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Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model

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Procedural justice research has documented many positive consequences of fair decision-making procedures and treatment by authorities. However, it is unclear why these effects of procedural justice occur. The group-value model proposes that fair procedures matter because they communicate two symbolic messages about group membership: (a) whether individuals are respected members of a group and (b) whether they should feel pride in the group as a whole. These messages are conveyed by 3 relational aspects of the actions of authorities—actions that indicate neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition. Results from 4 different studies provide evidence that: (a) relational aspects of fair procedures communicate group-relevant information, and (b) this information mediates the influence of procedural judgments on group-oriented behaviors and feelings of self-esteem.

During the past two decades, research has provided widespread evidence that people's feelings and actions in social interaction are affected by the perceived justice of the decision-making procedures they experience when dealing with others (see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992, for reviews). When people feel they have been fairly treated, they are more willing to accept the decisions resulting from the procedures (Greenberg, 1987; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993), more satisfied with the procedures (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), more likely to comply with general group rules and laws (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Degoey, 1995), more willing to remain a group member (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992; Tansky, 1993), and more willing to help the group, even at a cost to themselves (Tyler & Degoey, 1995).

Although this research has documented the importance of procedural justice, it is unclear *why* procedural justice influences group-oriented behaviors and attitudes. One approach is to emphasize the social contract. According to Thibaut and Walker (1975), for example, the concern with fair procedures springs ultimately from and is maintained by self-interest. Self-interest might be enlightened or broad, but it is rational. An alternative approach emphasizes the social bonds among group members and group authorities. The group-value model of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) suggests that fair procedures and treatment by authorities communicate identity-relevant information to the individuals affected by these procedures. In particular, the model proposes that fair procedures and treatment communicate information about: (a) the degree to which individuals are respected members of their groups and (b) the degree to which they can feel pride in their group membership. In this article, we explicitly tested whether fair procedures, in fact, communicate such identity-relevant information and whether it is this information that mediates the influence of procedural justice on general group-oriented behaviors. We also tested whether pride and respect represent identity-relevant information by investigating whether pride and respect mediate the influences of procedural justice on feelings of self-esteem (Koper, Van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Vermunt, Wit, van den Bos, & Lind, 1993).

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

An Instrumental Model of Justice

Historically, procedural justice effects have been explained by the instrumental model proposed by Thibaut and Walker (1975). Based on social exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), the instrumental model links evaluations of authorities to judgments of direct and indirect control over the outcomes of allocation procedures. An instrumental or social exchange explanation assumes that people are motivated to maximize their self-interest when they interact with each other (Tyler, 1994). As a consequence, people are sensitive to the efforts of others to control their behavior and only reluctantly submit themselves to external control, for example, control by a third-party authority. When they give up control to a third party, people seek to maintain some degree of indirect control over the decisions of those authorities, for example, through the presentation of evidence ("voice"). Hence, the instrumental model suggests that procedural fairness judgments are linked to evaluations about control because such evaluations reflect people's assessments of the likelihood that a procedure will serve their self-interest.

Studies have shown that the opportunity to have control over the decision-making process influences people's views about procedural justice. They have not, however, supported an instrumental model of the psychology of procedural justice. On the contrary, people have been found to care about having "voice" even when they believe that their arguments have little

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or no influence over their outcomes (Lind, Lissak, & Conlon, 1983; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). Furthermore, judgments about the quality of the social relationship between individuals and decisionmakers have been shown to have a greater influence on procedural justice judgments than instrumental judgments of control over the procedures and the favorability of outcomes resulting from the procedures (Tyler, 1989, 1994). In particular, judgments of procedural fairness are dominated by three types of relational judgments about authorities (Tyler, 1989). The first, *neutrality,* involves assessments of the degree to which decision-making procedures are unbiased, honest, and promote decisions based on evidence. The second, *trustworthiness,* involves assessments of the motives of authorities—judgments about their benevolence and concern for the needs of those with whom they deal. The third, *status recognition,* involves assessments of politeness, treatment with dignity, and respect for rights and entitlements due to every group member.

Two other recent findings also suggest that an instrumental model of procedural justice is incomplete. First, procedural justice judgments influence a wide variety of group-oriented attitudes and behaviors that are not directly linked to decision-making processes (Brockner et al., 1992; Organ, 1988; Tansky, 1993; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Degoey, 1995). If people are most concerned with achieving desired outcomes, it is unclear why their experiences with a specific decisionmaker would be relevant to attitudes and behaviors that are not instrumentally related to the particular decision. More important, research suggests that relational judgments of procedural justice are more closely related than are instrumental judgments to people's willingness to voluntarily perform tasks that help the group but are not required (Fahr, Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Konovsky & Folger, 1991; Moorman, 1991).

A second difficulty for an instrumental explanation of procedural justice is the influence of procedural justice on self-esteem. Recent experimental research shows that the fairness of the procedures with which participants are treated significantly influences their self-esteem (Koper et al., 1993; Vermunt et al., 1993). Furthermore, students' self-esteem during their college years has been found to be related to how fairly they remember being treated by their parents (Joubert, 1991). An instrumental approach might suggest that unfavorable outcomes influence general self-esteem. However, this model does not hypothesize a direct relationship between self-esteem and procedural evaluations. Furthermore, an instrumental model does not explain why relational evaluations are associated with greater self-esteem.

The Group-Value Model of Procedural Justice

Lind and Tyler proposed the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) as an alternative explanation for procedural justice effects. Their model suggests that procedural justice is important because it informs people about their social connection to groups and group authorities. The group-value model suggests that fair treatment and fair decision making by group authorities communicates to group members two symbolic messages about group memberships. First, the model suggests that fair treatment indicates a positive, respected position within the group. Unfair treatment indicates marginality and disrespect (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). When a faculty member is treated fairly or unfairly by his or her departmental chairperson, for instance, this indicates to the faculty member whether he or she is a valued member of the department.

Second, the use of fair or unfair decision-making procedures in groups also indicates whether members can take pride in their group membership (Deutsch & Steil, 1988; Lind & Earley, 1992). For example, politicians attempt to engage in public displays of fair procedures for decision making as symbols of government to encourage the development of national pride. The group-value model suggests that fair treatment and procedures can communicate this kind of identity-relevant information because authorities act as prototypical representatives of groups, and their actions can be seen as highly salient indicators of group opinions (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Furthermore, in organized groups, authorities express the values and norms of the group (Calder, 1977; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Feelings of pride and respect that result from fair treatment, in turn, are hypothesized to lead to group-serving behaviors. This prediction reflects social identity research, which shows that people who identify with their group and evaluate their group positively internalize the group's interests, equating them with their own self-interest (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). This provides a set of internalized group norms that guide individual behavior and encourage conformity to group rules (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). In addition, affiliation with a group leads to more commitment to remain with the group and to engage in assertive extrarole activities, such as staying late for work or volunteering to help in emergencies (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986). On the basis of this research, we expected that group members who feel more respected and more proud of their group as a result of being treated fairly by group authorities would be more likely to comply with group rules, more likely to engage in extrarole behaviors that help the group, and more committed to remain with the group.

The group-value model also incorporates another key premise from social identity theory—that people use groups as sources of information about themselves (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, 1990; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In particular, it is expected that people who feel more proud and more respected will report higher levels of self-esteem. Fair procedures communicate pride and respect to group members, which in turn increase self-esteem, suggesting one reason why procedural justice is related to self-esteem.

Although both the group-value model and social identity theory offer identity-based explanations for behavior that contrast with self-interested or resource-dependent explanations posited in earlier literatures (e.g., realistic conflict theory; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), social identity theory focuses on how identity-based explanations can illuminate *inter*group relations, whereas the group-value model offers an identity-based explanation for *intra*group relations. In other words, the group-value model focuses on individual group members' relationships to decision-making authorities and the single group or category that those authorities represent rather than relationships between different groups.

Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the hypotheses offered by the group-value model of procedural justice. Path c shows that the relational judgments people make about author-

ities are related to general compliance with group rules, extra-role behavior, commitment to the group, and self-esteem, as demonstrated in previous research. The group-value model suggests, however, that the psychological dynamics of procedural justice can be better understood by considering the mediating roles that feelings of group pride (Paths a1 and b1) and feelings of respect within groups (Paths a2 and b2) play between people's relational judgments about authorities and group-oriented behaviors. Because pride and respect are identity-relevant information that are linked to people's senses of self, we expect pride and respect to mediate between relational judgments about authorities and self-esteem. The group-value model suggests that when the paths through pride and respect are included, the importance of Path c will be reduced to zero (full mediation) or significantly reduced (partial mediation). The lesser significance of Path c in the group-value model is indicated by the dotted line in Figure 1. Note that people's instrumental judgments about authority may or may not have a direct effect on group-oriented behaviors but are not suggested in the group-value model to be mediated by pride and respect. For the sake of clarity, instrumental judgments are not represented in Figure 1.

STUDIES 1–4

Research and Analysis Design

To analyze the hypotheses offered by the group-value model, three goals needed to be accomplished. The first was to determine whether people, in fact, experience group pride and respect within groups and whether they distinguish between the two constructs. Although the group-value model suggests the importance of pride and respect, these have not been directly measured in previous research. Therefore, our first purpose was to develop measures of pride and respect and subject them to exploratory factor analyses.

The second goal was to assess the mediating roles of pride and respect in procedural justice effects. Mediation is tested with a multistage regression approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986; James & Brett, 1984): First, each of the mediators is regressed on the independent variable (assessing Paths a1 and a2 in Figure 1); second, the dependent variables are regressed on each of the mediators (assessing Paths b1 and b2); and third, the dependent variables are regressed sequentially on the independent variable (assessing Path c), and then on both the independent variable and each of the mediators (simultaneously assessing Paths c and b1 and Paths c and b2, respectively). Mediation is indicated if the following conditions are met: (a) the independent variable explains a significant amount of the variance in the mediating variables, (b) the mediating variables explain a significant amount of variance in the dependent variables, and (c) entering the mediating variables into the third regression equation reduces the independent variable's contribution to the explained variance of the dependent variables. In all analyses reported below, the role of each of the mediators in the group-value model—pride and respect—was assessed independently. Furthermore, in all of the analyses, instrumental judgments about authority were controlled. Finally, because we expected that pride and respect are related aspects of group membership, we assessed the joint role of pride and respect by entering them both in the regression equations.

Note that the path diagram in Figure 1 depicts a causal chain of relationships between variables, as the group-value model hypothesizes should exist. The data reported below, however, are correlational in nature, and hence causality among the observed relationships cannot be inferred from the analyses. In other words, for the purposes of this article, Figure 1 can be better viewed as patterns of covariations between variables than as a set of cause-and-effect relationships. A greater degree of confidence, however, that the observed relationships might follow the causal direction proposed by the group-value model can be derived from two types of additional analyses.

First, it is helpful to show that the mediating and dependent variables are not simply highly related constructs by demonstrating that the independent variable continues to covary with each of the mediating variables when the dependent variables are controlled (i.e., Paths a1 and a2 in Figure 1 remain signifi-



Figure 1. The group-value model of procedural justice.

cant when Paths b1 and b2, respectively, are controlled). If entering the dependent variables into the regression equation does not significantly diminish the relationship between independent and mediator variables, this would also support the argument that the dependent variables are not really the mediators and the mediators the dependent variables (e.g., self-esteem does not mediate between relational judgments and respect, following Paths c–b2 rather than Path a2). Second, a more convincing argument for mediation in the proposed direction can be made when the relationships between the mediating and dependent variables remain unaffected when the independent variable is controlled (i.e., Paths b1 and b2 in Figure 1 remain unaffected when Paths a1 and a2, respectively, are controlled). In the analyses described below, these additional analyses are reported as well. Again, however, it is important to note that the data are correlational in character, so any causal inferences must be viewed as tentative.

The third goal of this research was to test the robustness of the group-value model. Procedural justice effects have been replicated in legal (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Tyler, 1984), political (Tyler & Caine, 1981; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985), managerial (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990), interpersonal (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986), and educational settings (Tyler & Caine, 1981). The analyses reported below reflect this diversity of contexts in that they used studies of four groups that differ widely in their composition and types of relationships that group members have with a representative authority. A discovery of the same psychological dynamics across all four studies would provide evidence for the robustness of the group-value model.

Method

In Study 1, college students at the University of California at Berkeley (n = 335) completed a questionnaire that asked how a recent conflict with one or both of their parents had been resolved.[1] Students completed the questionnaire as part of a course requirement and reported on their attitudes and behaviors toward their families as well as their feelings of self-esteem. Families constitute a more close-knit and affectively important group than the groups typically studied in procedural justice research. We chose the family setting, however, to examine issues of pride and respect because people's sense of identity is closely aligned with family membership and their parents. Hence, we expected that the dynamics of pride and respect outlined by the group-value model would be particularly well supported in this data set. Although the use of college students as respondents has sometimes been criticized (e.g., Sears, 1986), it seems quite appropriate within the current context. College students are still connected with their parents, both emotionally and cognitively.

Studies 2 and 3 were conducted in two research contexts typically studied in procedural justice research: work organizations and university settings. Both contexts represent hierarchical groups in which people have direct experiences with representative authorities. In Study 2, university employees (n = 355) completed a mail survey in which they described a recent conflict with their immediate work supervisor (29% response rate). Respondents reported their evaluations of the supervisor and their attitudes and behaviors toward the university. Although this response rate is typical for mail surveys (Dillman, 1978), it is low in absolute terms. However, the purpose of this study is to examine the psychological relationships between key variables, not to establish the general representativeness of particular opinions.

In Study 3, college students (n = 228) completed a questionnaire in which they described a recent conflict (within the last 12 months) with a faculty or staff member. Students completed the questionnaire as part of a course requirement and reported their evaluations of the relevant authority, their attitudes and behaviors toward the university community (broadly defined as including faculty, staff and students), and their feelings of self-worth.

The fourth study was a telephone survey of people's attitudes about the United States Supreme Court, an authority representative of Americans in general but rarely experienced directly by individual Americans. Recent research shows that the same procedural justice relationships observed in studies of personal experiences with work or legal authorities also occur with national-level political authorities (Tyler, 1994). Five hundred and two randomly selected San Francisco Bay Area residents participated in the survey (74% response rate). The mean age of respondents was 41.91 years (SD = 15.95 years). Approximately half (53%) the respondents were female, 39% of the respondents reported graduating from college, and 53% of the respondents reported annual incomes greater than $40,000. Similar patterns of relationships between variables in all four data sets would demonstrate the robustness of the group-value model.

Construct Measurements

All items in all data sets were assessed with Likert-type scales. Nonstudent respondents (Studies 2 and 4) were given a *don't know* response option, and those responses were treated in the analyses as missing data. Items reported below that were reverse-coded are marked (R). Table 1 contains summary information about scale reliabilities, item response ranges, means, and standard deviations for all the variables in the four data sets (the intercorrelations among constructs are shown in the Appendix). Information about the measures of pride and respect reflects the final scales that were constructed on the basis of the exploratory factor analyses reported below.

Group Pride and Respect Within Groups

Group pride and respect within groups—the proposed mediators in the group-value model—were assessed with newly developed instruments. Although items for both constructs were roughly similar across all four data sets, their exact wording was adapted for the particular group contexts.

Group pride. Questions measuring pride were drawn from scales designed to measure the affective and evaluative aspects of identification with groups (Brown, Condor, Mathew, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Tajfel, 1978) and scales designed to measure affective evaluations of organizations (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986). The items are shown subsequently, when we discuss the exploratory factor analyses of the pride and respect items in all four data sets. Final scale reliabilities (Cronbach's alphas) for Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4 were .87, .77, .71, and .58, respectively.

