

Monday, 10 March 2025

(10.30 am)

(Proceedings delayed)

(10.35 am)

LADY HALLETT: Mr Sharma, I gather we've got a slight technical hitch but we seem to be ready to go.

MR SHARMA: We are.

My Lady, the first witness is Professor John Manners-Bell.

PROFESSOR JOHN MANNERS-BELL (sworn)

Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

MR SHARMA: Professor Manners-Bell, you have provided the Inquiry with an expert report. The reference is INQ000474864. It extends to approximately 200 pages. I wonder if you'd be kind enough to confirm that that report is true to the best of your knowledge and belief.

A. Absolutely.

Q. Professor Manners-Bell, you are the chief executive of a global market research organisation, Transport Intelligence Limited, the founder of the Foundation for Future Supply Chain, a fellow of the UK Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, and you are formerly the honorary visiting professor at London Metropolitan University Guildhall Faculty of Business and Law; is that correct?

1

cases are offshored, outsourced to China, to Asia. Those products move through the supply chain, through a variety of different companies, assembling those goods. They're shipped usually, you know, internationally by sea freight or by air cargo. They then arrive in the western market, where they go through, again, a whole process of different organisations, such as wholesalers, distributors, retailers, before they arrive at the consumer.

And at every stage, value is being added by all the different companies which are involved in that supply chain.

And as you have one flow of goods from Asia, usually -- I mean, not always but in many cases it is -- from Asia to the west, you also have flows of information, of data, which go up and down the supply chain, which provide levels of visibility, tracking, where are your goods, at what part of the process, the order process, are they --

Q. Thank you, professor. Can I ask you just to pause there. Perhaps during the course of your evidence I'm going to take you through a number of charts which you've very helpfully provided in your report. The first one is at page 15 of your report, and it touches on just what you've been explaining to the Inquiry.

3

A. That is correct.

Q. You are also the former chair of the Supply Chain and Logistics Global Advisory Council of the World Economic Forum?

A. Yeah.

Q. You are the author of several published works, including texts on global logistics and supply chain risk management?

A. That is correct.

Q. I wonder, Professor Manners-Bell, if we could start, please, with an introduction to supply chains, what they are, why they matter, and what they comprise of.

A. Certainly, and I think the first thing to recognise with supply chains is that, in usual times, they work away in the background, nobody really understand or recognises that they're there, and the first time that people will understand that supply chains actually exist is when they break and when you can't get food on the shelves or you can't get the right medicines at your hospital, or indeed, as we're all here today, is because you can't get hold of the right PPE.

And so I would say up until 2011 or so, there is really very little understanding of what could go wrong in supply chains, but as a whole, supply chains relate to the movement of goods from suppliers, who in many

2

There it is on screen.

What you've just described to the Inquiry is that moving in one direction is the flow of goods from the supplier to the manufacturer, to the distributor, the retailer, and ultimately to the customer.

The flow of funds in the opposite direction.

And then could you help us, please, with the arrow pointing in two directions, which refers to the flow of information. You've referred to "visibility". Could you help us, please, with what they mean in the context of supply chains.

A. Certainly. And this is absolutely a critical issue related to supply chain and the efficiency and the effectiveness of how the supply chain works.

If you're a customer, just to work through an example, and you place an order via -- maybe it could be on an online retailer, e-platform or whatever, then that triggers the release of an order process throughout the whole supply chain and the -- whoever the retailer may be or whoever is fulfilling that will order to its suppliers to replenish the stock, which has moved on to the customer. Those suppliers will then place orders further up the supply chain, internationally usually, as I was saying, in terms of manufacturing, especially with consumer goods, until it triggers a whole range of

4

1 different events throughout that supply chain.
 2 And so that's what I mean by the data flowing back
 3 up the supply chain. But once that order has been
 4 placed by the supplier, then they will upload some data
 5 to their platform that they are using which will inform
 6 every other member of the supply chain all the way back
 7 to the consumer when that goods will be delivered, when
 8 that order will be fulfilled. So that is the flow up
 9 and down.

10 **Q.** Now, this figure, of course, is a simplification of
 11 something which is far more complicated happening
 12 underneath.

13 Could we have, please, figure 2, which is at page 16
 14 of your report.

15 **A.** Yes, and as the Inquiry can see, things are much
 16 more complicated than the first diagram, which we
 17 displayed.

18 There are multiple tiers of suppliers, and many of
 19 those tiers will work for other companies within the
 20 supply chain as well. And this is getting closer to the
 21 reality of a PPE supply chain, which we'll come on to
 22 a lot later.

23 **Q.** So, just looking at figure 2, on the left-hand side
 24 there are "2. Tier Suppliers". What are they, please?

25 **A.** They are suppliers who are working for other companies

5

1 other suppliers, other manufacturers within the
 2 industry, but at the same time as that, they may also be
 3 supplying direct to the end manufacturer, the original
 4 equipment manufacturer.

5 **Q.** What are the problems, just in general terms, which are
 6 created by that combination of complexity and the lack
 7 of visibility within the supply chains? What happens?

8 **A.** Well, absolutely, the -- it is the lack of visibility
 9 which is the problem because data will be existing at
 10 various different silos, they're called, within the
 11 supply chain. So each supplier has its own resource of
 12 data which, because it may be competing with other
 13 companies, with other suppliers, with other
 14 manufacturers within the supply chain, it may not want
 15 to share, for competitive reasons, commercial reasons.

16 So consequently, getting visibility throughout the
 17 whole supply chain is very, very difficult, especially
 18 when we're talking about multiple tiers of suppliers.

19 **Q.** Is that because each of these entities within a supply
 20 chain is trying to protect the data which it holds about
 21 the products which it's buying and selling and about
 22 what it knows about the market?

23 **A.** That is correct, yes.

24 **Q.** I'd like to turn, please, to some of the features of the
 25 healthcare supply chains that this module is concerned

7

1 within the supply chain. So a tier 1 supplier would
 2 have a contact and link with the main customer, who was
 3 organising the manufacture of a particular product.
 4 Tier 2 suppliers will work for those tier 1 suppliers.
 5 And in many cases you can go down to tier 5, tier 6
 6 suppliers. So many, many tiers of suppliers all working
 7 for each other, all undertaking different processes
 8 within the supply chain, as they are being subcontracted
 9 to manufacture components, intermediate goods, which
 10 then are assembled at a later stage within that supply
 11 chain. So it is highly complicated.

12 **Q.** So there are a high number of different relationships at
 13 different layers involved, ultimately, in making sure
 14 that goods pass from one side of this diagram,
 15 ultimately to the other, the right, to the consumers?

16 **A.** Exactly. That's right.

17 **Q.** And in the course of this, the movement of goods from
 18 one side to the other, you refer in your report to there
 19 being a combination of collaboration and competition
 20 between different entities in a supply chain. Could you
 21 help us with that, please.

22 **A.** Yes, certainly. In many cases, many of these suppliers
 23 who are manufacturers in their own right will also be
 24 competing for the same business as -- for the main
 25 customer. So many times they will also supply goods to

6

1 with and some of the unique characteristics there are
 2 with PPE, with ventilators and with testing equipment.
 3 I wonder if we could start, please, with PPE supply
 4 chains.

5 What is it about PPE which marks it as, perhaps
 6 unique and different to other consumer goods which may
 7 be purchased in supermarkets and elsewhere?

8 **A.** Well, exactly, at some level they do look very similar
 9 to many consumer goods because they are low cost,
 10 they're manufactured remotely, offshored, and in that
 11 respect, it does resemble a consumer goods manufacturing
 12 supply chain.

13 But of course, as we saw throughout the Covid-19
 14 pandemic crisis, one of the key areas of differentiation
 15 is the criticality of those goods to public health, to
 16 health care workers. And so if in a consumer goods
 17 supply chain, you're not able to get hold of whatever it
 18 may be that you want to buy, it's not the end of the
 19 world. If you're not able to get a face mask or if
 20 you're not able to get any other item of PPE, then it
 21 becomes absolutely critical, which means that the supply
 22 chains need to be highly robust, highly resilient in
 23 order to ensure the supply.

24 **Q.** Each of those categories of healthcare equipment, they
 25 have slightly different characteristics. So for PPE,

8

1 you've touched upon the fact that they are low volume
 2 and low cost; is that fair?
 3 **A.** Yes, low value and high -- low value and high volume.
 4 **Q.** Thank you. And what about with respect to ventilators,
 5 by contrast to items of PPE? We've heard evidence from
 6 witnesses last week that describe the manufacture of PPE
 7 as being something which is actually quite technical and
 8 specific, but for ventilators it's another level of
 9 complexity, isn't it?
 10 **A.** Absolutely. They resemble high-tech goods and the
 11 supply chains resemble high-tech supply chains. Very,
 12 very different from consumer goods and PPE.
 13 **Q.** And what about with respect to testing equipment?
 14 **A.** For the testing equipment, again, we see there are
 15 differences. For example, in one item of PPE you may
 16 have five different components coming together. In some
 17 types of testing equipment, it may be 60 different parts
 18 which are being brought together within a kit. It's
 19 different types of materials. Some of those materials
 20 used are also hazardous and so it's far more complicated
 21 in terms of the manufacturer. And in terms of the use
 22 of testing equipment, when the tests are being sent back
 23 to be analysed, there's a whole new loop, as well, in
 24 terms of life of that testing equipment, which you don't
 25 get with PPE.

9

1 right condition, of the right quality, and at the right
 2 price.
 3 And are those the means by which one can measure the
 4 success or failure of a supply chain?
 5 **A.** Yes, I believe so. It's a well-used rubric within the
 6 industry, within the commercial industry, of how to
 7 measure the effectiveness of a supply chain and it
 8 applies equally well to the PPE sector as well, and
 9 other healthcares.
 10 **Q.** And in terms of the supply chains which this Inquiry and
 11 this module is considering, namely PPE, ventilators and
 12 testing equipment, is there any doubt in your mind about
 13 the success or failure of the supply chains for that
 14 equipment?
 15 **A.** Yes, and I've written down a quote from the Welsh
 16 Government, and it applies equally to all the devolved
 17 administrations and the UK Government, but they said
 18 that "delivering PPE stock to local health boards did
 19 not necessarily mean it reached the right hospital or
 20 the right ward", and that is an example, it really
 21 provides an illustration to the six Ps -- the six
 22 "rights" we were talking about. Because in supply chain
 23 terms, not getting the PPE to the right place means
 24 a critical supply chain failure. You may not have
 25 bothered to have had those goods in the first place if

11

1 PPE, you'll use, it's usually single use and then
 2 it's disposed of, and maybe we'll come back to that
 3 later on.
 4 **Q.** So there are a number of different ways in which the
 5 categories of healthcare equipment that this module is
 6 considering, they vary, and their supply chains are
 7 different owing to the characteristics of the items
 8 which are being bought and sold?
 9 **A.** Absolutely right.
 10 **Q.** Just to touch on what you described as a closed -- is it
 11 a closed loop that you referred to with respect to
 12 testing equipment?
 13 **A.** That's right.
 14 **Q.** And is that because the tests or some kinds of tests
 15 have to go to the consumer and then they have to be
 16 returned?
 17 **A.** Yes, that is correct, and then, because some of the
 18 testing equipment is manufactured specifically to the
 19 testing companies, they have to be sent back to
 20 a specific location which adds an air of complexity
 21 within the supply chain.
 22 **Q.** I'd like to move on, please, to how one measures the
 23 success of supply chains. You refer in your report to
 24 what is called the six Rs, and they are the right
 25 products in the right place, at the right time, in the

10

1 you're not able to get them to where they're needed at
 2 the right time, to the right people.

3 Could we have, please, another chart that you've
 4 produced in your report on page 33? Figure 7.

5 This is "Volatility in demand and supply variables
 6 during Covid", and you've described it as creating a
 7 "dysfunctional market". And on the left-hand side are
 8 what are described as "demand variables", so those
 9 variables coming from the demand side of the equation,
 10 and under there it says:

11 "[The] unknown infection and patient hospitalisation
 12 rates affects the underlying demand for PPE."

13 Another factor was the changing government guidance
 14 on the frequency of use of PPE in medical settings;
 15 changing government guidance on extension of use of PPE
 16 by the general public and businesses; multiple health
 17 procurement organisations in competition and making
 18 multiple orders; and then finally, the bullwhip effect.

19 What is the effect of the combination of the demand
 20 variables on this side of the equation?

21 **A.** Well, in simple terms it leads to huge volatility in
 22 demand. Supply chains work best in a more stable
 23 environment, and once you have multiple demand
 24 variables, all of which are highly volatile, then it
 25 goes back to what I was referring to in the first slide

12

1 when that data is transmitted up the supply chain. But
 2 the uncertainty, the instability which is being
 3 transmitted up the supply chain then causes a whole
 4 range of signals in terms of production, the
 5 requirement, the demand that's required for PPE goods,
 6 which then leads to, as we say, a market dysfunction.

7 **Q.** There are, of course, at least on the left-hand side,
 8 some areas in which the government does have control in
 9 terms of its policy. One or two of them are the
 10 guidance on the frequency of use of PPE and the rate at
 11 which that changes. Could you help us, please. What
 12 particular effect does changing guidance or changing
 13 guidance regularly have on supply chains?

14 **A.** Yes, I think the -- probably the biggest impact would be
 15 on the usage of PPE, whether it should be single use or
 16 sessional use, how many items of PPE are required
 17 throughout a single day, for example, relating --
 18 referring to the patient involved, whether -- the level
 19 of hospitalisation, for example.

20 So that is very clearly one of the biggest impacts
 21 on demand, but I think many of the other issues which
 22 are also highlighted, also had similar effects.

23 **Q.** And in terms of the multiple health procurement
 24 organisations, are you referring to the fact that each
 25 devolved administration in the UK had its own

13

1 visibility.

2 Taking all of these together, what effect did this
 3 have on supply chains which were providing PPE to the UK
 4 and worldwide?

5 **A.** Well, it had a devastating effect on them, and in the
 6 first -- putting it in context, in the first two months
 7 of 2020, actually more PPE was being shipped to China
 8 than was being shipped out of China, and that's because
 9 of the progress of the pandemic around the world.

10 The pandemic, of course, hit China and it also
 11 impacted very much on the suppliers, the manufacturers,
 12 in China as well. And so consequently, when the
 13 pandemic had spread to other regions, first to Italy in
 14 Europe and then the rest of Europe, there were these
 15 systemic problems in terms of supply.

16 And then, in terms of the international
 17 transportation element, if you look at the air cargo
 18 industry, for example, the air passenger sector was
 19 impacted by a lack of services flying to China, and so
 20 consequently there were bottlenecks in terms of being
 21 able to get available capacity when it came back
 22 on stream to Europe.

23 So there was a whole host, a concatenation, you
 24 might say, of supplied variables which came together to
 25 cause this huge stress.

15

1 procurement system and its own body that was buying
 2 items such as PPE?

3 **A.** Yes, I mean, it's a very fragmented demand side from
 4 the -- from NHS Supply Chain to the various health
 5 trusts that we have in England. Obviously in the
 6 devolved administrations there is centralisation of
 7 procurement, across the four nations. But then, when
 8 you look further in terms of the primary healthcare and
 9 social care, these organisations were also buying their
 10 own PPE. But beyond that, you could also add other
 11 government departments such as the MoD, for example.
 12 They all had -- they were all buying PPE, they were all
 13 holding stocks of PPE as well.

14 But just to put this in the global context as well,
 15 it's not just the UK, obviously. Every country around
 16 the world had similar problems and this was all feeding
 17 back to the suppliers largely based in China to create
 18 this dysfunction.

19 **Q.** Turning to the other side of this equation, the supply
 20 variables you describe on this side of the equation,
 21 material bottlenecks and production capacity, and
 22 inability to meet regulatory standards, government
 23 intervention in trade processes, disruption to air
 24 transport and shipping industry, and that point which
 25 you've referred to before: the lack of supply chain

14

1 **Q.** Could we touch, please, briefly on one of the points
 2 which is referred to on the demand variable side with
 3 another chart, which is at page 22 of your report:
 4 "Figure 5: The 'Bull Whip Effect'".

5 **A.** Yes.

6 **Q.** Thank you. Could we zoom in.

7 This is figure 5, the bullwhip effect. On the
 8 bottom it's referred to "Customer Demand", referring up
 9 to the supplier, and on the left-hand side it says:
 10 "Small change in Customer demand."
 11 Seems to create an exponential effect up the supply
 12 chain.

13 Could you please talk us through what's happening
 14 here and how this affects supply chains in an emergency.

15 **A.** Yes, and this is partly industry practice, partly
 16 psychological behaviour of people involved in the
 17 procurement process, but when there is even a small
 18 change in customer demand, the supplier will then
 19 obviously fulfil that demand, but when they replenish,
 20 they will pass on their orders further up the supply
 21 chain and at each stage within that, their supplier's
 22 supplier will add more and more to each order, because
 23 the worst thing that could possibly happen, in terms of
 24 supply chain, is being out of stock.

25 So, consequently, the whole behaviour of every

16

1 company within that supply chain is to over-order to
2 make sure that they don't run out of stock.

3 They think there's nothing wrong with that at their
4 stage of supply chain, but of course if that's passed on
5 right the way down, through many of those tiers that we
6 saw in some of those earlier graphics, then we see that
7 there is a huge demand which is actually not
8 illustrative of the real demand, actually, in the market
9 at the time. But it is passed on down the supply chain.

10 **Q.** Thank you.

11 Can I take you, please, moving perhaps away from
12 some of the theory about the way in which supply chains
13 operate, and dealing with what the practical
14 consequences are of the matters that you've referred to
15 in your evidence. So market dysfunction, the bullwhip
16 effect, and so on. What effect does that have on those
17 who are on the front line trying to procure items such
18 as PPE?

19 **A.** Well, it creates a hugely difficult market for them.
20 A lot of the -- as I think much of the evidence you
21 heard last week will suggest, the supply chains in
22 the UK were very much set up for business as usual --
23 I think you heard that term a lot over the last week --
24 rather than actually to deal with these major peaks of
25 demand.

17

1 over the last 20 years.

2 So there were certainly preparations put in place
3 but they weren't anywhere near to being sufficiently
4 robust enough to deal with the demand of the pandemic.

5 **LADY HALLETT:** So some work but not enough?

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **LADY HALLETT:** Sorry to interrupt.

8 **MR SHARMA:** Professor Manners-Bell, one of the reviews which
9 you conducted during the course of your report was into
10 the exercises which my Lady considered in Module 1 in
11 relation to preparedness for pandemics. What did you
12 discover about procurement and supply chains in the
13 exercises which you reviewed?

14 **A.** Well, I think there are two -- I mean, if we go back to
15 my Lady's point, yes, work had been done in terms of the
16 preparation, but I think there were two key areas where
17 there was -- it was lacking. And the fundamental
18 problem of the exercises, as far as I can see, from what
19 I have read, was that a global shortage or pandemic was
20 not taken into account.

21 So, in supply chain terms, the downstream element
22 was dealt with: get moving PPE from warehouses through
23 the supply chain to the healthcare workers who needed
24 it. So work was done on that part. But nobody, as far
25 as I am aware, actually looked at the possibility that

19

1 As I mentioned earlier on, supply chains work very
2 well at times of stability but they need the flexibility
3 and agility to work in times of emergency, crisis, as we
4 see.

5 So what we found was that the supply chain and the
6 logistics in the UK just wasn't able to cope with the
7 demands which were being placed upon it. The systems
8 were not set up, whether they were the warehousing
9 systems or whether they were the procurement systems.
10 The framework system which had been set up by the
11 NHS Supply Chain wasn't able to cope with the demand
12 either, and maybe we can talk about that a little bit
13 later on as well.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** Can I just interrupt for a second.

15 During Module 1, I think it was 1, it may even be 2,
16 I thought I was told by a number of certainly
17 politicians that, as a result of preparations for
18 Brexit, a lot of work had been done on the supply chains
19 that was of use. Would you agree with that assertion?

20 **A.** Yes, I do. I certainly agree with that. And there
21 was -- a lot of work was also being put into -- in terms
22 of the preparedness for pandemics and influenza in terms
23 of the PIPP stocks, which I'm sure we'll come on to as
24 well. And some of that work went back to 2003, when we
25 saw the first pandemic, and there have been iterations

18

1 there would be a global constraint of PPE.

2 **Q.** And one of the recommendations which you make, and we
3 don't need to turn to it, is that such exercises in the
4 future do take into account such factors as strains in
5 the supply chain and difficulties with procurement; is
6 that right?

7 **A.** That is absolutely right, yes.

8 **Q.** Turning, please, to the global trend in supply chains
9 leading up to the pandemic and how it was that supply
10 chains had the structures and features that they had
11 in 2020, is it right that since the 1980s there's just
12 been generally a move towards offshore manufacturing to
13 lower cost markets for items such as PPE?

14 **A.** Yes, indeed, there's -- and I think almost every sector
15 will have been impacted by this offshoring and
16 outsourcing trend, largely driven through the low-cost
17 manufacturing resources which exist throughout Asia.
18 That has been underpinned by improvements in data flows,
19 which gives more visibility of what's happening
20 throughout Asia as well. And also the -- very
21 importantly, that since the 1950s and the
22 containerisation of shipping, it's been very cheap to
23 move goods around the world.

24 **Q.** So in those countries the labour is obviously of lower
25 cost, there's greater production scalability, I think

20

1 you describe it as. It means that there is less
 2 inventory holding in the countries in which the stock is
 3 required, and as a consequence, the supply chains that
 4 supply the UK and other countries for critical items
 5 such as PPE, they are more vulnerable, aren't they?
 6 **A.** They are. They are, from a whole range of different
 7 risks. I think I mentioned 2011 was probably when risk
 8 really came onto the agenda, and the reason for that was
 9 that there were some very important natural disasters
 10 around that time, there was a tsunami in Japan, there
 11 was floods in Thailand, and people, certainly from the
 12 commercial sector, started to understand that an event
 13 happening on the other side of the world could still
 14 lead to automotive production being halted, for example,
 15 in Sunderland, and/or in the high-tech sector, that it
 16 would have huge ramifications in parts of the western
 17 world, in terms of high-tech manufacturing, for example.
 18 **Q.** And have those trends continued since the pandemic or
 19 has there been some change in the trends?
 20 **A.** Yes, now it's what I call a hybrid approach is being
 21 adopted. So if we take a step back further before the
 22 offshoring and outsourcing trend it was very much a case
 23 that there would be -- high levels of inventory would be
 24 held, just in case there was a major problem. Much of
 25 that inventory was held within Europe or in the UK close

21

1 one witness called a sort of analogue. So paper and
 2 pen. Others would be using spreadsheets as well. And
 3 there was no, sort of, interrelation or integration or
 4 the ability to integrate those different data silos as
 5 well.

6 But just to add to that in terms of complexity, of
 7 course, that's all in the downstream inventory. If you
 8 take into account the many distributors and
 9 manufacturers involved as well, there was no single view
 10 of the truth, as it's called, of the single view of
 11 inventory throughout the whole of the supply chain which
 12 is just as critical, in my mind.

13 **Q.** The Inquiry will be hearing evidence from Mr Webster and
 14 Ms Lawson, we don't need to turn the statements up, but
 15 what they say in their witness statements was that there
 16 was no way of tracking what the individual trusts had
 17 and there was no way of tracking what the individual
 18 products were that were being bought by institutions
 19 such as SCCL?

20 **A.** That is absolutely right, yes.

21 **Q.** Could we have up, please, one of your recommendations.
 22 It is at pages 79 and 80 of your report. You've made a
 23 number of recommendations, I think 29 in total. We'll
 24 just touch on some of them during the course of your
 25 evidence. It begins at the bottom of page 79. What you

23

1 to the end markets.

2 When you have offshoring and outsourcing, the risk
 3 elements of holding inventory goes down, and along with
 4 that, the financial costs of holding inventory goes
 5 down, but all these other risks increase, whether those
 6 are political, economic, societal, technological, or
 7 environmental, as I was saying.

8 **Q.** Touching, please, on what you've just mentioned that
 9 stockpiles and inventory and the practicality of
 10 stockpiles and inventory within the UK, could you help
 11 us with this, please: prior to the pandemic was there
 12 a single UK-wide complete inventory of items such as
 13 PPE?

14 **A.** Nowhere near, no. I mean, a huge fragmentation of data
 15 relating to inventory.

16 **Q.** And is it right that that was aggravated not only by the
 17 fact that inventory was held by the UK Government, it
 18 was also held by devolved administrations; it was held
 19 by trusts and boards and other health organisations.
 20 And so there's an enormous amount of data about what
 21 inventory holdings there are, but nobody knows or rather
 22 nobody knew, prior to the pandemic, what there was?

23 **A.** That's right, and many of the organisations you've just
 24 mentioned had different stages in their technological
 25 development as well. So some may be using I think what

22

1 have suggested is that there be maintained a digital
 2 twin of the complete UK inventory of PPE and healthcare
 3 equipment through an inventory management system.
 4 You've described it as an aspirational post-pandemic
 5 goal, and you go on to provide details of that.

6 What effect do you think having such an inventory
 7 system, a central inventory system would have on
 8 procurement and the supply chains going into a pandemic
 9 if it were to happen in the future?

10 **A.** Well, it would definitely forearm the people in charge
 11 of the supply chain, whether that sits the NHS Supply
 12 Chain or within the Department of Health and Social Care
 13 or even the politicians, to give an accurate view of
 14 what inventory is being held, what types of PPE are
 15 being held, the volumes that are being held and where
 16 they are being held as well, which is absolutely crucial
 17 in any supply chain, not just PPE, to know how much you
 18 already have of a particular item.

19 **Q.** Could I turn, please, to market concentration. We'll be
 20 hearing, the Inquiry will be hearing from witnesses
 21 later this morning and this afternoon about China being
 22 the dominant market in PPE, and just some figures, if
 23 I may. You've described in your report that in the year
 24 before the Covid-19 pandemic, it was estimated by the
 25 International Finance Corporation, IFC, that China

24

1 accounted for 50-60% of the world's supply of masks, 40%
 2 of cover-alls, 40% of aprons, 40-45% of eye protection
 3 and 30-40% of shoe covers, and then you refer to the
 4 United States taking up about 20-25% of the remaining
 5 market share. And then within those figures there's
 6 a little nuance, because gloves, for example, are
 7 manufactured predominantly in Malaysia and Thailand.
 8 They make up collectively about 85% of the market.

9 What are the risks that come from markets and
 10 suppliers and manufacturers being concentrated in
 11 a particular part of the world?

12 **A.** There's a whole range of risks. I mean, if we look at
 13 the political risks, for example, those can manifest
 14 themselves in terms of trade measures. Certainly at the
 15 outset of the pandemic, China restricted the supply of
 16 PPE because it was really focused on its own domestic
 17 issues. If -- and that is the case for all countries,
 18 I'm not just highlighting China, because actually,
 19 Germany and France also restricted the exports of PPE.

20 **Q.** So that is a phenomenon which means that no matter where
 21 you are going to source your PPE and other medical
 22 equipment from, that you have to take account of when
 23 you're building supply chain resilience?

24 **A.** If you don't manufacture in the UK, there is always
 25 a very significant political risk to supply, in

25

1 world which would mitigate this particular risk.

2 **Q.** Turning to that recommendation, could we have up,
 3 please, on the screen recommendation 22 of your report,
 4 which is at page 138. This is a recommendation that
 5 combines a number of features, some of which you've
 6 touched on, and others that we will come on to.

7 You've referred to the UK and devolved
 8 administration governments adopting an approach to
 9 stockpiles which combines elements of three potential
 10 options: firstly, strategic supplies, which we'll come
 11 back to; secondly, longer-term relationships with
 12 Chinese and critically -- your emphasis -- non-Chinese
 13 suppliers must be maintained or developed, taking into
 14 account the possibility that these channels may be
 15 rendered ineffectual in a pandemic.

16 Then the third point which you raise, which we'll
 17 again come on to, is some contingency for national
 18 production to be put into place.

19 So rather than happening upon one solution, if
 20 I may, to the supply chain problem, your recommendation
 21 is a combination of three or three and a half elements.
 22 Could you take us through why exactly that is?

23 **A.** Yes. Well, this is absolutely my recommendation: that
 24 we require a multi-faceted approach to building
 25 resilience in the PPE supply chain. Absolutely. It's

27

1 a pandemic.

2 **Q.** What is the solution, to put it bluntly, to
 3 concentration of market supply in one particular region,
 4 country or area in the world? You've referred, on the
 5 one hand, to diversification in your report; are there
 6 other areas which would limit or mitigate the risk to
 7 supply chains in a pandemic?

8 **A.** Yes, well, I think -- starting with diversification.
 9 I think that is absolutely critical and again, this is
 10 something which is a trend which is being undertaken
 11 throughout, not just PPE but throughout the whole of
 12 industry now, especially with the advent of more tariffs
 13 and the potential US-China trade war. So looking at
 14 multiple countries outside of China is a first step.
 15 But, of course, if we have a pandemic which actually
 16 develops and evolves from Asia, then the likelihood is
 17 all those countries may implement trade measures.

18 And so consequently, what I suggest and recommend is
 19 that we need to look at other markets, including
 20 near-shoring, near-sourcing from other parts of the
 21 world, which may not be impacted at the same time. And
 22 as the pandemic evolves throughout the world, then it
 23 would -- if you had a very proactive supply chain
 24 manager in charge of the PPE, they would be able to
 25 switch on manufacturers located in various parts of the

26

1 because if we look at a timeline of the development of
 2 the pandemic, I see -- and some of this actually relates
 3 to the preparedness plans which have been put in place
 4 already which we need to have inventory stocks in hand
 5 to deal with the pressing need urgency at the beginning
 6 of a pandemic.

7 Now, in the original plans it was hoped that JIT
 8 contracts would then kick in to replenish those stocks.

9 **Q.** Forgive me, they're just-in-time contracts?

10 **A.** Just-in-time contracts, yes -- would kick in to be able
 11 to replenish those stocks. That didn't happen, and the
 12 reasons behind that need to be addressed, and my
 13 approach, I suppose, really tries to provide a solution
 14 for why the JIT manufacturing didn't work in this sort
 15 of situation. And there are reasons for that, much
 16 because we relied on distributors rather than
 17 manufacturers, but if we were able to source goods from
 18 other parts of the world and have deeper engagement with
 19 those suppliers as well, that will be critical to this
 20 approach.

21 **Q.** So does that mean building up longer-term relationships
 22 with potential suppliers and manufacturers, not only in
 23 China but globally?

24 **A.** Absolutely, yes. You need core -- in my mind, in my
 25 opinion, what needs to happen is that the core

28

1 relationships with these manufacturers are developed,
2 long-term relationships, which means that in -- when
3 there's stress in the system, you're not suddenly
4 scabbling around for many hundreds or many thousands of
5 smaller suppliers that you have no relationship with,
6 you have no understanding of the quality or the quantity
7 that they might be able to provide but you have these
8 very long-term, very deep strategic relationships with
9 core suppliers which are already in place.

10 **Q.** Forgive me, what would be the difference between what
11 you are suggesting and what the UK Government, for
12 example, had in place when it came to just-in-time
13 contracts? Surely, if those suppliers are based
14 overseas, there's a possibility that those contracts,
15 strategic though they might be, would fail equally.
16 What is it that you suggest would stop that from
17 happening?

18 **A.** Well, I think in some cases the JIT was relying on
19 distributors rather than manufacturers. That's the
20 first point. My second point is that if you have those
21 long-term relationships in place, there is a less
22 likely -- there is a smaller likelihood that when there
23 is stress, that those manufacturers will be driven by
24 short-term benefits from the price of PPE. But
25 I completely agree that the only way you could

29

1 normal supply chain as business as usual, and are always
2 being used. So the likelihood of them going out of date
3 is very much smaller.

4 Now, a virtual rotating stockpile is when that is
5 undertaken by manufacturers throughout the rest of the
6 supply chain. So not held in a specific
7 government-controlled warehouse, for example, but
8 actually the responsibility is with the manufacturers,
9 and they will hold more stock in a relationship with the
10 procurement, with government procurement, on the
11 government's behalf.

12 **Q.** I'd like to turn, please, to another element of what you
13 suggest would assist in building the resilience of the
14 UK supply chains and that is the potential for domestic
15 manufacturing, but before I turn on to it, could
16 I please ask you, what is it, what are the structural
17 reasons, at least in the UK, that limit or prohibit the
18 building of domestic supply of items such as PPE?

19 **A.** In the first instance, as already mentioned, it is the
20 cost of labour. Some of the process can be very labour
21 intensive, in some cases, and which is why China in
22 particular has gained a competitive advantage, because
23 of its low-cost labour force, and also the scale of its
24 labour force as well.

25 It goes deeper than that, because the offshoring

31

1 absolutely ensure that you had supplies of PPE would be
2 to develop on onshored manufacturing sector within
3 the UK.

4 **Q.** We will turn to that in a moment. In your report,
5 Professor Manners-Bell, you are quite blunt and you
6 refer to a number of minimum requirements that the
7 UK Government has to achieve in order to build supply
8 chain resilience in the long term. The first we've
9 touched upon, which is establishing a control tower to
10 look at the inventory. The second is that you've
11 referred to initiating what you describe as virtual,
12 rotating stockpiles to address problems of PPE stock
13 control. Could you help us, please, with that second
14 point, virtual rotating stockpiles? What does that
15 mean?

16 **A.** That is a technique that is used quite widely within
17 industry in order to ensure that stocks do not run out
18 of date. I think one of the witnesses, I think
19 Mr Marron from last week, also referred to the rotating
20 stockpile which was being implemented for gloves.
21 And -- but in my mind, there is no reason why it should
22 be limited to one particular type of PPE. By rotating,
23 what we mean is that, instead of holding a separate
24 inventory, a separate stock of goods for a particular
25 event such as the pandemic, those goods flow into the

30

1 trend, as we've been talking about, goes back, you know,
2 two, three, four decades now. And so actually, it's not
3 just the labour and those -- the manufacturing processes
4 which are being offshored but a lot of the knowhow, the
5 experience, the expertise in manufacturing has been
6 lost. And it's usually said that if you lose that
7 ability, the capability to manufacture, and you lose the
8 know-how, then it will take a generation to build that
9 back up starting from scratch.

10 **Q.** You refer in your report to some areas in which the UK
11 in the manufacturing sector has what might be described
12 as a competitive advantage. There are areas in which
13 the United Kingdom has high levels of manufacturing
14 capability and capacity. Are there any ways that you
15 suggest that that could be turned to domestic
16 manufacture of items such as PPE and then of more
17 complicated equipment such as ventilators and testing
18 equipment?

19 **A.** I certainly think, in terms of ventilators -- because
20 the UK has decided, whether through policy or whether
21 through economics, to really focus on the high-value
22 manufacturing, the advanced manufacturing elements, so
23 aerospace, you know, biomedical technologies, for
24 example. And they've left many of the sort of
25 lower-value-adding processes to other manufacturers in

32

1 the rest of the world, predominantly in Asia.

2 But if you're able to automate your manufacturing
3 system, then you can remove the labour element which
4 puts the UK at a disadvantage. And I think that is an
5 area where certainly more focus should be placed and
6 more focus from government policy should be placed in
7 terms of developing that high-tech automation which can
8 then allow UK manufacturers to compete effectively with
9 other manufacturers in the rest of the world.

10 And that's already going on in Germany. So it's not
11 just an aspiration, it's something which our partners in
12 Europe are already well aware of, and that is why
13 I recommend that we also should be going down that path.

14 **Q.** Could we please bring up that recommendation on screen.
15 It's your recommendation at page 31 of your report. You
16 make the observation there that:

17 "Whilst it is not possible to reproduce the vast PPE
18 and healthcare equipment manufacturing capacity
19 presently based in Asia within the UK, policy focus
20 should be on developing a small, automated and scalable
21 manufacturing capability. This would be deployed to
22 provide enough product to meet UK demand between
23 depletion of emergency stockpiles [that you've referred
24 to] at the beginning of a pandemic and the time when the
25 global market was able to scale up to meet global

33

1 assist a country such as the UK with building resilience
2 for a pandemic in the future?

3 **A.** Yes, certainly. The PPE industry is, almost by
4 definition, a linear supply chain, so once it's been
5 used, you throw it away, and many times you're mandated
6 to throw away a mask or a gown or gloves after you've
7 used them. So it is part of the sort of -- what's
8 called the sort of take-make-waste sector. But if you
9 are able to bring an element of circularity into that,
10 so actually once you've used a particular item it can be
11 safely reused, then it could have a really big impact on
12 the volumes of new goods that you would need to reorder.

13 Now, that will take advances in technology, and
14 I think there has been some investment there, certainly
15 there have been some reach projects which will enable
16 PPE to be more robust, but it will be able to -- allow
17 them to be cleaned afterwards, using new techniques, and
18 then returned back into the hospital to be reused again.

19 **Q.** Could I have up, please, your recommendation 5, which is
20 on page 54 of your report. And here you make the
21 suggestion that:

22 "The government should increase investment in
23 research and development related to new, re-usable forms
24 of PPE."

25 Do you mean that investment should only be from the

35

1 demand."

2 If I may, one suggestion which may be made is that
3 investing in this kind of automation and equipment is
4 expensive and that the appetite isn't there. What could
5 the government do in terms of policy to encourage
6 domestic manufacturing to build up resilience in the way
7 that you suggest?

8 **A.** I think it very much needs to provide a long-term
9 horizon for investment in automation, and specifically
10 within the PPE sector. It can do that by committing to
11 minimum volumes of spend with these companies which are
12 investing in the technology.

13 That's happened in Canada, it's in the glove
14 manufacturing sector there, where the central
15 procurement organisation has committed to certain
16 volumes over time. It's also happened in Australia as
17 well. So it's something which other governments and
18 countries are looking at to provide that long-term
19 financial backing for a company which gives them the
20 confidence to actually go ahead and invest in this
21 high-capital automation equipment.

22 **Q.** In addition to automation, you also refer in your report
23 to potentially using circularity or reusable PPE. Could
24 you help us with where that would fit into the picture
25 of building supply chain resilience and how that might

34

1 public sector or is there scope for private sector
2 investment in these areas? And if so, how could the
3 government incentivise that?

4 **A.** Yes, I think this is really critical as we move forward
5 over the next decade to the use and re-use of PPE.
6 I think that the government should play a role of the
7 research projects for helping to develop that new
8 technology but, of course, it would be the private
9 sector who would be the driving force behind it. That
10 would require there to be a commercial rationale for
11 that investment, and again, that really would need
12 a commitment from the central procurement organisations
13 to invest or to have minimum levels of spend on
14 recyclable, circular PPE.

15 **Q.** Finally, Professor Manners-Bell, a topic which you
16 touched on at the beginning of your evidence, which is
17 data visibility and how important it is for parties
18 within supply chains to be able to see what is happening
19 elsewhere within the chain. Could you help us, please,
20 with what advancements have been made in terms of data
21 visibility and the ability of manufacturers, customers
22 at the end of the supply chain, and intermediaries to
23 understand what's happening within a supply chain?

24 **A.** There certainly have been huge advances in technologies
25 in terms of providing realtime visibility, realtime

36

1 visibility platforms, which are very widespread
 2 throughout industry of all sorts. It provides the
 3 visibility of usage, right from -- in the PPE sector,
 4 from the ward level all the way up through the supply
 5 chain from local holdings of inventory through
 6 distribution centres, and there should be -- it provides
 7 a control tower function. So someone sitting right --
 8 in an overarching role to be able to make judgements
 9 based on realtime demand, which was very much lacking
 10 throughout most of the early parts of the crisis.

11 **Q.** Could you explain in practical terms what that looks
 12 like? So we've heard in this module last week in
 13 evidence about modelling demand and about burn rates and
 14 an inability to predict the amount of PPE that was being
 15 used, and to track the quantity of PPE which was being
 16 supplied. In what ways do what you suggest assist in
 17 that regard?

18 **A.** It provides -- at any one point it should provide
 19 a supply chain manager with the tools to be able to, in
 20 terms of the level of procurement which is going to be
 21 needed to replenish stocks which are being used, and to
 22 do it from not just a central perspective but all the
 23 way from the end user, which in this case is the
 24 healthcare worker, and right through the supply chain.

25 So having that level of information allows the

37

1 Once it has been delivered, then again, an event
 2 will be triggered, data will be triggered to say it has
 3 been delivered, it is now here, and that will then
 4 replenish the inventory.

5 So it's a complete -- it allows complete
 6 transparency of the supply chain, and enabling managers
 7 to make better decisions.

8 **Q.** And is this system or this kind of software, is that
 9 something which is available now or is it something
 10 which is in development?

11 **A.** It's available now, and it's in -- most industries will
 12 be using this, even in sectors which are even more
 13 complicated, and there is more of the -- the potential
 14 for more obfuscation of the supply chain, such as the
 15 spare parts industry for the automotive industry, for
 16 example, which is very, very fragmented.

17 **Q.** And if I may close, please, with one of your
 18 recommendations, number 7, which is on 69 of your
 19 report. At the bottom of the page, please. You make
 20 a suggestion that the government also has a role in this
 21 respect, by the development of new technologies,
 22 innovation and business investment. And not only with
 23 investment in technologies, but also skills training and
 24 research in supply chains.

25 **A.** Yes, indeed. And I think this is one of the

39

1 manager to make more informed decisions which then
 2 goes -- relate that all the way back to the bullwhip
 3 effect slide that we saw earlier, by actually placing
 4 orders based on the reality rather than actually on
 5 models which, which may or may not be right, but in many
 6 cases are wrong, then it allows fulfilment in a much
 7 more ordered way and should not lead to the market
 8 dysfunction that we saw.

9 **Q.** You've referred to realtime tracking. How is it
 10 possible, or could you please describe how it's possible
 11 to have realtime tracking in such granular detail of
 12 singular items of, for example, PPE? How does that work
 13 in practice? What role do -- you refer to such things
 14 as IoT, Internet of Things. What role does that have to
 15 play in procurement and supply chains in the future?

16 **A.** Well, at every stage within the supply chain data is
 17 being provided to a supply chain management function,
 18 whether that is provided by the logistics company, who
 19 may be picking and packing from a warehouse. As soon as
 20 it's being taken out of that warehouse, that data will
 21 be released to say that "We need to reorder to replenish
 22 that particular item for that warehouse." For the
 23 person who has ordered it, it will tell you "That
 24 shipment of PPE will be delivered tomorrow morning at
 25 9 o'clock."

38

1 facilitatory roles of government: to be able to foster
 2 this high-tech advanced technology environment by --
 3 through things that it can impact upon, such as
 4 education and training as well, which will be very
 5 important for, if we're developing a UK supply chain, to
 6 be able to have smaller players within the UK feed into
 7 that supply chain, they will need people and resources
 8 to be able to integrate the technologies which are
 9 available presently. But that will allow much smaller
 10 organisations to become part of a more efficient and
 11 effective supply chain in the UK.

12 **MR SHARMA:** Professor Manners-Bell, I don't have any more
 13 questions.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** No, I don't have any questions.

15 Thank you very much indeed for your help, especially
 16 the written report that obviously we'll consider in more
 17 detail but you've given an excellent summary this
 18 morning, I'm really grateful to you.

19 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you, my Lady.

20 **LADY HALLETT:** Very well, I shall return at 11.55.

21 (11.40 am)

22 (A short break)

23 (11.55 am)

24 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Sharma.

25 **MR SHARMA:** My Lady, the next witness is Andrew Mitchell.

40

1 **MR ANDREW MITCHELL (affirmed)**
 2 **Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY**
 3 **LADY HALLETT:** I hope we haven't kept you waiting too long,
 4 Mr Mitchell.
 5 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you very much.
 6 **MR SHARMA:** Mr Mitchell, you have provided the Inquiry with
 7 two witness statements: a Corporate Witness Statement on
 8 behalf of the Department for International Trade, and
 9 then your personal witness statement responding to
 10 a number of questions posed by the Inquiry. Would you
 11 be kind enough to confirm that those witness statements
 12 are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
 13 **A.** I can confirm.
 14 **Q.** We're grateful for the assistance you have provided to
 15 the Inquiry to date. May I start, please, with
 16 something about your biography and background. You were
 17 a director general in the Department for International
 18 Trade, were you not, between April 2020 and
 19 November 2023?
 20 **A.** That's correct, yeah.
 21 **Q.** And prior to that you served as Her Late Majesty's Trade
 22 Commissioner for Europe between July 2018 and May 2020?
 23 **A.** That's correct.
 24 **Q.** And you are currently His Majesty's ambassador to
 25 Germany, which you've served in since September of 2024?

41

1 behalf of the Department of Health and Social Care in
 2 markets around the world?
 3 **A.** That's correct.
 4 **Q.** What sort of work was the Department engaged in as the
 5 pandemic struck the United Kingdom?
 6 **A.** So, as the pandemic struck the United Kingdom,
 7 principally those teams in the Department for
 8 International Trade were responsible for sourcing
 9 investment from international markets and attracting
 10 that to the United Kingdom, and then supporting
 11 exporters as they looked for opportunities in
 12 international markets to sell their goods and services,
 13 but then also to negotiate trade agreements, and,
 14 broadly speaking, to remove operated barriers and to
 15 work on trade in the international system.
 16 **Q.** In relation to supply chains, prior to the pandemic, was
 17 there any centrally coordinated supply chain resilience
 18 function, either within the department or within the
 19 government?
 20 **A.** There was not.
 21 **Q.** What was the reason for that not having been taken up by
 22 departments such as DIT?
 23 **A.** It's difficult for me to say. I think that, at the
 24 time, the department, which, as a consequence of having
 25 a very strong analytical function and global teams, did

43

1 **A.** That's correct.
 2 **Q.** In your role as the director general in the Department
 3 for International Trade, you were responsible for
 4 leading three teams: the first, the JACT, the Joint
 5 Assistance Coordination Team. Is that right?
 6 **A.** That's correct, yes.
 7 **Q.** And the second, the GSSEP, the Global Strategic Sourcing
 8 Engagement Project?
 9 **A.** That's also correct.
 10 **Q.** And also, in relation to Project Defend?
 11 **A.** That's right, yeah.
 12 **Q.** Could I start, please, with the Department for
 13 International Trade's role insofar as it affects
 14 preparedness for supply chain resilience. Was it
 15 intended, in the department, that it would play any role
 16 in an emergency response to a pandemic?
 17 **A.** Certainly to my knowledge it was not foreseen that we
 18 would play such a role in a pandemic, no.
 19 **Q.** Was the department designated in any sense a Lead
 20 Government Department for critical national
 21 infrastructure in terms of medical equipment or
 22 procurement of PPE or anything like that?
 23 **A.** It was not, no.
 24 **Q.** And yet the Department for International Trade became,
 25 as it were, at the front line of procurement for PPE on

42

1 provide supply chain analysis and reports on issues in
 2 association with supply chains, didn't believe that it
 3 would be necessary to have a standing function to that
 4 end, in other words the analytical function would be
 5 sufficient for most purposes.
 6 **Q.** Is it nonetheless true that the kind of expertise which
 7 was needed in the pandemic to analyse and consider and
 8 assist with supply chain resilience was to be found
 9 within your department?
 10 **A.** I mean, I think as we went through the various stages of
 11 the crisis, and there were principally three stages from
 12 the perspective of the work of that department, it
 13 became abundantly clear that, yes, this was a function
 14 was indeed necessary and useful to government.
 15 **Q.** Turning, please, to the role on the front line, as it
 16 were, in respect of embassies, high commissions and
 17 consulates of the United Kingdom around the world, what
 18 role did they play in relation to the sourcing and
 19 procurement of items such as ventilators, PPE and
 20 testing equipment?
 21 **A.** So in the very early stages of the crisis it became
 22 apparent that supply chains were compromised in the
 23 medical supplies, ventilators, PPE, et cetera. And the
 24 China team, based out of our embassy in Beijing, had
 25 identified that getting close to many of the

44

1 manufacturers and the suppliers had given them an
2 advantage in being able to procure some of these medical
3 supplies. Indeed, at the time, I believe they were of
4 the view that they had bought up all of the supplies
5 that were available on the market, in those very
6 challenged circumstances.

7 We had teams around the rest of the world. It
8 seemed logical at that point, then recognising the China
9 experience, to deploy that expertise also in respect of
10 markets elsewhere in the world, bearing in mind that we
11 had DIT officials on the ground in many, many places
12 around the world with essentially the same expertise.

13 **Q.** As you've mentioned, there wasn't, prior to the
14 pandemic, any standing capacity to do the kind of work
15 which you've just described. The Joint Assistance
16 Coordination Team was a group that was set up in
17 response to the pandemic. Could you help us, please,
18 with what that was, when it was set up, and what kind of
19 work it did.

20 **A.** So, to your first question, what was it, it was a joint
21 team created between the Department for International
22 Trade and the Foreign Office to bring together officials
23 essentially to source leads in overseas markets that
24 might lead to new supplies of medical equipment.

25 This was essentially a reaction to the circumstances
45

1 joint team in London would then communicate that demand
2 signal to our overseas posts, as we call them, and that
3 those posts would then go and chase down opportunities,
4 leads wherever they might find them. Then to send them
5 back to that team created in London to make sense of
6 what they were seeing, and then to send on those leads
7 the team felt were worthwhile back to DHSC.

8 **Q.** My Lady's Inquiry has heard evidence last week of teams
9 which were set up at pace and at speed. Was the JACT
10 one of those teams set up in the very earliest stages of
11 the pandemic?

12 **A.** It was indeed. It was set up on 28 March 2020 in,
13 I suppose, conditions of some uncertainty, partly
14 because, of course, it wasn't clear how the pandemic
15 would develop at that stage, but we recognised that
16 supply chains for most medical suppliers were indeed in
17 significant stress, and therefore we brought teams
18 together to create that demand management system. And
19 principally, in fact, relied on the military cell that
20 I had within my broader team for that purpose, and the
21 reason for that was that, as far as we were concerned at
22 the time, looking for leads in international markets was
23 principally a logistical exercise and we had access to
24 teams who had extensive experience of operating in
25 crisis conditions and essentially working around the
47

1 that I described, challenging supply chains, and a call
2 to action put out to overseas markets to anyone who
3 might have the opportunity to source supplies,
4 essentially then to bring those to the attention of the
5 British government. And therefore we brought this team
6 together, reflecting the fact that both the Foreign
7 Office, as it was at the time, and the Department for
8 International Trade had teams on the ground in many
9 markets around the world who had experience of working
10 with business, and indeed worked, in the case of the DIT
11 teams, day to day alongside businesses in international
12 markets.

13 **Q.** You've referred, of course, to teams which were based in
14 China, but there were also important teams in other
15 areas of the world, including America, Singapore,
16 Germany, Switzerland and Sweden, to name but a few.
17 From your vantage point, what was your role with respect
18 of those teams?

19 **A.** So the Joint Assistance Coordination Team was an effort
20 to bring together a cell in London that was capable,
21 then, of communicating with these teams in markets
22 overseas on behalf of the Department of Health and
23 Social Care. So the principle was that DHSC would
24 provide what was called the demand signal, in other
25 words what was required by way of medical supplies. The
46

1 clock and frankly moving leads backwards and forwards,
2 which was how we understood the role in those first
3 days.

4 **Q.** Just to provide the Inquiry with an idea of the scale of
5 the task. You talked about working around the clock.
6 Does that mean that you had people on shift so that they
7 could pick up the phone and send emails to people based
8 in embassies and consulates around the world?

9 **A.** We did indeed, yes. We established three rotas, so we
10 were working 24/7, and principally, as you say, the
11 reason for this was that we wanted to be immediately
12 available in a market that could be in South East Asia,
13 to be able to respond to any inquiry that might come our
14 way. And of course, the reason for this was that the
15 market conditions were such that we did not want to lose
16 any individual leads towards a medical supply.

17 **Q.** How many people were there, broadly, roughly speaking,
18 in the JACT?

19 **A.** In the JACT initially we brought together 20 from
20 Foreign Office and 20 from DIT. But they were then
21 looking after a team around the world, difficult to say,
22 but I'd say there were a couple of thousand people who
23 were working on this at the height of the crisis.

24 **Q.** Just to get an idea of the organisational challenges,
25 I wonder if perhaps we could bring up INQ000493813.
48

1 This is a process map created in April 2020 to set
2 out how various teams were envisaged to be brought
3 together. And on the left-hand side it can be seen that
4 there are sources of supplies coming from all DIT staff,
5 and then at stage 2, it appears that there are three
6 triage teams to deal with the leads that are coming in,
7 the FCO JACT team, the DIT JACT team, and then there's
8 another team beneath that, HLSB. Could you help us with
9 what HLSB is, please.

- 10 **A.** HLSB is a team that was within the Department for
11 International Trade whose specialism was in healthcare,
12 life sciences and the bio-economy.
- 13 **Q.** In the establishment of the system at the beginning of
14 the pandemic, was there some confusion, some overlap,
15 between the work that each of those three teams were
16 doing?
- 17 **A.** I would say it was a very difficult initial couple of
18 weeks for the team in the sense that what you had, the
19 HLSB team epitomises this, a group of experts, frankly,
20 in healthcare, life sciences work, particularly their
21 responsibility, investment, and export support, as I had
22 described, recognising that this wasn't going to be fit
23 for purpose for the scale of the task that confronted
24 us, so building a set of teams with people across
25 Whitehall, and worth bearing in mind, of course, that we

49

1 issue for us.

- 2 And I talk elsewhere in my own witness statement
3 about the importance of commercial expertise, so
4 commercial policy expertise in the design of the
5 systems. I think one of the issues that we had in the
6 early stages was without direct access to that
7 commercial policy support, some of the system design
8 questions, they were not optimal, frankly, and, you
9 know, we learnt the lessons from that through this
10 process, and as you'll have seen from the end of stage 2
11 of the crisis from the DIT perspective, we felt that we
12 had got to a reasonable place. But it is the commercial
13 design question there that's the issue, I think.
- 14 **Q.** Could we have up, please, on the screen INQ000489577.
15 And if we could scroll down to the email at the bottom
16 of slide 1, talking about overlap and inefficiency
17 within the systems established by the Department for
18 International Trade, the question here is asked as to
19 why there are two JACTs involved in the triage process
20 and considering that it would only need to be one team.
21 Is this a reference to the speed at which the system was
22 established and the risk of overlap and duplication of
23 effort?
- 24 **A.** In fact it's a reference to the fact that at the
25 beginning of the crisis we thought that the rational

51

1 were remote from each other operating on Microsoft
2 Teams' platform, many of us had never met. So in those
3 initial stages we're both bringing teams together from
4 different parts of the government system but also in
5 conditions in which we simply couldn't bring everybody
6 together into one place and work through a plan.

7 So yes, it was difficult in those initial stages,
8 the complexity was high.

9 I would say that the willingness of everybody to
10 lean into this task, recognising the scale of the
11 national emergency that we were facing, was nonetheless
12 really, really significant.

- 13 **Q.** One of the features that my Lady's Inquiry has heard in
14 respect of the Department of Health and Social Care is
15 the preponderance of the use of emails and forms and
16 Excel spreadsheets, no less, it seems, at least to be
17 referred to on this chart with references to forms and
18 spreadsheets and emails on the right-hand side. Did the
19 systems which the JACT and the Department for
20 International Trade were using, did they cause problems
21 for you in terms of coordination and efficiency?
- 22 **A.** I wouldn't say that the forms themselves caused issues.
23 I think the issue that we struggled with was developing
24 a sensible, single process. It was, in a sense, the
25 logic behind the creation of the forms that was the

50

1 response was to keep the teams, as it were, in separate
2 boxes under a single leadership, that that would provide
3 for speed, that was certainly the consideration at the
4 time. We quickly realised that this wasn't in fact the
5 right way to do this, so within couple of weeks, we'd
6 redesigned the team such that we fused the FCDO and the
7 DIT and the HLSB teams into one. So at the beginning of
8 this stage of the crisis essentially we were operating
9 with three teams under a single joint leadership for
10 those reasons.

- 11 **Q.** Could we zoom out from this email chain and go up to the
12 top. There's a reference there to -- about the JACT
13 teams being right. Of course, you're not on this email
14 chain, Mr Mitchell. I'd just like to understand it from
15 your vantage point, from looking at the JACT overall.
16 One of the issues, it seems, is that there's
17 a negotiation with the FCO and there's reference there
18 to politics being an issue. Is that something that you
19 recognised from your work in the Department for
20 International Trade, that there was some tension or some
21 politics at play between the department and the FCO?
- 22 **A.** This wasn't my experience. My experience was rather
23 that, as teams working together on the crisis, what we
24 were doing in those initial stages was really trying to
25 work out what the most rational way to operate together

52

1 was. I had close working relationships with my FCO
2 counterparts, I had known both of them for a very long
3 time, and certainly didn't feel that this was an
4 impediment. I can entirely understand however, that
5 somebody within the system might infer that that was
6 indeed the reason. But it certainly wasn't my
7 experience.

