Minister for Health and Social
23 Services.

24 If we can please turn to page 11 which might be
25 page 11, which might be a page you recognise. Ah,
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1 document, we see again a heading "Recommendation" and
2 can you see there that it says:

3 "The Minister is asked to agree:

4 "That all LHBs can recommend [local health boards]
5 can recommend testing for a wider range of symptoms

6 "[But] that our national messaging should remain
7 focused on the 3 primary symptoms until there is
8 4 nations agreement on widening the case definition."

9 So just a few questions arising from all of that
10 information.

11 First of all, can you help us at all -- you may not
12 be able to and if you can't, please say, but can you
13 help us with why the advice was to persist with national
14 messaging based on three symptoms?

15 **A.** So I think this was written at a time where, you know,
16 we understood that there was a wider range of symptoms
17 for people with Covid, and that if we wanted to optimise
18 the pick up of cases, that we should widen the
19 definition. And a number of health boards had already
20 started, because we were embedded with the health
21 boards, they had already started to do this locally.
22 And so we brought this to Welsh Government colleagues to
23 reach a more standardised national approach, and as you
24 can see from the Ministerial Advice Note, there was
25 agreement with broadening the symptomology for testing,
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1 but a wish, going back to our earlier discussion, to,
2 you know, await a four nations agreement on this before
3 pushing that at the national level.

4 **Q.** Did you or do you now have concerns that the delay,
5 perhaps I should say, to expand the range of symptoms in
6 public messaging could have resulted in individuals who
7 did suffer from Covid-19 not taking a test because they
8 didn't realise that they had Covid-19?

9 **A.** It's possible, yes.

10 **Q.** Thank you.

11 Now we'll move on, if we can, to tracing, please.
12 I wanted to ask you few questions about contact tracing,
13 and firstly about the digital element of contact
14 tracing. Is it right, first of all, that in relation to
15 contact tracing, much as with the rest of the Test,
16 Trace, Protect scheme, you sought to align with Public
17 Health England in your approach?

18 **A.** We did as much as possible, yes.

19 **Q.** Now, one specific question that has arisen time and
20 again, which you may well be able to help us with, is in
21 relation to the Welsh adoption of the NHS England app,
22 or NHSX app. We know that Wales, unlike Scotland and
23 Northern Ireland, did adopt the English app in late
24 2020.

25 Now, first of all, did you have any concerns in

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1 **A.** I think it was really just because we thought that, you
2 know, for certain sections of the community, it may be
3 a helpful adjunct. But, you know, not a main plank of
4 the response.

5 **Q.** Now, you've mentioned that contact tracing in Wales was
6 delivered by local teams, and that's something, I think,
7 that -- in fact if we can put up the plan again, your
8 initial plan, INQ000056350, at page 3. And underneath
9 "What needs to happen", we can see under the contact
10 tracing heading:

11 "Contact tracing identifies individuals who have
12 come into contact with an individual with COVID-19 ..."

13 You go on to say:

14 "The Plan proposes a three-tiered approach across
15 Wales at a national, regional and local level. It will
16 require very large numbers of people to be involved as
17 local contact tracing teams. They will be managed
18 locally and coordinated regionally ... [and that] Local
19 authorities, health boards and other partners will be
20 pivotal in leading and supporting local action."

21 Now, it's right that, as we've heard from other
22 witnesses as well, that this differed from the approach
23 in England.

24 Now, why was it? Why was it that Wales decided to
25 choose a local contact tracing system?

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1 Public Health Wales about adopting the English app?

2 **A.** Well, I think from fairly early on, we felt that the app
3 was going to be an adjunct rather than a major, major
4 part of our response. Our model for contact tracing was
5 personal, someone speaking to another person, delivered
6 by local teams who understood the local geography and
7 culture.

8 And as the NHS app was being developed, there were
9 concerns about, you know, it needed Welsh translation
10 and basic Welsh-ifying, but also that it didn't follow
11 exactly the same contact tracing guidance that we had.
12 So we always recommended contact isolation, whereas
13 there were some categories in England from the NHS app
14 where people would be just asked to perform strict
15 social distancing rather than isolation.

16 So we had that concern.

17 And then we were concerned that the data from the
18 NHS app didn't then come into our contact tracing
19 system. So the individuals would get some advice, but
20 they weren't within our system, either for us to, you
21 know, just know about them from the surveillance
22 perspective but also from the perspective of the support
23 that we would wish to give them.

24 **Q.** Thank you. Given those concerns, why did Wales or the
25 Welsh Government ultimately decide to adopt the app?

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1 **A.** Well, we -- you know, we felt that there was a clear
2 advantage in having a local system where people would
3 understand the geology, geography, and the culture
4 within their local areas, and it was really growing out
5 of the pre-existing arrangements. We had always worked
6 very closely in terms of communicable disease management
7 in the community with our local authorities, and they
8 were very keen to be involved, and so something that was
9 based on the local authority level supported by our
10 health boards seemed to be a, you know, the best
11 solution.

12 **Q.** Thank you. We can take that document off screen. Thank
13 you.

14 In terms of, effectively, feedback of, if I can say
15 it that way, or monitoring of how local health boards
16 implemented tracing, is it right that they produced
17 operational plans for the --

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** -- for Public Health Wales? And is it right that the
20 lead strategic director and his deputy reviewed the
21 plans in August 2020 and concluded that they didn't
22 provide complete assurance of a whole of Wales system
23 response for the next phase of the pandemic at that
24 time?

25 **A.** Yes, that's correct. And feedback was given, and then

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1 acted upon. Yeah.

2 **Q.** And when you say "acted upon", how were the problems
3 addressed?

4 **A.** So the challenges in the different -- in the seven
5 different responses were different. One was more -- was
6 giving more of a sitrep of what the situation was and
7 wasn't forward looking, and then others had had various
8 gaps. And all those elements were fed back to the
9 health boards who were the regional unit for them to
10 address.

11 **Q.** Were the problems addressed, as far as you're aware?

12 **A.** Yes, yes.

13 **Q.** And just finally on tracing, I just want to ask you
14 a question about backwards contact tracing. Because am
15 I right that in October 2020, you provided advice to the
16 Welsh Government's Test, Trace, Protect programme board
17 which advised on the use of backward contact tracing?

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** And am I also right that the advice was effectively that
20 full backward contact tracing was the best way to
21 maximise the potential for effective contact tracing?

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** Do you recall what the response was to this advice?

24 **A.** So we put forward the advice around backward contact
25 tracing because at that time, only 10% of cases had been

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1 periods?

2 **A.** Yes, yeah.

3 **Q.** And I think you say in your statement, but we don't need
4 to bring it up unless it would particularly help you, on
5 10 December 2020, 31 December 2021, and 28 January 2022,
6 those were three changes to self-isolation periods.

7 Now, is it right that you didn't provide any
8 specific advice on the first change in December 2020?

9 **A.** I don't recall such, no.

10 **Q.** You did provide advice on 31 December 2021 --

11 **A.** Yeah.

12 **Q.** -- in relation to allowing individuals to be released
13 from isolation after day 7 if they had a negative test,
14 and you provided advice again in relation to the third
15 change.

16 Now did you also undertake, I believe, or commission
17 research in relation to the impact of isolation?

18 **A.** Yes. Yes.

19 **Q.** If we can please get up on the screen INQ000056337.

20 Is this is an example of some research that was
21 commissioned on 10 March 2021?

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** If we can turn then, please, to page 4 of that same
24 document, and the third heading down, "Challenges of
25 self-isolation", and the third bullet point, we see

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1 identified as a contact already. So we were aware that
2 there was a lot of transmission going on that we were
3 not picking up.

4 We were also aware that for most cases, actually led
5 to less than one secondary case, but a few cases led to
6 many secondary cases, and it was felt that those were
7 driving the community spread, so-called superspreader
8 events. And so backward contact tracing is going
9 further back, as the name suggests, to try and identify
10 the source of infection, and with a view to being able
11 to identify the superspreader events and try and get on
12 top of those.

13 Unfortunately, that requires very significantly more
14 resource, because it identifies many more contacts, and
15 I think the outcome was that backward contact tracing
16 was felt not possible as a blanket approach but was
17 definitely used in areas of, you know, high prevalence
18 or to investigate particular situations.

19 **Q.** So it was implemented but only in specific situations?

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** Thank you. Now, then, if I can just move on to, as you
22 may have gathered, isolation, and your role in relation
23 to isolation.

24 Now, am I right that Public Health Wales advised on
25 numerous occasions about changes to self-isolation

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1 there:

2 "The top 5 challenges contacts thought they would
3 face during self-isolation were: Suffering from anxiety
4 or mental health problems ... looking after children ...
5 being concerned about the impact isolation will have on
6 work or business ... experiencing financial problems ...
7 and caring for vulnerable people who cannot stay with
8 friends or family ..."

9 Then if we could then, please, go to page 6. Thank
10 you.

11 And under the bottom heading, 1.4.2, we see
12 "Developing and targeting support for those experiencing
13 challenges whilst self-isolating", and there's -- if
14 I can call it a recommendation, "[Providing] mental
15 wellbeing and social support".

16 Then over the page to page 7, please.

17 We see three more recommendations in light blue --
18 sorry, just the second paragraph there. The second
19 paragraph is:

20 "[Increasing] financial support and access to food
21 and medications for those with precarious incomes."

22 So does it follow from this document that it was
23 within -- first of all, it was within your remit to
24 advise on the impact of self-isolation?

25 **A.** Yes.