Respect within groups. Across all four studies, three items used to measure respect began with the stem "If they knew me well". These items were designed to measure people's perceptions of where they stood in the group publicly or what they though their social reputation was, rather than whether they saw themselves as worthy of respect. Furthermore, we wanted an approach that would allow people to answer the question even for groups in which not all group members could possibly know them (e.g., "other Americans" in Study 4). To assess the

[1] A complete description of the methods and data reported for Study 1 was published in Tyler and Degoey (1996). A complete description of the methods and data reported for Study 2 will be published in Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996). A complete description of the methods and data reported for Study 4 was published in Tyler (1994). However, none of the analyses reported in this article have been published.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics For Variables

Variable	Family[a]			Work[b]			University[c]			Nation[d]		
	α	*M*	*SD*	α	*M*	*SD*	α	*M*	*SD*	α	*M*	*SD*
Group pride	.87	2.82	1.26	.77	2.05	0.66	.71	2.41	0.97	.58	2.36	1.39
Respect within groups	.86	2.43	1.09	.80	1.73	0.58	.85	2.87	1.05	.68	2.49	1.25
Instrumental judgments	.89	3.78	1.47	.88	2.40	0.86	.87	3.02	0.83	.70	3.55	1.06
Relational judgments	.92	3.32	1.31	.96	1.96	0.88	.92	2.52	0.73	.83	3.52	1.27
Compliance with rules	.74	2.40	0.82	.64	2.06	0.88	.54	1.61	0.59	.59	4.30	1.36
Extrarole behaviors	.81	2.74	0.91	.68	1.72	0.49	.69	2.29	0.54	—	—	—
Group commitment	—	—	—	.74	2.25	0.75	.75	1.74	0.64	—	—	—
Self-esteem	.80	3.09	1.07	—	—	—	.88	1.97	0.70	.71	2.40	0.95

Note. For scale reliabilities, Cronbach's alphas are shown. Dashes indicate that the variable was not assessed in a particular data set.
[a] Responses on all items could range from 1 through 7.
[b] Responses on all items could range from 1 through 4.
[c] Responses ranged from 1 to 4 for all variables except pride and respect (1 to 7) and self-esteem (1 to 5).
[d] Responses on all items could range from 1 through 7.

validity of the "If they knew me well" approach to measuring feelings of respect in groups, additional items that were designed to capture the same concept but that did not use the "If they knew me well" stem also were included in some of the studies. The items are again reported subsequently. Final scale reliabilities for Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4 were .86, .80, .85, and .68, respectively.

Evaluations of the Behavior of Group Authorities

Relational judgments about authority—neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition—the independent variables in the group-value model, were assessed in all data sets. These three aspects of the relational model were not differentiated. Instead, we created a single overall index. To control for the consequences of instrumental judgments about authorities in groups, we also assessed instrumental judgments. Both types of judgments were measured with well-established scales in Studies 1–3. For Study 4, which concerned the United States Supreme Court, we developed special items that reflected the nondirect and nonpersonal context of that situation but that nevertheless were similar in content to the items in the other three studies.

Previous research has indicated that the influence of relational judgments is affected by the degree to which people draw their identity from groups (Tyler & Degoey, 1995). In this study we assessed the degree of identification with the group by asking participants how important "their family, their job, the university, or America" were to "the way they think of themselves as a person." In Study 4, participants were also asked about the similarity of their values to those of "most Americans." In all four studies the relational index was weighted by identification. This weighting increased the influence of relational judgments among those more closely identified with their group. The average correlation of compliance with relational judgments was .24, whereas the average correlation with the weighted index was .29. The average correlation of extrarole behavior with relational judgments was .11, whereas the average correlation with the weighted index was .22. The average correlation of commitment with the relational judgments was .31, whereas the average correlation with the weighted index was .46. Finally, the average correlation of relational judgments to self-esteem was .10, whereas the average correlation with the weighted index was .11.

Instrumental judgments. Instrumental judgments about group authorities reflected respondents' evaluations of the degree of control they had over the authorities' decisions as well as their evaluations of the outcome of these decisions. We assessed instrumental judgments in Studies 1–3 using the same six items: "How much influence did you have over the decisions made by [the authority]?"; "Overall, how satisfied were you with the outcome?"; "How favorable was the outcome to you?"; "Compared to what you expected before you talked to [the authority], how much better or worse was the situation after the conflict was resolved?"; "How does your outcome compare to the outcomes you have received in the past when dealing with [the authority]?"; and "In terms of your outcome, how much did you gain or lose?" The questions were adapted for the particular contexts of the studies, with the authority in the family data set being the student's parent or parents, in the work data set being the respondent's supervisor, and in the university data set being the university representative with whom students had resolved their conflicts. Cronbach's alphas of the instrumental judgments about authority scales for Studies 1, 2, and 3 were .89, .90, and .82, respectively.

For the study of the United States Supreme Court, we developed five instrumental items: "How often do you agree with Court decisions?"; "How often have you agreed with recent Court decisions?"; "Do the views of average citizens influence Court decisions?"; "If you joined a group which presented its views to the Court, how likely is it that your views would influence the Court?"; "If you joined a group which presented its views to the Court, how likely is it that the Court would make a decision that you agreed with?" The reliability of the instrumental judgments scale in this study was .70.

Relational judgments. In the first three studies, relational judgments about authority were also assessed similarly. The relational index—a combined assessment of neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition—comprised 11 items: "How politely were you treated by [the authority]?", "How much concern did [the authority] show for your rights?", "How hard did [the authority] try to bring the issues into the open so that they could be resolved?", "How much of an opportunity were you given to describe your problem before any decisions were made about how to handle it?", "How dignified was [the authority's] treatment of you?", "How hard did [the authority] try to explain why he or she made the decisions they made?", "How likely do you think it is that the reasons [the authority] gave for their decisions were the real reasons for making those decisions?", "How honest was [the authority] in what he or she said to you?", "How much consideration was given to your views when decisions were made about how to handle the conflict?", "How hard did [the authority] try to do the right thing by you?", and "How hard did [the authority] try to take account of your needs in the situation?" Reliabilities of the relational judgments about authority scales for Studies 1, 2, and 3 were .92, .96, and .92, respectively.

For the fourth study, we again adapted items to the particular context.

Relational assessments about the Supreme Court were indexed by eight items. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that: "The Court considers the concerns of average citizens when making decisions", "The Supreme Court gives equal consideration to the views of all of the different groups in America", "The Supreme Court is concerned about protecting the average citizen's rights", "There are ways for the average citizen to have their views presented to the Court", and "The Court gets the kind of information it needs to make informed decisions". Respondents also were asked: "If you belonged to a group that went before the Court," would the Court "consider your views?", "try to be fair to your group?", and "genuinely care about your views?" Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .83.

Group-Oriented Attitudes and Behaviors

We assessed three types of group-oriented attitudes and behaviors that previously have been linked to evaluations of procedural justice. All items were drawn from existing scales and adapted to the different contexts of the four studies. The first type of group-oriented attitude or behavior was respondents' willingness to comply with group rules. Items were drawn from C. A. Smith, Organ, and Near's (1983) study and reflected both attitudinal responses to obedience as well as self-reports of actual compliance with group rules.

The second type of group-oriented attitude and behavior entailed measures of respondents' willingness to engage in extrarole behaviors that go beyond what is required or expected of them within their particular group contexts. Items were drawn from the Organizational Citizenship Behavior Scale (Mackenzie, Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991) and again reflected both attitudinal measures as well as self-reports of actual extrarole behaviors. We assessed these behaviors in Studies 1–3 only.

The final type of group-oriented attitude previously linked to procedural justice effects and assessed here was group commitment. Items in this case were drawn from Mowday, Porter, and Steer's (1982) Organizational Commitment Questionnaire and focused on respondents' desire to remain a member of their particular group. Because family membership (Study 1) and nationality (Study 4) are often thought of as ascribed memberships, and also because deciding to terminate membership in these groups is an uncommon occurrence, we did not assess group commitment in these studies.

Compliance with group rules. In each of the first three studies, measures of respondents' compliance with group rules again reflected similar content, although the wording was adapted to the various contexts. For example, employee compliance with organizational rules in the worker data set was assessed with the following five items: "I always try to follow the rules of my organization, even when I think they are wrong"; "I follow work rules and instructions with extreme care"; "I come to work on time"; "I follow the policies established by my supervisor"; and "In order for an organization to function, employees should follow their supervisors' orders without question." Reliabilities of the scales in Studies 1, 2, and 3 were .74, .64, and .54, respectively.

