

Cabinet Office
Katharine Hammond
Third witness statement
Exhibits: KH/62 –KH/96
Date: 30 August 2020

GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY

THIRD WITNESS STATEMENT
OF KATHARINE HAMMOND

I, Katharine Hammond, of Cabinet Office, 70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS **WILL SAY** as follows:

1. I am a Senior Civil Servant (SCS) and Director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office. I am authorised by the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General to make this statement. This is my third witness statement.
2. Except where otherwise stated, the facts and matters set out in this witness statement are within my own knowledge and are true. Otherwise, the contents are based on the documentation I have reviewed for the purposes of preparing this witness statement, and where that is so, I have identified the source of information upon which my evidence is based.
3. I make this third witness statement in response to the Inquiry’s ‘Request for Evidence under Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006’ dated 20 May 2020 (the “Third Rule 9 Request”). I previously made statements to the Inquiry on 5 March 2019

(the “First Statement”) and 10 July 2020 (the “Second Statement”). In this statement, I address each of the further questions posed by the Inquiry in turn. For ease of reference, I have reproduced below the questions to which each of my answers relate. I would, of course, be happy to clarify or amplify the points addressed in this statement, should the Inquiry wish me to do so.

The Role of CCS

4. In light of some of the further questions that I have been asked to address in the Third Rule 9 Request, it may assist if I briefly explain the responsibilities of the different actors involved in responding to and recovering from civil emergencies:

4.1. Category 1 and 2 Responders:

4.1.1. These are the organisations, such as the police, fire and rescue services and local authorities, which are at the core of emergency response. The fire and rescue services will coordinate the response at the scene of a major fire. Local authorities are expected to work with partners to, amongst other things, provide immediate shelter and welfare for survivors and provide for the medium to longer-term welfare of survivors. This is set out in **Emergency Response and Recovery**, which I now annex to this statement as **Exhibit KH/62 (CAB00004519)**. See also paragraph 29 of my First Statement.

4.2. Strategic Coordination Group/Recovery Coordination Group:

4.2.1. This is a multi-agency body made up of senior representatives with executive authority from each of the key organisations involved in the local response. It will usually be chaired by a police or fire officer in the response stage, but leadership will normally transfer to the local authority and a Recovery Coordination Group to oversee the recovery phase. In most scenarios response and recovery groups will work in parallel until the response is finished. This is set out in paragraphs 5.1 to 5.8 of **ConOps**, which I now annex to this statement as

Exhibit KH/63 (CAB00007011 / CAB00014570 / CAB00000026 / CAB00004613). The purpose of these bodies is to provide strategic guidance to the response and recovery arrangements on the ground. The Strategic Coordination Group and Recovery Coordination Groups may colloquially be known as “Gold”.

- 4.3. Lead Government Department for Response;
 - 4.3.1. The Lead Government Department (“LGD”) for Response is responsible for, amongst other things, producing a handling plan, producing a brief, accurate situation report to feed into CRIPs, ensuring that responders and affected communities have access to the resources they need, and drawing upon and applying relevant capabilities (paragraph 2.16 of ConOps).
 - 4.3.2. The LGD for response is expected to work closely with the LGD for the recovery phase from the outset to ensure a smooth transition of responsibilities at the appropriate time and ensure that response and recovery activities are undertaken in concert (ConOps, paragraph 2.18).

- 4.4. The Lead Government Department for Recovery:
 - 4.4.1. The LGD for Recovery is responsible for the tasks set out in paragraph 2.18 of ConOps. These include
 - 4.4.1.1. Acting as the focal point for communication between central government and multi-agency Recovery Coordinating groups;
 - 4.4.1.2. Agreeing across Government clear aims and objectives for the recovery process,
 - 4.4.1.3. Producing brief, accurate situation reports to feed into CRIPs;
 - 4.4.1.4. Ensuring the strategic recovery issues are identified and acted on during the response phase; and
 - 4.4.1.5. Drawing upon and applying relevant capabilities applicable to the emergency at hand and, if required,

co-ordinating the support needed from other government departments and agencies.

- 4.5. The role of Cabinet Office is, amongst other things to:
 - 4.5.1. Decide whether and when the central Government response mechanism should be activated;
 - 4.5.2. Ensure an LGD is in place;
 - 4.5.3. Provide staff to run the central Government response mechanism; and
 - 4.5.4. Broker policy solutions where necessary.
5. The role of CCS is focused on the central Government role in a response; it does not supplant any local or operational responsibilities. CCS is primarily responsible for monitoring developments on the ground using information provided by the relevant LGD; acting as secretariat to COBR and ad hoc ministerial meetings; providing advice to LGDs and local responders where necessary; and brokering policy solutions where issues cannot be resolved by local responders, the SGC, or the LGD.
6. A number of the questions I have been asked invite me to comment on statements made by other individuals in meetings, and work that was undertaken by other Departments. I have addressed these questions to the extent that I am able to do so, and have tried to be clear as to the limits of my ability to comment on the actions or interventions of others.

QUESTION 1: At paragraph 21 of your statement you refer to the Resilience Capabilities Survey (“RCS”) as a “tool to help identify potential capability gaps”.

- a. **Please provide an over view of how the RCS is undertaken**
- b. **Were any capability gaps and/or areas of need, relevant to an incident like the Grenfell Tower fire, identified in the surveys from 2014 onward until the Grenfell Tower fire?**
- c. **c. What has changed, if anything, with the RCS process since the Grenfell Tower fire?**

7. The Resilience Capabilities Survey (RCS) was launched in 2007 and was conducted biennially by CCS up until 2017. Detailed, capability-specific questions were set by lead government departments, and category 1 and 2 responders across England and Wales are asked to provide a self-assessment on a voluntary basis. The results provide local responders and government with a picture of resilience capability at the local level in England and Wales. The survey was last conducted in 2017. The survey opened on the 28th April and was live for 4 weeks until 26 May 2017.
8. No subsequent iteration of the RCS has taken place since 2017. Whilst the RCS was a useful discipline for self-assessment of capability, consideration is being given to its nature and role as the approach to mapping capabilities is being improved. CCS will undertake a short consultation process with both government departments and local responders to identify where the survey might be improved upon, building on lessons learned from the Grenfell Tower Fire and other events as appropriate.
9. The RCS was not designed to serve as a tool for auditing individual responder agencies. Responses were by way of self-assessment, and were processed and aggregated by a third party. This was intended to encourage wider participation, and make it clear that individual responses were not being audited by CCS. CCS never received the granular data, but instead prepared a High Level Report based on aggregated data. That High Level Report analysed trends nationally, in keeping with CCS' remit and focus. It does not identify capability gaps within individual Local Resilience Forums or Category 1 and 2 Responders such as RBKC.