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1 Q. Does it then also follow that it was within your remit
2 to advise on the necessity for, or indeed consequences
3 of, support for those isolating?
4 A. I think throughout we were highlighting the issues and
5 stresses the self-isolation caused for different groups,
6 and giving a range of options to be able to mitigate
7 some of those, to be able to make it easier for people
8 to isolate. So within that comes a suggestion that
9 increased financial support would help.
10 Q. Now, we know in fact that the Welsh Government did offer
11 financial payments for those isolating, initially £500
12 and then it was increased to £750. Given in particular
13 your recommendations and your findings in relation to
14 people's concerns about their finances when isolating,
15 were you asked to provide any specific advice as to the
16 financial packages or support offered by the Welsh
17 Government?
18 A. I'm not aware of whether we had a specific query about,
19 you know, how much it should be or whatever like that.
20 Q. Would you consider that you ought to have been involved
21 in those discussions?
22 A. I'm not sure that we should. I'm not sure that I can
23 answer that question.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 Then if we can move on, please, to my final small
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1 a list of recommendations and lessons that you have
2 taken from the pandemic and your experience. The
3 Inquiry has those, and we will be taking those into
4 account and using them going forward.
5 Having had some time to reflect since those witness
6 statements, is there anything that you wish to add
7 today?
8 A. I don't think there's anything that I want to add to
9 the -- what's written down in the two statements, thank
10 you.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 LADY HALLETT: Is there anything in particular you wish to
13 highlight?
14 A. I'm not sure to what extent it is documented explicitly,
15 but I would highlight the need for digital
16 interoperability in the future, and also, as we have
17 touched on this afternoon, the involvement in the four
18 nations in UK decision making, as well.
19 LADY HALLETT: And when you say digital interoperability,
20 between which different systems are we talking about?
21 Systems around the UK or systems within Wales?
22 A. Um --
23 LADY HALLETT: Or all of them?
24 A. All of them, but specifically systems around the UK.
25 MS NAGESH: Thank you, my Lady. Those are my questions.
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1 topic before we get on to lessons learned and
2 recommendations, I just want to ask you about equalities
3 and inequalities.
4 What steps, if any, did Public Health Wales take to
5 ensure that Test, Trace, Protect, and indeed isolation
6 support, was effective in relation to protected groups
7 or those with vulnerable characteristics?
8 A. So, as we noted the -- with one of our studies -- we did
9 a number of studies that looked at the impacts of
10 various parts of the pandemic on different groups,
11 including black, Asian, minority ethnic and people in
12 lower socioeconomic groups, et cetera, and all of this
13 was fed into the TTP programme in terms of -- to the
14 local teams as well as to Welsh Government to try to
15 make improvements as to how they operated and could
16 reach all the different -- different sections of the
17 community.
18 Q. And did you get any feedback from the local groups as to
19 steps they'd taken, or was your role done at that stage?
20 A. We did -- I think we did get feedback, but I don't have
21 that.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 Then just finally, if I can turn, please, to lessons
24 learned and recommendations, you've very helpfully
25 provided us in both of your witness statements with
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1 I understand that there are some questions from others.
2 LADY HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Nagesh.
3 Yes, I think Ms Parsons, who is -- if you look that
4 way, there you are. You've probably got direct sight.
5 Questions from MS PARSONS
6 MS PARSONS: Thank you very much, my Lady.
7 Good afternoon, Dr Howe, I ask questions on behalf
8 of the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru. My
9 questions are about delays in testing of healthcare
10 workers, care workers and patients. That's the overall
11 topic.
12 Firstly in relation to testing of care home
13 residents and care home staff in Wales, Mr Drakeford
14 recognised in the Senedd as early as 3 March 2020 that
15 older people, especially those in care homes, were
16 particularly vulnerable to Covid-19. That view that
17 routine testing in care homes may therefore need to be
18 prioritised was held by experts and, indeed, it was
19 a view highlighted in a paper produced by the Welsh
20 Government Office for Science on 29 April 2020.
21 On that date, the 29th, Mr Drakeford said this in
22 the Senedd:
23 [As read] "The reason we don't offer tests to
24 everybody in care homes, symptomatic and asymptomatic,
25 is because the clinical evidence tells us there is no
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1 value in doing so and that such testing would divert
2 capacity."
3 He made a similar statement the following week,
4 6 May.
5 Firstly, Dr Howe, what is your view, from a clinical
6 perspective, on Mr Drakeford's statement in the Senedd
7 that there was no clinical value in asymptomatic testing
8 in care homes?
9 **A.** So I think what he said was at the end of the sentence
10 was "in care homes where there's no evidence of Covid",
11 and I think that this was in a situation that the
12 majority of patients would have had symptoms, and if
13 there were no symptoms within the care home, it was felt
14 that the likelihood, given the prevalence within the
15 community, was very much that there would be no benefit
16 from asymptomatic testing when there was no signs of
17 symptoms.
18 **Q.** So it's confined, then, to if there is no symptoms in
19 the care homes?
20 **A.** Yes, I think that -- the expectation, I think, was at
21 that point that Covid being present within a care home
22 would be identified through the presence of symptoms.
23 **Q.** Right, but what was your view, from a clinical
24 perspective, on that statement that there was no value?
25 **A.** I think there was limited -- there would have been
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1 the first wave, lesser benefit as the community levels
2 of Covid were falling.
3 We referenced the routine testing that was done from
4 15 June. In the week of 22 June, 9,700 asymptomatic
5 staff were tested through the Lighthouse labs, and of
6 those 9,700, only four were positive. And from a purely
7 statistical perspective, you would expect, with the
8 specificity of the test, if you tested 10,000
9 individuals, that you would get around about four false
10 positives. And so statistically it was possible at that
11 point that, you know, those four people who were
12 identified were actually false positives, and that --
13 and this is just to give an idea of the fact that the --
14 you know, at a low prevalence, the number of cases to be
15 picked up was relatively modest, but that --
16 **Q.** Dr Howe, I apologise for cutting in, but I've got other
17 topics that I've been permitted to ask you about. That
18 was June, the example you give, and obviously as we go
19 further in 2020 we get to wave 2, and then a much
20 greater prevalence of the virus.
21 I'm going to ask you now, please, about delays to
22 routine testing of healthcare workers, which you have
23 touched upon already in your evidence.
24 **A.** Yeah.
25 **Q.** And it was recognised very early on that asymptomatic
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1 limited value at that point for testing if there was no
2 signs of infection within that care home, and it was at
3 around this time that there was whole home testing,
4 including asymptomatic individuals, if there was signs
5 of Covid within the care home, but if there wasn't any
6 sign, routine testing of all residents and staff was not
7 being performed.
8 That started, you know, the routine staff testing
9 started on 15 June.
10 **Q.** I won't dwell on this point for much longer because we
11 have other points to cover, Dr Howe, but as to the
12 chronology of routine testing for care workers in Wales,
13 asymptomatic testing or routine testing was announced on
14 16 May, as I'm sure you know, implemented on a weekly
15 basis on 15 June, and then on 4 December 2020, twice
16 weekly routine testing. And given what we know about
17 the particular vulnerability of people in care homes, do
18 you think it should have been introduced earlier and
19 more regularly?
20 **A.** At the time, there were challenges in terms of capacity,
21 not just testing capacity, but also sampling capacity
22 and the ability to deal with the results appropriately.
23 If all those symptoms had been in place, then there
24 would potentially have been benefit in testing earlier,
25 most benefit significantly earlier during the earlier in
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1 testing was of benefit, and the Inquiry heard evidence
2 last week from experts that by April 2020, it was clear
3 that asymptomatic testing of healthcare workers was
4 absolutely essential, and you've referenced healthcare
5 testing in Germany in April 2020.
6 The chronology as we understand it is this:
7 4 December 2020 the Welsh Government announce routine
8 testing of healthcare workers; implementation begins on
9 14 December 2020, and in many cases, Dr Howe, it isn't
10 in fact implemented until March 2021.
11 Now, given what we know about the value of testing
12 healthcare workers, in particular in relation to
13 preventing nosocomial infection, do you think routine
14 testing of healthcare workers should have been
15 introduced sooner?
16 **A.** So I think that the big change that happened in November
17 was the availability of lateral flow tests, and that
18 meant that the testing could be delivered at much
19 greater volume and much more effectively in November.
20 And, you know, we were able to take advantage of that
21 and introduce the healthcare worker testing.
22 **Q.** So you don't think it should have been introduced sooner
23 or you do?
24 **A.** If we had the resource, and particularly lateral flow
25 tests that could effectively test for whether people
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1 were infectious, then I think there was -- there would
2 have been benefit in testing earlier.

3 **Q.** I want to ask you about resourcing and testing capacity
4 in particular, please, because in the evidence that the
5 Inquiry has, and indeed in your statement, you talk
6 about Wales's underutilising of its testing capacity.

7 I'll give you two quick examples before turning to
8 the question: 6 May 2020, utilisation of 35% Public
9 Health Wales laboratories, and January 2021, 24% of
10 capacity.

11 So does that not suggest, Dr Howe, that, actually,
12 there was a huge amount of capacity that was
13 under-utilised, and indeed testing could have been
14 brought about or introduced much sooner?

15 **A.** So this was purely testing capacity that I was talking
16 about, and you referenced, and that doesn't necessarily
17 reflect sampling capacity or the capacity across the
18 whole system to be able to support not only the sampling
19 but dealing with the results. So there was not the
20 capacity across the board to deal with what would have
21 been a very significant increase in resource
22 requirement.

23 So if we were to have, using PCR tests, introduced
24 healthcare worker testing for 80,000 healthcare workers,
25 just the processing prior to the laboratory would have

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1 **A.** Yes, and --

2 **Q.** And was it advised to not test asymptotically?

3 **A.** I don't think we advised to not test asymptotically.

4 We did raise the question of, you know, why would we be
5 testing and what was the best way of achieving the
6 necessary outcomes from testing.

7 **MS PARSONS:** Thank you.

8 My Lady, I'm very conscious of the time, may I touch
9 briefly on the final topic and I'll be quick.

10 **LADY HALLETT:** Yes, if you can shorten
11 it -- (overspeaking) --

12 **MS PARSONS:** Yes, I'll shorten it, my Lady. I'm most
13 grateful.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.