8 **MR SHARMA:** Can we take that down, please.

9 **LADY HALLETT:** Can I just check, do we think "politics" in
10 that context meant departmental politics as opposed to
11 party politics?

12 **A.** Yes, my Lady. I think it's -- my interpretation of this
13 is that this is the politics of the office rather than
14 the politics of Parliament.

15 **LADY HALLETT:** Yes, thank you.

16 **MR SHARMA:** Thank you, my Lady.

17 One of the references you make in your witness
18 statement about the complexity of working between the
19 Department for International Trade and the FCO is that
20 structures were difficult for staff based in overseas
21 offices to navigate. Could you talk us through that,
22 please. What issues did that create, having staff
23 working in embassies, coordinating with the FCO and the
24 Department for International Trade in the UK, and then
25 them coordinating again with the Department of Health

53

1 Foreign Office and DIT and all of our teams globally.
2 So in that regard, no. But certainly across Whitehall
3 in the initial stages of the crisis, there wasn't
4 a single platform for communications, and yes, we had to
5 get accounts on different providers in order to be able
6 to participate in meetings.

7 **MR SHARMA:** Thank you, my Lady.

8 In terms of the guidance that was being provided by
9 the Department of Health and Social Care, could we
10 please have a look at INQ000489583.

11 This is guidance being provided by the Department of
12 Health and Social Care to those on the ground or through
13 JACT about the procurement of ventilators.

14 If we could zoom in, please, to "Reject anything" --
15 that's it, thank you.

16 In respect of the IPPV ventilators, this guidance
17 suggests that anything should be rejected other than
18 IPPV ventilators.

19 And then the second and third lines of guidance
20 refer to looking at documentation, and the words -- the
21 watchwords are IPPV. But then if the documentation
22 isn't clear, that one should look at the photograph of
23 the item being procured. And then a rudimentary
24 description, if I can put it that way, of a "large
25 technical machine", being of -- the ventilator that's

55

1 and Social Care as the lead government department? What
2 complexity did that create?

3 **A.** Yes, so the design -- the initial design map that you
4 showed the Inquiry demonstrates the problem with that
5 initial design, namely that if you were in a post
6 overseas and you'd had access to a lead, you'd be
7 looking at that design map and saying, "Which of those
8 entities do I send my lead in to?" And this is the
9 reason, essentially, why, quite quickly into the
10 process, we recognised that we needed entirely to fuse
11 these organisations, and to create a design of the
12 system that essentially had operations on one side and
13 strategy and briefing on the other side, such that later
14 in the crisis, if you had a lead, you'd have essentially
15 one contact point.

16 **LADY HALLETT:** Did you have any problems -- I've encountered
17 it in my work that's been government-related -- with
18 having different meeting platforms allowed in different
19 government departments? So I've found there are
20 different policies, like one department will only meet
21 on Teams and another department will only meet on
22 Google Meet or Zoom or whatever. Did you have that as
23 a problem at all?

24 **A.** Not in this particular work, because we were all on the
25 Microsoft Teams platform globally, so that meant the

54

1 being looked for.

2 Could you help us, please, with your experience and
3 the experience of those in-country with the guidance
4 that was being sent by the Department of Health and
5 Social Care in respect of the procurement of complicated
6 equipment such as ventilators and also testing
7 equipment, but also PPE.

8 **A.** Yes. I mean, clearly, in order for those teams in
9 markets overseas who had no particular experience of
10 medical supplies and medical supply chains to be able to
11 do the job that we were asking, we clearly needed quite
12 detailed specifications for the medical equipment
13 required. And it's well documented, including in my own
14 evidence, that in the initial stages that level of
15 technical specification was, from the perspective of
16 those posts overseas, not to the degree that we
17 required. And this was a known issue, one that we
18 worked on together. We rectified that, the Department
19 of Health and Social Care acted on that requirement
20 relatively quickly, but it's certainly true to say that
21 at the early stages, this was -- this was a factor, yes.

22 **Q.** Coordination with the Department of Health and Social
23 Care was an ongoing issue with the JACT. Could we
24 please bring up INQ000493811.

25 This is an email on 2 April which you are cc'd into,

56

1 from the head of the JACT from the FCO, to Emily Lawson
2 at the Department of Health and Social Care.

3 If we could zoom in, please, to "Once concern
4 flagged to me by the team" in the middle of the page.
5 One of the concerns flagged by the team:

6 "... has been the difficulty of ensuring a fast
7 turnaround from DHSC of the proposals coming from posts
8 and being coordinated by the JACT, and therefore risking
9 losing opportunities. I understand that today we lost
10 an order for 20 ventilators from Israel because we
11 weren't nimble enough, and there are concerns in the
12 China network that similar delays might cost us larger
13 numbers there, where international demand is enormous."

14 Again, drawing on your vantage point, Mr Mitchell,
15 was that a problem that was persistent at least in the
16 early stages of the pandemic, of offers, and potential
17 offers, of supply being routed to the DHSC, but then
18 there being delays in them being processed?

19 **A.** This was a feature particularly of the very early
20 stages, I would say, of the crisis. And of course from
21 the perspectives -- and you can entirely understand
22 this -- of the teams out in the market, timing was
23 critical, because leads were available very often only
24 for a short period of time, that was the way the market
25 was operating at that point, and the turnaround times

57

1 earlier, in other words there was a specification,
2 nonetheless, to identify as many leads as possible.
3 There was some verification but this was principally
4 around the good standing of the companies. What did we
5 know about the businesses that were offering these
6 leads?

7 So the level of triage, to use that word, that was
8 being applied was relatively low at this stage in the
9 crisis.

10 **Q.** And were you informed by officials or others at the
11 Department of Health and Social Care that at least at
12 their end they were buckling under the pressure of the
13 numbers of offers? Was there any suggestion that
14 further triage could be done, either by the JACT in
15 London or by the teams which were based in-country?

16 **A.** The point at which we brought in commercial expertise
17 and the Commercial Policy Team within the Department for
18 International Trade then connected with the DHSC
19 commercial team and with the Cabinet Office commercial
20 team, that was very much the discussion. So what level
21 of specification could we then provide that would
22 support a faster procurement process overall?

23 **Q.** And you've touched upon the next subject I'd like to
24 come to you with, which is the commercial expertise
25 which was available in-country on the ground of those

59

1 were challenging. And, you know, this is partly down to
2 the fact that -- we entirely recognise this -- that the
3 Department of Health and Social Care was dealing with
4 a huge profusion of expressions of interest.

5 I would say the fault was also partly ours. At this
6 stage of the process, frankly, we weren't giving DHSC
7 quite the level of specification around the leads that
8 we were providing that would have allowed them to take
9 quicker decisions.

10 So this is an accurate picture, I think, of a moment
11 in time, but I would say that there were issues on both
12 sides that we ultimately recognised and then dealt with
13 as we create the GSSEP, brought in commercial expertise,
14 and then redesigned those commercial processes.

15 **Q.** Just in terms of the work that JACT were doing, and
16 those on the ground with the embassies were doing, were
17 they conducting any sort of triage process about the
18 offers that were being sent in to the Department of
19 Health and Social Care or were they simply forwarding on
20 offers and leads that they thought ought to be followed
21 up?

22 **A.** I mean, the principal focus here was on maximising the
23 numbers of leads that we were able to secure. So
24 certainly the message from the centre was, within the
25 constraints set out in the document that you showed

58

1 receiving the offers. The JACT, of course, reformed and
2 became part of something called the GSSEP, but whilst it
3 was the JACT, at the very earliest stages of the
4 pandemic, was there available to it the sort of
5 commercial and subject-matter expertise on the ground
6 in-country where they were operating?

7 **A.** On the ground in the country in which the teams were
8 operating, there was commercial expertise available,
9 either within the posts, the missions concerned, or
10 through regional functions. So the Foreign Office had,
11 and has regional commercial functions to support the
12 work of posts overseas.

13 We didn't have -- in the early stages, we didn't
14 have that within the JACT, and as I said earlier on,
15 that -- a little bit because the intent, really, was to
16 mobilise as quickly as possible, to proliferate the
17 numbers of leads that we had access to, and it felt in
18 the early stages a little bit as though this was
19 a logistical operation rather than a commercial
20 operation. We quickly recognised that that wasn't
21 right.

22 **Q.** But forgive me, it's right, isn't it, that the
23 Department for International Trade, it did have some
24 commercial expertise, and I think you have set out in
25 your witness statement that it's your view that that

60

1 commercial expertise should have been deployed much
2 earlier?

3 **A.** That is my view, yes.

4 **Q.** And if that commercial expertise had been deployed at an
5 earlier stage in the pandemic, what effect would that
6 have had on the triaging process which was happening
7 in-country and then, on the back-up of offers that was
8 occurring in the Department of Health and Social Care?

9 **A.** I mean, as I referred to a little bit earlier on, there
10 would have been a much better commercial process,
11 end-to-end, which would have been, frankly, to the
12 benefit of DHSC in allowing them then to manage the
13 backlog more effectively. And we should have spotted
14 that at an earlier stage.

15 We saw the effects of this essentially then in the
16 GSSEP process, because then having rectified that,
17 brought in the commercial expertise that we required,
18 redesigned, then, the procurement process, we had
19 a better process, so we could see the evidence of that
20 later on in the crisis.

21 **Q.** The Inquiry has heard from a number of witnesses that in
22 that first hundred days, that speed was of the essence.
23 So I wonder if we could, please, have a look at an email
24 on 20 April 2020. So about 30 days or so into that
25 hundred days.

61

1 **Q.** Turning, please, away from the JACT and towards what
2 became -- forgive me, I think you referred to it as
3 GSSEP?

4 **A.** GSSEP, yes.

5 **Q.** GSSEP. What was it that converted the JACT into GSSEP?
6 When did that happen, and what problems did GSSEP fix?

7 **A.** So we also, through this process, of course, were
8 running lessons learned exercises, and those lessons
9 learned exercises were demonstrating a number of the
10 problems that we've talked about today. So what we
11 attempted to do in GSSEP was to clarify the role of the
12 Department, which was essentially in three areas, for
13 the purposes of the work of GSSEP. First of all,
14 sourcing leads overseas, as we'd done with the JACT.
15 But secondly, then, working with individual countries
16 and with groups of countries in international markets,
17 and thirdly, then, looking to how we could diversify
18 sources of supply, so working with new suppliers.

19 And GSSEP, which came into existence at the end of
20 April, was a response to the difficulties and the
21 recognition of the difficulties we'd faced in the first
22 stage of the crisis, and then a better understanding of
23 where DIT particularly could add value, which was in
24 those three areas plus, of course, the work that
25 separately and at the same time started on Project

63

1 It's INQ000493856. If we could zoom in, please, to
2 the top bullet point.

3 The issue with supply chains was not only being
4 noticed by those officials sending emails within the
5 JACT; in this bullet point, which is, as I say, on
6 20 April, it refers to the Cabinet Secretary and
7 Number 10:

8 "... getting concerned about the lack of overall
9 grip on supply chains work, both domestic and
10 international across all areas, including medical and
11 food ([it] did not sound as though it was aimed at us,
12 but more big picture)."

13 Then there's reference there to there being too many
14 competing and duplicating structures in place.

15 Does that email, again, does that reflect your
16 understanding of the position as it developed in as late
17 as 20 April 2020?

18 **A.** Yes, I think this is fair. There was, certainly from
19 the narrower perspective of the work that I was involved
20 in, you know, particularly at this point, we were
21 encountering difficulties in being able to properly
22 track leads through the system. There was a lot of
23 duplication in terms of working with distributors and
24 suppliers. So I think that, you know, that suggestion
25 of complexity, it certainly rings true for me, yeah.

62

1 Defend, which was about supply chain diversification.

2 **Q.** You referred to Project Defend. What was Project
3 Defend, and what issues was it investigating? What did
4 it find about the supply chains, in particular in
5 healthcare equipment?

6 **A.** So Project Defend was a supply chain resilience exercise
7 that was begun with a view to taking a slightly
8 longer-term look at where supply chain vulnerabilities
9 might manifest. So if we understand the work that we
10 were doing through the JACT and GSSEP, essentially, as
11 the short-term response, this was the longer-term
12 response that recognised that we had encountered supply
13 chain problems that had not been anticipated in the way
14 that they'd manifest, and then thought about what kinds
15 of mitigation we would require, but starting very much
16 with the data. So the work that was initially done by
17 the consultants BCG, in support of the Department,
18 identified where potentially vulnerable supply chains,
19 which supply chains might they be.

20 **Q.** So can I just pause for a moment. So it was noticed
21 that there was a fundamental problem with supply chains
22 that the Department for International Trade was
23 considering. It brought in Boston Consulting Group, an
24 external consultancy, to assist it with the analysis of
25 supply chains, and the direction for that to happen

64

1 came, did it not, from the very top? That on 25 April
 2 of 2020, it was the Prime Minister that commissioned
 3 a piece of work: to interrogate where the
 4 vulnerabilities lie in our critical goods and supply
 5 chains, to consider where they are, to consider how they
 6 could be mitigated, and with a particular view to
 7 potentially building domestic manufacturing capacity; is
 8 that right?

9 **A.** Yes, so the commission did, indeed, come from the top,
 10 and Project Defend was the response, and Project Defend
 11 then looked at the kinds of interventions that you might
 12 want to make in a market in order to increase resilience
 13 of which one was, potentially, domestic manufacturing.

14 **Q.** And the department in which that was located, was the
 15 Department for International Trade, was it not?

16 **A.** It was.

17 **Q.** How long did Project Defend last for, and what were
 18 fundamentally its outcomes in terms of the changes that
 19 were made to the structures within government looking at
 20 supply chains and supply chain resilience?

21 **A.** So Project Defend ran from April of 2020 until August, I
 22 believe, of 2021. It went through four stages of
 23 evolution, initially looking at a number of critical
 24 supply chains on a very fast trajectory to work out
 25 where the potential vulnerabilities existed in those

65

1 an ability to assess continuously and to use data to do
 2 this, supply chain vulnerability to build expertise, and
 3 then to support those government departments in their
 4 work, their individual supply chains, and this is
 5 essentially what the Global Supply Chains Directorate
 6 was designed to do.

7 **Q.** And of the other recommendations or what came out of
 8 Project Defend, in addition to the Global Supply Chains
 9 Directorate, were an in-house team of analysts to
 10 consider supply chain vulnerabilities, but also attempts
 11 to reduce vulnerabilities in supply chains by
 12 diversifying or attempting to diversify suppliers and
 13 supplier location, and that there would be increased
 14 global cooperation with other strategic partners around
 15 the world; is that right?

16 **A.** That is correct, and I mean, essentially, the
 17 interventions that could be applied to supply chains
 18 included diversification of supply, potential domestic
 19 manufacturer, potential stockpiling or international
 20 coordination, and those lenses, as we described them,
 21 were applied differentially to each supply chain
 22 depending on the nature of the supply chain involved,
 23 and this did, indeed, overall, I think, increase, first
 24 of all, very considerably our understanding of the
 25 nature and the functioning of those supply chains, but

67

1 critical national supply chains might be, and then the
 2 kinds of actions that might be taken to mitigate some of
 3 the risks that applied.

4 **Q.** May I pause you there. Just to be clear, Project Defend
 5 wasn't only about healthcare supply chains; it was
 6 a piece of work that looked at supply chains across the
 7 piece, but healthcare supply chains, the ones that we're
 8 considering, were certainly part of its work?

9 **A.** In those initial phases, yes, that's correct.

10 **Q.** What Project Defend arrived at was a central
 11 coordination point, a new institution within government
 12 that was initially called the Global Supply Chains
 13 Directorate. Could you help us, please, with what that
 14 was and what it became?

15 **A.** I think it's important to say that DIT had
 16 responsibility overall for the intelligence and for the
 17 analysis, for triaging the systems across government,
 18 but individual departments were responsible
 19 throughout -- from the beginning and throughout the
 20 process and that remains the case today, for the
 21 management of the supply chains that fall within their
 22 departmental competence. And so the directorate that
 23 was created came from, essentially, an assessment that
 24 Defend had done good work, it had identified a gap in
 25 the way that government operated, in other words

66

1 it gave us the capacity, then, to remove risk from
 2 supply chains, working with those government departments
 3 in order to be able, then, to identify where the
 4 pressures were and to use the interventions that I've
 5 described.

6 **Q.** One of the endpoint pieces of work of Project Defend and
 7 the directorate that was set up, which incidentally was
 8 renamed the Economic Security and Supply Chain
 9 Resilience Directorate, was something called the
 10 Critical Imports and Supply Chains Strategy.

11 Could we please bring it up. It's INQ000494249.

12 This is a document published by the UK Government in
 13 January of 2024.

14 Could we turn, please, to page 27.

15 And in the "Spotlight" box in the middle of the
 16 page, about halfway down, it says:

17 "Measures such as stockpiles and targeted buffer
 18 stocks are specifically designed to mitigate a specific
 19 product shortage."

20 And this a spotlight on what the government is doing
 21 with supplier coordination on health supply chains.
 22 This is one measure, and then it continues down in the
 23 paragraphs below to refer to:

24 "In particular, the NHS [implementing] multiple
 25 supplier framework agreements to improve security of

68

1 supply and to manage demand spikes or individual
2 supplier challenges."

3 Now Mr Mitchell, Professor Manners-Bell, who has
4 just given evidence, has considered this document and
5 this is what he says about it, and I wonder if, after
6 I've read it out to you, whether you could provide me
7 with your answer. This is his report at paragraph 250.
8 He says this, that:

9 "... the UK Government's prioritisation of making
10 PPE and healthcare equipment supply chains more
11 resilient remains unclear."

12 Looking at this document.

13 "In its report, 'Critical Imports and Supply Chains
14 Strategy' published in 2024, the sector revealed only
15 a cursory mention, and specific reference to China was
16 absent saying only: ..."

17 And the passages I've just read out to you:

18 "... 'the NHS will implement multiple supplier
19 framework agreements to improve security of supply ...'
20 and so on.

21 He refers to:

22 "... the Scottish and Welsh Governments [who] both
23 aspire to self-sufficiency in some types of PPE ...
24 [but] there is no evidence of a strategy formulation
25 process setting out how specific supply chain resilience

69

1 and the market with the highest risk associated with it
2 in the way that this report assesses risk.

3 So it's difficult for me to say more than that, to
4 be honest, but, as I say, I think this is broadly to be
5 expected from a national supply chain strategy.

6 **Q.** Would you expect such matters as diversification of
7 supply, support for domestic manufacturing and
8 investment in supply chain technology, insofar as it
9 affects healthcare supply chains, to be matters which
10 are taken up by the Department of Health and Social Care
11 rather than this UK Government document?

12 **A.** I mean, it was always the case through the Defend and
13 the work then of the Global Supply Chains Directorate
14 that the relationship was as between, for DIT, a central
15 intelligence function supporting department and the
16 responsibility for the supply chains themselves, which
17 sat within the Department, so yes.

18 **MR SHARMA:** Mr Mitchell, thank you very much. I don't have
19 any further questions.

20 My Lady, there are some Rule 10s.

21 **LADY HALLETT:** There are indeed.

22 Mr Weatherby. Mr Weatherby is sitting there.

23 **Questions from MR WEATHERBY KC**

24 **MR WEATHERBY:** Thank you very much.

25 Mr Mitchell, I am going to ask you just a few

71

1 will be achieved."

2 And so, from the beginning of Project Defend, at
3 which the emphasis was on diversification of supply,
4 partnering with allies, strategic reserves of critical
5 goods, and expanding UK production,
6 Professor Manners-Bell has considered this and says it
7 just doesn't go far enough. Could I have, please, your
8 reflections on that.

9 **A.** In fact it's difficult for me to comment in any detail
10 on this, since the report was published a year and
11 11 months after I had ceased any involvement in this
12 work. In a way, I mean, I would say that this is
13 broadly what I would anticipate and expect to see in
14 a strategy that looked at supply chain resilience across
15 the spectrum. In other words, this is a strategy for
16 supply chain resilience for the national economy rather
17 than a sector-specific supply chain strategy. That
18 would be for the DHSC.

19 But I do -- I mean, two things -- first of all,
20 recognise within this spotlight here the actions, the
21 interventions, that Defend recommend. So you can see in
22 the text here what's happening around domestic
23 production, for example, and diversification of supply.
24 Elsewhere in the report, I think it is also worth saying
25 that China is recognised as a very significant market,

70

1 questions on behalf of the Covid Bereaved Families for
2 Justice UK, two short topics about intermediaries.

3 So you describe in your statement -- and for the
4 record -- we don't need to look at it, but for the
5 record it's 13.17 -- that the intermediary market in the
6 context of ventilators was "much riskier" than procuring
7 directly from manufacturers.

8 And you state -- again, for the record,
9 paragraph 4.10 -- that in respect of guidance on
10 ventilator opportunities issued by the DHSC on
11 5 April 2020, and I quote:

12 "The guidance instructed officials conducting triage
13 to 'be cautious' of new suppliers entering the market
14 and claiming to have stock. This was due to an increase
15 in middlemen offering stock on behalf of companies."

16 So my question: can you help us, very briefly, just
17 what was the risk that you were referring to there in
18 your statement, the risk from the intermediary market?

19 **A.** And this was principally the experience of the team in
20 China on the ground.

21 **Q.** I'm going to come to that, yes?

22 **A.** That, you know, they spend a bit of time essentially
23 looking at what was available on the market, and had
24 discovered that sources of supply were much, much more
25 reliable when they went direct to the manufacturers.

72

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. That the intermediaries were essentially sourcing,
3 because of the way that the market was working, because
4 there was very high demand and very low supply, lots of
5 new suppliers were stepping into the market, and the
6 experience was that the product supplied via
7 intermediaries was likely to be harder, frankly, to
8 verify from the perspective of -- (overspeaking) --

9 Q. Right. So issues of quality --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- fraud, non-delivery, those sorts of things?

12 A. And the issue was, essentially, that because new
13 suppliers were coming on to the market, they were
14 essentially untested.

15 Q. Yes. Was -- similar guidance which I've just read out,
16 to be cautious due to middlemen, was that also issued in
17 respect of PPE? Or don't you know?

18 A. I'm sorry, I don't know the answer to that question.

19 Q. Okay. I mean you state it again, paragraph 13.21 of
20 your statement that:
21 "... the China team's preferred primary sourcing
22 strategy for PPE in China was to work with large
23 state-owned healthcare distributors (known as
24 state-owned enterprises, or SOEs)."

25 And that allowed for larger orders sourced from

73

1 your department about these high-risk problems?

2 A. So we -- the point at which we, as GSSEP, so the Global
3 Strategic Sourcing and Engagement Project, started work
4 setting out very clear demand signals on behalf of
5 DHSC --

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. -- then we issued a set of documents as part of that new
8 commercial process which included a statement of good
9 standing, and opportunity risk assessment that allowed
10 us then to work with the teams on the ground, to conduct
11 the due diligence, it wasn't formal due diligence in the
12 commercial sense but, nonetheless, gathering the data
13 that allowed us then to make those assessments together
14 with DHSC.

15 Q. But was the clear message going back to DHSC that the
16 problem of high risk, small intermediaries, was
17 something that needed to be considered carefully?

18 A. I mean, I can only answer that in relation to the
19 process which we put together, which was essentially
20 that if a supplier failed to fill out a statement of
21 good standing, for example, automatically, that lead
22 would not be taken forward.

23 Q. Yes, okay. Second point, and quickly, could we have up
24 INQ000493919. Just while that's going up, this is an
25 email that you produced at paragraph 4.48 of your

75

1 multiple factories, and you described, 13.22, that the
2 China team's experience that:
3 "... most offers of PPE supply from small
4 intermediaries were high risk ..."

5 And so I'm sure you'd agree that the China team
6 would be well placed to express that view, and that's
7 the view that you would share?

8 A. Yes. I mean, they were looking -- I mean, that word
9 "high risk", or the term "high risk" I think probably
10 has to be seen in the right context there, which is
11 I interpret that risk to be both quality but also
12 questions of reliability of supply.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. So they're talking about going to the SOEs because the
15 SOEs are in a position to source supply when individual
16 factories also stopped supplying, so they had access to
17 a broader set of sources. So from the perspective of
18 managing risk, they're managing risk of supply, but also
19 risk on quality.

20 Q. So we have heard that the PPE Buy Cell, the DHSC, and
21 the UK Government generally had a very large number of
22 offers, and both Buy Cell and the VIP Lane that we've
23 heard about, had a lot of those offers from small
24 intermediaries which were necessarily more high risk as
25 we've discussed. Was anything done to communicate from

74

1 statement, and it's the end email of a thread from JACT
2 leaders. It's specifically from Frank Clifford, Head of
3 Operations, to Fred Perry. And it's headed "PPE -
4 System broken", and it refers to:
5 "... approaching a Rubicon moment, perhaps we have
6 even crossed it already. The PPE team is adding no
7 value but at the same time are under increasing
8 pressure.
9 "They have been asked to stop forwarding items to
10 DHSC escalation ..."

11 Then the second bullet point is the one I want to
12 ask you about:
13 "Additionally, the frustration is growing at
14 post ..."

15 Then the second sentence:
16 "We even have the ludicrous situation of
17 a manufacturer being identified some time ago sending
18 information into the .gov system and now being asked to
19 undertake due diligence on a middleman who is offering
20 items from that company."

21 So is what's being said there, is that instead of
22 DHSC purchasing directly from the manufacturers to be
23 identified by your team, that the DHSC was now
24 indicating back to your team that it was considering
25 purchasing the same products but from an intermediary

76

1 who would sell at a marked-up price and at greater risk?
 2 **A.** I mean, it's difficult for me to say specifically with
 3 relation to this example, but certainly, we were aware
 4 at the time that intermediaries were operating in the
 5 market, and offering their supply to multiple sources,
 6 but there were multiple intermediaries also leading back
 7 to the same sources of supply. So this was absolutely
 8 a feature of the market at the time.
 9 **Q.** Yes, the question really was: was this a problem between
 10 your department and the DHSC in terms of that you'd
 11 identified this lead, yet they'd come back through
 12 asking you to do due diligence on a middleman? Was that
 13 part of the problem that's -- (overspeaking) --
 14 **A.** It's difficult -- as I say, it's difficult to say with
 15 this particular example but, I mean, the more general
 16 problem, which the GSSEP process tried to resolve, was
 17 that the commercial process that we were following was
 18 not in those initial stages sufficiently clear. So that
 19 was the aim.
 20 **MR WEATHERBY:** I won't take it any further. Thank you.
 21 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Mr Weatherby.
 22 Professor Thomas. He's over there.
 23 **Questions from PROFESSOR THOMAS KC**
 24 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** Good afternoon, Mr Mitchell, I represent
 25 FEMHO, the Federation of Ethnic Minority Healthcare
 77

1 it's the fifth one down, "Andrew Mitchell". Yes, there
 2 you go.
 3 Now, so you were at this meeting. You were aware
 4 that this risk having been identified at that time?
 5 That's correct, isn't it?
 6 **A.** Yes, I was at that meeting and I recognised that risk,
 7 yeah.
 8 **Q.** Yeah. So that brings me on to my second question, which
 9 is this: so, Mr Mitchell, what specific discussions or
 10 actions were taken to address this identified risk to
 11 ensure that procurement processes were aligned with the
 12 diverse needs of end users? Help us.
 13 **A.** So, I mean, I would simply say about this, first of all,
 14 that -- I mean, I entirely recognise that this is a very
 15 significant issue, and to your point, I was at that
 16 meeting and heard that risk discussed. I'm afraid that
 17 my responsibilities were principally in the
 18 international supply space rather than anything to do
 19 with the product specification. So once those
 20 specifications were made, they were passed to my
 21 department, and we were then sourcing those leads on
 22 behalf of the DHSC.
 23 **Q.** Forgive me, Mr Mitchell, that wasn't my question.
 24 I understand your answer, but my question was -- you had
 25 been at the meeting, even though you say you didn't have
 79

1 Organisations.
 2 Mr Mitchell, during a critical phase of the pandemic
 3 response, there were significant concerns, were there
 4 not, about inclusivity of procurement practices,
 5 particularly ensuring that PPE and other healthcare
 6 products procured met the diverse needs of all
 7 healthcare workers, including those from minority ethnic
 8 groups and individuals with specific disabilities.
 9 Now, let me come to my question. I've got two
 10 questions for you. The DHSC programme delivery board
 11 met on 12 June 2020, and that highlighted a strategic
 12 risk concerning the lack of inclusive product
 13 specifications.
 14 If we can just call up one document,
 15 INQ000339236_0029, thank you.
 16 Can you see that on your screen?
 17 **A.** I can, thank you.
 18 **Q.** Can you go down to point 4, do you see that? It's
 19 highlighted:
 20 "Risks that we do not provide the inclusive product
 21 specification for all end user requirements, eg ethnic
 22 minorities, [and] those [having] disability."
 23 If we go on to page 31, so that's two slides down,
 24 so it's ... yes.
 25 We can see that you are there -- can you highlight,
 78

1 the responsibility, I get that. My question was, this
 2 risk having been identified, particularly with ethnic
 3 minorities, my question was: what discussions or actions
 4 were taken to address this at the meeting? Not
 5 necessarily by you.
 6 **A.** I'm afraid I don't recall what actions were taken
 7 alleged that meeting on that topical. I'm sorry.
 8 **Q.** Could it be that none, it wasn't discussed, it was just
 9 let through?
 10 **A.** I'm sorry, I don't recall what actions were taken on
 11 that topic at this -- (overspeaking) --
 12 **Q.** It's an important point, isn't it?
 13 **A.** It's an important point yes.
 14 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** Thank you, my Lady.
 15 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Professor Thomas.
 16 Thank you very much indeed, Mr Mitchell. Thank you
 17 for your help in preparing statements and the like, and
 18 thank you for coming here today. I hope we didn't bring
 19 you over from Germany --
 20 **THE WITNESS:** Always a pleasure, my Lady.
 21 **LADY HALLETT:** I hope you can combine it with some other
 22 meeting in Whitehall or whatever, but thanks very much
 23 for your help.
 24 **THE WITNESS:** Thanks very much indeed.
 25 **LADY HALLETT:** Very well. Shall we break now, and I shall
 80

1 return at 1.55.

2 (12.54 pm)

3 (The Short Adjournment)

4 (1.55 pm)

5 LADY HALLETT: Mr Sharma.

6 MR SHARMA: My Lady, the next witness is Simon Manley.

7 MR SIMON MANLEY (sworn)

8 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY

9 MR SHARMA: Mr Manley, good afternoon.

10 You've provided one witness statement to the Inquiry
11 in your own name and you've also adopted the witness
12 statement of Sir Philip Barton, which you're able to
13 speak to during the course of your evidence. Would you
14 confirm that those statements are true to the best of
15 your knowledge and belief?

16 A. They are indeed.

17 Q. Thank you. Mr Manley, to start, please, with your
18 biography, a little bit about yourself. You are
19 formerly the Director General of Covid-19 at the FCO,
20 a position which you held between March and September of
21 2020?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. And prior to that, you were the British ambassador to
24 Spain?

25 A. That's right.

81

1 involvement in procurement only really came in in and
2 around -- and the first time I think we actually get
3 actively involved in this is around 14 March 2020.

4 Q. So the focus of the FCO prior to that date was about
5 repatriating citizens to the United Kingdom?

6 A. So we'd established the taskforce the joint taskforce
7 with DFID, in February. I think to look at the broader
8 international implications of the emerging -- it was
9 still not yet a declared pandemic, so it was
10 anticipation of something that might be coming our way.
11 And then there was this consular response, as I say, in
12 Wuhan, a couple of cruise ships in Tenerife and
13 elsewhere, where you'd had outbreaks where we'd had to
14 repatriate British nationals and, in some cases, our own
15 staff.

16 Q. From in your perspective, as director general, when did
17 I come to your attention that this pandemic might affect
18 global supply chains and in particular supply chains
19 emanating in China?

20 A. So I became director general on 16 March 2020, so just
21 after the initial requests out of Number 10 to secure
22 ventilators. So pretty much my first day in the job was
23 dominated by this challenge. But throughout this early
24 period it is one of a series of challenges, and the
25 challenges of returning the British nationals to the UK

83

1 Q. And you were also a non-resident ambassador to Andorra
2 between October 2013 and August of 2019?

3 A. That's exactly right, yes.

4 Q. And you've been in diplomatic service since 1990. You
5 are currently the United Kingdom's permanent
6 representative to the World Trade Organisation and the
7 United Nations in addition to other international
8 organisations based in Geneva; is that correct?

9 A. That is indeed correct, yes.

10 Q. Mr Manley, can I start, please, with the FCO's role
11 prior to the pandemic in respect of procurement. Before
12 the pandemic hit in China and in the UK, did the FCO
13 have any prior role in pandemic procurement or any
14 anticipated role in pandemic procurement?

15 A. In pandemic procurement, not really, no. I mean,
16 obviously we'd had some preparations for a series of
17 eventualities around pandemics but not really for taking
18 on a role in procurement.

19 Q. When the pandemic struck in China and in the UK, was
20 there any guidance or playbook which the FCO officials
21 could rely upon to respond to the emergency?

22 A. So, if I may say, I mean, our initial involvement was
23 very much a consular involvement and it was in the
24 initial outbreak in Wuhan and then in subsequent
25 outbreaks in hotels in Tenerife and elsewhere. So the

82

1 continues to be a big focus for our organisation in
2 those first few weeks and months.

3 Q. So to focus, please, on that initial request, did that
4 initial request emanate from Number 10?

5 In 14 March 2020, Number 10 sought the assistance of the
6 FCO to try to procure ventilators directly from China?

7 A. That's correct, yes. So I think we had been led to
8 believe, by a professor at Oxford that there was
9 a willingness on the part of a colleague of his in China
10 to help us secure those ventilators.

11 Q. And in relation to that request, what assistance did the
12 Department of Health and Social Care provide to the FCO?

13 A. So, I mean, on the specific request in respect of China,
14 that specific request didn't go that far. I mean, what
15 becomes quite clear pretty immediately is that we have
16 a bigger problem on our hands, and that there is
17 a requirement to secure several thousand ventilators
18 within the space of a month or so.

19 And so where we -- you know, we go to DHSC
20 essentially to understand precisely what it is we're
21 looking for. You know, none of us are experts in
22 ventilators. And so it is to acquire the sort of spec
23 that our post should be looking out for, and you'll see
24 from the material --

25 Q. Forgive me, is that a request that was made by the FCO

84

1 or the Department of Health and Social Care, or did they
 2 offer their assistance to you?
 3 **A.** I can't really remember what was the sequence, but we
 4 wrote out to -- I mean, originally to our post in China
 5 but then subsequently to a number of other posts in the
 6 network for help in trying to identify potential
 7 suppliers of ventilators. And obviously what our posts
 8 required was a sense of what was the specification of
 9 the ventilators that we were looking to acquire.
 10 **Q.** In terms of the expertise available in-country,
 11 focusing, please, on China, what sort of expertise was
 12 available to the FCO and therefore to the UK Government,
 13 by virtue of the FCO's officials in-country?
 14 **A.** So what we had in China at the time -- and it's --
 15 I suppose it's just worth, if I may, just giving a bit
 16 of context. I mean, the pandemic had obviously -- China
 17 had been the first place that the pandemic hit, and
 18 therefore, in response to the pandemic we'd already had
 19 to --
 20 **Q.** Please -- slow down, please.
 21 **A.** Sorry.
 22 **Q.** It's all right.
 23 **A.** Forgive me. We had already had to close two of our
 24 consulates in China. We were left with two other
 25 consulates outside of Beijing plus the embassy, so we

85

1 locations.
 2 **Q.** So just to break that down a little bit, so in China,
 3 two types of experts, if I may call them that --
 4 **A.** Correct.
 5 **Q.** -- some who are experts in the countries?
 6 **A.** Correct.
 7 **Q.** And others who have built up some expertise in relation
 8 to trade and investment and commercial matters?
 9 **A.** Yes, and obviously, I mean, there's an overlap. So many
 10 of those who had been working on life science issues
 11 within our trade and investment team obviously also had
 12 a knowledge of China itself, language expertise, or
 13 whatever.
 14 **Q.** Of course. You refer there to border closures --
 15 **A.** Yes.
 16 **Q.** -- that had taken place. What effect did that have on
 17 the people who were in-country and unable to be
 18 supplemented by others flying from the UK. Was that
 19 simply an impossibility?
 20 **A.** It was effectively an impossibility. So we had to work
 21 with the -- in terms of the people on the ground, and as
 22 I said, they were supplemented throughout by those who
 23 would have normally been posted to China but who we'd
 24 drawn down, as we'd say, in the weeks previous, but we
 25 couldn't send in additional people for some time. And

87

1 had -- still had Chongqing and Shanghai, plus the
 2 embassy in Beijing.
 3 What we had across that network was
 4 a cross-government operation. So we had staff working
 5 for various bits of the British government. And in
 6 particular what we had were two bits of expertise.
 7 And that was the staff who we had working on trade
 8 and investment matters, drawn primarily from DIT, as
 9 then was, who had a knowledge, particularly of those
 10 whom had been working on the life science sector, they
 11 had an awareness of the Chinese market, of the sort of
 12 companies who might be out there. And then more
 13 broadly, of course, what we had were people who knew
 14 China pretty well, who had the language expertise, who
 15 had an understanding of the relationship between firms
 16 and the state, which enabled us to sort of navigate the
 17 terrain.
 18 And I think it's important to remember that we had
 19 what we had because at that stage you couldn't send
 20 additional people into China because of the pandemic
 21 restrictions, and indeed, we'd had to remove quite
 22 a number of our staff and a lot of dependants over the
 23 course of the previous two months. So many of the
 24 people who would normally be working in China were still
 25 working on Chinese matters but working from secondary

86

1 also you have to remember as in many parts of the world,
 2 including, of course, in the UK, these were people who
 3 were obviously often having to work from home because
 4 they were under lockdown.
 5 So the pure logistics of working were quite hard.
 6 **Q.** You, of course, were based in the United Kingdom, were
 7 you not?
 8 **A.** Yeah, I was indeed, yes.
 9 **Q.** And in relation to the contact between the team based in
 10 China and the United Kingdom, did that come through the
 11 FCO in London or was that directly with the Department
 12 of Health and Social Care?
 13 **A.** So I think there were different types of contacts.
 14 I was in frequent contact with our ambassador there to
 15 get her sight of the overall state of affairs. We had,
 16 unusually, direct contacts between the network of -- the
 17 China Network, who were busily trying to help DHSC
 18 procure goods and DHSC, and we also had our team which
 19 became -- initially known as ACT, JACT, and then GSSEP,
 20 who were this interface, if you like, between our global
 21 network and our team in London -- (overspeaking) --
 22 **Q.** Thank you, Mr Manley. We've heard about as ACT, JACT,
 23 and so on, just earlier this afternoon.
 24 Can I move on, please, from ventilators, which was
 25 the initial procurement request, to the matter of PPE

88

1 and China Buy. Could you talk us through, please, the
 2 evolution of the team, moving from procurement and
 3 seeking out ventilators, to seeking out PPE?
 4 **A.** So, as you say, Mr Sharma, you know, the original -- the
 5 initial challenge was ventilators. But actually quite
 6 quickly -- I mean, at the time this seemed like a period
 7 of months but, of course, this was days and at most
 8 weeks -- it became clear that the NHS was going to
 9 require vast quantities of protective equipment. And
 10 indeed, as we had been out in the Chinese marketplace we
 11 had been conscious of the opportunities that already
 12 existed for PPE, and indeed, you know, by sort of a week
 13 or so after coming into the job we were already asking
 14 the network as a whole to get a sense of what the
 15 sourcing opportunities are likely to be for PPE.
 16 **Q.** When you're talking about the network as a whole, how
 17 many people, just roughly, are you talking, in-country,
 18 in China, doing this sort of work for the FCO?
 19 **A.** So in the case of China, which is probably the best
 20 documented, if I can put it like that, I mean, at peak
 21 we have about anywhere between 170 and 200 people
 22 working on these issues in China, on a shift basis.
 23 **Q.** And of those people, what is the divide between those
 24 who, as you described earlier, are in-country experts,
 25 or country experts, and then those with commercial

89

1 understanding of the changing requirements for PPE as
 2 we've understood better the likely path of the pandemic
 3 in the UK.
 4 **Q.** What sort of work, those officials based again, focusing
 5 in on China --
 6 **A.** Yes.
 7 **Q.** -- what sort of work were they doing with respect to
 8 specifications and letters of intent and contracts,
 9 focusing in, please, on the very earliest stages of the
 10 pandemic?
 11 **A.** So in the very earliest stages, where they can, they're
 12 trying to visit their production centres, the factories,
 13 if that's possible, they're trying to get clarity on the
 14 precise spec of the goods being produced in China and
 15 then checking that with DHSC to see whether this is
 16 indeed what we require. So it's an iterative process,
 17 and one at which we're obviously trying to move at pace
 18 because of both the clear scale of the requirement from
 19 the UK, but also the intense nature of the competition
 20 on the ground.
 21 **Q.** And you refer to visiting factories or manufacturers or
 22 suppliers. Of course, there were some restrictions on
 23 movement, and so what effect did that have on the way in
 24 which the team, in-country in China, could view and
 25 certify and check whether the manufacturers were going

91

1 expertise?
 2 **A.** I wouldn't know the precise distinction between the two.
 3 **Q.** The work that was being conducted by the FCO officials
 4 in-country in China, could you help us, please, with how
 5 they went about sourcing PPE? Who were they
 6 approaching? Who were they seeking out contacts for?
 7 **A.** So, I mean, in the initial phase that we are -- they are
 8 trying to understand what the landscape looks like. Who
 9 are the companies out there? Who might be able to
 10 provide at this sort of scale? It is, as you've heard
 11 elsewhere, including from the professor this morning,
 12 it's a very cutthroat market by this stage. There are
 13 obviously a number of other governments and
 14 organisations trying to secure PPE. So they are trying
 15 to identify what the possibilities are and then
 16 reporting back on those possibilities to DHSC.
 17 **Q.** I'm sorry -- who are they reporting back to?
 18 **A.** To DHSC, essentially.
 19 **Q.** And in terms of the reporting back to DHSC, presumably
 20 there's this ongoing dialogue between the officials on
 21 the ground in China and DHSC. Are DHSC providing the
 22 specifications and the type of kit that they require,
 23 and is the China team responding to that?
 24 **A.** Yes, that's essentially the process. So DHSC had that
 25 expertise and, of course, they had the best

90

1 to be able to provide the kind of equipment which was
 2 needed in the UK?
 3 **A.** So when they couldn't visit in person they were trying
 4 to find other ways of getting that certainty, whether it
 5 was through, kind of, video footage or other means. But
 6 they were very conscious that they -- that we needed to
 7 be absolutely sure of the goods that were coming to us,
 8 and that the facilities or the firms with which we were
 9 dealing were ones that were going to be able to produce
 10 these goods of the right quality in the right timeframe
 11 at the right price.
 12 **Q.** In terms of the split between the leadership of those
 13 teams, obviously there's the Department of Health and
 14 Social Care based in the United Kingdom and then the
 15 FCO, who is effectively working on the front line. What
 16 was the split in terms of leadership? Were the FCO able
 17 to take a lead in terms of sourcing and then signing
 18 contracts or did it always have to wait for DHSC to make
 19 a decision?
 20 **A.** So, I mean, I would like to say that the China operation
 21 was very much a joined-up cross-government operation.
 22 So the team, this 170 to 200-odd people at peak, were
 23 drawn from across the embassy and then the two remaining
 24 consulates, so they're people from across the
 25 government, it has a large DIT component. It's

92

1 headed -- the Head of Mission is obviously Foreign
2 Office, but it's very much a cross-government team --
3 sorry, I've forgotten the original question. Apologies.

4 **Q.** Who was taking the lead in relation to signing contracts
5 and making sure that equipment was being procured? Was
6 it still the Department of Health and Social Care or was
7 that something which the FCO was doing for itself?

8 **A.** So there are a number of contracts in the very early
9 phase which are signed by that China team on the ground,
10 but quite quickly, we tried to get ourselves into
11 a position where those contracts are being formally
12 signed off by DHSC. But it's always kind of part of a
13 conversation between the team on the ground and the DHSC
14 as to whether we're providing the right material.

15 **Q.** So it was possible, as it was at the very early stages
16 of the pandemic, for those who are based in-country at
17 the FCO in China to source and secure and sign contracts
18 for items such as PPE?

19 **A.** That was the case with a proportion in the early phase,
20 yes.

21 **Q.** We don't need to turn it up but on 18 April 2020 the
22 First Secretary of State Dominic Raab made a proposal
23 which was that the FCO ought to be able to continue to
24 purchase PPE directly in-country, not requiring it, the
25 contract to come back to the Department of Health and

93

1 and we -- I think we concluded that having the contracts
2 being signed off by the local Head of Mission wasn't, at
3 that stage, going to make a material difference to that.

4 **Q.** Could we turn up, please, INQ000493785.

5 These are emails between the Department for
6 International Trade employees about China procurement in
7 some of the very earliest stages of the pandemic between
8 23 March and 26 March.

9 Could we go down, please, to an email on 23 March
10 from Mr Duke. It begins "The single-most important
11 ask"?

12 **A.** Mm-hm.

13 **Q.** Two-thirds of the way down, please. Three paragraphs
14 from the bottom:

15 "The single-most important ask from our team in
16 China is this: London should approve procurement
17 immediately of everything the NHS will need in the
18 coming weeks and months. Delay will mean we may not be
19 able to secure stock. We understand the need to
20 prioritise, but we must stop [and my emphasis] our
21 current sequential approach."

22 Could you help us, please, with what you've
23 described, which is, if I may say so, a sequential
24 approach, some work being done in-country followed by
25 some work being done by the Department of Health and

95

1 Social Care. Can you help us, please, with the reasons
2 as to why that wasn't taken forward?

3 **A.** Because I think -- I mean, we looked at it very
4 carefully and I think these -- all the way through, all
5 the way through, we're questioning ourselves as to
6 whether we've got the right methodologies in place. I
7 mean, that explains the occasionally slightly
8 bewildering acronym soup as we moved from ACT to JACT to
9 GSSEP, or whatever, because we're constantly saying to
10 ourselves: is this the best way of doing things? And so
11 when the Secretary of State asked us to have a look at
12 this, we had another look at this. We came to the
13 conclusion that at least at that stage that wasn't going
14 to materially change our performance because this is now
15 several weeks into this process, and what is important
16 is the, throughout, is the precision of the demand
17 signal, which I think Andrew Mitchell referred to this
18 morning, and the pace of the decisions. Not because
19 pace in and of itself is important, but it's important
20 in this particular context where one of the risks that
21 we faced was of us finding the right material at the
22 right place, and at the right price, but finding that we
23 had been outbid by somebody before we could sign off
24 that contract.

25 So pace was important in that particular respect,

94

1 Social Care, to what was required at the very earliest
2 stages of the pandemic?

3 **A.** So I'm not sure I would necessarily, if I may say,
4 describe that as an entirely sequential process because
5 there's a constant process of engagement and interaction
6 between the China Network and DHSC. As I said, you
7 can -- I can understand the frustration of those, if you
8 like, on the front line in China who were out there
9 trying to find this PPE, often doing so, and wanted
10 a quick answer because they feared, as I said, that as
11 in this case, that we would turn up two days later to
12 discover that somebody else had come in in the interim
13 and had purchased those goods instead of us.

14 **Q.** I'm sorry, Mr Manley, could I ask you, please, to just
15 slow a touch.

16 **A.** I'm sorry.

17 So people were frustrated, I think, that they would
18 on some occasions find items, would report that back,
19 and by the time that we'd got an answer as to whether
20 this indeed was a contract with which we wished to
21 proceed, that somebody else had come in and purchased
22 it.

23 On the other hand, I also understand quite how
24 difficult it was to have a clear projection several
25 months out of what our needs might be over the course of

96

1 the year. So there was an understandable tension there,
2 but, you know, throughout, we are trying to speed up the
3 process but at the same time we have to have due respect
4 for ensuring that we've got the right items at the right
5 price and that we can be confident about the supplier.
6 So it's a constant tension throughout this process.

7 **Q.** Could we please bring up that email again, INQ000493785,
8 just to see what the consequences can be in the event
9 that speed is not prioritised.

10 If we go to the second paragraph from the bottom:

11 "This a practical example of what happens if speed
12 is not prioritised again in the very earliest stages of
13 the pandemic. To give just one example, last Thursday
14 we informed the Department of Health and Social Care we
15 were already to procure tens of billions of [Covid-19]
16 test kits. Today we still haven't received the green
17 light to place orders, and over the weekend the
18 United States bought all of the stock of [Covid-19]
19 testing kits in China."

20 And if we can go down, please, to the following
21 paragraph, this observation:

22 "We have been consistently behind the curve but we
23 need to get ahead of it. The China Network is ready to
24 respond (we have dozens of people working on healthcare
25 procurement, with more on standby). The DIT is leading

97

1 Could we display, please, down to bullet point
2 page 1, paragraph 4.

3 This, again, is an indication of the coordination
4 that was required between the FCO, the Department for
5 International Trade and the Department of Health and
6 Social Care.

7 And if we can go down, please, to page 6.

8 I won't take you through every single element of
9 this because we've considered it in a little detail with
10 Mr Marron, but the process through which offers had to
11 be coordinated between the FCO, in-country in China, and
12 the Department of Health and Social Care in the United
13 Kingdom, combined with such things as time differences,
14 communication issues and suchlike, would that not have
15 slowed the process of procurement of PPE at the early
16 stages of the pandemic and even into these later stages
17 in April?

18 **A.** Look, I mean, we were trying to run this process as
19 quickly as we could, along with colleagues in DHSC.
20 I think what, in some ways, if I may say, what this
21 annex also shows you is us trying to be very clear with
22 our teams who were working on this and the steps they
23 had to go through, which were important steps, after
24 all. Important steps like due diligence, and the rest.

25 As I say, it was a constant tension. I recognise

99

1 this work. The expertise and industry connections of
2 the DIT teams in China is saving lives in the UK -- and
3 we can do more. Please feel confident to strongly make
4 the case in any meetings where the opportunity lies."

5 So, Mr Manley, what I'm suggesting to you is that if
6 the FCO at the time were enabled to enter into and
7 procure more kit on the ground, these sorts of events
8 might not have happened?

9 **A.** I still think -- I think it was important for us to
10 ensure that we were procuring the goods in a way that
11 was consistent with the NHS's needs as they were being
12 relayed to us by DHSC, and whoever was doing that
13 procurement on the ground had to have that assurance at
14 the end of the day. But, look, I recognise that, like
15 I said, it was an extraordinarily competitive
16 environment and frustrating, therefore, for the teams
17 when contracts that they thought might be available to
18 us were lost.

19 **Q.** Could we bring up, please, INQ000477701 to touch
20 a little, please, on the China Buy process.

21 This is a letter from Tom Duke, who is the Senior
22 Responsible Officer of the Covid-19 Procurement
23 Taskforce, about procurement of PPE in China, towards a
24 medium and long-term strategy. This is going forward a
25 little bit in the chronology to 23 April 2020.

98

1 that.

2 **Q.** Could we go back, please, to page 1 of that document.
3 I'd like to ask you some questions, please, about the
4 China Buy sourcing strategy.

5 **A.** Yes.

6 **Q.** If we could turn to page 2. Thank you. Paragraph 5 at
7 the top. This sets out -- again, this is in April of
8 2020 -- that the primary sourcing strategy for PPE in
9 China was to work with large, state-owned healthcare
10 distributors.

11 It explains the reason why that is.

12 Would you be able to explain to the Inquiry please,
13 given that the China Buy team was so close in proximity
14 to large state-owned manufacturers as to why you
15 understand it was considered that a New Buy team had to
16 be set up to deal with offers that may very well have
17 been coming from the same source?

18 **A.** Yes, I have less sight, I have to admit, of that bit of
19 it. What I think you see here is -- perhaps coming
20 back, if I may say, Mr Sharma, to where we started, as
21 to what is the -- what is it that the PP -- who we did
22 have deployed in China brought to this operation. And I
23 think what you see in this strategy, which prioritises
24 state-owned enterprises, is that combination of sort of,
25 if you like, political insight into the way that state

100

1 and business operate in China and a knowledge of the
2 sector itself. And that led them to this conclusion
3 about how we should focus our effort on the state-owned
4 enterprises as a means of, if you like, reducing our
5 vulnerabilities to securing contracts with companies who
6 would prove less able to deliver the goods produced in
7 the time and the quality --

8 **Q.** Did you or anyone else within the FCO raise the fact
9 that the China Buy team was very close to a number of
10 large manufacturers in-country, and that perhaps one of
11 the strategies which ought to have been deployed would
12 have been to focus attention on those factories, rather
13 than, as we've heard from other witnesses,
14 intermediaries who sit between those factories and the
15 PPE supply in the United Kingdom?

16 **A.** Yes, well, I think -- I mean, as Andrew Mitchell was
17 explaining this morning, I think, you know, there
18 were -- I think we were aware that intermediaries were
19 not necessarily a particularly helpful avenue down which
20 to go, because in many cases, it turned out that you
21 were dealing with somebody who was in turn dealing with
22 the very company that we were already dealing with. So
23 that it kind of -- that those --

24 **Q.** Sorry, just to break that down, what you're saying is
25 that it's quite possible that there would be a contract

101

1 to 3 -- forgive me, there it is at the
2 second-from-the-bottom bullet point:

3 "It is [in]valuable to have a joint coordination
4 function ..."

5 With reference to the JACT.

6 And then:

7 "This may also have helped to mitigate
8 self-gazumping in the context of procurement not
9 recommended, or even known about, by the China Network."

10 So there was that risk. This document is setting
11 out the potential risks of being gazumped, of the
12 UK DHSC team being gazumped or vice versa by the
13 China Buy team based in China.

14 Could you help us, please, with what steps were put
15 in place to stop or limit the risk of that having
16 happened.

17 **A.** So, I mean, I may -- I'm not sure about the
18 particular context of the assertion here, but it is
19 certainly true to say that we were concerned at various
20 points in this early period by the fact that we -- our
21 sort of China Network purchasing team -- were not the
22 only UK entity seeking to purchase PPE in China. So
23 that there were cases of other UK entities, whether they
24 be devolved administrations or NHS trusts or others, who
25 were seeking to procure. And with a risk that you

103

1 with one of those large manufacturers in China, with
2 which the UK Government has a contract to supply PPE,
3 and then, in addition to that, the government may be
4 contracting with intermediaries whose ultimate supplier
5 is the same manufacturer?

6 **A.** That would indeed be a possibility. And it's also
7 something, to be honest, that happened to us outside of
8 the UK. So I think, if I remember rightly, I think --
9 I may get -- I think it was the case in Malta, where
10 again, you know, we had a -- we identified a company
11 who showed that they would be kind of willing to sell
12 their PPE to us, and then when we kind of looked further
13 we realised that, actually, their goods were being
14 produced in China. So there was a risk that we were
15 going to go all the way round again to end up with
16 similar goods but we'd have been better off going to the
17 original supplier.

18 But, you know, at the same time we were very -- we
19 wanted to ensure that we weren't neglecting a potential
20 opportunity, as well. So it was -- again, there's
21 a tension there.

22 **Q.** Could we have a look, please, at INQ000494034.

23 A document about this potential issue of gazumping,
24 one contractor gazumping another contractor in China.

25 And if we turn to page 2, perhaps over the page

102

1 indeed did end up, sort of, if you like, gazumping
2 yourself or at least competing against other UK
3 entities.

4 And I think you'll know that at, I think it's
5 around, 16 April or so when the Permanent Secretary at
6 DHSC writes, for example, to the devolved
7 administrations to stress the point that we're going to
8 be trying to insist upon a kind of all-UK procurement
9 policy.

10 **Q.** Forgive me, Mr Manley, it's my fault. This document
11 I should have introduced to you.

12 **A.** Sorry.

13 **Q.** What it is, it's a paper produced by the Department for
14 International Trade, it's produced on 1 June 2020, and
15 it's headed that there are lessons learnt for the London
16 procurement team.