QUESTION 2: Please provide details of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat pilot allowing Local Resilience Forums (“LRFs”) to assess themselves against Resilience Standards as set out in paragraphs 21 and 28 of your Statement.

10. I understand that the Inquiry has also asked Robert MacFarlane about this work (see question 3 of the Inquiry's Supplementary request for evidence to Robert

MacFarlane dated 24 June 2020), and he is best placed to provide a detailed answer to this question.

QUESTION 3: Has the CCS non-statutory Evacuation and Shelter guidance been updated in 2019 as indicated in your statement at paragraph 26a? If so, what were the main changes? Please provide a copy of the updated guidance. If it has not been updated, please explain why.

11. The Evacuation and Shelter guidance was not updated in 2019. This was because resources were re-prioritised to focus on planning for a “No Deal” withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and, subsequently, the response to the Covid-19 pandemic. It remains the intention to update the guidance.

QUESTION 4: At paragraph 26a of your statement, you refer to “*launching a tool for local authorities that will allow access to pre-negotiated rates for hotel room booking, and support both bulk booking and special requirements for displaced residents during emergencies*”. Please provide an update on this process and confirm whether it is operational.

12. Yes, this tool is operational. CCS worked with the Crown Commercial Service to develop the “Public Sector Travel and Venue” framework agreement”. The Crown Commercial Service is responsible for this framework. A copy of the webpage through which it can be accessed is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/64**. This can be used by the wider public sector to book emergency accommodation. Public bodies must sign up to the agreement in order to use it. The existence of this service was publicised in the “Resilience Gateway Bulletin” on Resilience Direct in December 2018. CCS also co-hosted a seminar with the Crown Commercial Service in January 2019 to provide more information to interested local authorities.

QUESTION 5: At paragraph 28 of your statement you state, “*CCS carried out a survey of LRFs’ resilience Capabilities in 2017*”. Please set out further details and the findings of this survey, including the particular findings for LRFs in London and the LRF of which the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (“RBKC”)

is part. Further, when did this survey take place? Was it a scheduled survey or prompted by events in 2017?

13. With apologies for any confusion, this refers to the Resilience Capabilities Survey, which is addressed in my response to question 1.

QUESTION 6: At paragraph 37 of your statement, you refer to a document entitled ‘Responding to emergencies: The UK general government response, concept of operations’ (“ConOps”). As at paragraphs 1.7 to 1.8 and Annex B of **ConOps:**

- a. Please set out what level of emergency the Grenfell Tower fire was initially categorised at on 14 June 2017 and the reasons why? It is understood that these categories include Local, Level 1 (significant emergency), Level 2 (serious emergency) or Level 3 (catastrophic emergency).
- b. Please confirm whether the categorisation/ level of emergency changed between 14 June 2017 to 20 June 2017 (inclusive) and the reasons that led to any change of categorisation?
- c. In the case of the Grenfell Tower fire, when was it decided that central government involvement was necessary? Who made this decision?

14. I will address this in my response to question 7.

QUESTION 7: At paragraph 37 of your statement, you state that where necessary, the central government crisis response mechanism/Cabinet Office Briefing Room (“COBR”) “*will be activated to coordinate the cross-government response in the aftermath of a major emergency.*”

- a. Please clarify the classification, and level, of a ‘major emergency’?
- b. Was COBR activated in response to the Grenfell Tower fire, and if so when? Who made this decision?
- c. If it was, what circumstances led to the activation of COBR and the Grenfell Tower fire being regarded as a ‘major emergency’?
- d. Was a ‘full’ activation of COBR required?

15. As set out in paragraph 37 of my First Statement, the document entitled “Responding to Emergencies: The UK central government response (concept of operations)” (“ConOps”) sets out arrangement for responding to and recovering from emergencies, irrespective of cause or location, requiring coordinated central government action”. Paragraph 1.8 of ConOps sets out three broad levels of emergency, numbered 1 to 3 in order of increasing severity, that are “likely to require direct central government engagement”. Paragraph 2.2 of ConOps provides that in the event of a Level 2 or 3 emergency central government’s crisis management mechanism (“COBR”) would be activated in order to facilitate rapid co-ordination of the central government response.

16. There is no formal declaration of the level at which an emergency is classified, which allows for judgment to be applied about where an emergency lies on the scale at any particular time. The levels provide a guide to activity needed rather than activating a specific set of action or resources, which allows for a flexible and tailored approach depending on the specific circumstances of an event. This is part of the strength of the mechanism, in my view.

17. In the case of the Grenfell Tower fire, COBR was not formally called. Instead, the meetings that took place in the days following the fire, and which I describe in my First Statement, were ad hoc ministerial meetings. This made no difference in practice: the same procedures were followed as would have been followed had the meetings had the status of “COBR” meetings, for example: CCS acted a secretariat, as it would have for a COBR meeting; and CRIPs were prepared in accordance with 3.10 of ConOps, as they would have been for a COBR meeting.

QUESTION 8: Please provide the following correspondence referred to at paragraph 44 of your statement:

- a. **Email at 03:49 on 14 June 2017 to Stuart Wainwright.**
- b. **The draft situation report that you reviewed and the version with your suggestions emailed at 04:33.**

18. The e-mail to Stuart Wainwright is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/65 (CAB00003016)**. The draft situation report is annex as **Exhibit KH/66 (CAB00003903)**.

QUESTION 9: As referred to at paragraph 45 of your statement, please provide the email updates from, as it was then known, the Department of Communities and Local Government’s Resilience & Emergency Division (“DCLG RED”) to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (“CCS”) during the first Strategic Coordination Group (“SCG”) meeting and after the call.

19. These documents are attached as **Exhibit KH/67 (CAB00007222)** and **Exhibit KH/68 (CAB00000157)**.

QUESTION 10: As referred to at paragraph 46 of your statement and at Exhibit KH/6, what was the source(s) of the information that responders did not need any resources or assistance from national government?

20. This would primarily have been based on the absence of a request for assistance. We would expect local responders to be best placed to assess the requirements on the ground, and determine whether or not they had the resources to address them. In addition, CCS would have received information from a variety of sources, including from individual departments and readouts from the Strategic Coordination Group. I note that Stuart Wainwright sent me an e-mail at 08:09 on 14 June 2017, in which he stated that the London Fire Brigade was not seeking additional resource, and that the NHS said that it had capacity (**Exhibit KH/69 (CAB00000159)**).

