

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES DIVISION

2020-21


Risk Register

Quarter 4

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES DIVISION (CCD)

AIM

‘To encourage effective emergency preparedness; support emergency response through delivery of government’s central crisis management arrangements; and work with key partners to strengthen NI resilience, primarily through the work of the Civil Contingencies Group (NI) led by HOCS.’



Key Risks Summary

EO1/21/0059785




Risk		Risk Type	Residual Risk Q2			Residual Risk Q3			Residual Risk Q4		
Risk No.	Description		Likelihood	Impact	Assessment	Likelihood	Impact	Assessment	Likelihood	Impact	Assessment
Operational Risks											
1	CCD cannot effectively provide the necessary information to the Executive to inform the management of the on-going Covid-19 situation whilst dealing concurrently with the impacts of the UK withdrawal from the EU due to lack of buy in from OGDs and partners to the NI civil contingencies arrangements	(i)	2	4	A	2	4	A	1	3	A
2	Failure to support and strategically lead arrangements for CCG (NI) in the event of a serious civil contingency.	(i)	2	4	A	2	4	A	1	4	A
3	CCD does not have sufficient staff with the required level of knowledge, skills and associated resource to meet critical business needs	(i)	3	4	A	3	4	A	2	3	A
Corporate Risks											
4	CCD is at risk of failure to meet NICS Cabinet Office information governance and security requirements	(i)	1	4	A	1	4	A	1	3	G
5	Operate within allocated budget: avoiding overspend and managing underspend within 1.5% target.	(i)	1	3	G	1	3	G	1	3	G
6	CCD's suite of protocols and guidance documents are not fit for purpose or user friendly.	(i)	3	4	A	3	4	A	2	4	A
7	CCD failure to secure adequate numbers of volunteers to support the escalation and stand up of the NIHub and its subsequent day to day operation in times of a developing emergency/crisis in NI.	(i)	3	4	A	4	4	R	1	1	G

RISKS FOR WHICH ASSURANCE IS TAKEN FROM AND MANAGED IN TEO RISK REGISTER




Nil




RISK TYPE

- (i). Risk is being managed effectively with a view to reducing the key risk assessment.
- (ii). Responsible officials required to take additional action, over and above the Controls and mitigating actions.
- (iii). Risk is cannot be managed and is not manageable at a branch level (will always be "Red").




RISK 1 – CCD cannot effectively provide the necessary information to the Executive to inform the management of the on-going Covid-19 situation whilst dealing concurrently with the impacts of the UK withdrawal from the EU due to lack of buy in from OGDs and partners to the NI civil contingencies arrangements.			
Primary Causes		Current and planned actions to manage the risk	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficulty in managing critical information flows across the public sector in NI. • Lack of engagement/liaison with and by Departments & multi-agency partners. • Low level of operational preparedness in some sectors to deal with concurrent issues. • Lack of availability of sufficient staff within CCD/NIHub with the relevant knowledge, skills and experience to deal with a critical event. • Complex and competing information demands, at both NI and UK 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of the EY C3 COVID-19 Response Lessons Learned Review. • New NIHub escalation model agreed by NICS Board to better inform and explain process of escalation and de-escalation of NIHub and levels of response as incident(s) develop • Refresh of the Departmental C3 (including JESIP Partners) relationships underway with revised ToR in place and more regular & routine engagement across the NICS. • Participation in NI D20 exercises to test the systems and procedures in preparedness. • Completion of Cabinet Office training to prepare staff for D20 risks/pressures • TEO EU Transition team have merged some staff with NIHub to provide continuity in response from the policy and preparation workstreams • De-escalation and standing down of strategic Civil Contingency architecture occurring as risks and issues associated with D20 risk profile move into BAU arrangements across the UK and NI • Preparation of a new civil contingencies framework in partnership with OGDs and other partner agencies. 	
Consequences			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The effectiveness of the strategic central government response to a civil emergency is compromised. • Public Health response compromised • Potentially significant damage to infrastructure, the economy and/or the environment. • Reputational damage to TEO, NICS, Ministers and the NI Executive, poor reflection on NI to the rest of the UK • Critical work cannot be taken forward due to a lack of resources both in terms of staff and money. 			
Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 1	Overall Risk Assessment
			
Business Plan Objective(s)	TFP		
Risk Owner	Andy Cole		
Responsible Officer(s)	Alison Clydesdale & Mark McGuicken		

RISK 2 – CCD fails to support and strategically lead arrangements for CCG (NI) in the event of a serious civil contingency.