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** And that of one of the risks which is identified is that
19 risk of self-gazumping and of intermediaries. And so
20 the question I had for you was as to whether, to the
21 best of your knowledge, there was a system or a process
22 in place, either in China or in the UK or within DHSC,
23 to make sure that the United Kingdom wasn't effectively
24 competing with itself?

25 **A.** So we recognised that there was a bit of a problem, and

104

1 actually I think DHSC, certainly in respect of the
2 devolved administrations, took action to try to ensure
3 that we were not competing against ourselves. But it
4 had been a problem at the very early stages. I think
5 we'd be the first to admit that.

6 And that, if I may say, was, you know, one of the --
7 I think Andrew Mitchell this morning kind of focused on
8 the role of the JACT as a sort of transmission point, if
9 you like, between the demand signal and the supply
10 signal, if I can put it in those terms, but there was
11 also a point about the JACT, and indeed GSSEP later on,
12 being a sort of single point of information for all of
13 us within the system, including our ministers, as to
14 where we were in the procurement process. And I think
15 that was one of the things we were trying to sort
16 through.

17 **Q.** Could I turn, please, to some of the lessons that were
18 learned by the FCO as a result of the China Buy
19 procurement process. So, setting aside what the
20 Department for International Trade had considered the
21 lessons that were learned, what reflections did the FCO
22 have about the operation of the China Buy team and the
23 procurement of PPE?

24 **A.** So I think -- well, two things. I think we thought they
25 did a tremendous job, first of all. They did

105

1 this. Partly for the lessons, partly of course because
2 needs change. And we moved from ventilators to PPE, and
3 then we realised that the sort of volumes of PPE that we
4 were going to need to continue to procure were such that
5 we needed a slightly different model, and it's one that
6 is more kind of UK or London-based than the one that
7 we'd started with. And also because you've been running
8 what's effectively a crisis operation, drawing on staff
9 who are not, you know, fundamentally versed in
10 procurement matters or even healthcare matters, and
11 taking them away from other jobs, and you're having to
12 try to get yourself back onto a more sustainable
13 footing.

14 So there's a process of near constant evolution
15 through the course of those first few months, and then
16 a sort of -- and lessons are being learned all the time,
17 some of which are immediate and they're being put into
18 practice in changes to the way that we are doing things
19 on the ground and some of which are longer term.

20 **Q.** Pause for a moment, please.

21 **LADY HALLETT:** If I could just ask a question.

22 **MR SHARMA:** Yes.

23 **LADY HALLETT:** Going back to Mr Sharma's question and the
24 lesson learned, I understand that you accept the
25 proposition that there may have been a lack of training

107

1 a tremendous job in the most difficult of circumstances,
2 as so many other people did in response to the pandemic.
3 It's a cutthroat competition, the pace at which they
4 were having to work, the pressure which they felt, as we
5 all did, to secure, first, ventilators and then PPE at
6 pace for our colleagues back on the front line in the
7 NHS.

8 **Q.** Forgive me, in the witness statement of Sir Philip
9 Barton, he describes that a number of the issues arise
10 from staff training and a lack of expertise on the front
11 line in China. Is that a sentiment that you agree with?

12 **A.** Yes, I do. So we drew a number of lessons from it,
13 which we have put into practice, or tried to put into
14 practice, which include the training that's available to
15 people, the procurement policies that we have in place.
16 But I just want to register that I think, you know, in
17 terms of the commitment that those officers showed, the
18 skill and dexterity they demonstrated in very difficult
19 conditions, they did a tremendous job. We were
20 constantly learning, constantly learning, constantly
21 trying to adapt our processes and procedures. And
22 I think you see that working through the -- you know,
23 the three or four months of -- the first few months of
24 the pandemic, as we shift the structures of the JACT and
25 the China Network, we shift the way that we are doing

106

1 or expertise. I'm just wondering how you put that long
2 that you've learned -- or, sorry, how your former
3 colleagues put that lesson that's been learned into
4 practice to apply both to business as usual -- because
5 presumably your people in China are having to deal with
6 business as usual as well as a pandemic. How do you get
7 the right kind of expertise and training for your people
8 in China? As you say you couldn't send new people in
9 who were properly trained. So how does that work, in
10 practice now? Today?

11 **A.** My Lady, I think that's a very good question because
12 I don't think it would be practical to make every member
13 of the China Network a procurement specialist. So what
14 we are trying to do is to try to ensure that we've got
15 higher levels of basic knowledge across the system and
16 then we've got the procurement policies in place that
17 would enable them in such an eventuality. But it was,
18 as we all know, an extraordinary time in which each and
19 every day, every assumption that we might have made, was
20 being thrown up in the air and we were having to adapt
21 constantly to those changing demands.

22 **LADY HALLETT:** Sorry to interrupt, Mr Sharma.

23 **MR SHARMA:** Not at all, my Lady.

24 One of the second lessons that Sir Philip Barton
25 places in his witness statement on behalf of the FCO is

108

1 that there was an absence of clear lines of
 2 responsibility between the FCO, the Department for
 3 International Trade, and the Department of Health and
 4 Social Care. Would you agree with that?

5 **A.** I would have, yes. But what we -- I think -- again,
 6 what we are trying to do in the course of the first few
 7 weeks and months is to get ourselves to a more
 8 sustainable footing and one in which there's a --
 9 through a kind of crisis period where we've got a demand
 10 signal that's coming out of DHSC and that's being
 11 implemented by joint teams, FCO and DIT teams, you know,
 12 we start, JACT starts as being primarily a FCO team,
 13 becomes a joint FCDO -- FCO/DIT/DHSC team and then
 14 modifies itself again and becomes a kind of DIT-led
 15 GSSEP. So we're evolving constantly.

16 **Q.** And this, Mr Manley, is one of your own, in fact your
 17 principal reflection about the approach to the pandemic.
 18 You say this:

19 "... if the wider expertise within government,
 20 including trade and investment expertise within [the
 21 Department for International Trade], had been available
 22 to the FCO at an earlier stage, effective procurement
 23 processes might have been established sooner."

24 **A.** Yes. We try and bring in this expertise as quickly as
 25 we can. If you look at the initial dates, I mean this

109

1 and, I think, if we were doing it all again, it's easy
 2 to do with hindsight, and we'd have been quicker at it,
 3 and I hope we'd be quicker at it again, if we were to be
 4 faced with similar circumstances.

5 **MR SHARMA:** Thank you, Mr Manley, I don't have any further
 6 questions.

7 **LADY HALLETT:** I think there are some questions from
 8 Ms Mitchell. No? Oh no, that's for Mr Gove, sorry.
 9 I don't think there are any questions for you,
 10 Mr Manley.

11 **MR SHARMA:** I don't believe there are.

12 **LADY HALLETT:** Very well. I'm terribly sorry about that.
 13 I'm getting ahead of myself, Mr Manley.
 14 Thank you very much, indeed, for your help. I hope
 15 we haven't flown in another diplomat to help us today.
 16 I was afraid we might have flown in Mr Mitchell
 17 especially, but you can combine your visit, I hope, with
 18 other special --

19 **A.** Special -- (overspeaking) --

20 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much indeed.

21 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you very much.
 22 Thank you, Mr Sharma.

23 **LADY HALLETT:** I think we might as well continue, Mr Wald,
 24 if you're happy?

25 **MR WALD:** Yes, my Lady, very happy.

111

1 is -- those initial messages that we're sending out on
 2 around 20 March, days after the pandemic has been
 3 declared, and when we're only, I think, realising quite
 4 what is happening to global supply chains as well. We
 5 then try and -- one of the lessons that we quickly learn
 6 from the JACT is that need to have more DIT staff and
 7 expertise in this, and that's what happens kind of
 8 within about a week.

9 **Q.** One of the ways of solving the problem of expertise is,
 10 of course, by training.

11 **A.** Mm-hm.

12 **Q.** Another means might be better coordination between the
 13 expertise which is available within the United Kingdom
 14 and within the FCO. In the event of a pandemic at some
 15 point in the future, what do you think the right balance
 16 is, the right mix between increasing training on the
 17 ground for officials and making sure that there's
 18 coordination? Or do you think it's not an either/or
 19 question?

20 **A.** I think you probably have to have a little bit both, but
 21 I do think a lot of it is about coordination, and we
 22 were hamstrung by the inability to bring in expertise
 23 from the UK into the China Network because of the
 24 pandemic restrictions. But as those days and weeks go
 25 on, we're trying to make the best use of that expertise

110

1 My Lady, our next witness this afternoon is
 2 Mr Michael Gove.

3 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.

4 **MR MICHAEL GOVE (sworn)**

5 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Gove, I hope we haven't kept you waiting
 6 for too long and that you were warned.

7 **THE WITNESS:** No, not at all. No, thank you very much,
 8 my Lady. Not at all.

9 **Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY FOR MODULE 5**

10 **MR WALD:** Please state your full name for the Inquiry.

11 **A.** Michael Andrew Gove.

12 **Q.** Thank you, Mr Gove, and thank you for supplying to the
 13 Inquiry a witness statement. It's Inquiry document
 14 INQ000563560. It's signed at the end.
 15 Could you confirm, please, for the Inquiry that it's
 16 true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** Thank you very much indeed. Mr Gove, by way of brief
 19 background, you are the former MP for Surrey Heath; is
 20 that right?

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** You've held numerous senior roles, including ministerial
 23 ones within the Conservative Party, but for the period
 24 of relevance to this module, you were the Chancellor of
 25 the Duchy of Lancaster between January 2020 and

112

1 September 2021; is that correct?
 2 **A.** Yes.
 3 **Q.** And you were the Minister for the Cabinet Office from
 4 mid-February 2020?
 5 **A.** Yes.
 6 **Q.** Thank you. And you are now the editor of The Spectator,
 7 you've been so since October 2024?
 8 **A.** Yes.
 9 **Q.** Thank you, Mr Gove. Moving on then, please, to your
 10 role in pandemic procurement which is obviously the
 11 subject of this module. You've told us in your witness
 12 evidence that that role was relatively limited and led
 13 by DHSC; is that right?
 14 **A.** Yes.
 15 **Q.** Throughout the period that is relevant to this module,
 16 your fellow minister there was Mr Matt Hancock from whom
 17 we'll be hearing in due course.
 18 **A.** Yes.
 19 **Q.** We know from your evidence also, Mr Gove, that you
 20 attended a range of important decision-making fora,
 21 sometimes attending, sometimes chairing, including COBR,
 22 the General Public Service Ministerial Implementation
 23 Group, HMIG, Cabinet, Covid-O and meetings with devolved
 24 administrations. Yes?
 25 **A.** Yes.

113

1 **LADY HALLETT:** I think we'd better give Mr Gove the chance
 2 to see if he wants -- can you summarise
 3 your -- (overspeaking) --
 4 **A.** Yes.
 5 **LADY HALLETT:** -- Mr Gove?
 6 **A.** So Professor Sanchez-Graells is both an academic and
 7 a lawyer, and in his work he exhibits the weaknesses of
 8 both of those otherwise admirable professions. He
 9 outlines an adherence to EU legacy law, which seems to
 10 me to be almost theological in its -- how can I put
 11 this -- finickiness and it is also the case that he
 12 seems profoundly to underestimate the degree of pressure
 13 under which this and other governments were placed at
 14 the beginning of the pandemic. So while I am a huge
 15 admirer both of academics and of lawyers, all
 16 professions have their flaws, and
 17 Professor Sanchez-Graells exhibits both of those flaws
 18 in his report.
 19 **Q.** All right, Mr Gove, I don't think there's any dispute
 20 that you and others -- we've heard from some of them
 21 last week -- were under terrific pressure during this
 22 period. The simple point, and it's a point relevant to
 23 one of the High Court judgments, of which you may be
 24 aware, that even during emergency procurement, it is
 25 necessary, it is essential, to maintain principles of

115

1 **Q.** You tell us very candidly, if I may say so, that you
 2 have no extensive knowledge of public procurement law.
 3 That's the position, isn't it?
 4 **A.** Yes.
 5 **Q.** But you are nonetheless, Mr Gove, familiar with the
 6 importance with the ensuring that fairness and
 7 transparency is achieved through that process at all
 8 times?
 9 **A.** Yes, consistent with other priorities.
 10 **Q.** Yes, I don't know whether you've been able to tune in to
 11 last week's evidence at all, have you, Mr Gove?
 12 **A.** I've had the chance to read some of it.
 13 **Q.** I don't know whether you have read, therefore, the
 14 evidence of Professor Sanchez-Graells? You will, then,
 15 recall a set of principles that govern procurement and
 16 his evidence that not just even in an emergency, but
 17 especially in an emergency, fairness and transparency
 18 are to be maintained.
 19 **A.** I read his evidence, both here to the Inquiry, and also
 20 the report that he prepared. I think there are a number
 21 of flaws in his analysis.
 22 **Q.** Well, I'm not going to ask you to critique his analysis;
 23 I'm asking you a very specific question about
 24 transparency and fairness. Can we limit ourselves for
 25 these purposes to that? Would you mind?

114

1 transparency and fairness. In that particular case, or
 2 cases, they related to equal treatment and the
 3 publication of contract notices after the event.
 4 **A.** Yes, and I take it you're referring to the case that
 5 dealt with PestFix, Clandeboye and Ayanda?
 6 **Q.** I am. They are both Good Law Project cases, they are
 7 separate cases.
 8 **A.** Mm.
 9 **Q.** One of them found unequal treatment as a result of the
 10 High Priority Lane, to which we'll come in a few
 11 moments, and the other found, as a result of notices not
 12 having been published within the requisite time or at
 13 all, that requirement of transparency had not been met?
 14 **A.** Yes, I have a very low opinion of the Good Law Project.
 15 I believe that its title is an almost perfect oxymoron.
 16 The man who runs it is a politically motivated grifter.
 17 **Q.** All right. Well, thank you for that, Mr Gove. It
 18 wasn't a question I was asking you, but you've said your
 19 piece.
 20 You do, by contrast, have an enormously high opinion
 21 of Lord Agnew, don't you?
 22 **A.** Yes.
 23 **Q.** And you say so in your written evidence. You delegated
 24 authority for issues pertaining to government commercial
 25 activity to your junior minister, you say Lord Theodore

116

1 Agnew. Did he report to you?
 2 **A.** Yes.
 3 **Q.** Yes. So you were provided with updates so far as his
 4 involvement in public procurement was concerned?
 5 **A.** Yes, but there would be many decisions which Theodore
 6 would take which, in the course of any given day,
 7 I would not seek nor wish to micromanage.
 8 **Q.** Do you have any sense of what proportion of his time was
 9 devoted to the challenge of emergency procurement?
 10 **A.** A significant amount but I would not be able to put
 11 a percentage upon it.
 12 **Q.** Okay. Thank you for that. You say that he had
 13 a vitally important role within the Cabinet Office, you
 14 describe him as a lynchpin. You use various other
 15 adjectives describing him in heroic terms.
 16 **A.** Yes.
 17 **Q.** And indeed, you describe him as a hero --
 18 **A.** Yes.
 19 **Q.** -- for his role in public procurement?
 20 **A.** Absolutely.
 21 **Q.** All right, thank you for that.
 22 I want to move on to the subject of the Ventilator
 23 Challenge. You tell us within your written evidence
 24 that the procurement -- that you did not have any direct
 25 decision-making authority or leadership, with the

117

1 And number 3, "I want you to purchase this or these
 2 items from this source."
 3 Which he described as "not okay".
 4 Now, the third example would be direct decision
 5 making, would it not, whereas the first two, indirect?
 6 **A.** Yes, but I think that since the example of any contract
 7 being awarded at the behest or request of a minister
 8 which resulted in public money going to any contractor
 9 didn't arise.
 10 **Q.** Sorry, you acknowledge that the third species, the third
 11 subcategory that Sir Gareth postulated last week would
 12 be direct intervention from a minister, if it existed?
 13 **A.** Yes.
 14 **Q.** All right. You say that you had no direct
 15 decision-making authority or leadership with the
 16 exception of the Ventilator Challenge --
 17 **A.** Yes.
 18 **Q.** -- where you did. Yes?
 19 **A.** Yes.
 20 **Q.** Because you had direct intervention, you had direct
 21 involvement and intervention in that challenge?
 22 **A.** Well, it may help the Inquiry to note that in the
 23 Ventilator Challenge, which followed on from the
 24 inability of the government to procure ventilators at
 25 a time when they were considered to be a vital element

119

1 exception of the Ventilator Challenge.
 2 **A.** Yes.
 3 **Q.** I just want to ask you, in relation to the first clause
 4 there, you distinguish, presumably, direct
 5 decision-making authority or leadership and indirect
 6 decision-making authority or leadership; is that fair?
 7 **A.** I believe so but it depends how you develop this line of
 8 questioning.
 9 **Q.** Well, let's see how we get on. By "direct", that is
 10 issuing an instruction?
 11 **A.** Mm.
 12 **Q.** A clear instruction. I don't know whether you followed
 13 or read Mr Rhys Williams's evidence or Sir Gareth Rhys
 14 Williams's evidence of last week?
 15 **A.** I did.
 16 **Q.** You did. You may recall, therefore, in relation to
 17 ministerial pressure, that he subdivided that category
 18 into three subcategories.
 19 There is a request from a minister for an update as
 20 to how an offer that has made its way into the VIP Lane
 21 is progressing. That's number 1. Which he said, fair
 22 enough.
 23 Number 2, "You said you'd get back to me by X, and
 24 have not done so, why not?" He described that as
 25 annoying but fair.

118

1 in the response to Covid, the Prime Minister asked the
 2 Cabinet Office to lead an innovation partnership-type
 3 arrangement, during which there were a number of
 4 companies, some of them established medical suppliers,
 5 one, at least, not, to see if it was possible, at pace,
 6 to provide the NHS with the equipment that it was, at
 7 the time, so desperately in need of. I believe that the
 8 eventual outcome of that was a success and I believe
 9 that Gareth Rhys Williams and Theodore Agnew deserve
 10 enormous credit for it.
 11 **Q.** All right. Well, we heard evidence about the Ventilator
 12 Challenge, as you will know, last week, particularly
 13 from Sir Gareth, but since some of that correspondence
 14 included or was sent by you, it's important, and only
 15 fair to you, that the Inquiry should hear directly from
 16 you in relation to it. And that's what I want to move
 17 to now, if I may.
 18 **A.** Of course.
 19 **Q.** Thank you.
 20 Could we have, therefore, INQ000048399 up on
 21 display.
 22 As early as 20 March 2020, which was four days after
 23 the Ventilator Challenge was announced, the
 24 Prime Minister, in a WhatsApp messaging group -- which
 25 I don't think included you?

120

1 A. No, it did not.

2 Q. -- was messaging about ventilators, and he said this:

3 "Dyson freaking."

4 Then we have:

5 "Action this day."

6 Mr Hancock says:

7 "I have also received the same. I will talk to

8 Dyson and Michael" -- which I presume is yourself.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. "... and sort it."

11 Were you at this point informed that Sir James Dyson

12 was freaking?

13 A. I was certainly informed, I don't know if it was

14 precisely at this point, I was certainly informed at

15 different points of the frustrations that

16 Sir James Dyson felt with the process of Dyson the

17 company's involvement in the Ventilator Challenge.

18 Q. Was pressure being applied to you to include Dyson in

19 the Ventilator Challenge, and to progress its design?

20 A. Pressure was being applied to me to ensure that we got

21 ventilators to the front line, and the decision to take

22 procurement of ventilators out of DHSC and into the

23 Cabinet Office for the Ventilator Challenge was

24 a reflection of the Prime Minister's judgment that DHSC

25 was doing an enormous amount under pressure, and that

121

1 as much direct involvement with any other potential

2 ventilator manufacturer as you did with Dyson?

3 A. No, not as much as with Dyson.

4 Q. All right. Thank you, that's what I wanted to be clear

5 about.

6 Clearly, as you've indicated in your answers this

7 afternoon, Sir James was very active in pushing to be

8 involved. We know that, don't we?

9 A. He wanted to save lives.

10 Q. He wanted to save lives. We know of this. Could we

11 have another document for which you are not responsible,

12 but in which you are mentioned, INQ000569777, page 11,

13 which is a rather well-thumbed copy of Mr Hancock's

14 pandemic diaries.

15 A. Mm.

16 Q. It's 25 March 2020:

17 "Boris called Michael Gove and me in to talk

18 ventilators. He wants Michael to pick it up, given all

19 the procurement people are actually based in the Cabinet

20 Office.

21 "Our competition is proving a mixed blessing. Some

22 participants are a little over-enthusiastic. James

23 Dyson, the vacuum manufacturer, has been contacting

24 numerous people in high places to ensure he has

25 a prominent role. He's continually on the phone,

123

1 Sir Gareth, because he had some experience in this area,

2 could help us to secure those supplies. A number of

3 different companies were involved in that process, the

4 most high profile of which to those who would not have

5 been involved in the field of medical equipment, would

6 obviously have been Sir James.

7 Q. I note that save for that last part of your answer, you

8 have answered in general terms. We're going to turn on

9 to the detail in a moment but can I ask you directly:

10 did you have as much or more direct involvement in any

11 other potential ventilator manufacturer as you did with

12 Dyson?

13 A. I looked at all of the designs. I spent my time trying

14 to ensure that the process was happening as quickly as

15 possible. What I wanted to ensure was that all viable

16 designs were followed up. The difference between

17 Sir James and others is that he has not, or had not

18 primarily been involved in making medical equipment, but

19 what he was and is, is an entrepreneur, an inventor, and

20 designer of distinction who had been contacted by the

21 Prime Minister and who had indicated his willingness to

22 help at a time of national challenge.

23 Q. Mr Gove, it's not quite what I asked you. Can I take

24 you back to my question, please, and I think it's one

25 that permits for a "Yes" or "No" answer. Did you have

122

1 including to Boris, pushing to take part. He's an

2 amazing innovator and engineer and he's completely right

3 to turn to this -- after all, we put out the call -- but

4 it's becoming awkward."

5 Then further down:

6 "Michael texted asking to talk urgently about what

7 to do about Dyson. It's a fine line between enthusiasm

8 and getting in the way."

9 All right, would you agree with that assessment?

10 Was it becoming awkward?

11 A. It was the case that Sir James was frustrated at what he

12 perceived to be bureaucratic slowness on the part of the

13 government machine. Part of my role was to challenge

14 the bureaucracy within the government machine at every

15 point, not just on behalf of Sir James but on behalf of

16 the National Health Service and those at the front line.

17 Sir James has a particularly energetic style of making

18 himself known. So do I.

19 Q. You speak within your witness statement about the

20 political pressure that Sir James is capable of

21 exerting. What do you mean by that, and did it come to

22 bear on you?

23 A. If it was the case that at any point someone who was

24 willing to help the front line had been fobbed off with

25 bureaucratic excuses, and if their kind efforts had not

124

1 been followed up energetically, that would have been
 2 a political problem. But worse than that, it would have
 3 been a failure to discharge my duty as a minister
 4 seeking to help the front line.

5 **Q.** Is that your assessment of the Dyson proposal: that
 6 Sir James was fobbed off?

7 **A.** It was the case that he communicated to me and to others
 8 frustration with the process. So I set out at different
 9 points in order to see if aspects of the process that
 10 might be conducted sequentially could be conducted in
 11 parallel. I asked questions about whether or not space
 12 in some of the testing facilities, which I believe were
 13 in Birmingham, could be freed in order to ensure that
 14 the process of advancing different prototypes could be
 15 done.

16 At that time, my main aim was to ensure that we had
 17 the maximum number of potential ventilators from the
 18 maximum number of suppliers, and I think it was noted in
 19 the evidence that Sir James, because of his production
 20 facilities, had his prototype got through testing, which
 21 it didn't, would have been able to produce significant
 22 numbers.

23 **Q.** Were you capable of forming a view as to whether --
 24 which side of the line his proposals fell: enthusiasm
 25 and getting in the way?

125

1 **Q.** Yes.

2 **A.** So the reason why I pressed was to see if it was
 3 possible to refine the design and, indeed, the design
 4 was refined, and some but not all of the obstacles to
 5 its implementation were addressed.

6 **Q.** Well, let's --

7 **A.** But throughout, we were very clear that no device should
 8 be deployed on the front line unless it had secured
 9 approval from the MHRA.

10 **Q.** Because of the fundamental importance of ensuring safety
 11 in a piece of apparatus such as a ventilator?

12 **A.** Correct.

13 **Q.** Yes. All right, let's turn to some of the relevant
 14 correspondence and test the degree to which it matches
 15 up to the account which you now give.

16 Could we have INQ000496699.

17 It's an email dated 25 March 2020, from Sir Gareth
 18 Rhys Williams to Sir John Manzoni: "CdI" -- that's
 19 yourself?

20 **A.** Mm.

21 **Q.** "... insistent [in capital letters] we place an order
 22 with Dyson ... contingent on passing clinical and
 23 passing MHRA approvals ... they are working at full
 24 speed already ... but if that's what cdI wants ..."

25 All right.

127

1 **A.** I think that it's in the nature of government that every
 2 single day, people who are enthusiastic, sometimes
 3 always -- sometimes also get in the way. So it may be
 4 the case that there are people who maintain an
 5 Aristotelian golden mean between enthusiasm and getting
 6 in the way, but normally in the rough and tumble of
 7 politics and government, sometimes the best people, the
 8 most energetic people, can overreach, but you want to
 9 have people who are capable of either asking difficult
 10 questions or being demanding. That's the price of
 11 progress.

12 **Q.** Mr Gove, you relied, as all ministers must, on the
 13 advice of senior civil servants?

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** And you heard, did you not, then and last week in
 16 evidence, Sir Gareth Rhys Williams significant concerns
 17 about the safety of the ventilator prototype being
 18 proposed by Dyson?

19 **A.** Yes.

20 **Q.** Yes. Were you aware of those concerns both at the
 21 time -- you presumably are aware that that was the
 22 evidence given last week?

23 **A.** Yes, of course I was.

24 **Q.** Were you aware at the time?

25 **A.** Yes, of course I was.

126

1 That's the first one. Before I put a question to
 2 you, I'm going to bring up on screen the second one.

3 The same day, it's INQ000533247. The same day
 4 Richard Hornby, the Chief Financial Officer at the
 5 Cabinet Office -- with whom I'm sure you're familiar.

6 **A.** Mm.

7 **Q.** -- emailed cabinet colleagues to say:
 8 "Please accept this as authorisation to raise
 9 a purchase order for £100,000 in favour of Dyson for
 10 prototype ventilators. Gareth Rhys Williams has been
 11 instructed by the CDL to proceed at place. Description
 12 and conditions will come from Gareth and Dan. Thanks
 13 and happy to discuss."

14 Then one more before I pose a question to you, if
 15 I may.

16 It's INQ000497116. And this is a few days later ...
 17 yes, there it is. If we just scroll up, we'll see who
 18 this comes from. It's from -- yes, it's from your
 19 office.

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** "Dear all" -- and there are a number of action points
 22 there. Do you see one, two, three, four, five, down:
 23 "MHRA" -- that's the regulatory body responsible for
 24 ensuring safety?

25 **A.** Mm.

128

1 Q. "And GRW" -- Sir Gareth Rhys Williams -- "to ensure by
2 the end of Friday ..."

3 A. Mm.

4 Q. And this is written on a Wednesday:

5 "... to ensure by the end of Friday the Dyson
6 product has [first] been tested and [second], has been
7 approved by MHRA."

8 Now, Mr Gove, given what you say about the
9 importance of safety, given what you say that you
10 regarded your role only as one of unblocking
11 bureaucracy, how was it that you were able, on
12 Wednesday, 25 March, to give a clear instruction that
13 not only would the Dyson product have been tested
14 three days later, but also approved by MHRA, by that
15 time?

16 A. I could not tell the MHRA what to approve and would not.
17 I think that this is Private Office shorthand for "We
18 would hope that it had been tested, and if tested
19 satisfactorily, approved by the MHRA to that timescale."

20 I was anxious to ensure at all points that if we
21 could, that we had products that could save lives
22 operating at the front line. But it's absurd to imagine
23 that I, or any other minister, could instruct the MHRA,
24 an independent regulatory agency, to approve a product.
25 If I had told the MHRA to approve a product, they would

129

1 Note the word "circumvent", strong language for
2 a regulatory body charged with ensuring the crucial
3 safety of devices used to maintain life.

4 A. Completely. But what I was doing, and did throughout,
5 was at every stage ask if there was any way in which
6 this process could be accelerated. Why? Because
7 I wished to see ventilators placed at the disposal of
8 the NHS at a time when it was felt that we needed them
9 and we needed them delivered at scale.

10 So whether or not Graeme Tunbridge was in any of the
11 meetings -- I'm not sure that he was in many -- if he
12 had been, or if others had been, they would have been
13 able to tell you that I was asking a series of questions
14 in order to ensure that the process was as efficient,
15 effective and fast as possible.

16 But whenever confronted with brute facts, about
17 safety or otherwise, I would always accept them. It's
18 the role of ministers to challenge, and, indeed, one of
19 the conclusions of an earlier module of the Inquiry was
20 that ministers have to challenge the advice they are
21 given.

22 Q. Mr Gove, you've said that in answer to previous
23 questions, but it does seem from this email
24 correspondence that what you were doing is stepping
25 beyond that role and mandating a regulatory body to do

131

1 have told me where to get off.

2 Q. Well, Mr Gove, that's the reason that the question has
3 been put to you. Let's see how others on this email
4 string interpreted what it was that you were doing at
5 this point. Can we scroll up a little bit. Up to the
6 top.

7 A. Mm.

8 Q. Yes, there it is. This is from Graeme Tunbridge from
9 the MHRA itself.

10 A. Mm.

11 Q. "The readout from CDL's Private Office and a response by
12 John Manzoni are below -- in short, you will see that
13 CDL was keen to press forward with Dyson's proposal to
14 a time scale that is totally unrealistic."

15 Well, that's one point.

16 A. Mm.

17 Q. That's going too fast, going faster than we are capable
18 of achieving safely.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. "... based in part on promises made by Dyson that are
21 already not being fulfilled. In addition, however, CDL
22 did not appreciate the level of risk involved in the
23 manufacture and use of ventilators and wanted to
24 circumvent the expedited regulatory process that has
25 been put in place."

130

1 neither what it could within a given timeframe, nor what
2 it might not end up doing, depending on the result of
3 its tracing?

4 A. No, not true --

5 **LADY HALLETT:** I'm not that's -- forgive me, Mr Gove.

6 I'm not sure that's a fair way of putting it,
7 Mr Wald. The idea that a third party comes up with the
8 word "circumvent" does not mean that Mr Gove was trying
9 to circumvent. I think we need to be careful.

10 **MR WALD:** Mr Gove, you have given your evidence. You were
11 not seeking to circumvent the role of the MHRA?

12 A. No, and it's ludicrous to imagine that any minister
13 could have done.

14 Just imagine the situation, if you will, that
15 a minister, Matt Hancock, I, Boris Johnson, says we want
16 to have a potentially lethal machine in hospitals
17 deliberately so that we can meet an arbitrary deadline.
18 It's inconceivable.

19 Q. All right, Mr Gove, let's just finish up on this string
20 of correspondence.

21 Could we have INQ000534490. This a further --
22 I just want you to have the opportunity to respond to
23 this, if you would.

24 This is Sir Gareth, 25 March:

25 "Suggestions what to?"

132

1 "I do feel that CDL ..."
 2 This is you.
 3 **A.** Mm.
 4 **Q.** "... is being unreasonable -- even if he was correct
 5 that we had delayed anything, which I don't believe he
 6 is at all, this tone is ... regrettable. But see below.
 7 It would appear that the Dyson sample is [just] not ...
 8 ready to be shipped by them. MHRA could have been
 9 testing something else this evening. In the meanwhile
 10 we are getting, of course, more test rigs for them so
 11 that is no bottleneck."

12 Now, there is a new point expressed in this email,
 13 which is the opportunity cost.

14 **A.** Mm.

15 **Q.** Which is the time, the effort, that is being devoted to
 16 Dyson meant that that time, that effort, could not be
 17 devoted to other ventilator proposals of the type that
 18 you were describing earlier fell to be considered --

19 **A.** Mm.

20 **Q.** -- and that you would have considered. Is that a fair
 21 point, Mr Gove?

22 **A.** I don't believe that it is. So I think that the first
 23 thing to say is that there are always trade-offs in this
 24 process. The second thing to say is that, as Gareth
 25 Rhys Williams pointed out, in the end the Ventilator

133

1 from a source which, if they were viable, would have
 2 been capable of producing them at a scale and in
 3 a number greater than any of the other arrivals.

4 **MR WALD:** My Lady, I note the time but I'm quite close to
 5 concluding this topic.

6 **LADY HALLETT:** Carry on, please.

7 **MR WALD:** If you're content to carry on for a few moments.

8 **LADY HALLETT:** Of course.

9 **MR WALD:** Could we have INQ000536361, please, brought up on
 10 to the screen.

11 Now, this concern from Sir Gareth led Sir John
 12 Manzoni to intervene personally with the MHRA, and he
 13 has provided in his witness statement the following. He
 14 says:

15 "I recall that I was concerned that, by virtue of
 16 the meeting being called by CDL, indirect pressure was
 17 being placed on the MHRA [indirect pressure] to approve
 18 the supplier's design at the stage of selecting
 19 suppliers to progress in the Ventilator Challenge.
 20 I felt I had to and did intervene in this meeting to
 21 ensure that the MHRA approval system, as the regulatory
 22 system, was properly applied and to protect the
 23 integrity of the process."

24 Now, again, strong words. According to Sir John
 25 Manzoni there, there was a need to protect the integrity

135

1 Challenge -- thanks to his leadership more than
 2 anyone's, and also Theodore Agnew's -- was able to
 3 produce products in weeks that would ordinarily have
 4 taken months, if not years.

5 The third thing to say is that at any given point,
 6 the MHRA laboratory would have been -- the people there
 7 would have been working flat out. I also believe the
 8 people at Dyson were working flat out, but it might have
 9 been the case that Dyson's ability to bring the improved
 10 product to the laboratory in time on this occasion was
 11 found wanting. But I think in the greater scheme of
 12 things, the loss of time, the opportunity, cost, would
 13 have been nugatory.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** Can I ask this, do you think this is fair,
 15 Mr Gove: that you put a great deal of pressure -- part
 16 of your job, as you've said -- because you understood
 17 the Dyson prototype was viable when it wasn't?

18 **A.** Well, I think that's at the heart of it, my Lady. I, by
 19 definition, am not an expert, the MHRA are, in deciding
 20 whether or not a prototype is suitable for deployment.

21 What I do have experience of is pushing
 22 bureaucracies, and sometimes I can be unreasonable and
 23 rebarbative in tone, and I apologise for that, but
 24 I think that in this case what I was seeking to do was
 25 to see if an opportunity existed to produce ventilators

134

1 of the process. Do you agree that such a need did
 2 arise?

3 **A.** No. I believe that I respected the integrity of the
 4 process throughout. What I wanted to ensure was that it
 5 was being implemented, appropriate processes, as
 6 effectively as possible.

7 There's a distinction, I think, to be drawn between
 8 the ability of an agency or regulator to determine
 9 whether or not technical specifications have been met,
 10 and also the speed and effectiveness with which the
 11 bureaucracy overseeing that is operating.

12 **Q.** You mentioned that the Dyson proposal had the support of
 13 the Prime Minister himself.

14 **A.** Well, the original drive to secure additional
 15 ventilators had come from the Prime Minister. He was
 16 the author of the Ventilator Challenge and therefore
 17 deserves credit for ensuring that we did actually secure
 18 additional ventilators faster than might otherwise have
 19 been the case. It was also the case that the
 20 Prime Minister, I believe, set out to encourage a number
 21 of British industrialists to help, of whom Mr James
 22 Dyson was one. I also believe that McLaren, the sports
 23 car manufacturer, were also contacted because some of
 24 the facilities that they had at their disposal were
 25 potentially capable, potentially capable, of aiding in

136

1 that effort.

2 **Q.** But as far as you're aware -- well, we haven't found
3 documentation within the Inquiry that suggests that you
4 promoted or supported a particular proposal in the way
5 that you have done here; is that correct?

6 **A.** I was very interested in all of the proposals, but the
7 critical thing about Sir James and Dyson is that they
8 had the capacity, as I mentioned earlier, to produce at
9 scale. Most of the other companies were smaller scale,
10 though in the end, as I think Gareth Rhys Williams
11 recorded in his evidence, Smiths and Penlon, in
12 particular I think, really rose to the occasion. But
13 I remember having detailed conversations at a very early
14 stage in the process with Gareth and others in order to
15 understand what was required of each of the potential
16 consortia.

17 I think one of the consortia that McLaren were part
18 of fell away relatively early on, I can't recall all of
19 them, but I was just anxious to see that they all
20 contributed. And I also felt, as I say, that given
21 Sir James and his team had a record of deploying
22 ingenious solutions to intractable problems, the fact
23 that they were involved was an asset.

24 **Q.** The final question on this topic, Mr Gove. Looking
25 back, with the benefit of hindsight, it's always very

137

1 communications from every potential seller to
2 discriminating buyer with neither endorsement nor
3 stigma."

4 Does that description that you offer at paragraph 92
5 apply to the Dyson example?

6 **A.** I think that at paragraph 92 I'm referring explicitly to
7 PPE, and to the High Priority Lane. The Ventilator
8 Challenge was a different exercise, as I've explained.
9 And I think that the proof of its success rests in the
10 evidence that we heard from Gareth Rhys Williams and
11 others.

12 Of course, as the Inquiry knows, as our
13 understanding of the virus evolved and our understanding
14 of treatment of those who suffered from the virus
15 evolved, the need for ventilation, an invasive procedure
16 in any case, was superseded by other treatments.

17 But the line of questioning, the heuristic which is
18 being applied, is that there was something somehow wrong
19 about Sir James Dyson's involvement or the energetic
20 championing of him.

21 In the end, as I say, Sir James lost money trying to
22 help the NHS. Driving the machine hard in order to
23 ensure that we had additional ventilators resulted in
24 success. One of the problems governing debate outside
25 this Inquiry on procurement is that individuals, like

139

1 helpful to have that benefit, any regrets? Do you have
2 any regrets in the way in which the Dyson matter was
3 handled or the proposal was handled?

4 **A.** No, I don't because I think it's right to acknowledge
5 that Sir James, having sought very hard to ensure that
6 he could provide a viable ventilator, in the end bore
7 the costs himself of the work that he had carried out at
8 risk. And he is a man of means, but I think he, or his
9 company, bore costs of £20 million, the reason he was
10 acting as he was, was because he believed he wanted to
11 help the NHS. I think there's been a focus on Sir James
12 because it was erroneously suggested that he was a donor
13 to the Conservative Party, the BBC had to apologise when
14 it was pointed out that was not the case. Sir James
15 inevitably attracts attention and controversy because of
16 his support for Brexit, but I think that the overall
17 Ventilator Challenge, as I say, worked well and everyone
18 within it, particularly, as I say, Gareth Rhys Williams
19 and Theodore Agnew, deserve thanks and credit.

20 **Q.** Just arising out of that answer if I may, Mr Gove, you
21 say under the heading "Conflicts of interest" in your
22 evidence, paragraph 92, you say:

23 "No pressure was or could be applied to award any
24 individual or company a contract. I passed on every
25 request I received in the manner of a postman delivering

138

1 Jolyon Maugham and others, have sought to suggest that
2 there was something somehow fishy, stinky or corrupt
3 about this process. That is, as I say in my statement,
4 politically-motivated bilge.

5 **LADY HALLETT:** I think that's a moment to take a break,
6 Mr Wald.

7 You remember, Mr Gove, we take breaks for the
8 stenographer, and I promise you, we will finish your
9 evidence today and I shall return at 25 to.

10 (3.20 pm)

(A short break)

12 (3.35 pm)

13 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Wald.

14 **MR WALD:** Mr Gove, I want to turn now to the subject of the
15 VIP Lane, if I may. You make it very clear in your
16 evidence that you were not responsible for setting it
17 up, you had no hand in that, in fact you didn't even
18 know about it until some point afterwards.

19 Do you remember how long after it was set up that --

20 **A.** I can't remember exactly, no. I think I was made aware
21 of it by media reporting.

22 **Q.** Yes, you say so in your statement.

23 **A.** Yeah, I think so, yes.

24 **Q.** Yes. You may have read or heard last week's witnesses.

25 None of them would favour a reinstatement of a VIP Lane

140

1 or a High Priority Lane in the event of a future
 2 pandemic which called for emergency procurement.
 3 I assume that you would align yourself with those
 4 witnesses, that you would not support or press for or
 5 advocate for the reintroduction of the VIP Lane or the
 6 High Priority Lane?

7 **A.** No, I don't believe so, and I think that as things -- as
 8 one reflects on procurement, both the successes and the
 9 failures, I think that the issue of the VIP or High
 10 Priority Lane is a marginal one, but I wouldn't,
 11 certainly, strive to reinstate such an arrangement in
 12 any future pandemic preparedness.

13 **Q.** No.

14 **A.** But I do believe that the focus or attention that has
 15 been directed towards the High Priority Lane as one of
 16 our principal defects in our approach towards
 17 procurement is disproportionate.

18 **Q.** Okay, well, that's a fair observation. There's the
 19 optics of it but then there's the actual functioning of
 20 it. We touched upon the High Court challenges. The
 21 VIP Lane was found to be unlawful on the grounds of
 22 unequal treatment, so it's not purely a matter of
 23 optics, is it, Mr Gove?

24 **A.** Well, I've read Mrs Justice O'Farrell's judgment, and
 25 indeed you are right that its operation was found to be

141

1 **A.** Mm.

2 **Q.** And so we are looking, as we must, at finding better
 3 ways of emergency procuring in the future. So the fact
 4 that a particular contract or three may or may not have
 5 received an award ultimately is, to use your language,
 6 marginal; it's not really the crux of the matter, is it,
 7 Mr Gove?

8 **A.** Well, again, I think that there have been various
 9 attempts, statistical attempts, to suggest that somehow
 10 the High Priority Lane massively distorted the process
 11 of procurement, and I think, again, there are deeper and
 12 more profound problems with procurement, both as we saw
 13 during the pandemic and more broadly, than the operation
 14 of the High Priority Lane.

15 **Q.** All right, as I said, I will come back to it. You've
 16 offered a page or so of reflections at the end of your
 17 witness statements, and I want to ask you briefly about
 18 those towards the end.

19 **A.** Thank you.

20 **Q.** You've told us within your written statement that as
 21 a high priority minister with a co-ordinating role
 22 during the pandemic, you were often in receipt of a very
 23 large number of offers of assistance.

24 **A.** Mm.

25 **Q.** And you cite the example of one of them, your then

143

1 unlawful, but it's also the case, I think, that the
 2 judgment concludes that the contracts would have been
 3 awarded to those respective bidders in any case.

4 And I also think it's important to bear in mind the
 5 point that's made by -- several points that are made by
 6 Nigel Boardman in his report, his review into
 7 procurement overall. He makes the point that the
 8 government needs to be willing to experiment
 9 simultaneously with several potential solutions,
 10 acknowledging that some of them might not work, given
 11 the scale of emergency procedures.

12 **Q.** Mr Gove, I'll come in due course to invite you to offer
 13 your view on what alternative solutions might look like,
 14 particularly given your wealth of experience in
 15 government.

16 **A.** Thank you.

17 **Q.** But just to respond, if I may, and ask you a further
 18 question based on what you've just said, you're right,
 19 of course, that in the case of where unequal treatment
 20 was found, it was also found that the particular
 21 contracts that were there being considered would have
 22 been awarded in any event?

23 **A.** Yes.

24 **Q.** But we are in this Inquiry focused on systems, aren't
 25 we?

142

1 shadow minister, Rachel Reeves MP?

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** And you've provided a response to Rachel Reeves, who was
 4 requesting an update in relation to a number of offers.
 5 Let's have a look, if we may, at your response.
 6 It's INQ000512941.
 7 It's dated 2 May 2020. So it postdates the
 8 existence of the High Priority Lane. Were you aware of
 9 it by now, do you know?

10 **A.** I can't recall if I was aware of it specifically at that
 11 time.

12 **Q.** Okay, very fair. You've said that:
 13 "If businesses ..."
 14 Yes, there we are:
 15 "The Government has set up clear routes for
 16 businesses to use if they want to help with the response
 17 to COVID-19, and we encourage all potential offers to be
 18 directed to the following webform ... If businesses use
 19 this webform, it ensures that offer is entered into our
 20 system effectively and allows the appropriate team to
 21 take it forward. As you would expect, all offers are
 22 triaged by officials and we are focused on prioritising
 23 those which can deliver significant quantities of
 24 high-quality equipment to the health and care sector."
 25 So there, Mr Gove, you appear to be describing what

144

1 on the face of it looks likely a sensible method --

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** -- of receiving and triaging offers but which is not the

4 VIP Lane.

5 **A.** Mm.

6 **Q.** Yes?

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** So would this -- you said that you weren't sure whether

9 or not, at the time of writing this letter, you were

10 aware of an alternative VIP Lane?

11 **A.** Mm.

12 **Q.** Whether or not you were so aware, would what you are

13 describing here to Rachel Reeves not serve as a method

14 of receiving offers that would not encounter some of the

15 problems, whether identified by the High Court or by

16 others, of the VIP or High Priority Lane?

17 **A.** I think the particular webform here and the particular

18 portal that we had operating was not perhaps providing

19 the rapidity of response that a number of Members of

20 Parliament hoped to see at a time when there was an

21 urgent need to secure PPE.

22 I don't know if you've had a chance to look at the

23 original letter that Rachel Reeves sent me?

24 **Q.** I have seen that letter.

25 **A.** And as you will see, in it Rachel Reeves listed 20 or so

145

1 maintain a rapid response through the process where

2 appropriate?

3 **A.** Yes, but not every offer received a response that rapid.

4 **Q.** No, it was a matter of triage, it was a matter of

5 judgement of the offer whether or not it did receive

6 such treatment?

7 **A.** Yes, but initially at least the scale of offers that

8 were made meant that not everybody was responded to as

9 quickly as they might have been, and there were a number

10 of Members of Parliament who would contact me and other

11 ministers, indeed others within government, saying,

12 "I've made this offer, I believe this offer is

13 profoundly helpful", and it took longer than 24 hours

14 for them to receive an appropriate response.

15 **Q.** If we could keep this document on the screen for

16 a moment. Mr Gove, by contrast, the VIP Lane enabled an

17 offer to come into consideration and receive

18 prioritisation, merely by dint of who it was that was

19 referring it in. So unlike the rapid response team,

20 unlike the webform that you explained as an option to

21 Rachel Reeves, it offered an advantage simply that

22 derived from a personal contact. That's right, isn't

23 it?

24 **A.** Not only from personal contact. Some of -- for entrants

25 to the High Priority Lane, some were referred on the

147

1 potential sources of PPE.

2 The charge, quite properly, as an Opposition

3 spokesperson, that she was making, is that we were being

4 laggardly in pursuing these particular offers, and in my

5 response I made it clear that some of those offers,

6 generously meant, were not offers that it was worth

7 pursuing. One was from a theatrical costumier, another

8 from a football agent, and so on.

9 **Q.** You refer to it at the bottom of this document.

10 **A.** Exactly.

11 **Q.** The annex to your letter.

12 **A.** Exactly.

13 **Q.** Yes.

14 **A.** And I make no criticism at all of Rachel Reeves because

15 there were any number of Members of Parliament and

16 others who were seeking to ensure that generous-hearted

17 and kindly-meant offers were being processed.

18 I provided Rachel with the official means by which we

19 were gatekeeping those offers, but I think it is fair to

20 say that it was a legitimate question on the part of

21 Rachel Reeves and others, were we doing enough to ensure

22 that offers were followed up.

23 **Q.** As to rapidity, Mr Gove, you are aware, are you not, of

24 the rapid response team that was able to provide

25 a 24-hour response time to an initial offer and then to

146

1 basis of the personal contact, some were referred on the

2 basis of the turnover and their assessed capacity to

3 deliver as being significant players in the field, yes.

4 **Q.** But it was a limited category of person that was able to

5 make a reference into the VIP Lane or High Priority

6 Lane, was it not?

7 **A.** Well, first of all, it's not the case that things were

8 referred to the High Priority Lane; the High Priority

9 Lane took referrals that had come from a variety of

10 people. So forgive me making this distinction, and it

11 is a distinction with a difference. Certainly in the

12 initial phases of the pandemic, I or anyone else would

13 pass on offers. Within the team that was responsible

14 for assessing offers, a High Priority Lane was set up,

15 and ministers were subsequently made aware that offers

16 that they had referred and offers that were also

17 referred from MPs, senior officials and peers, went

18 through that lane.

19 It was also the case, I think, that there were some

20 offers that came from the FCDO and others that were also

21 referred to that lane as well.

22 **Q.** You've made it very clear, Mr Gove, in your evidence,

23 that when you were in receipt of an offer, you acted as

24 a postman. You didn't seek to assess it, to triage it;

25 you passed it on?

148

- 1 **A.** Yes, it would be very difficult for me to have made that
 2 assessment, and indeed fundamentally, there was an
 3 eight-stage process, which I believe Jonathan Marron
 4 outlined last week, to determine whether or not
 5 a contract would eventually be awarded. It might be the
 6 case that I could say, "this individual or this
 7 organisation is clearly a respectable business", or
 8 "this individual is an eccentric who has forwarded
 9 something that is inappropriate", but in most cases the
 10 people who would contact me would appear to be
 11 businesses that were capable, at the very least, of
 12 operating effectively. The High Priority Lane would
 13 then conduct an initial assessment and then after that
 14 there were two more processes that they had to go
 15 through.
- 16 So the High Priority Lane, like the Make team and
 17 the China team, was, as it were, a tributary that went
 18 into the broader reservoir and then, from that reservoir
 19 a variety of tests were applied.
- 20 **Q.** Mr Gove, thank you. It wasn't a criticism and I note
 21 the time, we've got a bit to get through, so if we could
 22 try and keep the answers a little bit more succinct,
 23 that would help us all enormously.
- 24 **A.** Of course.
- 25 **Q.** Thank you very much. The reason I've kept this document
 149

- 1 politically difficult, don't you? You mean that the
 2 political pressure was to invite further offers of PPE
 3 when the existing offers were already overwhelming?
- 4 **A.** Well, we couldn't willingly turn away individuals who
 5 might be able to help.
- 6 **Q.** That's a different point, Mr Gove.
- 7 **A.** Yes, but --
- 8 **Q.** I'm asking about the call to arms, the request for
 9 further offers when the existing offers were
 10 overwhelming those individuals that were busily
 11 triaging, sifting out, the good from the bad.
- 12 **A.** It's certainly the case that the individuals concerned
 13 faced an enormous wave of offers but I don't believe
 14 that it would have been possible to stem that wave, as
 15 it were, and it was quite right that we should seek to
 16 ensure that we got the maximum number of credible offers
 17 dealt with as quickly as possible.
- 18 **Q.** Before I move on, a contrary view, it's clearly not your
 19 view, would be that we have an abundance of offers, we
 20 should focus our resources now on sifting out, within
 21 that source, those offers that are credible, those
 22 offers that are good, those offers that we should take
 23 forward, and that however great the political pressure
 24 to make announcements to invite further offers, one
 25 should refrain from doing that in order to allow those
 151

- 1 up on the screen is that you will see you wrote in your
 2 third paragraph:
 3 "The response to help with the national effort
 4 against this pandemic has been overwhelming, and I am
 5 sure you will join me in commending the extraordinary
 6 efforts of British businesses and individuals."
- 7 **A.** Mm.
- 8 **Q.** Now, you will be aware from last week, in relation to
 9 the call to arms, of the evidence that we heard, that it
 10 proved to be counterproductive. I know it wasn't your
 11 idea. Do you share the view that that call to arms was
 12 a counterproductive measure?
- 13 **A.** Well, I think it would have been very difficult for any
 14 government not to welcome offers of PPE at a time when
 15 the principal concern was its absence. So the principal
 16 concern, not just in the United Kingdom but across
 17 Europe, was that frontline professionals were being put
 18 in a position of danger because of the lack of that
 19 equipment, and there was a worldwide excess of demand
 20 over supply, so any government that wasn't doing
 21 everything that it could in order to secure PPE would
 22 undoubtedly be criticised, and individuals who thought
 23 they might be able to help, good-hearted individuals,
 24 shouldn't have been, what's the word, dissuaded.
- 25 **Q.** Mr Gove, when you say "very difficult", you mean
 150

- 1 responsible for emergency procurement to get on and do
 2 their jobs?
- 3 **A.** Well, by definition one could not know before assessing
 4 the offers how many of them would be viable. So
 5 I absolutely take the point that the number of offers
 6 was significant, and difficult for the team to process,
 7 but until that work of processing starts, one cannot
 8 know which offers are meritorious. I would add that the
 9 existence of the different streams, the China stream,
 10 the Make stream and so on, was an effort to make sure
 11 that bets were placed on as many horses as possible
 12 because we did not know which of them would finish the
 13 course.
- 14 **Q.** So to that point, Mr Gove, did you follow Sir Gareth
 15 Rhys Williams's evidence in which he expressly advises
 16 against a call to arms --
- 17 **A.** Mm.
- 18 **Q.** -- shortly before it is made?
- 19 **A.** Yes --
- 20 **Q.** He does that on the basis of his experience of the
 21 ventilator call to arms, and the disruption that that
 22 had caused. So I'm going to suggest to you that it was
 23 then possible, if ministers were prepared to follow the
 24 advice of senior civil servants who were closer to the
 25 practicalities of all this to refrain from exacerbating
 152

1 a problem of offer flow. That was possible at the time,
 2 was it not?
 3 **A.** I think it's generally the case, in almost any process,
 4 that ministers will want things to go faster, and civil
 5 servants will say, "Actually, we're moving just as fast
 6 as we can", and sometimes the ministers will be right to
 7 press for greater pace, sometimes the civil servants
 8 will be right to push back against such impatience.
 9 It's impossible to know *ex ante*, to use Gareth's phrase,
 10 whether or not the ministers will be vindicated in their
 11 impatience or the civil servants will be vindicated in
 12 their caution.
 13 **Q.** We are going to come on, as I said we would, to
 14 reflections, ways in which matters could be improved in
 15 the event of a future pandemic, and emergency
 16 procurement. Just since we're on the topic now, is one
 17 of those ways to provide more space and freedom for
 18 those involved in the difficult day job of emergency
 19 procurement to escape what has been described as the
 20 "noise", the distraction, the interference of ministers
 21 that, perhaps for valid motives, are seeking either
 22 updates or explanations for why a particular offer has
 23 not been progressed, or even -- to identify the third of
 24 Sir Gareth's possibilities -- mandating a particular
 25 outcome.

153

1 we now know quite a lot through evidence that has been
 2 received by the Inquiry, and the pressure that was
 3 brought to bear on those responsible for procuring
 4 essential PPE and other essential medical kit.

5 Now, we know from the evidence of Sir Gareth, from
 6 Jonathan Marron, from others, that the call to arms only
 7 made their experience more difficult.

8 **A.** Yes.

9 **Q.** And we know also from Sir Gareth that that was what he
 10 anticipated would happen and advised against.

11 **A.** Mm.

12 **Q.** So let me put the question again but in more narrow
 13 bounds than it was before. Even in an emergency
 14 situation such as that, would you not countenance some
 15 adjustment to that normal democratic principle that you
 16 espouse?

17 **A.** No. I think it's all the more important in emergency
 18 circumstances that there is clear democratic
 19 accountability.

20 I think in a previous module, and certainly in some
 21 of the evidence that has been examined, there's an email
 22 that I sent quite early on in the pandemic, early on in
 23 March, in which I asked a variety of questions, and the
 24 reason that I asked those, as other ministers did, was
 25 to satisfy ourselves that the situation was being taken

155

1 Would it not be beneficial to have a system in the
 2 future that protected civil servants from that sort of
 3 ministerial interference?

4 **A.** Absolutely not. I think that would be totally
 5 counterproductive. And I think it misunderstands
 6 democratic accountability.

7 Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the
 8 government's response to a variety of events including
 9 this crisis. The opposition will quite rightly question
 10 ministers and say, "Have you improved this process? Are
 11 you procuring things at the right level? Have you got
 12 the right approach towards lockdown?", or whatever.

13 And if it is the case that ministers blandly come
 14 back and say, "Well, the civil servants are doing their
 15 very best and you should just quieten down there", then
 16 that is no way of maintaining democratic accountability.

