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Innovation and Lessons Learned from the government's response to COVID-19

Final report

9 JUNE 2022

Introduction and aims

The COVID-19 pandemic, and the effort to respond to it, has seen change and development in the Civil Service of a scale that has not been seen outside of war time. New services have been designed and delivered at rapid pace, and existing services have been adapted beyond their original remit in order to meet the challenges presented by the pandemic and deliver for the public. Civil Servants have worked flexibly, often remotely, and with many new colleagues and collaborators bringing fresh perspectives and experiences.

The Innovation and Learning Project set out to identify changes in the civil service approach with the potential to improve productivity or service delivery outside of crises, and at scale. The findings from the project will feed into work on Civil Service reform led by the Modernisation and Reform Unit. Specifically, the findings will be incorporated into work to develop the strategy for the second year of delivery against the Declaration on Government Reform. This work may also be useful to refer back to in planning for future crises responses. With the agreement of contributing departments and functions, findings could also be shared between departments to facilitate discussions about best practice.

In some cases, the pandemic prompted entirely new innovation. In others, it accelerated the pace of changes that were happening anyway, or forced the adoption of delivery models used previously at a smaller scale. Some of what happened is replicable in business as usual, but it is important to consider the unique context of the pandemic response - where the pressures of conflicting priorities largely fell away - when thinking about how learning could be adapted to apply in business as usual, and if it is desirable to do so.



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ABOUT THE REPORT, METHODOLOGY AND KEY FINDINGS

About this report

This is the full detailed report of our findings and recommendations. Slide 7 maps the findings against the priorities for delivering against the Declaration on Government Reform, to make the Civil Service: more connected, more impact focused, more adaptable, more strategic, and more efficient, however this pack is structured into themes that emerged during the review of all the evidence. The themes and links to respective sections are:

- 1) [People](#) (encompassing resourcing, productivity, and ways of working);
- 2) [Delivery](#) (including governance, digital delivery, and comms);
- 3) [Leadership and Culture](#) (encouraging a sense of mission, and empowering leadership at all levels);
- 4) [Data and Analysis](#) (sharing, collection, and presentation); and
- 5) [Working together](#) (with experts, delivery partners, and across government).

[Summary document can be found here](#)

[Source materials are linked here](#)

Methodology

The emerging themes and findings have been drawn from a wide range of reliable evidence using three approaches:

1. **Review of lessons learned by government departments**, including returns from BEIS, CO, DCMS, DEFRA, DfE, DfT, DIT, DLUHC, DWP, FCDO, HMRC, HSE and ONS.
1. **External publications**: a targeted literature review drawing upon publications from Parliament, NAO, and think tanks (e.g. Institute for Government).
1. **Review of COVID-19 Task Force lessons learned exercises** conducted throughout the two-year lifespan of the Task Force, combined with an SCS workshop held in March 2022.

NR to run through

Methodology - Limitations

Scope

- **The scope of the research was limited to pre-existing material.** No new lessons learned exercises were commissioned and therefore the project team did not have control over the topics covered and the questions addressed. It was also not possible to test views from one department or function with others to check that the conclusions drawn in one area apply consistently. Therefore, the findings are based only on the information available.
- **The views of the citizens and those impacted by particular policies were not in scope,** neither was how decisions were made, by who and whether they were the right ones. That will be the subject of the Public Inquiry into COVID-19 set up by the government.

Gaps

- **Some departments did not provide returns,** including DHSC. Returns from functions were limited, although some may have incorporated their response into the relevant departmental return.
- **There was limited information quantifying the impacts** of the innovations and improvements made. It may have been too early or the focus on the crisis response may have resulted in evaluations not being put in place.
- **It is not known what departments stopped doing** when reallocating resources to the COVID-19 response and how this influenced the innovations / improvements made, and their sustainability.

NR I to run through

More connected		Emphasise an authentic sense of overarching mission and purpose			Ensure depts have access to appropriate industry and academic expertise , to help improve customer satisfaction and trust in policy making/delivery. Co-production leads to better service design
More impact-focused	Set clear cross Government resourcing priorities , integrating HR data to evidence need, tracking the skills of Civil Servants, and incentivising more frontline exposure .	Emphasise, invest in and reward a can-do, outcome focused culture across the entire Civil Service Actively consider the benefits of fast decision-making finessed by iterative implementation	Greater end user-focus in policy and comms design Build trust in communications through real-time transparency and private sector collaboration	Set direction and enable more informed policy decisions by synthesising data from multiple sources and actively sharing analytical insights xWH	Ensure all policy areas have access to scientific and academic expertise in advance of crises
More adaptable	Maximise effectiveness by championing wellbeing , improving support for managers , adapting training to deploy staff quicker, using flexible working , and diversifying recruitment routes.		Design digital services with the end users at the heart, consider the wider applications of developments such as remote identity verification.		
More strategic			Set clear central delivery priorities supported by tailored governance, consider delivery throughout policy making ,		
More efficient	Work more efficiently by adapting crisis team structures for future use, integrating government systems , and using video conferencing where appropriate.		Improve interoperability between digital systems across government, and consider developing a citizen payment mechanism to get money to people quickly	Rapidly deploy data to decision makers by using: - APIs to access datasets in departments - Automated reporting tools with visualisation charts/dashboard	

Next steps

The findings range in scale and ease of implementation. Some reflect recommendations made elsewhere, including by parliamentary committees and a number of actions link directly to immediate Civil Service reform priorities.

We have highlighted a few key findings here, which we think have a clear, immediate route to delivery:

- **Having common systems to track and register skills across the Civil Service.** Work is already underway in the Cabinet Office to develop a system to do this, and it has clear links to reform priorities in terms of helping us understand how we can ensure we retain a mix of skills as we make the Civil Service leaner. To take this forward, we would suggest some work to investigate how many departments are setting up similar systems, and how we can bring this data together across the Civil Service.
- **Using flexible working to increase the number of Civil Servants outside of London.** As more of the Civil Service transitions to hybrid working arrangements, it is important to consider how to consolidate and build upon progress made during the pandemic to grow the Civil Service outside of London. Departments could share their approaches to growing their regional workforces, and their policies around hybrid working, and compare and evaluate the impact of different approaches.
- **Looking at broader applications of simplifications made to digital processes.** Easements in the benefits system such as around digital identity verification could be applied in other government services. Subject to wider prioritisation, GDS could be well placed to consider the wider applications of similar digital process simplifications and innovations.
- **Improving data sharing arrangements across Government.** Significant progress was made on data-sharing through the pandemic. Cross-government work should take place to take forward measures to make data-sharing easier in future, such as the adoption of uniform data standards.
- **Developing routes to quickly bring experts into Government.** There is already a stream of work led by Go-Science looking at how to enable better access to experts. This not only feels more pressing in the wider context of Civil Service reform, but also in terms of preparing for and managing future crises and emergencies.



