

Thursday, 30 November 2023

1  
2 (10.00 am)  
3 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith.  
4 **MR KEITH:** Good morning, my Lady. Today's witness is  
5 Matt Hancock.  
6 **MR MATT HANCOCK (affirmed)**  
7 **Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY**  
8 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Hancock, may I give you the same apology  
9 I've given other witnesses we have had to call back.  
10 I'm sorry the modular structure means we have to keep  
11 imposing on you, but thank you for coming.  
12 **THE WITNESS:** Not at all.  
13 **MR KEITH:** Could you give your full name.  
14 **A.** Yes, I am Matthew John David Hancock.  
15 **Q.** Mr Hancock, you are the MP for West Suffolk, and of  
16 course we have received evidence in Module 1 from you  
17 that you were Paymaster General and Minister for the  
18 Cabinet Office from May 2015 to July 2016, and then you  
19 served as Secretary of State for Health and Social Care  
20 from 9 July 2018, when you took over from  
21 Jeremy Hunt MP, and you served in that post to  
22 26 June 2021 when you resigned?  
23 **A.** That's right.  
24 **Q.** Thank you for the provision of a further statement. You  
25 obviously provided a great deal of information for the

1

1 and Social Care was a vast one. It had, of course, all  
2 its usual business, it was the lead government  
3 department in response to this national public health  
4 crisis, and the obligations upon it were, to use your  
5 words, vast and fast paced.  
6 **A.** Yes.  
7 **Q.** In Module 1 you accepted in the course of your evidence  
8 under oath that there had been a serious and significant  
9 inadequacy of preparation within the DHSC for a pandemic  
10 health emergency. May the Inquiry take from that  
11 acceptance that, on the cusp of the pandemic in  
12 January 2020, the absence of preparation had serious,  
13 significant consequences in terms of the DHSC's ability  
14 to be able to respond?  
15 **A.** Well, of course, as Secretary of State for Health and  
16 Social Care, I was responsible not just for the  
17 department, but ministerially responsible for the wider  
18 health family as well, the agencies, of course the  
19 biggest being the NHS itself, and Public Health England  
20 and others, and it is absolutely true, as I set out in  
21 my evidence in Module 1, that the plans that we had were  
22 not adequate.  
23 The -- and as we discussed in Module 1, that was,  
24 I think, on two bases. The first is in practical terms,  
25 for instance the UK didn't have a significant testing

3

1 purposes of Module 1, and you gave evidence, and you  
2 have further assisted by providing a lengthy statement,  
3 176 pages, which we can see there on the screen, and  
4 also a supplementary statement -- you were good enough  
5 to respond to a number of additional areas that  
6 the Inquiry put to you.

7 I just want to put into place, please, some of the  
8 building blocks necessary for the questioning that will  
9 follow. The Inquiry has, I should make plain, received  
10 a copy of your book, Pandemic Dairies, which obviously  
11 consists of a significant contribution to the debate  
12 about the response to coronavirus. Can I just please  
13 ask you, though, to make plain that, notwithstanding  
14 that it is entitled Pandemic Dairies, it is, to use your  
15 words, an account pieced together from formal papers,  
16 contemporaneous notes and voice memos, WhatsApps and  
17 communications and interviews?

18 **A.** That's right, it's written as contemporaneous rather  
19 than with hindsight, but it was written after the  
20 pandemic using contemporaneous materials.

21 **Q.** Yes, so stylistically it is not a diary, it is re-pieced  
22 together and called a diary?

23 **A.** Correct, it's my recollections.

24 **Q.** In the dairies, so-called, and in your statement, you  
25 make plain that the remit of the Department of Health

2

1 capability, and in terms of the wrong doctrine, which  
2 was that all the planning, based on the 2011 pandemic  
3 flu plan onwards, was based on the assumption that we'd  
4 be dealing with the consequences of a pandemic rather  
5 than trying to suppress a pandemic.  
6 **Q.** Does it follow from the absence of preparation, and  
7 perhaps the way in which, in terms of planning, the  
8 department -- as well as the rest of government -- may  
9 be said to have been pointing in the wrong direction,  
10 that when the DHSC and yourself were required to address  
11 the crisis and the breaking of the crisis in January and  
12 February, it became apparent that in terms of the  
13 structure, the personnel, the resourcing, the money, as  
14 well as the absence of plans to deal with a coronavirus,  
15 that you were in very real difficulties?

16 **A.** Well, a couple of points on that. The first is I take  
17 issue with "absence of a plan". There wasn't an absence  
18 of a plan, there were plans. They were -- I've  
19 critiqued the plans, I've said that they weren't  
20 adequate, but there were plans in place. There was the  
21 2011 plan, there had been the Cygnus exercise under  
22 Jeremy Hunt's position as Secretary of State.

23 So there were plans. There were areas in which the  
24 response, early response was very strong: PHE got  
25 a diagnostic test together within a matter of days, the

4

1 early surveillance, essentially led by  
2 Professor Van-Tam, as he's given evidence, was very  
3 good, and our role -- the UK's role internationally is  
4 strong in the first few weeks.

5 So there were plans, but the plans were inadequate  
6 in ways that we discussed in Module 1.

7 With respect directly to the impact of that on the  
8 department, of course when a pandemic strikes, even if  
9 you had the very best plans, those responsible for  
10 responding would have to -- would have to strengthen the  
11 operation, would have to tool up. And in the early days  
12 we expanded the department very significantly, and we --  
13 ultimately we brought in army personnel, for instance,  
14 lots more clinical personnel, others, and we took people  
15 off non-pandemic-related work and put them onto  
16 pandemic-related work. All of these things were in  
17 response to the pandemic, they would have been needed  
18 whether we had -- even if we had the perfect plan, even  
19 if we learn all the lessons next time there is  
20 a pandemic, and there will be another one, that  
21 of course the Department of Health will have to shift to  
22 respond to those challenges.