17 Now, inevitably, sometimes ministerial judgement
 18 will be wrong, but ultimately the ministers are
 19 accountable and that's the way that Parliament and our
 20 democracy should operate.

21 **Q.** Mr Gove, bear in mind that the question I posed was
 22 within very narrow bounds, because we're talking about
 23 emergency procurement.

24 **A.** Yes.

25 **Q.** We are talking about a specific situation, about which

154

1 sufficiently seriously.

2 It's not for me to pre-judge any of the Inquiry's
 3 conclusions, obviously, but I think one of the things
 4 that evidence in other modules would seem to indicate
 5 and to reinforce is that perhaps ministers at an earlier
 6 stage in the pandemic should have been more energetic
 7 and more aggressive in questioning some of the advice
 8 that we were being given.

9 And so at different times, as I say, the cautious
 10 Charlies will be correct. At other times, the impatient
 11 lams will be correct, but on the whole, I think it is
 12 absolutely right for ministers to challenge and then be
 13 held accountable.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** Are we back to your "daft laddie" questions,
 15 Mr Gove?

16 **A.** To an extent, yes, my Lady, yes.

17 **MR WALD:** Mr Gove, I think we are in the home straight. For
 18 the stenographer, if you could slow down a little.

19 **A.** I apologise.

20 **Q.** For me, if you could be, if you wouldn't mind, slightly
 21 more succinct.

22 **A.** Yes, I'll try.

23 **Q.** Thank you, that would be enormously appreciated.

24 Let's move on to your own role in the VIP Lane.

25 **A.** Mm.

156

1 Q. You had some involvement in the Meller Designs offer,
2 didn't you? And David Meller is a personal friend of
3 yours.

4 A. Yes, a great personal friend.

5 Q. A great personal friend. He supported you financially
6 in one of your bids to become the Conservative Party
7 leader; is that right?

8 A. Yes, he's a very shrewd businessman, but on that
9 occasion he got it wrong.

10 Q. Ah. Well, he didn't support you in the other bid to
11 become leader?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Well, he got it right on that occasion.

14 A. I think you can say that's true, as indeed did the
15 country.

16 Q. No comment, Mr Gove.

17 Let's first establish how Mr Meller was introduced
18 to the HPL. I think he first came in without your
19 involvement; is that right?

20 A. Yes, that's right. I'm not sure, I can't recall
21 precisely whether or not it was because he was
22 approached by Andrew Feldman, Lord Feldman, or
23 approached by one of my special advisers without my
24 knowledge at the time.

25 Q. In any event, he contacted your Private Office I think
157

1 friend of yours, or whether, instead, that friendship
2 meant that he was treated with additional caution.
3 I want to look at each of the emails and invite you to
4 comment on which of those two things is happening.

5 So let's situate ourselves first with INQ000563687.

6 Now this, I think, was before your involvement.

7 A. Mm.

8 Q. This was the initial contact with your Private Office.

9 A. Mm.

10 Q. There are two emails, one of the 19th and I think one of
11 the 25th that we don't necessarily need to bring up.

12 A. Mm.

13 Q. "Not sure who the best person is as I only began to
14 support [someone who has been redacted out] on it
15 yesterday -- but I think this will be of some use for
16 someone."

17 You were then called, I think, by Mr Meller?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you spoke to him on 26 March?

20 A. I believe that's correct.

21 Q. Do you remember what the content of that call was?

22 A. I don't recall it in detail but I do believe that he was
23 expressing concern that his offer to source and provide
24 PPE was not being taken up as energetically as it might.

25 Q. Yes. Now already, Mr Meller is receiving treatment that
159

1 a full week before he contacted you; is that correct?

2 A. I think that's right, yes.

3 Q. Yes. I was somewhat curious. Why would that have been?
4 Would it have been so well known that he was a friend of
5 yours within your Private Office that his contact would
6 have been taken forward and accepted?

7 A. No, I think it was because -- as I say, I can't remember
8 whether or not it was Andrew Feldman or Henry Newman, my
9 special adviser, who had contacted him. He was known to
10 be -- his whole business was particularly to source
11 textiles and other products and to provide them for
12 retailers, so I think it was presumed that he might have
13 some expertise in this area. One thing that was always
14 the case, though, was that my Private Office was told
15 and was aware that he was a friend of mine, and that he
16 had donated money to my political campaigning activity
17 in the past, and therefore that any approach should be
18 treated with particular care, in other words, he should
19 not be, what's the word --

20 Q. Favouritism --

21 A. Treated -- yes, exactly. Precisely in order to ensure
22 that that was the case.

23 Q. And what I want to do is in the time remains, is to see
24 whether the correspondence suggests that he was
25 favouritised on the basis that he was a close personal
158

1 those companies or their directors that were drawn to
2 your attention by Rachel Reeves did not receive; is that
3 a fair observation?

4 A. Well, I think --

5 Q. Or did they receive that treatment?

6 A. I think they did receive that treatment, yes.

7 Q. By whom? Who was their, as we'll come to see in the
8 correspondence, who was their champion, or who was
9 supporting their offers?

10 A. Oh, we went to great lengths to investigate all of those
11 offers because they had been placed in the public domain
12 by Rachel and if we hadn't followed them up she would,
13 quite rightly, have excoriated us.

14 Q. But that's a slightly different point, isn't it,
15 Mr Gove? I appreciate that investigation was undertaken
16 about those companies.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But what we see here -- I mean, we can cut to it because
19 you were involved, and you know, is your involvement in
20 making sure the offer is properly considered, goes
21 through the system at a reasonable pace?

22 A. Yes, well, I think --

23 Q. So that's the aspect of the treatment that I wondered
24 whether you were able to say that those companies
25 mentioned by Rachel Reeves also received, not
160

1 investigation, but chivvying along?
 2 **A.** Well, most of them couldn't supply PPE, you know, the
 3 theatrical costumier could not supply PPE. So it would
 4 have been, I think, eccentric -- it might have been an
 5 eccentric piece of chivalry on my part to have
 6 championed the theatrical costumier that Rachel had
 7 mentioned --
 8 **Q.** Mr Gove, if I may, you said to us a few moments ago that
 9 you regarded yourself as a postbox.
 10 **A.** Yes.
 11 **Q.** All you knew about this offer is that it came from
 12 a good friend. You knew nothing more about what it was
 13 that was being offered at what price, within what
 14 timeframe --
 15 **A.** No, but what I would do, if I may --
 16 **Q.** By all means, but let's just deal with this point before
 17 you move on to whatever --
 18 **A.** No, no, I think --
 19 **Q.** So my question to you again, Mr Gove, was this: already
 20 we are seeing, through contact with your Private Office,
 21 through a phone call with you, through emails we are
 22 about to look at, involvement, treatment, chivvying
 23 along that Mr Meller receives, that those companies,
 24 investigated though they might have been, did not
 25 receive, is that not a version of unequal treatment?

161

1 chasers?
 2 And, again, it was the case that there was an
 3 organisation, called UK Civil Air Patrol, which I'd
 4 never heard of before, and again, around the same time:
 5 [As read] "Thanks, CDL is keen its progressed, so
 6 can the team managing the inbox note this please. He
 7 [that is me] is getting increasingly frustrated that
 8 people contacting him about their offer not being
 9 progressed. Absolutely understand everyone is doing
 10 their best but it just helps with ministerial handling
 11 and assurance that we are kept up to speed on progress
 12 where possible."
 13 **Q.** All right.
 14 **A.** So there are -- not an infinite but scores of examples
 15 of me chivvying when there are halfway credible efforts.
 16 **Q.** Mr Gove, let's follow the Meller example through.
 17 **A.** Mm.
 18 **Q.** Let's do two things. We were going to consider, as we
 19 go along, whether references to your good friendship
 20 with him was, as you suggest, in order to make sure that
 21 no favouritism was given, or, by contrast and instead,
 22 whether it was the opposite. But why don't we at the
 23 same time just consider -- let's wait until we've got to
 24 the end of it -- whether there were other examples that
 25 received that sort of treatment. All right?

163

1 **A.** No, because none -- I think only one of the 20 companies
 2 that Rachel Reeves wrote to me about actually would have
 3 been capable, under any circumstances, of providing PPE.
 4 I'll seek to --
 5 **Q.** Mr Gove, you've gone back to it. We're getting into
 6 a loop. Nor did you know whether any of these -- this
 7 offer was viable, because, as you quite rightly said,
 8 you didn't have the time, the capacity, to assess
 9 offers. All you knew about Mr Meller's offer initially,
 10 and actually eventually, was that it had come from
 11 Mr Meller?
 12 **A.** Firstly, in the Rachel Reeves list, I did ask that they
 13 be looked at closely.
 14 Secondly, there are available to the Inquiry, in
 15 fact shared with the Inquiry, and referred to in my
 16 witness statement, a variety, a plethora of emails of me
 17 acting on behalf of people who were concerned.
 18 So there's a case that was put forward by the Member
 19 of Parliament for Romford, in which people in my private
 20 office say to Matt Hancock's private office: we're
 21 getting hammered by people chasing their offers of PPE,
 22 ventilators, et cetera, who are saying they've tried to
 23 contact the teams but have heard nothing back. I'm sure
 24 your SpAds and ministers are also being inundated. Is
 25 there a better way for us to handle all of these

162

1 So let's go to INQ000533868, please, and page 4.
 2 This is an email dated 3 April:
 3 "I have just spoken to David Meller (a good friend
 4 of Michael Gove) who was asked to source PP3 masks for
 5 China. He has managed to do so, and has been given
 6 a verbal commitment for 40m masks.
 7 "This as you will see below has come through the MOD
 8 (not sure why). He now [has] an urgent order to secure
 9 the 5m in Holland, and the balance in China."
 10 Now you would say, would you, Mr Gove, that the
 11 reference to Mr Meller being a good friend of yours is
 12 to signal that any form of favouritism must be
 13 scrupulously avoided. Is that why it's included in the
 14 email?
 15 **A.** Well, I don't know why Andrew, who is someone for whom
 16 I have the highest regard, would have put that in. It
 17 may have been to close the loop or to provide additional
 18 information. I think there was a difference between my
 19 private office, which would act as the chaser, and would
 20 have been aware of all of the connections or
 21 relationships that I might have had with anyone who was
 22 seeking to land a contract, and Andrew, who was enlisted
 23 by DHSC to deliberately seek out the type of people who
 24 might be able to provide PPE.
 25 **Q.** On the face of it, Mr Gove, the mere inclusion of the

164

1 reference without the caveat or the caution that you
2 suggest, would lead one to assume that "This is an offer
3 that we ought to take particularly seriously because of
4 the friendship or the good friendship that this person
5 making this offer has to Michael Gove"; yes?

6 **A.** That is one inference.

7 **Q.** Let's have a look at the next email in the chain.

8 It's INQ000534695.

9 It's dated the following day. It's Mr Cairnduff to
10 the Cabinet Office.

11 **A.** Mm.

12 **Q.** We heard from Mr Cairnduff last week.

13 **A.** Yeah.

14 **Q.** He says this:

15 "There's been multiple conversations with Mr Meller
16 which are ongoing but he keeps separately contacting
17 private offices even while conversations with our team
18 are continuing. Unfortunately that [means] he's
19 generating a lot of noise in the system.

20 "Please do not mention that validation check to him
21 or anyone else.

22 "If he contacts either of you again please direct
23 him to this mailbox. Going through multiple routes is
24 actually slowing things as we need to respond to each of
25 the points of contact, it's not speeding them up (this

165

1 **LADY HALLETT:** Can I put to you a possibility, Mr Gove.

2 Supposing you had a system whereby when the team looked
3 at an offer, you had red, amber, green. So red would be
4 the sweet little lady who wanted to knit a mask, green
5 would be the possible James Dyson type, a manufacturer
6 who could produce at speed and in quantity, and then in
7 the middle you have "possible can produce it, but not
8 too sure". Would that be the kind of prioritisation
9 system that you would think could work?

10 **A.** Yes, my Lady, and I think that in some of the evidence
11 that the Inquiry has heard -- I can't remember which
12 witness, it may have been Jonathan Marron, made the
13 point that if, for example, Amazon offers to help --
14 I mean, obviously there are all sorts of other questions
15 about Amazon -- you'd be fairly certain that they would
16 have the capacity to provide logistics support, in the
17 same way as a businessman who operates in the Far East
18 and sources items of clothing and other garments is more
19 likely, inevitably so, more likely to be able to provide
20 PPE than a football agent.

21 **MR WALD:** Mr Gove, let's move on through the email exchanges
22 to INQ000533988.

23 It's ten days later, 14 April 2020. Paul Bywater to
24 Max Cairnduff ...

25 **A.** Mm.

167

1 is the third separate enquiry I've received about
2 Mr Meller since yesterday evening)."

3 Now, slightly different point here, but we heard
4 last week about noise, about distractions.

5 **A.** Yes, quite.

6 **Q.** This was consuming quite a lot of bandwidth amongst
7 those whose responsibility it was to triage offers.

8 It's possible that there comes a point where the
9 chasing, the requests for feedbacks, the chivvying,
10 interferes with the day job.

11 **A.** Yes, I think that's entirely fair.

12 **Q.** And that is the anxiety, the concern, that is here being
13 expressed, isn't it?

14 **A.** Yes, it is. It's one that I expressed myself.

15 **Q.** All right. It's one of the reasons, presumably, why you
16 would not advocate for the reinstatement of a VIP Lane
17 in the form it took during the pandemic?

18 **A.** Well, actually, I would not advocate for a VIP Lane, but
19 the existence of a VIP Lane means that some of those who
20 have access to significant networks and can source goods
21 abroad can be dealt with in a way that would be
22 different from a well-meaning individual who did not
23 have that network.

24 **Q.** It's not the only way to achieve it, though, is it?

25 **A.** It's not the only anyway to achieve it, no.

166

1 **Q.** There we are. Second paragraph:

2 "David wants" -- we'll start at the:

3 "David wants to speak to me today. I don't have
4 a problem speaking to him whilst on leave but I wanted
5 to check on what line I should take on his existing gown
6 offers.

7 "We know he has Michael Gove's ear ..."

8 Now, pausing there for a moment. Do you think that
9 phrase that's used is a caution against offering any
10 form of favouritism to David Meller or is the opposite:
11 is suggesting that this person should receive
12 preferential treatment on account of his relationship,
13 the influence that he can have with Michael Gove on
14 a normal reading of those words.

15 **A.** No, I think it's something else. I think that Max here
16 is acknowledging that these offers have been in triage
17 for almost two weeks, and judging by, I don't know whose
18 email, they had dropped through the cracks. So it would
19 appear to be the case that -- and this is no criticism
20 of Max or any of the team -- it would appear to be the
21 case that there had been a system snafu, and Max
22 entirely understandably, or the person emailing Max
23 says:

24 "I don't want to jump on a call when I know that
25 gowns/aprons are a priority and simply say that I can't

168

1 tell him anything further. I will if that is your
2 advice but we all know that private offices will be
3 following that call up fairly quickly with some urgent
4 chasing for clarity."

5 So the key thing there, to my mind, is concern that
6 a provider, in this case Mr Meller but it could have
7 been any provider, had not been treated with the
8 efficiency that one would want at, you know, the apex of
9 efficiency, as it were, and that if it was the case that
10 it got back to me, I might say, "Bloody hell,
11 irrespective of who the person making the offer was, why
12 is it that anyone providing something that we need
13 desperately is not being dealt with in this way?"

14 Had it been any other provider who had contacted me
15 and who had said there is a flaw in the system, as
16 a number did, then I would have pursued that
17 energetically in order to ensure that the system worked.

18 **Q.** All right. Mr Gove, those are two competing
19 interpretations of this email. I'm going to move on
20 because I'm conscious of time.

21 Could we have INQ000534834.

22 It's an email from Lord Feldman to Andy Wood in
23 which Lord Bethell is cc'd.

24 "I have just spoken to David Meller ..."

25 And once again:

169

1 Meller Designs worth £164 million. Were you aware of
2 that?

3 **A.** Subsequently, yes.

4 **Q.** And were you aware that within that contract, the
5 average price for medical gowns was £5.87 -- sorry, the
6 average price at the time was £5.87, but Mr Meller,
7 Meller Designs' medical gowns cost £12.64, so a little
8 over twice the going rate. Were you aware of that?

9 **A.** No.

10 **Q.** Is it possible, I know you've given your interpretation
11 of each of these emails, that there was pressure felt by
12 those that didn't interpret those emails in the way that
13 you have this afternoon to enter into a contract with
14 Mr Meller contrary to commercial advice, or the going
15 rate? Is that a possibility?

16 **A.** No.

17 **Q.** Why would it not be a possibility?

18 **A.** Because I can't imagine for any reason Mr Wood, or
19 anyone else, choosing to place a contract on that basis.
20 So those decisions, over the issuance of contracts, were
21 matters for officials not for politicians, and also,
22 I would say that, again, in the work that's been done by
23 the National Audit Office and also by Nigel Boardman,
24 they make it clear that those decisions were taken
25 autonomously.

171

1 "... (a good friend of Michael Gove), who has
2 asked ..."

3 This is actually the email we looked at earlier.

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** The question here -- can we scroll up to the top of it
6 now because I don't think we, it says:

7 "Are you able to handle this?"

8 "Please confirm. It seems like a terrific
9 opportunity."

10 And the response that Andy Wood gives is -- at the
11 top:

12 "Thank you. We are on this one with Bruce and team.
13 The price is very high. Even in today's market. So
14 will need extra handling."

15 **A.** Mm.

16 **Q.** You weren't involved in discussions about price, were
17 you?

18 **A.** No.

19 **Q.** Did you know that the price being asked by Mr Meller was
20 approximately twice the going rate at the time? Did you
21 know that?

22 **A.** I did not know that.

23 **Q.** There are two sources to establish that -- well, three.

24 You can either take it from me, Mr Gove, the --

25 Mr Meller ended up entering into a contract through

170

1 **Q.** Mr Gove, finally, in your reflections section, you say:

2 "The High Priority Lane was not the initiative of
3 ministers. It was the idea of officials ..."

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** You don't know where it originates, do you?

6 **A.** I don't, no.

7 **Q.** So you're not really able to state that with such
8 clarity in your statement, are you?

9 **A.** Well, I don't know of any minister who -- I asked
10 repeatedly -- I don't know of any minister who initiated
11 it, no.

12 **Q.** But, I mean, it's never too late to correct an error.

13 **A.** Mm.

14 **Q.** Are these two sentences baseless? We're going to look
15 at this with other witnesses, Mr Gove:

16 "The High Priority Lane was not the initiative of
17 ministers. It was the idea of officials ..."

18 You simply don't know whether that's correct or
19 incorrect, do you?

20 **A.** To the best of my knowledge, I do, yes.

21 **Q.** What is the basis for you saying that it is officials
22 that came up with the idea?

23 **A.** That's what I was told.

24 **Q.** By whom?

25 **A.** By the officials with whom I was working in order to

172

1 ensure that my evidence could be consistent with the
2 high standards the Inquiry requires.

3 **Q.** I think you have answered this already and the chair has
4 supplemented this point with some additional questions,
5 but at 102 of your reflections you say it would be
6 absurd if faced -- "if in the teeth of a terrible
7 crisis, government officials had failed to institute
8 a process to manage and assess the potentially
9 life-saving offers that we were receiving in vast
10 numbers on a daily basis."

11 You don't go so far as to say that the system that
12 was used is the only way of achieving that important
13 objective, do you?

14 **A.** It's not the only way. Of course not.

15 **MR WALD:** Yes. All right, Mr Gove, thank you, those are all
16 my questions. I gather there are questions for you that
17 will come from others.

18 **LADY HALLETT:** There are questions from Dr Mitchell -- this
19 time I've got it right -- who sits there.

20 **Questions from DR MITCHELL KC**

21 **DR MITCHELL:** Mr Gove, I appear as instructed by Aamer Anwar
22 & Company on behalf of the Scottish Covid Bereaved.

23 On Saturday, 14 March 2020, to 16 March, the
24 Ventilator Challenge began, over the course of that
25 weekend, and I'm about to take us to an email which you
173

1 Now, presumably you were asking that question at
2 that time because you didn't yet know the answers to it?

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** Now, in relation to these, these are questions that are
5 being posed a fortnight after the Ventilator Challenge
6 was taken up?

7 **A.** Mm.

8 **Q.** Ought these to be the kind of questions that were
9 answered or had the ability to be answered before
10 calling for the Ventilator Challenge rather than after,
11 given the unfortunate effect that the Ventilator
12 Challenge had of causing the system to flood with
13 offers?

14 **A.** I don't think the Ventilator Challenge did have an
15 unfortunate effect in causing the system to flood with
16 offers.

17 **Q.** Well, the whole system was flooded with offers. Part of
18 that was people contacting -- and we've heard evidence
19 about it -- people contacting the government about
20 offers in relation to ventilators.

21 What I'm asking is, the questions that you're posing
22 there, would they have been better asked before the
23 Ventilator Challenge was announced, so that the
24 government could have satisfied itself that they had
25 already approached every domestic supplier/collaborator
175

1 sent to Mark Sedwill at the Cabinet Office on
2 2 April 2020, just over a fortnight later.

3 This email has a very long list of questions about
4 important issues in relation to the early days of Covid
5 and I wonder if that might be the email that you were
6 referring to at an earlier stage.

7 That's INQ000217031.

8 Now in that email, at the start of the email you
9 indicate that you're going to pose a series of questions
10 that state that you're not expecting immediate answers
11 to that. Do we see that?

12 **A.** Mm, mm.

13 **Q.** Now, what I would like to take you to is a particular
14 issue that you posed. If we can go -- it's the fifth
15 question from the bottom, and it comes within the
16 context of the issue of ventilators that you've
17 identified.

18 **A.** Mm.

19 **Q.** And a question you posed -- and it certainly (unclear)
20 daft laddie questions -- is:

21 "Are we certain we have approached every possible
22 domestic supplier/collaborator/in the private sector?
23 What can the Chemical industries Association offer?
24 What has been the structured set of conversations with
25 the wider Life Sciences/BioSciences sector?"
174

1 and the private sector, the chemical industries, and had
2 a structured set of conversations with the wider
3 licences or biosciences sector?

4 **A.** Can I refer you to the fourth paragraph?

5 **Q.** Yes, certainly.

6 **A.** So here I'm talking about testing. So the point I'm
7 making is that there are some things that we have learnt
8 from the Ventilator Challenge that may or may not have
9 a relevance to testing.

10 **Q.** Indeed. But the question that you're asking here about
11 collaborations and the private sector with the Chemical
12 Industries Association and the life sciences and
13 biosciences sector, are you saying that those are in
14 relation to PPE and not in relation to ventilators?

15 **A.** No, I'm saying they're in relation to testing.

16 **Q.** And in relation to testing -- in relation to testing,
17 why, at that particular stage, did you raise it as part
18 of the issues under questions in relation to ventilators
19 and not later when you deal with the issue of testing in
20 your letter?

21 **A.** It is about testing. I think you're misreading the
22 letter. So I make the point that I'm going to raise
23 testing, first of all. I then reassure Mark Sedwill
24 that I have confidence and respect for many others. And
25 then I say, with respect to testing:
176

1 "... what are we acquiring, what do we actually
2 need?"
3 So I ask about kits. And then I use an analogy with
4 the ventilator process to illuminate the debate about
5 the testing.
6 So it's a point about testing, not about anything
7 else.
8 **Q.** So you're suggesting that those questions aren't about
9 testing. Does that seem clear to you, when you read it
10 that way?
11 **A.** Yes, because the Chemical Industries Association and the
12 life sciences and biosciences sector are exactly the
13 sort of people who might help with testing, not with PPE
14 or ventilators.
15 **Q.** Moving on to my next question, in the same document you
16 asked -- and this is on the next page, at 02 -- it's the
17 sixth paragraph down and it's in relation to public
18 sector testing. The paragraph starts:
19 "If according to the latest DHSC papers ..."
20 **A.** Mm.
21 **Q.** And the question I want to ask about is just further
22 down in that paragraph which says:
23 "We understand that CMO's office is working with
24 counterparts in DAs -- how can we make sure there is
25 a consistent approach in prioritisation of public sector

177

1 efficient and logical but, of course, it's one of
2 a number of things which one could not mandate.
3 **DR MITCHELL:** My Lady, those are my questions.
4 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much indeed, Ms Mitchell.
5 Mr Gove, that completes the questions. Politicians,
6 or former politicians, are sometimes accused of mincing
7 their words. You couldn't be accused of that today.
8 Thank you very much for your help. I know that the
9 burden I impose on people like you, asking you to come
10 back, prepare written statements, coming on to give
11 evidence, but as you'll understand it's because of the
12 wide range of responsibilities you had and my very wide
13 terms of reference. So thank you for your help.
14 **THE WITNESS:** Not at all. Thank you, my Lady.
15 **LADY HALLETT:** I think there's a matter in relation to a
16 document, Mr Wald.
17 **MR WALD:** Yes, my Lady. There is an issue that has arisen
18 in relation to one particular document.
19 Could I just ask in relation to INQ000533868, that
20 there be no reporting carried out until the position has
21 been clarified and confirmed?
22 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you. There's a possibility I may have
23 to restrict some of the content. Certainly. I so
24 order.
25 Very well, thank you all very much indeed. I shall

179

1 testing across the UK?"
2 Did you receive a response to that question?
3 **A.** I can't recall. My aim was, as I'm sure you'll
4 appreciate, to ensure that wherever possible, we didn't
5 have different lists of key workers who should be tested
6 ahead of others, quite understandably, in different
7 parts of the United Kingdom. We couldn't ensure that
8 that was the case, but coordination there, I think,
9 would have been wise.
10 I don't have to hand Mark Sedwill's reply.
11 **Q.** And I think you've already touched on it, but why did
12 you consider that that was a matter of importance? Why
13 should it have been consistent across all four nations?
14 **A.** Wherever possible, consistency of approach across the
15 entire United Kingdom would make things easier in terms
16 of communication. So for the sake of argument, if there
17 are a particular group of people who are prioritised for
18 testing in England but not in Scotland, that might give
19 rise to concern and to a lack of clarity in
20 communication. So it would seem to me that,
21 particularly if you have, more with Wales and England
22 than with Scotland and England, cross-border activity,
23 as well, you'd want to ensure that if it were teachers
24 who were prioritised ahead of nurses or vice versa, that
25 the same approach was taken. So that would seem to be

178

1 return at 10.00 tomorrow.
2 (4.27 pm)
3 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

180

	I N D E X	
		PAGE
1		
2		
3	PROFESSOR JOHN MANNERS-BELL (sworn)	1
4	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	1
5		
6	MR ANDREW MITCHELL (affirmed)	41
7	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	41
8	Questions from MR WEATHERBY KC	71
9	Questions from PROFESSOR THOMAS KC	77
10		
11	MR SIMON MANLEY (sworn)	81
12	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	81
13		
14	MR MICHAEL GOVE (sworn)	112
15	Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY .	112
16	FOR MODULE 5	
17	Questions from DR MITCHELL KC	173
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

DR MITCHELL: [2] 173/21 179/3	10.30 [1] 1/2	144/7 167/23 173/23 174/2	9	absent [1] 69/16
LADY HALLETT: [40] 1/5 18/14 19/5 19/7 40/14 40/20 40/24 41/3 53/9 53/15 54/16 71/21 77/21 80/15 80/21 80/25 81/5 107/21 107/23 108/22 111/7 111/12 111/20 111/23 112/3 112/5 115/1 115/5 132/5 134/14 135/6 135/8 140/5 140/13 156/14 167/1 173/18 179/4 179/15 179/22	10.35 [1] 1/4	2021 [2] 65/22 113/1 2023 [1] 41/19 2024 [4] 41/25 68/13 69/14 113/7	9 o'clock [1] 38/25 92 [3] 138/22 139/4 139/6	absolutely [21] 1/17 4/12 7/8 8/21 9/10 10/9 20/7 23/20 24/16 26/9 27/23 27/25 28/24 30/1 77/7 92/7 117/20 152/5 154/4 156/12 163/9
MR SHARMA: [16] 1/7 1/12 19/8 40/12 40/25 41/6 53/8 53/16 55/7 71/18 81/6 81/9 107/22 108/23 111/5 111/11	10s [1] 71/20	2025 [1] 1/1 22 [2] 16/3 27/3 23 [1] 98/25 23 March [2] 95/8 95/9	A	absurd [2] 129/22 173/6
MR WALD: [11] 111/25 112/10 132/10 135/4 135/7 135/9 140/14 156/17 167/21 173/15 179/17	11 [1] 123/12	24 hours [1] 147/13 24/7 [1] 48/10 25 [3] 25/4 65/1 140/9	Aamer [1] 173/21	abundance [1] 151/19
MR WEATHERBY: [2] 71/24 77/20	11 months [1] 70/11	25 March [2] 129/12 132/24	ability [7] 23/4 32/7 36/21 67/1 134/9 136/8 175/9	abundantly [1] 44/13
PROFESSOR THOMAS: [2] 77/24 80/14	11.40 [1] 40/21	25 March 2020 [2] 123/16 127/17	able [52] 8/17 8/19 8/20 12/1 15/21 18/6 18/11 26/24 28/10 28/17 29/7 33/2 33/25 35/9 35/16 36/18 37/8 37/19 40/1 40/6 40/8 45/2 48/13 55/5 56/10 58/23 62/21 68/3 81/12 90/9 92/1 92/9 92/16 93/23 95/19 100/12 101/6 114/10 117/10 125/21 129/11 131/13 134/2 146/24 148/4 150/23 151/5 160/24 164/24 167/19 170/7 172/7	academic [1] 115/6
THE WITNESS: [7] 40/19 41/5 80/20 80/24 111/21 112/7 179/14	11.55 [2] 40/20 40/23	250 [1] 69/7	about [109] 7/18 7/20 7/21 7/22 8/5 9/4 9/13 11/12 11/22 17/12 18/12 19/12 22/20 24/21 25/4 25/8 32/1 37/13 37/13 41/16 48/5 51/3 51/16 52/12 53/18 55/13 58/17 59/5 61/24 62/8 63/10 64/1 64/4 64/14 66/5 68/16 69/5 72/2 74/14 74/23 75/1 76/12 78/4 79/13 81/18 83/4 88/22 89/16 89/21 90/5 95/6 97/5 98/23 100/3 101/3 102/23 103/9 103/17 105/11 105/22 109/17 110/8 110/21 111/12 114/23 120/11 121/2 123/5 124/6 124/7 124/19 125/11 126/17 129/8 131/16 137/7 139/19 140/3 140/18 143/17 151/8 154/22 154/25 154/25 160/16 161/11 161/12 161/22 162/2 162/9 163/8 166/1 166/4 166/4 167/15 170/16 173/25 174/3 175/19 175/19 176/6 176/10 176/21 177/3 177/4 177/6 177/6 177/8 177/21	academics [1] 115/15
'	12 [1] 78/11	25th [1] 159/11	account [7] 19/20 20/4 23/8 25/22 27/14 127/15 168/12	accountability [3] 154/6 154/16 155/19
'be [1] 72/13	12.54 [1] 81/2	26 March [2] 95/8 159/19	accountable [3] 154/7 154/19 156/13	accounted [1] 25/1
'Bull [1] 16/4	12.64 [1] 171/7	27 [1] 68/14	accounts [1] 55/5	accounts [1] 55/5
'Critical [1] 69/13	13.17 [1] 72/5	28 March 2020 [1] 47/12	accurate [2] 24/13 58/10	accurate [2] 24/13 58/10
'the [1] 69/18	13.21 [1] 73/19	29 [1] 23/23	accused [2] 179/6 179/7	accused [2] 179/6 179/7
-	13.22 [1] 74/1	3	achieve [3] 30/7 166/24 166/25	achieved [2] 70/1 114/7
-- and [1] 57/21	138 [1] 27/4	3 April [1] 164/2	achieving [2] 130/18 173/12	achieving [2] 130/18 173/12
.	14 [2] 83/3 173/23	3.20 [1] 140/10	acknowledge [2] 119/10 138/4	acknowledge [2] 119/10 138/4
... [1] 69/19	14 April 2020 [1] 167/23	3.35 [1] 140/12	acknowledging [2] 142/10 168/16	acknowledging [2] 142/10 168/16
.gov [1] 76/18	15 [1] 3/24	30 [1] 61/24	acquire [2] 84/22 85/9	acquire [2] 84/22 85/9
0	16 [2] 5/13 83/20	30-40 [1] 25/3	acquiring [1] 177/1	acquiring [1] 177/1
0029 [1] 78/15	16 April [1] 104/5	31 [2] 33/15 78/23	acronym [1] 94/8	acronym [1] 94/8
02 [1] 177/16	16 March [1] 173/23	33 [1] 12/4	across [15] 14/7 49/24 55/2 62/10 66/6 66/17 70/14 86/3 92/23 92/24 108/15 150/16 178/1 178/13 178/14	across [15] 14/7 49/24 55/2 62/10 66/6 66/17 70/14 86/3 92/23 92/24 108/15 150/16 178/1 178/13 178/14
1	164 million [1] 171/1	4	act [4] 88/19 88/22 94/8 164/19	act [4] 88/19 88/22 94/8 164/19
1 June 2020 [1] 104/14	170 [2] 89/21 92/22	4.10 [1] 72/9	acted [2] 56/19 148/23	acted [2] 56/19 148/23
1.55 [2] 81/1 81/4	18 [1] 93/21	4.27 [1] 180/2	acting [2] 138/10 162/17	acting [2] 138/10 162/17
10 [4] 62/7 83/21 84/4 84/5	19 [7] 8/13 24/24 81/19 97/15 97/18 98/22 144/17	4.48 [1] 75/25		
10 March 2025 [1] 1/1	1950s [1] 20/21	40 [3] 25/1 25/2 25/3		
10.00 [2] 180/1 180/3	1980s [1] 20/11	40-45 [1] 25/2		
	1990 [1] 82/4	40m [1] 164/6		
	19th [1] 159/10	45 [1] 25/2		
	2	5		
	2 April [1] 56/25	5 April 2020 [1] 72/11		
	2 April 2020 [1] 174/2	5.87 [2] 171/5 171/6		
	20 [7] 48/19 48/20 61/24 62/17 120/22 145/25 162/1	50-60 [1] 25/1		
	20 April [1] 62/6	54 [1] 35/20		
	20 March [1] 110/2	5m [1] 164/9		
	20 million [1] 138/9	6		
	20 ventilators [1] 57/10	60 [2] 9/17 25/1		
	20 years [1] 19/1	69 [1] 39/18		
	20-25 [1] 25/4	7		
	200 [1] 89/21	79 [2] 23/22 23/25		
	200 pages [1] 1/14	8		
	200-odd [1] 92/22	80 [1] 23/22		
	2003 [1] 18/24	85 [1] 25/8		
	2011 [2] 2/22 21/7			
	2013 [1] 82/2			
	2018 [1] 41/22			
	2019 [1] 82/2			
	2020 [29] 15/7 20/11 41/18 41/22 47/12 49/1 61/24 62/17 65/2 65/21 72/11 78/11 81/21 83/3 83/20 84/5 93/21 98/25 100/8 104/14 112/25 113/4 120/22 123/16 127/17			

A	36/20	agree [8] 18/19 18/20 29/25 74/5 106/11 109/4 124/9 136/1	along [5] 22/3 99/19 161/1 161/23 163/19	analysts [1] 67/9		
action [4] 46/2 105/2 121/5 128/21	advances [2] 35/13 36/24	agreements [3] 43/13 68/25 69/19	alongside [1] 46/11	analytical [2] 43/25 44/4		
actions [6] 66/2 70/20 79/10 80/3 80/6 80/10	advancing [1] 125/14	Ah [1] 157/10	already [21] 24/18 28/4 29/9 31/19 33/10	Andorra [1] 82/1		
active [1] 123/7	advent [1] 26/12	ahead [5] 34/20 97/23 111/13 178/6 178/24	33/12 76/6 85/18 85/23 89/11 89/13 97/15 101/22 127/24 130/21 151/3 159/25 161/19 173/3 175/25 178/11	Andrew [12] 40/25 41/1 79/1 94/17 101/16 105/7 112/11 157/22 158/8 164/15 164/22 181/6		
actively [1] 83/3	advice [6] 126/13 131/20 152/24 156/7 169/2 171/14	aiding [1] 136/25	also [75] 2/2 3/15 6/23 6/25 7/2 9/20 13/22 13/22 14/9 14/10 15/10 18/21 20/20 22/18 25/19 30/19 31/23 33/13 34/16 34/22 39/20 39/23 42/9 42/10 43/13 45/9 46/14 50/4 56/6 56/7 58/5 63/7 67/10 70/24 73/16 74/11 74/16 74/18 77/6 81/11 82/1 87/11 88/1 88/18 91/19 96/23 99/21 102/6 103/7 105/11 107/7 113/19 114/19 115/11 121/7 126/3 129/14 134/2 134/7 136/10 136/19 136/22 136/23 137/20 142/1 142/4 142/20 148/16 148/19 148/20 155/9 160/25 162/24 171/21 171/23	Andrew Mitchell [1] 105/7		
activity [3] 116/25 158/16 178/22	advised [1] 155/10	aim [3] 77/19 125/16 178/3	annex [2] 99/21 146/11	announced [2] 120/23 175/23		
actual [1] 141/19	adviser [1] 158/9	aimed [1] 62/11	announcements [1] 151/24	annoying [1] 118/25		
actually [29] 2/17 9/7 15/7 17/7 17/8 17/24 19/25 25/18 26/15 28/2 31/8 32/2 34/20 35/10 38/3 38/4 83/2 89/5 102/13 105/1 123/19 136/17 153/5 162/2 162/10 165/24 166/18 170/3 177/1	advisers [1] 157/23	air [7] 3/5 10/20 14/23 15/17 15/18 108/20 163/3	another [13] 9/8 12/3 12/13 16/3 31/12 49/8 54/21 94/12 102/24 110/12 111/15 123/11 146/7	answered [10] 69/7 73/18 75/18 79/24 96/10 96/19 122/7 122/25 131/22 138/20		
adapting [2] 106/21 108/20	Advisory [1] 2/3	align [1] 141/3	answers [4] 123/6 149/22 174/10 175/2	ante [1] 153/9		
add [5] 14/10 16/22 23/6 63/23 152/8	advocate [3] 141/5 166/16 166/18	aligned [1] 79/11	anticipate [1] 70/13	anticipated [3] 64/13 82/14 155/10		
added [1] 3/10	aerospace [1] 32/23	all [100] 2/20 3/10 5/6 6/6 6/7 11/16 12/24 14/12 14/12 14/12 14/16 15/2 22/5 23/7 25/17 26/17 37/2 37/4 37/22 38/2 45/4 49/4 54/23 54/24 55/1 62/10 63/13 67/24 70/19 78/6 78/21 79/13 85/22 94/4 94/4 97/18 99/24 102/15 104/8 105/12 105/25 106/5 107/16 108/18 108/23 111/1 112/7 112/8 114/7 114/11 115/15 115/19 116/13 116/17 117/21 119/14 120/11 122/13 122/15 123/4 123/18 124/3 124/9 126/12 127/4 127/13 127/25 128/21 129/20 132/19 133/6 137/6 137/18 137/19 143/15 144/17 144/21 146/14 148/7 149/23 152/25 155/17 160/10 161/11 161/16 162/9 162/25 163/13 163/25 164/20 166/15 167/14 169/2 169/18 173/15 173/15 176/23 178/13 179/14 179/25	affirmed [2] 41/1 181/6	all-UK [1] 104/8	anticipation [1] 83/10	Anwar [1] 173/21
addition [5] 34/22 67/8 82/7 102/3 130/21	affects [4] 12/12 16/14 42/13 71/9	alleges [1] 80/7	am [11] 1/2 1/4 19/25 40/21 40/23 71/25 115/14 116/6 134/19 150/4 180/3	anxiety [1] 166/12		
additional [8] 86/20 87/25 136/14 136/18 139/23 159/2 164/17 173/4	affect [1] 83/17	allies [1] 70/4	amazing [1] 124/2	anxious [2] 129/20 137/19		
Additionally [1] 76/13	affects [4] 12/12 16/14 42/13 71/9	allow [4] 33/8 35/16 40/9 151/25	Amazon [2] 167/13 167/15	any [65] 8/20 11/12 24/17 32/14 37/18 40/12 40/14 42/15 42/19 43/17 45/14 48/13 48/16 54/16 58/17 59/13 70/9 70/11 71/19 77/20 82/13 82/13 82/20 98/4 111/5 111/9 115/19 117/6 117/8 117/24 119/6 119/8 122/10 123/1 124/23 129/23 131/5 131/10 132/12 134/5 135/3 138/1 138/2 138/23 139/16 141/12 142/3 142/22 146/15 150/13 150/20 153/3 156/2 157/25 158/17 162/3 162/6 164/12 168/9 168/20 169/7 169/14		
address [3] 30/12 79/10 80/4	affairs [1] 88/15	allowed [5] 54/18 58/8 73/25 75/9 75/13	ambassador [4] 41/24 81/23 82/1 88/14			
addressed [2] 28/12 127/5	affairs [1] 88/15	allows [4] 37/25 38/6 39/5 144/20	amber [1] 167/3			
adds [1] 10/20	affairs [1] 88/15	alls [1] 25/2	America [1] 46/15			
adherence [1] 115/9	after [15] 35/6 48/21 69/5 70/11 83/21 89/13 99/23 110/2 116/3 120/22 124/3 140/19 149/13 175/5 175/10	almost [6] 20/14 35/3 115/10 116/15 153/3 168/17	amongst [1] 166/6			
adjectives [1] 117/15	afternoon [7] 24/21 77/24 81/9 88/23 112/1 123/7 171/13		amount [4] 22/20 37/14 117/10 121/25			
adjourned [1] 180/3	afterwards [2] 35/17 140/18		analogue [1] 23/1			
Adjournment [1] 81/3	again [34] 3/7 9/14 26/9 27/17 35/18 36/11 39/1 53/25 57/14 62/15 72/8 73/19 91/4 97/7 97/12 99/3 100/7 102/10 102/15 102/20 109/5 109/14 111/1 111/3 135/24 143/8 143/11 155/12 161/19 163/2 163/4 165/22 169/25 171/22		analogy [1] 177/3			
adjustment [1] 155/15	against [7] 104/2 105/3 150/4 152/16 153/8 155/10 168/9		analyse [1] 44/7			
administration [2] 13/25 27/8	agency [2] 129/24 136/8		analysed [1] 9/23			
administrations [7] 11/17 14/6 22/18 103/24 104/7 105/2 113/24	agenda [1] 21/8		analysis [5] 44/1 64/24 66/17 114/21 114/22			
admirable [1] 115/8	agent [2] 146/8 167/20					
admirer [1] 115/15	aggravated [1] 22/16					
admit [2] 100/18 105/5	aggressive [1] 156/7					
adopted [2] 21/21 81/11	agility [1] 18/3					
adopting [1] 27/8	Agnew [4] 116/21 117/1 120/9 138/19					
advanced [2] 32/22 40/2	Agnew's [1] 134/2					
advancements [1]	ago [2] 76/17 161/8					

A	98/25 99/17 100/7 104/5 164/2 167/23 174/2 April 2020 [6] 41/18 49/1 61/24 62/17 93/21 98/25 aprons [2] 25/2 168/25 arbitrary [1] 132/17 are [214] area [4] 26/4 33/5 122/1 158/13 areas [11] 8/14 13/8 19/16 26/6 32/10 32/12 36/2 46/15 62/10 63/12 63/24 aren't [3] 21/5 142/24 177/8 argument [1] 178/16 arise [3] 106/9 119/9 136/2 arisen [1] 179/17 arising [1] 138/20 Aristotelian [1] 126/5 arms [6] 150/9 150/11 151/8 152/16 152/21 155/6 around [24] 14/15 15/9 20/23 21/10 29/4 43/2 44/17 45/7 45/12 46/9 47/25 48/5 48/8 48/21 58/7 59/4 67/14 70/22 82/17 83/2 83/3 104/5 110/2 163/4 arrangement [2] 120/3 141/11 arrivals [1] 135/3 arrive [2] 3/6 3/9 arrived [1] 66/10 arrow [1] 4/7 as [286] Asia [9] 3/1 3/13 3/15 20/17 20/20 26/16 33/1 33/19 48/12 aside [1] 105/19 ask [20] 3/20 31/16 71/25 76/12 95/11 95/15 96/14 100/3 107/21 114/22 118/3 122/9 131/5 134/14 142/17 143/17 162/12 177/3 177/21 179/19 asked [15] 51/18 76/9 76/18 94/11 120/1 122/23 125/11 155/23 155/24 164/4 170/2 170/19 172/9 175/22 177/16 asking [13] 56/11 77/12 89/13 114/23 116/18 124/6 126/9 131/13 151/8 175/1 175/21 176/10 179/9 aspect [1] 160/23	aspects [1] 125/9 aspiration [1] 33/11 aspirational [1] 24/4 aspire [1] 69/23 assembled [1] 6/10 assembling [1] 3/3 assertion [2] 18/19 103/18 assess [4] 67/1 148/24 162/8 173/8 assessed [1] 148/2 assesses [1] 71/2 assessing [2] 148/14 152/3 assessment [6] 66/23 75/9 124/9 125/5 149/2 149/13 assessments [1] 75/13 asset [1] 137/23 assist [5] 31/13 35/1 37/16 44/8 64/24 assistance [8] 41/14 42/5 45/15 46/19 84/5 84/11 85/2 143/23 associated [1] 71/1 association [4] 44/2 174/23 176/12 177/11 assume [2] 141/3 165/2 assumption [1] 108/19 assurance [2] 98/13 163/11 at [256] attempted [1] 63/11 attempting [1] 67/12 attempts [3] 67/10 143/9 143/9 attended [1] 113/20 attending [1] 113/21 attention [6] 46/4 83/17 101/12 138/15 141/14 160/2 attracting [1] 43/9 attracts [1] 138/15 Audit [1] 171/23 August [2] 65/21 82/2 Australia [1] 34/16 author [2] 2/6 136/16 authorisation [1] 128/8 authority [5] 116/24 117/25 118/5 118/6 119/15 automate [1] 33/2 automated [1] 33/20 automatically [1] 75/21 automation [5] 33/7 34/3 34/9 34/21 34/22 automotive [2] 21/14 39/15	autonomously [1] 171/25 available [18] 15/21 39/9 39/11 40/9 45/5 48/12 57/23 59/25 60/4 60/8 72/23 85/10 85/12 98/17 106/14 109/21 110/13 162/14 avenue [1] 101/19 average [2] 171/5 171/6 avoided [1] 164/13 award [2] 138/23 143/5 awarded [4] 119/7 142/3 142/22 149/5 aware [23] 19/25 33/12 77/3 79/3 101/18 115/24 126/20 126/21 126/24 137/2 140/20 144/8 144/10 145/10 145/12 146/23 148/15 150/8 158/15 164/20 171/1 171/4 171/8 awareness [1] 86/11 away [8] 2/14 17/11 35/5 35/6 63/1 107/11 137/18 151/4 awkward [2] 124/4 124/10 Ayanda [1] 116/5	53/20 59/15 82/8 88/6 88/9 91/4 92/14 93/16 103/13 107/6 123/19 130/20 142/18 baseless [1] 172/14 basic [1] 108/15 basis [8] 89/22 148/1 148/2 152/20 158/25 171/19 172/21 173/10 BBC [1] 138/13 BCG [1] 64/17 be [232] bear [4] 124/22 142/4 154/21 155/3 bearing [2] 45/10 49/25 became [9] 42/24 44/13 44/21 60/2 63/2 66/14 83/20 88/19 89/8 because [73] 2/20 7/9 7/12 7/19 8/9 10/14 10/17 11/22 15/8 16/22 25/6 25/16 25/18 28/1 28/16 31/22 31/25 32/19 47/14 54/24 57/10 57/23 60/15 61/16 73/3 73/3 73/12 74/14 86/19 86/20 88/3 91/18 94/3 94/9 94/14 94/18 96/4 96/10 99/9 101/20 107/1 107/7 108/4 108/11 110/23 119/20 122/1 125/19 127/10 131/6 134/16 136/23 138/4 138/10 138/12 138/15 146/14 150/18 152/12 154/22 157/21 158/7 160/11 160/18 162/1 162/7 165/3 169/20 170/6 171/18 175/2 177/11 179/11 become [3] 40/10 157/6 157/11 becomes [4] 8/21 84/15 109/13 109/14 becoming [2] 124/4 124/10 been [127] 3/25 5/3 18/10 18/18 18/25 19/15 20/12 20/15 20/18 20/22 21/19 28/3 32/1 32/5 35/4 35/14 35/15 36/20 36/24 39/1 39/3 43/21 54/17 57/6 61/1 61/4 61/10 61/11 64/13 76/9 79/4 79/25 80/2 82/4 84/7 85/17 86/10 87/10 87/23 89/10 89/11 94/23 97/22 100/17 101/11 101/12
----------	---	--	--	---

B	21/20 23/18 24/14 24/15 24/15 24/16 24/21 25/10 26/10 30/20 31/2 32/4 37/14 37/15 37/21 38/17 38/20 45/2 52/13 52/18 55/8 55/11 55/23 55/25 56/1 56/4 57/8 57/17 57/18 57/18 58/18 59/8 62/3 62/13 62/21 76/17 76/18 76/21 90/3 91/14 93/5 93/11 95/2 95/24 95/25 98/11 102/13 103/11 103/12 105/12 107/16 107/17 108/20 109/10 109/12 119/7 121/18 121/20 126/10 126/17 130/21 133/4 133/15 135/16 135/17 136/5 139/18 142/21 146/3 146/17 148/3 150/17 155/25 156/8 159/24 161/13 162/24 163/8 164/11 166/12 169/13 170/19 175/5 belief [4] 1/16 41/12 81/15 112/16 believe [24] 11/5 44/2 45/3 65/22 84/8 111/11 116/15 118/7 120/7 120/8 125/12 133/5 133/22 134/7 136/3 136/20 136/22 141/7 141/14 147/12 149/3 151/13 159/20 159/22 believed [1] 138/10 Bell [12] 1/9 1/10 1/12 1/18 2/10 19/8 30/5 36/15 40/12 69/3 70/6 181/3 below [4] 68/23 130/12 133/6 164/7 beneath [1] 49/8 beneficial [1] 154/1 benefit [3] 61/12 137/25 138/1 benefits [1] 29/24 Bereaved [2] 72/1 173/22 best [15] 1/16 12/22 41/12 81/14 89/19 90/25 94/10 104/21 110/25 112/16 126/7 154/15 159/13 163/10 172/20 Bethell [1] 169/23 bets [1] 152/11 better [11] 39/7 61/10 61/19 63/22 91/2 102/16 110/12 115/1 143/2 162/25	175/22 between [39] 6/20 29/10 33/22 41/18 41/22 45/21 49/15 52/21 53/18 71/14 77/9 81/20 82/2 86/15 88/9 88/16 88/20 89/21 89/23 90/2 90/20 92/12 93/13 95/5 95/7 96/6 99/4 99/11 101/14 105/9 109/2 110/12 110/16 112/25 122/16 124/7 126/5 136/7 164/18 bewildering [1] 94/8 beyond [2] 14/10 131/25 bid [1] 157/10 bidders [1] 142/3 bids [1] 157/6 big [3] 35/11 62/12 84/1 bigger [1] 84/16 biggest [2] 13/14 13/20 bilge [1] 140/4 billions [1] 97/15 bio [1] 49/12 bio-economy [1] 49/12 biography [2] 41/16 81/18 biomedical [1] 32/23 biosciences [4] 174/25 176/3 176/13 177/12 Birmingham [1] 125/13 bit [15] 18/12 60/15 60/18 61/9 72/22 81/18 85/15 87/2 98/25 100/18 104/25 110/20 130/5 149/21 149/22 bits [2] 86/5 86/6 blandly [1] 154/13 blessing [1] 123/21 Bloody [1] 169/10 blunt [1] 30/5 bluntly [1] 26/2 board [1] 78/10 Boardman [2] 142/6 171/23 boards [2] 11/18 22/19 body [4] 14/1 128/23 131/2 131/25 border [2] 87/14 178/22 bore [2] 138/6 138/9 Boris [3] 123/17 124/1 132/15 Boris Johnson [1] 132/15	Boston [1] 64/23 both [20] 46/6 50/3 53/2 58/11 62/9 69/22 74/11 74/22 91/18 108/4 110/20 114/19 115/6 115/8 115/15 115/17 116/6 126/20 141/8 143/12 bothered [1] 11/25 bottleneck [1] 133/11 bottlenecks [2] 14/21 15/20 bottom [9] 16/8 23/25 39/19 51/15 95/14 97/10 103/2 146/9 174/15 bought [4] 10/8 23/18 45/4 97/18 bounds [2] 154/22 155/13 box [1] 68/15 boxes [1] 52/2 break [7] 2/18 40/22 80/25 87/2 101/24 140/5 140/11 breaks [1] 140/7 Brexit [2] 18/18 138/16 brief [1] 112/18 briefing [1] 54/13 briefly [3] 16/1 72/16 143/17 bring [17] 33/14 35/9 45/22 46/4 46/20 48/25 50/5 56/24 68/11 80/18 97/7 98/19 109/24 110/22 128/2 134/9 159/11 bringing [1] 50/3 brings [1] 79/8 British [7] 46/5 81/23 83/14 83/25 86/5 136/21 150/6 broader [4] 47/20 74/17 83/7 149/18 broadly [6] 43/14 48/17 70/13 71/4 86/13 143/13 broken [1] 76/4 brought [12] 9/18 46/5 47/17 48/19 49/2 58/13 59/16 61/17 64/23 100/22 135/9 155/3 Bruce [1] 170/12 brute [1] 131/16 buckling [1] 59/12 buffer [1] 68/17 build [4] 30/7 32/8 34/6 67/2 building [9] 25/23 27/24 28/21 31/13 31/18 34/25 35/1	49/24 65/7 built [1] 87/7 bullet [5] 62/2 62/5 76/11 99/1 103/2 bullwhip [4] 12/18 16/7 17/15 38/2 burden [1] 179/9 bureaucracies [1] 134/22 bureaucracy [3] 124/14 129/11 136/11 bureaucratic [2] 124/12 124/25 burn [1] 37/13 busily [2] 88/17 151/10 business [11] 1/24 6/24 17/22 31/1 39/22 46/10 101/1 108/4 108/6 149/7 158/10 businesses [8] 12/16 46/11 59/5 144/13 144/16 144/18 149/11 150/6 businessman [2] 157/8 167/17 but [205] buy [12] 8/18 74/20 74/22 89/1 98/20 100/4 100/13 100/15 101/9 103/13 105/18 105/22 Buy Cell [1] 74/22 buyer [1] 139/2 buying [4] 7/21 14/1 14/9 14/12 Bywater [1] 167/23
			C	
			cabinet [12] 59/19 62/6 113/3 113/23 117/13 120/2 121/23 123/19 128/5 128/7 165/10 174/1 Cairnduff [3] 165/9 165/12 167/24 call [16] 21/20 46/1 47/2 78/14 87/3 124/3 150/9 150/11 151/8 152/16 152/21 155/6 159/21 161/21 168/24 169/3 called [14] 7/10 10/24 23/1 23/10 35/8 46/24 60/2 66/12 68/9 123/17 135/16 141/2 159/17 163/3 calling [1] 175/10 came [14] 15/21 15/24 21/8 29/12 63/19 65/1 66/23 67/7 83/1 94/12 148/20 157/18 161/11 172/22 campaigning [1]	