QUESTION 11: In relation to paragraph 47 of your statement:

- a. Please clarify how a “cross-government ministerial meeting” differs from a COBR meeting.**
- b. Please provide any correspondence you were included in with regards to the convening of the cross-government ministerial meeting.**

21. The difference between a cross-governmental ministerial meeting and a COBR meeting is addressed in my answer to question 7.
22. As I explain in paragraph 47 of my First Statement, Stuart Wainwright led on the decision to call the first ministerial meeting as a normal part of his role as Head of Readiness and Response. This is addressed in paragraph 14 of his statement to the Inquiry, dated 7 March 2019.

QUESTION 12: In relation to paragraph 49 of your statement, please provide an overview of how a Commonly Recognised Information Picture (“CRIP”) is compiled, dealing with how information is received, verified and selected for inclusion.

23. Paragraphs 3.10 to 3.15 of ConOps explain how CRIPs are created and used during an emergency. A CRIP is a document which is displayed in COBR meetings, or ad hoc ministerial meetings convened to manage a crisis. The purpose of a CRIP is to ensure that everyone who is part of the decision-making process has access to consistent information about the situation. The contents of a CRIP therefore vary according to the specific circumstances of an event – it contains the available information needed to inform decisions. A CRIP therefore can consist of information relating to both the scene of the emergency and significant wider impacts. It will tend to include facts and figures, images, the main developments and decisions, trends, and upcoming decision points.
24. In order to ensure accurate and timely information is available in the CRIP, CCS requests situation reports (“SitReps”) from other Government Departments and agencies as appropriate. All departments and agencies involved in the emergencies are responsible for ensuring that they are able to access either directly or indirectly relevant, timely, information on their areas of responsibility, and are able to provide a prompt read-out of the impact including the views of key stakeholders. Information from local responders is normally routed through the relevant Government Department to avoid duplication and minimised the burden on local responders.

25. The CRIP is based on the best information available at the time, as provided by other Government Departments. Ultimately, CCS will determine what goes into the CRIP based on the criteria set out at paragraph 23 of this statement, with the key consideration being whether information is pertinent to decisions that need to be made by Central Government.

QUESTION 13: In relation to paragraph 50 of your statement and Exhibit KH/7, where the 14 June 2017 ministerial meeting is discussed:

- a. ***“It was confirmed that front line responders did not require any additional support for the immediate response”.* What was the source of this information?**
 - b. **What was the source of information for *“key issue b) immediate shelter and temporary accommodation”*, where it notes *“the Council were not currently asking for additional support”*?**
 - c. **What was the nature of the concerns of the Mayor of London in relation to *“key issue b) immediate shelter and temporary accommodation”*, as set out in CAB00013811? It is understood that CAB00013811 is an earlier draft of the minutes exhibited as Exhibit KH/7.**
26. **Exhibit KH/7** is a Minute of the ministerial meeting that took place on 14 June 2017. The quotations at points a, b, and c of this question are taken from those Minutes, and record what was said in the meeting by one or more attendees. I am not able to expand further on them.

QUESTION 14: With regard to paragraph 51 of your statement:

- a. **Were you expecting Nicholas Holgate’s attendance at the first meeting?**
 - b. **If not, when did you become aware that he was expected to attend the first meeting?**
27. Paragraph 51 of my First Statement sets out, on the basis of a review of the e-mail correspondence in **Exhibits KH/8 and KH/9**, my understanding of what took place in relation to Mr Holgate’s attendance at the meeting. I am not able to

elaborate beyond that based on recall of events but, given his role, it would have been normal for him to attend a meeting of this nature.

QUESTION 15: Please provide details of when you were in contact with David Bellamy and the information he provided to you about “the ‘on the ground’ situation” as referred to in paragraph 57 of your statement. Please provide any relevant correspondence and/or notes of this conversation.

28. Most of my contact with David Bellamy took place by phone. I do not take a written record of telephone calls as a matter of course, and they would not otherwise have been recorded by CCS. I have found one e-mail demonstrating direct contact I had with David Bellamy. This is attached as **Exhibit KH/70 (CAB00005546)**.

QUESTION 16: In relation to paragraph 60 of your statement dealing with the situation prior to the second ministerial meeting:

a. **What information, if any, had DCLG RED provided as to the capacity of the RBKC to deal with the emergency response?**

b. **Had you, or the Cabinet Office, asked DCLG RED about RBKC’s capacity prior to the second ministerial meeting?**

29. CCS received information about the fire and the response to it through a variety of different sources: for example, readouts from Strategic Coordination Group meetings, returns from departments for the purposes of preparing CRIPs, information obtained through direct communications between officials, and information provided by attendees at ministerial and official meetings.

30. It is possible that I, or other colleagues in CCS, had concerns about RBKC’s capacity prior to this meeting. However, it is evident from the e-mail that I sent to Jillian Kay and Katherine Richardson (see **Exhibit KH/19**) paragraph 64 of my First Statement) that any such concerns only reached a level at which I felt it necessary to raise them following the second ministerial meeting. Given this

correspondence, I think it is unlikely that I raised the issue of RBKC's capacity as a specific question with DCLG RED before the second ministerial meeting, and I have no recollection of doing so. The following day, I was copied into an e-mail from the Permanent Secretary of DCLG to Mark Sedwill (**Exhibit KH/70**) responding to the Prime Minister's concerns about RBKC's capacity, and setting out the steps being taken to address them.

QUESTION 17. Why was the reference to “no request for national Government assistance” in the overview section of CRIP 1 (Exhibit KH/6) removed from CRIP 2 (Exhibit KH/15)? Had national government assistance been requested by this point, and if so by whom?

31. I do not recall why this reference was removed from summary page the CRIP. There are however references throughout the body of the CRIP to there being sufficient capacity. Had national government assistance been requested, I would have expected this to be indicated by the inclusion in the CRIP of an express statement to that effect, rather than simply by the omission of an earlier statement that there had been no such request. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not recall any such request having been received.

QUESTION 18: In paragraph 67 of your statement, you say that in the period after the Ministerial meeting you may have spoken to David Bellamy given your concerns but cannot be sure. Can you provide any notes or record of communications with David Bellamy at this point or confirm that this has been checked and no record has been found?

32. As indicated at paragraph 28 above, my contact with David Bellamy was mainly by telephone and would therefore not have been recorded. I have checked and, as indicated above, I have found one e-mail demonstrating direct contact I had with David Bellamy. This is attached as **Exhibit KH/71 (CAB00005546)**.