MAIN THEMES

1. PEOPLE

People

More
Impact
Focused

More
Adaptable

More
Efficient

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Summary

- **RESOURCING:** Cross-government approach ensured consistency in role prioritisation; departments restructured themselves quickly to focus on delivery.
- **MAXIMISING STAFF EFFECTIVENESS:** Wellbeing initiatives, workload management approaches and ensuring diversity of experience on COVID teams helped improve productivity and effectiveness and prevent burnout.
- **WAYS OF WORKING:** Virtual working and collaborative working tools presented opportunities to make productivity gains.

How?

- **RESOURCING:** Central approach backed up by cross-government data ensured common purpose; DWP streamlined training to focus on most common interactions to stand up new resource more quickly; many departments made use of central coordination teams, PMO functions, and operation teams to free up policy resource.
- **MAXIMISING STAFF EFFECTIVENESS:** C19TF prioritised range of staff wellbeing initiatives; FCDO set up function with DG-level oversight to ensure resilience of staff network; C19TF brought together a range of skillsets (military, private sector)
- **WAYS OF WORKING:** Video-conferencing enabled effective engagement with stakeholders at pace. Shared documents enabled co-production, although this was limited across government by the use of different systems

So what?

- **RESOURCING:** Ensure central resourcing priorities are set and clearly communicated. Further integrate HR data to support resource planning. Track the skills and experience of individuals across the Civil Service. Expose more Civil Servants to the frontline, and consolidate their experience.
- **MAXIMISING STAFF EFFECTIVENESS:** Ensure leaders champion and resource staff wellbeing. Improve support and training for line managers, and recognise line management as a skill. Deploy rotas/shift patterns in non-operational roles to manage particularly intensive or demanding periods of work. Where there is a need to redeploy staff at pace, consider adapting training requirements to focus initially on high volume tasks. Retain staff recruited during the pandemic in regional locations by taking a more flexible approach to hybrid/hub working. Diversify recruitment routes to build teams with a broader range of experience.
- **WAYS OF WORKING:** Consider how crisis team structures could be adapted to respond to emerging priorities. Integrate systems to smooth movement across departmental boundaries and improve collaborative working. Maximise opportunities presented by video conferencing tools for stakeholder engagement and collaborative working.

Learning from our approach to resourcing the pandemic could help us achieve our vision of a slimmer Civil Service

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Key Findings:

- Ensure central resourcing priorities are set and clearly communicated.
- Further integrate HR data, e.g. on staff sickness to support resource planning and evidence resource need.
- Track the skills and experience of individuals across the Civil Service.
- Explore ways of exposing more Civil Servants to the frontline, and consolidate the experience of those who were redeployed in the pandemic.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Setting cross-government priorities helped manage resourcing requirements across the piece, but this could have happened more quickly, and would have been more effective if the Civil Service had a better understanding of the skills and experience held by its people.

- CSHR developed a central model using Strategic Resourcing Partners for each department with access to cross-government data. This enabled the design of a cross-government resourcing approach that reduced conflicting resourcing activity.
- What capability government had in crisis response resourcing was built through the experience of EU Exit resourcing. Some departments and CSHR have completed, or are intending to complete, lessons learned exercises and are creating 'how to' guides, but more could be done to consider how learning from this experience could support work on Civil Service reform outside of crises.
- Delays were caused by uncertainty over central priorities. In order for central resourcing plans to be effective as rapidly as possible, clear political/central steers on priorities, and what work could be deprioritised, are needed as soon as possible. [CSHR]
- Access to data from across government gave legitimacy to central resourcing plans. Better integrating HR data (e.g. on staff absences) would take this even further, and would support workforce planning in business as usual, as well as in future surge resourcing situations. [CSHR]
- Identifying and accessing the right specialist skills remains complex. Better, consistent ways of tracking skills across the Civil Service, beyond individuals self-determining their professions or functions, would simplify this. [CSHR, DfT] The Cabinet Office is working on a way of tracking skills within the department; this could be extended to implement a consistent approach to skills tracking across the Civil Service.

DWP's Virtual Service Centre was an innovative approach to redeploying staff to manage an unprecedented surge in caseload. More opportunities to build frontline experience in reserve could help prepare for future surge need, and build on the ambition for a more connected Civil Service.

- DWP redeployed more than 3,000 internal colleagues as well as a further 1,000 from other departments to manage a surge in claims through their Virtual Service Centre. Despite an unprecedented surge in demand, 90% of claims were paid on time and in full. Consolidating the experience and training of these staff would be beneficial for future crises. Outside of crises, there are potentially wider benefits to policy-making and service delivery to be realised from more back office civil servants gaining experience of frontline delivery.

Productivity can be improved by investing in support for staff wellbeing, training, and by diversifying teams

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Key Findings:

- Ensure leaders champion and resource staff wellbeing to improve effectiveness.
- Improve support and training for line managers, and recognise line management as a skill.
- Where there is a need to mobilise staff at pace, consider adapting training requirements to focus initially on high volume tasks.
- Retain staff recruited during the pandemic in regional locations by taking a more flexible approach to hybrid/hub working.
- Diversify recruitment routes in business as usual to build teams with a broader range of experience.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Where resources were dedicated to supporting staff, teams were more resilient.

- Specific posts were created within the Operations team of the C-19 Taskforce to focus on wellbeing and inclusion and to coordinate a programme of work across the taskforce. This supported staff resilience and led to measurable improvements in staff wellbeing (see case study)
- Line managers often went above and beyond to support people at times where both work and personal circumstances were extremely challenging. But there often wasn't enough formal, structural support for line managers.
- The FCDO faced particular challenges in supporting its overseas workforce. FCDO ran a project, led by a DG, to improve resilience across the diplomatic network with a range of actions to reflect changed ways of working and support staff wellbeing. Work is currently ongoing to embed this focus on network resilience and to better monitor it going forward.