<p>C</p> <p>campaigning... [1] 158/16</p> <p>can [74] 3/20 5/15 6/5 11/3 17/11 18/12 18/14 19/18 25/13 31/20 33/3 33/7 34/10 35/10 40/3 41/13 49/3 53/4 53/8 53/9 55/24 57/21 64/20 70/21 72/16 75/18 78/14 78/16 78/17 78/18 78/25 78/25 80/21 82/10 88/24 89/20 91/11 94/1 96/7 96/7 97/5 97/8 97/20 98/3 99/7 105/10 109/25 111/17 114/24 115/2 115/10 122/9 122/23 126/8 130/5 132/17 134/14 134/22 144/23 153/6 157/14 160/18 163/6 166/20 166/21 167/1 167/7 168/13 170/5 170/24 174/14 174/23 176/4 177/24</p> <p>can't [13] 2/18 2/19 2/20 85/3 137/18 140/20 144/10 157/20 158/7 167/11 168/25 171/18 178/3</p> <p>Canada [1] 34/13</p> <p>candidly [1] 114/1</p> <p>cannot [1] 152/7</p> <p>capability [3] 32/7 32/14 33/21</p> <p>capable [10] 46/20 124/20 125/23 126/9 130/17 135/2 136/25 136/25 149/11 162/3</p> <p>capacity [11] 14/21 15/21 32/14 33/18 45/14 65/7 68/1 137/8 148/2 162/8 167/16</p> <p>capital [2] 34/21 127/21</p> <p>car [1] 136/23</p> <p>care [31] 8/16 14/9 24/12 43/1 46/23 50/14 54/1 55/9 55/12 56/5 56/19 56/23 57/2 58/3 58/19 59/11 61/8 71/10 84/12 85/1 88/12 92/14 93/6 94/1 96/1 97/14 99/6 99/12 109/4 144/24 158/18</p> <p>careful [1] 132/9</p> <p>carefully [2] 75/17 94/4</p> <p>cargo [2] 3/5 15/17</p> <p>carried [2] 138/7 179/20</p> <p>carry [2] 135/6 135/7</p>	<p>case [43] 21/22 21/24 25/17 37/23 46/10 66/20 71/12 89/19 93/19 96/11 98/4 102/9 115/11 116/1 116/4 124/11 124/23 125/7 126/4 134/9 134/24 136/19 136/19 138/14 139/16 142/1 142/3 142/19 148/7 148/19 149/6 151/12 153/3 154/13 158/14 158/22 162/18 163/2 168/19 168/21 169/6 169/9 178/8</p> <p>cases [14] 3/1 3/14 6/5 6/22 29/18 31/21 38/6 83/14 101/20 103/23 116/2 116/6 116/7 149/9</p> <p>categories [2] 8/24 10/5</p> <p>category [2] 118/17 148/4</p> <p>cause [2] 15/25 50/20</p> <p>caused [2] 50/22 152/22</p> <p>causes [1] 13/3</p> <p>causing [2] 175/12 175/15</p> <p>caution [4] 153/12 159/2 165/1 168/9</p> <p>cautious [2] 73/16 156/9</p> <p>cautious' [1] 72/13</p> <p>caveat [1] 165/1</p> <p>cc'd [2] 56/25 169/23</p> <p>cdl [8] 127/18 127/24 128/11 130/13 130/21 133/1 135/16 163/5</p> <p>CDL's [1] 130/11</p> <p>ceased [1] 70/11</p> <p>cell [4] 46/20 47/19 74/20 74/22</p> <p>central [6] 24/7 34/14 36/12 37/22 66/10 71/14</p> <p>centralisation [1] 14/6</p> <p>centrally [1] 43/17</p> <p>centre [1] 58/24</p> <p>centres [2] 37/6 91/12</p> <p>certain [3] 34/15 167/15 174/21</p> <p>certainly [35] 2/13 4/12 6/22 18/16 18/20 19/2 21/11 25/14 32/19 33/5 35/3 35/14 36/24 42/17 52/3 53/3 53/6 55/2 56/20 58/24 62/18 62/25 66/8 77/3 103/19 105/1 121/13</p>	<p>121/14 141/11 148/11 151/12 155/20 174/19 176/5 179/23</p> <p>certainty [1] 92/4</p> <p>certify [1] 91/25</p> <p>cetera [2] 44/23 162/22</p> <p>chain [94] 1/21 2/2 2/7 3/2 3/12 3/17 4/13 4/14 4/19 4/23 5/1 5/3 5/6 5/20 5/21 6/1 6/8 6/11 6/20 7/11 7/14 7/17 7/20 8/12 8/17 10/21 11/4 11/7 11/22 11/24 13/1 13/3 14/4 14/25 16/12 16/21 16/24 17/1 17/4 17/9 18/5 18/11 19/21 19/23 20/5 23/11 24/11 24/12 24/17 25/23 26/23 27/20 27/25 30/8 31/1 31/6 34/25 35/4 36/19 36/22 36/23 37/5 37/19 37/24 38/16 38/17 39/6 39/14 40/5 40/7 40/11 42/14 43/17 44/1 44/8 52/11 52/14 64/1 64/6 64/8 64/13 65/20 67/2 67/10 67/21 67/22 68/8 69/25 70/14 70/16 70/17 71/5 71/8 165/7</p> <p>chains [73] 2/11 2/14 2/17 2/24 2/24 4/11 7/7 7/25 8/4 8/22 9/11 9/11 10/6 10/23 11/10 11/13 12/22 13/13 15/3 16/14 17/12 17/21 18/1 18/18 19/12 20/8 20/10 21/3 24/8 26/7 31/14 36/18 38/15 39/24 43/16 44/2 44/22 46/1 47/16 56/10 62/3 62/9 64/4 64/18 64/19 64/21 64/25 65/5 65/20 65/24 66/1 66/5 66/6 66/7 66/12 66/21 67/4 67/5 67/8 67/11 67/17 67/25 68/2 68/10 68/21 69/10 69/13 71/9 71/13 71/16 83/18 83/18 110/4</p> <p>chair [2] 2/2 173/3</p> <p>chairing [1] 113/21</p> <p>challenge [30] 83/23 89/5 117/9 117/23 118/1 119/16 119/21 119/23 120/12 120/23 121/17 121/19 121/23 122/22 124/13 131/18 131/20 134/1 135/19</p>	<p>136/16 138/17 139/8 156/12 173/24 175/5 175/10 175/12 175/14 175/23 176/8</p> <p>challenged [1] 45/6</p> <p>challenges [5] 48/24 69/2 83/24 83/25 141/20</p> <p>challenging [2] 46/1 58/1</p> <p>champion [1] 160/8</p> <p>championed [1] 161/6</p> <p>championing [1] 139/20</p> <p>chance [3] 114/12 115/1 145/22</p> <p>Chancellor [1] 112/24</p> <p>change [5] 16/10 16/18 21/19 94/14 107/2</p> <p>changes [3] 13/11 65/18 107/18</p> <p>changing [6] 12/13 12/15 13/12 13/12 91/1 108/21</p> <p>channels [1] 27/14</p> <p>characteristics [3] 8/1 8/25 10/7</p> <p>charge [3] 24/10 26/24 146/2</p> <p>charged [1] 131/2</p> <p>Charlies [1] 156/10</p> <p>chart [3] 12/3 16/3 50/17</p> <p>Chartered [1] 1/21</p> <p>charts [1] 3/22</p> <p>chase [1] 47/3</p> <p>chaser [1] 164/19</p> <p>chasers [1] 163/1</p> <p>chasing [3] 162/21 166/9 169/4</p> <p>cheap [1] 20/22</p> <p>check [4] 53/9 91/25 165/20 168/5</p> <p>checking [1] 91/15</p> <p>chemical [4] 174/23 176/1 176/11 177/11</p> <p>chief [2] 1/18 128/4</p> <p>China [95] 3/1 14/17 15/7 15/8 15/10 15/12 15/19 24/21 24/25 25/15 25/18 26/13 26/14 28/23 31/21 44/24 45/8 46/14 57/12 69/15 70/25 72/20 73/21 73/22 74/2 74/5 82/12 82/19 83/19 84/6 84/9 84/13 85/4 85/11 85/14 85/16 85/24 86/14 86/20 86/24 87/2 87/12 87/23 88/10</p>	<p>88/17 89/1 89/18 89/19 89/22 90/4 90/21 90/23 91/5 91/14 91/24 92/20 93/9 93/17 95/6 95/16 96/6 96/8 97/19 97/23 98/2 98/20 98/23 99/11 100/4 100/9 100/13 100/22 101/1 101/9 102/1 102/14 102/24 103/9 103/13 103/13 103/21 103/22 104/22 105/18 105/22 106/11 106/25 108/5 108/8 108/13 110/23 149/17 152/9 164/5 164/9</p> <p>China Buy [5] 89/1 98/20 100/4 103/13 105/18</p> <p>Chinese [5] 27/12 27/12 86/11 86/25 89/10</p> <p>chivalry [1] 161/5</p> <p>chivvying [4] 161/1 161/22 163/15 166/9</p> <p>Chongqing [1] 86/1</p> <p>choosing [1] 171/19</p> <p>chronology [1] 98/25</p> <p>circular [1] 36/14</p> <p>circularity [2] 34/23 35/9</p> <p>circumstances [6] 45/6 45/25 106/1 111/4 155/18 162/3</p> <p>circumvent [5] 130/24 131/1 132/8 132/9 132/11</p> <p>cite [1] 143/25</p> <p>citizens [1] 83/5</p> <p>civil [8] 126/13 152/24 153/4 153/7 153/11 154/2 154/14 163/3</p> <p>claiming [1] 72/14</p> <p>Clandeboye [1] 116/5</p> <p>clarified [1] 179/21</p> <p>clarify [1] 63/11</p> <p>clarity [4] 91/13 169/4 172/8 178/19</p> <p>clause [1] 118/3</p> <p>cleaned [1] 35/17</p> <p>clear [24] 44/13 47/14 55/22 66/4 75/4 75/15 77/18 84/15 89/8 91/18 96/24 99/21 109/1 118/12 123/4 127/7 129/12 140/15 144/15 146/5 148/22 155/18 171/24 177/9</p> <p>clearly [6] 13/20 56/8 56/11 123/6 149/7</p>
---	--	---	---	--

<p>C</p> <p>clearly... [1] 151/18</p> <p>Clifford [1] 76/2</p> <p>clinical [1] 127/22</p> <p>clock [2] 48/1 48/5</p> <p>close [10] 21/25 39/17 44/25 53/1 85/23 100/13 101/9 135/4 158/25 164/17</p> <p>closed [2] 10/10 10/11</p> <p>closely [1] 162/13</p> <p>closer [2] 5/20 152/24</p> <p>closures [1] 87/14</p> <p>clothing [1] 167/18</p> <p>CMO's [1] 177/23</p> <p>co [1] 143/21</p> <p>COBR [1] 113/21</p> <p>collaboration [1] 6/19</p> <p>collaborations [1] 176/11</p> <p>collaborator [2] 174/22 175/25</p> <p>colleague [1] 84/9</p> <p>colleagues [4] 99/19 106/6 108/3 128/7</p> <p>collectively [1] 25/8</p> <p>combination [5] 6/19 7/6 12/19 27/21 100/24</p> <p>combine [2] 80/21 111/17</p> <p>combined [1] 99/13</p> <p>combines [2] 27/5 27/9</p> <p>come [33] 5/21 10/2 18/23 25/9 27/6 27/10 27/17 48/13 59/24 65/9 72/21 77/11 78/9 83/17 88/10 93/25 96/12 96/21 116/10 124/21 128/12 136/15 142/12 143/15 147/17 148/9 153/13 154/13 160/7 162/10 164/7 173/17 179/9</p> <p>comes [4] 128/18 132/7 166/8 174/15</p> <p>coming [15] 9/16 12/9 49/4 49/6 57/7 73/13 80/18 83/10 89/13 92/7 95/18 100/17 100/19 109/10 179/10</p> <p>commending [1] 150/5</p> <p>comment [3] 70/9 157/16 159/4</p> <p>commercial [31] 7/15 11/6 21/12 36/10 51/3 51/4 51/7 51/12</p>	<p>58/13 58/14 59/16 59/17 59/19 59/19 59/24 60/5 60/8 60/11 60/19 60/24 61/1 61/4 61/10 61/17 75/8 75/12 77/17 87/8 89/25 116/24 171/14</p> <p>commission [1] 65/9</p> <p>commissioned [1] 65/2</p> <p>Commissioner [1] 41/22</p> <p>commissions [1] 44/16</p> <p>commitment [3] 36/12 106/17 164/6</p> <p>committed [1] 34/15</p> <p>committing [1] 34/10</p> <p>communicate [2] 47/1 74/25</p> <p>communicated [1] 125/7</p> <p>communicating [1] 46/21</p> <p>communication [3] 99/14 178/16 178/20</p> <p>communications [2] 55/4 139/1</p> <p>companies [20] 3/3 3/11 5/19 5/25 7/13 10/19 34/11 59/4 72/15 86/12 90/9 101/5 120/4 122/3 137/9 160/1 160/16 160/24 161/23 162/1</p> <p>company [9] 17/1 34/19 38/18 76/20 101/22 102/10 138/9 138/24 173/22</p> <p>company's [1] 121/17</p> <p>compete [1] 33/8</p> <p>competence [1] 66/22</p> <p>competing [7] 6/24 7/12 62/14 104/2 104/24 105/3 169/18</p> <p>competition [5] 6/19 12/17 91/19 106/3 123/21</p> <p>competitive [4] 7/15 31/22 32/12 98/15</p> <p>complete [4] 22/12 24/2 39/5 39/5</p> <p>completely [3] 29/25 124/2 131/4</p> <p>completes [1] 179/5</p> <p>complexity [8] 7/6 9/9 10/20 23/6 50/8 53/18 54/2 62/25</p> <p>complicated [7] 5/11 5/16 6/11 9/20 32/17 39/13 56/5</p> <p>component [1] 92/25</p>	<p>components [2] 6/9 9/16</p> <p>comprise [1] 2/12</p> <p>compromised [1] 44/22</p> <p>concatenation [1] 15/23</p> <p>concentrated [1] 25/10</p> <p>concentration [2] 24/19 26/3</p> <p>concern [8] 57/3 135/11 150/15 150/16 159/23 166/12 169/5 178/19</p> <p>concerned [9] 7/25 47/21 60/9 62/8 103/19 117/4 135/15 151/12 162/17</p> <p>concerning [1] 78/12</p> <p>concerns [5] 57/5 57/11 78/3 126/16 126/20</p> <p>concluded [1] 95/1</p> <p>concludes [1] 142/2</p> <p>concluding [1] 135/5</p> <p>conclusion [2] 94/13 101/2</p> <p>conclusions [2] 131/19 156/3</p> <p>condition [1] 11/1</p> <p>conditions [6] 47/13 47/25 48/15 50/5 106/19 128/12</p> <p>conduct [2] 75/10 149/13</p> <p>conducted [4] 19/9 90/3 125/10 125/10</p> <p>conducting [2] 58/17 72/12</p> <p>confidence [2] 34/20 176/24</p> <p>confident [2] 97/5 98/3</p> <p>confirm [6] 1/15 41/11 41/13 81/14 112/15 170/8</p> <p>confirmed [1] 179/21</p> <p>Conflicts [1] 138/21</p> <p>confronted [2] 49/23 131/16</p> <p>confusion [1] 49/14</p> <p>connected [1] 59/18</p> <p>connections [2] 98/1 164/20</p> <p>conscious [3] 89/11 92/6 169/20</p> <p>consequence [2] 21/3 43/24</p> <p>consequences [2] 17/14 97/8</p> <p>consequently [5] 7/16 15/12 15/20 16/25 26/18</p>	<p>Conservative [3] 112/23 138/13 157/6</p> <p>consider [8] 40/16 44/7 65/5 65/5 67/10 163/18 163/23 178/12</p> <p>considerably [1] 67/24</p> <p>consideration [2] 52/3 147/17</p> <p>considered [12] 19/10 69/4 70/6 75/17 99/9 100/15 105/20 119/25 133/18 133/20 142/21 160/20</p> <p>considering [6] 10/6 11/11 51/20 64/23 66/8 76/24</p> <p>consistency [1] 178/14</p> <p>consistent [5] 98/11 114/9 173/1 177/25 178/13</p> <p>consistently [1] 97/22</p> <p>consortia [2] 137/16 137/17</p> <p>constant [4] 96/5 97/6 99/25 107/14</p> <p>constantly [6] 94/9 106/20 106/20 106/20 108/21 109/15</p> <p>constraint [1] 20/1</p> <p>constraints [1] 58/25</p> <p>consular [2] 82/23 83/11</p> <p>consulates [5] 44/17 48/8 85/24 85/25 92/24</p> <p>consultancy [1] 64/24</p> <p>consultants [1] 64/17</p> <p>Consulting [1] 64/23</p> <p>consumer [9] 3/9 4/25 5/7 8/6 8/9 8/11 8/16 9/12 10/15</p> <p>consumers [1] 6/15</p> <p>consuming [1] 166/6</p> <p>contact [14] 6/2 54/15 88/9 88/14 147/10 147/22 147/24 148/1 149/10 158/5 159/8 161/20 162/23 165/25</p> <p>contacted [6] 122/20 136/23 157/25 158/1 158/9 169/14</p> <p>contacting [5] 123/23 163/8 165/16 175/18 175/19</p> <p>contacts [4] 88/13 88/16 90/6 165/22</p> <p>containerisation [1] 20/22</p>	<p>content [3] 135/7 159/21 179/23</p> <p>context [11] 4/10 14/14 15/6 53/10 72/6 74/10 85/16 94/20 103/8 103/18 174/16</p> <p>contingency [1] 27/17</p> <p>contingent [1] 127/22</p> <p>continually [1] 123/25</p> <p>continue [3] 93/23 107/4 111/23</p> <p>continued [1] 21/18</p> <p>continues [2] 68/22 84/1</p> <p>continuing [1] 165/18</p> <p>continuously [1] 67/1</p> <p>contract [15] 93/25 94/24 96/20 101/25 102/2 116/3 119/6 138/24 143/4 149/5 164/22 170/25 171/4 171/13 171/19</p> <p>contracting [1] 102/4</p> <p>contractor [3] 102/24 102/24 119/8</p> <p>contracts [17] 28/8 28/9 28/10 29/13 29/14 91/8 92/18 93/4 93/8 93/11 93/17 95/1 98/17 101/5 142/2 142/21 171/20</p> <p>contrary [2] 151/18 171/14</p> <p>contrast [4] 9/5 116/20 147/16 163/21</p> <p>contributed [1] 137/20</p> <p>control [4] 13/8 30/9 30/13 37/7</p> <p>controlled [1] 31/7</p> <p>controversy [1] 138/15</p> <p>conversation [1] 93/13</p> <p>conversations [5] 137/13 165/15 165/17 174/24 176/2</p> <p>converted [1] 63/5</p> <p>cooperation [1] 67/14</p> <p>coordinated [3] 43/17 57/8 99/11</p> <p>coordinating [2] 53/23 53/25</p> <p>coordination [14] 42/5 45/16 46/19 50/21 56/22 66/11 67/20 68/21 99/3 103/3 110/12 110/18</p>
---	---	---	--	---

<p>C</p> <p>coordination... [2] 110/21 178/8</p> <p>cope [2] 18/6 18/11</p> <p>copy [1] 123/13</p> <p>core [3] 28/24 28/25 29/9</p> <p>Corporate [1] 41/7</p> <p>Corporation [1] 24/25</p> <p>correct [30] 1/25 2/1 2/9 7/23 10/17 41/20 41/23 42/1 42/6 42/9 43/3 66/9 67/16 79/5 81/22 82/8 82/9 84/7 87/4 87/6 113/1 127/12 133/4 137/5 156/10 156/11 158/1 159/20 172/12 172/18</p> <p>correspondence [6] 120/13 127/14 131/24 132/20 158/24 160/8</p> <p>corrupt [1] 140/2</p> <p>cost [11] 8/9 9/2 20/13 20/16 20/25 31/20 31/23 57/12 133/13 134/12 171/7</p> <p>costs [3] 22/4 138/7 138/9</p> <p>costumier [3] 146/7 161/3 161/6</p> <p>could [122] 2/10 2/23 4/7 4/9 4/16 5/13 6/20 8/3 12/3 13/11 14/10 16/1 16/6 16/13 16/23 21/13 22/10 23/21 24/19 27/2 27/22 29/25 30/13 31/15 32/15 33/14 34/4 34/23 35/11 35/19 36/2 36/19 37/11 38/10 42/12 45/17 48/7 48/12 48/25 49/8 51/14 51/15 52/11 53/21 55/9 55/14 56/2 56/23 57/3 59/14 59/21 61/19 61/23 62/1 63/17 63/23 65/6 66/13 67/17 68/11 68/14 69/6 70/7 75/23 80/8 82/21 89/1 90/4 91/24 94/23 95/4 95/9 95/22 96/14 97/7 98/19 99/1 99/19 100/2 100/6 102/22 103/14 105/17 107/21 112/15 120/20 122/2 123/10 125/10 125/13 125/14 127/16 129/16 129/21 129/21 129/23 131/6 132/1 132/13 132/21 133/8 133/16 135/9 138/6 138/23</p>	<p>147/15 149/6 149/21 150/21 152/3 153/14 156/18 156/20 161/3 167/6 167/9 169/6 169/21 173/1 175/24 179/2 179/19</p> <p>couldn't [9] 50/5 86/19 87/25 92/3 108/8 151/4 161/2 178/7 179/7</p> <p>Council [1] 2/3</p> <p>COUNSEL [8] 1/11 41/2 81/8 112/9 181/4 181/7 181/12 181/15</p> <p>countenance [1] 155/14</p> <p>counterparts [2] 53/2 177/24</p> <p>counterproductive [3] 150/10 150/12 154/5</p> <p>countries [10] 20/24 21/2 21/4 25/17 26/14 26/17 34/18 63/15 63/16 87/5</p> <p>country [23] 14/15 26/4 35/1 56/3 59/15 59/25 60/6 60/7 61/7 85/10 85/13 87/17 89/17 89/24 89/25 90/4 91/24 93/16 93/24 95/24 99/11 101/10 157/15</p> <p>couple [4] 48/22 49/17 52/5 83/12</p> <p>course [50] 3/21 5/10 6/17 8/13 13/7 15/10 17/4 19/9 23/7 23/24 26/15 36/8 46/13 47/14 48/14 49/25 52/13 57/20 60/1 63/7 63/24 81/13 86/13 86/23 87/14 88/2 88/6 89/7 90/25 91/22 96/25 107/1 107/15 109/6 110/10 113/17 117/6 120/18 126/23 126/25 133/10 135/8 139/12 142/12 142/19 149/24 152/13 173/14 173/24 179/1</p> <p>Court [3] 115/23 141/20 145/15</p> <p>cover [1] 25/2</p> <p>cover-alls [1] 25/2</p> <p>covers [1] 25/3</p> <p>Covid [13] 8/13 12/6 24/24 72/1 81/19 97/15 97/18 98/22 113/23 120/1 144/17 173/22 174/4</p> <p>Covid-19 [7] 8/13 24/24 81/19 97/15 97/18 98/22 144/17</p>	<p>Covid-O [1] 113/23</p> <p>cracks [1] 168/18</p> <p>create [7] 14/17 16/11 47/18 53/22 54/2 54/11 58/13</p> <p>created [5] 7/6 45/21 47/5 49/1 66/23</p> <p>creates [1] 17/19</p> <p>creating [1] 12/6</p> <p>creation [1] 50/25</p> <p>credible [3] 151/16 151/21 163/15</p> <p>credit [3] 120/10 136/17 138/19</p> <p>crisis [21] 8/14 18/3 37/10 44/11 44/21 47/25 48/23 51/11 51/25 52/8 52/23 54/14 55/3 57/20 59/9 61/20 63/22 107/8 109/9 154/9 173/7</p> <p>critical [17] 4/12 8/21 11/24 21/4 23/12 26/9 28/19 36/4 42/20 57/23 65/4 65/23 66/1 68/10 70/4 78/2 137/7</p> <p>criticality [1] 8/15</p> <p>critically [1] 27/12</p> <p>criticised [1] 150/22</p> <p>criticism [3] 146/14 149/20 168/19</p> <p>critique [1] 114/22</p> <p>cross [4] 86/4 92/21 93/2 178/22</p> <p>cross-border [1] 178/22</p> <p>cross-government [1] 92/21</p> <p>crossed [1] 76/6</p> <p>crucial [2] 24/16 131/2</p> <p>cruise [1] 83/12</p> <p>crux [1] 143/6</p> <p>curious [1] 158/3</p> <p>current [1] 95/21</p> <p>currently [2] 41/24 82/5</p> <p>cursor [1] 69/15</p> <p>curve [1] 97/22</p> <p>customer [8] 4/5 4/15 4/22 6/2 6/25 16/8 16/10 16/18</p> <p>customers [1] 36/21</p> <p>cut [1] 160/18</p> <p>cutthroat [2] 90/12 106/3</p>	<p>data [19] 3/16 5/2 5/4 7/9 7/12 7/20 13/1 20/18 22/14 22/20 23/4 36/17 36/20 38/16 38/20 39/2 64/16 67/1 75/12</p> <p>date [4] 30/18 31/2 41/15 83/4</p> <p>dated [4] 127/17 144/7 164/2 165/9</p> <p>dates [1] 109/25</p> <p>David [6] 157/2 164/3 168/2 168/3 168/10 169/24</p> <p>David Meller [4] 157/2 164/3 168/10 169/24</p> <p>day [15] 13/17 46/11 46/11 83/22 98/14 108/19 117/6 121/5 126/2 128/3 128/3 153/18 165/9 166/10 180/3</p> <p>days [13] 48/3 61/22 61/24 61/25 89/7 96/11 110/2 110/24 120/22 128/16 129/14 167/23 174/4</p> <p>deadline [1] 132/17</p> <p>deal [9] 17/24 19/4 28/5 49/6 100/16 108/5 134/15 161/16 176/19</p> <p>dealing [6] 17/13 58/3 92/9 101/21 101/21 101/22</p> <p>dealt [6] 19/22 58/12 116/5 151/17 166/21 169/13</p> <p>Dear [1] 128/21</p> <p>debate [2] 139/24 177/4</p> <p>decade [1] 36/5</p> <p>decades [1] 32/2</p> <p>decided [1] 32/20</p> <p>deciding [1] 134/19</p> <p>decision [8] 92/19 113/20 117/25 118/5 118/6 119/4 119/15 121/21</p> <p>decision-making [5] 113/20 117/25 118/5 118/6 119/15</p> <p>decisions [7] 38/1 39/7 58/9 94/18 117/5 171/20 171/24</p> <p>declared [2] 83/9 110/3</p> <p>deep [1] 29/8</p> <p>deeper [3] 28/18 31/25 143/11</p> <p>defects [1] 141/16</p> <p>Defend [17] 42/10 64/1 64/2 64/3 64/6</p>	<p>65/10 65/10 65/17 65/21 66/4 66/10 66/24 67/8 68/6 70/2 70/21 71/12</p> <p>definitely [1] 24/10</p> <p>definition [3] 35/4 134/19 152/3</p> <p>degree [3] 56/16 115/12 127/14</p> <p>Delay [1] 95/18</p> <p>delayed [2] 1/3 133/5</p> <p>delays [2] 57/12 57/18</p> <p>delegated [1] 116/23</p> <p>deliberately [2] 132/17 164/23</p> <p>deliver [3] 101/6 144/23 148/3</p> <p>delivered [5] 5/7 38/24 39/1 39/3 131/9</p> <p>delivering [2] 11/18 138/25</p> <p>delivery [2] 73/11 78/10</p> <p>demand [35] 12/5 12/8 12/9 12/12 12/19 12/22 12/23 13/5 13/21 14/3 16/2 16/8 16/10 16/18 16/19 17/7 17/8 17/25 18/11 19/4 33/22 34/1 37/9 37/13 46/24 47/1 47/18 57/13 69/1 73/4 75/4 94/16 105/9 109/9 150/19</p> <p>demanding [1] 126/10</p> <p>demands [2] 18/7 108/21</p> <p>democracy [1] 154/20</p> <p>democratic [4] 154/6 154/16 155/15 155/18</p> <p>demonstrated [1] 106/18</p> <p>demonstrates [1] 54/4</p> <p>demonstrating [1] 63/9</p> <p>department [71] 24/12 41/8 41/17 42/2 42/12 42/15 42/19 42/20 42/24 43/1 43/4 43/7 43/18 43/24 44/9 44/12 45/21 46/7 46/22 49/10 50/14 50/19 51/17 52/19 52/21 53/19 53/24 53/25 54/1 54/20 54/21 55/9 55/11 56/4 56/18 56/22 57/2 58/3 58/18 59/11 59/17 60/23 61/8 63/12 64/17 64/22 65/14</p>
--	---	---	--	---

D	159/22	130/22 131/4 135/20	64/25	79/12
department... [24] 65/15 71/10 71/15 71/17 75/1 77/10 79/21 84/12 85/1 88/11 92/13 93/6 93/25 95/5 95/25 97/14 99/4 99/5 99/12 104/13 105/20 109/2 109/3 109/21	detailed [2] 56/12 137/13 details [1] 24/5 determine [2] 136/8 149/4 devastating [1] 15/5 develop [4] 30/2 36/7 47/15 118/7 developed [3] 27/13 29/1 62/16 developing [4] 33/7 33/20 40/5 50/23 development [5] 22/25 28/1 35/23 39/10 39/21 develops [1] 26/16 device [1] 127/7 devices [1] 131/3 devolved [9] 11/16 13/25 14/6 22/18 27/7 103/24 104/6 105/2 113/23 devoted [3] 117/9 133/15 133/17 dexterity [1] 106/18 DFID [1] 83/7 DHSC [46] 46/23 47/7 57/7 57/17 58/6 59/18 61/12 70/18 72/10 74/20 75/5 75/14 75/15 76/10 76/22 76/23 77/10 78/10 79/22 84/19 88/17 88/18 90/16 90/18 90/19 90/21 90/21 90/24 91/15 92/18 93/12 93/13 96/6 98/12 99/19 103/12 104/6 104/22 105/1 109/10 109/13 113/13 121/22 121/24 164/23 177/19 diagram [2] 5/16 6/14 dialogue [1] 90/20 diaries [1] 123/14 did [79] 11/18 15/2 19/11 43/25 44/18 45/19 48/9 48/15 50/18 50/20 53/22 54/2 54/16 54/22 59/4 60/23 62/11 63/6 63/6 64/3 65/1 65/9 65/17 67/23 82/12 83/16 84/3 84/11 85/1 87/16 88/10 91/23 92/18 100/21 101/8 104/1 105/21 105/25 105/25 106/2 106/5 106/19 117/1 117/24 118/15 118/16 119/18 121/1 122/10 122/11 122/25 123/2 124/21 126/15	136/1 136/17 147/5 152/12 152/14 155/24 157/14 160/2 160/5 160/6 161/24 162/6 162/12 166/22 169/16 170/19 170/20 170/22 175/14 176/17 178/2 178/11 didn't [19] 28/11 28/14 44/2 53/3 60/13 60/13 79/25 80/18 84/14 119/9 125/21 140/17 148/24 157/2 157/10 162/8 171/12 175/2 178/4 difference [5] 29/10 95/3 122/16 148/11 164/18 differences [2] 9/15 99/13 different [40] 3/3 3/7 3/11 5/1 6/7 6/12 6/13 6/20 7/10 8/6 8/25 9/12 9/16 9/17 9/19 10/4 10/7 21/6 22/24 23/4 50/4 54/18 54/18 54/20 55/5 88/13 107/5 121/15 122/3 125/8 125/14 139/8 151/6 152/9 156/9 160/14 166/3 166/22 178/5 178/6 differentially [1] 67/21 differentiation [1] 8/14 difficult [23] 7/17 17/19 43/23 48/21 49/17 50/7 53/20 70/9 71/3 77/2 77/14 77/14 96/24 106/1 106/18 126/9 149/1 150/13 150/25 151/1 152/6 153/18 155/7 difficulties [4] 20/5 62/21 63/20 63/21 difficulty [1] 57/6 digital [1] 24/1 diligence [5] 75/11 75/11 76/19 77/12 99/24 dint [1] 147/18 diplomat [1] 111/15 diplomatic [1] 82/4 direct [15] 7/3 51/6 72/25 88/16 117/24 118/4 118/9 119/4 119/12 119/14 119/20 119/20 122/10 123/1 165/22 directed [2] 141/15 144/18 direction [3] 4/3 4/6	directions [1] 4/8 directly [7] 72/7 76/22 84/6 88/11 93/24 120/15 122/9 director [5] 41/17 42/2 81/19 83/16 83/20 directorate [7] 66/13 66/22 67/5 67/9 68/7 68/9 71/13 directors [1] 160/1 disabilities [1] 78/8 disability [1] 78/22 disadvantage [1] 33/4 disasters [1] 21/9 discharge [1] 125/3 discover [2] 19/12 96/12 discovered [1] 72/24 discriminating [1] 139/2 discuss [1] 128/13 discussed [3] 74/25 79/16 80/8 discussion [1] 59/20 discussions [3] 79/9 80/3 170/16 display [2] 99/1 120/21 displayed [1] 5/17 disposal [2] 131/7 136/24 disposed [1] 10/2 disproportionate [1] 141/17 dispute [1] 115/19 disruption [2] 14/23 152/21 dissuaded [1] 150/24 distinction [5] 90/2 122/20 136/7 148/10 148/11 distinguish [1] 118/4 distorted [1] 143/10 distraction [1] 153/20 distractions [1] 166/4 distribution [1] 37/6 distributor [1] 4/4 distributors [7] 3/8 23/8 28/16 29/19 62/23 73/23 100/10 DIT [20] 43/22 45/11 46/10 48/20 49/4 49/7 51/11 52/7 55/1 63/23 66/15 71/14 86/8 92/25 97/25 98/2 109/11 109/13 109/14 110/6 DIT-led [1] 109/14 diverse [2] 78/6	diversification [7] 26/5 26/8 64/1 67/18 70/3 70/23 71/6 diversify [2] 63/17 67/12 diversifying [1] 67/12 divide [1] 89/23 do [65] 8/8 18/20 20/4 24/6 30/17 34/5 34/10 35/25 37/16 37/22 38/13 45/14 52/5 53/9 54/8 56/11 63/11 67/1 67/6 70/19 77/12 78/18 78/20 79/18 98/3 106/12 108/6 108/14 109/6 110/15 110/18 110/21 111/2 116/20 117/8 124/7 124/18 124/21 128/22 131/25 133/1 134/14 134/21 134/24 136/1 138/1 140/19 141/14 144/9 150/11 152/1 158/23 159/21 159/22 161/15 163/18 164/5 165/20 168/8 172/5 172/19 172/20 173/13 174/11 177/1 do we [1] 177/1 document [18] 58/25 68/12 69/4 69/12 71/11 78/14 100/2 102/23 103/10 104/10 112/13 123/11 146/9 147/15 149/25 177/15 179/16 179/18 documentation [3] 55/20 55/21 137/3 documented [2] 56/13 89/20 documents [1] 75/7 does [17] 8/11 13/8 13/12 17/16 28/21 30/14 38/12 38/14 48/6 62/15 62/15 108/9 131/23 132/8 139/4 152/20 177/9 doesn't [1] 70/7 doing [25] 49/16 52/24 58/15 58/16 64/10 68/20 89/18 91/7 93/7 94/10 96/9 98/12 106/25 107/18 111/1 121/25 130/4 131/4 131/24 132/2 146/21 150/20 151/25 154/14 163/9 domain [1] 160/11 domestic [13] 25/16 31/14 31/18 32/15 34/6 62/9 65/7 65/13 67/18 70/22 71/7

D	77/12 97/3 99/24 113/17 142/12 Duke [2] 95/10 98/21 duplicating [1] 62/14 duplication [2] 51/22 62/23 during [13] 3/21 12/6 18/15 19/9 23/24 78/2 81/13 115/21 115/24 120/3 143/13 143/22 166/17 duty [1] 125/3 dysfunction [4] 13/6 14/18 17/15 38/8 dysfunctional [1] 12/7 Dyson [28] 121/3 121/8 121/11 121/16 121/16 121/18 122/12 123/2 123/3 123/23 124/7 125/5 126/18 127/22 128/9 129/5 129/13 130/20 133/7 133/16 134/8 134/17 136/12 136/22 137/7 138/2 139/5 167/5 Dyson's [3] 130/13 134/9 139/19	editor [1] 113/6 education [1] 40/4 effect [16] 12/18 12/19 13/12 15/2 15/5 16/7 16/11 17/16 17/16 24/6 38/3 61/5 87/16 91/23 175/11 175/15 Effect' [1] 16/4 effective [3] 40/11 109/22 131/15 effectively [9] 33/8 61/13 87/20 92/15 104/23 107/8 136/6 144/20 149/12 effectiveness [3] 4/14 11/7 136/10 effects [2] 13/22 61/15 efficiency [4] 4/13 50/21 169/8 169/9 efficient [3] 40/10 131/14 179/1 effort [8] 46/19 51/23 101/3 133/15 133/16 137/1 150/3 152/10 efforts [3] 124/25 150/6 163/15 eg [1] 78/21 eight [1] 149/3 eight-stage [1] 149/3 either [10] 18/12 43/18 59/14 60/9 104/22 110/18 126/9 153/21 165/22 170/24 either/or [1] 110/18 element [7] 15/17 19/21 31/12 33/3 35/9 99/8 119/25 elements [4] 22/3 27/9 27/21 32/22 else [9] 96/12 96/21 101/8 133/9 148/12 165/21 168/15 171/19 177/7 elsewhere [8] 8/7 36/19 45/10 51/2 70/24 82/25 83/13 90/11 email [28] 51/15 52/11 52/13 56/25 61/23 62/15 75/25 76/1 95/9 97/7 127/17 130/3 131/23 133/12 155/21 164/2 164/14 165/7 167/21 168/18 169/19 169/22 170/3 173/25 174/3 174/5 174/8 174/8 emailed [1] 128/7 emailing [1] 168/22 emails [11] 48/7 50/15 50/18 62/4 95/5 159/3 159/10 161/21	162/16 171/11 171/12 emanate [1] 84/4 emanating [1] 83/19 embassies [4] 44/16 48/8 53/23 58/16 embassy [4] 44/24 85/25 86/2 92/23 emergency [19] 16/14 18/3 33/23 42/16 50/11 82/21 114/16 114/17 115/24 117/9 141/2 142/11 143/3 152/1 153/15 153/18 154/23 155/13 155/17 emerging [1] 83/8 Emily [1] 57/1 Emily Lawson [1] 57/1 emphasis [3] 27/12 70/3 95/20 employees [1] 95/6 enable [2] 35/15 108/17 enabled [3] 86/16 98/6 147/16 enabling [1] 39/6 encounter [1] 145/14 encountered [2] 54/16 64/12 encountering [1] 62/21 encourage [3] 34/5 136/20 144/17 end [28] 7/3 8/18 22/1 36/22 37/23 44/4 51/10 59/12 61/11 61/11 63/19 76/1 78/21 79/12 98/14 102/15 104/1 112/14 129/2 129/5 132/2 133/25 137/10 138/6 139/21 143/16 143/18 163/24 ended [1] 170/25 endorsement [1] 139/2 endpoint [1] 68/6 energetic [4] 124/17 126/8 139/19 156/6 energetically [3] 125/1 159/24 169/17 engaged [1] 43/4 engagement [4] 28/18 42/8 75/3 96/5 engineer [1] 124/2 England [4] 14/5 178/18 178/21 178/22 enlisted [1] 164/22 enormous [5] 22/20 57/13 120/10 121/25 151/13 enormously [3] 116/20 149/23 156/23	enough [9] 1/15 19/4 19/5 33/22 41/11 57/11 70/7 118/22 146/21 enquiry [1] 166/1 ensure [31] 8/23 30/1 30/17 79/11 98/10 102/19 105/2 108/14 121/20 122/14 122/15 123/24 125/13 125/16 129/1 129/5 129/20 131/14 135/21 136/4 138/5 139/23 146/16 146/21 151/16 158/21 169/17 173/1 178/4 178/7 178/23 ensures [1] 144/19 ensuring [8] 57/6 78/5 97/4 114/6 127/10 128/24 131/2 136/17 enter [2] 98/6 171/13 entered [1] 144/19 entering [2] 72/13 170/25 enterprises [3] 73/24 100/24 101/4 enthusiasm [3] 124/7 125/24 126/5 enthusiastic [2] 123/22 126/2 entire [1] 178/15 entirely [8] 53/4 54/10 57/21 58/2 79/14 96/4 166/11 168/22 entities [5] 6/20 7/19 54/8 103/23 104/3 entity [1] 103/22 entrants [1] 147/24 entrepreneur [1] 122/19 environment [3] 12/23 40/2 98/16 environmental [1] 22/7 envisaged [1] 49/2 epitomises [1] 49/19 equal [1] 116/2 equally [3] 11/8 11/16 29/15 equation [4] 12/9 12/20 14/19 14/20 equipment [36] 7/4 8/2 8/24 9/13 9/14 9/17 9/22 9/24 10/5 10/12 10/18 11/12 11/14 24/3 25/22 32/17 32/18 33/18 34/3 34/21 42/21 44/20 45/24 56/6 56/7 56/12 64/5 69/10 89/9 92/1 93/5 120/6 122/5 122/18 144/24 150/19
	E			
	e-platform [1] 4/17 each [15] 6/7 7/11 7/19 8/24 13/24 16/21 16/22 49/15 50/1 67/21 108/18 137/15 159/3 165/24 171/11 ear [1] 168/7 earlier [18] 17/6 18/1 38/3 59/1 60/14 61/2 61/5 61/9 61/14 88/23 89/24 109/22 131/19 133/18 137/8 156/5 170/3 174/6 earliest [7] 47/10 60/3 91/9 91/11 95/7 96/1 97/12 early [21] 37/10 44/21 51/6 56/21 57/16 57/19 60/13 60/18 83/23 93/8 93/15 93/19 99/15 103/20 105/4 120/22 137/13 137/18 155/22 155/22 174/4 easier [1] 178/15 East [2] 48/12 167/17 easy [1] 111/1 eccentric [3] 149/8 161/4 161/5 economic [3] 2/3 22/6 68/8 economics [1] 32/21 economy [2] 49/12 70/16			

E	38/16 99/8 108/12 108/19 108/19 124/14 126/1 131/5 138/24 139/1 147/3 174/21 175/25 everybody [3] 50/5 50/9 147/8 everyone [2] 138/17 163/9 everything [2] 95/17 150/21 evidence [45] 3/21 9/5 17/15 17/20 23/13 23/25 36/16 37/13 47/8 56/14 61/19 69/4 69/24 81/13 113/12 113/19 114/11 114/14 114/16 114/19 116/23 117/23 118/13 118/14 120/11 125/19 126/16 126/22 132/10 137/11 138/22 139/10 140/9 140/16 148/22 150/9 152/15 155/1 155/5 155/21 156/4 167/10 173/1 175/18 179/11 evolution [3] 65/23 89/2 107/14 evolved [2] 139/13 139/15 evolves [2] 26/16 26/22 evolving [1] 109/15 ex [1] 153/9 exacerbating [1] 152/25 exactly [9] 6/16 8/8 27/22 82/3 140/20 146/10 146/12 158/21 177/12 examined [1] 155/21 example [29] 4/16 9/15 11/20 13/17 13/19 14/11 15/18 21/14 21/17 25/6 25/13 29/12 31/7 32/24 38/12 39/16 70/23 75/21 77/3 77/15 97/11 97/13 104/6 119/4 119/6 139/5 143/25 163/16 167/13 examples [2] 163/14 163/24 Excel [1] 50/16 excellent [1] 40/17 exception [2] 118/1 119/16 excess [1] 150/19 exchanges [1] 167/21 excoriated [1] 160/13 excuses [1] 124/25	executive [1] 1/18 exercise [3] 47/23 64/6 139/8 exercises [6] 19/10 19/13 19/18 20/3 63/8 63/9 exerting [1] 124/21 exhibits [2] 115/7 115/17 exist [2] 2/17 20/17 existed [4] 65/25 89/12 119/12 134/25 existence [4] 63/19 144/8 152/9 166/19 existing [4] 7/9 151/3 151/9 168/5 expanding [1] 70/5 expect [3] 70/13 71/6 144/21 expected [1] 71/5 expecting [1] 174/10 expedited [1] 130/24 expensive [1] 34/4 experience [18] 32/5 45/9 46/9 47/24 52/22 52/22 53/7 56/2 56/3 56/9 72/19 73/6 74/2 122/1 134/21 142/14 152/20 155/7 experiment [1] 142/8 expert [2] 1/13 134/19 expertise [37] 32/5 44/6 45/9 45/12 51/3 51/4 58/13 59/16 59/24 60/5 60/8 60/24 61/1 61/4 61/17 67/2 85/10 85/11 86/6 86/14 87/7 87/12 90/1 90/25 98/1 106/10 108/1 108/7 109/19 109/20 109/24 110/7 110/9 110/13 110/22 110/25 158/13 experts [6] 49/19 84/21 87/3 87/5 89/24 89/25 explain [2] 37/11 100/12 explained [2] 139/8 147/20 explaining [2] 3/25 101/17 explains [2] 94/7 100/11 explanations [1] 153/22 explicitly [1] 139/6 exponential [1] 16/11 export [1] 49/21 exporters [1] 43/11 exports [1] 25/19 express [1] 74/6 expressed [3] 133/12	166/13 166/14 expressing [1] 159/23 expressions [1] 58/4 expressly [1] 152/15 extends [1] 1/14 extension [1] 12/15 extensive [2] 47/24 114/2 extent [1] 156/16 external [1] 64/24 extra [1] 170/14 extraordinarily [1] 98/15 extraordinary [2] 108/18 150/5 eye [1] 25/2	fast [5] 57/6 65/24 130/17 131/15 153/5 faster [4] 59/22 130/17 136/18 153/4 fault [2] 58/5 104/10 favour [2] 128/9 140/25 favouritised [1] 158/25 favouritism [4] 158/20 163/21 164/12 168/10 FCDO [3] 52/6 109/13 148/20 FCO [36] 49/7 52/17 52/21 53/1 53/19 53/23 57/1 81/19 82/12 82/20 83/4 84/6 84/12 84/25 85/12 88/11 89/18 90/3 92/15 92/16 93/7 93/17 93/23 98/6 99/4 99/11 101/8 105/18 105/21 108/25 109/2 109/11 109/12 109/13 109/22 110/14 FCO's [2] 82/10 85/13 FCO/DIT/DHSC [1] 109/13 feared [1] 96/10 feature [2] 57/19 77/8 features [4] 7/24 20/10 27/5 50/13 February [2] 83/7 113/4 Federation [1] 77/25 feed [1] 40/6 feedbacks [1] 166/9 feeding [1] 14/16 feel [3] 53/3 98/3 133/1 Feldman [4] 157/22 157/22 158/8 169/22 fell [3] 125/24 133/18 137/18 fellow [2] 1/21 113/16 felt [9] 47/7 51/11 60/17 106/4 121/16 131/8 135/20 137/20 171/11 FEMHO [1] 77/25 few [10] 46/16 71/25 84/2 106/23 107/15 109/6 116/10 128/16 135/7 161/8 field [2] 122/5 148/3 fifth [2] 79/1 174/14 figure [6] 5/10 5/13 5/23 12/4 16/4 16/7 figure 2 [1] 5/23 Figure 7 [1] 12/4
----------	--	---	--	---

F	101/12 138/11 141/14 151/20	Foundation [1] 1/20	fundamental [3] 19/17 64/21 127/10	93/10 97/23 102/9 107/12 108/6 109/7 118/9 118/23 126/3 130/1 149/21 152/1
figures [2] 24/22 25/5	focused [4] 25/16 105/7 142/24 144/22	founder [1] 1/20	fundamentally [3] 65/18 107/9 149/2	getting [14] 5/20 7/16 11/23 44/25 62/8 92/4 111/13 124/8 125/25 126/5 133/10 162/5 162/21 163/7
fill [1] 75/20	focusing [3] 85/11 91/4 91/9	four [7] 14/7 32/2 65/22 106/23 120/22 128/22 178/13	funds [1] 4/6	give [7] 24/13 97/13 115/1 127/15 129/12 178/18 179/10
final [1] 137/24	follow [3] 152/14 152/23 163/16	four decades [1] 32/2	further [17] 4/23 14/8 16/20 21/21 59/14 71/19 77/20 102/12 111/5 124/5 132/21 142/17 151/2 151/9 151/24 169/1 177/21	given [21] 40/17 45/1 69/4 100/13 117/6 123/18 126/22 129/8 129/9 131/21 132/1 132/10 134/5 137/20 142/10 142/14 156/8 163/21 164/5 171/10 175/11
finally [3] 12/18 36/15 172/1	followed [8] 58/20 95/24 118/12 119/23 122/16 125/1 146/22 160/12	fourth [1] 176/4	fused [1] 52/6	giving [2] 58/6 85/15
Finance [1] 24/25	following [7] 77/17 97/20 135/13 144/18 165/9 169/3 180/3	fragmentation [1] 22/14	future [11] 1/21 20/4 24/9 35/2 38/15 110/15 141/1 141/12 143/3 153/15 154/2	global [20] 1/19 2/3 2/7 14/14 19/19 20/1 20/8 33/25 33/25 42/7 43/25 66/12 67/5 67/8 67/14 71/13 75/2 83/18 88/20 110/4
financial [3] 22/4 34/19 128/4	food [2] 2/18 62/11	fragmented [2] 14/3 39/16	G	globally [3] 28/23 54/25 55/1
financially [1] 157/5	footage [1] 92/5	France [1] 25/19	gained [1] 31/22	glove [1] 34/13
find [5] 47/4 64/4 92/4 96/9 96/18	football [2] 146/8 167/20	Frank [1] 76/2	gap [1] 66/24	gloves [3] 25/6 30/20 35/6
finding [3] 94/21 94/22 143/2	footing [2] 107/13 109/8	frankly [6] 48/1 49/19 51/8 58/6 61/11 73/7	Gareth [20] 118/13 119/11 120/9 120/13 122/1 126/16 127/17 128/10 128/12 129/1 132/24 133/24 135/11 137/10 137/14 138/18 139/10 152/14 155/5 155/9	go [32] 1/6 2/23 3/6 3/16 6/5 10/15 19/14 24/5 34/20 47/3 52/11 70/7 78/18 78/23 79/2 84/14 84/19 95/9 97/10 97/20 99/7 99/23 100/2 101/20 102/15 110/24 149/14 153/4 163/19 164/1 173/11 174/14
finickiness [1] 115/11	forearm [1] 24/10	fraud [1] 73/11	Gareth's [2] 153/9 153/24	goal [1] 24/5
finish [3] 132/19 140/8 152/12	Foreign [6] 45/22 46/6 48/20 55/1 60/10 93/1	freeing [2] 121/3 121/12	garments [1] 167/18	goes [7] 12/25 22/3 22/4 31/25 32/1 38/2 160/20
firms [2] 86/15 92/8	foreseen [1] 42/17	Fred [1] 76/3	gatekeeping [1] 146/19	going [41] 3/22 24/8 25/21 31/2 33/10 33/13 37/20 49/22 71/25 72/21 74/14 75/15 75/24 89/8 91/25 92/9 94/13 95/3 98/24 102/15 102/16 104/7 107/4 107/23 114/22 119/8 122/8 128/2 130/17 130/17 152/22 153/13 163/18 165/23 169/19 170/20 171/8 171/14 172/14 174/9 176/22
first [45] 1/8 2/13 2/16 3/24 5/16 11/25 12/25 15/6 15/6 15/13 18/25 26/14 29/20 30/8 31/19 42/4 45/20 48/2 61/22 63/13 63/21 67/23 70/19 79/13 83/2 83/22 84/2 85/17 93/22 105/5 105/25 106/5 106/23 107/15 109/6 118/3 119/5 128/1 129/6 133/22 148/7 157/17 157/18 159/5 176/23	force [3] 31/23 31/24 36/9	freed [1] 125/13	gather [2] 1/5 173/16	gone [1] 162/5
forearm [1] 24/10	fora [1] 113/20	freedom [1] 153/17	gathering [1] 75/12	
Foreign [6] 45/22 46/6 48/20 55/1 60/10 93/1	force [3] 31/23 31/24 36/9	freight [1] 3/5	gave [1] 68/1	
forearm [1] 24/10	form [3] 164/12 166/17 168/10	frequency [2] 12/14 13/10	gazumped [2] 103/11 103/12	
foreseen [1] 42/17	formal [1] 75/11	frequent [1] 88/14	gazumping [5] 102/23 102/24 103/8 104/1 104/19	
forgive [12] 28/9 29/10 60/22 63/2 79/23 84/25 85/23 103/1 104/10 106/8 132/5 148/10	formally [1] 93/11	Friday [2] 129/2 129/5	general [10] 7/5 12/16 41/17 42/2 77/15 81/19 83/16 83/20 113/22 122/8	
forgotten [1] 93/3	former [4] 2/2 108/2 112/19 179/6	friend [10] 157/2 157/4 157/5 158/4 158/15 159/1 161/12 164/3 164/11 170/1	generally [3] 20/12 74/21 153/3	
form [3] 164/12 166/17 168/10	formerly [2] 1/23 81/19	friendship [4] 159/1 163/19 165/4 165/4	generating [1] 165/19	
formal [1] 75/11	forming [1] 125/23	front [13] 17/17 42/25 44/15 92/15 96/8 106/6 106/10 121/21 124/16 124/24 125/4 127/8 129/22	generation [1] 32/8	
formally [1] 93/11	forms [5] 35/23 50/15 50/17 50/22 50/25	frontline [1] 150/17	generous [1] 146/16	
former [4] 2/2 108/2 112/19 179/6	formulation [1] 69/24	frustrated [3] 96/17 124/11 163/7	generous-hearted [1] 146/16	
formerly [2] 1/23 81/19	fortnight [2] 174/2 175/5	frustrating [1] 98/16	generously [1] 146/6	
forming [1] 125/23	forum [1] 2/4	frustration [3] 76/13 96/7 125/8	Geneva [1] 82/8	
forms [5] 35/23 50/15 50/17 50/22 50/25	forward [9] 36/4 75/22 94/2 98/24 130/13 144/21 151/23 158/6 162/18	frustrations [1] 121/15	Germany [5] 25/19 33/10 41/25 46/16 80/19	
formulation [1] 69/24	forwarded [1] 149/8	fulfil [1] 16/19	get [29] 2/18 2/19 2/21 8/17 8/19 8/20 9/25 12/1 15/21 19/22 48/24 55/5 80/1 83/2 88/15 89/14 91/13	
fortnight [2] 174/2 175/5	forwarding [2] 58/19 76/9	fulfilled [2] 5/8 130/21		
Forum [1] 2/4	forwards [1] 48/1	fulfilling [1] 4/20		
forward [9] 36/4 75/22 94/2 98/24 130/13 144/21 151/23 158/6 162/18	foster [1] 40/1	fulfilment [1] 38/6		
forwarded [1] 149/8	found [11] 18/5 44/8 54/19 116/9 116/11 134/11 137/2 141/21 141/25 142/20 142/20	full [3] 112/10 127/23 158/1		
forwarding [2] 58/19 76/9	function [9] 37/7 38/17 43/18 43/25 44/3 44/4 44/13 71/15 103/4	functioning [2] 67/25 141/19		
forwards [1] 48/1	functions [2] 60/10 60/11			
foster [1] 40/1				
found [11] 18/5 44/8 54/19 116/9 116/11 134/11 137/2 141/21 141/25 142/20 142/20				