QUESTION 19: Please provide further details of any communications you had with David Bellamy about the appointment of John Barradell, as referred to at paragraph 68 of your statement. Please provide any relevant correspondence and/or notes of these.

33. As indicated at paragraph 28 above, my contact with David Bellamy was mainly by telephone and would therefore not have been recorded. My understanding is that the decision to appoint John Barradell would have been taken by the Mayor's Office or the Mayor's deputy, as I say in paragraph 68 of my First Statement. It is likely that David Bellamy simply informed me about this during a telephone call. For the avoidance of doubt, I would not expect to have been formally consulted about this decision. If there was any consultation with central government, it is more likely that this would have been with DCLG, as the department responsible both for local government and the recovery phase of emergency.

QUESTION 20: What did you understand the scope of RBKC's role to be in the period following John Barradell's appointment?

34. I understood this to be a change of leadership, rather than a change of the role of RBKC: Mr Barradell took over responsibility for leadership of the recovery operation from Mr Holgate.

QUESTION 21: As referred to at paragraph 69 of your statement, what were the circumstances that led to the Prime Minister chairing the Ministerial meeting on 16 June 2017?

35. I do not think I am able to expand beyond what is set out in paragraph 69 of my First Statement. I was informed by Alastair Whitehead that the then Prime Minister had decided to chair. It is not unusual for Prime Ministers to take the chair of meetings of this nature even in a series of meetings primarily chaired by another Minister.

QUESTION 22: At paragraph 70 of your statement, you state that the Home Office was still the Lead Government Department (“LGD”). When did the LGD change and why?

36. Home Office was the lead Government Department for the “response” phase of the emergency because it is the department responsible for the fire and rescue services. DCLG was the lead Government Department for the “recovery” phase, because it is the default lead for longer term disaster recovery in England. These roles were pre-agreed and so each department had responsibilities for their respective phases throughout: it was simply that the emphasis of activity changed as the situation developed.

QUESTION 23: KH/24, the minutes of the ministerial meeting at 13:30 on 16 June 2017, states:

- a. The Secretary of State for DCLG “ said that while he could not provide absolute reassurance that there was genuine coordination on the ground, his Department had already committed to deploying more people which could only help the situation ” (paragraph 3, page 2).*
- i. What was your understanding as to why DCLG could not provide such reassurance?*
- b. “There had been a request for a representative from DCLG to be embedded at Kensington Town Hall with the recovery operation” (paragraph 6b, page 3).*
- i. Who made this request and why?*
37. I do not know why the statement made by the Secretary of State for DCLG was made in those terms.
38. I do not recall who specifically made the request for someone from DCLG to be embedded at Kensington Town Hall. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (“MHCLG”) may be better placed to answer these questions.
- c. “ a Unit should be established within Government to provide coordinated victim support to the affected families, similar to the*

Victims of Terror Unit that had been set up in the Home Office ”
(paragraph 6d, page 3).

i. Why was a central government unit for victims deemed necessary?

39. I have had sight of an e-mail from No.10 to the Private Secretary to the Minister for Communities and Local Government sent at 07:41 on 16 June 2017 (**Exhibit KH/72 (CAB00005546)**), which suggests that this proposal originally came from No. 10. My understanding is that the rationale for this proposal was to ensure that HM Government was doing everything that it could to put in place an integrated package of support for victims, as set out in item 1 of the Minute of the ministerial meeting of 16 June 2017 (annexed to my First Statement as **Exhibit KH/24**).

d. “that arrangements are in place to coordinate the offers of public assistance and these are distributed effectively to those in need. There should be consistent messaging between the central and local level on the need for and handling of donations” (paragraph 7, page 4).

i. Are you aware of any arrangements that were put in place to coordinate offers of public assistance and donations?

40. The Office for Civil Society, based in the Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (“DCMS”) sent me an e-mail on 19th June 2017 (**Exhibit KH/73 (CAB00014259)**). This e-mail explained that the Charities Commission had been working to support charities in responding to the fire, and now wished to discuss how to coordinate such responses in the future. This work led to the establishment of the National Emergency Trust, which coordinates charitable responses to domestic emergencies.

41. A submission from the Charities Commission to ministers in the Home Office and DCMS was attached (**Exhibit KH/74 (CAB00004207)**). In that submission, the Charities Commission sets out the work that it said it had done up to 19 June 2020, and what it was proposing to do thereafter. I am not able to comment on

the accuracy of this submission, nor do I have anything to add to it. I simply refer to it for the purposes of bringing it to the attention of the Inquiry.

QUESTION 24: In relation to paragraph 72 of your statement, please provide any documents associated with the officials meeting you chaired at 17:00 on 16 June 2017 about setting up a Grenfell Victims Unit. This is taken to include, but is not limited to, the agenda, attendees list, minutes and actions.

42. This was an ad hoc meeting, called at extremely short notice, with the intention of moving things on at pace before the weekend. It arose from Action 4 from the ministerial meeting that took place the same day. The ministerial meeting started at 13:30, and the cross-Whitehall meeting about the victims unit took place at 17:00.

43. CCS has been able to locate the following documents relating to the meeting:

43.1 e-mail chain relating to the calling of the meeting (**Exhibit KH/75 (CAB00014377)**); and

43.2 A read out from the meeting (**Exhibit KH/76 (CAB00014386)**).

44 Given the ad hoc nature of the meeting, it seems unlikely that there would have been any more formal documentation than this.

QUESTION 25: Please outline whether you had any further involvement with the Grenfell Victims Unit beyond this meeting.

45 DCLG was responsible for the Grenfell Victims Unit. Colleagues across CCS liaised with the Unit as part of its day to day work on the response to the fire.

QUESTION 26: Exhibit KH/33, the minutes of the ministerial meeting at 11:00 on 17 June 2017, state:

a. *“there should be a single centre for the affected community to access services and advice. This should be appropriately and sufficiently staffed, including by central government officials, and kept open for as long as necessary ” (paragraph 9ii, page 4)*

- i. Was there a concern expressed that the Westway Centre at that stage was not sufficiently staffed/resourced?
- ii. Was there a request made for the presence of central government staff? If so, by who?
- iii. Was it usual or expected for central government staff to attend 'on the ground' of an emergency in this way?
- iv. Was the Cabinet Office kept informed of the number of central government staff who assisted at the Westway Centre? If so, could details of the number of staff per government department be provided up until the 20 June 2017 (inclusive)?
- v. Had central government staff who attended the Westway Centre received training for this type of work? Is training required as a prerequisite for being deployed in circumstances such as these or being part of a 'surge team'?