15 **MS PARSONS:** The last topic, Dr Howe, is routine testing of
16 patients in hospitals, and we know from an Audit Wales
17 report in March 2021 that that needed to be strengthened
18 further, "Once tested on admission", I quote, "there has
19 been no regular testing during a patient's hospital stay
20 unless patients have developed symptoms", and then the
21 report concludes that more should be done -- that more
22 effective testing should be done, including more
23 frequent testing during a patient's hospital stay.

24 And I think a Public Health Wales report of
25 23 September 2020 said that there is evidence to suggest

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1 required something like 160 whole-time equivalent weeks
2 of resource behind it.

3 You know, that's -- in the pandemic, that might have
4 been possible, but that was -- sampling was being -- at
5 the responsibility of the health boards.

6 **Q.** Dr Howe, just before we move on to the last topic,
7 I think the answer to my question is you don't think
8 there was the scope or the capacity to test routinely
9 sooner, but did you in fact advise the Welsh Government
10 to do so?

11 **A.** I don't recall formal advice to test healthcare workers,
12 although we were involved in the advice that
13 I referenced earlier in June 2020 to use excess capacity
14 to test asymptomatic healthcare workers, and the health
15 boards responded to the extent that we were in July
16 testing 400 healthcare workers a week, and that
17 increased up to 2,000 a week in October 2020. And they
18 were focusing on areas either where there were outbreaks
19 or areas where staff were looking after particularly
20 vulnerable patients, such as bone marrow transplant
21 units, et cetera.

22 **Q.** Thank you, Dr Howe. So I think the answer is that you
23 provided advice, informal advice, and you used the word
24 in your evidence "informal discussion", about
25 asymptomatic testing; is that correct?

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1 transfer of patients between wards and hospitals
2 resulted in spread of Covid-19 to new areas in the
3 hospital.

4 Just quickly then, please, Dr Howe, the question is
5 this: given the high levels of nosocomial infections in
6 Wales, are you able to help with why the Welsh
7 Government didn't implement more frequent testing sooner
8 of patients during a patient's stay in hospital? And is
9 this something Public Health Wales advised or not?

10 **A.** I think the recommendation was from fairly on to test
11 people who were symptomatic, and then -- when they
12 presented to hospital, and then there was advice to
13 test, asymptotically, people who were coming in
14 electively. It did appear from the Welsh Audit Office
15 report that that was not -- that that had not been
16 implemented by colleagues in the health boards, and then
17 there was later advice on routine testing of hospital
18 inpatients, which was initially at day 5 following
19 admission, and then subsequently to every five days, and
20 the update -- uptake of that by health boards was
21 variable and we reviewed that in fact in 2022, and found
22 that it was variable across the health boards as to how
23 they had implemented that.

24 **MS PARSONS:** Thank you, Dr Howe.

25 Thank you, my Lady, I am most grateful for the time.

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1 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Ms Parsons.

2 Mr Thomas.

3 Mr Thomas is around there.

4 **Questions from PROFESSOR THOMAS KC**

5 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** Good afternoon, Dr Howe. I represent
6 FEMHO, that's the Federation of Ethnic Minority
7 Healthcare Organisations.

8 In paragraph 546 of your witness statement, you note
9 that data from sources such as passenger locator forms
10 and other UK nations was not integrated into the contact
11 relationship management system, and had to be manually
12 inputted.

13 What efforts, if any, were made to integrate these
14 data sources and what operational impacts did the lack
15 of integration have on the delivery of Test, Trace,
16 Protect programme?

17 **A.** So I think that it was difficult during the pandemic to
18 make much progress with the data, automated data
19 integration, which was the challenge. And so we had to
20 rely on manual data entry, which was obviously time
21 consuming. The impact was on the time and, at times, us
22 having an incomplete picture of the situation.

23 **Q.** At paragraph 547, you state that the epidemiological
24 reports, based on the CRM data, were used to guide
25 strategies and advice.

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1 **Q.** How urgently?

2 **A.** I think as soon as we could.

3 **Q.** At paragraph 555, you highlight the poor completeness of
4 occupation, place of work and ethnicity data in the CRM
5 system. Given these gaps, how did they affect Public
6 Health Wales's ability to evaluate adherence to or to
7 assess the equity impacts of Test, Trace and Protect
8 programme, particularly among ethnic minority or
9 low-paid workers?

10 **A.** Yes, this was a particular challenge, and as your
11 question implies, it did mean that we had some gaps in
12 the information. We felt that we had a, you know,
13 reasonable overall appreciation. However, as you say,
14 we didn't have this information filled in as much as we
15 would wish. And we fed this back to the local teams,
16 because, you know, the reason that it was not filled in
17 was because the contact tracers were very focused on
18 speaking to contacts and telling them to isolate, and
19 were not always collecting some of the important
20 metadata that we were relying on.

21 So we fed that back to them, the importance of
22 filling that in.

23 **Q.** At paragraph 558, you refer to efforts to improve the
24 recording of ethnicity data in NHS systems. What
25 concrete steps have Public Health Wales and its partners

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1 **A.** Mm-hm.

2 **Q.** How regularly were these reports reviewed and adapted to
3 reflect realtime changes in infection patterns or risk
4 among different population groups?

5 **A.** So the situation evolved during the pandemic. I mean,
6 epidemiological reports were given on a daily basis, and
7 then more thorough reports on a twice-weekly and later
8 weekly basis.

9 **Q.** Paragraph 549, you refer to SAGE's recommendations for
10 essential data fields for test and trace systems. How
11 did Public Health Wales assess its readiness in relation
12 to the recommended data fields, and were there any gaps
13 identified that required urgent remedy?

14 **A.** As stated in the statement, we went through the data
15 fields as required by SAGE, and we were able to show
16 that most of the data was already captured in Wales at
17 that time.

18 There were one or two elements that were not
19 captured --

20 **Q.** Gaps?

21 **A.** Sorry?

22 **Q.** Gaps. When you say one or two elements, there were one
23 or two gaps?

24 **A.** Gaps, yes, there were one or two gaps that we then
25 sought to remedy.

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1 taken since the pandemic to improve the recording and
2 use of ethnicity data, and are these measures now
3 embedded in routine surveillance or emergency planning?

4 **A.** Yes, so in our IT systems that we're now using, and
5 as -- and we're also seeking to procure a new system,
6 a replacement to the Tarian, of which we've spoken
7 earlier, in that, and our current systems, a number of
8 these fields have been made mandatory, so that staff
9 have to, you know, record a response.

10 **Q.** I now want to move on to another theme, which is lessons
11 learned.

12 What lessons were learned from the data reliability
13 issues with postcodes, addresses, ethnicity and
14 international travel in the CRM system, and the lack of
15 integration of certain data sources?

16 **A.** So I think that the lesson that isn't necessarily learnt
17 but is to be learnt, as I said earlier, is, you know,
18 that data interoperability is key. We have made some
19 steps in terms of what I've said earlier around
20 mandatory fields, to try to improve some of the
21 information that we collect, but being able to move it
22 between different systems I think will be key in the
23 future.

24 **Q.** Let me move on. I want to do these last three questions
25 very swiftly, if I may.

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1 What changes would you recommend to improve data
2 accuracy and completeness in future public health
3 programmes and ensure better integration of data in
4 future contact and tracing of healthcare systems,
5 surveillance systems?

6 **A.** So I'm not sure if I am misunderstanding the question,
7 because I'm not sure that I've got anything to add over
8 what I've said --

9 **Q.** All right.

10 **A.** -- around interoperability and, you know, ensuring the
11 data capture in the first instance.

12 **Q.** Given the operational challenges caused by the lack of
13 integration that we looked at of certain data sources,
14 passenger locator forms et cetera, what improvements
15 would you recommend to ensure better integration?

16 **A.** And again, it's similar, but it needs a review of all
17 the different systems, because it potentially might not
18 be recognised which systems do need to be integrated,
19 but across the board, integration or interoperability
20 more, I think is the answer to the question.

21 **Q.** Okay. Any specific recommendations you would make to
22 improve the consistency and accuracy of ethnicity data
23 recording in the NHS public health systems to ensure
24 more equitable and inclusive pandemic responses in the
25 future?

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1 the Inquiry.

2 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you.

3 **LADY HALLETT:** Very well, I shall return at 3.35.

4 (3.21 pm)

(A short break)

6 (3.35 pm)

7 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Good afternoon.

8 My Lady, please could Oliver Munn be affirmed.

9 **MR OLIVER MUNN (affirmed)**

10 **LADY HALLETT:** I hope you were warned that you were last on
11 today, Mr Munn.

12 **THE WITNESS:** Yes, my Lady.

13 **Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY FOR MODULE 7**

14 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Could you please give the Inquiry your full
15 name.

16 **A.** My name is Oliver Munn.

17 **Q.** Mr Munn, quite unique in this Inquiry, you have provided
18 a one-page witness statement to the Inquiry dated
19 30 April 2025. Can I ask you, first of all, to confirm
20 that the content of that statement is true to the best
21 of your knowledge and belief?

22 **A.** It is.

23 **Q.** And in reality you are, by this statement, confirming
24 that the statement of Jessie Owens dated 15 April 2025,
25 who was the corporate witness for the Cabinet Office,

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1 **A.** I'm sorry, I don't have anything to add. I think it's
2 key information because it enables us to understand the
3 impact on different parts of society, and it really
4 should be a priority for the future.

5 **Q.** Finally this: in the light of the challenges faced with
6 aligning data fields with SAGE recommendations, are
7 there any steps that could be taken to ensure that
8 future public health systems are better prepared and
9 more adaptable in terms of data collection and analysis
10 that you can suggest?

11 **A.** Well, as I referenced, you know, we are looking at
12 a refreshed system in Wales and all these issues are
13 well acknowledged, that, you know, for the future.

14 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** Dr Howe, thank you.

15 My Lady, sorry for racing through them.

16 **LADY HALLETT:** No, don't worry. Thank you very much,
17 Mr Thomas. I'm very grateful.