Some teams adapted how they operated quickly to manage capacity.

- DWP streamlined training to focus on the most frequently occurring customer interactions to enable staff to be operational within 5-8 days.

Response teams often contained a diverse range of experience, and this could be built upon to ensure the Civil Service becomes more reflective of the society it serves.

- Home working enabled recruitment from a wider geographical base, leading to teams that are more reflective of the nation as a whole.
- Whilst there was generally a low tolerance for using innovative recruitment routes and a preference to focus on traditional methods, there are some examples of the use of alternative routes (e.g. reservists, private sector appts) and staff are overwhelmingly positive about the experience of working in diverse teams.
- The structure of SAGE and the sub group network enabled experts from a variety of different disciplines to work together to build the evidentiary picture.
- Greater use of online meetings meant more involvement of junior colleagues, expanding development opportunities and the range of voices around the table in key meetings [BEIS].

Building on changed ways of working can help the Civil Service become more efficient and fit for the future

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Key Findings:

- Consider how crisis team structures could be adapted in business as usual to respond to emerging priorities.
- Integrate systems across the Civil Service to smooth movement across departmental boundaries and improve collaborative working (security vetting, IT, estates).
- Maximise opportunities presented by video conferencing tools to improve pace and effectiveness of collaborative working.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Many departments set up central crisis teams and structured their responses to take pressure off those developing policy or managing delivery.

- Some departments set up unique operations teams to manage the onboarding of staff [DLUHC, C-19TF], as well as PMO functions staffed by those with appropriate skills (e.g. reservists in C-19TF) to manage assurance and reporting and free up policy teams.

- In some cases, departments now have pre-agreed crisis resource within the department that can be stood up immediately in future crises. [DfE, DEFRA]

More integration of systems across the Civil Service would improve collaborative working and prevent bureaucratic delays.

- When moving staff onto high priority response areas, onboarding caused delays (security vetting) and different systems (IT, estates) made mobilisation less smooth. [DLUHC, DfT, CSHR]

- Shared documents were essential for managing version control and enabling fast and effective collaborative working, although this wasn't always possible when co-producing with other departments because of the use of different systems. [BEIS, C-19TF]

Technology has changed the way we interact within teams, across government, and with our stakeholders. As we embrace hybrid working, we should think carefully about what the best channel is to conduct specific engagement, to maximise efficiency and effectiveness.

- Video calling technology has improved meeting efficiency by enabling more time to be used for substantive discussion, rather than logistics, and has saved officials time travelling between cross-government meetings - however this led to meeting proliferation and overuse because of the ease of setting up meetings. [BEIS]
- Video calling enabled government to convene external stakeholders quickly and get messages out. It meant business engagement could take place much more frequently, including with Ministers. More time was spent talking to stakeholders and the absolute number and diversity of businesses that could be reached increased. A positive consequence of this engagement was that businesses were far more receptive to government asks for data and information, often detailed and commercially sensitive and at cost to them, as they felt they had a chance to engage and influence. [BEIS, DfT]
- The ONS has initiated the Evolving the Workplace project to embed hybrid working post-pandemic - redesigning office layouts to create more space for collaborative working, reducing fixed desks and creating more flexible meeting spaces. Over the longer-term, changes should see a reduction of around 20% of office running costs and a 38% reduction on ONS' carbon footprint by 2025.



2. DELIVERY

Delivery



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Summary

- **DIGITAL DELIVERY:** Rapid delivery of digital infrastructure (e.g. furlough, Oak National Academy), use of digital tools as default to enable fast engagement (e.g. ventilator challenge, NSV signposting tool), simplification of existing infrastructure (UC)
- **COMMS:** Transparency at speed, use of trusted experts as figure-heads, purpose of comms both to inform and to change behaviour
- **GOVERNANCE:** C19TF central coordination role to join up response across government, COVID-S and COVID-O structure set up to provide forums for quick decision-making, consistent clearance processes such as 'triple-lock'

How?

- **GOVERNANCE:** Central commissioning process worked well when there was a clear ask of departments with deadlines that matched urgency, but this was not consistent, SAGE commission principles were effective at ensuring their capacity was effectively used
- **DIGITAL DELIVERY:** BEIS used 'rapid response squad' model to deliver ventilator challenge form in 1 day, HMRC used 'ruthless simplicity' principle to maintain focus on end user, increasing use of automation (e.g. in shielding platform) improved efficiency, 156 easements made to UC to deal with volume.
- **COMMS:** When messaging was clear, strong and consistent this influenced behaviour change (e.g. first lockdown), SAGE advice published within 2 weeks of meetings, GCSA and CMO played prominent role in media activity



So what?

- **GOVERNANCE:** Set a small number of clear central delivery priorities, supported by tailored governance frameworks, consider delivery throughout the policy making process, follow the SAGE commissioning model for scientific and technical advice, and improve tracking of commissions from the centre to departments..
- **DIGITAL DELIVERY:** Design digital services with the need of the end user at the heart, consider the wider applications of developments such as remote identity verification in the benefits system, consider expanding online learning to support specific groups of learners, improve interoperability between digital systems across government, consider developing a citizen payment mechanism to get money to people quickly.
- **COMMS:** Focus on the end user and the desired behaviour change when designing policy and comms, introduce a principle of assumed rapid publication, private sector collaboration can be used effectively to deliver priority messages to the public.

The centre should set out a handful of cross-cutting delivery priorities and make its ask of departments clear

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Key Findings:

- The centre should set a small number of clear delivery priorities, supported by governance frameworks designed to encourage a collective sense of mission
- Delivery considerations should be accounted for throughout the policy making process, rather than a secondary thought
- Follow the SAGE commissioning process in commissioning scientific and technical advice across government. For wider commissioning from the centre to departments, introduce better tracking arrangements inspired by the SAGE model (eg clear commissions and tight tracking) for consistency and to avoid duplication.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Putting more structure around the process for commissioning scientific and technical advice could improve its quality. The centre could reduce duplication by better tracking its ask of departments.