46 I note that the excerpt of the minutes quoted by the Inquiry in its question is a summary of a discussion of the attendees, rather than an action point coming out of the meeting. This suggests to me that it reflects a general agreement that such a facility was needed, and should remain open, rather than a specific point about the adequacy of what was already in place.

47 It is not common to have staff from central government departments deployed in this way, but it can sometimes happen. The deployment of such staff would have been a matter between the local team responsible for the operation of the site, and the departments providing the staff. CCS did not formally coordinate such deployment or keep a register of the people deployed. Similarly, training of staff would have been a matter for the departments providing the staff. In many cases, these staff would have been carrying out their day-to-day functions on site instead of in their usual location.

QUESTION 27: Exhibit KH/32, an action tracker for 17 June 2017, does not appear to have any progress updates. Please clarify and provide any action tracker completed for this date.

48 This appears to be the result of an error in cross-referencing with the Inquiry's Unique Reference Numbers. I attach as **Exhibit KH/77** a version of the tracker which includes updates.

QUESTION 28: As referred to at paragraph 78 of your statement, can you assist as to why no minutes were taken for the officials meeting on 18th June?

49 The meeting on 18 June 2017 was not a decision-making meeting. Its purpose was to check on progress over the weekend of the action points identified in the ministerial meetings during the week. As such, it was not necessary to take a minute. The key points from the meeting would have been captured in the actions.

QUESTION 29: Please clarify why the action tracker from the 18 June 2017 officials meeting you have relied upon, Exhibit KH/40 (CAB00001300), is different to a more detailed version available at CAB00007719?

50 It appears that these are different versions of the same document. The file name for **Exhibit KH/40 (CAB00001300)** in the Inquiry's spreadsheet is "*Grenfell Tower V1.docx*". The file name for the document to which the Inquiry has given the reference number **CAB00007719** (which I now annex as **Exhibit KH/78**) is "*Action tracker DNSA-chaired meeting 18-06-17 Grenfell Tower VI EE 20.46.....docx*." The purpose of the action tracker is to track progress against the action points from the ministerial meeting, so they are updated when new information is received. I would surmise that the reference to "20.46" in the title of **CAB00007719** refers to the time the file was updated, but I cannot reliably say that that is the case.

QUESTION 30: Exhibit KH/36 (at item 2a) and Exhibit KH/40 (at action 18) refer to an update and discussion from/with John Barradell as to the presence of visible people on the streets of the borough as a first point of contact. Did an update and/or discussion regarding this occur during the 18 June 2017 official meeting? If so, provide details?

51 **Exhibit KH/36** is the Chair's Brief for the officials' meeting of 18 June 2017. Item 2(a) reminds the Chair to ask John Barradell to confirm that there are no visible people on the streets of the borough that individuals can use as first point of contact. **Exhibit KH/40** is the action tracker from the same meeting. Action 18 is for the deployment of a highly visible presence in the locality to facilitate access to support service.

52 I do not now recall the detail of that meeting. I note that action 18 has been updated in the Action Tracker for the meeting on Monday 19 June 2017 (**Exhibit KH/47**). It says that local authority officials with high visibility jackets had been walking through the area and had had a mixed reception from the community.

QUESTION 31: exhibit KH/40 (at action 19) refers to an update and discussion regarding the number of people affected with particulars around their residence and ability, or otherwise, to return to their homes. Was there a discussion and/or update from either John Barradell or DCLG at the officials meeting in relation to this?

53 **Exhibit KH/40** is the action tracker from the officials' meeting of 18 June 2017. Action 19 is for London Recovery Gold (John Barradell) to provide figures to DCLG on the number of people affected by the fire, broken down into those present in the Grenfell Tower, and those from the immediate vicinity who cannot return to their home, and those who can. I do not now recall the detail of the meeting. However, I note that CRIP 7 (**Exhibit KH/46**) dated 19 June 2017 contains, in slide 7, a breakdown of the numbers of households in need of housing, broken down by whether they originated from the tower itself, or surrounding areas.

QUESTION 32: Exhibit KH/41 is the action list for the officials meeting on 18 June 2017, action 5 of this document notes "*CABINET OFFICE COMMS, working closely with LA GOLD COMMS, to finalise leaflet today summarising key information for local residents*". Please provide further details regarding the

discussion of this, including the timeframe of the implementation and distribution of this?

54 “Cabinet Office Comms” is a reference to the Communications team in Cabinet Office. They were assigned the lead for this action and acted accordingly. I note that the action tracker for the ministerial meeting on 19 June 2017 notes (**Exhibit KH/47**), at action 10, that the Cabinet Office leaflet is scheduled to be ready on 19 June, and then is marked as complete. I expect that distribution would have been a judgment best made locally, where the judgement of who needed access to the information would be most accurate.

QUESTION 33: In relation to paragraph 79 of your statement, please expand further upon the nature of the concerns raised by the First Secretary of State? Please also provide further details as to the advice you provided including communications relating to this.

55 The concerns of the First Secretary of State were set out to me in an e-mail from his Principal Private Secretary sent at 14:28 on 18 June 2017, which I now attach as **Exhibit KH/79 (CAB00012118)**. The e-mail says no more about these concerns than is set out in paragraph 79 of my First Statement.

56 Paragraph 79 of my statement goes on to explain that, after the officials’ meeting on 18 June, I provided advice on how DCLG could be supported as the Grenfell response shifted into recovery, and that I suggested that Ian Whitehouse, one of my Deputy Directors, be seconded to DCLG. I did this in an e-mail to Mark Sedwill at 17:03 on 18 June 2017. That e-mail is now attached as **Exhibit KH/80 (CAB00011688)**.

QUESTION 34: Please confirm the correct time of the ministerial meeting on 19 June 2017. It is noted that the agenda (Exhibit KH/45) suggests 11.00 while the minutes (KH/48) records 16.00

57 This appears to result from an error in cross-referencing against the Inquiry's list of URNs. An updated Agenda is attached as **Exhibit KH/81 (CAB00002937)**. This records that the meeting was scheduled to take place at 16:00.

58 I attach, as **Exhibit KH/82 (CAB00000648)**, an e-mail from 07:12 on 19 June 2017 sent to CCS Control by the Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for State for Policing and the Fire Service (Home Office), asking whether the scheduled Grenfell meeting would be moved due to the Prime Minister chairing a COBR meeting on the Finsbury Park mosque incident at 10:00. I do not now recall the precise events, but it seems likely based on this documentation that the ministerial meeting on the 19 June was originally due to take place at 11:00, but was moved to 16:00 due to this competing appointment.