18 Dr Howe, that completes the questions that we have
19 for you. You have spoken about the time during the
20 pandemic very calmly, but that's probably your
21 professional training. It must have been enormously
22 pressurised for you and your colleagues, so thank you
23 very much for all that you did and your colleagues did
24 to try and keep the people of Wales safe. I'm very
25 grateful to you for that work and of course for helping

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1 was true to the best of your knowledge, as well, and
2 belief.

3 Perhaps if we just briefly identify, at page 108,
4 please, the signature and date of the statement of
5 Jessie Owen, please. Thank you.

6 But essentially, you've adopted this statement now
7 as your own and so, for all practical purposes, you are
8 the corporate witness.

9 **A.** That's right.

10 **Q.** Thank you. So can we then start with identifying
11 yourself, please. You tell us that you're a former
12 senior civil servant who had the role of director,
13 testing and tracing delivery, in the Covid taskforce
14 within the Cabinet Office from 28 April 2020 to
15 25 February 2022.

16 **A.** That's right.

17 **Q.** And I think it's right that prior to joining the
18 taskforce in the Cabinet Office you were not -- you were
19 in the private sector; is that correct?

20 **A.** That's right.

21 **Q.** So we need to bear in mind that you only arrived
22 28 April 2020.

23 **A. (Witness nodded)**

24 **Q.** Thank you. And you tell us that essentially you were in
25 that role for the two years to the February of 2022, but

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1 thereafter, you were part of the UK Health Security
2 Agency's director general Health Protection operations
3 from 2022 to 2024?

4 **A.** [No audible answer]

5 **Q.** And can you help us identify, because I think you're
6 back in the private sector now, when in 2024 did you
7 leave UKHSA?

8 **A.** On 31 March 2024.

9 **Q.** Thank you. So can we thank you for, notwithstanding
10 that background, agreeing to speak to the corporate
11 witness statement on behalf of the Cabinet Office.

12 But perhaps before we identify the role of the
13 Cabinet Office, can we just understand, then, as the
14 director of Testing and Tracing Delivery in the Covid
15 taskforce and the Cabinet Office, can you give us an
16 idea what that practically that meant day-to-day when
17 you first joined in April of 2020, please?

18 **A.** Well, in April of 2020, NHS Test and Trace had not been
19 set up. It was still a period where things were moving
20 very quickly and, indeed, I didn't join on 28 April with
21 the title director of Testing and Tracing Delivery
22 because at the time things were so fluid that portfolios
23 would change day-to-day and so in my first week
24 I remember I did something on transport and something on
25 test and trace and something on businesses, and it was

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1 ministers, and so the taskforce was the secretariat for
2 the Covid-O, Covid Operations Committee, that ministers
3 used throughout the pandemic to make decisions. And in
4 that regard, I and my team would sometimes draft papers
5 for Covid O to consider on testing, tracing and
6 isolation matters, or at least draft the chair's briefs
7 for the chair of Covid-O and the CTL.

8 **Q.** Thank you. Can we then, please, turn into the statement
9 INQ000587352 at paragraph 2.5, please, just to make sure
10 we are clear before we get into the detail of the role
11 of the Cabinet Office, please.

12 So it's paragraph 2.5 on page 7 of the statement of
13 Jessie Owen INQ000587352, please. Thank you.

14 At paragraph 2.5 you detail that:

15 "Throughout the pandemic, including in the context
16 of work relating to TTI, many decisions rightly
17 continued to be taken within individual departments.
18 Where collective decisions were not required, the role
19 of the Cabinet Office was, as is typical for the centre
20 of government, focused around strategic coordination,
21 ensuring collaboration between the relevant parts of
22 government, assuring progress and providing challenge to
23 help strengthen policy making and ensure alignment with
24 the Government's overarching strategic objectives."

25 And then if we move down, please, to paragraph 2.7,

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1 only really over the course of May that my portfolio
2 became defined as everything relating to testing,
3 tracing and isolation.

4 **Q.** So taking that date, then, of around May when you then
5 became the director for testing and tracing, can you
6 just give us some idea, bearing in mind we're going to
7 look at the roles of different departments they had in
8 supporting the work of, particularly, the Test and Trace
9 system, what were you actually doing day-to-day, just to
10 give an idea practically of the involvement of the
11 Cabinet Office and you in particular?

12 **A.** So the Cabinet Office corporate statement refers to
13 three roles that the Cabinet Office played, one of which
14 was the critical friend role, and, my Lady, I spoke to
15 test and trace colleagues pretty much every day for
16 two years, and ensured that I was aware of exactly what
17 they were doing, where they were going, fed into their
18 strategy, updated them on the government's broader Covid
19 strategy so that everything test, trace and isolate
20 related fully tied into where the government was and was
21 going on non-pharmaceutical interventions, vaccination,
22 et cetera.

23 The Covid taskforce also played an important role in
24 relation to collective agreement and the process of
25 ensuring that decisions were properly taken by

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1 you detail that:

2 "The Cabinet Office also had 'responsibility for
3 coordinating the Government's response to crises',
4 working closely with the lead government departments."

5 Just pausing there, it's right, I think, you
6 identify that the Lead Government Department for test,
7 trace and isolate was the Department of Health and
8 Social Care; is that correct?

9 **A.** Correct.

10 **Q.** So can you then help, when you describe that the Cabinet
11 Office has that lead in respect of crises, how that
12 operated in practice in respect of test, trace and
13 isolate, please.

14 **A.** The Cabinet Office, and through the Civil Contingencies
15 Secretariat, that I think you heard about in Module 2,
16 my Lady, plays an important role in planning for crises,
17 and in the early stages of the crisis in the
18 coordinating the central response, but, as I think
19 Lord Sedwill in his evidence in Module 2 made clear, the
20 aim is then to hand over to the Lead Government
21 Department as quickly as possible, and so responsibility
22 for testing, tracing and isolation was obviously the
23 responsibility of DHSC, and it was rightly for DHSC to
24 lead the planning and operationalisation of TTI.

25 **Q.** Thank you. Can we just highlight another number of

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paragraphs that perhaps help understand the dynamic that operate between the Cabinet Office and the Department of Health and Social Care.

Paragraph 2.18, please, at page 9, you detail that:

"The Cabinet Office was not and would not have been expected to be routinely involved in the detailed TTI work led by [the Department of Health and Social Care] and its agencies, for example, establishing, maintaining or monitoring infrastructure, laboratory capacity, testing technologies or other associated capabilities, nor would the Cabinet Office be expected to assess overall UK preparedness to develop and scale diagnostics for a given disease. This more detailed preparedness work would fall under the responsibility of [the Department of Health and Social Care] as the [Lead Government Department]. DHSC and its executive agencies, notably the UKHSA [which we know came on latterly and was operational from October 2021], would therefore be best placed to summarise and comment on the adequacy of the TTI policies and strategies in place prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic."

A. I think this paragraph relates specifically to preparedness, and so what it's saying is that the Cabinet Office would not and would not have been expected to be routinely involved in detailed TTI work

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where possible the trade-offs of different response options."

Is there anything you want to add in respect of that?

A. No.

Q. Thank you.

And then significantly you then identify at paragraph 2.38 that:

"The Prime Minister, [Mr] Johnson, remained close to this work throughout the pandemic, including through regular, often weekly, meetings with Baroness Harding, as Chair of NHS [Test and Trace], and others closely involved in TTI work including the Health Secretary, the Chief Scientific and Medical Advisors and other officials, which focused on a range of issues from the ambition to roll out a mass population testing programme ... to community testing and surge testing in specific settings and geographical areas."

And you also detail:

"In addition, Baroness Harding on occasion provided updates on the progress NHS [Test and Trace] to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office."

Pausing there, can you assist us, because we know that when Baroness Harding was the chief executive of NHS Test and Trace there was a unique reporting

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by DHSC before the pandemic came along, hence why there are several references to preparedness within the paragraph.

Once the pandemic had come along and that TTI was a big part of the government's response, and -- the Cabinet Office was very close to TTI work being led by the department, obviously not in the lead role, but as I mentioned we were having daily conversations with them and ensuring that what they were doing was fully coordinated with the rest of the work of government.

Q. Thank you.

Then perhaps just to highlight some additional paragraphs, paragraph 2.37, please, at page 14. Thank you. The statement details:

"As was the case throughout the COVID-19 response, one unique role of the Cabinet Office was its work to consider and provide advice to ministers on the trade-offs of different TTI approaches. Whereas the focus of other government departments centred around, for example, the impacts of TTI policies on health (for DHSC), the economy (for [Her Majesty's Treasury]) [at that time] or specific sector-based impacts (for other government departments), the Cabinet Office's role at the centre of government was to look across the board and support decision-makers to understand and balance

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structure initially until the December of 2020, where essentially she reported directly to the Prime Minister, and so can you help us understand that structure set against the lead department being the Department of Health and Social Care, please.

A. Yeah, absolutely.

And Ms Cartwright, you mentioned the word "unique", I actually don't think it's unique because the chief executive of NHS England had exactly the same arrangement reporting directly in to the Prime Minister rather than the Health Secretary, and so actually, I think it was quite a parallel arrangement to that with NHSE before its recent abolition.

I wasn't involved in the decision to appoint Baroness Harding or to make her report in to the Prime Minister rather than the Health Secretary, but I can only speculate that the Prime Minister was trying to make clear that he was very personally invested in this work and that that would send a message across Whitehall that Test and Trace was a foremost government priority and that other government departments should do all they could to assist it in its work.