Primary Causes		Current and planned actions to manage the risk		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of central co-ordination of the strategic preparedness agenda.• Lack of engagement with and by multi-agency partners.• Low level of operational preparedness due to completing work pressures• Lack of availability of sufficient staff within CCD with the relevant knowledge, skills and experience to deal with an emergency (staff turn-over).		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tri-annual meetings (routine) of the Civil Contingencies Group (NI) (CCG(NI), the principal civil contingencies strategic preparedness body for NI restarting in Q4.• NI Hub – infrastructure established and in place, the lessons learned report from COVID-19 response will ensure that continuous improvement process is on-going.• Testing of operational preparedness to ensure that TEO can put the necessary strategic response structures in place quickly have been successful for D20 response.• Training plan for all CCD staff in civil contingency response being developed.• Exercising of NI Hub staff (UK and NI level) to be conducted with long term aspiration to regularly exercise/familiarise the running of Civil Contingencies response in NICS & partners.• Lessons learned being incorporated in review of Civil Contingencies Framework to ensure best practice is captured and designed into CCG(NI) & NIHub posture and response.• CCG(NI) being redesigned as part of framework review to make more agile and responsive		
Consequences				
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Failure of CCG(NI) to react to serious incidents quickly enough and with sufficient data to make early critical decisions• Lack of support/understanding of NICCMA from partner organisations leading to a dis-jointed response to serious incident• Lack of support from other NICS Depts due to perception of ineffectiveness of CCD – break in relationship with C3 leads and JESIP partners				
Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 1	Overall Risk Assessment	
				
Business Plan Objective(s)	TFO			
Risk Owner	Andy Cole			
Responsible Officer(s)	Mark McGuicken			

RISK 3 – CCD does not have sufficient staff with the required level of knowledge, skills and associated resource to meet critical business needs.			
Primary Causes		Current and planned actions to manage the risk	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sufficient staffing resources not available to carry out necessary minimum work and simultaneously implement improvements in business delivery. High level of staff change at Staff Officer grade up to G5 level in past 12 months has led to a significant difficulties in maintaining a stable (trained / familiarised) workforce with sufficient corporate knowledge and experience in Civil Contingencies in the Division to enable structural resilience. Historically under staffed work area in TEO Complex, cross-cutting area of work that is unique within NICS, staff require regular and constant Professional Development to remain current and suitably qualified 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Utilising the PWC review into CCD capability/capacity, the resultant staff structure is being sought. Business case for additional staff has been secured and filling of posts has been commenced. Additional temporary staff resources have been secured from within TEO. Staff on temporary redeployment have returned to CCPB. Retain the use of staff (x3) from first Hub standup to assist with hub roles (SitRep Cell) to assist with D20 (winter 2020/21) escalation. Use of Agency staff to fill stop gaps at AO grade CCD to develop and resource a staff training plan and induction process to ensure staff remain current, competent and qualified for roles across the NIHub structures/CCD. Use of TP's to ensure that correct management structures are in place to support work programme for the Division. Retention of seconded staff to ensure experienced staff can continue to contribute to project work and the embedding of lessons learned into the new Framework Document 	
Consequences			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Critical work cannot be taken forward due to a lack of staff and staff training/experience in Civil Contingencies. The effort in time of money and resources spent on EU exit preparedness/Covid -19 response are wasted. Inability to fully implement recommendations or review outcomes due to BAU workload on undermanned team, no improvement in delivery. Reliance on external contractors to deliver Civil Contingency response 			
Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2	Overall Risk Assessment
			
Business Plan Objective(s)	TFO		
Risk Owner	Andy Cole		
Responsible Officer(s)	Mark McGuicken		




RISK 4 – CCD is at risk of failure to meet NICS Cabinet Office information governance and security requirements.