- The process for commissioning science advice was very clear and managed tightly to ensure questions coming to SAGE were specific and answerable. This ensured more time could be spent on delivering the best advice, rather than clarifying the ask. [GO-Science]
- At times the TF commissioning process worked well and led to clear delivery expectations and a route for departmental engagement with the centre. But the quality of commissions varied and TF officials were sometimes not able to explain context or give a rationale for urgency, or properly engage departments. This issue was accentuated by turnover at the centre and a lack of two-way communication. [BEIS, DLUHC]

The rapid pace of action forced government to consider delivery from the very start of the policy-making process

- The shielding programme worked closely with delivery partners (LAs, supermarkets) throughout to ensure that delivery considerations were fully embedded into policy-making. This enabled support (e.g. food boxes in wave 1) to be delivered and scaled up quickly. [DLUHC]

Governance structures reflected and reinforced the collective sense of mission. To replicate this in business as usual, the focus needs to be limited to a small number of cross-cutting delivery priorities

- The COVID S/COVID O governance structure was effective at focusing ministerial attention on both the strategic direction and practical delivery issues in an appropriate way. COVID-O had the structure of bringing in officials responsible for the delivery of key policies as equals which built trust and respect. The secretariat also worked extremely closely with No.10 to ensure thinking was aligned. [C-19TF]

Digital tools enabled delivery to move rapidly; building on this in business as usual requires investment and an appreciation of the trade-offs

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Key Findings:

- Digital services should be designed with the need of the end user at the heart.
- Some changes made during the pandemic - such as remote identity verification in the benefits system - have wider potential applications, but would require investment and in some cases also come with risks.
- More interoperability between digital systems across government would improve the ability of the state to rapidly introduce new digital services.
- The pandemic exposed a gap in the lack of a citizen payment mechanism to get money to people quickly, rather than trying to identify how existing systems could be flexed to deliver new aims.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Ensuring digital systems have a single, core aim helped ensure they delivered as effectively as possible.

- HMRC used the principle of 'ruthless simplicity' in designing the furlough scheme which ensured the system focused on the need of the service user and resisted attempts to make the system do too much.
- Innovative, rapid models of digital delivery could be replicated for unique purposes. BEIS deployed a rapid response squad to design a digital form to triage and coordinate offers of support from industry in response to the ventilator challenge, and a system was operational within 24 hours.

The pandemic prompted simplification in the benefits system, some of which has been deemed to be worth keeping despite potential risks. Government could challenge itself to simplify further systems and processes for the benefit of the end user.

- DWP - 31 out of 156 easements across service lines in DWP have now become BAU, including processes that enable claimants to verify their identity remotely - however this does require a greater risk appetite.
- Over 150k pupils per week continue to access Oak National Academy (online learning) now face-to-face classrooms are back. [DfE] Whilst research shows that the vast majority of pupils learn better face-to-face, could online learning be repurposed/built upon for those who don't?

Government was sometimes constrained by what was possible using existing systems and databases. Improving the interoperability of systems and data would enable more digital progress, but there are complex questions about civil liberties that would need to be considered.

- Where government had existing systems, delivery was easier (UC, furlough, patient records). Setting up new systems to do new things was much harder (test and trace). If existing systems were better able to talk to each other, this could help the development of new digital solutions.
- There was a specific gap in terms of the government's ability to get money to people quickly and target this most appropriately, which has subsequently also been an issue in terms of providing support for the cost of living. [DWP]

Clear, strong messaging supported behaviour change in the early part of the pandemic, and openness built trust

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Key Findings:

- Focus on the end user and the desired behaviour change when designing policy and communicating with the public.
- Rapid transparency of science advice improved public trust and influenced behaviour change. Government could build on its commitment to be open and transparent with the public by introducing a principle of assumed rapid publication for expert advice.
- Private sector collaboration can be used effectively to deliver priority messages to the public.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

When trying to affect a behaviour change, policy and comms should be designed together with a focus on how best to create the desired behaviour. In crisis scenarios where rapid change is required, avoid creating policy that is too complicated to communicate clearly.

- Clear, strong, consistent messaging from government was very effective, but as the messaging became more nuanced throughout the pandemic, it became less effective. [HoL]

Transparency is an effective tool in building public trust, and in the case of SAGE advice, it also encouraged more expert voices to engage with the science advice and improve its quality. Making rapid transparency the default for scientific and expert advice could improve public trust and engagement.

- Rapid transparency of SAGE advice following an early commitment to publish within 2 weeks of meetings, plus the use of near real-time data in daily press conferences built public trust in the science and helped support adherence with non pharmaceutical interventions (lockdowns, social distancing). [GO-Science]
- The public profile of experts - especially GCSA and CMO - has been raised by the pandemic and this could be used going forward to help promote science/evidence or as a comms tool [GO-Science]

Collaboration with the media to deliver public health messaging was effective and is a model that could be used in future to deliver priority messages

- The COVID-19 Press Partnership model was a collaboration with 600 national/local and over 300 digital titles to deliver messages to people, particularly around vaccination. Messaging delivered through the partnership was routinely trusted by more than 60% of the public. [Comms]



3. LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE

Leadership and culture

More
Connected

More
Impact
Focused

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Summary

- **Mission:** The overarching sense of mission brought together work across sectors, organisations, disciplines and grade, increased effectiveness and efficiency in the national response.
- **Mindset:** A greater level of empowerment and ownership created a stronger sense of delivery
- **Decision-making:** Using familiar apparatus, decisions were made faster and taking on a higher level of risk.

How?

- **Mission:** High levels of ministerial engagement and clear communication of their priorities led to unified cross-government teams.
- **Mindset:** Departments fed back to us that teams had a strong sense of drive, ownership and willingness to work across departmental boundaries on shared outcomes.
- **Decision-making:** Around 250 COVID-O Committees were held during the pandemic, informed by a further extensive network of secretariats and committees (including SAGE). (C19TF)



So what?

- **Mission:** Emphasise an authentic sense of overarching mission and purpose, capitalising on people's desire to make a difference.
- **Mindset:** Cultivate a can-do culture as well as structural reform, elevating the importance of the outcome as well as the quality of policy thinking.
- **Decision-making:** Give greater emphasis to "time" and speed in risk analysis and senior decision making. MVPs, iteration and fast feedback loops supported delivery, creating momentum and demonstrating strong political grip.

Clear overarching shared mission

Key Findings:

- Emphasise an authentic sense of overarching mission and purpose to harness people's drive for a stepchange in outcomes.
- Visibly reward departments and teams who support others beyond their remit to achieve the greater goal and make it demonstrably in their interests to do so

What happened in the pandemic and how?