In the fourth data set, items were again adapted for the impersonal nature of respondents' relationship with the Supreme Court. We used four items to assess general compliance with federal authorities: "I feel that I should accept the decisions made by government leaders in Washington even when I disagree with them", "People should obey the laws made by the federal government even if they go against what they think is right", "There are times when it is all right for people to disobey the government (R)", and "I can think of situations in which I would stop supporting the policies of our government (R)." Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .59.

Extrarole behaviors. In the family, work, and university data sets, the same six questions (adapted for their contexts) assessed whether group members engaged in extrarole behaviors. Items in the family study, for instance, asked respondents "To what extent do you make suggestions to improve your family life?", "Generally, how hard do you try to keep up with the lives of your family members?", "How much effort do you put into helping your family members beyond that what is generally expected of you?", "How common is it that you give up some of your personal time for the sake of your family", "How often do you attend family events that are not required?", and "How frequently do you help other family members when they have heavy work loads or other burdens?" Reliabilities for Studies 1, 2, and 3 were .81, .68, and .69, respectively.

Group commitment. Respondents' commitment to their work organization or university community were assessed similarly as well. In the university data set, for instance, the following four items were used: "I cannot think of another university I would rather attend", "I think about transferring often" (R), "I regret the decision to come to the University of California at Berkeley" (R), and "I will probably look for an alternative university within the next year" (R). Cronbach's alphas for the group commitment scales in the work and university data sets were .74 and .75, respectively.

Self-Esteem

For the family study, we used 7 items adapted from Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (1979) to assess students' feelings of self-esteem. Students were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with statements of the following type: "I am pretty sure of myself", "I generally feel satisfied with myself", "I sometimes think of myself as a failure" (R), "I am proud of what I have accomplished in my life", "I often give in too easily" (R), "There are a lot of things about myself that I would change if I could" (R), and "I often wish I were someone else" (R; $\alpha = .80$). The same 7 items were used in the nation study ($\alpha = .71$). For the university study, 10 items from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale were used ($\alpha = .88$).

Note that in some cases the scale reliabilities are less than desirable, particularly for the scales of pride and respect in the study of the Supreme Court. Generally, the effects of measurement error are that the size of measures of association are attenuated. Such attenuation of effects in mediation analyses tends to underestimate the effects of the mediator and overestimate the effect of the independent variable (if all coefficients are positive; Judd & Kenny, 1981). Hence, the mediation analyses reported below are best seen as conservative estimates of the dynamics of procedural justice described by the group-value model.

Results

Factor Analyses

The first issue addressed was whether pride in group membership and feelings of respect within a group could be distinguished from each other. Principal-components factor analysis of the responses to the pride and respect items developed for all four studies indicated two factors that accounted for 58% or more of the total variance. Because we expected feelings of pride and respect to be positively correlated, we conducted a two-factor oblique rotation that resulted in the factor structure reported in Tables 2 and 3.

Pride items in all four studies assessed the degree of pride in group membership participants felt. In the family study, additional items assessed students' feelings of pride in their parent or parents; these items were included because parents are important members of the family group. As we noted previously, in all four studies respect was measured with items that asked respondents to indicate how they believed they were viewed by those who "knew them well". The university study extended the range of respect items by including "I believe that most members of my group respect me" and "I believe I make a good impression on other members of my group". In addition, items

in the family study assessed whether participants felt their parents, as important members of their family, respected them. For these additional items in the family data set, we did not use the "If they knew me well" stem because we assumed that students felt their parents knew them well. The factor analyses loaded the additional items in the family and university studies onto the same factor as the items starting with the "If they knew me well" stem, suggesting that both the items that used the sentence stem and those that did not use the stem tapped a general judgment about respect in a similar fashion.

For all studies, two factors met the selection criteria of eigenvalues greater than 1.0. In addition, all items loaded on the factor they were intended to measure. We deleted one item in the family study from the final scale of respect within groups because of multiple loadings on both factors. Overall, the consistency of the items across the data sets and the magnitude of their loadings provide strong empirical support that people (a) experience group pride and respect and (b) distinguish between the two constructs. Correlations between the final scales of pride and respect in Studies 1–4 were .43, .12, .38, and .35, respectively.

We also used factor analyses to assess whether items used to measure instrumental and relational judgments about group authorities loaded on two separate factors (because these analyses replicate previous studies, details are not reported). All items loaded on their respective factors. Furthermore, as in previous research, relational judgments were significantly related to evaluations of procedural fairness. Pearson correlations between relational judgments and a 3-item procedural justice scale (e.g., "Overall, how fair were the procedures used to resolve the conflict?") for Studies 1–4 were .85, .92, .56, and .75, respectively. Correlation coefficients for the relationships between instrumental judgments and the overall procedural justice scale also were substantial but less strong than those for the relational judgments. For Studies 1–4, the coefficients were .68, .81, .41, and .69, respectively.

Stage 1 of the Mediation Analyses: Assessing Relationships Between Independent and Mediator Variables

The group-value model argues that the relational aspects of procedural judgments communicate information about pride

Table 2
Results of Factor Analyses

	Factor loadings							
	Family		Work		University		Nation	
Questionnaire item	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Group pride								
I am proud to think of myself as a member of this group.	**.85**	.45	**.86**	.10	**.81**	.24	**.85**	.27
It would be hard to find another group I would like as much to be a part of.	**.80**	.41	**.74**	.05	**.56**	.23	—	—
When someone praises my group's members, I feel it is a personal compliment to me.	**.76**	.26	**.71**	.14	**.74**	.21	**.84**	.30
I talk up my group to friends as a great group to be a part of.	.77	.32	**.79**	.08	**.75**	.35	—	—
I frequently tell others how much I like my parent(s).	**.83**	.30	—	—	—	—	—	—
It would be hard to think of other parent(s) I would like as much.	**.72**	.33	—	—	—	—	—	—
When someone praises my parent(s), it feels as a personal compliment to me.	**.73**	.27	—	—	—	—	—	—
Respect within groups								
If they knew me well, most members of my group would respect my values.	.30	**.78**	.06	**.84**	.20	**.74**	.18	**.82**
If they knew me well, most members of my group would think highly of my accomplishments in life.	.29	**.82**	.01	**.82**	.21	**.77**	.35	**.79**
If they knew me well, most members of my group would approve of how I live my life.	.28	**.82**	.19	**.86**	.25	**.82**	.26	**.69**
My parent(s) respect my values.[a]	.65	**.72**	—	—	—	—	—	—
My parent(s) approve of my life.	.36	**.83**	—	—	—	—	—	—
My parent(s) think I have accomplished a great deal in my life.	.36	**.75**	—	—	—	—	—	—
I believe that most members of my group respect me.	—	—	—	—	.39	.77	—	—
I believe I make a good impression on other members of my group.	—	—	—	—	.42	**.83**	—	—

Note. Numbers in boldface type are primary loadings. Dashes indicate items that were not assessed in a data set.

[a] Cross-loading of item on both factors: Item was dropped from final scale.

Table 3
Summary Factor Statistics

Factor statistic	Family		Work		University		Nation	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Eigenvalue	5.97	2.11	3.57	1.99	3.71	1.54	2.18	1.04
Percentage of variance explained	46	16	37	29	41	17	44	21
Cumulative percentage of variance explained	—	62	—	65	—	58	—	64

and respect (or, in correlational terms, covary with these two constructs). These relational judgments are hypothesized to covary more strongly with pride and respect than instrumental aspects of fairness judgments are. We used multiple regression analyses to test these hypotheses. Two types of analyses were conducted. First, we regressed pride and respect on instrumental and relational judgments alone. Second, we added each of the dependent variables to the regression equations to control for the covariation between dependent and mediator variables.

Tables 4 and 5 show the regression equations, with the first type of equations reported in the top part of the tables and all subsequent analyses below them. The first type of analysis revealed significant relationships between relational judgments and both pride and respect in all four data sets except for one case. Relational judgments about the Supreme Court were only marginally linked to feelings of respect among Americans, not a surprising finding given the distant and impersonal link between members of the Supreme Court and Americans in general. Instrumental judgments were marginally related to the measures of pride in two data sets, but no significant relationships were found in any of the other analyses.