Q. Thank you. And so, in correcting me in describing it as a unique reporting restriction, we know that that reporting directly to the Prime Minister came to an end

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1 in December of 2020, so can you help us understand,
 2 then, why that shifted after December 2020 and then it
 3 went back to reporting essentially to the Health
 4 Minister in the Department of Health and Social Care?
 5 **A.** So that was a decision made by the Cabinet Secretary,
 6 and I can't pretend to know exactly what was going
 7 through his mind in determining that, but by way of
 8 context, I can tell you that the Secretary of State for
 9 Health had been very, very closely involved in all of
 10 the work of Test and Trace since the very beginning, and
 11 that Baroness Harding, who you'll be hearing from
 12 tomorrow, was speaking to the Health Secretary all the
 13 time on everything and that submissions that Test and
 14 Trace was preparing were going through the
 15 Health Secretary for his approval. So I think, although
 16 the formal reporting line may not have changed until
 17 December 2020, in practice, the Secretary of State for
 18 Health was all over every aspect of NHS Test and Trace's
 19 work from the very beginning.
 20 **Q.** Thank you. Can we, then, please, look together at
 21 paragraph 3.2 on page 28, please.
 22 Thank you.
 23 Now, you detail there under the "Development of Test
 24 and Trace":
 25 "As explained in Section 2, in line with the [Lead
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1 and policies and capabilities were used to respond to
 2 the initial cases of the novel coronavirus."
 3 And so can I ask you then, why is the Cabinet Office
 4 not able to comment on how existing infrastructure and
 5 capacity was utilised in the early stage, especially
 6 given its central coordination role in times of crises?
 7 **A.** The central coordination role that you describe, led by
 8 the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, involves assigning
 9 actions and being clear on owners and assessing progress
 10 across a waterfront of the crisis response, but those
 11 actions, those owners, sit in nine departments in the
 12 nine -- in the Lead Government Department for each of
 13 those activities, and the Civil Contingencies
 14 Secretariat is not staffed to man mark, for want of
 15 a better phrase, each of those workstreams being led by
 16 departments.
 17 As we might get on to, it became clear in the spring
 18 of 2020 that the centre of government needed to grip
 19 a wide range of department-led initiatives, and so
 20 a Covid taskforce was created within the Cabinet Office
 21 over the spring of 2020, precisely to provide the kind
 22 of close involvement that the Cabinet Office had not
 23 been resourced to provide in January, February of 2020.
 24 **Q.** Thank you. Now, that may partially answer the next
 25 question, please, Mr Munn. Do you accept that as part
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1 Government Department] model, the [Department of Health
 2 and Social Care] is responsible for public health
 3 protection and responding to emerging infectious
 4 diseases. At the outbreak of the pandemic, therefore,
 5 the Cabinet Office ordinarily had limited involvement in
 6 policy and strategy work relating to TTI."
 7 Can you assist, then, we've already looked together
 8 that the Cabinet Office was responsible for coordination
 9 across government departments in response to crises,
 10 working closely with lead government departments, and
 11 this would have included with regard to Test, Trace and
 12 Isolate; would you agree?
 13 **A.** Yeah.
 14 **Q.** Thank you. And if we look at paragraph 3.5, please, it
 15 details:
 16 "In this early stage, the Cabinet Office worked to
 17 understand the progress of test and trace work across
 18 government in order to update and provide advice to the
 19 Prime Minister, and to understand where further support
 20 from central government may be needed. The Cabinet
 21 Office was not, however, closely involved in [Public
 22 Health England [or the] Department of Health and Social
 23 Care's] detailed work in this initial period to test,
 24 trace and isolate contacts, nor is the department able
 25 to comment on how any existing capacity, infrastructure
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1 of the Cabinet Office role in advising the
 2 Prime Minister, it would have needed an understanding of
 3 what infrastructure actually existed at the outset of
 4 the pandemic? So I think you've dealt with the spring,
 5 but would you agree that it would have been far better
 6 if there was that information known about the
 7 infrastructure in the January of 2020?
 8 **A.** The Cabinet Office would be reliant on the relevant
 9 government department to provide it with information on
 10 the state of preparedness in its area or the actions
 11 that it was taking. And so in those early days before
 12 the Covid taskforce was created, the Civil Contingencies
 13 Secretariat would have been commissioning the Department
 14 of Health and Social Care for updates on the testing and
 15 tracing infrastructure that they had in place, how it
 16 was expanding, et cetera. It would have been receiving
 17 updates from DHSC, but would not have been in a position
 18 to do much more than pass on those updates to the
 19 Prime Minister and certainly wasn't in a position, as
 20 was the case later when the Covid taskforce was
 21 established, to have real subject-matter experts who
 22 knew all about testing, tracing and isolation sitting
 23 within the Cabinet Office and who understood, you know,
 24 the various nuances and complications of
 25 operationalising a TTI system.
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1 Q. Thank you.
 2 I'll take you in a moment to a passage in
 3 Mr Johnson's statement by reference to the Civil
 4 Contingencies Secretariat just for reference, but
 5 briefly before doing that, do you accept that the United
 6 Kingdom's lack of infrastructure for testing at scale
 7 would have been obvious to the Cabinet Office from
 8 January 2020 had comprehensive enquiries been made in
 9 that early stage?
 10 A. As we covered a few moments ago, I joined the Cabinet
 11 Office at the end of April 2020 and so it's difficult
 12 for me to state with any certainty what the Cabinet
 13 Office should or shouldn't have known in January. What
 14 I do know is that from the documents I've reviewed in
 15 preparing for this meeting, that the Cabinet Office did
 16 ask DHSC for various updates in January and February of
 17 2020 as to what testing capacity was in place and could
 18 be put in place, and received those updates. I can't
 19 tell you to what extent they had the resources or the
 20 knowledge to really scrutinise the responses they got
 21 back.
 22 Q. Thank you; can we then briefly look at a passage in
 23 Mr Johnson's witness statement that he's provided,
 24 please.
 25 Which is INQ000587378. It's page 9, paragraph 22.
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1 I was not an employee of the Cabinet Office at the time,
 2 nor even a civil servant, and I have never worked in the
 3 Civil Contingencies Secretariat, so my knowledge of that
 4 process is secondhand, but I can only assume that the
 5 director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had
 6 received from DHSC a reassuring update endorsed, as is
 7 mentioned, by the CMO and the Government Chief
 8 Scientific Advisor, and had passed that on to the
 9 Prime Minister. I'm afraid there's not much more I can
 10 add.
 11 Q. No, thank you.
 12 Perhaps, then, if we can go back into the witness
 13 statement, please, at paragraph 1.8, so it's the
 14 INQ000587352, page 2, paragraph 1.8, we can see that in
 15 fact the position that is now detailed is:
 16 "At the outset of the pandemic, the UK had very
 17 limited capability and infrastructure to test for cases
 18 of the novel coronavirus and trace their contacts.
 19 Setting up a test and trace system on the scale and at
 20 the speed demanded by the virus posed an unprecedented
 21 challenge. The UK Government worked to meet that
 22 challenge in collaboration with the wider public sector,
 23 [including] industry, academia, local government and
 24 others."
 25 And so identifying that unprecedented challenge,
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1 Thank you.
 2 We can see that he details in this statement:
 3 "I remember that I was told that we had an excellent
 4 system for testing and tracing contacts although
 5 I cannot now recall who said this -- I think I was told
 6 it many times by many people."
 7 Then it goes on, effectively:
 8 "As an example of a document that gave me this
 9 reassuring message about our preparedness ... on
 10 28 February 2020, the Director of the Civil
 11 Contingencies Secretariat sent me a briefing note
 12 prepared in consultation with the CMO and GCSA on the
 13 UK's preparedness ... The note said that our
 14 '[p]reparations are well underway' and '[w]e continue to
 15 be ready with to deal with ...many more if the outbreak
 16 escalates' ... '[o]ur NHS has tried-and-tested systems
 17 to quickly identify and isolate those who may have
 18 Covid-19'."
 19 Thank you. Can you assist, why did the director of
 20 the Civil Contingencies Secretariat send Mr Johnson this
 21 reassuring message about the state of preparedness,
 22 rather than inform him that there was, in fact, a lack
 23 of infrastructure and capability? Can you assist with
 24 that, please?
 25 A. I can assist by providing context. As I mentioned,
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1 when did it become clear to the Cabinet Office that
 2 there was very limited capability and infrastructure?
 3 Can you assist?
 4 A. All I can tell you is that when I arrived on 28 April,
 5 I think that was the feeling within the Cabinet Office.
 6 I suppose what you're asking is at some point between
 7 the notes to the Prime Minister at the end of February,
 8 where the message from CCS was there's infrastructure in
 9 place, and my arrival at the end of April, the message
 10 changed, but I am afraid I can't tell you within that
 11 two-month window exactly when that feeling changed. And
 12 obviously the Cabinet Office is a big organisation and
 13 different people would have had different views at
 14 different times.
 15 Q. Thank you. But would you agree with the principle that
 16 the role of the Cabinet Office should have been to
 17 advise the Prime Minister of this lack of infrastructure
 18 and capability as early as possible?
 19 A. Absolutely.
 20 Q. But you can only really speak to that that plainly had
 21 been identified when you came along near to the end of
 22 April?
 23 A. Correct.
 24 Q. Thank you.
 25 Can we then, please, move forward again to
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1 paragraph 3.8 at page 29, please.

2 And perhaps before doing that we'll start at 3.7,
3 please. The statement details:

4 "By mid-March 2020, at the time the World Health
5 Organization (WHO) was encouraging countries to 'test,
6 test, test', concern was being raised within No.10 about
7 the UK's ability to scale testing to the levels required
8 to respond to COVID-19, particularly in relation to
9 limitations in PHE's capacity for operational delivery
10 of testing and contact tracing on a large scale."

11 Then if we move then to 3.8 you detail that:

12 "On 14 March 2020, CDL" -- is that the Chancellor of
13 the Duchy of Lancaster?

14 A. That's right, Michael Gove at the time.

15 Q. Thank you. Obviously as a member of the cabinet:

16 "... chaired a meeting to explore ways that the
17 Cabinet Office could Help DHSC to increase testing
18 capacity ..."

19 Can I ask you, do you accept that there was no
20 attempt by the Cabinet Office to have a high-level
21 meeting with the Department of Health and Social Care on
22 the subject of test and trace specifically to understand
23 the UK's readiness and detail until this meeting of
24 14 March 2020?

25 A. Whilst I'm not aware of any other attempts, I cannot

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1 This is on capability.