- SCALE: The sheer enormity of the pandemic required government both to do new things and to do existing things in a new way. Urgency accelerated change, and created the conditions for it to move much faster than normal. For example, when BEIS asked businesses for support to build ventilators, the Ventilator Challenge Form was launched in a single day.
- MINISTERS: Because COVID-19 met so frequently, Ministers established a clear sense of a single overarching mission as they approached the challenges of how to manage the pandemic collectively. (C19TF Feedback)
- DEPARTMENTS: Interactions were more productive as there was a shared sense of mission and willingness to overcome barriers. eg a number of departments were happy to offer workforces and resources for things that might not fall directly in their remit. (C19TF Feedback)
- TEAMS: Staff were motivated by the unique circumstances and a clear sense of national mission. For example, HMRC feedback, showed a strong commitment to ensure that members of the public received payments they needed in time.

Mindset, not structures, are the key to stepchange in efficiency and effectiveness

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Key Findings:

- Emphasise, invest in and reward a can-do, outcome focused culture across the entire Civil Service, including messaging and incentive structures to focus work on the government's priorities rather than department's.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

- **LEADERSHIP AT ALL LEVELS:** The pandemic saw a fundamental shift in leadership irrespective of seniority. People at every level wanted to give what skills they could to address the global problem and the very clear aim, strong mandate and sense of purpose provided a framework within which people could operate.
- **EMBRACE DIFFERENCE:** To overcome the inevitable challenges of many perspectives that comes from multi-disciplinary teams, HMRC set out clear expectations: "Come ready to disagree and leave ready to commit?"
- **CONCURRENT WORKSTRANDS:** Clarity and trust underpinned processes for work to be progressed in parallel, rather than sequentially. This accelerated the result and enabled iterative changes to be quickly implemented.
- **EMPOWERMENT:** Clear frameworks and priorities allowed decisions and actions to be progressed with a higher degree of autonomy. For example, in HMRC, the DG provided "top cover" to manage the inevitable risks of iterating at pace. This released the core team to focus on delivery, rather than cross-checking.

Decision-making

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Key Findings:

- Actively consider the benefits of fast decision-making finessed by iterative implementation rather than delaying to perfect an approach.
- In exceptional circumstances, consider when it is appropriate (and defensible) to flex formal processes to ensure that the best outcome is reached quickly enough

What happened in the pandemic and how?

- **APPETITE:** The scale of the challenge meant that there was much greater openness to proposing and seriously considering bold solutions if a strong evidence-based case was made. (C19TF)
- **COLLABORATION:** Much as set out in the Declaration, discussion between ministers and Civil Servants in COVID-O meetings enabled greater input from those responsible for implementing the decisions.
- **URGENCY:** The urgency of addressing rising cases forced decisions to be made much more quickly than is often the case, based on the best available information. The risk of deferring was often much greater than not seizing the initiative.
- **COMPRESSED POLICY CYCLE:** The compressed process of decision-making to policy implementation, led to greater focus on successful delivery and roll-out. Feedback was quickly reintegrated into the process. For example, the Shielding service was redesigned while it was paused, drawing on user feedback and engagement. The redesigned service resulted in higher quality experience for Clinically Extremely Vulnerable people and for councils.
- **OUTCOME OVER PROCESS:** The procurement model deployed by the Vaccine Taskforce (making decisions at risk, outside conventional procurement procedures) proved highly effective. The Commons recommended that lessons from this success should be applied to other areas of Government.



4. DATA

Data and Analysis

More
Impact
Focused

More
Efficient

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Summary

- **Sharing:** shared data, information and analytical products between departments more rapidly than before for briefing packs, dashboards, policy development and to inform decisions
- **Collection:** collected data more frequently and more efficiently
- **Reporting:** Improved data reporting, turning data into insights through dashboards, and using data visualisations to tell stories

How?

- **JOINT WORKING** between departments, e.g. the CO had embedded ONS policy liaison officers to rapidly relay data requests to ONS, and set up a joint unit with FCDO to gather and share intelligence xWH from around the world through an active publishing programme
- **USED APIs** to access datasets in departments/ agencies and set up automated reporting tools to quickly update and reproduce data briefing packs
- **DATA COLLECTION PORTALS** were set up with centralised reporting and dashboards



So what?

- **Timely deployment of data: Faster and earlier** access to data from across government to inform decisions
- **Improve networking: Sharing data/ analytical products xWH** to set direction and ensure rapidly emerging scientific understanding feeds directly into **strategy and policy decisions**
- **Establish a central repository for data: Linked data used centrally for many commissions** and different audiences, makes it easier when we get requests for data/ analysis as it is readily available.
- **Improve content, frequency and timeliness**, be more responsive to emerging policy needs and give deeper insights

Sharing data more effectively across government and linking datasets can support decision-making

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Key Findings:

- Share data earlier and faster across government to ensure the timely deployment of data to set direction and inform decisions (FCDO, C19TF)
- Use technology to analyse data in PowerBI and share it back with partner organisations to see the overall situation and get feedback - to improve relationships/ build trust in data (BEIS).
- Put the latest and most relevant data and analysis at the centre to support decision making (e.g. daily data briefings to the PM informed the decision to accelerate the booster vaccine programme in 2021) (C19TF, ONS)
- Invest in research using a multidisciplinary approach, enabling answers to some of the most pressing science and policy issues

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Solutions to data-sharing were developed, although these ideally would have come quicker. Protocols to share data need to be built upon to ensure immediate flows of data in future emergency scenarios. More data-sharing also has the potential to improve service delivery in business as usual.

- The pandemic led to data and information being shared between departments more rapidly (JIO, CO/ C19TF, FCDO, ONS). Often, this was achieved through joint working between departments (e.g. embedded ONS liaison officers in CO; ICJU working between CO and FCDO). This had real positive impacts, such as sharing data on vaccine uptake by ethnicity leading to more investment in community champions which improved vaccine uptake by ethnic minority groups (DLUHC).
- Better data sharing across government requires the adoption of uniform data standards, a rebalancing of risk of data loss/misuse vs. the benefits to society, a shift away from individual liability of data officers, digitising paper records, establishing data sharing protocols between public bodies, and greater use of APIs and automation (C19TF, ONS, HoC)

Care was taken to share not only data, but also the analytical insights gleaned from it, often presented in a way to make them easily understandable.

