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Novel Coronavirus Outbreak (M) (4)

CABINET OFFICE BRIEFING ROOMS

Novel Coronavirus Outbreak (M) (4)

Meeting on Tuesday, 18th February 2020

In Irrelevant & Sensitive , Cabinet Office

70 Whitehall at 15:00

MINUTES

PRESENT

The Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP Secretary of State for Health and Social Care In the CHAIR

The Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP

Secretary of State for International Development

The Rt Hon Stephen Barclay MP Chief Secretary to Her Majesty's Treasury

The Rt Hon Nick Gibb MP Minister of State for School Standards at the Department for Education

Nigel Adams MP Minister of State for Asia at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP The Paymaster General at the Cabinet Office

Edward Argar MP Minister of State at the Department of Health

and Social Care

Lucy Frazer MP

Minister of State at the Ministry of Justice

The Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith

Minister of State at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department

for International Development

James Heappey MP

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the

Ministry of Defence

Mims Davies MP

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the

Department for Work and Pensions

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Novel Coronavirus Outbreak

Item 1: Current Situation Update

- 1. The CHAIR invited the Government Chief Medical Officer (CMO) to update on the global situation and the latest UK risk assessment. The CMO said that the regional epidemic in Hubei province and China more widely was reducing in intensity. However, he said that there was increased risk there as people return to schools and workplaces.
- 2. Continuing, the CMO updated on the global risk, particularly countries where there was a risk of onward transmission, highlighting Japan and other South Eastern Asian countries. The risk to Japan was primarily from domestic transmission. Both escalation to a global pandemic, and isolation of the majority of cases to China remained realistic possibilities.
- 3. The CMO said that in the UK there were nine positive cases confirmed, and almost 5,000 tests returned as negative by the NHS. There were eight workplace sites where employees had reported symptoms, along with several cases of self-isolation. A member of the Rural Payments Agency staff was presently aboard the Diamond Princess.
- 4. The CHAIR invited the Minister of State for Asia at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to update on the plan to repatriate UK nationals from the Diamond Princess cruise ship. THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR ASIA AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE said that they had concerns about preparations for a flight that Wednesday, given difficulties determining a landing time with Japan. That the best case scenario would now be a Thursday repatriation, but Friday remained a possibility. That a Friday repatriation would not be acceptable.
- 5. Continuing, THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR ASIA AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE said that:
 - Communications had been opened with British Nationals as to whether they would
 choose to be repatriated to the UK, given that approximately 60 per cent live in Hong
 Kong. The intent would then be to quarantine those repatriated, for 14 days, and
 Arrowe Park has been identified as the quarantine site.
 - There were concerns about protection of Foreign and Commonwealth Office consular staff, noting that other nations had sent teams of infection specialists to repatriate their citizens.
 - There was a possibility for EU nationals, particularly Irish nationals, to join the flight.
 - Japanese authorities had stated that passengers had served a 14 day quarantine on the ship, and would be free to depart for onward travel on disembarkation. The UK government position was that quarantine had not been served at sea. This therefore raised the question of what action should be taken at the border, should these individuals return independently.
 - There were challenges with using NHS staff to support the repatriation and the use of Ministry of Defence aeromedical personnel remained the preferred option. Whilst the Ministry of Defence would have medical staff on the flight, it was not for them to

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- The legislation should be ready to go through both Houses of Parliament by the time a decision is made whether legislation is required.
- 13. The CHAIR introduced the Legislative Policy paper and maximalist list of possible provisions, emphasising the significance that any Bill covered all four nations of the UK.
- 14. In discussion the following points were made:
 - The Bill was referred to as 'COVID-19', but there remained a question of whether it should apply more generically to any pandemic.
 - Concern about scope creep based on the provisions presented.
 - The importance of the public being adequately persuaded that such provisions were necessary.
 - That provision with respect to staff ratios and school standards was included in the Bill but required further development.
- 15. Responding, the CHAIR said that all departments should work at pace if the Bill was to be developed promptly. Policy decisions were imminently required, so that drafting could begin.
- 16. Summing up the CHAIR urged care in developing legislative positions. He said that they should not be extended beyond core ministerial groups and agencies, and stated that there should be no external engagement without Ministerial consent.

Item 3: Planning for a Reasonable Worst Case Scenario (RWCS) – next phase

- 17. The CHAIR invited the Director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to give an update on planning for the RWCS. The DIRECTOR OF THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES SECRETARIAT said that there was work to be done to create a clear plan of activity (across the UK Government) from the moment of sustained transmission to its estimated peak, which was likely to be a period of three months. That a detailed agenda of decisions and actions required over a period of twelve weeks was required.
- 18. In discussion, the following points were made:
 - The further from central government, the more difficult it would be to create detailed
 plans, particularly in the social care and voluntary sectors. Therefore information
 should be shared to undertake proper planning but there remained a risk that some of
 this information could reach the media.
 - The need for preparatory work with the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector's response would be important.
 - Welsh response structures had been heavily tested recently with flooding and were as ready as they could be.
 - That the Northern Ireland Executive Strategic Civil Contingencies Group meeting on 19 February would discuss the response to a potential pandemic.
 - 38 English Local Resilence Forums (LRFs) had been asked to review their reasonable worst case scenario pandemic influenza plans and report back to the Ministry for