2 A. Mm.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 We can see detailed there that Professor Pillay
5 details:

6 "... there remained considerable expertise through
7 local Directors of Public Health and outbreak control
8 teams. Despite this, the immediate COVID response
9 involved very significant investment in a series of
10 outsourced functions, rather than using such resource to
11 rebuild existing [infrastructure]."

12 And similarly, the Inquiry has a statement from
13 Lord Bethell that similarly comments upon the preference
14 to use Directors of Public Health's knowledge.

15 So can I ask you, do you agree that the UK's lack of
16 sufficient localised infrastructure for test and trace
17 hampered its ability to deliver a Test and Trace
18 Programme despite Directors of Public Health, expertise
19 and local teams?

20 A. Let me say that Directors of Public Health have a huge
21 amount of expertise and often are extremely accomplished
22 and talented people. They lead public health teams
23 within local authorities that have faced consistent
24 resourcing and budgetary challenges, and it is not the
25 case, in England today, and it certainly wasn't in 2020,

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1 categorically state that there were none.

2 Q. Can you assist, then, if the Cabinet Office did not
3 undertake sufficient detailed work to understand the
4 progress of test and trace until March, but is it --
5 does it look more like that the Cabinet Office was
6 accepting the assurances at face value from the
7 Department of Health and Social Care without examining
8 or scrutinising capability and infrastructure?

9 A. The processes of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, as
10 I've mentioned, are not a process I'm familiar with.
11 They obviously go out to the department asking them for
12 their plans and their preparedness and they receive
13 them. I imagine that they do more than just, you know,
14 passing them on to the Prime Minister and saying, "We've
15 received this and here it is", but I'm afraid I don't
16 know the level of scrutiny that they apply, or the
17 extent to which they dive into the responses they
18 receive from departments.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 Can I then, please, briefly ask you about some
21 evidence that we're going to hear from on Friday from
22 Professor Pillay, and it's one of the documents in the
23 pack, it's INQ000475152.

24 That's INQ000475152 and it's page 4, paragraph 15,
25 please.

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1 that we have a well-resourced local public health layer
2 that, you know, can be deployed at short notice to do
3 all sorts of extremely ambitious things. There are
4 extremely talented people in public health departments
5 in local authorities across the country but they are
6 operating on very limited budgets and they often have
7 considerably smaller headcounts than they had
8 historically and so, unlike some other countries where
9 contact tracing in particular was sent to a subnational
10 level, and I'm thinking particularly of federal
11 countries like Germany or the US which had
12 well-resourced, high-budget public health departments at
13 a regional level, England does not have that. It has
14 152 public health teams at local authority level, some
15 of which cover really very small areas, all of which
16 face massive budgetary challenges in the context of
17 local authority finances.

18 And so whilst there are some exceptionally talented
19 and hard-working people working for Director of Public
20 Health and as a Director of Public Health, they are not
21 a well-resourced function that can easily be activated
22 to deliver huge, very ambitious contact tracing as was
23 required -- (overspeaking) --

24 Q. Can you assist, considering the United Kingdom's Civil
25 Contingencies Act framework which emphasises the role of

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1 local responders as the building block to response, did
2 the Cabinet Office liaise across departments to identify
3 and build up the localised infrastructure early on in
4 the pandemic?

5 **A.** When NHS Test and Trace was launched on 28 May, it was
6 a very national operation, and fairly quickly
7 transitioned into a mix of national and local and
8 indeed, by August 2020, local tracing partnerships were
9 announced, I believe on 10 August 2020, and the Cabinet
10 Office was certainly supportive of that move to better
11 involve Directors of Public Health and local public
12 health expertise to ensure that contact tracing was more
13 effective and made better use of local knowledge.

14 **Q.** Thank you. But obviously that seems slightly later on
15 in the chronology. I wondered if you could assist,
16 before we get to what was announced in the May, whether
17 you're able to assist from the April when you were in --
18 sort of arriving in the Cabinet Office, was there
19 consideration being given about this existing local
20 resource with the expertise that existed in Directors
21 of Public Health?

22 **A.** I think there was knowledge in the Cabinet Office that
23 Directors of Public Health were in place across the
24 country and often brought tremendous talent, energy and
25 enthusiasm to their roles. What DHSC was tasked with

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1 teams who already have a large number of existing and
2 ongoing responsibilities, did not have tens of thousands
3 of people sitting around waiting to be -- to have new
4 responsibilities given to them.

5 **Q.** Thank you. Can we then, please, just look on the
6 chronology, and I appreciate we're just picking issues
7 and themes out of the full chronology context that your
8 witness statement provides, but can we please look at
9 paragraph 3.22 where you detail, at paragraph -- sorry,
10 page 39, paragraph 3.22.

11 You detail there the announcement of the
12 2 April 2020, when Mr Hancock the Health Secretary
13 announced the 100,000 testing target across the UK by
14 the end of the month. And can you assist, did the
15 Cabinet Office play any role in the identification of
16 the need to increase testing to be 100,000?

17 **A.** Well, later in that paragraph it says:

18 "... Dominic Cummings notes that he and the
19 Prime Minister had told the Health Secretary to aim for
20 100,000 tests per day."

21 So from that I conclude that the Cabinet Office, or
22 Number 10 as part of the Cabinet Office, was very
23 supportive of a stretching testing target.

24 **Q.** So can I ask with obviously identifying that Mr Cummings
25 and Mr Johnson had been involved in that, do you accept

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1 assembling over the course of May 2020 before its
2 announcement on 28 May, was a large-scale contact
3 tracing operation that could handle the many, many
4 thousands, tens of thousands of tests -- of cases a day
5 that were forecast, and so they put their focus on
6 building a large, scalable central operation at first,
7 before then transitioning fairly quickly in the
8 following months to a mix of national and local, to
9 ensure that they were making best use of the expertise
10 that was held at local level.

11 **Q.** Thank you. Then can I ask with referencing obviously
12 the large-scale testing and therefore the large-scale
13 central contact tracing, was any thought given about the
14 fact that this was outsourcing to companies with no
15 experience or relevant expertise or local knowledge, in
16 terms of whether that was the best way to go for this
17 centralised contact tracing, rather than utilising the
18 local contact tracing?

19 **A.** The first thing to say from a Cabinet Office perspective
20 is that that was a decision for the Lead Government
21 Department, the Department of Health and Social Care.
22 And so the Cabinet Office would not that have had
23 a direct role in that. But I would add by way of
24 context, we were looking at tens of thousands of contact
25 tracers that needed onboarding, and local public health

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1 that the Cabinet Office was under a duty to clearly
2 advise that the target was wholly unrealistic rather
3 than simply encouraging rapid extension of -- expansion
4 of testing capacity?

5 **A.** It would have been for DHSC to judge whether it was
6 realistic or not. The role of the Cabinet Office and, I
7 think, the role of the Prime Minister as he'd have seen
8 it, would be to challenge departments to aim high, and
9 that's what he did with that 100,000 target. And to the
10 point that it was wildly unrealistic, it was met, which
11 suggests that it was not wildly unrealistic.

12 **Q.** Thank you. Now I'm going to move on now to the creation
13 and establishment of NHS Test and Trace. Can we briefly
14 look, please, at the terms of reference which is
15 INQ000198082. INQ000198082. Thank you.

16 We can see there the Test, Track and Trace
17 Ministerial Taskforce terms of reference and I think at
18 this point we can see the membership included Dido
19 Harding as the chair. And if we move through, we can
20 see that, as required, please, a little further down, we
21 only have "As required" that Number 10 would be
22 involved.

23 And then over the page, I think it identifies as
24 what you've already told us -- we can keep moving
25 down -- that the Cabinet Office had the secretariat role

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1 of those meetings.

2 And so without a standing member in the taskforce
3 can you assist us as to why the Cabinet Office was only
4 the secretariat on those meetings, please?

5 **A.** I think it's important to give some context on this
6 taskforce. It was announced on 7 May, and by 28 May had
7 been superseded by the creation of Test and Trace, so it
8 existed for no more than three weeks.

9 **Q.** Yes.

10 **A.** And I've asked the Cabinet Office which, as you say
11 here, was the secretariat to look through records and
12 they have confirmed that they have no evidence that this
13 taskforce ever met in its form. So I think this
14 taskforce is a bit of an irrelevance, if I'm honest.

15 Now, it's true that, you know, these stakeholders
16 remained involved, but the notion of the taskforce as
17 described in these terms of reference I think was
18 quickly overtaken by events.

19 **Q.** Thank you.

20 Well, then can we look at an email that I think --
21 looking, from the appointment of Baroness Harding on
22 7 May, at an email of 18 May, just to try to understand
23 something that you were involved in.

24 It's INQ000195932, please. That's INQ000195932.
25 Thank you.

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1 speed and scale, fundamental questions about isolation,
2 about -- then over the page -- asymptomatic contacts and
3 testing, enforcement. And again in respect of the app
4 on page 3. Questions about what was the hurdle to the
5 app to make comfortable enough to launch it. And again
6 over the page, questions around sort of further issues
7 of testing and capacity.

8 And so can you help us, we know that this is 18 May
9 with some fairly fundamental concerns being expressed
10 about the strategy of test, trace and isolate, can you
11 help us understand this in the context of then what
12 happened at the announcement on 27 May? Was test, trace
13 and isolate at this stage in a very poor state?

14 **A.** Let me first say that I think this -- you were asking
15 earlier about the role of the Cabinet Office vis-à-vis
16 DHSC.

17 **Q.** Yes.

18 **A.** This is a wonderful example of the role of the
19 Cabinet Office versus DHSC, which is to say the Cabinet
20 Office asking difficult questions, including big-picture
21 difficult questions, and tasking them to the DHSC.

22 And you'll see in this email it's -- Tom Shinner
23 writes:

24 "I've agreed with Dido that if we give her ... seven
25 days, they'll come back with that they think the answers

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1 And so this is an email of 18 May 2020. So
2 almost -- just over a week before the announcement of
3 the NHS Test and Trace strategy which was then going to
4 be implemented on 28 May. And we can see that you're
5 one of the recipients of this e-mail.