Controlling for the relationships between the dependent variables (compliance with groups' rules, extrarole behaviors, group commitment, and self-esteem) and group pride and respect did not alter these findings very much, except in a few cases. Introducing extrarole behaviors and group commitment into the regression analyses for the university data reduced the relationships between relational judgments and respect to insignificance. In the work data set, controlling for group commitment reduced the relationship between relational judgments and pride to marginal significance. Finally, introducing self-esteem to the regression equation reduced the relationship between relational judgments and respect to insignificance in the nation study. Note, however, that only a marginally significant relationship between relational judgments and respect was found in that data set when the regression analysis was conducted without any controls.

Overall, 20 of the 24 regression equations in which the dependent variables were controlled showed significant relationships between relational judgments about authorities and the mediators, pride and respect, as the group-value model predicts. These additional analyses indicated that pride, respect, and the dependent variables are not simply highly correlated constructs reflecting general positive affect toward the groups but rather are independent, yet related, aspects of group membership. Possibly the only exceptions to this statement are the constructs of pride and group commitment. Even though the items used to assess these constructs differ considerably at face value, the strong relationships between commitment and pride in the two data sets in which commitment was measured suggests that these constructs may tap into similar feelings about group membership.

Stage 2 of the Mediation Analyses: Assessing Relationships Between Mediator and Dependent Variables

In Stage 2 of the mediation analyses, we assessed the relationships among group pride, respect within groups, and group-oriented attitudes and behaviors. For each of the dependent variables, we used multiple regression analyses to test whether pride or respect were related to the target variable. Two types of analyses were conducted. In the first, the dependent variables were regressed on pride and respect, respectively. The second type of analyses controlled for the relationships between the dependent variables and instrumental and relational judgments about group authorities.

Table 6 shows that when compliance with group rules was the dependent variable, both pride and respect were significantly related to compliance in all four data sets. When extrarole behavior was the dependent variable, both pride and respect were significantly related to that dependent variable in all three of the studies in which it was measured (see Table 7). Pride dominated in the family and work studies, whereas respect was more closely related to students' willingness to engage in extrarole behaviors in the university study. Table 8 shows that when group commitment was the dependent variable, pride was related to commitment in both studies in which commitment was measured, whereas respect was related to group commitment in the university study. When self-esteem was the dependent variable, both pride and respect were significantly related to self-esteem in all three studies in which self-esteem was measured (see Table 9). However, when both pride and respect were included in the same regression equation, respect dominated the amount of variance explained in respondents' self-esteem.

The bottom portions of Tables 6–9 show that including both instrumental and relational judgments about authority in the regression equations did not significantly alter the findings, except for the nation study. In that study, the relationship between respect and compliance with group rules, and between pride and self-esteem, became insignificant when instrumental and relational judgments about authorities were controlled. Again,

Table 4
Relationships Between Evaluations of Authorities and Group Pride

Evaluations of authorities and dependent variables	Group pride			
	Family	Work	University	Nation
Instrumental judgments	−.02	.16**	−.15**	.05
Relational judgments	.62****	.28****	.48****	.38****
R^2	.37****	.15****	.18****	.17****
Instrumental judgments	−.01	.17**	−.15**	.04
Relational judgments	.52****	.25****	.47****	.31****
Compliance with rules	.24****	.26****	.12**	.20****
R^2	.42****	.20****	.19****	.20****
Instrumental judgments	−.02	.10	−.13**	—
Relational judgments	.52****	.25****	.44****	—
Extrarole behaviors	.35****	.39****	.18****	—
R^2	.48****	.29****	.21****	—
Instrumental judgments	—	.03	−.12**	—
Relational judgments	—	.12	.32****	—
Group commitment	—	.63****	.47****	—
R^2	—	.48****	.38****	—
Instrumental judgments	−.03	—	−.15**	.07
Relational judgments	.59****	—	.46****	.36****
Self-esteem	.22****	—	.17***	.08
R^2	.42****	—	.21****	.17****

Note. Values for independent variables are beta weights. Dashes indicate dependent variables that were not included in a particular study. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses.
** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

Table 5
Relationships Between Evaluations of Authorities and Respect Within the Group

Evaluations of authorities and dependent variables	Respect within the group			
	Family	Work	University	Nation
Instrumental judgments	.05	.15	−.10	.06
Relational judgments	.43****	.29****	.19***	.15*
R^2	.20****	.04***	.02**	.03***
Instrumental judgments	.07	.16	−.09	.05
Relational judgments	.29****	.23***	.18***	.12*
Compliance with rules	.35****	.20***	.15**	.09
R^2	.30****	.07****	.04***	.03***
Instrumental judgments	.06	.11	−.05	—
Relational judgments	.37****	.31****	.09	—
Extrarole behaviors	.19****	.25****	.39****	—
R^2	.23	.10****	.17****	—
Instrumental judgments	—	.14	−.08	—
Relational judgments	—	.29****	.10	—
Group commitment	—	.01	.28****	—
R^2	—	.04***	.09****	—
Instrumental judgments	.05	—	−.11	.14
Relational judgments	.37****	—	.12**	.06
Self-esteem	.42****	—	.48****	.35****
R^2	.37****	—	.24****	.14

Note. Values for independent variables are beta weights. Dashes indicate dependent variables that were not included in a particular study. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses.
* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

Table 6
Relationships Between Feelings About Group Membership and Compliance With Group Rules

Feelings about group membership and independent variables	Compliance with group rules			
	Family	Work	University	Nation
Group pride	.45****	.25***	.15***	.34****
R^2	.20****	.10****	.02**	.11****
Group pride	.33****	.27****	.14**	.21****
Instrumental judgments	−.04	.09	−.01	.06
Relational judgments	.21***	.32****	.03	.27****
R^2	.22****	.16****	.01*	.18****
Respect within group	.47****	.24****	.16***	.16****
R^2	.21****	.05****	.02***	.02****
Respect within group	.37****	.19***	.15**	.08
Instrumental judgments	−.06	.07	−.02	.06
Relational judgments	.26****	.25***	.07	.34****
R^2	.26****	.13****	.02**	.16****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses.
*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$. ****$p < .001$.

however, out of the 32 regression equations in which the independent variables were controlled, 30 showed significant relationships between each of the mediators and the dependent variables, as the group-value model predicts.

Stage 3 of the Mediation Analyses: Assessing the Roles of Mediators Between Independent and Dependent Variables

The previous two stages of the mediation analyses generally showed that: (a) relational judgments about group authorities were significantly linked to feelings of pride and respect, and (b) feelings of pride and respect were each significantly linked to group-oriented behaviors and self-esteem. With few exceptions, these relationships were observed in all four data sets. In the final sets of analyses we addressed two issues. First, we attempted to replicate previous procedural justice research by assessing whether relational judgments about authorities are significantly linked to the group-oriented attitudes and behaviors measured in these studies. Replication of earlier self-esteem findings in justice research also were attempted.

Second, the analyses assessed whether the significant linkages between relational judgments, group-oriented behaviors, and self-esteem would be reduced or made nonsignificant when the mediators (pride and respect) were introduced. To demonstrate mediation it is necessary to show that (a) the mediation influences the dependent variable and (b) the introduction of the mediation into the equation either reduces (partial mediation) or eliminates (full mediation) the significant relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables.

The top parts of Tables 10–13 report on the relationships between the independent and dependent variables alone, and the regression equations in the remainders of the tables reflect these relationships when the mediators were included. The roles of each of the mediators—pride and respect—were assessed independently, as they were in the previous analyses, as well as simultaneously. The simultaneous analyses allowed for a test of the full group-value model, by allowing the covariation between pride and respect to affect the results. Note that the analyses in which pride and respect are controlled independently are essentially the same as the analyses reported in the bottom parts of Tables 6–9. In Tables 6–9, however, we attempt to show that the relationships between the mediators and the dependent variables remained significant when the independent variables were controlled. In contrast, in Tables 10–13 we attempt to indicate whether the relationships between the independent and dependent variables would be significantly reduced when the mediators (pride and respect) were included in the regression equations. For ease of comparisons, the same analyses are reported in both sets of tables.