- The ICJU brought together data from multiple sources and turned it into analytical insights and evidence summaries for sharing xWH through an active publishing programme (FCDO, Cabinet Office)
- Reporting methods were improved - such as a single data collection interface with centralised reporting and KPIs dashboard (BEIS) and the use of visualisation tools and techniques to tell stories with data (C19TF)

COVID dashboards were effective at presenting data in a helpful way to inform decision making. Expanding automation enabled the scale of reporting, would enable more real-time data to be used to support decision making in the future.

- Data automation was used to enable rapid deployment - the C-19 Taskforce used APIs to access datasets in other government departments and automated reporting tools in order to iterate dashboards.

Linking datasets has the potential to provide richer insights and could help government design better services, but there are complex ethical considerations.

- ONS linked to Census data to create richer datasets for research, subject to full ethical scrutiny and of data protection, security and transparency standards.

Investment in research ensured scientists from a range of disciplines could work together to develop the best evidence

- Initiating the National Core Studies (NCS) approach (HoC; GO-Science) to focus scientific minds across a range of disciplines on the most critical questions and gaps in knowledge facilitated rapid multi-departmental cooperation and cross-cutting scientific collaboration.

Collecting data very frequently was necessary in the pandemic and may be again in future crises

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Key Findings:

- Collected and linked **data** could be **used centrally for many commissions** and different audiences (BEIS, FCDO, DfE, ONS)
- **Regular data collections can be improved** with regard to content, frequency and timeliness, as well as accessibility and visibility of the data, by setting up a working group (DLUHC)
- In serious emergencies, **high-frequency and short-turnaround data collections are both necessary and feasible**, and should be considered again (DLUHC). Having frequent data allows for a better informed policy in real time
- **Smarter/ online data collections can reduce costs** and carbon footprint, enable more responsive surveys to emerging policy needs, and be more inclusive in collection mode (ONS)
- Daily data collection from educational settings can give **deeper insights** and **early warning signs** (DfE).

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Data collection happened much more frequently during the pandemic. Realistically, the scale of this may not be replicable (or necessary) outside of crises, but it has shown what is possible in emergency scenarios.

- Collected data more frequently and more efficiently (DfE daily, BEIS weekly, FCDO, DLUHC, ONS)
- Setting up daily **data collection portal** (DfE)

Smarter ways of collecting data can reduce the burden and avoid duplication.

- Streamlined data/ information collections to avoid duplicate requests (FCDO)
- Established monthly Local Authority COVID-19 Financial Impact Monitoring **surveys** (17+ rounds of these surveys have been completed) (DLUHC)
- Greater use of **telephone and online surveys** (ONS)



5. WORKING TOGETHER

Working Together



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Summary

- **SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS:** Scientific and academic experts provided data, analysis and challenge, allowing rapidly emerging scientific understanding to feed directly into decision making.
- **INDUSTRY EXPERTS, DELIVERY PARTNERS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR:** Working closely with industry experts and local delivery partners (including private sector), to ensure focus on customer/end-user.
- **ACROSS THE CIVIL SERVICE:** working across multiple or all departments on complex xgovt policy and response

How?

- **WITH SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS:** Surge resourcing was brought in through Public Sector Research Establishment (Go-Science) & Interchange Programme (Go-Science). Transparent, high profile and embedded nature of SAGE, multi discipline forums and boards (C19 TF, DCMS Events Research Programme), International Science Cell (FCDO).
- **WITH INDUSTRY EXPERTS, DELIVERY PARTNERS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR:** Co-production models (Shielding), working with community and business groups. Film & TV Production Restart scheme using industry experts to design deliver and promote the scheme as well as sit on decision making boards
- **ACROSS THE CIVIL SERVICE:** information sharing using existing forums, proactive early engagement with decision makers, early engagement with other depts where possible on xgovt policies

So what?

SCIENTIFIC and ACADEMIC experts can give valuable assurance, challenge, intel, and advice and are beneficial when brought in early. Wide engagement with considered representation avoids group think. We should further develop and maintain routes to get scientific and academic expertise into Government quickly and efficiently, perhaps following the SAGE model for in BAU settings

The ability to utilise and bring INDUSTRY EXPERTS in could open new doors and bring effectiveness, efficiency, customer satisfaction and trust in policy making/delivery. Departments should ensure they have access to appropriate expertise of affected industries in policy making and on steering boards.

Co-production is potential effective model to adopt more often.

Collaboration, coordination and information sharing across govt was key in the pandemic and should improve going forward, especially with Local Authorities and regional providers.

Working Together - wide and early use of scientific and academic experts brings value

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- Scientific and academic experts can give valuable assurance, challenge, intel, and advice and should be brought in at the early stages of a problem if the expertise doesn't exist in the civil service.
- Develop and maintain routes to get scientific and academic expertise into Government quickly and efficiently, perhaps following the SAGE model in BAU settings
- Engage widely ensuring carefully considered representation to avoid group think.

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Bringing experts in:

- Events Research Programme: To provide scientific assurance and challenge an independently chaired Science Board was formed. Experts were involved at every stage of delivery to ensure that testing and digital capabilities were able to support the safe reopening of events. By working with govt depts and scientists from academic institutions, the ERP covered all aspects of delivering major events. A science framework produced by SAGE was used in the ERP to design the pilot and complementary scientific studies of transmission, environment and behaviour. Innovate methods including the gathering and application of data, and frameworks are now informing research elsewhere in government *[DCMS]*
- Go Science and DIE also highlighted the importance of bringing experts in early. Go-Science was able to use surge expertise resourcing through the Public Sector Research Establishment and an interchange programme is being developed to facilitate easy routes to bring academics into government. *[GO Science and DIE]*
- SAGE and the Subgroup network facilitated many different disciplines to work collaboratively at pace to provide collective and coordinated advice. Participants could also reach back into their wider networks for support and act as a conduit for provision of much broader, diverse expertise. This multidisciplinary approach during COVID-19 has strengthened the science advice provided to decision-makers. This ability to draw from a list of leading experts, has applicability to future emergencies and outside of emergencies where rapid science advice is required. The Case for Change work in GO Science on accessing experts has taken steps to address this with the development of accessing expert guidance, pilot of a 'challenge council' and proposal to monitor diversity through data collection. *[GO Science]*

Wide engagement & representation:

- International engagement on science across a range of channels, both formal and informal, enhanced understanding of the virus internationally *[GO Science]*. FCDO Science Cell brought scientists together internationally to share expertise - meant rapidly emerging scientific understanding could feed directly into decision making *[FCDO]*.
- CO C19 TF ran frequent Exit Analysis meetings that provided a forum to share the latest modelling and analysis with civil servants and academics, to discuss possible measures and their effectiveness to inform decisions. This brought broader expertise and challenge to the decision making process. *[C19Taskforce]*
- Open engagement with the National Academies and wider science community amplified SAGE's capacity. A Culture of open engagement helped motivate science community to assist and strengthened existing relationships. *[GO Science]* However, lack of representation from the social care sector in SAGE and other governance structures meant that Ministers lacked important advice when making crucial decisions. *[House of Commons]*

Working Together - working with industry experts and private sector on industry solutions puts the customer at the heart

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The ability to utilise and bring industry experts and academics in could open new doors and bring effectiveness, efficiency, customer satisfaction and trust in policy making/delivery

Ensure dept have access to appropriate expertise by :

- formalising departments' stakeholder networks/advisory groups to ensure quality and trust.
- Consider a requirement to have an expert group for each area of departmental focus by default? Cases to be made for exceptions

What happened in the pandemic and how?

- Industry experts were able to help make sure the industry needs were at the heart of policies and programmes by being involved in the development of policies to a greater extent than before. For example, the Film and TV production Restart Scheme had industry groups play a central role in the design, delivery and promotion of the scheme. [Source: Process Evaluation of the Film & TV Production Restart Scheme] The decision to use the level of embedded expertise in the way DCMS did was largely drawn from needing a policy of extreme detail in an area DCMS had no prior experience in against immediate timescales to prevent industry collapse.
- The Events Research Programme also highlighted the importance of effective partnership working across public and private sectors and the challenge it brought. They brought together partners including core government departments and agencies, universities, scientific and ethics advisers, local authorities, and events industry stakeholders. They brought together a range of disciplines that had traditionally not worked together navigating what were at times very challenging relationships as conflicting priorities clashed (e.g. scientists vs policy makers), to create an agile, multi faceted team [DCMS].
- The CO Covid Taskforce noted the value of including business perspectives in policy advice and working with community and business groups to assess the impact of policies. [Covid19 Task Force].

Working Together - using Co-Production as an effective service delivery model

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- Co-production leads to better service design
- Advice to state how delivery bodies have been involved in development with a senior delivery partner signing off or consulted on all proposals

What happened in the pandemic and how?

- **Importance/benefits of working well with local delivery partners and private sector:**
Co-production: Some academic papers encouraged **co-production** in the commissioning of public services, and for regulators to hold public services to account for implementation plans and targets. [House of Commons & House of Lords]
- An example of this working well is in the **co-production model adopted to deliver shielding support**, where the programme harnessed local knowledge and helped manage risk. The willingness of LAs to report frequent assurance data to government that confirmed service sufficiency and the set up of a local engagement team to work with councils enabling regular information flows and feedback were two key aspects that helped the success of the programme. [DLUHC]
- **Private sector** should be recognised as key public service providers - eg The private sector played an integral role in the delivery and rapid scale up of services in the Covid response such as the Nightingale hospitals, education, refuse collection, and so on. but there is the recommendation for better civil protection planning with the private sector to improve the government's understanding of what partnerships could deliver. This will highlight how to best coordinate the resources the private sector could offer. [House of Lords and Reform]

Working Together - Improve collaboration across government

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- **Better communication with local authorities and regional providers**
- **Information sharing with decision makers and interested stakeholders should be frequent, structured and early**

What happened in the pandemic and how?

Better communication with Local authorities and regional providers:

Communication and coordination with local authorities and service providers is important and must improve. For example there was a lack of understanding of some delivery partner roles and therefore lack of consultation and communication about measures partners had to interpret and implement [House of Lords]. HoC also made the point that Central Government and national service providers must improve the way they communicate and cooperate with local service providers as equal partners in the delivery of services [House of Commons]

An example of good information sharing, submitted by the shielding programme shows: Willingness of LAs to report frequent assurance data to government that confirmed service sufficiency. Local engagement team was set up to work with councils enabling regular information flows and feedback. This was one of the reasons attributed to a successful programme [DLUHC]

Another example of a good information sharing was FCDO's International Science Cell. As shown on the previous theme, it had many scientific and data benefits, but another positive was that it also helped to strengthen diplomatic relations [FCDO].

X govt engagement and coordination: Information sharing with decision makers and interested stakeholders should be frequent, structured and early.

- DfE used cross departmental working groups. They also highlighted that 'Joined up collaborative working with internal teams and across Gov e.g. UKHSA is critical' along with 'a strategy of 'Strong communication with government departments and communication with sector, testing out approach e.g. with teaching unions.'
- Proactive engagement work with decision makers promoted greater understanding for decision makers/parliamentarians [Go science]

Useful links and source materials:

- [Summary report](#)
- [Spreadsheet](#) of departmental and functional returns and key lessons
- [Evidence cards](#)
- [TF lessons learned](#) summary doc
- External [literature review](#) summary doc
- [Existing Case Studies](#) (MRU owned)
- [Contact List](#)
- [Strength of evidence](#) spreadsheet



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ANNEX

case study - more adaptable

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Prioritising staff wellbeing in the Cabinet Office C-19 Taskforce

WHAT?

[Source: CO/ COVID-19 Task Force]

- Because it was recognised that staff were working extremely long hours under intense pressure, and whilst dealing with the impacts of the pandemic on their own lives, support for wellbeing was specifically resourced, not just a corporate add-on.
- The Task Force leadership needed to support line managers to manage staff in an environment without clearly defined roles.
- Building an inclusive and collaborative culture amongst colleagues with a diverse range of experience, despite most people working remotely and never meeting each other
- Encouraging a sense of corporate identity in an environment where most staff were on



HOW?

- **Organisational design:** Operations function to build and maintain the C19-TF as a team
- **Staff support:** Inclusion and Wellbeing Officer post, recruitment of MHFAs from a range of backgrounds, weekly time-to-talk sessions, monthly Critical Incident Debrief sessions, a signposting document, coffee roulette, MH awareness training for line managers
- **Diversity and Inclusion:** People Group, champions for protected characteristics, action plan focused on People Survey feedback, leads for line management and performance management, teach-ins for line managers, leaver's survey, pulse survey, network groups (e.g. for parents and carers), Thought for the Day emails to mark key D&I events, BH&D events
- **L&D:** lunch and learns, mentoring, career development sessions
- **Comms:** programme of induction activity, weekly newsletter, values charter, 3 all-staff weekly meetings.
- **RMR:** "Thank you" board, 1p vote reward scheme



SO WHAT?