6 **A.** Mm-hm.

7 **Q.** And essentially we just move through the policy. If we
8 look at the punchline:

9 "Punchline is that most of the big design questions
10 remain unresolved -- with some pretty fundamental
11 differences of view as to what this programme is trying
12 to achieve, and by when."

13 And then we can obviously see reference to the app.
14 And:

15 "It won't involve the app ..."

16 So this is 18 May suggesting that the app wouldn't
17 be involved.

18 "... it won't be very good, but she [Dido Harding]
19 thinks she has agreed with Chris and Patrick that it
20 will be 'good enough' to begin with, if coupled with
21 the JBC being able to implement effective ... measures."

22 And again, if we go over the page -- the time
23 doesn't allow to go through the detail of this, but if
24 we go over the page, please, we see "Questions
25 outstanding", and they include relating to strategy,

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1 are."

2 Which is exactly the role that the Cabinet Office
3 should and did play. I mean, it's clear from this email
4 on 18 May that Tom Shinner, as well as others who he
5 references, and I am among them, still had some concerns
6 over whether Test and Trace was going to be ready to
7 launch promptly. But to give full credit to Baroness
8 Harding and her team, they engaged with these questions
9 promptly and came back with answers, and there were
10 a series of discussions over the following week which
11 got us into a place collectively where we were happy to
12 go ahead with the launch of the Test and Trace service
13 on 28 May, just ten days later.

14 **Q.** Thank you.

15 Now, there's two references to the app, and
16 essentially this seems to be identifying that it was not
17 going to be ready, but can you assist, then: when the
18 announcement was made of NHS Test and Trace, and the
19 public announcement on 27 May, it indicated that to
20 complement the rollout there would be the NHS Covid-19
21 app that was predicted to follow in a couple of weeks or
22 in the coming weeks, and we know in fact that it wasn't
23 rolled out until 24 September 2020, so four months
24 later.

25 This email seems to suggest that the significant

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1 issues with the app were still not dealt with. Can you
 2 help as to why, then, it was expressly referenced as
 3 being almost imminent on 27 May?

4 **A.** I think by 27 May, apps had already been rolled out in
 5 various European countries, and the Prime Minister and
 6 the Health Secretary felt the need to say something
 7 about an app. But you're right: on 27 May, the app was
 8 not ready to go and it would -- as we know, it would
 9 take several more months for it to be ready to go, but
 10 I think ministers wanted to signal that that was the
 11 desired direction of travel and that we weren't ignoring
 12 what others were doing in other comparable countries and
 13 that we wished to make use of all the technology
 14 available to ensure an effective testing, tracing and
 15 isolation system.

16 **Q.** Can I ask you, was there not an issue, though, of public
 17 trust then in suggesting that the app was about to be
 18 rolled out in the next couple of weeks? Would it not
 19 have been better to be more open about the stage that
 20 the Covid-19 app was at, rather than, in the rollout of
 21 NHS Test and Trace, almost heralding that the app would
 22 be with us in a couple of weeks?

23 **A.** It's a good question and a question that comms
 24 professionals within Number 10 would have doubtless
 25 considered. I mean, I don't -- my memory is not good

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1 until it was ready to go.

2 **Q.** Thank you. Can I briefly, then, ask you about just
 3 two paragraphs. There are others where Baroness Harding
 4 in her witness statement comments upon the role of the
 5 Cabinet Office.

6 But please can we display INQ000587322, at page 21,
 7 please. That's INQ000587322, and it's paragraph 5.10.

8 We're going to hear from Baroness Harding tomorrow,
 9 but because the Cabinet Office are referenced, I wonder
 10 if you can assist at all. We can see at 5.10, its
 11 detail, for example:

12 "... NHS [Test and Trace] faced various difficulties
 13 in obtaining HMT and [Cabinet Office] approval for
 14 Lighthouse laboratories in the summer of 2020 ... and
 15 this meant that the approvals process for the expansion
 16 of the Lighthouse network took far longer than it should
 17 have in the circumstances. Had [NHS Test and Trace] had
 18 greater delegated procurement authority during this
 19 time, this would likely have reduced the capacity issues
 20 we experienced in the autumn."

21 So can you assist, the criticism of the delay, then,
 22 in the later rollout of the Lighthouse laboratories,
 23 seems to be referencing difficulties in the Cabinet
 24 Office approval. Can you give us some context to
 25 whether that's accurate as to the assessment made by

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1 enough to know whether, on 27 May, we were clear how far
 2 away the app was. I think we all thought the app was
 3 going to come sooner than it did.

4 There had been a successful trial on the
 5 Isle of Wight in April or May 2020, and so I think that,
 6 you know, if you'd have asked the average person within
 7 the Cabinet Office or Number 10 "When is the app going
 8 to come?", they wouldn't have said as late as
 9 24 September, but I would say the Cabinet Office was --
 10 broadly supported the principle of getting the app right
 11 before rolling it out, and you will see emails from
 12 Tom Shinner, from Ben Warne and others saying there was
 13 a very real risk of going live with an app that wasn't
 14 ready, that would lose public confidence, and you only
 15 really got one opportunity to launch it and drive
 16 take-up, and that if an app was rolled out prematurely
 17 that was unstable or not functional, that would destroy
 18 public confidence in the app.

19 And just one thing I'll say is that the
 20 effectiveness of the Bluetooth app is proportionate to
 21 the square of the number of users. So you double the
 22 number of users, you have an app that's four times more
 23 effective. Hence it's incredibly important that you get
 24 high take-up. And that's why there was a real desire
 25 from the centre to ensure that the app was not launched

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1 Baroness Harding, please?

2 **A.** Of course. In Module 2, Lord Sedwill, the former
 3 Cabinet Secretary gave evidence to the Inquiry, and
 4 I think he very aptly described the dual roles of the
 5 Cabinet Office. The first is to coordinate
 6 cross-government action on the Prime Minister's top
 7 priorities, such as Covid, and the second is to act as
 8 a shared service provider across government on things
 9 like digital, legal, commercial, HR, et cetera. And
 10 I think what you see here is the second of those.

11 So I was in the Covid taskforce which was very much
 12 in the first of those, but there is a Government
 13 Commercial Function as part of the Cabinet Office that
 14 is charged with ensuring that departments follow
 15 commercial best practices and commercial rules in order
 16 to deliver the best possible value for money to the
 17 taxpayer.

18 And I think what Baroness Harding is referring to
 19 here is that Test and Trace had to get approval from the
 20 Government Commercial Function and from the minister,
 21 who was Lord Agnew, for various spends, and that at
 22 times that process took longer than they'd have liked.

23 What I will say is that the Government Commercial
 24 Function moved very quickly compared to its usual pace,
 25 very much took on board the exceptional circumstances in

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1 which we were operating, and was, broadly, very
2 expeditious in getting approvals to Test and Trace but
3 I think on these particular occasions there are some
4 emails that suggest that Lord Agnew as the minister had
5 some concerns and some questions that he wanted
6 answering before he was willing to approve the sign-off.

7 My Lady, I believe you've heard from Lord Agnew in
8 a previous module and you'll know that he had strong
9 opinions on these topics.

10 Q. Thank you. And then briefly can I take you to the next
11 paragraph of Baroness Harding's statement, please.
12 5.11. It's detailed:

13 "These challenges were further exacerbated by the
14 inherently unpredictable nature of the pandemic. In
15 December 2020, [NHS Test and Trace] was encouraged to
16 move towards a more 'business-as-usual' environment and
17 increase focus on value for money across the
18 organisation (including in relation to procurement).
19 Shortly afterwards, a new variant of the virus emerged
20 which led to the standing up of new use cases such as
21 the testing of hauliers at the border and of secondary
22 school staff and pupils at very short notice and the
23 need for a third lockdown. This meant that
24 simultaneously [NHS Test and Trace] was being challenged
25 by the Prime Minister to scale faster, and the [Cabinet

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1 remained with the Health Secretary. Considerable
2 freedoms and independence were afforded to [NHS Test and
3 Trace] to expedite the delivery of testing and tracing.
4 Baroness Harding was given permission to draw upon
5 resources and expertise across government, to bring in
6 external experts as required ... and all government
7 departments were instructed by the Cabinet Secretary to
8 provide any necessary support that [NHS Test and Trace]
9 requested."

10 And then the next paragraph, please. 3.48:

11 "At the same time, it was important for the Cabinet
12 Office to maintain a proportionate level of central
13 oversight of work undertaken by [NHS Test and Trace]
14 given its centrality both to the understanding the virus
15 and the government's overarching strategy for managing
16 the pandemic and easing restrictions."

17 And so can we just have complete understanding of
18 who ultimately was responsible for the development of an
19 effective large-scale mass testing and tracing system?

20 A. Baroness Harding.

21 Q. Baroness Harding, from NHS Test and Trace?

22 A. Mm-hm.

23 Q. And can you assist, then, in terms of that sitting
24 within the Department of Health and Social Care, as the
25 Lead Government Department, how did that work?

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1 Office] to slow down."

2 Can you assist to identify in this time period, in
3 particular, the Cabinet Office is seeking to slow down
4 matters?

5 A. I think, per my previous answer, this is a reference to
6 commercial approvals, and I think the exhibits that are
7 attached to that, relate to some emails that Lord Agnew
8 sent laying out his concerns about approving certain
9 spend.

10 Q. Thank you. Can we then briefly, just to make sure
11 there's absolute clarity about the ultimate
12 responsibility for the development of testing, can we
13 look at 3.47, please, in the INQ000587352 statement to
14 which you're speaking at page 47. That's
15 paragraph 3.47, thank you.

16 Sorry, it's INQ000587352. Sorry, we're back into
17 Jessie Owens's statement now, please. INQ000587352, at
18 page 47, paragraph 3.47. Thank you. And we can move
19 into page 47, please. Thank you.