<p>G</p> <p>good [18] 59/4 66/24 75/8 75/21 77/24 81/9 108/11 116/6 116/14 150/23 151/11 151/22 161/12 163/19 164/3 164/11 165/4 170/1</p> <p>good-hearted [1] 150/23</p> <p>goods [38] 2/25 3/4 3/13 3/18 4/3 4/25 5/7 6/9 6/14 6/17 6/25 8/6 8/9 8/11 8/15 8/16 9/10 9/12 11/25 13/5 20/23 28/17 30/24 30/25 35/12 43/12 65/4 70/5 88/18 91/14 92/7 92/10 96/13 98/10 101/6 102/13 102/16 166/20</p> <p>Google [1] 54/22</p> <p>Google Meet [1] 54/22</p> <p>got [19] 1/5 51/12 78/9 94/6 96/19 97/4 108/14 108/16 109/9 121/20 125/20 149/21 151/16 154/11 157/9 157/13 163/23 169/10 173/19</p> <p>Gove [67] 111/8 112/2 112/4 112/5 112/11 112/12 112/18 113/9 113/19 114/5 114/11 115/1 115/5 115/19 116/17 122/23 123/17 126/12 129/8 130/2 131/22 132/5 132/8 132/10 132/19 133/21 134/15 137/24 138/20 140/7 140/14 141/23 142/12 143/7 144/25 146/23 147/16 148/22 149/20 150/25 151/6 152/14 154/21 156/15 156/17 157/16 160/15 161/8 161/19 162/5 163/16 164/4 164/10 164/25 165/5 167/1 167/21 168/13 169/18 170/1 170/24 172/1 172/15 173/15 173/21 179/5 181/14</p> <p>Gove's [1] 168/7</p> <p>govern [1] 114/15</p> <p>governing [1] 139/24</p> <p>government [61] 11/16 11/17 12/13 12/15 13/8 14/11 14/22 22/17 29/11 30/7 31/7 31/10 33/6 34/5 35/22 36/3 36/6 39/20 40/1 42/20</p> <p>43/19 44/14 46/5 50/4 54/1 54/17 54/19 65/19 66/11 66/17 66/25 67/3 68/2 68/12 68/20 71/11 74/21 85/12 86/4 86/5 92/21 92/25 93/2 102/2 102/3 109/19 116/24 119/24 124/13 124/14 126/1 126/7 142/8 142/15 144/15 147/11 150/14 150/20 173/7 175/19 175/24</p> <p>government's [3] 31/11 69/9 154/8</p> <p>government-controll ed [1] 31/7</p> <p>government-related [1] 54/17</p> <p>governments [5] 27/8 34/17 69/22 90/13 115/13</p> <p>gown [2] 35/6 168/5</p> <p>gowns [3] 168/25 171/5 171/7</p> <p>gowns/aprons [1] 168/25</p> <p>Graells [3] 114/14 115/6 115/17</p> <p>Graeme [2] 130/8 131/10</p> <p>Graeme Tunbridge [1] 130/8</p> <p>granular [1] 38/11</p> <p>graphics [1] 17/6</p> <p>grateful [2] 40/18 41/14</p> <p>great [5] 134/15 151/23 157/4 157/5 160/10</p> <p>greater [5] 20/25 77/1 134/11 135/3 153/7</p> <p>green [3] 97/16 167/3 167/4</p> <p>grifter [1] 116/16</p> <p>grip [1] 62/9</p> <p>ground [18] 45/11 46/8 55/12 58/16 59/25 60/5 60/7 72/20 75/10 87/21 90/21 91/20 93/9 93/13 98/7 98/13 107/19 110/17</p> <p>grounds [1] 141/21</p> <p>group [6] 45/16 49/19 64/23 113/23 120/24 178/17</p> <p>groups [2] 63/16 78/8</p> <p>growing [1] 76/13</p> <p>GRW [1] 129/1</p> <p>GSSEP [19] 42/7 58/13 60/2 61/16 63/3 63/4 63/5 63/5 63/6</p>	<p>63/11 63/13 63/19 64/10 75/2 77/16 88/19 94/9 105/11 109/15</p> <p>guidance [14] 12/13 12/15 13/10 13/12 13/13 55/8 55/11 55/16 55/19 56/3 72/9 72/12 73/15 82/20</p> <p>Guildhall [1] 1/24</p> <hr/> <p>H</p> <p>had [163] 11/25 13/22 13/25 14/12 14/16 15/5 15/13 18/10 18/18 19/15 20/10 20/10 22/24 23/16 26/23 29/12 30/1 44/24 45/1 45/4 45/7 45/11 46/8 46/9 47/20 47/23 47/24 48/6 49/18 49/21 50/2 51/5 51/12 53/1 53/2 54/6 54/12 54/14 55/4 56/9 60/10 60/17 61/4 61/6 61/18 64/12 64/13 66/15 66/24 66/24 70/11 72/23 74/16 74/21 74/23 79/24 82/16 83/13 83/13 84/7 85/14 85/16 85/17 85/18 85/23 85/23 86/1 86/1 86/3 86/4 86/6 86/7 86/9 86/10 86/11 86/13 86/14 86/15 86/18 86/19 86/21 87/10 87/11 87/16 87/20 88/15 88/18 89/10 89/11 90/24 90/25 94/12 94/23 96/12 96/13 96/21 98/13 99/10 99/23 100/15 102/10 104/20 105/4 105/20 109/21 114/12 116/13 117/12 119/14 119/20 119/20 122/1 122/17 122/20 122/21 124/24 124/25 125/16 125/20 127/8 129/18 129/21 129/25 131/12 131/12 133/5 135/20 136/12 136/15 136/24 137/8 137/21 138/7 138/13 139/23 140/17 145/18 145/22 148/9 148/16 149/14 152/22 157/1 158/9 158/16 160/11 161/6 162/10 164/21 167/2 167/3 168/18 168/21 169/7 169/14 169/14 169/15 173/7 175/9 175/12 175/24 176/1</p>	<p>179/12</p> <p>hadn't [1] 160/12</p> <p>half [1] 27/21</p> <p>halfway [2] 68/16 163/15</p> <p>halted [1] 21/14</p> <p>hammered [1] 162/21</p> <p>hamstrung [1] 110/22</p> <p>Hancock [3] 113/16 121/6 132/15</p> <p>Hancock's [2] 123/13 162/20</p> <p>hand [11] 5/23 12/7 13/7 16/9 26/5 28/4 49/3 50/18 96/23 140/17 178/10</p> <p>handle [2] 162/25 170/7</p> <p>handled [2] 138/3 138/3</p> <p>handling [2] 163/10 170/14</p> <p>hands [1] 84/16</p> <p>happen [7] 16/23 24/9 28/11 28/25 63/6 64/25 155/10</p> <p>happened [5] 34/13 34/16 98/8 102/7 103/16</p> <p>happening [13] 5/11 16/13 20/19 21/13 27/19 29/17 36/18 36/23 61/6 70/22 110/4 122/14 159/4</p> <p>happens [3] 7/7 97/11 110/7</p> <p>happy [3] 111/24 111/25 128/13</p> <p>hard [3] 88/5 138/5 139/22</p> <p>harder [1] 73/7</p> <p>has [62] 4/21 5/3 7/11 20/18 21/19 30/7 31/22 32/5 32/11 32/13 32/20 34/15 35/14 38/23 39/1 39/2 39/20 47/8 50/13 57/6 60/11 61/21 69/3 69/4 70/6 74/10 92/25 102/2 110/2 118/20 122/17 123/23 123/24 124/17 128/10 129/6 129/6 130/2 130/24 135/13 141/14 144/15 149/8 150/4 153/19 153/22 155/1 155/21 159/14 164/5 164/5 164/7 164/8 165/5 167/11 168/7 170/1 173/3 174/3 174/24 179/17 179/20</p> <p>have [233]</p>	<p>haven't [5] 41/3 97/16 111/15 112/5 137/2</p> <p>having [20] 24/6 37/25 43/21 43/24 53/22 54/18 61/16 78/22 79/4 80/2 88/3 95/1 103/15 106/4 107/11 108/5 108/20 116/12 137/13 138/5</p> <p>hazardous [1] 9/20</p> <p>he [71] 69/5 69/8 69/21 106/9 114/20 115/2 115/7 115/8 115/11 117/1 117/12 118/17 118/21 118/24 119/3 121/2 122/1 122/17 122/19 123/9 123/10 123/18 123/24 124/11 125/7 131/11 131/11 133/4 133/5 135/12 135/13 136/15 138/6 138/7 138/8 138/8 138/9 138/10 138/10 138/10 138/12 142/7 152/15 152/20 155/9 157/5 157/9 157/10 157/13 157/18 157/21 157/25 158/1 158/4 158/9 158/12 158/15 158/15 158/18 158/24 158/25 159/2 159/22 163/6 164/5 164/8 165/14 165/16 165/22 168/7 168/13</p> <p>he's [6] 77/22 123/25 124/1 124/2 157/8 165/18</p> <p>head [4] 57/1 76/2 93/1 95/2</p> <p>headed [3] 76/3 93/1 104/15</p> <p>heading [1] 138/21</p> <p>health [37] 8/15 8/16 11/18 12/16 13/23 14/4 22/19 24/12 43/1 46/22 50/14 53/25 55/9 55/12 56/4 56/19 56/22 57/2 58/3 58/19 59/11 61/8 68/21 71/10 84/12 85/1 88/12 92/13 93/6 93/25 95/25 97/14 99/5 99/12 109/3 124/16 144/24</p> <p>Health Service [1] 124/16</p> <p>healthcare [22] 7/25 8/24 10/5 14/8 19/23 24/2 33/18 37/24 49/11 49/20 64/5 66/5 66/7 69/10 71/9 73/23 77/25 78/5 78/7 97/24 100/9 107/10</p>
---	--	---	--

H	50/8 73/4 74/4 74/9 74/9 74/24 75/1 75/16 115/23 116/10 116/20 122/4 123/24 139/7 141/1 141/6 141/9 141/15 141/20 143/10 143/14 143/21 144/8 144/24 145/15 145/16 147/25 148/5 148/8 148/8 148/14 149/12 149/16 170/13 172/2 172/16 173/2	holdings [2] 22/21 37/5 holds [1] 7/20 Holland [1] 164/9 home [2] 88/3 156/17 honest [2] 71/4 102/7 honorary [1] 1/23 hope [8] 41/3 80/18 80/21 111/3 111/14 111/17 112/5 129/18 hoped [2] 28/7 145/20 horizon [1] 34/9 Hornby [1] 128/4 horses [1] 152/11 hospital [3] 2/19 11/19 35/18 hospitalisation [2] 12/11 13/19 hospitals [1] 132/16 host [1] 15/23 hotels [1] 82/25 hour [1] 146/25 hours [1] 147/13 house [1] 67/9 how [40] 4/14 10/22 11/6 13/16 16/14 20/9 24/17 32/8 34/25 36/2 36/17 38/9 38/10 38/12 47/14 48/2 48/17 49/2 63/17 65/5 65/17 69/25 89/16 90/4 96/23 101/3 108/1 108/2 108/6 108/9 115/10 118/7 118/9 118/20 129/11 130/3 140/19 152/4 157/17 177/24 however [3] 53/4 130/21 151/23 HPL [1] 157/18 huge [8] 12/21 15/25 17/7 21/16 22/14 36/24 58/4 115/14 hugely [1] 17/19 hundred [2] 61/22 61/25 hundreds [1] 29/4 hybrid [1] 21/20	125/11 155/23 172/9 I assume [1] 141/3 I became [1] 83/20 I believe [3] 45/3 125/12 136/3 I call [1] 21/20 I can [9] 41/13 53/4 55/24 75/18 78/17 89/20 96/7 105/10 134/22 I can't [6] 85/3 137/18 144/10 157/20 171/18 178/3 I certainly [2] 18/20 32/19 I come [1] 83/17 I completely [1] 29/25 I could [2] 107/21 129/16 I described [1] 46/1 I did [3] 118/15 162/12 170/22 I do [9] 18/20 70/19 106/12 110/21 133/1 134/21 141/14 159/22 172/20 I don't [13] 40/12 40/14 71/18 80/10 108/12 111/5 120/25 133/5 138/4 159/22 168/3 172/6 178/10 I entirely [1] 79/14 I felt [1] 135/20 I gather [2] 1/5 173/16 I get [1] 80/1 I had [7] 47/20 49/21 53/1 70/11 104/20 129/25 135/20 I have [11] 19/19 35/19 70/7 100/18 100/18 116/14 121/7 145/24 164/3 164/16 176/24 I hope [7] 41/3 80/18 80/21 111/3 111/14 111/17 112/5 I impose [1] 179/9 I interpret [1] 74/11 I just [7] 18/14 53/9 64/20 106/16 118/3 132/22 179/19 I know [4] 150/10 168/24 171/10 179/8 I looked [1] 122/13 I made [1] 146/5 I make [2] 146/14 176/22 I may [21] 24/23 27/20 34/2 39/17 82/22 87/3 95/23 96/3 99/20 100/20 102/9 103/17 105/6 114/1	120/17 128/15 138/20 140/15 142/17 161/15 179/22 I mean [40] 3/14 5/2 14/3 19/14 22/14 25/12 44/10 56/8 58/22 61/9 67/16 70/12 70/19 71/12 73/19 74/8 74/8 75/18 77/2 77/15 79/13 79/14 82/15 82/22 84/13 84/14 85/4 85/16 87/9 89/6 89/20 90/7 92/20 94/3 99/18 101/16 103/17 109/25 167/14 172/12 I mentioned [3] 18/1 21/7 137/8 I might [2] 164/21 169/10 I move [2] 88/24 151/18 I note [3] 122/7 135/4 149/20 I only [1] 159/13 I or [1] 148/12 I passed [1] 138/24 I pause [1] 66/4 I please [1] 31/16 I pose [1] 128/14 I posed [1] 154/21 I pressed [1] 127/2 I presume [1] 121/8 I promise [1] 140/8 I provided [1] 146/18 I put [3] 115/10 128/1 167/1 I quote [1] 72/11 I read [1] 114/19 I recall [1] 135/15 I received [1] 138/25 I recognise [2] 98/14 99/25 I recognised [1] 79/6 I recommend [1] 33/13 I refer [1] 176/4 I remember [2] 102/8 137/13 I represent [1] 77/24 I said [7] 60/14 87/22 96/6 96/10 98/15 143/15 153/13 I say [12] 62/5 71/4 77/14 83/11 137/20 138/17 138/18 139/21 140/3 156/9 158/7 176/25 I see [1] 28/2 I send [1] 54/8 I sent [1] 155/22 I set [1] 125/8 I shall [4] 40/20 80/25 140/9 179/25
----------	--	---	--	--

I	I want [9] 76/11 117/22 119/1 120/16 140/14 143/17 158/23 159/3 177/21	identify [5] 59/2 68/3 85/6 90/15 153/23	implement [2] 26/17 69/18	increasingly [1] 163/7	
I should [2] 104/11 168/5	I wanted [4] 122/15 123/4 136/4 168/4	if [136] 1/15 2/10 4/15 8/3 8/16 8/19 8/19 11/25 15/17 17/4 19/14 21/21 23/7 24/9 24/22 25/12 25/17 25/24 26/15 26/23 27/19 28/1 28/17 29/13 29/20 32/6 33/2 34/2 35/8 36/2 39/17 40/5 48/25 51/15 54/5 54/14 55/14 55/21 55/24 57/3 61/4 61/23 62/1 64/9 69/5 75/20 78/14 78/23 82/22 85/15 87/3 88/20 89/20 91/13 95/23 96/3 96/7 97/10 97/11 97/20 98/5 99/7 99/20 100/6 100/20 100/25 101/4 102/8 102/25 104/1 105/6 105/8 105/10 107/21 109/19 109/25 111/1 111/3 111/24 114/1 115/2 119/12 120/5 120/17 121/13 124/23 124/25 125/9 127/2 127/24 128/14 128/17 129/18 129/20 129/25 131/5 131/11 131/12 132/14 132/23 133/4 134/4 134/25 135/1 135/7 138/20 140/15 142/17 144/5 144/10 144/13 144/16 144/18 145/22 147/15 149/21 152/23 154/13 156/18 156/20 156/20 160/12 161/8 161/15 165/22 167/13 169/1 169/9 173/6 173/6 174/5 174/14 177/19 178/16 178/21 178/23	import [2] 68/10 69/13	implications [1] 83/8	indeed [40] 2/20 20/14 39/25 40/15 44/14 45/3 46/10 47/12 47/16 48/9 53/6 65/9 67/23 71/21 80/16 80/24 81/16 82/9 86/21 88/8 89/10 89/12 91/16 96/20 102/6 104/1 105/11 111/14 111/20 112/18 117/17 127/3 131/18 141/25 147/11 149/2 157/14 176/10 179/4 179/25
I so [1] 179/23	I will [2] 121/7 143/15	importantly [1] 20/21	importance [5] 51/3 114/6 127/10 129/9 178/12	independently [1] 129/24	
I spent [1] 122/13	I wished [1] 131/7	Imports [2] 68/10 69/13	important [24] 21/9 36/17 40/5 46/14 66/15 80/12 80/13 86/18 94/15 94/19 94/19 94/25 95/10 95/15 98/9 99/23 99/24 113/20 117/13 120/14 142/4 155/17 173/12 174/4	independent [1] 129/24	
I start [3] 41/15 42/12 82/10	I won't [1] 77/20	impose [1] 179/9	impossibility [2] 87/19 87/20	indicate [2] 156/4 174/9	
I still [1] 98/9	I wonder [4] 1/15 2/10 48/25 174/5	impossible [1] 153/9	improve [2] 68/25 69/19	indicated [2] 122/21 123/6	
I suggest [1] 26/18	I would [21] 2/22 49/17 50/9 57/20 58/5 58/11 70/12 70/13 79/13 92/20 96/3 109/5 117/7 117/10 131/17 152/8 161/15 166/18 169/16 171/22 174/13	impose [1] 179/9	improvement [3] 134/9 153/14 154/10	indication [1] 99/3	
I suppose [2] 47/13 85/15	I wouldn't [3] 50/22 90/2 141/10	impossibility [2] 87/19 87/20	improve [2] 68/25 69/19	indirect [4] 118/5 119/5 135/16 135/17	
I take [2] 116/4 122/23	I'd [8] 7/24 10/22 31/12 48/22 52/14 59/23 100/3 163/3	impossible [1] 153/9	improvement [3] 134/9 153/14 154/10	individual [12] 23/16 23/17 48/16 63/15 66/18 67/4 69/1 74/15 138/24 149/6 149/8 166/22	
I talk [1] 51/2	I'll [3] 142/12 156/22 162/4	improvement [3] 134/9 153/14 154/10	improvements [1] 20/18	individuals [8] 78/8 139/25 150/6 150/22 150/23 151/4 151/10 151/12	
I then [1] 176/23	I'm [42] 3/21 18/23 25/18 40/18 72/21 73/18 74/5 79/16 80/6 80/7 80/10 90/17 96/3 96/14 96/16 98/5 103/17 108/1 111/12 111/13 114/22 114/23 128/2 128/5 131/11 132/5 132/6 135/4 139/6 151/8 152/22 157/20 162/23 169/19 169/20 173/25 175/21 176/6 176/6 176/15 176/22 178/3	improvement [3] 134/9 153/14 154/10	inability [4] 14/22 37/14 110/22 119/24	industrialists [1] 136/21	
I think [126] 2/13 13/14 13/21 17/20 17/23 19/14 19/16 20/14 20/25 21/7 22/25 23/23 26/9 29/18 30/18 30/18 33/4 34/8 35/14 36/4 36/6 39/25 43/23 44/10 50/23 51/5 51/13 53/12 60/24 62/18 62/24 63/2 66/15 67/23 70/24 71/4 74/9 83/2 83/7 84/7 86/18 88/13 94/3 94/4 94/17 95/1 99/20 100/19 101/16 101/17 102/8 102/8 102/9 104/4 104/4 105/1 105/4 105/7 105/14 105/24 105/24 106/22 108/11 109/5 110/20 111/1 111/23 114/20 115/1 119/6 122/24 125/18 126/1 129/17 132/9 133/22 134/11 134/18 134/24 137/10 137/12 137/17 138/4 138/8 138/16 139/6 139/9 140/5 140/20 140/23 141/7 141/9 143/8 143/11 145/17 146/19 150/13 153/3 154/4 154/5 155/17 155/20 156/3 156/11 156/17 157/14 157/18 157/25 158/2 158/7 158/12 159/10 159/15 160/4 160/6 161/4 162/1 164/18 166/11 167/10 168/15 168/15 173/3 176/21 178/11 179/15	I've [16] 11/15 54/16 54/19 68/4 69/6 69/17 73/15 78/9 93/3 114/12 139/8 141/24 147/12 149/25 166/1 173/19	inappropriate [1] 149/9	inability [4] 14/22 37/14 110/22 119/24	industries [5] 39/11 174/23 176/1 176/12 177/11	
I thought [1] 18/16	I've found [1] 54/19	inappropriate [1] 149/9	inbox [1] 163/6	industry [13] 7/2 11/6 11/6 14/24 15/18 16/15 26/12 30/17 35/3 37/2 39/15 39/15 98/1	
I turn [3] 24/19 31/15 105/17	lans [1] 156/11	inappropriate [1] 149/9	incentivise [1] 36/3	ineffectual [1] 27/15	
I understand [3] 57/9 79/24 107/24	idea [7] 48/4 48/24 132/7 150/11 172/3 172/17 172/22	inappropriate [1] 149/9	incidentally [1] 68/7	inefficiency [1] 51/16	
I use [1] 177/3	identified [13] 44/25 64/18 66/24 76/17 76/23 77/11 79/4 79/10 80/2 102/10 104/18 145/15 174/17	inappropriate [1] 149/9	include [2] 106/14 121/18	inevitably [3] 138/15 154/17 167/19	

I	165/8	interim [1] 96/12	inundated [1] 162/24	25/17 44/1 50/22 51/5
ingenious [1] 137/22	INQ000534834 [1] 169/21	intermediaries [13] 36/22 72/2 73/2 73/7	invasive [1] 139/15	52/16 53/22 58/11
initial [24] 49/17 50/3	INQ000536361 [1] 135/9	74/4 74/24 75/16 77/4	inventor [1] 122/19	64/3 73/9 87/10 89/22
50/7 52/24 54/3 54/5	INQ000563560 [1] 112/14	77/6 101/14 101/18	inventory [23] 21/2	99/14 106/9 116/24
55/3 56/14 66/9 77/18	INQ000563687 [1] 159/5	102/4 104/19	21/23 21/25 22/3 22/4	174/4 176/18
82/22 82/24 83/21	INQ000569777 [1] 123/12	intermediary [3] 72/5	22/9 22/10 22/12	issuing [1] 118/10
84/3 84/4 88/25 89/5	inquiry [43] 1/11 1/13	72/18 76/25	22/15 22/17 22/21	it [404]
90/7 109/25 110/1	3/25 4/2 5/15 11/10	intermediate [1] 6/9	23/7 23/11 24/2 24/3	it's [131] 7/21 8/18
146/25 148/12 149/13	23/13 24/20 41/2 41/6	international [38]	24/6 24/7 24/14 28/4	9/8 9/18 9/20 10/1
159/8	41/10 41/15 47/8 48/4	15/16 24/25 41/8	30/10 30/24 37/5 39/4	10/2 11/5 14/3 14/15
initially [7] 48/19	48/13 50/13 54/4	41/17 42/3 42/13	invest [2] 34/20	16/8 20/22 21/20
64/16 65/23 66/12	61/21 81/8 81/10	42/24 43/8 43/9 43/12	36/13	23/10 27/25 32/2 32/6
88/19 147/7 162/9	100/12 112/9 112/10	43/15 45/21 46/8	investigate [1]	33/10 33/11 33/15
initiated [1] 172/10	112/13 112/13 112/15	46/11 47/22 49/11	160/10	34/13 34/16 34/17
initiating [1] 30/11	114/19 119/22 120/15	50/20 51/18 52/20	investigated [1]	35/4 38/10 38/20 39/5
initiative [2] 172/2	131/19 137/3 139/12	53/19 53/24 57/13	161/24	39/11 39/11 43/23
172/16	139/25 142/24 155/2	59/18 60/23 62/10	investigating [1]	51/24 53/12 56/13
innovation [2] 39/22	162/14 162/15 167/11	63/16 64/22 65/15	64/3	56/20 60/22 60/25
120/2	173/2 181/4 181/7	67/19 79/18 82/7 83/8	investigation [2]	62/1 66/15 68/11 70/9
innovator [1] 124/2	181/12 181/15	95/6 99/5 104/14	160/15 161/1	71/3 72/5 76/1 76/2
INQ00048399 [1] 120/20	Inquiry's [1] 156/2	105/20 109/3 109/21	investing [2] 34/3	76/3 77/2 77/14 77/14
INQ000217031 [1] 174/7	insight [1] 100/25	internationally [2]	34/12	78/18 78/24 79/1
INQ000339236 [1] 78/15	insist [1] 104/8	3/5 4/23	investment [15] 34/9	80/12 80/13 85/14
INQ000474864 [1] 1/14	insistent [1] 127/21	Internet [1] 38/14	35/14 35/22 35/25	85/15 85/22 86/18
INQ000477701 [1] 98/19	insofar [2] 42/13	interpret [2] 74/11	36/2 36/11 39/22	90/12 91/16 92/25
INQ000489577 [1] 51/14	71/8	171/12	39/23 43/9 49/21 71/8	93/2 93/12 94/19 97/6
INQ000489583 [1] 55/10	instability [1] 13/2	interpretation [2]	86/8 87/8 87/11	101/25 102/6 104/4
INQ000493785 [2] 95/4 97/7	instance [1] 31/19	53/12 171/10	109/20	104/10 104/13 104/14
INQ000493811 [1] 56/24	instead [5] 30/23	interpretations [1]	invite [4] 142/12	104/15 106/3 107/5
INQ000493813 [1] 48/25	76/21 96/13 159/1	169/19	151/2 151/24 159/3	110/18 111/1 112/13
INQ000493856 [1] 62/1	163/21	interpreted [1] 130/4	6/13 13/18 16/16 23/9	112/14 112/15 115/22
INQ000493919 [1] 75/24	institute [2] 1/22	interrelation [1] 23/3	51/19 62/19 67/22	120/14 122/23 122/24
INQ000494034 [1] 102/22	institution [1] 66/11	interrogate [1] 65/3	83/3 122/3 122/5	123/16 124/4 124/7
INQ000494249 [1] 68/11	institutions [1] 23/18	interrupt [3] 18/14	122/18 123/8 130/22	126/1 127/17 128/3
INQ000496699 [1] 127/16	instruct [1] 129/23	19/7 108/22	137/23 153/18 160/19	128/16 128/18 128/18
INQ000497116 [1] 128/16	instructed [3] 72/12	intervene [2] 135/12	170/16	129/22 131/17 132/12
INQ000512941 [1] 144/6	128/11 173/21	135/20	involvement [15]	132/18 137/25 138/4
INQ000533247 [1] 128/3	instruction [3]	intervention [4]	70/11 82/22 82/23	141/22 142/1 142/4
INQ000533868 [2] 164/1 179/19	118/10 118/12 129/12	14/23 119/12 119/20	83/1 117/4 119/21	143/6 144/6 144/7
INQ000533988 [1] 167/22	integrate [2] 23/4	119/21	121/17 122/10 123/1	148/7 151/12 151/18
INQ000534490 [1] 132/21	40/8	interventions [4]	139/19 157/1 157/19	153/3 153/9 155/17
INQ000534695 [1]	integration [1] 23/3	65/11 67/17 68/4	159/6 160/19 161/22	156/2 164/13 165/8
	integrity [3] 135/23	70/21	IoT [1] 38/14	165/9 165/9 165/25
	135/25 136/3	into [46] 18/21 19/9	IPPV [3] 55/16 55/18	166/8 166/14 166/15
	intelligence [3] 1/20	19/20 20/4 23/8 24/8	55/21	166/24 166/25 167/23
	66/16 71/15	27/13 27/18 30/25	irrespective [1]	168/15 169/22 172/12
	intended [1] 42/15	34/24 35/9 35/18 40/6	169/11	173/14 174/14 177/6
	intense [1] 91/19	50/6 50/10 52/7 54/9	is [398]	177/16 177/17 179/1
	intensive [1] 31/21	56/25 61/24 63/5	isn't [10] 9/9 34/4	179/11
	intent [2] 60/15 91/8	63/19 73/5 76/18	55/22 60/22 79/5	Italy [1] 15/13
	interaction [1] 96/5	86/20 89/13 93/10	80/12 114/3 147/22	item [6] 8/20 9/15
	interest [2] 58/4	94/15 98/6 99/16	160/14 166/13	24/18 35/10 38/22
	138/21	100/25 106/13 106/13	Israel [1] 57/10	55/23
	interested [1] 137/6	107/17 108/3 110/23	issuance [1] 171/20	items [19] 9/5 10/7
	interface [1] 88/20	118/18 118/20 121/22	171/20	13/16 14/2 17/17
	interference [2]	142/6 144/19 147/17	issue [16] 4/12 50/23	20/13 21/4 22/12
	153/20 154/3	148/5 149/18 162/5	51/1 51/13 52/18	31/18 32/16 38/12
	interferes [1] 166/10	170/25 171/13	56/17 56/23 62/3	44/19 76/9 76/20
		intractable [1]	73/12 79/15 102/23	93/18 96/18 97/4
		137/22	141/9 174/14 174/16	119/2 167/18
		introduced [2]	176/19 179/17	iterations [1] 18/25
		104/11 157/17	issued [3] 72/10	iterative [1] 91/16
		introduction [1] 2/11	73/16 75/7	its [21] 4/20 7/11
			issues [17] 13/21	13/9 13/25 14/1 25/16

I	judging [1] 168/17 judgment [3] 121/24 141/24 142/2 judgments [1] 115/23 July [1] 41/22 July 2018 [1] 41/22 jump [1] 168/24 June [2] 78/11 104/14 June 2020 [1] 78/11 junior [1] 116/25 just [82] 3/20 3/25 4/2 4/15 5/23 7/5 10/10 14/14 14/15 18/6 18/14 20/11 21/24 22/8 22/23 23/6 23/12 23/24 24/17 24/22 25/18 26/11 28/9 28/10 29/12 32/3 33/11 37/22 45/15 48/4 48/24 52/14 53/9 58/15 64/20 66/4 69/4 69/17 70/7 71/25 72/16 73/15 75/24 78/14 80/8 83/20 85/15 85/15 87/2 88/23 89/17 96/14 97/8 97/13 101/24 106/16 107/21 108/1 114/16 118/3 124/15 128/17 132/14 132/19 132/22 133/7 137/19 138/20 142/17 142/18 150/16 153/5 153/16 154/15 161/16 163/10 163/23 164/3 169/24 174/2 177/21 179/19 Justice [2] 72/2 141/24 Justice UK [1] 72/2	kindly [1] 146/17 kindly-meant [1] 146/17 kinds [4] 10/14 64/14 65/11 66/2 Kingdom [16] 32/13 43/5 43/6 43/10 44/17 83/5 88/6 88/10 92/14 99/13 101/15 104/23 110/13 150/16 178/7 178/15 Kingdom's [1] 82/5 kit [4] 9/18 90/22 98/7 155/4 kits [3] 97/16 97/19 177/3 knew [5] 22/22 86/13 161/11 161/12 162/9 knit [1] 167/4 know [67] 3/4 24/17 32/1 32/8 32/23 51/9 58/1 59/5 62/20 62/24 72/22 73/17 73/18 84/19 84/21 89/4 89/12 90/2 97/2 101/17 102/10 102/18 104/4 105/6 106/16 106/22 107/9 108/18 109/11 113/19 114/10 114/13 118/12 120/12 121/13 123/8 123/10 140/18 144/9 145/22 150/10 152/3 152/8 152/12 153/9 155/1 155/5 155/9 160/19 161/2 162/6 164/15 168/7 168/17 168/24 169/2 169/8 170/19 170/21 170/22 171/10 172/5 172/9 172/10 172/18 175/2 179/8 know-how [1] 32/8 knowhow [1] 32/4 knowledge [13] 1/16 41/12 42/17 81/15 86/9 87/12 101/1 104/21 108/15 112/16 114/2 157/24 172/20 known [8] 53/2 56/17 73/23 88/19 103/9 124/18 158/4 158/9 knows [3] 7/22 22/21 139/12	lacking [2] 19/17 37/9 laddie [2] 156/14 174/20 lady [24] 1/8 19/10 40/19 40/25 53/12 53/16 55/7 71/20 80/14 80/20 81/6 108/11 108/23 111/25 112/1 112/8 134/18 135/4 156/16 167/4 167/10 179/3 179/14 179/17 Lady's [3] 19/15 47/8 50/13 laggardly [1] 146/4 Lancaster [1] 112/25 land [1] 164/22 landscape [1] 90/8 lane [35] 74/22 116/10 118/20 139/7 140/15 140/25 141/1 141/5 141/6 141/10 141/15 141/21 143/10 143/14 144/8 145/4 145/10 145/16 147/16 147/25 148/5 148/6 148/8 148/9 148/14 148/18 148/21 149/12 149/16 156/24 166/16 166/18 166/19 172/2 172/16 language [4] 86/14 87/12 131/1 143/5 large [9] 55/24 73/22 74/21 92/25 100/9 100/14 101/10 102/1 143/23 largely [2] 14/17 20/16 larger [2] 57/12 73/25 last [22] 9/6 17/21 17/23 19/1 30/19 37/12 47/8 65/17 97/13 114/11 115/21 118/14 119/11 120/12 122/7 126/15 126/22 140/24 149/4 150/8 165/12 166/4 late [3] 41/21 62/16 172/12 later [15] 5/22 6/10 10/3 18/13 24/21 54/13 61/20 96/11 99/16 105/11 128/16 129/14 167/23 174/2 176/19 latest [1] 177/19 law [5] 1/25 114/2 115/9 116/6 116/14 Lawson [2] 23/14 57/1 lawyer [1] 115/7	lawyers [1] 115/15 layers [1] 6/13 lead [16] 21/14 38/7 42/19 45/24 54/1 54/6 54/8 54/14 75/21 77/11 92/17 93/4 112/9 120/2 165/2 181/15 leader [2] 157/7 157/11 leaders [1] 76/2 leadership [9] 52/2 52/9 92/12 92/16 117/25 118/5 118/6 119/15 134/1 leading [4] 20/9 42/4 77/6 97/25 leads [19] 12/21 13/6 45/23 47/4 47/6 47/22 48/1 48/16 49/6 57/23 58/7 58/20 58/23 59/2 59/6 60/17 62/22 63/14 79/21 lean [1] 50/10 learn [1] 110/5 learned [8] 63/8 63/9 105/18 105/21 107/16 107/24 108/2 108/3 learning [2] 106/20 106/20 learnt [3] 51/9 104/15 176/7 least [10] 13/7 31/17 50/16 57/15 59/11 94/13 104/2 120/5 147/7 149/11 leave [1] 168/4 led [5] 84/7 101/2 109/14 113/12 135/11 left [7] 5/23 12/7 13/7 16/9 32/24 49/3 85/24 left-hand [5] 5/23 12/7 13/7 16/9 49/3 legacy [1] 115/9 legitimate [1] 146/20 lengths [1] 160/10 lenses [1] 67/20 less [5] 21/1 29/21 50/16 100/18 101/6 lesson [2] 107/24 108/3 lessons [11] 51/9 63/8 63/8 104/15 105/17 105/21 106/12 107/1 107/16 108/24 110/5 let [3] 78/9 80/9 155/12 let's [16] 118/9 127/6 127/13 130/3 132/19 144/5 156/24 157/17 159/5 161/16 163/16 163/18 163/23 164/1 165/7 167/21
J	JACT [33] 42/4 47/9 48/18 48/19 49/7 49/7 50/19 52/12 52/15 55/13 56/23 57/1 57/8 58/15 59/14 60/1 60/3 60/14 62/5 63/1 63/5 63/14 64/10 76/1 88/19 88/22 94/8 103/5 105/8 105/11 106/24 109/12 110/6 JACTs [1] 51/19 James [21] 121/11 121/16 122/6 122/17 123/7 123/22 124/11 124/15 124/17 124/20 125/6 125/19 136/21 137/7 137/21 138/5 138/11 138/14 139/19 139/21 167/5 January [2] 68/13 112/25 January 2020 [1] 112/25 January of [1] 68/13 Japan [1] 21/10 JIT [3] 28/7 28/14 29/18 job [9] 56/11 83/22 89/13 105/25 106/1 106/19 134/16 153/18 166/10 jobs [2] 107/11 152/2 John [7] 1/8 1/10 127/18 130/12 135/11 135/24 181/3 Johnson [1] 132/15 join [1] 150/5 joined [1] 92/21 joint [10] 42/4 45/15 45/20 46/19 47/1 52/9 83/6 103/3 109/11 109/13 Jolyon [1] 140/1 Jolyon Maugham [1] 140/1 Jonathan [3] 149/3 155/6 167/12 judge [1] 156/2 judgement [2] 147/5 154/17 judgements [1] 37/8	kick [2] 28/8 28/10 kind [23] 1/15 34/3 39/8 41/11 44/6 45/14 45/18 92/1 92/5 93/12 101/23 102/11 102/12 104/8 105/7 107/6 108/7 109/9 109/14 110/7 124/25 167/8 175/8	L	laboratory [2] 134/6 134/10 labour [7] 20/24 31/20 31/20 31/23 31/24 32/3 33/3 lack [10] 7/6 7/8 14/25 15/19 62/8 78/12 106/10 107/25 150/18 178/19

L	95/2	169/23	12/17 69/9 93/5	many [39] 2/25 3/14
lethal [1] 132/16	located [2] 26/25	Lord Feldman [1]	110/17 113/20 117/25	5/18 6/5 6/6 6/6 6/22
letter [7] 98/21 145/9	65/14	157/22	118/5 118/6 119/5	6/22 6/25 8/9 13/16
145/23 145/24 146/11	location [2] 10/20	lose [3] 32/6 32/7	119/15 122/18 124/17	13/21 17/5 22/23 23/8
176/20 176/22	67/13	48/15	146/3 148/10 160/20	29/4 29/4 32/24 35/5
letters [2] 91/8	locations [1] 87/1	losing [1] 57/9	165/5 169/11 176/7	38/5 44/25 45/11
127/21	lockdown [2] 88/4	loss [1] 134/12	Malaysia [1] 25/7	45/11 46/8 48/17 50/2
level [12] 8/8 9/8	154/12	lost [4] 32/6 57/9	Malta [1] 102/9	59/2 62/13 86/23 87/9
13/18 37/4 37/20	logic [1] 50/25	98/18 139/21	man [1] 116/16	88/1 89/17 101/20
37/25 56/14 58/7 59/7	logical [2] 45/8 179/1	lot [13] 5/22 17/20	manage [3] 61/12	106/2 117/5 131/11
59/20 130/22 154/11	logistical [2] 47/23	17/23 18/18 18/21	69/1 173/8	152/4 152/11 176/24
levels [5] 3/17 21/23	60/19	32/4 62/22 74/23	managed [1] 164/5	Manzoni [4] 127/18
32/13 36/13 108/15	logistics [7] 1/22 2/3	86/22 110/21 155/1	management [5] 2/8	130/12 135/12 135/25
licences [1] 176/3	2/7 18/6 38/18 88/5	165/19 166/6	24/3 38/17 47/18	map [3] 49/1 54/3
lie [1] 65/4	167/16	lots [1] 73/4	66/21	54/7
lies [1] 98/4	London [10] 1/23	low [10] 8/9 9/1 9/2	manager [3] 26/24	March [19] 1/1 47/12
life [10] 9/24 49/12	46/20 47/1 47/5 59/15	9/3 9/3 20/16 31/23	37/19 38/1	81/20 83/3 83/20 84/5
49/20 86/10 87/10	88/11 88/21 95/16	59/8 73/4 116/14	managers [1] 39/6	95/8 95/8 95/9 110/2
131/3 173/9 174/25	104/15 107/6	low-cost [2] 20/16	managing [3] 74/18	120/22 123/16 127/17
176/12 177/12	London-based [1]	31/23	74/18 163/6	129/12 132/24 155/23
life-saving [1] 173/9	107/6	lower [3] 20/13 20/24	mandate [1] 179/2	159/19 173/23 173/23
light [1] 97/17	long [14] 29/2 29/8	32/25	mandated [1] 35/5	March 2020 [4] 83/3
like [28] 7/24 10/22	29/21 30/8 34/8 34/18	lower-value-adding	mandating [2]	83/20 120/22 173/23
31/12 37/12 42/22	41/3 53/2 65/17 98/24	[1] 32/25	131/25 153/24	marginal [2] 141/10
52/14 54/20 59/23	108/1 112/6 140/19	ludicrous [2] 76/16	manifest [3] 25/13	143/6
80/17 88/20 89/6	174/3	132/12	64/9 64/14	Mark [3] 174/1
89/20 90/8 92/20 96/8	long-term [5] 29/2	lynchpin [1] 117/14	Manley [14] 81/6	176/23 178/10
98/14 99/24 100/3	29/8 29/21 34/18	M	81/7 81/9 81/17 82/10	marked [1] 77/1
100/25 101/4 104/1	98/24	machine [5] 55/25	88/22 96/14 98/5	market [35] 1/19 3/6
105/9 139/25 142/13	longer [6] 27/11	124/13 124/14 132/16	104/10 109/16 111/5	7/22 12/7 13/6 17/8
149/16 170/8 174/13	28/21 64/8 64/11	139/22	111/10 111/13 181/11	17/15 17/19 24/19
179/9	107/19 147/13	made [22] 23/22 34/2	manner [1] 138/25	24/22 25/5 25/8 26/3
likelihood [3] 26/16	longer-term [4]	36/20 65/19 79/20	Manners [12] 1/9	33/25 38/7 45/5 48/12
29/22 31/2	27/11 28/21 64/8	84/25 93/22 108/19	1/10 1/12 1/18 2/10	48/15 57/22 57/24
likely [7] 29/22 73/7	64/11	118/20 130/20 140/20	19/8 30/5 36/15 40/12	65/12 70/25 71/1 72/5
89/15 91/2 145/1	look [26] 8/8 14/8	142/5 142/5 146/5	69/3 70/6 181/3	72/13 72/18 72/23
167/19 167/19	15/17 25/12 26/19	147/8 147/12 148/15	Manners-Bell [3] 1/9	73/3 73/5 73/13 77/5
limit [4] 26/6 31/17	28/1 30/10 55/10	148/22 149/1 152/18	1/10 181/3	77/8 86/11 90/12
103/15 114/24	55/22 61/23 64/8 72/4	155/7 167/12	manufacture [7] 6/3	170/13
limited [4] 1/20 30/22	83/7 94/11 94/12	mailbox [1] 165/23	6/9 9/6 25/24 32/7	marketplace [1]
113/12 148/4	98/14 99/18 102/22	main [3] 6/2 6/24	32/16 130/23	89/10
line [18] 17/17 42/25	109/25 142/13 144/5	125/16	manufactured [3]	markets [16] 20/13
44/15 92/15 96/8	145/22 159/3 161/22	maintain [4] 115/25	8/10 10/18 25/7	22/1 25/9 26/19 43/2
106/6 106/11 118/7	165/7 172/14	126/4 131/3 147/1	manufacturer [12]	43/9 43/12 45/10
121/21 124/7 124/16	looked [12] 19/25	maintained [3] 24/1	4/4 7/3 7/4 9/21 67/19	45/23 46/2 46/9 46/12
124/24 125/4 125/24	43/11 56/1 65/11 66/6	27/13 114/18	76/17 102/5 122/11	46/21 47/22 56/9
127/8 129/22 139/17	70/14 94/3 102/12	maintaining [1]	123/2 123/23 136/23	63/16
168/5	122/13 162/13 167/2	154/16	167/5	marks [1] 8/5
linear [1] 35/4	170/3	Majesty's [2] 41/21	manufacturers [27]	Marron [5] 30/19
lines [2] 55/19 109/1	looking [19] 5/23	41/24	6/23 7/1 7/14 15/11	99/10 149/3 155/6
link [1] 6/2	26/13 34/18 47/22	major [2] 17/24 21/24	23/9 25/10 26/25	167/12
list [2] 162/12 174/3	48/21 52/15 54/7	make [32] 17/2 20/2	28/17 28/22 29/1	mask [3] 8/19 35/6
listed [1] 145/25	55/20 63/17 65/19	25/8 33/16 35/8 35/20	29/19 29/23 31/5 31/8	167/4
lists [1] 178/5	65/23 69/12 72/23	37/8 38/1 39/7 39/19	32/25 33/8 33/9 36/21	masks [3] 25/1 164/4
little [18] 2/23 18/12	74/8 84/21 84/23 85/9	47/5 53/17 65/12	45/1 72/7 72/25 76/22	164/6
25/6 60/15 60/18 61/9	137/24 143/2	75/13 92/18 95/3 98/3	91/21 91/25 100/14	massively [1] 143/10
81/18 87/2 98/20	looks [3] 37/11 90/8	104/23 108/12 110/25	101/10 102/1	matches [1] 127/14
98/25 99/9 110/20	145/1	140/15 146/14 148/5	manufacturing [22]	material [5] 14/21
123/22 130/5 149/22	loop [4] 9/23 10/11	149/16 151/24 152/10	4/24 8/11 20/12 20/17	84/24 93/14 94/21
156/18 167/4 171/7	162/6 164/17	152/10 163/20 171/24	21/17 28/14 30/2	95/3
lives [4] 98/2 123/9	Lord [5] 116/21	176/22 177/24 178/15	31/15 32/3 32/5 32/11	materially [1] 94/14
123/10 129/21	116/25 157/22 169/22	makes [1] 142/7	32/13 32/22 32/22	materials [2] 9/19
local [3] 11/18 37/5	169/23	making [19] 6/13	33/2 33/18 33/21 34/6	9/19
	Lord Bethell [1]		34/14 65/7 65/13 71/7	Matt [3] 113/16

M	5/2 11/19 14/3 19/14 22/14 25/12 28/21 30/15 30/23 35/25 44/10 48/6 56/8 58/22 61/9 67/16 70/12 70/19 71/12 73/19 74/8 74/8 75/18 77/2 77/15 79/13 79/14 82/15 82/22 84/13 84/14 85/4 85/16 87/9 89/6 89/20 90/7 92/20 94/3 94/7 95/18 99/18 101/16 103/17 109/25 124/21 126/5 132/8 138/8 150/25 151/1 160/18 167/14 172/12	mentioned [11] 18/1 21/7 22/8 22/24 31/19 45/13 123/12 136/12 137/8 160/25 161/7 mere [1] 164/25 merely [1] 147/18 meritorious [1] 152/8 message [2] 58/24 75/15 messages [1] 110/1 messaging [2] 120/24 121/2 met [5] 50/2 78/6 78/11 116/13 136/9 method [2] 145/1 145/13 methodologies [1] 94/6 Metropolitan [1] 1/24 MHRA [17] 127/9 127/23 128/23 129/7 129/14 129/16 129/19 129/23 129/25 130/9 132/11 133/8 134/6 134/19 135/12 135/17 135/21 Michael [13] 112/2 112/4 112/11 121/8 123/17 123/18 124/6 164/4 165/5 168/7 168/13 170/1 181/14 Michael Gove [1] 164/4 micromanage [1] 117/7 Microsoft [2] 50/1 54/25 mid [1] 113/4 mid-February [1] 113/4 middle [3] 57/4 68/15 167/7 middleman [2] 76/19 77/12 middlemen [2] 72/15 73/16 might [48] 15/24 29/7 29/15 32/11 34/25 45/24 46/3 47/4 48/13 53/5 57/12 64/9 64/19 65/11 66/1 66/2 83/10 83/17 86/12 90/9 96/25 98/8 98/17 108/19 109/23 110/12 111/16 111/23 125/10 132/2 134/8 136/18 142/10 142/13 147/9 149/5 150/23 151/5 158/12 159/24 161/4 161/24 164/21 164/24 169/10 174/5 177/13 178/18 military [1] 47/19 million [2] 138/9	171/1 mincing [1] 179/6 mind [11] 11/12 23/12 28/24 30/21 45/10 49/25 114/25 142/4 154/21 156/20 169/5 mine [1] 158/15 minimum [3] 30/6 34/11 36/13 minister [21] 65/2 113/3 113/16 116/25 118/19 119/7 119/12 120/1 120/24 122/21 125/3 129/23 132/12 132/15 136/13 136/15 136/20 143/21 144/1 172/9 172/10 Minister's [1] 121/24 ministerial [6] 112/22 113/22 118/17 154/3 154/17 163/10 ministers [21] 105/13 126/12 131/18 131/20 147/11 148/15 152/23 153/4 153/6 153/10 153/20 154/7 154/10 154/13 154/18 155/24 156/5 156/12 162/24 172/3 172/17 minorities [2] 78/22 80/3 minority [2] 77/25 78/7 misreading [1] 176/21 Mission [2] 93/1 95/2 missions [1] 60/9 misunderstands [1] 154/5 Mitchell [25] 40/25 41/1 41/4 41/6 52/14 57/14 69/3 71/18 71/25 77/24 78/2 79/1 79/9 79/23 80/16 94/17 101/16 105/7 111/8 111/16 173/18 173/20 179/4 181/6 181/17 mitigate [5] 26/6 27/1 66/2 68/18 103/7 mitigated [1] 65/6 mitigation [1] 64/15 mix [1] 110/16 mixed [1] 123/21 mm [36] 95/12 110/11 116/8 118/11 123/15 127/20 128/6 128/25 129/3 130/7 130/10 130/16 133/3 133/14 133/19 143/1 143/24 145/5 145/11 150/7 152/17 155/11 156/25 159/7 159/9	159/12 163/17 165/11 167/25 170/15 172/13 174/12 174/12 174/18 175/7 177/20 Mm-hm [2] 95/12 110/11 mobilise [1] 60/16 MoD [2] 14/11 164/7 model [1] 107/5 modelling [1] 37/13 models [1] 38/5 modifies [1] 109/14 module [13] 7/25 10/5 11/11 18/15 19/10 37/12 112/9 112/24 113/11 113/15 131/19 155/20 181/16 Module 1 [2] 18/15 19/10 modules [1] 156/4 moment [9] 30/4 58/10 64/20 76/5 107/20 122/9 140/5 147/16 168/8 moments [3] 116/11 135/7 161/8 Monday [1] 1/1 money [3] 119/8 139/21 158/16 month [1] 84/18 months [12] 15/6 70/11 84/2 86/23 89/7 95/18 96/25 106/23 106/23 107/15 109/7 134/4 more [57] 5/11 5/16 9/20 12/22 15/7 16/22 16/22 20/19 21/5 26/12 31/9 32/16 33/5 33/6 35/16 38/1 38/7 39/12 39/13 39/14 40/10 40/12 40/16 61/13 62/12 69/10 71/3 72/24 74/24 77/15 86/12 97/25 98/3 98/7 107/6 107/12 109/7 110/6 122/10 128/14 133/10 134/1 143/12 143/13 149/14 149/22 153/17 155/7 155/12 155/17 156/6 156/7 156/21 161/12 167/18 167/19 178/21 more complicated [1] 5/16 morning [7] 24/21 38/24 40/18 90/11 94/18 101/17 105/7 most [15] 37/10 39/11 44/5 47/16 52/25 74/3 89/7 95/10 95/15 106/1 122/4 126/8 137/9 149/9
----------	---	---	---	---

M	165/9 165/12	179/4	155/12	108/8 133/12
most... [1] 161/2	Mr Duke [1] 95/10	Ms Lawson [1] 23/14	narrower [1] 62/19	Newman [1] 158/8
motivated [2] 116/16 140/4	Mr Gove [57] 111/8 112/5 112/12 112/18 113/9 113/19 114/5 114/11 115/1 115/5 115/19 116/17 122/23 126/12 129/8 130/2 131/22 132/5 132/8 132/10 133/21 134/15 137/24 138/20 140/7 140/14 141/23 142/12 143/7 144/25 146/23 147/16 148/22 149/20 150/25 151/6 152/14 154/21 156/15 156/17 157/16 160/15 161/8 161/19 162/5 163/16 164/10 164/25 167/1 167/21 169/18 170/24 172/1 172/15 173/15 173/21 179/5	Ms Mitchell [2] 111/8 179/4	national [10] 27/17 42/20 50/11 66/1 70/16 71/5 122/22 124/16 150/3 171/23	next [8] 36/5 40/25 59/23 81/6 112/1 165/7 177/15 177/16
motives [1] 153/21	Mr Hancock [1] 121/6	much [43] 5/15 15/11 17/20 17/22 21/22 21/24 24/17 28/15 31/3 34/8 37/9 38/6 40/9 40/15 41/5 59/20 61/1 61/10 64/15 71/18 71/24 72/6 72/24 72/24 80/16 80/22 80/24 82/23 83/22 92/21 93/2 111/14 111/20 111/21 112/7 112/18 122/10 123/1 123/3 149/25 179/4 179/8 179/25	nations [2] 83/14 83/25	NHS [13] 14/4 18/11 24/11 68/24 69/18 89/8 95/17 103/24 106/7 120/6 131/8 138/11 139/22
move [14] 3/2 10/22 20/12 20/23 36/4 88/24 91/17 117/22 120/16 151/18 156/24 161/17 167/21 169/19	Mr Hancock's [1] 123/13	multi [1] 27/24	nations [3] 14/7 82/7 178/13	NHS Supply [1] 18/11
moved [3] 4/21 94/8 107/2	Mr James [1] 136/21	multiple [14] 5/18 7/18 12/16 12/18 12/23 13/23 26/14 68/24 69/18 74/1 77/5 77/6 165/15 165/23	natural [1] 21/9	NHS's [1] 98/11
movement [3] 2/25 6/17 91/23	Mr Manley [11] 81/9 81/17 82/10 88/22 96/14 98/5 104/10 109/16 111/5 111/10 111/13	my [82] 1/8 19/10 19/15 23/12 27/23 28/12 28/24 28/24 29/20 30/21 40/19 40/25 42/17 47/8 47/20 50/13 51/2 52/22 52/22 53/1 53/6 53/12 53/12 53/16 54/8 54/17 55/7 56/13 61/3 71/20 72/16 78/9 79/8 79/17 79/20 79/23 79/24 80/1 80/3 80/14 80/20 81/6 83/22 95/20 104/10 108/11 108/23 111/25 112/1 112/8 122/13 122/24 124/13 125/3 125/16 134/18 135/4 140/3 146/4 156/16 157/23 157/23 158/8 158/14 158/16 161/5 161/19 162/15 162/19 164/18 167/10 169/5 172/20 173/1 173/16 177/15 178/3 179/3 179/3 179/12 179/14 179/17	nature [4] 67/22 67/25 91/19 126/1	Nigel [2] 142/6 171/23
moving [8] 4/3 17/11 19/22 48/1 89/2 113/9 153/5 177/15	Mr Marron [2] 30/19 99/10	my Lady [3] 80/14 108/11 112/8	navigate [2] 53/21 86/16	not [191]
MP [2] 112/19 144/1	Mr Matt [1] 113/16	myself [2] 111/13 166/14	near [5] 19/3 22/14 26/20 26/20 107/14	note [6] 119/22 122/7 131/1 135/4 149/20 163/6
MPs [1] 148/17	Mr Meller [13] 157/17 159/17 159/25 161/23 162/11 164/11 165/15 166/2 169/6 170/19 170/25 171/6 171/14	name [3] 46/16 81/11 112/10	near-shoring [1] 26/20	noted [1] 125/18
Mr [133] 1/5 23/13 30/19 40/24 41/1 41/4 41/6 52/14 57/14 69/3 71/18 71/22 71/22 71/23 71/25 77/21 77/24 78/2 79/9 79/23 80/16 81/5 81/7 81/9 81/17 82/10 88/22 89/4 95/10 96/14 98/5 99/10 100/20 104/10 107/23 108/22 109/16 111/5 111/8 111/10 111/13 111/16 111/22 111/23 112/2 112/4 112/5 112/12 112/18 113/9 113/16 113/19 114/5 114/11 115/1 115/5 115/19 116/17 118/13 121/6 122/23 123/13 126/12 129/8 130/2 131/22 132/5 132/7 132/8 132/10 132/19 133/21 134/15 136/21 137/24 138/20 140/6 140/7 140/13 140/14 141/23 142/12 143/7 144/25 146/23 147/16 148/22 149/20 150/25 151/6 152/14 154/21 156/15 156/17 157/16 157/17 159/17 159/25 160/15 161/8 161/19 161/23 162/5 162/9 162/11 163/16 164/10 164/11 164/25 165/9 165/12 165/15 166/2 167/1 167/21 169/6 169/18 170/19 170/24 170/25 171/6 171/14 171/18 172/1 172/15 173/15 173/21 179/5 179/16 181/6 181/8 181/11 181/14	Mr Meller's [1] 162/9	namely [2] 11/11 54/5	near-sourcing [1] 26/20	nothing [3] 17/3 161/12 162/23
Mr Cairnduff [2]	Mr Michael [1] 112/2	narrow [2] 154/22	necessary [6] 11/19 74/24 80/5 96/3 101/19 159/11	
	Mr Mitchell [13] 41/4 41/6 52/14 57/14 69/3 71/18 71/25 77/24 78/2 79/9 79/23 80/16 111/16		necessary [3] 44/3 44/14 115/25	
	Mr Rhys [1] 118/13		need [32] 8/22 18/2 20/3 23/14 26/19 28/4 28/5 28/12 28/24 35/12 36/11 38/21 40/7 51/20 72/4 93/21 95/17 95/19 97/23 107/4 110/6 120/7 132/9 135/25 136/1 139/15 145/21 159/11 165/24 169/12 170/14 177/2	
	Mr Sharma [7] 1/5 40/24 81/5 89/4 100/20 108/22 111/22		needed [12] 12/1 19/23 37/21 44/7 54/10 56/11 75/17 92/2 92/6 107/5 131/8 131/9	
	Mr Sharma's [1] 107/23		needs [8] 28/25 34/8 78/6 79/12 96/25 98/11 107/2 142/8	
	Mr Wald [5] 111/23 132/7 140/6 140/13 179/16		neglecting [1] 102/19	
	Mr Weatherby [3] 71/22 71/22 77/21		negotiate [1] 43/13	
	Mr Webster [1] 23/13		negotiation [1] 52/17	
	Mr Wood [1] 171/18		neither [2] 132/1 139/2	
	Mrs [1] 141/24		network [16] 57/12 85/6 86/3 88/16 88/17 88/21 89/14 89/16 96/6 97/23 103/9 103/21 106/25 108/13 110/23 166/23	
	Mrs Justice [1] 141/24		networks [1] 166/20	
	Ms [3] 23/14 111/8		never [3] 50/2 163/4 172/12	
		N	new [16] 9/23 35/12 35/17 35/23 36/7 39/21 45/24 63/18 66/11 72/13 73/5 73/12 75/7 100/15	