- Support for wellbeing is more effective when prioritised as more than a corporate addition - General wellbeing scores increased by 32% within a month of Inclusion and Wellbeing Officer appointment.
- Enthusiastic sponsorship from seniors enables culture change where wellbeing is prioritised.
- Continuous evaluation of data and feedback enabled activity to be adapted to need and achieved positive results
- Targeted comms and campaigns worked to achieve specific objectives (e.g. 31% increase in understanding of how to spot and respond to BH&D, 26% increase in objective setting), confidence
- Mentoring programme for minority ethnic colleagues supported individual promotions.

Link to key finding: Ensure leaders champion and resource staff wellbeing to improve effectiveness.

The most innovative element of the case study is not the wellbeing initiatives themselves, but the prioritisation and resourcing of wellbeing in the context of many urgent and conflicting priorities. This within high-priority programmes in business as usual, particularly where the subject matter is emotionally challenging. Wellbeing initiatives are of mutual benefit to staff and organisations. To be most effective, coordination roles should be resourced in addition to existing resource, and enthusiastic, authentic senior sponsorship is needed.

case study - more delivery-oriented COVID-19 Press Partnership

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WHAT?

[Source: National Resilience Hub]

- In order to deliver priority messages to the public, the National Resilience Hub created a unique collaboration with the media.
- The partnership covered 600 national and local titles and more than 300 digital ones, reaching more than 49 million adults monthly.
- The intention was to reach as many audiences as possible to ensure they had access to key public health information, and to encourage them to behave in certain ways, such as getting vaccinated.



HOW?

- Regular long-form content covered key issues from regular testing to vaccination. Content was tailored to each publication's style to appeal to those audiences. A range of voices were used to help influence behaviours: 590 case studies of the experiences of 'real people' were sourced, and expert voices such as Chris Whitty were also used.
- 30 multicultural titles not in the English language helped get messages to audiences in their own language.



SO WHAT?

- Information delivered through the partnership was consistently trusted by more than 60% of the public.
- 82% claimed that 'Get Boosted Now' content made them aware that all adults could get a booster vaccine, with 51% saying that it motivated them to get boosted.

Link to key finding: Private Sector collaboration can be used effectively to deliver priority messages to the public.

The Press Partnership is an example of government and private sector collaboration deployed at key stages in the pandemic to deliver priority messaging. This may be applicable in future, particularly for future messaging around public health. The Press Partnership model represents an effective model of communications in certain circumstances, but is one option in a menu of comms tools.

case study - more impact focused

Data Briefings to the Prime Minister

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WHAT?

[Source: CO/ COVID-19 Task Force]

Briefed the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and senior officials with **tailored data packs on a daily basis** during the pandemic, drawing upon the large number of charts held in the data asset catalogue/ dashboard



HOW?

The C19TF had secured **federated access** to datasets in other departments through **APIs**, such as from the Covid 19 Data Cell created by NHSE/I and NHSX to bring together multiple complex data sources. This enabled the latest data to be drawn down on demand, such as vaccines from the NHS or school data from DfE.

Reproducible/ automated reports were set up for the rapid deployment of this data to decision makers



SO WHAT?

Achieved better decision making by providing ministers and senior officials **with timely access to comprehensible data**

EXAMPLE: data briefings to the PM in the run up to Christmas 2021 informed the decision to accelerate the booster vaccine programme

Link to key finding: Putting the latest and most relevant data and analysis at the centre supports decision making

The RAPID project by 10DS (No.10) is supporting depts. to set up APIs. Benefits vs. risks of data sharing and varying data standards across depts. present challenges. Once API access and automated reporting have been set up, they are highly likely to continue to be used due to the efficiencies made. Training/ selling benefits will help.

case study - more connected

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Film and TV production restart scheme

WHAT?

The £500m Film and TV Production Restart Scheme is an unprecedented intervention by DCMS, HMT, other departments and industry bodies to restart film and TV production during the pandemic in the absence of Covid-19 insurance cover.

Oversight was provided by DCMS, including a Steering Board. The British Film Institute (BFI) provides monitoring of the UK film and TV market, tracking the Scheme's take-up, expenditure and earnings of all UK productions. The BFI also support policy decisions and provide assurance during the onboarding process to reduce instances of risk and fraud.

HOW?

Through excellent collaboration working openly and at pace, the Scheme was put in place within weeks.

DCMS had existing strong stakeholder relations and went even further to collaborate on this scheme.

'It is a very collaborative Board and... this has been a significant positive of the Scheme. It was suggested that the Board's internal collaboration has allowed for growing confidence in decision-making, and the effective utilisation of the different skills and expertise present'

SO WHAT?

An independent evaluation recognised the open collaborative approach as critical to the scheme's success, highlighting the iterative close working with industry and partners, reducing risk of failure post-launch. This open and collaborative approach has also been taken to develop the scheme's exit strategy, and has enabled a strategic approach to industry's lobbying of insurers.

The Evaluation made the recommendation: 'Sector representatives and industry groups should play a central role in the design, delivery, and promotion of schemes like the Film and TV Production Restart Scheme in the future. Selection of these individuals or organisations must be carefully considered in advance to ensure correct and comprehensive representation across all aspects of the industry.'

Link to key finding: Ensure dept have access to appropriate expertise by:

- formalising departments' stakeholder networks/advisory groups to ensure quality and trust.
- Consider a requirement to have an expert group for each area of departmental focus by default. Cases to be made for exceptions

This project has informed the successful launch of a £750m live events reinsurance scheme by DCMS, and lessons have inspired schemes being explored by DLUHC in response to the Grenfell inquiry. Industry experts as members of steering boards will continue in DCMS, and all departments developing services can adopt close inclusion of the users in their designing. This level of industry involvement was a little further than DCMS usually engage, and exact replication may not be appropriate for some departments, but an increased level of engagement, and the ability to call upon trusted industry experts quickly will help future projects. Finding a way to have trusted stakeholders will help with sharing more openly, and allowing industries to work with government at a greater depth.

Source: Process Evaluation of the Film & TV Production Restart Scheme and DCMS Capturing Innovation from Covid