Primary Causes		Current and planned actions to manage the risk	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduced staffing resources over several years resulting in inexperienced staff managing file structures. High level of turnover (NIHub) of staff accessing and using sensitive, protectively marked Civil Contingencies information & data and proper information governance procedures not being followed. Large volumes of information flowing through CCG(NI), NIHub and CCD and inability to capture key information and recording of key decisions due to small numbers of staff and unfamiliarity of work area. Cyber security risk. Inadequate management of corporate information (including personal and sensitive personal information under the Data Protection Act 1998 and GDPR). Non-compliance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Inadequate implementation of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure all CONOPS & SOPS produced to support the secure operation (physical and records) of NI Civil Contingency response Adherence to the departmental policies and guidance on data management storage/security. Adherence to the requirements of the department's disposal schedule. Attendance at seminars/information events on information security. Ensure strict adherence to the clear desk policy and that staff 'sweep' offices at end of each day. Staff to each take responsibility for their own record management and document security/storage. New CCD file plan being developed to simplify record management. Controls on invitation and access to virtual meetings with confirmed attendee's only allowed to enter meetings. NIhub SOPS includes a reference to the NICS Guide to IT Security and a Fileplan Protocol 	
Consequences			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reputational damage – public and political criticism. Regulatory action taken by ICO against TEO Inability to retrieve information leading to poor evidential basis for policy development, decision making and accountability purposes. Sanction and reduction in information sharing from critical partners (Cabinet Office, PSNI etc) due to inability to control and manage securely 3rd party information/data 			
Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 1	Overall Risk Assessment
			
Business Plan Objective(s)	TFO		
Risk Owner	Mark McGuicken		
Responsible Officer(s)	Name Redacted		

RISK 5 – Failure to operate within allocated budget: avoiding overspend and managing underspend within 1.5% target

Primary Causes		Current and planned actions to manage the risk		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constrained public expenditure context and the likely decision to protect certain departments. There are no Ministers to put in place mitigating measures. The absence of key mechanisms in the NI public expenditure process (eg delay in setting budget; uncertainty of monitoring rounds). Novel and fast moving Civil Contingency emergencies require the rapid allocation of resources or awarding of contracts to facilitate/support the Executive response. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing budgetary management to ensure maximum VFM in discretionary spend. Liaison with Finance Division in re-profiling exercises and Monitoring Rounds. Robust financial management/governance in place to maximise VFM and to prioritise expenditure effectively. Regular expenditure reviews in branch. Ensure Business cases are kept under review and extended/closed as and when required. All cost centres have been reviewed to ensure full utilisation of 2020/21 budgets. All year end processes are being delivered in line with financial management deadlines. 		
Consequences				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unable to meet objectives regarding operational readiness to respond. Unable to resource adequate training needs for the Branch Unable to meet statutory requirements regarding maintenance repair of the former RGHQ site. Reputational damage. 				
Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)		Impact: 3	Likelihood: 1	Overall Risk Assessment
				
Business Plan Objective(s)		TFO		
Risk Owner		Mark McGuicken		
Responsible Officer(s)		Name Redacted		

RISK 6 – CCD's suite of protocols and guidance documents are not fit for purpose or user friendly.