QUESTION 35: Exhibit KH/47 at paragraph 80 of your statement is action tracker from 19 June 2017, action 18 on page 8 of this document states "*LA Gold: Currently there is a staff shortfall with personnel from other authorities assisting with all aspects of the response. LA Gold to feed into DCLG RED with a list of staff, their role and how they intend to scale up if required. LA Gold will also let the Victim Support Unit know where there are significant gaps so Central Govt. can assist using its surge capacity function.*"

- a. **Are you aware why there was a staff shortfall with personnel from other authorities?**
- b. **What is the central government surge capacity function?**
- c. **Was surge capacity subsequently used in response to the shortfall with personnel?**

59 I am not able to answer question 35 a. I note that the information contained in action point 18 is attributed to Recovery Gold. They may be better placed to answer this question.

60 The central government surge capacity is a team based in HM Revenue and Customs, known as the Surge and Rapid Response Team (“SRRT”). Information about them is available on the Gov.uk website. A pdf of the relevant webpage is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/83**.

61 HMRC was invited to the meeting on 16 June 2017 regarding the establishment of the Grenfell Tower Victims Unit (see question 24 above). In his e-mail of 16 June 2017 at 16:14, Ian Whitehouse stated that HMRC’s attendance was required and noted that this was “RE civil service surge capacity” (**Exhibit KH/75**). One of the actions from that meeting was that HMRC were to “mobilise (ideally) 20 AOs from their surge pool, with CTC clearance” and liaise with DCLG (see **Exhibit KH/76**). “AO” means Administrative Officer, which is a grade of employee in some civil service departments, while “CTC clearance” is a level of security clearance. Later on 16 June 2017, the Head of Operational Delivery Profession Team in HMRC e-mailed Ian Whitehouse to say that they had identified 20 members of the SRRT to deploy to support victims of the Grenfell Tower fire. That e-mail is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/84 (CAB00012064)**. I do not now recall any further details about this deployment. I note that the deployment was of HMRC staff to support DCLG.

QUESTION 36: Exhibit KH/47, at action 20 on page 8, further states “London Borough of Ealing has taken over the management of this facility - Westway Centre”. Are you aware of the circumstances and reasons that led to this?

62 I attach as **Exhibit KH/85 (CAB00009946)** an e-mail chain from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Response Lead, setting out various concerns about the Centre, before noting that it was not being run by the Borough of Ealing. This suggests that the change took place due to concerns about the operation of the Centre. I am not able to add to this. MHCLG may be better placed to assist as the LGD for Recovery, and the department responsible for local government.

QUESTION 37: Exhibit KH/48, the ministerial meeting minutes of 19 June 2017 state: “ *The RECOVERY GOLD highlighted that there were issues with the provision of hot water and gas to a number of affected properties situated within the wider cordon (around 400 households in total). The RECOVERY GOLD raised concerns about the effectiveness of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), who managed Grenfell Tower and surround [sic] properties*”. This is also found in Exhibit KH/49 at action 1.

- a. What were the specific concerns raised about the Kensington & Chelsea Tenants Management Organisation (KCTMO)?
- b. What was proposed in the form of next steps to address these?

63 My recollection was that there were questions about the overall effectiveness of KCTMO as a body and therefore its ability to discharge its role in responding to events. I do not recall whether these were the concerns that Recovery Gold raised in that meeting. Recovery Gold may be better placed to assist with this question.

QUESTION 38: Exhibit KH/49, referred to at paragraph 80 of your statement, is the actions list for a meeting on 19 June 2017. At action 4 it states “*RECOVERY GOLD to confirm by close today (Monday) how many eligible people have not yet received the £500 cash payment, and to make these payments as soon as possible*”. What was the outcome of this action and please provide details of the information provided?

64 This information is set out in slide 7 of CRIP 8, dated 20 June 2017 (**Exhibit KH/53**).

QUESTION 39. Exhibit KH/50, referred to at paragraph 83 of your statement, is the chair’s brief for the officials meeting on 20 June 2017. This document raised a number of issues in advance of the official’s meeting on 20 June 2017 at 15:30. These included:

- a. “*There was still some confusion around the households eligible for financial support and the progress being made with making payments to residents. This appears to be due to lack of join up between DCLG,*

and the Local Authority. DCLG claim they have a new process which will fix this” (paragraph 4). Please provide further details as to the nature of the confusion and the level of progress?

- b. *“There are a growing number of reports (media and from departments) of a lack of infrastructure and organisation at the Westway Victim Support Centre being run by the Recovery Gold. We understand that families are getting good service but that Government teams would like greater direction from Local GOLD regarding the support ask of their departments” (paragraph 5). Please provide further details as to the reports from departments including communications you had sight of?*
- c. *“YOU may wish to ask John for greater engagement between the Local GOLD and Government teams” (paragraph 15). What was envisaged or indicated as the form of greater engagement from Local Gold?*

65 I believe that the section quoted at part a. of the question reflects the action point from 19 June 2017, as referred to in question 38. This appears to have resulted in the provision of the information set out in CRIP 8 (**Exhibit KH/53**).

66 The only departmental reports that I have been able to identify concerning the organisation of Westway are one from the FCO, as set out in the attached e-mail of 19 June 2017 (**Exhibit KH/86 (CAB00009996)**), and another from the BEIS Response lead dated 20 June 2017 (**Exhibit KH/87 (CAB00001172)**). It seems likely that most reports of this nature would have gone to DCLG as the department responsible for the recovery phase, and that this section of the Chair’s brief reflected the information given to CCS by DCLG.

67 My understanding is that the section quoted by the Inquiry at point “c” of this question was simply intended as a general request to communicate. The section quoted at point “b” indicates that departments felt that more direction was required from Gold. I do not recall any specific reports or communications from departments to this effect, and the indications to this effect may well have been given in the course of discussions with colleagues across government. It was

envisaged, as far as I recall, that greater efforts would be made to ensure that information was shared regularly to keep everyone on the same page.

QUESTION 40: exhibit KH/54, referred to at paragraph 83 of your statement, is the meeting minutes for the officials meeting at 15:30 on 20 June 2017. At paragraph 15 it states “Barradell raised concerns that the management of Westway Community Centre was not adequate enough”.

- a. **What specific concerns were raised?**
- b. **What was put in place to remedy those concerns?**

68 I am not able to assist with this question, as I am unable to recall precisely what was said, or what was done in response, beyond that which is recorded in the minutes. As the person raising the concerns, John Barradell may be better placed to provide an answer.