Table 7
Relationships Between Feelings About Group Membership and Extrarole Behaviors

Feelings about group membership and independent variables	Extrarole behaviors		
	Family	Work	University
Group pride	.49****	.45****	.27****
R^2	.24****	.20****	.07****
Group pride	.50****	.44****	.21***
Instrumental judgments	.00	.08	−.09
Relational judgments	−.03	−.05	.15**
R^2	.24****	.19****	.08****
Respect within group	.30****	.22****	.41****
R^2	.09****	.04****	.17****
Respect within group	.22****	.25****	.38****
Instrumental judgments	−.02	.11	−.09
Relational judgments	.19***	.15	.18***
R^2	.11****	.09****	.18****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses.
**$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$. ****$p < .001$.

Table 8
Relationships Between Feelings About Group Membership and Group Commitment

Feelings about group membership and independent variables	Group commitment	
	Work	University
Group pride	.69****	.56****
R^2	.47****	.31****
Group pride	.62****	.52****
Instrumental judgments	.11	.02
Relational judgments	.08	.09
R^2	.49****	.31****
Respect within group	−.04	.30****
R^2	.00	.09****
Respect within group	.01	.26****
Instrumental judgments	.21***	−.04
Relational judgments	.25***	.29****
R^2	.16****	.15****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

The findings generally replicated previous procedural justice studies in showing that relational judgments were significantly linked to compliance in three of the four studies, to extrarole behaviors in two of the three studies in which they were assessed, to group commitment in both of the studies in which it was assessed, and to self-esteem in all three studies in which it was assessed. In all, our analyses replicated previous research in 10 of 12 analyses. Furthermore, instrumental judgments were not significantly related to any of the dependent variables except in 2 of the analyses that we conducted.

Table 10 reports on the mediation analyses for compliance with group rules. In three of four cases relational judgments influenced compliance. Of those three cases the combined analysis (including both pride and respect) shows one case of full mediation (family), one of partial mediation (nation), and one of no mediation (work). When extrarole behavior was the independent variable (see Table 11), relational judgments exerted an influence in two of three cases. Of those cases a joint analysis indicated one instance of full mediation (family) and one of partial mediation (university). In the case of commitment (Table 12), relational judgments influenced commitment in both cases examined. Furthermore, both showed full mediation. Finally, with self-esteem, relational judgments influenced self-esteem in three of three cases. In two of those cases full mediation was found (family, university) and in one there was partial mediation (nation). Overall, relational judgments were influential in 10 of 12 cases, and in those 10 cases 6 were fully mediated by pride or respect, and 3 were partially mediated. Only 1 was not mediated by pride and respect.

Table 9
Relationships Between Feelings About Group Membership and Self-Esteem

Feelings about group membership and independent variables	Self-esteem		
	Family	University	Nation
Group pride	.31****	.23****	.12***
R^2	.09****	.05****	.01***
Group pride	.35****	.21***	.09
Instrumental judgments	.03	.04	−.23***
Relational judgments	−.08	.04	.24***
R^2	.09****	.04****	.04****
Respect within group	.48****	.48****	.34****
R^2	.23****	.24****	.12****
Respect within group	.52****	.48****	.34****
Instrumental judgments	−.01	.06	−.25***
Relational judgments	−.08	.05	.23***
R^2	.23****	.24****	.15****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

Discussion

Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model

Previous research has documented that procedural justice judgments are central to the effectiveness of authorities in groups. Existing frameworks appear ill-suited, however, to explain some of the recent, striking findings of procedural justice research—in particular, the strong effects of fairness judgments on group-oriented attitudes and behaviors. The group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989, Tyler & Lind, 1992) draws on insights from social identity theory for a new theoretical framework within which to understand these findings. The model suggests that authority structures, particularly people's perceptions of their relationships to group authorities, are significantly linked to people's feelings about group membership. These feelings, in turn, are suggested to mediate between people's justice evaluations of group authorities and their attitudes and behaviors toward the group.

Across four studies, the results generally supported the group-value model. First, in accordance with patterns of results shown in previous research, relational aspects of people's fairness evaluations of group authorities tended to be more strongly related to their attitudes and behaviors than did instrumental, outcome-oriented aspects of these evaluations. Second, the relational aspects of procedural fairness were significantly related to two distinct types of feelings about group membership: pride in group membership and perceived respect within groups. Third, feelings of pride and respect mediate between relational judgments about group authorities and three types of group-oriented behaviors and attitudes typically studied in recent procedural justice research: compliance with group rules, group commitment, and extrarole behavior directed at groups. In seven of nine cases, relational indicators influenced group-oriented attitudes and behaviors. Of those seven cases, four show complete mediation of the effect by pride or respect, two show partial mediation, and only one shows no evidence of mediation. Fourth, the significant relationships between relational judgments about the actions of group authorities, feelings of pride and respect, and self-esteem support the group-value model's argument that procedures communicate identity-relevant information. In all three cases studied, self-esteem was in-

Table 10
Results of Mediated Analysis of Compliance With Group Rules

Evaluations of authorities and mediators	Compliance with group rules			
	Family	Work	University	Nation
Instrumental judgments	−.05	.05	−.03	.07
Relational judgments	.41****	.30****	.09	.35****
R^2	.15****	.10****	.00	.15****
Instrumental judgments	−.04	.09	−.01	.06
Relational judgments	.21****	.32****	.03	.27****
Group pride	.33****	.27****	.14**	.21****
R^2	.22****	.16****	.01*	.18****
Instrumental judgments	−.06	.07	−.02	.06
Relational judgments	.26****	.25***	.07	.34****
Respect within group	.37****	.19***	.15**	.08
R^2	.26****	.13****	.02**	.16****
Instrumental judgments	−.06	.11	−.01	.05
Relational judgments	.12	.33****	.02	.27****
Group pride	.25****	.24****	.10	.20***
Respect within group	.32****	.14**	.12*	.04
R^2	.29****	.17****	.02**	.18****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses.
* $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

fluenced by relational judgments, and in all three cases that effect is mediated by pride and respect (two cases of full mediation; one of partial mediation).

Replications of these findings across four very different group contexts—from the small intimate relationships representative of families to the impersonal symbolic nature of the relationship between citizens and the Supreme Court—attest to the robustness of the group-value model. Of course, not all the data sets showed equally strong relationships, suggesting that contextual differences are an important question for future research. In our analyses, the family data set showed the strongest support for the group-value model, and the national data set revealed the weakest relationships. Several factors distinguish the family context from the other research contexts. First, parents are easily identifiable as an authority representing the family group. In contrast, the university authorities with whom students resolved their conflicts (in the university study), or the supervisors with whom workers resolved their grievances (in the work study), may not have been viewed as representative of the university community or work organization, respectively. For example, many students described a single interaction with the professor or staffperson. Therefore, it might be easy to dismiss the authority's treatment as nonrepresentative of the group's general attitudes.

A second important difference between these group contexts is the frequency of people's experiences with the relevant authority. In the university study, for instance, students often described a one-time interaction with a university authority during which a particular school-related conflict was resolved. Respondents in the national study had no direct experiences with the U.S. Supreme Court. In contrast, students' description of a conflict with their parent(s) represents one experience in a continuous relationship. Unfair treatment by a parent may be more personally meaningful than unfair treatment by a professor or a Supreme Court judge. Furthermore, for college students, a parent's decision about family issues may be more important and influential than a professor's decision about a grade. Similarly, a supervisor's decision may mean immediate changes for an employee, whereas a Supreme Court decision may mean little change for most citizens.