Primary Causes		Current and planned actions to manage the risk		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Reduced staffing resources over a sustained period (years) resulting in no capacity to revise or apply/implement strategic review to CCD protocols/guidance.Due to high level of staff churn at middle and senior manager level, insufficient appropriate experience or expertise to conduct review of protocols/legislation/guidance exists within CCDCivil Contingencies Act 2004 no longer reflective of advances within the Civil Contingency legislative sphere nor is it reflective of strategic/tactical advances/developments within Civil Contingencies/Resilience environment across the UK.Workloads associated with YELLOWHAMMER/EU Exit and then COVID-19 response absorbed all capacity in CCD to conduct reviews into protocols/guidance/legislation		<ul style="list-style-type: none">Continue with the completion of outstanding actions in the CCD Work Programme as agreed at CCG(NI)Initiate a work programme in FY 20/21 to complete a regional Security Risk Assessment for NIComplete and sign off updated CONOPs and SOPS for the NIHubSeveral short sharp desktop reviews of protocols and guidance to agree prioritisation of review process going forward.Seek the return of experienced staff out on loan to other areas of TEOEngage with Devolved Administrations and UKG to contribute to the development of new CC protocols and guidance documents to ensure they are fit for purpose for NI in the first instance.Additional external resources have been secured to commence the overview of the documentation.Seek additional staff resource to enable experienced staff to move on to review/rewrite work streams for old protocols and guidance documentation.As part of review into Civil Contingencies architecture the refresh of the framework document has commenced, this will update the current framework and will start a forward work programme to look at legislation, working groups etc		
Consequences				
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Guidance and protocols out of date and no longer fit for purpose in many cases.Reputational risk for TEO as other partner organisations have updated and developed new process/procedures in same timeframe.Legislative and policy framework is outdated and requires amendment.Some local (Regional) Risk Assessments out of date and no longer applicable				
Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2	Overall Risk Assessment	
				
Business Plan Objective(s)	TFO			
Risk Owner	Mark McGuicken			
Responsible Officer(s)	Name Redacted			

RISK 7 – CCD failure to secure adequate numbers of volunteers to support the escalation and stand up of the NIHub and its subsequent day to day operation in times of a developing emergency/crisis in NI.

Primary Causes

- Failure to maintain volunteer lists from across the NICS for a NI Hub Stand up
- Failure to have an agreed/understood process for escalation and de-escalation of the NIHub in place with stakeholders
- Failure to provide training to NIHub volunteers
- Failure to maintain NIHub IT equipment, hardware and physical location to a sufficient readiness state
- Lack of comprehensive in-house data analytics expertise within NICS to support fusion of information/data within the NIHub

Consequences

- NIHub slow to set up and information flows from stakeholders interrupted or mismanaged having implications of strategic issue decision making
- Credibility of CCD and by extention TEO damaged and loss of confidence across depts and Civil Contingencies Stakeholders
- Reputational damage for CCD/TEO/NICS

Current and planned actions to manage the risk

- Volunteer list being updated and additional communications across NICS to emphasize the importance of volunteers to the operation of the NIHub
- NIHub escalation and de-escalation protocol agreed by TEO and shared with C3 Leads
- Training/refresh of NIHub volunteers to take place Oct 2020
- Place training packages for NIHUB roles onto links to support remote learning
- Agency Staff member retained to focus on maintenance of NIHub IT assets and ensure kept up to date and ready to deploy if required/.
- Engage with HOCS and Perm Secs to seek assurance that is require in extremis that staff resource will be released if essential to the functioning of the NIHUB
- With de-escalation of NIHub and move of CCG(NI) to prepare phase the requirement for an immediate or rapid draw on volunteers from across NICS is substantially reduced.
- On-going hub readiness checklist to be incorporated into CCPB BAU activities to ensure future preparedness.

Risk Assessment (after current and planned actions)	Impact: 1	Likelihood: 1	Overall Risk Assessment
			
Business Plan Objective(s)	TFO		
Risk Owner	Andy Cole		
Responsible Officer(s)	Alison Clydesdale		

1. RISK/IMPACT EVALUATION – IMPACT

DESCRIPTOR	FACTORS TO CONSIDER TO AID ASSESSMENT
Low	Little or no impact on achievement of key objective(s); or £10,000s lost; or minor non-compliance issues; or minor delay in timing.
Medium	Some impact on achievement of key objective(s); or £100,000s lost; or local media attention; or NIAO criticism.
High	The failure of key objective(s); or regional/national media attention; or £1,000,000s lost; or critical attention from Assembly/PAC; or death.

2. RISK/IMPACT EVALUATION – LIKELIHOOD

DESCRIPTOR	FACTORS TO CONSIDER TO AID ASSESSMENT
Low	May occur only in exceptional circumstances
Medium	Could occur at some time
High	Is expected to occur in most circumstances

3. OVERALL ASSESSMENT:

Impact	High			
	Medium			
	Low			
		Low	Medium	High
Likelihood				