QUESTION 41: Exhibit KH/55, referred to at paragraph 83 of your statement, is the action list for the officials meeting at 15:30 on 20 June 2017. At paragraph 5 it refers to “DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND PENSIONS and RECOVERY GOLD to provide a consolidated, detailed updated account of the payments made by ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA and DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND PENSIONS to victims to date by 12:30 on Wednesday 21 June”. Was this received, further, please provide details of this consolidated updated account of payments?

69 I attach as **Exhibit KH/88 (CAB00005755)** a draft of CRIP 13, dated 25 June 2019, which includes, at slide 4, information about the financial support provided to victims. It states at the bottom of slide 4 that the source of the information was both DCLG and DWP.

QUESTION 42: Were there action trackers, further to the version provided at Exhibit KH/47, produced for Tuesday, 20 June 2017 and Wednesday, 21st June 2017? Please provide copies.

70 I attach an action tracker for the meeting of 21 June 2017 as **Exhibit KH/89**.
CCS has not been able to locate an action tracker for the meeting of 20 June 2017.

QUESTION 43: Exhibit KH/56, referred to at paragraph 87 of your statement, is a summary of internal lessons learned by CCS after the Grenfell Tower fire. In relation to paragraph 5 of Exhibit KH/56:

- 70.1 Please expand further on the challenges in maintaining situational awareness and the CRIP?**
- 70.2 What was the agreed DCLG process for clearing key data at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire response?**
- 70.3 Why were these issues with the process not addressed at the time?**
- 70.4 Did CCS request a DCLG liaison officer to be embedded in the COBR situation cell at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire response? If not, why was this? Please provide any correspondence regarding this.**

71 Paragraph 5 of the document to which the Inquiry refers states that

“There were challenges in maintaining situational awareness and the CRIP, in particular engagement with DCLG and the timeliness of information were raised as key issues. The agreed DCLG process for clearing key data did not work; returns consistently failed to meet reporting deadlines, and there were issues with the quality of data once received. Often returns were incomplete, data tables did not add up or conflicting data was provided. Financial support figures being a case in point where different figures were quoted by DCLG and DWP Ministers at a number of COBR meetings. Whilst recognising the stretch on DCLG resource, arguably, CCS should have pushed harder for both a DCLG liaison officer to be embedded in the COBR situation cell and for a change in the internal DCLG clearance process to improve quality and timeliness of

information. CCS should request that DCLG look at improving information flows as part of their internal lessons.”

72 This paragraph relates to the challenges in getting a clear and consistent understanding on basic information about things like the number of people displaced, where they were, how many had received money and how much money in total had been paid.

73 I believe that the reference to the “agreed DCLG process for clearing key data” refers to issue with verifying information about financial support provided to victims. Although it falls outside the 7-day period specified by the Inquiry, I attach as **Exhibit KH/90 (CAB00010617)** an e-mail chain between CCS control and DCLG over 1 and 2 July 2017, concerning the details of financial support provided. This demonstrates that there was confusion about the basis on which these figures were being provided. DCLG’s preferred process was that information cleared by Recovery Gold should be used, rather than information provided by the Department for Work and Pensions. This e-mail chain also demonstrates that efforts were made to address these issues while the recovery phase progressed. The Lessons Learned exercise is simply reflecting on this process after the event.

74 I do not recall whether or not CCS asked for a DCLG Liaison Officer to be embedded in the situation cell, and I have not been able to locate any relevant correspondence. I note that the document in which this suggestion is made is a “lessons learned” exercise conducted after the event, so it may well be that this was something that, with hindsight, we considered would have been useful.

QUESTION 44: Further to your letter to Mark Sedwill, Exhibit KH/57, regarding the National Resilience Project findings and the four workstream reports found at Exhibit KH/58 through Exhibit KH/61:

- a. Please confirm which of the key recommendations outlined at paragraph 3 of Exhibit KH/57 and set out within the respective

workstream reports, have been taken forward and provide an update as to their current status.

- 75 My covering letter to Mark Sedwill (**Exhibit KH/57**) set out three key recommendations arising from the project.
- 76 The first of these was a proposal to build on the capability of ResilienceDirect to solve a number of important practical issues in supporting victims in crisis, around which people often perceive barriers which do not exist, such as restrictions on data sharing. This relates to work on ERIC and data protection guidance, both of which are addressed later in this statement.
- 77 The second of these was to move from local self-assessment of resilience capabilities to local assurance, underpinned by rigorous peer review and central support for performance review. I understand that the Inquiry has asked Robert MacFarlane to provide an update on this work in Question 3 of its Supplementary Request for Evidence from him, dated 24 June 2020. Robert will be better placed than I am to provide an update on these matters.
- 78 The third recommendation was that the process for escalating concerns about local capability be systematised, and backed up by strengthened local authority mutual aid and a module based system for deploying the resource most likely to be overwhelmed. This recommendation has been implemented through a variety of different measures. CCS worked with MHCLG to develop guidance for MHCLG's Government Liaison Officers ("GLOs") on how to spot potential issues, and how to raise concerns within the relevant organisations, with peers, or with central Government as appropriate (**Annexed as Exhibit KH/91**). I understand that MHCLG has incorporated this into its training for GLOs. MHCLG is the owner of this process and the documentation that relates to it.
- 79 Work on mutual aid has been progressed through MHCLG's network of "Resilience Advisers" ("RAs"). RAs support LRFs to develop local response plans. They connect LRFs to each other regionally and nationally. Through the RA network, MCHLG encouraged LRFs to enter into formal mutual aid agreements, for example between London Boroughs and Tier 1 local authorities

in the South East. Guidance on mutual aid was also provided in the *Local Authorities' Preparedness for Civil Emergencies: A Good Practice Guide for Chief Executives*, which is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/92**.

80 MHCLG's network of GLOs provides support to local responders to help apply for national aid appropriate, including through the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities ("MACA"). An explanatory note on MACA from the Gov.uk website is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/93**.

b. Please provide details about the LRF Chairs' Conference referred to in paragraph 5 of Exhibit KH/57 and associated meeting documents including minutes, attendees and agenda.

81 This event is a bi-annual conference that brings together representatives from central Government and Local Resilience Forums. The 2017 conference took place in September 2017, some three months after the Grenfell Tower fire. My understanding is that it was not specifically concerned with the Grenfell Tower fire and that the issues it addressed are not relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

c. Please clarify whether there is, or is scheduled to be, an update to the 'Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders' guidance produced in 2007, as referred to at paragraph 26 of Exhibit KH/58.

82 Draft guidance has been prepared, and is currently out for consultation amongst the responder community on ResilienceDirect.

d. Please provide an update as to the work underway by the National Casualty Bureau and the development of the data sharing platform Emergency Response in a Crisis ("ERIC") hosted by Resilience Direct, as referred to at paragraph 28 of Exhibit KH/58.