Table 11
Results of Mediated Analysis of Extrarole Behaviors

Evaluations of authorities and mediators	Extrarole behaviors		
	Family	Work	University
Instrumental judgments	−.01	.15	−.13
Relational judgments	.29****	.07	.26****
R^2	.08****	.03***	.04****
Instrumental judgments	.00	.08	−.09
Relational judgments	−.03	−.05	.15**
Group pride	.51****	.44****	.21***
R^2	.24****	.19****	.08****
Instrumental judgments	−.02	.11	−.08
Relational judgments	.19***	.15	.18***
Respect within group	.22**	.25****	.38****
R^2	.11****	.09****	.18****
Instrumental judgments	−.01	.06	−.08
Relational judgments	−.06	.01	.15**
Group pride	.48****	.40****	.08
Respect within group	.13**	.18***	.36****
R^2	.25****	.22****	.19****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses.
** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

Table 12
Results of Mediated Analysis of Group Commitment

Evaluations of authorities and mediators	Group commitment	
	Work	University
Instrumental judgments	.21***	−.06
Relational judgments	.25***	.34****
R^2	.16****	.09****
Instrumental judgments	.11	.02
Relational judgments	.08	.09
Group pride	.62****	.52****
R^2	.49****	.31****
Instrumental judgments	.21***	−.04
Relational judgments	.25***	.29****
Respect within group	.01	.26****
R^2	.16****	.15****
Instrumental judgments	.12**	.02
Relational judgments	.04	.09
Group pride	.64****	.48****
Respect within group	−.10	.12**
R^2	.48****	.32****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

Still, it is important to recognize that our results suggest that even a single interaction with an authority can shape group-oriented attitudes and opinions. If people view authorities as representative of an important group, a single experience can be emblematic of general group opinions. On the one hand, students can view an appointment with a disrespectful and rude financial aid staffperson as an unusual event. On the other hand, they can view the same interaction as yet another example of a cold and unfeeling bureaucracy. Furthermore, the possibility that the same dynamics occur in evaluations of national political authorities suggests that evidence of fair or unfair relational treatment does not necessarily require personal experience. It may be enough to know of others' experiences, or to expect certain types of experiences. Certainly, voters form opinions of political candidates' moral character without personal contact (Tyler & Degoey, 1996).

Table 13
Results of Mediated Analysis of Self-Esteem

Evaluations of authorities and mediators	Self-esteem		
	Family	University	Nation
Instrumental judgments	.02	.01	−.23***
Relational judgments	.14**	.14**	.28****
R^2	.02**	.01*	.04***
Instrumental judgments	.03	.04	−.23***
Relational judgments	−.08	.04	.24***
Group pride	.35****	.21***	.09
R^2	.09****	.04***	.04***
Instrumental judgments	−.01	.06	−.25***
Relational judgments	−.08	.05	.23***
Respect within group	.52****	.48****	.34****
R^2	.23****	.24****	.15****
Instrumental judgments	−.01	.06	−.25***
Relational judgments	−.06	.03	.22***
Group pride	.23****	.03	.01
Respect within group	.48****	.47****	.34****
R^2	.26****	.24****	.14****

Note. Values for independent variables and mediators are beta weights. See Results section for details regarding the different analyses. * $p < .10$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$. **** $p < .001$.

The evidence from these studies shows how relational evaluations—respectful, neutral, and trustworthy treatment from authorities—can facilitate group-oriented behavior. People do not have to get favorable outcomes, or feel they have control over decisions, before they will comply with group rules or do things on behalf of the group. Instead, relationally fair treatment can promote feelings of pride and respect that in turn encourage group-serving behavior. This is a low-cost way for leaders and authorities to be effective. It shows how leaders can pursue long-term group interests without having to provide for individual short-term benefits. The optimistic implications of the group-value model are a stark contrast to more instrumental models of the person that suggest people's attitudes and behaviors reflect their understanding of personal costs and benefits.

However, because these data are correlational, any causal inferences should be made cautiously, if at all. Of particular concern is whether feelings of pride and respect shape procedural justice judgments, instead of the reverse. Conversely, of concern is whether, for instance, engaging in group-serving behaviors or having high self-esteem leads people to believe they are more respected within their group or feel greater pride in group membership. Partial support for the proposed causal direction of these effects can been gleaned from longitudinal studies of procedural justice effects. For example, Brockner et al. (1992) found that the perceived fairness of an organizational layoff changed workers' commitment to their work organization. Partial support can also be derived from experimental studies of group behavior. Social identity studies have shown, for instance, that when participants are arbitrarily assigned to a group and positively evaluate that group, they generally engage in attitudes and behaviors that benefit the group (Maas & Schaller, 1991). Recent experimental research also has shown that participants reported significantly higher self-esteem when the research assistant treated them respectfully and fairly than when the research assistant treated them inconsiderately and unfairly (Koper et al., 1993). These results suggests that it is not unreasonable to argue that relationally fair treatment and respect promote feelings of self-esteem and group-oriented behavior and attitudes.

The group-value model hypothesizes that the fairness of specific interactions with authorities shapes general feelings of pride and respect, which in turn influence general group-oriented attitudes and behavior. However, in this research we have not considered the variable most widely studied in justice research—the voluntary acceptance of decisions. A replication of the analyses that focused on decision acceptance suggested that, although voluntary acceptance of decisions was strongly related to relational judgments about authorities, feelings of pride and respect did not mediate that relationship to a significant degree.

Although the pattern of findings in the case of decision acceptance differed from those reported earlier in this article, it is

not necessarily contrary to the predictions of the group-value model. First, we assessed voluntary decision acceptance, as it has been in many previous studies, by asking respondents about their willingness to accept a decision within a specific dispute they had described. Quite possibly, if respondents had been asked about the degree to which they *generally* were willing to accept the decisions of a group authority, the same psychological dynamics as revealed above would have been shown. Such a general-acceptance variable would parallel more closely the general attitudes and behaviors toward groups assessed above.

Second, people's willingness to accept particular decisions by group authorities may be related to their general attitudes toward their groups, attitudes that we have shown to be linked to judgments about group authorities. To test this latter possibility, we created an overall index of workers' attitudes toward their organization (in the work study) by combining the variables of commitment, feelings of obligation to comply with work rules, and willingness to engage in extrarole behaviors. The overall index explained 20% ($p < .001$) of respondents' willingness to voluntarily accept a particular decision made by their supervisors. Similarly, in the family study, we created an overall attitude index by combining the variables reflecting feelings of obligation to comply with family rules and willingness to engage in extrarole behaviors. Thirteen percent ($p < .001$) of the variance in willingness to voluntarily accept particular parental decisions was explained by this overall index. Relational judgments about group authorities, then, may affect the willingness to accept decisions directly, and indirectly through its covariation with people's general attitudes toward their groups.

In summary, the group-value model provides an exciting new way of examining the psychological underpinnings of procedural justice effects. Although a number of issues still need to be resolved, the findings of our analyses provide the first support for the hypotheses proposed in the model. Furthermore, the findings suggest a number of fruitful avenues for future research.

Implications of the Group-Value Model for Social Identity Theory

As noted earlier in the article, the group-value model draws heavily from social identity theory, a theory that suggests that people draw a sense of identity from group membership and that such sense of identity is related to group-oriented attitudes and behaviors. As we noted, the group-value model and social identity theory differ in at least one important aspect: The group-value model is mainly concerned with explaining intragroup dynamics, whereas social identity theory is primarily concerned with explaining intergroup dynamics. In focusing on intergroup relations, social identity theorists have focused on how feelings about a social category as a whole (in contrast to other social categories) affect people's attitudes and behaviors. An important contribution of our research, however, is the suggestion that people consider *two* sources of information about their social category: their position within the group (respect), and the position of the group as a whole (pride). Feelings of group pride correspond more directly to the group-level judgments that have been the focus of social identity theorists. In this section, we discuss how paying attention to issues of respect within groups, and how they are linked to authority structures in groups, can inform social identity research and theory.

Social identity theory predicts that people's senses of self-worth are affected by their evaluations of the groups to which they belong. Unfortunately, related empirical research has not consistently supported this hypothesis (for reviews see Hogg & Abrams, 1988, 1990; Maass & Schaller, 1991; Messick & Mackie, 1989). Our results, however, suggest that group membership may still be related to self-evaluations but that feelings about the self are more influenced by people's perceptions of respect within groups than their evaluations of the entire group (pride). In all three studies, respect explained more of the variance in self-esteem than did pride.

These results can explain why, even when people are able to change groups, they often remain identified with marginal, stigmatized, or low-status groups (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, de Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Pettigrew, 1978). Being a respected member of a marginal group may be better for one's sense of self than being a marginal member of a respected group. For example, much of the recent writing by minority group members about affirmative action stresses the potential subjective emptiness of the objective gains that occur through affirmative action programs (Nacoste, 1990). Such gains do not enhance minority members' senses of self if they feel that they are not gaining the respect of those in the occupations that they join.