<p>N</p> <p>noticed [2] 62/4 64/20</p> <p>notices [2] 116/3 116/11</p> <p>November [1] 41/19</p> <p>November 2023 [1] 41/19</p> <p>now [45] 5/10 21/20 26/12 28/7 31/4 32/2 35/13 39/3 39/9 39/11 69/3 76/18 76/23 78/9 79/3 80/25 94/14 108/10 113/6 119/4 120/17 127/15 129/8 133/12 135/11 135/24 140/14 144/9 150/8 151/20 153/16 154/17 155/1 155/5 159/6 159/25 164/8 164/10 166/3 168/8 170/6 174/8 174/13 175/1 175/4</p> <p>Nowhere [1] 22/14</p> <p>nuance [1] 25/6</p> <p>nugatory [1] 134/13</p> <p>number [44] 3/22 6/12 10/4 18/16 23/23 27/5 30/6 39/18 41/10 61/21 62/7 63/9 65/23 74/21 83/21 84/4 84/5 85/5 86/22 90/13 93/8 101/9 106/9 106/12 114/20 118/21 118/23 119/1 120/3 122/2 125/17 125/18 128/21 135/3 136/20 143/23 144/4 145/19 146/15 147/9 151/16 152/5 169/16 179/2</p> <p>number 1 [1] 118/21</p> <p>Number 10 [4] 62/7 83/21 84/4 84/5</p> <p>Number 2 [1] 118/23</p> <p>number 3 [1] 119/1</p> <p>number 7 [1] 39/18</p> <p>numbers [6] 57/13 58/23 59/13 60/17 125/22 173/10</p> <p>numerous [2] 112/22 123/24</p> <p>nurses [1] 178/24</p>	<p>obviously [19] 14/5 14/15 16/19 20/24 40/16 82/16 85/7 85/16 87/9 87/11 88/3 90/13 91/17 92/13 93/1 113/10 122/6 156/3 167/14</p> <p>occasion [4] 134/10 137/12 157/9 157/13</p> <p>occasionally [1] 94/7</p> <p>occasions [1] 96/18</p> <p>occurring [1] 61/8</p> <p>October [2] 82/2 113/7</p> <p>October 2013 [1] 82/2</p> <p>October 2024 [1] 113/7</p> <p>odd [1] 92/22</p> <p>off [7] 93/12 94/23 95/2 102/16 124/24 125/6 130/1</p> <p>offer [26] 85/2 118/20 139/4 142/12 144/19 146/25 147/3 147/5 147/12 147/12 147/17 148/23 153/1 153/22 157/1 159/23 160/20 161/11 162/7 162/9 163/8 165/2 165/5 167/3 169/11 174/23</p> <p>offered [3] 143/16 147/21 161/13</p> <p>offering [5] 59/5 72/15 76/19 77/5 168/9</p> <p>offers [58] 57/16 57/17 58/18 58/20 59/13 60/1 61/7 74/3 74/22 74/23 99/10 100/16 143/23 144/4 144/17 144/21 145/3 145/14 146/4 146/5 146/6 146/17 146/19 146/22 147/7 148/13 148/14 148/15 148/16 148/20 150/14 151/2 151/3 151/9 151/9 151/13 151/16 151/19 151/21 151/22 151/22 151/24 152/4 152/5 152/8 160/9 160/11 162/9 162/21 166/7 167/13 168/6 168/16 173/9 175/13 175/16 175/17 175/20</p> <p>office [29] 45/22 46/7 48/20 53/13 55/1 59/19 60/10 93/2 113/3 117/13 120/2 121/23 123/20 128/5 128/19 129/17 130/11 157/25 158/5 158/14</p>	<p>159/8 161/20 162/20 162/20 164/19 165/10 171/23 174/1 177/23</p> <p>Officer [2] 98/22 128/4</p> <p>officers [1] 106/17</p> <p>offices [3] 53/21 165/17 169/2</p> <p>official [1] 146/18</p> <p>officials [19] 45/11 45/22 59/10 62/4 72/12 82/20 85/13 90/3 90/20 91/4 110/17 144/22 148/17 171/21 172/3 172/17 172/21 172/25 173/7</p> <p>offs [1] 133/23</p> <p>offshore [1] 20/12</p> <p>offshored [3] 3/1 8/10 32/4</p> <p>offshoring [4] 20/15 21/22 22/2 31/25</p> <p>often [4] 57/23 88/3 96/9 143/22</p> <p>Oh [2] 111/8 160/10</p> <p>okay [6] 73/19 75/23 117/12 119/3 141/18 144/12</p> <p>on [287]</p> <p>on stream [1] 15/22</p> <p>once [8] 5/3 12/23 35/4 35/10 39/1 57/3 79/19 169/25</p> <p>one [102] 3/13 3/24 4/3 6/14 6/18 8/14 9/15 10/22 11/3 13/9 13/20 16/1 19/8 20/2 23/1 23/21 26/3 26/5 27/19 30/18 30/22 34/2 37/18 39/17 39/25 47/10 50/6 50/13 51/5 51/20 52/7 52/16 53/17 54/12 54/15 54/20 55/22 56/17 57/5 65/13 68/6 68/22 76/11 78/14 79/1 81/10 83/24 91/17 94/20 97/13 101/10 102/1 102/24 104/18 105/6 105/15 107/5 107/6 108/24 109/8 109/16 110/5 110/9 115/23 116/9 120/5 122/24 128/1 128/2 128/14 128/22 129/10 130/15 131/18 136/22 137/17 139/24 141/8 141/10 141/15 143/25 146/7 151/24 152/3 152/7 153/16 156/3 157/6 157/23 158/13 159/10 159/10 162/1 165/2 165/6 166/14 166/15 169/8</p>	<p>170/12 179/1 179/2 179/18</p> <p>ones [3] 66/7 92/9 112/23</p> <p>ongoing [3] 56/23 90/20 165/16</p> <p>online [1] 4/17</p> <p>only [28] 22/16 28/22 29/25 35/25 39/22 51/20 54/20 54/21 57/23 62/3 66/5 69/14 69/16 75/18 83/1 103/22 110/3 120/14 129/10 129/13 147/24 155/6 159/13 162/1 166/24 166/25 173/12 173/14</p> <p>onshored [1] 30/2</p> <p>onto [2] 21/8 107/12</p> <p>operate [4] 17/13 52/25 101/1 154/20</p> <p>operated [2] 43/14 66/25</p> <p>operates [1] 167/17</p> <p>operating [11] 47/24 50/1 52/8 57/25 60/6 60/8 77/4 129/22 136/11 145/18 149/12</p> <p>operation [10] 60/19 60/20 86/4 92/20 92/21 100/22 105/22 107/8 141/25 143/13</p> <p>operations [2] 54/12 76/3</p> <p>opinion [3] 28/25 116/14 116/20</p> <p>opportunities [6] 43/11 47/3 57/9 72/10 89/11 89/15</p> <p>opportunity [9] 46/3 75/9 98/4 102/20 132/22 133/13 134/12 134/25 170/9</p> <p>opposed [1] 53/10</p> <p>opposite [3] 4/6 163/22 168/10</p> <p>opposition [2] 146/2 154/9</p> <p>optics [2] 141/19 141/23</p> <p>optimal [1] 51/8</p> <p>option [1] 147/20</p> <p>options [1] 27/10</p> <p>or [182]</p> <p>order [31] 3/19 4/16 4/18 4/20 5/3 5/8 8/23 16/22 17/1 30/7 30/17 55/5 56/8 57/10 65/12 68/3 125/9 125/13 127/21 128/9 131/14 137/14 139/22 150/21 151/25 158/21 163/20 164/8 169/17 172/25 179/24</p>	<p>ordered [2] 38/7 38/23</p> <p>orders [6] 4/22 12/18 16/20 38/4 73/25 97/17</p> <p>ordinarily [1] 134/3</p> <p>ordinating [1] 143/21</p> <p>organisation [6] 1/19 34/15 82/6 84/1 149/7 163/3</p> <p>organisational [1] 48/24</p> <p>organisations [12] 3/8 12/17 13/24 14/9 22/19 22/23 36/12 40/10 54/11 78/1 82/8 90/14</p> <p>organising [1] 6/3</p> <p>original [7] 7/3 28/7 89/4 93/3 102/17 136/14 145/23</p> <p>originally [1] 85/4</p> <p>originates [1] 172/5</p> <p>other [80] 5/6 5/19 5/25 6/7 6/15 6/18 7/1 7/1 7/12 7/13 7/13 8/6 8/20 11/9 13/21 14/10 14/19 15/13 21/4 21/13 22/5 22/19 25/21 26/6 26/19 26/20 28/18 32/25 33/9 34/17 44/4 46/14 46/24 50/1 54/13 55/17 59/1 66/25 67/7 67/14 70/15 78/5 80/21 82/7 85/5 85/24 90/13 92/4 92/5 96/23 101/13 103/23 104/2 106/2 107/11 111/18 114/9 115/13 116/11 117/14 122/11 123/1 129/23 133/17 135/3 137/9 139/16 147/10 155/4 155/24 156/4 156/10 157/10 158/11 158/18 163/24 167/14 167/18 169/14 172/15</p> <p>others [23] 23/2 27/6 59/10 87/7 87/18 103/24 115/20 122/17 125/7 130/3 131/12 137/14 139/11 140/1 145/16 146/16 146/21 147/11 148/20 155/6 173/17 176/24 178/6</p> <p>otherwise [3] 115/8 131/17 136/18</p> <p>ought [5] 58/20 93/23 101/11 165/3 175/8</p> <p>our [43] 33/11 44/24 47/2 48/13 55/1 65/4 67/24 82/22 83/10 83/14 84/1 84/16 84/23 85/4 85/7 85/23</p>
---	--	---	---	---

O	51/16 51/22 87/9	33/24 35/2 42/16	86/6 94/20 94/25	97/24 106/2 106/15
our... [27] 86/22	overreach [1] 126/8	42/18 43/5 43/6 43/16	103/18 116/1 137/4	108/5 108/7 108/8
87/11 88/14 88/18	overseas [11] 29/14	44/7 45/14 45/17	137/12 142/20 143/4	123/19 123/24 126/2
88/20 88/21 94/14	45/23 46/2 46/22 47/2	47/11 47/14 49/14	145/17 145/17 146/4	126/4 126/7 126/8
95/15 95/20 96/25	53/20 54/6 56/9 56/16	57/16 60/4 61/5 78/2	153/22 153/24 158/18	126/9 134/6 134/8
99/22 101/3 101/4	60/12 63/14	82/11 82/12 82/13	174/13 176/17 178/17	148/10 149/10 162/17
103/20 105/13 106/6	overseeing [1]	82/14 82/15 82/19	179/18	162/19 162/21 163/8
106/21 112/1 123/21	136/11	83/9 83/17 85/16	particular context [1]	164/23 175/18 175/19
139/12 139/13 141/16	overspeaking [6]	85/17 85/18 86/20	103/18	177/13 178/17 179/9
141/16 144/19 151/20	73/8 77/13 80/11	91/2 91/10 93/16 95/7	particularly [15]	perceived [1] 124/12
154/19 165/17	88/21 111/19 115/3	96/2 97/13 99/16	49/20 57/19 62/20	percentage [1]
ours [1] 58/5	overwhelming [3]	106/2 106/24 108/6	63/23 78/5 80/2 86/9	117/11
ourselves [8] 93/10	150/4 151/3 151/10	109/17 110/2 110/14	101/19 120/12 124/17	perfect [1] 116/15
94/5 94/10 105/3	owing [1] 10/7	110/24 113/10 115/14	138/18 142/14 158/10	performance [1]
109/7 114/24 155/25	own [12] 6/23 7/11	123/14 141/2 141/12	165/3 178/21	94/14
159/5	13/25 14/1 14/10	143/13 143/22 148/12	parties [1] 36/17	perhaps [11] 3/21
out [53] 15/8 16/24	25/16 51/2 56/13	150/4 153/15 155/22	partly [7] 16/15 16/15	8/5 17/11 48/25 76/5
17/2 30/17 31/2 38/20	81/11 83/14 109/16	156/6 166/17	47/13 58/1 58/5 107/1	100/19 101/10 102/25
44/24 46/2 49/2 52/11	156/24	pandemics [3] 18/22	107/1	145/18 153/21 156/5
52/25 57/22 58/25	owned [6] 73/23	19/11 82/17	partnering [1] 70/4	period [8] 57/24
60/24 65/24 67/7 69/6	73/24 100/9 100/14	paper [2] 23/1 104/13	partners [2] 33/11	83/24 89/6 103/20
69/17 69/25 73/15	100/24 101/3	papers [1] 177/19	67/14	109/9 112/23 113/15
75/4 75/20 83/21	Oxford [1] 84/8	paragraph [17] 69/7	partnership [1] 120/2	115/22
84/23 85/4 86/12 89/3	oxymoron [1] 116/15	72/9 73/19 75/25	partnership-type [1]	permanent [2] 82/5
89/3 89/10 90/6 90/9	P	97/10 97/21 99/2	120/2	104/5
96/8 96/25 100/7	pace [10] 47/9 91/17	100/6 138/22 139/4	parts [10] 9/17 21/16	permits [1] 122/25
101/20 103/11 109/10	94/18 94/19 94/25	139/6 150/2 168/1	26/20 26/25 28/18	Perry [1] 76/3
110/1 121/22 124/3	106/3 106/6 120/5	176/4 177/17 177/18	37/10 39/15 50/4 88/1	persistent [1] 57/15
125/8 133/25 134/7	153/7 160/21	177/22	178/7	person [8] 38/23
134/8 136/20 138/7	packing [1] 38/19	paragraph 13.21 [1]	party [5] 53/11	92/3 148/4 159/13
138/14 138/20 151/11	page [24] 3/24 5/13	73/19	112/23 132/7 138/13	165/4 168/11 168/22
151/20 159/14 164/23	12/4 16/3 23/25 27/4	paragraph 250 [1]	157/6	169/11
179/20	33/15 35/20 39/19	69/7	pass [3] 6/14 16/20	personal [8] 41/9
outbid [1] 94/23	57/4 68/14 68/16	paragraph 4 [1] 99/2	148/13	147/22 147/24 148/1
outbreak [1] 82/24	78/23 99/2 99/7 100/2	paragraph 4.10 [1]	passages [1] 69/17	157/2 157/4 157/5
outbreaks [2] 82/25	100/6 102/25 102/25	72/9	passed [5] 17/4 17/9	158/25
83/13	123/12 143/16 164/1	paragraph 4.48 [1]	79/20 138/24 148/25	personally [1] 135/12
outcome [2] 120/8	177/16 181/2	75/25	passenger [1] 15/18	perspective [8]
153/25	page 1 [2] 99/2 100/2	Paragraph 5 [1]	passing [2] 127/22	37/22 44/12 51/11
outcomes [1] 65/18	page 11 [1] 123/12	100/6	127/23	56/15 62/19 73/8
outlined [1] 149/4	page 138 [1] 27/4	paragraph 92 [3]	past [1] 158/17	74/17 83/16
outlines [1] 115/9	page 15 [1] 3/24	138/22 139/4 139/6	path [2] 33/13 91/2	perspectives [1]
outset [1] 25/15	page 16 [1] 5/13	paragraphs [2] 68/23	patient [2] 12/11	57/21
outside [4] 26/14	page 2 [2] 100/6	95/13	13/18	pertaining [1] 116/24
85/25 102/7 139/24	102/25	parallel [1] 125/11	Patrol [1] 163/3	PestFix [1] 116/5
outsourced [1] 3/1	page 22 [1] 16/3	Parliament [7] 53/14	Paul [1] 167/23	phase [4] 78/2 90/7
outsourcing [3]	page 27 [1] 68/14	145/20 146/15 147/10	Paul Bywater [1]	93/9 93/19
20/16 21/22 22/2	page 31 [2] 33/15	154/7 154/19 162/19	167/23	phases [2] 66/9
over [17] 17/1 17/23	78/23	part [22] 3/18 19/24	pause [4] 3/20 64/20	148/12
19/1 34/16 36/5 77/22	page 33 [1] 12/4	25/11 35/7 40/10 60/2	66/4 107/20	phenomenon [1]
80/19 86/22 96/25	page 4 [1] 164/1	66/8 75/7 77/13 84/9	pausing [1] 168/8	25/20
97/17 102/25 123/22	page 54 [1] 35/20	93/12 122/7 124/1	peak [2] 89/20 92/22	Philip [3] 81/12 106/8
150/20 171/8 171/20	page 6 [1] 99/7	124/12 124/13 130/20	peaks [1] 17/24	108/24
173/24 174/2	page 79 [1] 23/25	134/15 137/17 146/20	peers [1] 148/17	phone [3] 48/7
over-enthusiastic [1]	pages [2] 1/14 23/22	161/5 175/17 176/17	pen [1] 23/2	123/25 161/21
123/22	pages 79 [1] 23/22	participants [1]	Penlon [1] 137/11	photograph [1] 55/22
over-order [1] 17/1	pandemic [79] 8/14	123/22	people [51] 2/16 12/2	phrase [2] 153/9
overall [8] 52/15	15/9 15/10 15/13	participate [1] 55/6	16/16 21/11 24/10	168/9
59/22 62/8 66/16	18/25 19/4 19/19 20/9	particular [37] 6/3	40/7 48/6 48/7 48/17	pick [2] 48/7 123/18
67/23 88/15 138/16	21/18 22/11 22/22	13/12 24/18 25/11	48/22 49/24 86/13	picking [1] 38/19
142/7	24/4 24/8 24/24 25/15	26/3 27/1 30/22 30/24	86/20 86/24 87/17	picture [3] 34/24
overarching [1] 37/8	26/1 26/7 26/15 26/22	31/22 35/10 38/22	87/21 87/25 88/2	58/10 62/12
overlap [4] 49/14	27/15 28/2 28/6 30/25	54/24 56/9 64/4 65/6	89/17 89/21 89/23	piece [6] 65/3 66/6
		68/24 77/15 83/18	92/22 92/24 96/17	66/7 116/19 127/11

P	86/1	167/1 171/15 171/17 179/22	76/6 78/5 88/25 89/3 89/12 89/15 90/5 90/14 91/1 93/18 93/24 96/9 98/23 99/15 100/8 101/15 102/2 102/12 103/22 105/23 106/5 107/2 107/3 139/7 145/21 146/1 150/14 150/21 151/2 155/4 159/24 161/2 161/3 162/3 162/21 164/24 167/20 176/14 177/13	presume [1] 121/8 presumed [1] 158/12 pretty [3] 83/22 84/15 86/14 previous [4] 86/23 87/24 131/22 155/20 price [13] 11/2 29/24 77/1 92/11 94/22 97/5 126/10 161/13 170/13 170/16 170/19 171/5 171/6 primarily [3] 86/8 109/12 122/18 primary [3] 14/8 73/21 100/8 Prime [8] 65/2 120/1 120/24 121/24 122/21 136/13 136/15 136/20 Prime Minister [7] 65/2 120/1 120/24 122/21 136/13 136/15 136/20 principal [5] 58/22 109/17 141/16 150/15 150/15 principally [8] 43/7 44/11 47/19 47/23 48/10 59/3 72/19 79/17 principle [2] 46/23 155/15 principles [2] 114/15 115/25 prior [9] 22/11 22/22 41/21 43/16 45/13 81/23 82/11 82/13 83/4 priorities [1] 114/9 prioritisation [4] 69/9 147/18 167/8 177/25 prioritise [1] 95/20 prioritised [4] 97/9 97/12 178/17 178/24 prioritises [1] 100/23 prioritising [1] 144/22 priority [21] 116/10 139/7 141/1 141/6 141/10 141/15 143/10 143/14 143/21 144/8 145/16 147/25 148/5 148/8 148/8 148/14 149/12 149/16 168/25 172/2 172/16 private [17] 36/1 36/8 129/17 130/11 157/25 158/5 158/14 159/8 161/20 162/19 162/20 164/19 165/17 169/2 174/22 176/1 176/11 proactive [1] 26/23 probably [5] 13/14 21/7 74/9 89/19 110/20
piece... [1] 161/5 pieces [1] 68/6 PIPP [1] 18/23 place [27] 4/16 4/22 10/25 11/23 11/25 19/2 27/18 28/3 29/9 29/12 29/21 50/6 51/12 62/14 85/17 87/16 94/6 94/22 97/17 103/15 104/22 106/15 108/16 127/21 128/11 130/25 171/19 placed [10] 5/4 18/7 33/5 33/6 74/6 115/13 131/7 135/17 152/11 160/11 places [3] 45/11 108/25 123/24 placing [1] 38/3 plan [1] 50/6 plans [2] 28/3 28/7 platform [5] 4/17 5/5 50/2 54/25 55/4 platforms [2] 37/1 54/18 play [6] 36/6 38/15 42/15 42/18 44/18 52/21 playbook [1] 82/20 players [2] 40/6 148/3 please [91] 2/11 4/7 4/10 5/13 5/24 6/21 7/24 8/3 10/22 12/3 13/11 16/1 16/13 17/11 20/8 22/8 22/11 23/21 24/19 27/3 30/13 31/12 31/16 33/14 35/19 36/19 38/10 39/17 39/19 41/15 42/12 44/15 45/17 49/9 51/14 53/8 53/22 55/10 55/14 56/2 56/24 57/3 61/23 62/1 63/1 66/13 68/11 68/14 70/7 81/17 82/10 84/3 85/11 85/20 85/20 88/24 89/1 90/4 91/9 94/1 95/4 95/9 95/13 95/22 96/14 97/7 97/20 98/3 98/19 98/20 99/1 99/7 100/2 100/3 100/12 102/22 103/14 105/17 107/20 112/10 112/15 113/9 122/24 128/8 135/6 135/9 163/6 164/1 165/20 165/22 170/8 pleasure [1] 80/20 plethora [1] 162/16 plus [3] 63/24 85/25	pm [5] 81/2 81/4 140/10 140/12 180/2 point [58] 14/24 19/15 27/16 29/20 29/20 30/14 37/18 45/8 46/17 52/15 54/15 57/14 57/25 59/16 62/2 62/5 62/20 66/11 75/2 75/23 76/11 78/18 79/15 80/12 80/13 99/1 103/2 104/7 105/8 105/11 105/12 110/15 115/22 115/22 121/11 121/14 124/15 124/23 130/5 130/15 133/12 133/21 134/5 140/18 142/5 142/7 151/6 152/5 152/14 160/14 161/16 166/3 166/8 167/13 173/4 176/6 176/22 177/6 pointed [2] 133/25 138/14 pointing [1] 4/8 points [8] 16/1 103/20 121/15 125/9 128/21 129/20 142/5 165/25 policies [3] 54/20 106/15 108/16 policy [9] 13/9 32/20 33/6 33/19 34/5 51/4 51/7 59/17 104/9 political [9] 22/6 25/13 25/25 100/25 124/20 125/2 151/2 151/23 158/16 politically [3] 116/16 140/4 151/1 politically-motivated [1] 140/4 politicians [5] 18/17 24/13 171/21 179/5 179/6 politics [8] 52/18 52/21 53/9 53/10 53/11 53/13 53/14 126/7 portal [1] 145/18 pose [2] 128/14 174/9 posed [5] 41/10 154/21 174/14 174/19 175/5 posing [1] 175/21 position [7] 62/16 74/15 81/20 93/11 114/3 150/18 179/20 possibilities [3] 90/15 90/16 153/24 possibility [8] 19/25 27/14 29/14 102/6	possible [26] 33/17 38/10 38/10 59/2 60/16 91/13 93/15 101/25 120/5 122/15 127/3 131/15 136/6 151/14 151/17 152/11 152/23 153/1 163/12 166/8 167/5 167/7 171/10 174/21 178/4 178/14 possibly [1] 16/23 post [5] 24/4 54/5 76/14 84/23 85/4 post-pandemic [1] 24/4 postbox [1] 161/9 postdates [1] 144/7 posted [1] 87/23 postman [2] 138/25 148/24 posts [8] 47/2 47/3 56/16 57/7 60/9 60/12 85/5 85/7 postulated [1] 119/11 potential [21] 26/13 27/9 28/22 31/14 39/13 57/16 65/25 67/18 67/19 85/6 102/19 102/23 103/11 122/11 123/1 125/17 137/15 139/1 142/9 144/17 146/1 potentially [8] 34/23 64/18 65/7 65/13 132/16 136/25 136/25 173/8 PP [1] 100/21 PP3 [1] 164/4 PPE [116] 2/21 5/21 8/2 8/3 8/5 8/20 8/25 9/5 9/6 9/12 9/15 9/25 10/1 11/8 11/11 11/18 11/23 12/12 12/14 12/15 13/5 13/10 13/15 13/16 14/2 14/10 14/12 14/13 15/3 15/7 17/18 19/22 20/1 20/13 21/5 22/13 24/2 24/14 24/17 24/22 25/16 25/19 25/21 26/11 26/24 27/25 29/24 30/1 30/12 30/22 31/18 32/16 33/17 34/10 34/23 35/3 35/16 35/24 36/5 36/14 37/3 37/14 37/15 38/12 38/24 42/22 42/25 44/19 44/23 56/7 69/10 69/23 73/17 73/22 74/3 74/20 76/3		

<p>P</p> <p>problem [19] 7/9 19/18 21/24 27/20 54/4 54/23 57/15 64/21 75/16 77/9 77/13 77/16 84/16 104/25 105/4 110/9 125/2 153/1 168/4</p> <p>problems [14] 7/5 14/16 15/15 30/12 50/20 54/16 63/6 63/10 64/13 75/1 137/22 139/24 143/12 145/15</p> <p>procedure [1] 139/15</p> <p>procedures [2] 106/21 142/11</p> <p>proceed [2] 96/21 128/11</p> <p>Proceedings [1] 1/3</p> <p>process [65] 3/7 3/18 3/19 4/18 16/17 31/20 49/1 50/24 51/10 51/19 54/10 58/6 58/17 59/22 61/6 61/10 61/16 61/18 61/19 63/7 66/20 69/25 75/8 75/19 77/16 77/17 90/24 91/16 94/15 96/4 96/5 97/3 97/6 98/20 99/10 99/15 99/18 104/21 105/14 105/19 107/14 114/7 121/16 122/3 122/14 125/8 125/9 125/14 130/24 131/6 131/14 133/24 135/23 136/1 136/4 137/14 140/3 143/10 147/1 149/3 152/6 153/3 154/10 173/8 177/4</p> <p>processed [2] 57/18 146/17</p> <p>processes [10] 6/7 14/23 32/3 32/25 58/14 79/11 106/21 109/23 136/5 149/14</p> <p>processing [1] 152/7</p> <p>procure [9] 17/17 45/2 84/6 88/18 97/15 98/7 103/25 107/4 119/24</p> <p>procured [3] 55/23 78/6 93/5</p> <p>procurement [71] 12/17 13/23 14/1 14/7 16/17 18/9 19/12 20/5 24/8 31/10 31/10 34/15 36/12 37/20 38/15 42/22 42/25 44/19 55/13 56/5 59/22 61/18 78/4 79/11 82/11 82/13</p>	<p>82/14 82/15 82/18 83/1 88/25 89/2 95/6 95/16 97/25 98/13 98/22 98/23 99/15 103/8 104/8 104/16 105/14 105/19 105/23 106/15 107/10 108/13 108/16 109/22 113/10 114/2 114/15 115/24 117/4 117/9 117/19 117/24 121/22 123/19 139/25 141/2 141/8 141/17 142/7 143/11 143/12 152/1 153/16 153/19 154/23</p> <p>procuring [5] 72/6 98/10 143/3 154/11 155/3</p> <p>produce [7] 92/9 125/21 134/3 134/25 137/8 167/6 167/7</p> <p>produced [7] 12/4 75/25 91/14 101/6 102/14 104/13 104/14</p> <p>producing [1] 135/2</p> <p>product [12] 6/3 33/22 68/19 73/6 78/12 78/20 79/19 129/6 129/13 129/24 129/25 134/10</p> <p>production [9] 13/4 14/21 20/25 21/14 27/18 70/5 70/23 91/12 125/19</p> <p>products [9] 3/2 7/21 10/25 23/18 76/25 78/6 129/21 134/3 158/11</p> <p>professionals [1] 150/17</p> <p>professions [2] 115/8 115/16</p> <p>professor [23] 1/8 1/10 1/12 1/18 1/23 2/10 3/20 19/8 30/5 36/15 40/12 69/3 70/6 77/22 77/23 80/15 84/8 90/11 114/14 115/6 115/17 181/3 181/9</p> <p>Professor John [3] 1/8 1/10 181/3</p> <p>Professor Manners-Bell [9] 1/12 1/18 2/10 19/8 30/5 36/15 40/12 69/3 70/6</p> <p>Professor Sanchez-Graells [3] 114/14 115/6 115/17</p> <p>Professor Thomas [2] 77/22 80/15</p> <p>profile [1] 122/4</p> <p>profound [1] 143/12</p>	<p>profoundly [2] 115/12 147/13</p> <p>profusion [1] 58/4</p> <p>programme [1] 78/10</p> <p>progress [5] 15/9 121/19 126/11 135/19 163/11</p> <p>progressed [3] 153/23 163/5 163/9</p> <p>progressing [1] 118/21</p> <p>prohibit [1] 31/17</p> <p>Project [18] 42/8 42/10 63/25 64/2 64/2 64/6 65/10 65/10 65/17 65/21 66/4 66/10 67/8 68/6 70/2 75/3 116/6 116/14</p> <p>projection [1] 96/24</p> <p>projects [2] 35/15 36/7</p> <p>proliferate [1] 60/16</p> <p>prominent [1] 123/25</p> <p>promise [1] 140/8</p> <p>promises [1] 130/20</p> <p>promoted [1] 137/4</p> <p>proof [1] 139/9</p> <p>properly [5] 62/21 108/9 135/22 146/2 160/20</p> <p>proportion [2] 93/19 117/8</p> <p>proposal [6] 93/22 125/5 130/13 136/12 137/4 138/3</p> <p>proposals [4] 57/7 125/24 133/17 137/6</p> <p>proposed [1] 126/18</p> <p>proposition [1] 107/25</p> <p>protect [3] 7/20 135/22 135/25</p> <p>protected [1] 154/2</p> <p>protection [1] 25/2</p> <p>protective [1] 89/9</p> <p>prototype [5] 125/20 126/17 128/10 134/17 134/20</p> <p>prototypes [1] 125/14</p> <p>prove [1] 101/6</p> <p>proved [1] 150/10</p> <p>provide [28] 3/17 24/5 28/13 29/7 33/22 34/8 34/18 37/18 44/1 46/24 48/4 52/2 59/21 69/6 78/20 84/12 90/10 92/1 120/6 138/6 146/24 153/17 158/11 159/23 164/17 164/24 167/16 167/19</p> <p>provided [13] 1/12 3/23 38/17 38/18 41/6 41/14 55/8 55/11</p>	<p>81/10 117/3 135/13 144/3 146/18</p> <p>provider [3] 169/6 169/7 169/14</p> <p>providers [1] 55/5</p> <p>provides [4] 11/21 37/2 37/6 37/18</p> <p>providing [8] 15/3 36/25 58/8 90/21 93/14 145/18 162/3 169/12</p> <p>proving [1] 123/21</p> <p>proximity [1] 100/13</p> <p>Ps [1] 11/21</p> <p>psychological [1] 16/16</p> <p>public [11] 8/15 12/16 36/1 113/22 114/2 117/4 117/19 119/8 160/11 177/17 177/25</p> <p>publication [1] 116/3</p> <p>published [5] 2/6 68/12 69/14 70/10 116/12</p> <p>purchase [4] 93/24 103/22 119/1 128/9</p> <p>purchased [3] 8/7 96/13 96/21</p> <p>purchasing [3] 76/22 76/25 103/21</p> <p>pure [1] 88/5</p> <p>purely [1] 141/22</p> <p>purpose [2] 47/20 49/23</p> <p>purposes [3] 44/5 63/13 114/25</p> <p>pursued [1] 169/16</p> <p>pursuing [2] 146/4 146/7</p> <p>push [1] 153/8</p> <p>pushing [3] 123/7 124/1 134/21</p> <p>put [29] 14/14 18/21 19/2 26/2 27/18 28/3 46/2 55/24 75/19 89/20 103/14 105/10 106/13 106/13 107/17 108/1 108/3 115/10 117/10 124/3 128/1 130/3 130/25 134/15 150/17 155/12 162/18 164/16 167/1</p> <p>puts [1] 33/4</p> <p>putting [2] 15/6 132/6</p> <p>Q</p> <p>quality [8] 11/1 29/6 73/9 74/11 74/19 92/10 101/7 144/24</p> <p>quantities [2] 89/9 144/23</p> <p>quantity [3] 29/6</p>	<p>37/15 167/6</p> <p>question [39] 45/20 51/13 51/18 72/16 73/18 77/9 78/9 79/8 79/23 79/24 80/1 80/3 93/3 104/20 107/21 107/23 108/11 110/19 114/23 116/18 122/24 128/1 128/14 130/2 137/24 142/18 146/20 154/9 154/21 155/12 161/19 170/5 174/15 174/19 175/1 176/10 177/15 177/21 178/2</p> <p>questioning [4] 94/5 118/8 139/17 156/7</p> <p>questions [47] 1/11 40/13 40/14 41/2 41/10 51/8 71/19 71/23 72/1 74/12 77/23 78/10 81/8 100/3 111/6 111/7 111/9 112/9 125/11 126/10 131/13 131/23 155/23 156/14 167/14 173/4 173/16 173/16 173/18 173/20 174/3 174/9 174/20 175/4 175/8 175/21 176/18 177/8 179/3 179/5 181/4 181/7 181/8 181/9 181/12 181/15 181/17</p> <p>quick [1] 96/10</p> <p>quicker [3] 58/9 111/2 111/3</p> <p>quickly [15] 52/4 54/9 56/20 60/16 60/20 75/23 89/6 93/10 99/19 109/24 110/5 122/14 147/9 151/17 169/3</p> <p>quieten [1] 154/15</p> <p>quite [26] 9/7 30/5 30/16 54/9 56/11 58/7 84/15 86/21 88/5 89/5 93/10 96/23 101/25 110/3 122/23 135/4 146/2 151/15 154/9 155/1 155/22 160/13 162/7 166/5 166/6 178/6</p> <p>quote [2] 11/15 72/11</p> <p>R</p> <p>Raab [1] 93/22</p> <p>Rachel [15] 144/1 144/3 145/13 145/23 145/25 146/14 146/18 146/21 147/21 160/2 160/12 160/25 161/6 162/2 162/12</p> <p>raise [5] 27/16 101/8 128/8 176/17 176/22</p>
--	--	--	--	--

R	52/10 94/1 166/15	87/14 91/21 146/9	54/17 116/2	30/4 32/10 33/15
ramifications [1]	reassure [1] 176/23	176/4	relates [1] 28/2	34/22 35/20 39/19
21/16	rebarbative [1]	reference [12] 1/13	relating [2] 13/17	40/16 69/7 69/13
ran [1] 65/21	134/23	51/21 51/24 52/12	22/15	70/10 70/24 71/2
range [6] 4/25 13/4	recall [10] 80/6 80/10	52/17 62/13 69/15	relation [28] 19/11	96/18 114/20 115/18
21/6 25/12 113/20	114/15 118/16 135/15	103/5 148/5 164/11	42/10 43/16 44/18	117/1 142/6
179/12	137/18 144/10 157/20	165/1 179/13	75/18 77/3 84/11 87/7	reporting [5] 90/16
rapid [4] 146/24	159/22 178/3	references [3] 50/17	88/9 93/4 118/3	90/17 90/19 140/21
147/1 147/3 147/19	receipt [2] 143/22	53/17 163/19	118/16 120/16 144/4	179/20
rapidity [2] 145/19	148/23	referrals [1] 148/9	150/8 174/4 175/4	reports [1] 44/1
146/23	receive [9] 147/5	referred [25] 4/9	175/20 176/14 176/14	represent [1] 77/24
rate [4] 13/10 170/20	147/14 147/17 160/2	10/11 14/25 16/2 16/8	176/15 176/16 176/16	representative [1]
171/8 171/15	160/5 160/6 161/25	17/14 26/4 27/7 30/11	176/18 177/17 179/15	82/6
rates [2] 12/12 37/13	168/11 178/2	30/19 33/23 38/9	179/18 179/19	reproduce [1] 33/17
rather [15] 17/24	received [9] 97/16	46/13 50/17 61/9 63/2	relationship [5] 29/5	request [11] 84/3
22/21 27/19 28/16	121/7 138/25 143/5	64/2 94/17 147/25	31/9 71/14 86/15	84/4 84/11 84/13
29/19 38/4 52/22	147/3 155/2 160/25	148/1 148/8 148/16	168/12	84/14 84/25 88/25
53/13 60/19 70/16	163/25 166/1	148/17 148/21 162/15	relationships [9]	118/19 119/7 138/25
71/11 79/18 101/12	receives [1] 161/23	referring [9] 12/25	6/12 27/11 28/21 29/1	151/8
123/13 175/10	receiving [5] 60/1	13/18 13/24 16/8	29/2 29/8 29/21 53/1	requesting [1] 144/4
rational [2] 51/25	145/3 145/14 159/25	72/17 116/4 139/6	164/21	requests [2] 83/21
52/25	173/9	147/19 174/6	relatively [4] 56/20	166/9
rationale [1] 36/10	recognise [6] 2/13	refers [4] 4/8 62/6	59/8 113/12 137/18	require [6] 27/24
re [2] 35/23 36/5	58/2 70/20 79/14	69/21 76/4	relayed [1] 98/12	36/10 64/15 89/9
re-usable [1] 35/23	98/14 99/25	refine [1] 127/3	release [1] 4/18	90/22 91/16
re-use [1] 36/5	recognised [9] 47/15	refined [1] 127/4	released [1] 38/21	required [11] 13/5
reach [1] 35/15	52/19 54/10 58/12	reflect [1] 62/15	relevance [2] 112/24	13/16 21/3 46/25
reached [1] 11/19	60/20 64/12 70/25	reflecting [1] 46/6	176/9	56/13 56/17 61/17
reaction [1] 45/25	79/6 104/25	reflection [2] 109/17	relevant [3] 113/15	85/8 96/1 99/4 137/15
read [12] 19/19 69/6	recognises [1] 2/15	121/24	115/22 127/13	requirement [5] 13/5
69/17 73/15 114/12	recognising [3] 45/8	reflections [6] 70/8	reliability [1] 74/12	56/19 84/17 91/18
114/13 114/19 118/13	49/22 50/10	105/21 143/16 153/14	reliable [1] 72/25	116/13
140/24 141/24 163/5	recognition [1] 63/21	172/1 173/5	relied [3] 28/16 47/19	requirements [3]
177/9	recommend [3]	reflects [1] 141/8	126/12	30/6 78/21 91/1
reading [1] 168/14	26/18 33/13 70/21	reformed [1] 60/1	rely [1] 82/21	requires [1] 173/2
readout [1] 130/11	recommendation [8]	refrain [2] 151/25	relying [1] 29/18	requiring [1] 93/24
ready [3] 1/6 97/23	27/2 27/3 27/4 27/20	152/25	remaining [2] 25/4	requisite [1] 116/12
133/8	27/23 33/14 33/15	regard [3] 37/17 55/2	92/23	research [4] 1/19
real [1] 17/8	35/19	164/16	remains [3] 66/20	35/23 36/7 39/24
realised [3] 52/4	recommendations	regarded [2] 129/10	69/11 158/23	resemble [3] 8/11
102/13 107/3	[5] 20/2 23/21 23/23	161/9	remember [11] 85/3	9/10 9/11
realising [1] 110/3	39/18 67/7	region [1] 26/3	86/18 88/1 102/8	reserves [1] 70/4
reality [2] 5/21 38/4	recommended [1]	regional [2] 60/10	137/13 140/7 140/19	reservoir [2] 149/18
really [23] 2/15 2/23	103/9	60/11	140/20 158/7 159/21	149/18
11/20 21/8 25/16	record [4] 72/4 72/5	regions [1] 15/13	167/11	resident [1] 82/1
28/13 32/21 35/11	72/8 137/21	register [1] 106/16	remote [1] 50/1	resilience [17] 25/23
36/4 36/11 40/18	recorded [1] 137/11	regrets [2] 138/1	remotely [1] 8/10	27/25 30/8 31/13 34/6
50/12 50/12 52/24	rectified [2] 56/18	138/2	remove [4] 33/3	34/25 35/1 42/14
60/15 77/9 82/15	61/16	regrettable [1] 133/6	43/14 68/1 86/21	43/17 44/8 64/6 65/12
82/17 83/1 85/3	recyclable [1] 36/14	regularly [1] 13/13	renamed [1] 68/8	65/20 68/9 69/25
137/12 143/6 172/7	red [2] 167/3 167/3	regulator [1] 136/8	rendered [1] 27/15	70/14 70/16
realtime [5] 36/25	redacted [1] 159/14	regulatory [7] 14/22	reorder [2] 35/12	resilient [2] 8/22
36/25 37/9 38/9 38/11	redesigned [3] 52/6	128/23 129/24 130/24	38/21	69/11
reason [15] 21/8	58/14 61/18	131/2 131/25 135/21	repatriate [1] 83/14	resolve [1] 77/16
30/21 43/21 47/21	reduce [1] 67/11	reinforce [1] 156/5	repatriating [1] 83/5	resource [1] 7/11
48/11 48/14 53/6 54/9	reducing [1] 101/4	reinstate [1] 141/11	repeatedly [1] 172/10	resources [3] 20/17
100/11 127/2 130/2	Reeves [12] 144/1	reinstatement [2]	replenish [7] 4/21	40/7 151/20
138/9 149/25 155/24	144/3 145/13 145/23	140/25 166/16	16/19 28/8 28/11	respect [21] 8/11 9/4
171/18	145/25 146/14 146/21	reintroduction [1]	37/21 38/21 39/4	9/13 10/11 39/21
reasonable [2] 51/12	147/21 160/2 160/25	141/5	reply [1] 178/10	44/16 45/9 46/17
160/21	162/2 162/12	Reject [1] 55/14	report [31] 1/13 1/16	50/14 55/16 56/5 72/9
reasons [8] 7/15 7/15	refer [13] 6/18 10/23	rejected [1] 55/17	3/23 3/24 5/14 6/18	73/17 82/11 84/13
28/12 28/15 31/17	25/3 30/6 32/10 34/22	relate [2] 2/24 38/2	10/23 12/4 16/3 19/9	91/7 94/25 97/3 105/1
	38/13 55/20 68/23	related [4] 4/13 35/23	23/22 24/23 26/5 27/3	176/24 176/25

R	133/25 137/10 138/18 139/10 152/15 Richard [1] 128/4 right [91] 2/19 2/21 6/15 6/16 6/23 10/9 10/13 10/24 10/25 10/25 11/1 11/1 11/1 11/19 11/20 11/23 12/2 12/2 17/5 20/6 20/7 20/11 22/16 22/23 23/20 37/3 37/7 37/24 38/5 42/5 42/11 50/18 52/5 52/13 60/21 60/22 65/8 67/15 73/9 74/10 81/25 82/3 85/22 92/10 92/10 92/11 93/14 94/6 94/21 94/22 94/22 97/4 97/4 108/7 110/15 110/16 112/20 113/13 115/19 116/17 117/21 119/14 120/11 123/4 124/2 124/9 127/13 127/25 132/19 138/4 141/25 142/18 143/15 147/22 151/15 153/6 153/8 154/11 154/12 156/12 157/7 157/13 157/19 157/20 158/2 163/13 163/25 166/15 169/18 173/15 173/19 right-hand [1] 50/18 rightly [4] 102/8 154/9 160/13 162/7 rights [1] 11/22 rigs [1] 133/10 rings [1] 62/25 rise [1] 178/19 risk [37] 2/7 21/7 22/2 25/25 26/6 27/1 51/22 68/1 71/1 71/2 72/17 72/18 74/4 74/9 74/9 74/11 74/18 74/18 74/19 74/24 75/1 75/9 75/16 77/1 78/12 79/4 79/6 79/10 79/16 80/2 102/14 103/10 103/15 103/25 104/19 130/22 138/8 riskier [1] 72/6 risking [1] 57/8 risks [10] 21/7 22/5 25/9 25/12 25/13 66/3 78/20 94/20 103/11 104/18 robust [3] 8/22 19/4 35/16 role [31] 36/6 37/8 38/13 38/14 39/20 42/2 42/13 42/15 42/18 44/15 44/18 46/17 48/2 63/11 82/10 82/13 82/14	82/18 105/8 113/10 113/12 117/13 117/19 123/25 124/13 129/10 131/18 131/25 132/11 143/21 156/24 roles [2] 40/1 112/22 Romford [1] 162/19 rose [1] 137/12 rotas [1] 48/9 rotating [5] 30/12 30/14 30/19 30/22 31/4 rough [1] 126/6 roughly [2] 48/17 89/17 round [1] 102/15 routed [1] 57/17 routes [2] 144/15 165/23 Rs [1] 10/24 Rubicon [1] 76/5 rubric [1] 11/5 rudimentary [1] 55/23 Rule [1] 71/20 Rule 10s [1] 71/20 run [3] 17/2 30/17 99/18 running [2] 63/8 107/7 runs [1] 116/16	123/10 129/21 saving [2] 98/2 173/9 saw [7] 8/13 17/6 18/25 38/3 38/8 61/15 143/12 say [79] 2/22 13/6 15/24 23/15 38/21 39/2 43/23 48/10 48/21 48/22 49/17 50/9 50/22 56/20 57/20 58/5 58/11 62/5 66/15 70/12 71/3 71/4 77/2 77/14 77/14 79/13 79/25 82/22 83/11 87/24 89/4 92/20 95/23 96/3 99/20 99/25 100/20 103/19 105/6 108/8 109/18 114/1 116/23 116/25 117/12 119/14 128/7 129/8 129/9 133/23 133/24 134/5 137/20 138/17 138/18 138/21 138/22 139/21 140/3 140/22 146/20 149/6 150/25 153/5 154/10 154/14 156/9 157/14 158/7 160/24 162/20 164/10 168/25 169/10 171/22 172/1 173/5 173/11 176/25 saying [12] 4/24 22/7 54/7 69/16 70/24 94/9 101/24 147/11 162/22 172/21 176/13 176/15 says [13] 12/10 16/9 68/16 69/5 69/8 70/6 121/6 132/15 135/14 165/14 168/23 170/6 177/22 scalability [1] 20/25 scalable [1] 33/20 scale [14] 31/23 33/25 48/4 49/23 50/10 90/10 91/18 130/14 131/9 135/2 137/9 137/9 142/11 147/7 SCCL [1] 23/19 scheme [1] 134/11 science [2] 86/10 87/10 sciences [5] 49/12 49/20 174/25 176/12 177/12 Sciences/BioScience s [1] 174/25 scope [1] 36/1 scores [1] 163/14 Scotland [2] 178/18 178/22 Scottish [2] 69/22 173/22 scrabbling [1] 29/4	scratch [1] 32/9 screen [9] 4/1 27/3 33/14 51/14 78/16 128/2 135/10 147/15 150/1 scroll [4] 51/15 128/17 130/5 170/5 scrupulously [1] 164/13 sea [1] 3/5 second [17] 18/14 29/20 30/10 30/13 42/7 55/19 75/23 76/11 76/15 79/8 97/10 103/2 108/24 128/2 129/6 133/24 168/1 secondary [1] 86/25 secondly [3] 27/11 63/15 162/14 Secretary [4] 62/6 93/22 94/11 104/5 section [1] 172/1 sector [28] 11/8 15/18 20/14 21/12 21/15 30/2 32/11 34/10 34/14 35/8 36/1 36/1 36/9 37/3 69/14 70/17 86/10 101/2 144/24 174/22 174/25 176/1 176/3 176/11 176/13 177/12 177/18 177/25 sectors [1] 39/12 secure [14] 58/23 83/21 84/10 84/17 90/14 93/17 95/19 106/5 122/2 136/14 136/17 145/21 150/21 164/8 secured [1] 127/8 securing [1] 101/5 security [3] 68/8 68/25 69/19 Sedwill [2] 174/1 176/23 Sedwill's [1] 178/10 see [40] 5/15 9/14 17/6 18/4 19/18 28/2 36/18 61/19 70/13 70/21 78/16 78/18 78/25 84/23 91/15 97/8 100/19 100/23 106/22 115/2 118/9 120/5 125/9 127/2 128/17 128/22 130/3 130/12 131/7 133/6 134/25 137/19 145/20 145/25 150/1 158/23 160/7 160/18 164/7 174/11 seeing [2] 47/6 161/20 seek [5] 117/7
----------	---	---	---	---

S	servants [7] 126/13 152/24 153/5 153/7 153/11 154/2 154/14	101/3 104/11 120/15 127/7 151/15 151/20 151/22 151/25 154/15 154/20 156/6 158/17 158/18 168/5 168/11 178/5 178/13	singular [1] 38/12	snafu [1] 168/21
seek... [4] 148/24 151/15 162/4 164/23	serve [1] 145/13	shouldn't [1] 150/24	Sir [37] 81/12 106/8 108/24 118/13 119/11 120/13 121/11 121/16 122/1 122/6 122/17 123/7 124/11 124/15 124/17 124/20 125/6 125/19 126/16 127/17 127/18 129/1 132/24 135/11 135/11 135/24 137/7 137/21 138/5 138/11 138/14 139/19 139/21 152/14 153/24 155/5 155/9	so [260]
seeking [11] 89/3 89/3 90/6 103/22 103/25 125/4 132/11 134/24 146/16 153/21 164/22	served [2] 41/21 41/25	showed [4] 54/4 58/25 102/11 106/17	social [28] 14/9 24/12 43/1 46/23 50/14 54/1 55/9 55/12 56/5 56/19 56/22 57/2 58/3 58/19 59/11 61/8 71/10 84/12 85/1 88/12 92/14 93/6 94/1 96/1 97/14 99/6 99/12 109/4	SOEs [3] 73/24 74/14 74/15
seem [6] 1/6 131/23 156/4 177/9 178/20 178/25	services [2] 15/19 43/12	shows [1] 99/21	Sir Gareth [11] 118/13 119/11 120/13 122/1 126/16 127/17 129/1 132/24 152/14 155/5 155/9	software [1] 39/8
seemed [2] 45/8 89/6	sessional [1] 13/16	shrewd [1] 157/8	Sir Gareth's [1] 153/24	sold [1] 10/8
seems [6] 16/11 50/16 52/16 115/9 115/12 170/8	set [24] 17/22 18/8 18/10 45/16 45/18 47/9 47/10 47/12 49/1 49/24 58/25 60/24 68/7 74/17 75/7 100/16 114/15 125/8 136/20 140/19 144/15 148/14 174/24 176/2	side [18] 5/23 6/14 6/18 12/7 12/9 12/20 13/7 14/3 14/19 14/20 16/2 16/9 21/13 49/3 50/18 54/12 54/13 125/24	Sir James [16] 122/6 122/17 123/7 124/11 124/15 124/17 124/20 125/6 125/19 137/7 137/21 138/5 138/11 138/14 139/19 139/21	solution [3] 26/2 27/19 28/13
seen [4] 49/3 51/10 74/10 145/24	setting [5] 69/25 75/4 103/10 105/19 140/16	sides [1] 58/12	Sir James Dyson [2] 121/11 121/16	solutions [3] 137/22 142/9 142/13
selecting [1] 135/18	settings [1] 12/14	sifting [2] 151/11 151/20	Sir John [2] 127/18 135/24	solving [1] 110/9
self [3] 69/23 103/8 104/19	several [6] 2/6 84/17 94/15 96/24 142/5 142/9	sight [2] 88/15 100/18	Sir Philip [3] 81/12 106/8 108/24	some [88] 5/4 7/24 8/1 8/8 9/16 9/19 10/14 10/17 13/8 17/6 17/12 18/24 19/5 21/9 21/19 22/25 23/24 24/22 27/5 27/17 28/2 29/18 31/20 31/21 32/10 35/14 35/15 45/2 47/13 49/14 49/14 51/7 52/20 52/20 59/3 60/23 66/2 69/23 71/20 76/17 80/21 82/16 83/14 87/5 87/7 87/25 91/22 95/7 95/24 95/25 96/18 99/20 100/3 105/17 107/17 107/19 110/14 111/7 114/12 115/20 120/4 120/13 122/1 123/21 125/12 127/4 127/13 136/23 140/18 142/10 145/14 146/5 147/24 147/25 148/1 148/19 155/14 155/20 156/7 157/1 158/13 159/15 166/19 167/10 169/3 173/4 176/7 179/23
self-gazumping [2] 103/8 104/19	shadow [1] 144/1	sign [2] 93/17 94/23	Sit [1] 101/14	somebody [5] 53/5 94/23 96/12 96/21 101/21
self-sufficiency [1] 69/23	shall [5] 40/20 80/25 80/25 140/9 179/25	signal [7] 46/24 47/2 94/17 105/9 105/10 109/10 164/12	sits [2] 24/11 173/19	somehow [3] 139/18 140/2 143/9
sell [3] 43/12 77/1 102/11	Shanghai [1] 86/1	signals [2] 13/4 75/4	sitting [2] 37/7 71/22	someone [5] 37/7 124/23 159/14 159/16 164/15
seller [1] 139/1	share [4] 7/15 25/5 74/7 150/11	signed [4] 93/9 93/12 95/2 112/14	situate [1] 159/5	something [21] 5/11 9/7 26/10 33/11 34/17 39/9 39/9 41/16 52/18 60/2 68/9 75/17 83/10 93/7 102/7 133/9 139/18 140/2 149/9 168/15 169/12
selling [1] 7/21	shared [1] 162/15	signing [2] 92/17 93/4	situation [6] 28/15 76/16 132/14 154/25 155/14 155/25	
send [7] 47/4 47/6 48/7 54/8 86/19 87/25 108/8	Sharma [7] 1/5 40/24 81/5 89/4 100/20 108/22 111/22	silos [2] 7/10 23/4	six [3] 10/24 11/21 11/21	
sending [3] 62/4 76/17 110/1	shelves [1] 2/18	similar [7] 8/8 13/22 14/16 57/12 73/15 102/16 111/4	sixth [1] 177/17	
senior [5] 98/21 112/22 126/13 148/17 152/24	shift [4] 48/6 89/22 106/24 106/25	Simon [3] 81/6 81/7 181/11	skill [1] 106/18	
sense [8] 42/19 47/5 49/18 50/24 75/12 85/8 89/14 117/8	shipment [1] 38/24	simple [2] 12/21 115/22	skills [1] 39/23	
sensible [2] 50/24 145/1	shipped [4] 3/4 15/7 15/8 133/8	simplification [1] 5/10	slide [3] 12/25 38/3 51/16	
sent [8] 9/22 10/19 56/4 58/18 120/14 145/23 155/22 174/1	shipping [2] 14/24 20/22	simply [7] 50/5 58/19 79/13 87/19 147/21 168/25 172/18	slides [1] 78/23	
sentence [1] 76/15	ships [1] 83/12	simultaneously [1] 142/9	slight [1] 1/5	
sentences [1] 172/14	shoe [1] 25/3	since [11] 20/11 20/21 21/18 41/25 70/10 82/4 113/7 119/6 120/13 153/16 166/2	slightly [7] 8/25 64/7 94/7 107/5 156/20 160/14 166/3	
sentiment [1] 106/11	shoring [1] 26/20	Singapore [1] 46/15	slow [3] 85/20 96/15 156/18	
separate [5] 30/23 30/24 52/1 116/7 166/1	short [8] 29/24 40/22 57/24 64/11 72/2 81/3 130/12 140/11	single [15] 10/1 13/15 13/17 22/12 23/9 23/10 50/24 52/2 52/9 55/4 95/10 95/15 99/8 105/12 126/2	slowed [1] 99/15	
separately [2] 63/25 165/16	short-term [2] 29/24 64/11	single-most [2] 95/10 95/15	slowing [1] 165/24	
September [3] 41/25 81/20 113/1	shortage [2] 19/19 68/19		slowness [1] 124/12	
sequence [1] 85/3	shorthand [1] 129/17		small [6] 16/10 16/17 33/20 74/3 74/23 75/16	
sequential [3] 95/21 95/23 96/4	shortly [1] 152/18		smaller [6] 29/5 29/22 31/3 40/6 40/9 137/9	
sequentially [1] 125/10	should [35] 13/15 30/21 33/5 33/6 33/13 33/20 35/22 35/25 36/6 37/6 37/18 38/7 55/17 55/22 61/1 61/13 84/23 95/16		Smiths [1] 137/11	
series [4] 82/16 83/24 131/13 174/9				
seriously [2] 156/1 165/3				

