

62. I can recall that I was involved in a meeting at the end of March 2020 with one supplier (Dyson), CDL, Gareth and the MHRA, who set the specifications for ventilators. I recall that I was concerned that, by virtue of the meeting being called by CDL, indirect pressure was being placed on the MHRA to approve the supplier's design at the stage of selecting suppliers to progress in the Ventilator Challenge. I felt I had to and did intervene in this meeting to ensure that the MHRA approval system, as the regulatory system, was properly applied and to protect the integrity of the process. I also had to correct the actions identified in the readout from this meeting circulated by the CDL's private office.<sup>22</sup> I had a call with Lord Agnew on 27 March 2020, at which I raised the situation with this supplier and reiterated that it would need to prove its product was safe and pass testing. Lord Agnew agreed.<sup>23</sup> This supplier did not ultimately make a successful ventilator and we did not procure any ventilators from them.

63. The Ventilator Challenge was a success in my eyes. It relied on British ingenuity and industry. It was a success because we were able to make functioning ventilators within a very short space of time.

#### **H. OPERATION MOONSHOT**

64. I was not involved in Operation Moonshot which I understand was launched after I had left my role as the Chief Executive of the Civil Service.

#### **I. FRAUD AND ABUSES IN THE SYSTEM**

65. As above, at the beginning of the pandemic, there was a lot of panic and frustration and it was a complicated situation. Some people took advantage of this.

66. To prevent fraud in procurement, at first, we had a fraud group in the Cabinet Office (known at the time of the pandemic as the Government Counter Fraud Function (GCFF)). They were good and part of developing the commercial function in the system. This group

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<sup>22</sup> [JM/26 - INQ000513540].

<sup>23</sup> [JM/27 - INQ000513564].