20 So just so there's absolute clarity as to
21 responsibilities, we can see at paragraph 3.47 you
22 detail that:

23 "Under the leadership of the Executive Chair, [NHS
24 Test and Trace] had the Prime Minister's full authority
25 to deliver. Ministerial accountability to Parliament

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1 A. Baroness Harding and all of the officials working within
2 NHS Test and Trace were members of the Department of
3 Health and Social Care. Indeed, they worked out of the
4 DHSC building, they had DHSC email addresses. And in
5 practice, they sent submissions to the Health Secretary
6 and health ministers before making important decisions,
7 but I think Baroness Harding will be able to describe
8 the inner workings of Test and Trace to you better than
9 I can.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 Can I briefly touch upon Operation Moonshot, which
12 was then the Prime Minister who made the announcement on
13 9 September 2020 about his desire for Operation
14 Moonshot. It's your paragraph 3.91. I don't think we
15 need to turn to it. But can you assist, then, as to why
16 the Prime Minister was getting involved again in testing
17 strategy, which ultimately had quite a number of people
18 criticise the Operation Moonshot philosophy, and I think
19 ultimately, from that announcement on 9 September,
20 I think the tests that were identified that would have
21 been part of Operation Moonshot effectively were used as
22 part of the Community Testing Programme that came in in
23 November of 2020, but do you have any observations from
24 the Cabinet Office's perspective of the Prime Minister
25 essentially making that Operation Moonshot announcement?

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1 **A.** I think by way of context it's worth remembering that
2 until vaccines came along very late in 2020, testing,
3 tracing and isolation was one of the largest tools at
4 the government's disposal, and it's absolutely natural
5 and right that the Prime Minister should take a personal
6 interest in it.

7 I think the PM was very excited by the possibilities
8 that large-scale testing using lateral flow devices
9 offered. These would -- a technology that had been
10 around for years but was only really proven to work for
11 Covid at scale from autumn 2020 onwards, and he saw in
12 that a huge tool in the government's arsenal for
13 combatting Covid, particularly before vaccines arrived.
14 So I think it's no surprise that he was keen to push
15 NHS Test and Trace to move fast on the rollout of
16 lateral flow tests.

17 **Q.** Thank you.

18 Can we then, please, move to the topic of financial
19 support briefly, please, and can we move to
20 paragraph 5.18 at page 85.

21 You detail at paragraph 5.18:

22 "By mid-September 2020, with infections rising and
23 evidence suggesting only a very low percentage
24 (circa 20%) of those with COVID-19 symptoms in England
25 fully complied with self-isolation guidance, and that

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1 support for isolation?

2 **A.** Absolutely. Test and Trace, by the summer of 2020, was
3 doing a lot of work to understand the barriers to
4 self-isolation among groups of all types, with polling
5 data, with follow-up calls to people self-isolating,
6 asking them whether they fully complied, et cetera. And
7 although NHS Test and Trace is best placed to answer
8 this question, from my personal recollection I know that
9 they really, you know, went into the data on what was
10 keeping people from self-isolating, people of all
11 ethnicities, people in different professions, different
12 income levels, and so they built up a data picture that
13 was able to move ministers towards alignment.

14 **Q.** Thank you.

15 Then can we pick up, then, perhaps on that theme on
16 inequalities and disproportionately impacted groups.

17 Can we move, please, to paragraph 6.5 at page 93,
18 where you detail:

19 "The Cabinet Office's involvement in work to address
20 inequalities in relation to TTI began early in the
21 pandemic, prior to the establishment of [the Covid-19
22 Taskforce] and [NHS Test and Trace]."

23 And so can you assist, the Cabinet Office provided
24 guidance to the Department of Health and Social Care on
25 the public sector of -- PHE as well as equalities

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1 rates of self-isolation by other household members and
2 contacts were likely to be even lower, the [Covid-19
3 Taskforce] prepared advice for the Prime Minister
4 recommending a carrot-and-stick approach to increasing
5 compliance."

6 We obviously know that the figure that was then
7 arrived at subsequently was £500. Can you assist, did
8 the Cabinet Office have a view on the -- whether £500
9 was an adequate amount of --

10 **A.** I think there's an important context to provide here.
11 Ministers, including the Prime Minister, had been
12 arguing for some time that they were keen to increase
13 support for self-isolating people, both financial and
14 non-financial support, that there had been a range of
15 views across ministers on this topic I think it's fair
16 to say, and it took some months of conversations at
17 official level and at a political level, in -- to get
18 alignment across government on what that would look
19 like. And, eventually, a package that was acceptable to
20 the Chancellor, the Health Secretary, and the
21 Prime Minister emerged, and that was the package that is
22 described in paragraph 5.18.

23 **Q.** Thank you. And are you able to assist how the needs of
24 those from ethnic minority backgrounds were considered
25 in decision-making respect to the provision of financial

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1 insights regarding the potential impacts of TTI
2 policies. How were the needs and concerns of those from
3 ethnic minority backgrounds, including healthcare
4 workers, factored into this?

5 **A.** The Cabinet Office was home to the Government Equalities
6 Office that eventually emerged with some other teams to
7 become the Equalities Hub, and I'd also add that on the
8 establishment of the Covid taskforce, a team was
9 established within that taskforce focused on
10 disproportionately impacted groups. So there was a real
11 focus at the Cabinet Office that then saw the
12 appointment of Emran Mian as the senior responsible
13 owner for disproportionately impacted groups. I know
14 that you heard from him, my Lady, recently.

15 So the Cabinet Office was very keen to share with
16 DHSC and with NHS Test and Trace the expertise that the
17 Department had on equalities questions, and to ensure
18 that NHS Test and Trace took full advantage of the
19 knowledge that was at the central government.

20 **Q.** Thank you.

21 Now, if we just move forward, please, to
22 paragraph 6.15 on page 98, please. And throughout 6.15
23 through to 6.20, you refer to the recommendations in the
24 quarterly reports on inequalities, including to improve
25 participation in the TTI system.

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1 Can you assist, were the recommendations from those
2 reports implemented?

3 **A.** So I can't speak to those exact reports. What I do
4 know, though, is that, following the pandemic, the
5 government launched an Inclusive Britain action plan
6 with 74 actions that I think incorporated many of these
7 actions that had come from the quarterly reports during
8 the pandemic. That action plan the government has been
9 providing periodic updates against. The most recent of
10 those updates was in May 2024 when it was reported that
11 62 of the 74 actions had been completed.

12 I don't have an update since May 2024, but I can
13 tell you that at that date the vast majority of the
14 actions in the Inclusive Britain action plan were
15 complete.

16 **Q.** Thank you.

17 And then can I move, then, to lessons learned and
18 recommendations for the future. The Cabinet Office has
19 provided seven pages looking at lessons learning and
20 recommendations.

21 Can we please briefly look at paragraph 7.6, please,
22 at page 103. Thank you.

23 It details there:

24 "A number of recommendations were made by [the
25 Covid-19 Taskforce] strand of the project."

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1 Second, supported by the ONS, the National Situation
2 Centre has created a risk vulnerability tool to estimate
3 the number of people who are vulnerable to negative
4 impacts of national security assessment risks. It will
5 be made available across government, including to the
6 devolved administrations.

7 And thirdly, lessons management best practice
8 guidance, published last year on gov.co.uk, now
9 advocates for a participatory approach to emergency
10 management which considers the impacts of emergencies on
11 individuals and builds community resilience.

12 **Q.** Thank you. And then finally can I take you back to 7.4,
13 please, which deals with data and analyses at page 102.
14 Obviously, data analyses was one thematic area reviewed
15 as part of the Innovation and Lessons Learned Project.
16 It goes on to detail that:

17 "The report acknowledged that 'more interoperability
18 between digital systems across government would improve
19 the ability of the state to rapidly introduce new
20 digital services.'"

21 The Inquiry has heard quite a lot of evidence about
22 issues of data blockages and with number of criticisms
23 levied as against how data was managed within the
24 Department of Health and Social Care and how that
25 operated across departments. Are you able to provide

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1 And I think this is a project that followed
2 following the spring of 2022.

3 "One recommendation was to ensure equalities
4 considerations were central to decision making from the
5 start, and to identify those who may be
6 disproportionately impacted as early as possible (eg
7 multi-generational households), whilst recognising that
8 disproportionately impacted groups will not always be
9 the same cohort of people. Another recommendation was
10 to create and maintain an overview of all pressures on
11 local authorities and key delivery agencies related to
12 the policies and decisions in question to ensure
13 effective allocation of resources."

14 Are you able to assist as to what specific action
15 the Cabinet Office has taken since the review to
16 implement this recommendation, and to ensure that equity
17 is embedded in its decision-making processes?

18 **A.** Yes. I have three updates. Firstly, the National
19 Security Risk Assessment methodology now includes
20 a specific impact category on vulnerable people with the
21 Cabinet Office having issued new guidance to departments
22 in October 2024 to improve consideration of the
23 disproportionate impacts that risks may have on
24 different groups across a full spectrum of
25 vulnerability.

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1 any update of any work that's been done to improve data
2 sharing or interoperability?

3 **A.** I'm afraid I'm not, but I do know that this remains an
4 area that the government is focused on and that recent
5 public statements have focused on the need to share data
6 better across government, particularly in an age where
7 AI and others tools are emerging.

8 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Thank you, Mr Munn.

9 Those are my questions, my Lady. There are no Core
10 Participant questions that have been permitted.

11 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much indeed, Mr Munn, and
12 thank you, particularly having left the Civil Service,
13 to return to the private sector to volunteer -- I assume
14 it was volunteering, rather than anything else, to come
15 along and help the Inquiry. I'm really grateful to you.

16 **THE WITNESS:** Very well.

17 **LADY HALLETT:** Very well, it is 10.00 tomorrow.

18 **MS CARTWRIGHT:** Thank you, my Lady.

19 (4.36 pm)

20 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the followed day)

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