S	specific [13] 9/8 10/20 31/6 68/18 69/15 69/25 70/17 78/8 79/9 84/13 84/14 114/23 154/25 specifically [6] 10/18 34/9 68/18 76/2 77/2 144/10 specification [7] 56/15 58/7 59/1 59/21 78/21 79/19 85/8 specifications [6] 56/12 78/13 79/20 90/22 91/8 136/9 Spectator [1] 113/6 spectrum [1] 70/15 speed [11] 47/9 51/21 52/3 61/22 97/2 97/9 97/11 127/24 136/10 163/11 167/6 speeding [1] 165/25 spend [3] 34/11 36/13 72/22 spent [1] 122/13 spikes [1] 69/1 split [2] 92/12 92/16 spoke [1] 159/19 spoken [2] 164/3 169/24 spokesperson [1] 146/3 sports [1] 136/22 spotlight [3] 68/15 68/20 70/20 spotted [1] 61/13 spread [1] 15/13 spreadsheets [3] 23/2 50/16 50/18 stability [1] 18/2 stable [1] 12/22 staff [10] 49/4 53/20 53/22 83/15 86/4 86/7 86/22 106/10 107/8 110/6 stage [26] 3/10 6/10 16/21 17/4 38/16 47/15 49/5 51/10 52/8 58/6 59/8 61/5 61/14 63/22 86/19 90/12 94/13 95/3 109/22 131/5 135/18 137/14 149/3 156/6 174/6 176/17 stages [28] 22/24 44/10 44/11 44/21 47/10 50/3 50/7 51/6 52/24 55/3 56/14 56/21 57/16 57/20 60/3 60/13 60/18 65/22 77/18 91/9 91/11 93/15 95/7 96/2 97/12 99/16 99/16 105/4 standards [2] 14/22	173/2 standby [1] 97/25 standing [5] 44/3 45/14 59/4 75/9 75/21 start [9] 2/10 8/3 41/15 42/12 81/17 82/10 109/12 168/2 174/8 started [5] 21/12 63/25 75/3 100/20 107/7 starting [3] 26/8 32/9 64/15 starts [3] 109/12 152/7 177/18 state [16] 72/8 73/19 73/23 73/24 86/16 88/15 93/22 94/11 100/9 100/14 100/24 100/25 101/3 112/10 172/7 174/10 state-owned [6] 73/23 73/24 100/9 100/14 100/24 101/3 statement [23] 41/7 41/9 51/2 53/18 60/25 72/3 72/18 73/20 75/8 75/20 76/1 81/10 81/12 106/8 108/25 112/13 124/19 135/13 140/3 140/22 143/20 162/16 172/8 statements [8] 23/14 23/15 41/7 41/11 80/17 81/14 143/17 179/10 States [2] 25/4 97/18 statistical [1] 143/9 stem [1] 151/14 stenographer [2] 140/8 156/18 step [2] 21/21 26/14 stepping [2] 73/5 131/24 steps [4] 99/22 99/23 99/24 103/14 stigma [1] 139/3 still [7] 21/13 83/9 86/1 86/24 93/6 97/16 98/9 stinky [1] 140/2 stock [12] 4/21 11/18 16/24 17/2 21/2 30/12 30/24 31/9 72/14 72/15 95/19 97/18 stockpile [2] 30/20 31/4 stockpiles [7] 22/9 22/10 27/9 30/12 30/14 33/23 68/17 stockpiling [1] 67/19 stocks [8] 14/13 18/23 28/4 28/8 28/11 30/17 37/21 68/18	stop [4] 29/16 76/9 95/20 103/15 stopped [1] 74/16 straight [1] 156/17 strains [1] 20/4 strategic [8] 27/10 29/8 29/15 42/7 67/14 70/4 75/3 78/11 strategies [1] 101/11 strategy [12] 54/13 68/10 69/24 70/14 70/15 70/17 71/5 73/22 98/24 100/4 100/8 100/23 Strategy' [1] 69/14 stream [3] 15/22 152/9 152/10 streams [1] 152/9 stress [5] 15/25 29/3 29/23 47/17 104/7 string [2] 130/4 132/19 strive [1] 141/11 strong [3] 43/25 131/1 135/24 strongly [1] 98/3 struck [3] 43/5 43/6 82/19 structural [1] 31/16 structured [2] 174/24 176/2 structures [5] 20/10 53/20 62/14 65/19 106/24 struggled [1] 50/23 style [1] 124/17 subcategories [1] 118/18 subcategory [1] 119/11 subcontracted [1] 6/8 subdivided [1] 118/17 subject [5] 59/23 60/5 113/11 117/22 140/14 subject-matter [1] 60/5 subsequent [1] 82/24 subsequently [3] 85/5 148/15 171/3 success [6] 10/23 11/4 11/13 120/8 139/9 139/24 successes [1] 141/8 succinct [2] 149/22 156/21 such [40] 3/8 14/2 14/11 17/17 20/3 20/4 20/13 21/5 22/12 23/19 24/6 30/25 31/18 32/16 32/17	35/1 38/11 38/13 39/14 40/3 42/18 43/22 44/19 48/15 52/6 54/13 56/6 68/17 71/6 93/18 99/13 107/4 108/17 127/11 136/1 141/11 147/6 153/8 155/14 172/7 suchlike [1] 99/14 suddenly [1] 29/3 suffered [1] 139/14 sufficiency [1] 69/23 sufficient [1] 44/5 sufficiently [3] 19/3 77/18 156/1 suggest [12] 17/21 26/18 29/16 31/13 32/15 34/7 37/16 140/1 143/9 152/22 163/20 165/2 suggested [2] 24/1 138/12 suggesting [4] 29/11 98/5 168/11 177/8 suggestion [5] 34/2 35/21 39/20 59/13 62/24 Suggestions [1] 132/25 suggests [3] 55/17 137/3 158/24 suitable [1] 134/20 summarise [1] 115/2 summary [1] 40/17 Sunderland [1] 21/15 supermarkets [1] 8/7 superseded [1] 139/16 supplemented [3] 87/18 87/22 173/4 supplied [3] 15/24 37/16 73/6 supplier [18] 4/4 5/4 6/1 7/11 16/9 16/18 16/22 67/13 68/21 68/25 69/2 69/18 75/20 97/5 102/4 102/17 174/22 175/25 supplier's [2] 16/21 135/18 supplier/collaborator [1] 175/25 supplier/collaborator /in [1] 174/22 suppliers [36] 2/25 4/21 4/22 5/18 5/24 5/25 6/4 6/4 6/6 6/6 6/22 7/1 7/13 7/18 14/17 15/11 25/10 27/13 28/19 28/22 29/5 29/9 29/13 45/1 47/16 62/24 63/18 67/12 72/13 73/5 73/13 85/7 91/22
----------	---	---	--	--

S	27/22 32/8 35/8 35/13 53/8 58/8 77/20 92/17 99/8 116/4 117/6 121/21 122/23 124/1 140/5 140/7 144/21 151/22 152/5 165/3 168/5 170/24 173/25 174/13	54/21 54/25 55/1 56/8 57/22 59/15 60/7 75/10 92/13 98/2 98/16 99/22 109/11 109/11 162/23 Teams' [1] 50/2 tech [6] 9/10 9/11 21/15 21/17 33/7 40/2	11/12 32/17 44/20 56/6 97/19 125/12 125/20 133/9 176/6 176/9 176/15 176/16 176/16 176/19 176/21 176/23 176/25 177/5 177/6 177/9 177/13 177/18 178/1 178/18	84/7 90/24 91/13 106/14 108/3 108/11 109/10 109/10 110/7 111/8 114/3 118/21 120/16 123/4 126/10 127/18 127/24 128/1 128/23 130/2 130/15 130/17 132/5 132/6 134/18 140/5 141/18 142/5 147/22 151/6 154/19 157/14 157/20 158/2 159/20 160/14 160/23 166/11 168/9 171/22 172/18 172/23 174/7
suppliers... [3] 120/4 125/18 135/19	take-make-waste [1] 35/8	tests [4] 9/22 10/14 10/14 149/19	theatrical [3] 146/7 161/3 161/6	
supplies [11] 27/10 30/1 44/23 45/3 45/4 45/24 46/3 46/25 49/4 56/10 122/2	taken [19] 19/20 38/20 43/21 66/2 71/10 75/22 79/10 80/4 80/6 80/10 87/16 94/2 134/4 155/25 158/6 159/24 171/24 175/6 178/25	text [1] 70/22	their [37] 5/5 6/23 10/6 14/9 16/20 16/21 17/3 22/24 23/15 43/12 49/20 59/12 66/21 67/3 67/4 77/5 85/2 91/12 102/12 102/13 115/16 124/25 136/24 148/2 152/2 153/10 153/12 154/14 155/7 160/1 160/7 160/8 160/9 162/21 163/8 163/10 179/7	
supply [198]	talking [10] 7/18 11/22 32/1 51/16 74/14 89/16 89/17 154/22 154/25 176/6	texted [1] 124/6	them [43] 12/1 13/9 15/5 17/19 23/24 31/2 34/19 35/7 35/17 45/1 47/2 47/4 47/4 53/2 53/25 57/18 58/8 61/12 67/20 87/3 101/2 107/11 108/17 115/20 116/9 120/4 131/8 131/9 131/17 133/8 133/10 135/2 137/19 140/25 142/10 143/25 147/14 152/4 152/12 158/11 160/12 161/2 165/25	
supplying [3] 7/3 74/16 112/12	talk [8] 16/13 18/12 51/2 53/21 89/1 121/7 123/17 124/6	texts [1] 2/7	themselves [3] 25/14 50/22 71/16	
support [13] 49/21 51/7 59/22 60/11 64/17 67/3 71/7 136/12 138/16 141/4 157/10 159/14 167/16	talked [2] 48/5 63/10	Thailand [2] 21/11 25/7	then [122] 3/6 4/7 4/17 4/22 5/4 6/10 8/20 10/1 10/15 10/17 12/18 12/24 13/3 13/6 14/7 15/14 15/16 16/18 17/6 25/3 25/5 26/16 26/22 27/16 28/8 32/8 32/16 33/3 33/8 35/11 35/18 38/1 38/6 39/1 39/3 41/9 43/10 43/13 45/8 46/4 46/21 47/1 47/3 47/4 47/6 48/20 49/5 49/7 53/24 55/19 55/21 55/23 57/17 58/12 58/14 59/18 59/21 61/7 61/12 61/15 61/16 61/18 62/13 63/15 63/17 63/22	
supported [2] 137/4 157/5	task [3] 48/5 49/23 50/10	than [29] 5/16 15/8 17/24 27/19 28/16 29/19 31/25 38/4 53/13 55/17 60/19 70/17 71/3 71/11 72/6 79/18 101/13 107/6 125/2 130/17 134/1 135/3 136/18 143/13 147/13 155/13 167/20 175/10 178/22	thank [55] 3/20 9/4 16/6 17/10 40/15 40/19 41/5 53/15 53/16 55/7 55/15 71/18 71/24 77/20 77/21 78/15 78/17 80/14 80/15 80/16 80/16 80/18 81/17 88/22 100/6 111/5 111/14 111/20 111/21 111/22 112/3 112/7 112/12 112/12 112/18 113/6 113/9 116/17 117/12 117/21 120/19 123/4 142/16 143/19 149/20 149/25 156/23 170/12 173/15 179/4 179/8 179/13 179/14 179/22 179/25	
supporting [3] 43/10 71/15 160/9	taskforce [3] 83/6 83/6 98/23	thank [55] 3/20 9/4 16/6 17/10 40/15 40/19 41/5 53/15 53/16 55/7 55/15 71/18 71/24 77/20 77/21 78/15 78/17 80/14 80/15 80/16 80/16 80/18 81/17 88/22 100/6 111/5 111/14 111/20 111/21 111/22 112/3 112/7 112/12 112/12 112/18 113/6 113/9 116/17 117/12 117/21 120/19 123/4 142/16 143/19 149/20 149/25 156/23 170/12 173/15 179/4 179/8 179/13 179/14 179/22 179/25	thanks [6] 80/22 80/24 128/12 134/1 138/19 163/5	
suppose [3] 28/13 47/13 85/15	teachers [1] 178/23	term [16] 17/23 27/11 28/21 29/2 29/8 29/21 29/24 30/8 34/8 34/18 64/8 64/11 64/11 74/9 98/24 107/19	that [1112]	
supposing [1] 167/2	team [65] 42/5 44/24 45/16 45/21 46/5 46/19 47/1 47/5 47/7 47/20 48/21 49/7 49/7 49/8 49/10 49/18 49/19 51/20 52/6 57/4 57/5 59/17 59/19 59/20 67/9 72/19 74/5 76/6 76/23 76/24 87/11 88/9 88/18 88/21 89/2 90/23 91/24 92/22 93/2 93/9 93/13 95/15 100/13 100/15 101/9 103/12 103/13 103/21 104/16 105/22 109/12 109/13 137/21 144/20 146/24 147/19 148/13 149/16 149/17 152/6 163/6 165/17 167/2 168/20 170/12	terms [49] 4/24 7/5 9/21 9/21 9/24 11/10 11/23 12/21 13/4 13/9 13/23 14/8 15/15 15/16 15/20 16/23 18/21 18/22 19/15 19/21 21/17 23/6 25/14 32/19 33/7 34/5 36/20 36/25 37/11 37/20 42/21 50/21 55/8 58/15 62/23 65/18 77/10 85/10 87/21 90/19 92/12 92/16 92/17 105/10 106/17 117/15 122/8 178/15 179/13	that I [9] 62/19 129/23 131/13 135/15 136/3 149/6 155/24 160/23 166/14	
sure [25] 6/13 17/2 18/23 74/5 92/7 93/5 96/3 103/17 104/23 110/17 128/5 131/11 132/6 145/8 150/5 152/10 157/20 159/13 160/20 162/23 163/20 164/8 167/8 177/24 178/3	teams [39] 42/4 43/7 43/25 45/7 46/8 46/11 46/13 46/14 46/18 46/21 47/8 47/10 47/17 47/24 49/2 49/6 49/15 49/24 50/3 52/1 52/7 52/9 52/13 52/23	that it [1] 40/3	that Rachel [1] 161/6	
Surely [1] 29/13	team's [2] 73/21 74/2	that's [73] 5/2 6/16 10/13 13/5 15/8 17/4 22/23 23/7 29/19 33/10 34/13 41/20 41/23 42/1 42/6 42/9 42/11 43/3 51/13 54/17 55/15 55/25 66/9 74/6 75/24 77/13 78/23 79/5 81/25 82/3	then [122] 3/6 4/7 4/17 4/22 5/4 6/10 8/20 10/1 10/15 10/17 12/18 12/24 13/3 13/6 14/7 15/14 15/16 16/18 17/6 25/3 25/5 26/16 26/22 27/16 28/8 32/8 32/16 33/3 33/8 35/11 35/18 38/1 38/6 39/1 39/3 41/9 43/10 43/13 45/8 46/4 46/21 47/1 47/3 47/4 47/6 48/20 49/5 49/7 53/24 55/19 55/21 55/23 57/17 58/12 58/14 59/18 59/21 61/7 61/12 61/15 61/16 61/18 62/13 63/15 63/17 63/22	
Surrey [1] 112/19	take [30] 3/22 17/11 20/4 21/21 23/8 25/22	T		
sustainable [2] 107/12 109/8				
Sweden [1] 46/16				
sweet [1] 167/4				
switch [1] 26/25				
Switzerland [1] 46/16				
sworn [6] 1/10 81/7 112/4 181/3 181/11 181/14				
system [37] 14/1 18/10 24/3 24/7 24/7 29/3 33/3 39/8 43/15 47/18 49/13 50/4 51/7 51/21 53/5 54/12 62/22 76/4 76/18 104/21 105/13 108/15 135/21 135/22 144/20 154/1 160/21 165/19 167/2 167/9 168/21 169/15 169/17 173/11 175/12 175/15 175/17				
systemic [1] 15/15				
systems [8] 18/7 18/9 18/9 50/19 51/5 51/17 66/17 142/24				

T	18/8 18/9 19/3 20/10 21/5 21/5 21/6 21/6 23/15 24/16 25/8 26/24 29/7 29/15 31/9 40/7 43/11 44/18 45/3 45/4 47/4 47/6 48/6 48/20 50/20 51/8 58/17 58/19 58/20 59/12 60/6 64/19 65/5 65/5 72/22 72/25 73/13 74/8 74/16 76/9 79/20 81/16 85/1 86/10 87/22 88/4 90/5 90/5 90/6 90/7 90/14 90/17 90/22 90/25 91/7 91/11 92/3 92/3 92/6 92/6 96/10 96/17 98/11 98/17 99/22 102/11 103/23 105/24 105/25 106/3 106/4 106/18 106/19 116/2 116/6 116/6 119/25 127/23 129/25 131/12 131/20 135/1 136/24 137/7 137/19 137/23 144/16 147/9 148/16 149/14 150/23 160/5 160/6 160/11 161/24 162/12 167/15 168/18 171/24 175/22 175/24	67/23 70/24 71/4 74/9 83/2 83/7 84/7 86/18 88/13 94/3 94/4 94/17 95/1 96/17 98/9 98/9 99/20 100/19 100/23 101/16 101/17 101/18 102/8 102/8 102/9 104/4 104/4 105/1 105/4 105/7 105/14 105/24 105/24 106/16 106/22 108/11 108/12 109/5 110/3 110/15 110/18 110/20 110/21 111/1 111/7 111/9 111/23 114/20 115/1 115/19 119/6 120/25 122/24 125/18 126/1 129/17 132/9 133/22 134/11 134/14 134/18 134/24 136/7 137/10 137/12 137/17 138/4 138/8 138/11 138/16 139/6 139/9 140/5 140/20 140/23 141/7 141/9 142/1 142/4 143/8 143/11 145/17 146/19 148/19 150/13 153/3 154/4 154/5 155/17 155/20 156/3 156/11 156/17 157/14 157/18 157/25 158/2 158/7 158/12 159/6 159/10 159/15 159/17 160/4 160/6 160/22 161/4 161/18 162/1 164/18 166/11 167/9 167/10 168/8 168/15 168/15 170/6 173/3 175/14 176/21 178/8 178/11 179/15	65/25 66/9 67/3 67/20 67/25 68/2 73/11 74/23 75/13 77/18 78/7 78/22 79/19 79/21 81/14 84/2 84/10 86/9 87/10 87/22 89/23 89/23 89/25 90/16 91/4 92/12 93/11 93/16 96/7 96/13 101/12 101/14 101/23 102/1 105/10 106/17 107/15 108/21 110/1 110/24 115/8 115/17 122/2 122/4 124/16 126/20 139/14 141/3 142/3 143/18 144/23 146/5 146/19 151/10 151/21 151/21 151/22 151/25 153/17 153/18 155/3 155/24 159/4 160/1 160/10 160/16 160/24 161/23 166/7 166/19 168/14 169/18 171/12 171/12 171/20 171/24 173/15 176/13 177/8 179/3	167/21 168/18 170/25 throughout [25] 4/18 5/1 7/16 8/13 13/17 20/17 20/20 23/11 26/11 26/11 26/22 31/5 37/2 37/10 66/19 66/19 83/23 87/22 94/16 97/2 97/6 113/15 127/7 131/4 136/4 throw [2] 35/5 35/6 thrown [1] 108/20 thumbed [1] 123/13 Thursday [1] 97/13 tier [6] 5/24 6/1 6/4 6/4 6/5 6/5 tier 1 [1] 6/4 Tier 2 [1] 6/4 tier 5 [1] 6/5 tier 6 [1] 6/5 tiers [5] 5/18 5/19 6/6 7/18 17/5 time [73] 2/16 7/2 10/25 12/2 17/9 21/10 26/21 28/9 28/10 29/12 33/24 34/16 43/24 45/3 46/7 47/22 52/4 53/3 57/24 58/11 63/25 72/22 76/7 76/17 77/4 77/8 79/4 83/2 85/14 87/25 89/6 96/19 97/3 98/6 99/13 101/7 102/18 107/16 108/18 116/12 117/8 119/25 120/7 122/13 122/22 125/16 126/21 126/24 129/15 130/14 131/8 133/15 133/16 134/10 134/12 135/4 144/11 145/9 145/20 146/25 149/21 150/14 153/1 157/24 158/23 162/8 163/4 163/23 169/20 170/20 171/6 173/19 175/2 timeframe [3] 92/10 132/1 161/14 timeline [1] 28/1 times [9] 2/14 6/25 18/2 18/3 35/5 57/25 114/8 156/9 156/10 timescale [1] 129/19 timing [1] 57/22 title [1] 116/15 today [11] 2/20 57/9 63/10 66/20 80/18 97/16 108/10 111/15 140/9 168/3 179/7 today's [1] 170/13 together [17] 9/16 9/18 15/2 15/24 45/22 46/6 46/20 47/18 48/19 49/3 50/3 50/6 52/23 52/25 56/18
----------	---	--	---	--

T	transmission [1] 105/8	turn [20] 7/24 20/3 23/14 24/19 30/4 31/12 31/15 68/14 93/21 95/4 96/11 100/6 101/21 102/25 105/17 122/8 124/3 127/13 140/14 151/4	UK manufacturers [1] 33/8	United Kingdom [6] 32/13 43/5 43/10 44/17 88/6 104/23
together... [2] 75/13 75/19	transmitted [2] 13/1 13/3	turned [2] 32/15 101/20	UK-wide [1] 22/12	United Kingdom's [1] 82/5
told [7] 18/16 113/11 129/25 130/1 143/20 158/14 172/23	transparency [6] 39/6 114/7 114/17 114/24 116/1 116/13	turnaround [2] 57/7 57/25	ultimate [1] 102/4	United States [2] 25/4 97/18
Tom [1] 98/21	transport [3] 1/19 1/22 14/24	turned [2] 32/15 101/20	ultimately [6] 4/5 6/13 6/15 58/12 143/5 154/18	University [1] 1/24
tomorrow [2] 38/24 180/1	transportation [1] 15/17	turning [5] 14/19 20/8 27/2 44/15 63/1	unable [1] 87/17	unknown [1] 12/11
tone [2] 133/6 134/23	treated [4] 158/18 158/21 159/2 169/7	turnover [1] 148/2	unblocking [1] 129/10	unlawful [2] 141/21 142/1
too [6] 41/3 62/13 112/6 130/17 167/8 172/12	treatment [14] 116/2 116/9 139/14 141/22 142/19 147/6 159/25 160/5 160/6 160/23 161/22 161/25 163/25 168/12	twice [2] 170/20 171/8	unclear [2] 69/11 174/19	unless [1] 127/8
took [4] 105/2 147/13 148/9 166/17	treatments [1] 139/16	twin [1] 24/2	under [12] 12/10 52/2 52/9 59/12 76/7 88/4 115/13 115/21 121/25 138/21 162/3 176/18	unlikely [2] 147/19 147/20
tools [1] 37/19	tremendous [3] 105/25 106/1 106/19	two [32] 4/8 13/9 15/6 19/14 19/16 32/2 41/7 51/19 70/19 72/2 78/9 78/23 85/23 85/24 86/6 86/23 87/3 90/2 92/23 95/13 96/11 105/24 119/5 128/22 149/14 159/4 159/10 163/18 168/17 169/18 170/23 172/14	underestimate [1] 115/12	unrealistic [1] 130/14
top [8] 52/12 62/2 65/1 65/9 100/7 130/6 170/5 170/11	trend [5] 20/8 20/16 21/22 26/10 32/1	two months [2] 15/6 86/23	underlying [1] 12/12	unreasonable [2] 133/4 134/22
topic [5] 36/15 80/11 135/5 137/24 153/16	trends [2] 21/18 21/19	two weeks [1] 168/17	underneath [1] 5/12	untested [1] 73/14
topical [1] 80/7	triage [10] 49/6 51/19 58/17 59/7 59/14 72/12 147/4 148/24 166/7 168/16	Two-thirds [1] 95/13	underpinned [1] 20/18	until [8] 2/22 4/25 65/21 140/18 152/7 163/23 179/20 180/3
topics [1] 72/2	triaged [1] 144/22	type [6] 30/22 90/22 120/2 133/17 164/23 167/5	understand [21] 2/15 2/17 21/12 36/23 52/14 53/4 57/9 57/21 64/9 79/24 84/20 90/8 95/19 96/7 96/23 100/15 107/24 137/15 163/9 177/23 179/11	unusually [1] 88/16
total [1] 23/23	triaging [4] 61/6 66/17 145/3 151/11	types [6] 9/17 9/19 24/14 69/23 87/3 88/13	understand it [1] 100/15	up [88] 2/22 3/16 4/23 5/3 5/8 13/1 13/3 16/8 16/11 16/20 17/22 18/8 18/10 20/9 23/14 23/21 25/4 25/8 27/2 28/21 32/9 33/14 33/25 34/6 35/19 37/4 43/21 45/4 45/16 45/18 47/9 47/10 47/12 48/7 48/25 51/14 52/11 56/24 58/21 61/7 68/7 68/11 71/10 75/23 75/24 77/1 78/14 87/7 92/21 93/21 95/4 96/11 97/2 97/7 98/19 100/16 102/15 104/1 108/20 102/20 122/16 123/18 125/1 127/15 128/2 128/17 130/5 130/5 132/2 132/7 132/19 135/9 140/17 140/19 144/15 146/22 148/14 150/1 159/11 159/24 160/12 163/11 165/25 169/3 170/5 170/25 172/22 175/6
totally [2] 130/14 154/4	tributary [1] 149/17		understandable [1] 97/1	update [2] 118/19 144/4
touch [5] 10/10 16/1 23/24 96/15 98/19	tried [4] 77/16 93/10 106/13 162/22	U	understandably [2] 168/22 178/6	updates [2] 117/3 153/22
touched [7] 9/1 27/6 30/9 36/16 59/23 141/20 178/11	tries [1] 28/13	UK [59] 1/21 11/17 13/25 14/15 15/3 17/22 18/6 21/4 21/25 22/10 22/12 22/17 24/2 25/24 27/7 29/11 30/3 30/7 31/14 31/17 32/10 32/20 33/4 33/8 33/19 33/22 35/1 40/5 40/6 40/11 53/24 68/12 69/9 70/5 71/11 72/2 74/21 82/12 82/19 83/25 85/12 87/18 88/2 91/3 91/19 92/2 98/2 102/2 102/8 103/12 103/22 103/23 104/2 104/8 104/22 107/6 110/23 163/3 178/1	understanding [9] 2/23 29/6 62/16 63/22 67/24 86/15 91/1 139/13 139/13	upload [1] 5/4
touches [1] 3/24	triggered [2] 39/2 39/2	UK DHSC [1] 103/12	understood [3] 48/2 91/2 134/16	upon [10] 9/1 18/7 27/19 30/9 40/3 59/23 82/21 104/8 117/11 141/20
Touching [1] 22/8	triggers [2] 4/18 4/25	UK Government [9] 11/17 22/17 29/11 30/7 68/12 71/11 74/21 85/12 102/2	undertake [1] 76/19	urgency [1] 28/5
Touching [1] 22/8	true [10] 1/16 41/12 44/6 56/20 62/25 81/14 103/19 112/16 132/4 157/14	UK Government's [1] 69/9	undertaken [3] 26/10 31/5 160/15	urgent [3] 145/21 164/8 169/3
towards [8] 20/12 48/16 63/1 98/23 141/15 141/16 143/18 154/12	trusts [4] 14/5 22/19 23/16 103/24		undertaking [1] 6/7	urgently [1] 124/6
tower [2] 30/9 37/7	truth [1] 23/10		undoubtedly [1] 150/22	us [56] 4/7 4/10 6/21
tracing [1] 132/3	try [8] 84/6 105/2 107/12 108/14 109/24 110/5 149/22 156/22		unequal [4] 116/9 141/22 142/19 161/25	
track [2] 37/15 62/22	trying [25] 7/20 17/17 52/24 85/6 88/17 90/8 90/14 90/14 91/12 91/13 91/17 92/3 96/9 97/2 99/18 99/21 104/8 105/15 106/21 108/14 109/6 110/25 122/13 132/8 139/21		unfortunate [2] 175/11 175/15	
tracking [5] 3/17 23/16 23/17 38/9 38/11	try [8] 84/6 105/2 107/12 108/14 109/24 110/5 149/22 156/22		Unfortunately [1] 165/18	
trade [36] 14/23 25/14 26/13 26/17 41/8 41/18 41/21 42/3 42/24 43/8 43/13 43/15 45/22 46/8 49/11 50/20 51/18 52/20 53/19 53/24 59/18 60/23 64/22 65/15 82/6 86/7 87/8 87/11 95/6 99/5 104/14 105/20 109/3 109/20 109/21 133/23	tsunami [1] 21/10		unique [2] 8/1 8/6	
Trade's [1] 42/13	tumble [1] 126/6		United [20] 25/4 32/13 43/5 43/6 43/10 44/17 82/5 82/7 83/5 88/6 88/10 92/14 97/18 99/12 101/15 104/23 110/13 150/16 178/7 178/15	
trade-offs [1] 133/23	Tunbridge [2] 130/8 131/10		understanding [9] 2/23 29/6 62/16 63/22 67/24 86/15 91/1 139/13 139/13	
trained [1] 108/9	tune [1] 114/10		understand it [1] 100/15	
training [8] 39/23 40/4 106/10 106/14 107/25 108/7 110/10 110/16			understandable [1] 97/1	
trajectory [1] 65/24			understandably [2] 168/22 178/6	

U
us... [53] 13/11 16/13
 22/11 26/13 27/22
 30/13 34/24 36/19
 45/17 49/8 49/24 50/2
 51/1 53/21 56/2 57/12
 62/11 66/13 68/1
 72/16 75/10 75/13
 79/12 84/10 84/21
 86/16 89/1 90/4 92/7
 94/1 94/11 94/21
 95/22 96/13 98/9
 98/12 98/18 99/21
 102/7 102/12 103/14
 105/13 111/15 113/11
 114/1 117/23 122/2
 143/20 149/23 160/13
 161/8 162/25 173/25
US-China [1] 26/13
usable [1] 35/23
usage [2] 13/15 37/3
use [24] 9/21 10/1
 10/1 12/14 12/15
 13/10 13/15 13/16
 18/19 36/5 36/5 50/15
 59/7 67/1 68/4 110/25
 117/14 130/23 143/5
 144/16 144/18 153/9
 159/15 177/3
used [12] 9/20 11/5
 30/16 31/2 35/5 35/7
 35/10 37/15 37/21
 131/3 168/9 173/12
useful [1] 44/14
user [2] 37/23 78/21
users [1] 79/12
using [7] 5/5 22/25
 23/2 34/23 35/17
 39/12 50/20
usual [5] 2/14 17/22
 31/1 108/4 108/6
usually [5] 3/4 3/14
 4/23 10/1 32/6

V
vacuum [1] 123/23
valid [1] 153/21
validation [1] 165/20
valuable [1] 103/3
value [7] 3/10 9/3 9/3
 32/21 32/25 63/23
 76/7
vantage [3] 46/17
 52/15 57/14
variable [1] 16/2
variables [7] 12/5
 12/8 12/9 12/20 12/24
 14/20 15/24
variety [6] 3/3 148/9
 149/19 154/8 155/23
 162/16
various [9] 7/10 14/4
 26/25 44/10 49/2 86/5

103/19 117/14 143/8
vary [1] 10/6
vast [3] 33/17 89/9
 173/9
ventilation [1] 139/15
ventilator [31] 55/25
 72/10 117/22 118/1
 119/16 119/23 120/11
 120/23 121/17 121/19
 121/23 122/11 123/2
 126/17 127/11 133/17
 133/25 135/19 136/16
 138/6 138/17 139/7
 152/21 173/24 175/5
 175/10 175/11 175/14
 175/23 176/8 177/4
ventilators [45] 8/2
 9/4 9/8 11/11 32/17
 32/19 44/19 44/23
 55/13 55/16 55/18
 56/6 57/10 72/6 83/22
 84/6 84/10 84/17
 84/22 85/7 85/9 88/24
 89/3 89/5 106/5 107/2
 119/24 121/2 121/21
 121/22 123/18 125/17
 128/10 130/23 131/7
 134/25 136/15 136/18
 139/23 162/22 174/16
 175/20 176/14 176/18
 177/14
verbal [1] 164/6
verification [1] 59/3
verify [1] 73/8
versa [2] 103/12
 178/24
versed [1] 107/9
version [1] 161/25
very [114] 2/23 3/23
 7/17 7/17 8/8 9/11
 9/12 13/20 14/3 15/11
 17/22 18/1 20/20
 20/22 21/9 21/22
 25/25 26/23 29/8 29/8
 31/3 31/20 34/8 37/1
 37/9 39/16 39/16 40/4
 40/15 40/20 41/5
 43/25 44/21 45/5
 47/10 49/17 53/2
 57/19 57/23 59/20
 60/3 64/15 65/1 65/24
 67/24 70/25 71/18
 71/24 72/16 73/4 73/4
 74/21 75/4 79/14
 80/16 80/22 80/24
 80/25 82/23 90/12
 91/9 91/11 92/6 92/21
 93/2 93/8 93/15 94/3
 95/7 96/1 97/12 99/21
 100/16 101/9 101/22
 102/18 105/4 106/18
 108/11 111/12 111/14
 111/20 111/21 111/25
 112/7 112/18 114/1

114/23 116/14 123/7
 127/7 137/6 137/13
 137/25 138/5 140/15
 143/22 144/12 148/22
 149/1 149/11 149/25
 150/13 150/25 154/15
 154/22 157/8 170/13
 174/3 179/4 179/8
 179/12 179/25 179/25
via [2] 4/16 73/6
viable [6] 122/15
 134/17 135/1 138/6
 152/4 162/7
vice [2] 103/12
 178/24
video [1] 92/5
view [16] 23/9 23/10
 24/13 45/4 60/25 61/3
 64/7 65/6 74/6 74/7
 91/24 125/23 142/13
 150/11 151/18 151/19
vindicated [2] 153/10
 153/11
VIP [16] 74/22 118/20
 140/15 140/25 141/5
 141/9 141/21 145/4
 145/10 145/16 147/16
 148/5 156/24 166/16
 166/18 166/19
VIP Lane [9] 74/22
 118/20 140/15 141/5
 141/21 145/10 147/16
 148/5 156/24
virtual [3] 30/11
 30/14 31/4
virtue [2] 85/13
 135/15
virus [2] 139/13
 139/14
visibility [12] 3/17
 4/9 7/7 7/8 7/16 15/1
 20/19 36/17 36/21
 36/25 37/1 37/3
visit [3] 91/12 92/3
 111/17
visiting [2] 1/23
 91/21
vital [1] 119/25
vitality [1] 117/13
volatile [1] 12/24
volatility [2] 12/5
 12/21
volume [2] 9/1 9/3
volumes [5] 24/15
 34/11 34/16 35/12
 107/3
vulnerabilities [6]
 64/8 65/4 65/25 67/10
 67/11 101/5
vulnerability [1] 67/2
vulnerable [2] 21/5
 64/18

W
wait [2] 92/18 163/23
waiting [2] 41/3
 112/5
Wald [5] 111/23
 132/7 140/6 140/13
 179/16
Wales [1] 178/21
want [23] 7/14 8/18
 48/15 65/12 76/11
 106/16 117/22 118/3
 119/1 120/16 126/8
 132/15 132/22 140/14
 143/17 144/16 153/4
 158/23 159/3 168/24
 169/8 177/21 178/23
wanted [12] 48/11
 96/9 102/19 122/15
 123/4 123/9 123/10
 130/23 136/4 138/10
 167/4 168/4
wanting [1] 134/11
wants [5] 115/2
 123/18 127/24 168/2
 168/3
war [1] 26/13
ward [2] 11/20 37/4
warehouse [4] 31/7
 38/19 38/20 38/22
warehouses [1]
 19/22
warehousing [1]
 18/8
warned [1] 112/6
was [482]
wasn't [23] 18/6
 18/11 45/13 47/14
 49/22 52/4 52/22 53/6
 55/3 60/20 66/5 75/11
 79/23 80/8 94/2 94/13
 95/2 104/23 116/18
 134/17 149/20 150/10
 150/20
waste [1] 35/8
watchwords [1]
 55/21
wave [2] 151/13
 151/14
way [54] 5/6 17/5
 17/12 23/16 23/17
 29/25 34/6 37/4 37/23
 38/2 38/7 46/25 48/14
 52/5 52/25 55/24
 57/24 64/13 66/25
 70/12 71/2 73/3 83/10
 91/23 94/4 94/5 94/10
 95/13 98/10 100/25
 102/15 106/25 107/18
 112/18 118/20 124/8
 125/25 126/3 126/6
 131/5 132/6 137/4
 138/2 154/16 154/19
 162/25 166/21 166/24

167/17 169/13 171/12
 173/12 173/14 177/10
ways [9] 10/4 32/14
 37/16 92/4 99/20
 110/9 143/3 153/14
 153/17
we [373]
we'd [17] 52/5 63/14
 63/21 82/16 83/6
 83/13 85/18 86/21
 87/23 87/24 96/19
 102/16 105/5 107/7
 111/2 111/3 115/1
we'll [13] 5/21 10/2
 18/23 23/23 24/19
 27/10 27/16 40/16
 113/17 116/10 128/17
 160/7 168/2
we're [23] 2/20 7/18
 40/5 41/14 50/3 66/7
 84/20 91/17 93/14
 94/5 94/9 104/7
 109/15 110/1 110/3
 110/25 122/8 153/5
 153/16 154/22 162/5
 162/20 172/14
we've [21] 1/5 9/5
 30/8 32/1 37/12 63/10
 74/22 74/25 88/22
 91/2 94/6 97/4 99/9
 101/13 108/14 108/16
 109/9 115/20 149/21
 163/23 175/18
weaknesses [1]
 115/7
wealth [1] 142/14
Weatherby [5] 71/22
 71/22 71/23 77/21
 181/8
webform [4] 144/18
 144/19 145/17 147/20
Webster [1] 23/13
Wednesday [2] 129/4
 129/12
week [19] 9/6 17/21
 17/23 30/19 37/12
 47/8 89/12 110/8
 115/21 118/14 119/11
 120/12 126/15 126/22
 149/4 150/8 158/1
 165/12 166/4
week's [2] 114/11
 140/24
weekend [2] 97/17
 173/25
weeks [11] 49/18
 52/5 84/2 87/24 89/8
 94/15 95/18 109/7
 110/24 134/3 168/17
welcome [1] 150/14
well [82] 5/20 7/8 8/8
 9/23 11/5 11/8 11/8
 12/21 14/13 14/14
 15/5 15/12 17/19 18/2

<p>W</p> <p>well... [68] 18/13 18/24 19/14 20/20 22/25 23/2 23/5 23/9 24/10 24/16 26/8 27/23 28/19 29/18 31/24 33/12 34/17 38/16 40/4 40/20 56/13 74/6 80/25 86/14 100/16 101/16 102/20 105/24 108/6 110/4 111/12 111/23 114/22 116/17 118/9 119/22 120/11 123/13 127/6 130/2 130/15 134/18 136/14 137/2 138/17 141/18 141/24 143/8 148/7 148/21 150/13 151/4 152/3 154/14 157/10 157/13 158/4 160/4 160/22 161/2 164/15 166/18 166/22 170/23 172/9 175/17 178/23 179/25</p> <p>well-thumbed [1] 123/13</p> <p>Welsh [2] 11/15 69/22</p> <p>went [8] 18/24 44/10 65/22 72/25 90/5 148/17 149/17 160/10</p> <p>were [263]</p> <p>weren't [6] 19/3 57/11 58/6 102/19 145/8 170/16</p> <p>west [1] 3/15</p> <p>western [2] 3/6 21/16</p> <p>what [195]</p> <p>what's [9] 16/13 20/19 35/7 36/23 70/22 76/21 107/8 150/24 158/19</p> <p>whatever [8] 4/17 8/17 54/22 80/22 87/13 94/9 154/12 161/17</p> <p>WhatsApp [1] 120/24</p> <p>when [49] 2/17 2/18 5/7 5/7 7/18 9/22 13/1 14/7 15/12 15/21 16/17 16/19 18/24 21/7 22/2 25/22 29/2 29/12 29/22 31/4 33/24 45/18 63/6 72/25 74/15 82/19 83/16 89/16 92/3 94/11 98/17 102/12 104/5 110/3 119/25 131/8 134/17 138/13 145/20 148/23 150/14 150/25 151/3 151/9 163/15 167/2 168/24 176/19 177/9</p>	<p>whenever [1] 131/16</p> <p>where [36] 3/6 3/18 12/1 19/16 24/15 25/20 33/5 34/14 34/24 57/13 60/6 63/23 64/8 64/18 65/3 65/5 65/25 68/3 83/13 83/13 84/19 91/11 93/11 94/20 98/4 100/20 102/9 105/14 109/9 119/18 130/1 142/19 147/1 163/12 166/8 172/5</p> <p>whereas [1] 119/5</p> <p>whereby [1] 167/2</p> <p>wherever [3] 47/4 178/4 178/14</p> <p>whether [42] 13/15 13/18 18/8 18/9 22/5 24/11 32/20 32/20 38/18 69/6 91/15 91/25 92/4 93/14 94/6 96/19 103/23 104/20 114/10 114/13 118/12 125/11 125/23 131/10 134/20 136/9 145/8 145/12 145/15 147/5 149/4 153/10 157/21 158/8 158/24 159/1 160/24 162/6 163/19 163/22 163/24 172/18</p> <p>which [229]</p> <p>while [3] 75/24 115/14 165/17</p> <p>whilst [3] 33/17 60/2 168/4</p> <p>Whip [1] 16/4</p> <p>Whitehall [3] 49/25 55/2 80/22</p> <p>who [102] 2/25 5/25 6/2 6/23 17/17 19/23 36/9 38/18 38/23 46/2 46/9 47/24 48/22 56/9 69/3 69/22 76/19 77/1 86/7 86/9 86/12 86/13 86/14 86/14 86/24 87/5 87/7 87/10 87/17 87/22 87/23 88/2 88/17 88/20 89/24 90/5 90/6 90/8 90/9 90/17 92/15 93/4 93/16 96/8 98/21 99/22 100/21 101/5 101/14 101/21 102/11 103/24 107/9 108/9 116/16 122/4 122/20 122/21 124/23 126/2 126/4 126/9 128/17 139/14 144/3 146/16 147/10 147/18 149/8 149/10 150/22 151/4 152/24 158/9 159/13 159/14 160/7 160/8 160/8 162/17 162/22</p>	<p>164/4 164/15 164/21 164/22 164/23 166/19 166/22 167/4 167/6 167/17 169/11 169/14 169/15 170/1 172/9 172/10 173/19 177/13 178/5 178/17 178/24</p> <p>who showed [1] 102/11</p> <p>whoever [3] 4/19 4/20 98/12</p> <p>whole [18] 2/24 3/7 4/19 4/25 7/17 9/23 13/3 15/23 16/25 21/6 23/11 25/12 26/11 89/14 89/16 156/11 158/10 175/17</p> <p>wholesalers [1] 3/8</p> <p>whom [8] 86/10 113/16 128/5 136/21 160/7 164/15 172/24 172/25</p> <p>whose [4] 49/11 102/4 166/7 168/17</p> <p>why [26] 2/12 27/22 28/14 30/21 31/21 33/12 51/19 54/9 94/2 100/11 100/14 118/24 127/2 131/6 153/22 158/3 163/22 164/8 164/13 164/15 166/15 169/11 171/17 176/17 178/11 178/12</p> <p>wide [3] 22/12 179/12 179/12</p> <p>widely [1] 30/16</p> <p>wider [3] 109/19 174/25 176/2</p> <p>widespread [1] 37/1</p> <p>will [72] 2/16 4/20 4/22 5/4 5/5 5/7 5/8 5/19 6/4 6/23 6/25 7/9 16/18 16/20 16/22 17/21 20/15 23/13 24/20 27/6 28/19 29/23 30/4 31/9 32/8 35/13 35/15 35/16 38/20 38/23 38/24 39/2 39/2 39/3 39/11 40/4 40/7 40/9 54/20 54/21 69/18 70/1 95/17 95/18 114/14 120/12 121/7 128/12 130/12 132/14 140/8 143/15 145/25 150/1 150/5 150/8 153/4 153/5 153/6 153/8 153/10 153/11 154/9 154/18 156/10 156/11 159/15 164/7 169/1 169/2 170/14 173/17</p> <p>Williams [9] 120/9 126/16 127/18 128/10 129/1 133/25 137/10</p>	<p>138/18 139/10</p> <p>Williams's [3] 118/13 118/14 152/15</p> <p>willing [3] 102/11 124/24 142/8</p> <p>willingly [1] 151/4</p> <p>willingness [3] 50/9 84/9 122/21</p> <p>wise [1] 178/9</p> <p>wish [1] 117/7</p> <p>wished [2] 96/20 131/7</p> <p>within [74] 5/19 6/1 6/8 6/10 7/1 7/7 7/10 7/14 7/19 9/18 10/21 11/5 11/6 16/21 17/1 21/25 22/10 24/12 25/5 30/2 30/16 33/19 34/10 36/18 36/19 36/23 38/16 40/6 43/18 43/18 44/9 47/20 49/10 51/17 52/5 53/5 58/24 59/17 60/9 60/14 62/4 65/19 66/11 66/21 70/20 71/17 84/18 87/11 101/8 104/22 105/13 109/19 109/20 110/8 110/13 110/14 112/23 116/12 117/13 117/23 124/14 124/19 132/1 137/3 138/18 143/20 147/11 148/13 151/20 154/22 158/5 161/13 171/4 174/15</p> <p>without [4] 51/6 157/18 157/23 165/1</p> <p>witness [24] 1/8 23/1 23/15 40/25 41/7 41/7 41/9 41/11 51/2 53/17 60/25 81/6 81/10 81/11 106/8 108/25 112/1 112/13 113/11 124/19 135/13 143/17 162/16 167/12</p> <p>witnesses [8] 9/6 24/20 30/18 61/21 101/13 140/24 141/4 172/15</p> <p>won't [2] 77/20 99/8</p> <p>wonder [7] 1/15 2/10 8/3 48/25 61/23 69/5 174/5</p> <p>wondered [1] 160/23</p> <p>wondering [1] 108/1</p> <p>Wood [3] 169/22 170/10 171/18</p> <p>word [6] 59/7 74/8 131/1 132/8 150/24 158/19</p> <p>words [10] 44/4 46/25 55/20 59/1 66/25 70/15 135/24 158/18 168/14 179/7</p>	<p>work [65] 2/14 4/15 5/19 6/4 12/22 18/1 18/3 18/18 18/21 18/24 19/5 19/15 19/24 28/14 38/12 43/4 43/15 44/12 45/14 45/19 49/15 49/20 50/6 52/19 52/25 54/17 54/24 58/15 60/12 62/9 62/19 63/13 63/24 64/9 64/16 65/3 65/24 66/6 66/8 66/24 67/4 68/6 70/12 71/13 73/22 75/3 75/10 87/20 88/3 89/18 90/3 91/4 91/7 95/24 95/25 98/1 100/9 106/4 108/9 115/7 138/7 142/10 152/7 167/9 171/22</p> <p>worked [4] 46/10 56/18 138/17 169/17</p> <p>worker [1] 37/24</p> <p>workers [4] 8/16 19/23 78/7 178/5</p> <p>working [34] 5/25 6/6 46/9 47/25 48/5 48/10 48/23 52/23 53/1 53/18 53/23 62/23 63/15 63/18 68/2 73/3 86/4 86/7 86/10 86/24 86/25 86/25 87/10 88/5 89/22 92/15 97/24 99/22 106/22 127/23 134/7 134/8 172/25 177/23</p> <p>works [2] 2/6 4/14</p> <p>world [27] 2/3 8/19 14/16 15/9 20/23 21/13 21/17 25/11 26/4 26/21 26/22 27/1 28/18 33/1 33/9 43/2 44/17 45/7 45/10 45/12 46/9 46/15 48/8 48/21 67/15 82/6 88/1</p> <p>world's [1] 25/1</p> <p>worldwide [2] 15/4 150/19</p> <p>worse [1] 125/2</p> <p>worst [1] 16/23</p> <p>worth [5] 49/25 70/24 85/15 146/6 171/1</p> <p>worthwhile [1] 47/7</p> <p>would [173] 2/22 6/1 13/14 18/19 20/1 21/16 21/23 21/23 23/2 24/7 24/10 26/6 26/23 26/24 27/1 28/8 28/10 29/10 29/15 29/16 30/1 31/13 33/21 34/24 35/12 36/8 36/9 36/10 36/11 41/10 42/15 42/18</p>
--	---	--	--	---

<p>W</p> <p>would... [141] 44/3 44/4 46/23 47/1 47/3 47/15 49/17 50/9 51/20 52/2 57/20 58/5 58/8 58/11 59/21 61/5 61/10 61/11 64/15 67/13 70/12 70/13 70/18 71/6 74/6 74/7 75/22 77/1 79/13 81/13 86/24 87/23 92/20 96/3 96/11 96/17 96/18 99/14 100/12 101/6 101/11 101/25 102/6 102/11 108/12 108/17 109/4 109/5 114/25 117/5 117/6 117/7 117/10 119/4 119/5 119/11 122/4 122/5 124/9 125/1 125/2 125/21 129/13 129/16 129/18 129/25 131/12 131/17 132/23 133/7 133/20 134/3 134/6 134/7 134/12 135/1 140/25 141/3 141/4 142/2 142/21 144/21 145/8 145/12 145/14 147/10 148/12 149/1 149/5 149/10 149/10 149/12 149/23 150/13 150/21 151/14 151/19 152/4 152/8 152/12 153/13 154/1 154/4 155/10 155/14 156/4 156/23 158/3 158/4 158/5 160/12 161/3 161/15 162/2 164/10 164/10 164/16 164/19 164/19 165/2 166/16 166/18 166/21 167/3 167/5 167/8 167/9 167/15 168/18 168/20 169/8 169/16 171/17 171/22 173/5 174/13 175/22 178/9 178/15 178/20 178/25</p> <p>wouldn't [4] 50/22 90/2 141/10 156/20</p> <p>writes [1] 104/6</p> <p>writing [1] 145/9</p> <p>written [7] 11/15 40/16 116/23 117/23 129/4 143/20 179/10</p> <p>wrong [6] 2/23 17/3 38/6 139/18 154/18 157/9</p> <p>wrote [3] 85/4 150/1 162/2</p> <p>Wuhan [2] 82/24 83/12</p>	<p>Y</p> <p>yeah [9] 2/5 41/20 42/11 62/25 79/7 79/8 88/8 140/23 165/13</p> <p>year [3] 24/23 70/10 97/1</p> <p>years [2] 19/1 134/4</p> <p>yes [160] 5/15 6/22 7/23 9/3 10/17 11/5 11/15 13/14 14/3 16/5 16/15 18/20 19/6 19/15 20/7 20/14 21/20 23/20 26/8 27/23 28/10 28/24 35/3 36/4 39/25 42/6 44/13 48/9 50/7 53/12 53/15 54/3 55/4 56/8 56/21 61/3 62/18 63/4 65/9 66/9 71/17 72/21 73/1 73/10 73/15 74/8 74/13 75/6 75/23 77/9 78/24 79/1 79/6 80/13 82/3 82/9 84/7 87/9 87/15 88/8 90/24 91/6 93/20 100/5 100/18 101/16 104/17 106/12 107/22 109/5 109/24 111/25 112/17 112/21 113/2 113/5 113/8 113/14 113/18 113/24 113/25 114/4 114/9 114/10 115/4 116/4 116/14 116/22 117/2 117/3 117/5 117/16 117/18 118/2 119/6 119/13 119/17 119/18 119/19 121/9 122/25 126/14 126/19 126/20 126/23 126/25 127/1 127/13 128/17 128/18 128/20 130/8 130/19 140/22 140/23 140/24 142/23 144/2 144/14 145/2 145/6 145/7 146/13 147/3 147/7 148/3 149/1 151/7 152/19 154/24 155/8 156/16 156/16 156/22 157/4 157/8 157/20 158/2 158/3 158/21 159/18 159/25 160/6 160/17 160/22 161/10 165/5 166/5 166/11 166/14 167/10 170/4 171/3 172/4 172/20 173/15 175/3 176/5 177/11 179/17</p> <p>yesterday [2] 159/15 166/2</p> <p>yet [4] 42/24 77/11 83/9 175/2</p> <p>you [544]</p> <p>you would [1] 144/21</p>	<p>you'd [10] 1/15 54/6 54/6 54/14 74/5 77/10 83/13 118/23 167/15 178/23</p> <p>you'll [6] 10/1 51/10 84/23 104/4 178/3 179/11</p> <p>you're [27] 4/15 8/17 8/19 8/20 12/1 25/23 29/3 33/2 35/5 52/13 81/12 89/16 101/24 107/11 111/24 116/4 128/5 135/7 137/2 142/18 172/7 174/9 174/10 175/21 176/10 176/21 177/8</p> <p>you've [54] 3/23 3/25 4/2 4/9 9/1 12/3 12/6 14/25 17/14 22/8 22/23 23/22 24/4 24/23 26/4 27/5 27/7 30/10 33/23 35/6 35/10 38/9 40/17 41/25 45/13 45/15 46/13 59/23 81/10 81/11 82/4 90/10 95/22 107/7 108/2 112/22 113/7 113/11 114/10 116/18 123/6 131/22 134/16 142/18 143/15 143/20 144/3 144/12 145/22 148/22 162/5 171/10 174/16 178/11</p> <p>your [136] 1/16 2/19 3/18 3/21 3/23 3/24 5/14 6/18 10/23 11/12 12/4 16/3 17/15 19/9 23/21 23/22 23/24 24/23 25/21 26/5 27/3 27/12 27/20 30/4 32/10 33/2 33/15 33/15 34/22 35/19 35/20 36/16 39/17 39/18 40/15 41/9 41/12 41/16 42/2 44/9 45/20 46/17 46/17 52/15 52/19 53/17 56/2 57/14 60/25 60/25 62/15 69/7 70/7 72/3 72/18 73/20 75/1 75/25 76/23 76/24 77/10 78/16 79/15 79/24 80/17 80/23 81/11 81/13 81/15 81/17 83/16 83/17 104/21 108/2 108/5 108/7 109/16 109/16 111/14 111/17 112/10 112/16 113/9 113/11 113/16 113/19 115/3 116/18 116/23 116/25 117/23 122/7 123/6 124/19 125/5 128/18</p>	<p>129/10 132/10 134/16 138/21 140/8 140/15 140/22 142/13 142/14 143/5 143/16 143/20 143/25 144/5 146/11 148/22 150/1 150/10 151/18 156/14 156/24 157/6 157/18 157/25 158/5 159/6 159/8 160/2 160/19 161/20 162/24 163/19 169/1 171/10 172/1 172/8 173/5 176/20 179/8 179/13</p> <p>yours [4] 157/3 158/5 159/1 164/11</p> <p>yourself [7] 81/18 104/2 107/12 121/8 127/19 141/3 161/9</p> <hr/> <p>Z</p> <p>zoom [6] 16/6 52/11 54/22 55/14 57/3 62/1</p>
---	--	--	---