83 I understand, after consulting with colleagues in CCS, that much of the work on ERIC has been done. Thames Valley Police developed the initial concept, with support from the ResilienceDirect team in CCS. However, the system has yet to become operational due to difficulties in finding a suitable departmental owner for the system within Whitehall.

e. Please provide an update as to work to “identify best practice regarding the coordination of voluntary support in emergencies and share with Local Resilience Forums”, as referred to at paragraph 46 and recommendation 12 of Exhibit KH/58.

84 This is addressed in the Community Resilience Development Framework, which was published in June 2019 (annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/94**. Section 3.3 in particular addresses the management of voluntary capabilities. CCS also issued guidance on Planning the Coordination of Spontaneous Volunteers in June 2019. This is annexed to this statement as **Exhibit KH/95**.

f. What role, if any, did the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (“VSCPF”) have prior to the Grenfell Tower fire? Has this since changed? When was the last meeting of the VSCPF or its working party prior to June 2017?

85 The Civil Contingencies Act, regulations and guidance require Category 1 responders “to have regard” to the activities of voluntary organisations in the course of carrying out their emergency and business continuity planning duties. To assist in achieving this, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat asked the British Red Cross to convene a grouping of organisations that have a role to play in civil protection arrangements in the UK. The Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (“VSCPF”) was formed, comprising representatives from the voluntary sector, central and local government, devolved administrations, statutory authorities and professional associations. The strategic aim of the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum was to identify and maximise the voluntary sector contribution to civil protection arrangements in the UK. Having checked with CCS

colleagues, I understand that the last meeting of the VSCPF prior to the fire was on 23 September 2016.

86 Many of the activities of the VSCPF have been subsumed into the more recently created Voluntary and Community Sector Emergencies Partnership (“VCSEP”). The VCSEP was one outcome, of the reviews into the emergencies of 2017. The VCSEP has an ambition to build the strategic collaboration and cooperation between key national charities and to improve learning across the sector.

g. Please provide an update as to work undertaken to develop a voluntary sector framework as referred to at paragraph 46 of Exhibit KH/58.

87 This is incorporated into the Community Resilience Development Framework (KH/94).

h. Please provide an update as to whether a Local Resilience Assurance Team (“LRAT”) was created as referred at paragraph 21 of Exhibit KH/59?

88 I understand that Robert MacFarlane will address this in his supplementary witness statement. He is best placed to address this.

i. What was the outcome of any review, if undertaken, of the mutual aid guidance contained within the “Emergency Preparedness” document as referred to under the heading “Action to be taken” at paragraph 13 of Exhibit KH/61?

89 Emergency Preparedness was not updated. Instead, supporting guidance was prepared by MHCLG and an organisation called Solace. This guidance is annexed as Exhibit KH/91.

j. Please provide details as to the design of the National Crisis Surge team concept and whether such a team has been established, as referred to under the heading “Proposals” at page 9 of Exhibit KH/61.

90 The standing National Crisis Surge team was a concept developed during the preparation of the Queen's speech in 2017. With experience from responding to other subsequent emergencies, it became apparent that the issues that the proposed National Crisis Surge team was intended to address could be better targeted through a mixture of local solutions, such as the enhancement of mutual aid agreements, national assistance to local responders, through the enhanced GLO network (described at paragraphs 78 and 80 above), and through the enhancement of crisis management resources that I describe in response to the next question.

k. What decision was made in relation to developing proposals for creating a cross-Whitehall crisis response cadre, as referred to at page 12 of Exhibit KH/61?

91 Around 15,000 people were trained in crisis management as part of the preparations for a no deal withdrawal from the European Union. These people have been a useful resource to draw upon during the response to Covid-19. Through 2019 and 2020, CCS has been developing the Crisis Management Excellence Programme, which seeks to consolidate and develop these gains, by putting in place formal structures and standard, to foster a cohesive community for Crisis Management practitioners.

QUESTION 45: In paragraph 27 of Paul McClohrrie's witness statement, he states that he looked into the amount of accommodation available in the area as a precaution and that information was passed onto you.

- a. What did you do with this information?**
- b. Was this information provided to RBKC?**

92 I sent the information about the draft AirBnB MoU to DCLG in an e-mail at 18:18 on 23 June 2017, in case it was of assistance. That e-mail is annexed as **Exhibit KH/96 (CAB00012017)**. I did not pass it on to RBKC myself because it was the role of DCLG to be the link point. I do not know whether or not DCLG passed it on to the local authority separately.

QUESTION 46: Were you aware of the ‘utilities coordination cell’ that was set up by Sebastian James, of the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, as a system to support victims and manage issues at the Westway centre?

- a. **Was consideration given to the use of a similar coordination cell for the other teams that were commissioned to the Westway centre?**
- b. **Was consideration given to the preparation of a staff guide, similar to the one prepared by Sebastian James for his team at the Westway Centre entitled ‘Recovery Efforts using the Central Government Utilities Coordination Cell Model’?**

93 I was aware that the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy was dealing with the restoration of utilities, but do not recall being made aware of the details of the structure delivering it in this case. Nor would I necessarily have expected to be so long as the key tasks were being delivered.

QUESTION 47: the Report of the Post Implementation Review of the Civil Contingencies Act and Regulations, dated March 2017, lists its next steps at paragraph 29. This states that “ a further report summarising the findings and any actions arising from all three workstreams to RPC in autumn 2017 ” Please provide an update on this area and whether this report was completed.

94 Yes. The report presented to the RPC in March 2017 committed CCS to completing workstream 2 (the 2017 Resilience Capability Survey) and workstream 3 (the development of Resilience Standards) and to present a further report summarising the findings and any actions arising from all three workstreams to the RPC. A subsequent report meeting these obligations was presented by CCS to the committee at end 2017.

95 I believe that report noted that businesses subject to obligations set out in the CCA overwhelmingly reported that they do not view their statutory duties as a burden and 75% of those surveyed surpassed the requirement placed upon them by the Act as part of normal business planning. It confirmed that the resilience standards were being trialled for roll out throughout 2018, and I understand that Robert MacFarlane has addressed the National Resilience Standards in paragraph

8 of his second statement. At time of writing, colleagues are locating the final submitted draft of this report, which does not appear in the correct electronic file.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I am willing for this statement to form part of the evidence before the Inquiry and to be published on the Inquiry's website.

Signed

Personal Data

Full name Katharine Hammond

Date 30 August 2020