The relationship between evaluations of respect within groups and self-esteem might also explain why out-group prejudice and discrimination, which social identity theory posits arise naturally from people's need to bolster their self-esteem, have not been consistently found in social identity research (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Some studies have shown that group members with low self-esteem are more likely to derogate out-groups, whereas other studies have found that group members with high self-esteem are more likely to derogate out-groups (see Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Long, Spears, & Manstead, 1994). One explanation for this inconsistency is that people who do not feel respected by an advantaged group may be motivated to focus on the status of their larger group compared with other groups, and not their personal place within their group, to bolster their self-esteem. In contrast, individuals who feel they are valued members of their group, even if that group is of low status, may not need to focus on intergroup comparisons and out-group derogation to raise their positive feelings about themselves.

Social identity theorists have recently begun to acknowledge the potential weaknesses of their sole focus on the categorical characteristics of groups in comparisons to other groups. Hinkle and Brown (1990), for instance, suggested that "[group] membership seems more bound up with dynamics within the group than with any relationship between that group and others" (p. 67). It is interesting to note that the recognition of intragroup dynamics parallels the empirical shift from using the minimal-group paradigm to studying the effects of social categorization in experimental settings to natural groups and field research. An important difference between laboratory and real-world groups is that real-world groups are established groups in which ongoing social relationships are expressed in authority structures and differentiation among group members. It is precisely these types of structured and differentiated groups that have been the focus of procedural justice research (see Lind &

Tyler, 1988, and Tyler & Lind, 1992, for reviews). The inclusion, then, of feelings of respect within groups, and how people's relationships to group authorities affect these feelings, in a social identity theory framework may provide a more complete picture of how people derive a sense of self-worth from group membership than does social identity theory's emphasis on evaluations of one group in comparison to others.

If, as we suggest, respect, as an evaluation of one's position within the group, can supplement the traditional focus of social identity theory on evaluations of groups as a whole (pride), a key question for future research is a clearer conceptualization of what respect is. For example, in all four of the present studies, respondents were asked whether other group members would approve of their lifestyle, respect their values, and appreciate their accomplishments, *if those group members knew them well.* Our intention was to create a series of questions that would be appropriate even in contexts (such as the nation study) in which all group members could not possibly know the respondent. By drawing attention to other group members' opinions, we hoped to learn people's views of what other group members thought, not what they thought of themselves. However, respondents may have interpreted the questions as asking whether they really deserved respect, rather than how they thought other group members viewed them. Fortunately, these questions were closely related to other questions that more directly measured people's assessments of their social reputation (e.g., "I believe that most members of the university community respect me"). However, the potential ambiguity of these questions suggests that an important goal for future research will be to determine whether respect represents people's subjective evaluations of how the group, as a whole, values them as the group-value model hypothesizes or whether respect captures the quality of a particular set of interpersonal relationships.

Implications of Social Identity Theory for the Group-Value Model

In the preceding section we discussed how the group-value model can make theoretical contributions to social identity theory and research. In this final section, the reverse—how social identity theory can further inform the group-value model—is discussed.

As we noted, social identity theory argues that people's attitudes and behaviors are affected by evaluative comparisons between groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Interestingly, the group-value model does not address such comparative processes; only "absolute" levels of pride and respect, void of explicit comparisons between groups or individuals within groups, are considered. Moreover, only absolute levels of procedural justice judgments are considered, without paying attention to the possibility that people engage in comparative evaluations between procedures or treatment by authorities, either within groups or across groups. This points to a potential limitation of the group-value model. People could, for example, be influenced by how fairly they feel treated by group authorities relative to other individuals. If so, then many of the same invidious comparisons that social identity theory suggests occur between groups ("My group is better than your group") could also occur in terms of relative respect within groups ("I am a more valued group member than you are"). These comparative aspects of evaluations of group authorities, pride, and respect were not examined in the studies reported in this article and should be explored in future studies.

Finally, social identity theory and research remind us that individuals are members of many different groups. This could take the form of cross-cutting group memberships (e.g., being female and African American) and nested group memberships—that is, groups existing within groups. Although the research reported in this article was limited to investigations of individuals' connections to a single group and its representative authority, there are numerous social situations in which people may be members of groups included within larger social categories. This suggests more complex questions, for instance, about whether feelings that one's group is respected by the larger superordinate category and its corresponding authorities will influence people's attitudes and behavior (e.g., does the university administration respect the psychology department; Thompson, Kray, & Lind, 1994). This possibility of multiple group memberships also suggests that people's choices of the groups with which they identify may influence their judgments of procedural justice (H. J. Smith & Tyler, in press; Huo et al., 1996) and hence the psychological dynamics proposed by the group-value model.

CONCLUSION

Procedural justice research documents the many positive and unexpected consequences of fair and respectful treatment. Procedural justice not only encourages people to accept unfavorable decisions, but it also promotes commitment, loyalty, and effort on behalf of the larger group. Our results show why procedural justice is related to group-oriented attitudes and behaviors. Fair and respectful treatment by authorities who represent important groups communicates feelings of respect and pride. Feelings of respect and pride, in turn, are related to self-esteem, feelings of obligation to group authorities, and the desire to help the group beyond what is required. Together, these two concepts—pride and respect—can explain several inconsistencies in previous research and outline when people will be willing to act in their group's interest, even when it conflicts with their personal desires.

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(*Appendix follows on next page*)

Appendix

Intercorrelations Among Items in Each Study

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Study 1: Family											
1. Relational judgments	3.32	1.31	—								
2. Relational judgments × identification	—[a]	—[a]	.68	—							
3. Instrumental judgments	3.78	1.47	.56	.39	—						
4. Pride	2.82	1.26	.43	.61	.22	—					
5. Respect	2.43	1.09	.43	.45	.22	.43	—				
6. Compliance	2.40	0.82	.28	.39	.11	.45	.47	—			
7. Extrarole	2.74	0.91	.17	.28	.10	.49	.30	.59	—		
8. Commitment	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—	
9. Self-esteem	3.09	1.07	.16	.15	.07	.31	.48	.22	.17	—[a]	—
Study 2: Work											
1. Relational judgments	1.96	0.88	—								
2. Relational judgments × identification	6.30	3.40	.85	—							
3. Instrumental judgments	2.40	0.86	.74	.62	—						
4. Pride	2.05	0.66	.38	.38	.33	—					
5. Respect	1.73	0.58	.10	.20	.03	.11	—				
6. Compliance	2.06	0.88	.30	.33	.23	.10	.24	—			
7. Extrarole	1.72	0.49	.16	.17	.20	.45	.22	.02	—		
8. Commitment	2.25	0.75	.37	.38	.37	.69	.05	.08	.31	—	
9. Self-esteem	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—
Study 3: University											
1. Relational judgments	2.52	0.73	—								
2. Relational judgments × identification	5.12	2.48	.68	—							
3. Instrumental judgments	3.02	0.83	.60	.47	—						
4. Pride	2.41	0.97	.17	.41	.08	—					
5. Respect	2.87	1.05	.01	.14	−.01	.37	—				
6. Compliance	1.61	0.59	.09	.08	.01	.15	.16	—			
7. Extrarole	2.29	0.54	.00	.20	.00	.27	.41	.16	—		
8. Commitment	1.74	0.64	.13	.31	.10	.56	.30	.16	.27	—	
9. Self-esteem	1.97	0.70	.08	.14	.07	.23	.49	.21	.28	.29	—
Study 4: Nation											
1. Relational judgments	3.52	1.27	—								
2. Relational judgments × identification	10.86	4.93	.80	—							
3. Instrumental judgments	3.55	1.06	.73	.69	—						
4. Pride	2.36	1.39	.33	.38	.30	—					
5. Respect	2.49	1.25	.15	.14	.16	.29	—				
6. Compliance	4.30	1.36	.30	.34	.30	.34	.16	—			
7. Extrarole	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—		
8. Commitment	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—[a]	—	
9. Self-esteem	2.40	0.95	.05	.03	.04	.12	.35	—[a]	—[a]	.02	—

[a] Variable was not included in the data set.

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