23 **Q.** You say there were plans, and you're astute to make the  
24 point that there was a plan, the 2011 pandemic flu  
25 strategy, but your statement itself says, and I quote

5

1 doesn't, of course, deal with the institutional links  
2 between the DHSC and the NHS and Public Health England  
3 or the scientific advisory structure, or of course the  
4 possibility that there would be movements in personnel  
5 and a ramping up in funding for the department. But in  
6 a broad sense, that is a correct proposition, is it not?  
7 Structurally and in terms of resourcing, when the crisis  
8 broke, the DHSC was under par?

9 **A.** Well, he didn't use the words "under par", they're your  
10 words, and I would reject that, because the senior  
11 personnel in DHSC were absolutely superb and rose to the  
12 challenge. But it was blazingly obvious that when  
13 a pandemic strikes, the Health Department is going to  
14 have more to do, and so I regard that comment as very  
15 straightforward.

16 **Q.** All right.

17 Could we have INQ000273901, page 78. This is  
18 an extract from Sir Patrick Vallance's dairies dated  
19 3 June 2020:

20 "Quad call exposed the massive internal operational  
21 mess inside DHSC and PHE."

22 Could we have page 587:

23 "Also 'clear lack of grip in DHSC' [this is in  
24 July] -- very good at analysis, no grip on actions --  
25 SEDWILL."

7

1 it:

2 "There was no book or report to pull off a shelf to  
3 tell us how to handle a pandemic ..."

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** So, of course, as with responding to any crisis or  
6 emergency faced by government, the absence of a book or  
7 report to tell you how to do it --

8 **A.** Yeah.

9 **Q.** -- is going to have an impact on your practical  
10 efficiency, on your ability to respond. That's obvious,  
11 isn't it?

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** Yes.

14 **A.** This was the first major pandemic in living memory.  
15 There wasn't anybody who had responded to it. None of  
16 my living predecessors, as secretaries of state had had  
17 to deal with something on this scale.

18 **Q.** Indeed.

19 You are aware, of course, from the witness statement  
20 of Mark Sedwill, now Lord Sedwill, the  
21 Cabinet Secretary, that in a report to the  
22 Prime Minister in the summer of 2020, he said the "DHSC  
23 was neither structured nor resourced for a public health  
24 crisis of this magnitude".

25 Granted, it's a very broad observation, and it

6

1 Page 594:

2 "Email from within DHSC describes it as  
3 'ungovernable and a web of competing parts' [...]"

4 And, I'll summarise, there are other diary entries  
5 in Sir Patrick Vallance's evening notes where he says:

6 "It is clear that once again DHSC has done nothing  
7 ... people ... lobbying in [...] points [and] no clear  
8 operational accountability."

9 And so on.

10 Regardless of what reasonable mitigation might be  
11 offered, and there is obviously mitigation which may be  
12 offered, senior officials in government continued to  
13 express concern over a number of months, Lord Sedwill,  
14 Sir Patrick Vallance and others, Helen MacNamara, about  
15 the state of the DHSC. Correct?

16 **A.** Well, I don't know whether these parts of Sir Patrick's  
17 dairies were contemporaneous, because I know that some  
18 was written after the event --

19 **Q.** Well, can I just pause you there, with respect. These  
20 were evening notes made certainly more contemporaneously  
21 than your diary -- Pandemic Dairies book. The vast  
22 majority were written on the day or the day after. Only  
23 some, it is apparent, were written later.

24 **A.** Yes. So, as I say, we don't know whether these are  
25 contemporaneous, but that is by-the-by. The point here

8

1 I think in response is that when you have an enormous  
2 unprecedented event, the department that is in the  
3 forefront of responding to it of course is going to do  
4 its best to rise to that challenge, and that's what the  
5 DHSC did. Did everything go right? Of course it  
6 didn't. And you wouldn't expect it to.

7 It is natural for the centre, the Cabinet Office, to  
8 be sceptical of departments. That's what -- I was the  
9 Cabinet Office minister, as you've noted. The culture  
10 of the Cabinet Office is to be sceptical of the  
11 operation of departments, partly to hold them to  
12 account.

13 I think that the toxic culture that you've seen at  
14 the centre of government, that's been the subject of  
15 much discussion, was unhelpful in assuming that when  
16 anything was difficult or a challenge, therefore there  
17 was somehow fault and blame. That was -- that is a part  
18 of a toxic culture that we've seen, and is -- and some  
19 of these exhibits that you've just shown demonstrate  
20 a lack of generosity or empathy in understanding the  
21 difficulty of rising to such a big challenge.

22 So did the DHSC need to expand and grow? Of course.  
23 Did it get everything right? No, of course not. There  
24 were -- no doubt we'll go into individual challenges.  
25 But did it rise to the challenge overall of responding

9

1 But it was -- I had to commission the work to get that  
2 going, from the Health Department.

3 Similarly, the view over whether or not to close  
4 schools ended up -- and the NPIs -- ended up within the  
5 Health Department early on. Now, that was taken back to  
6 the CTF, back into the Cabinet Office, and rightly so.

7 So the department, yes, had a huge amount to do, but  
8 I would argue that because the rest of Whitehall was  
9 slow getting going, we had to get up there and do it.  
10 And if that led to criticisms from those in the centre  
11 of government, then, you know, frankly, I'd far rather  
12 that we did step up and take that responsibility, even  
13 though it brought us flak later and evidently flak at  
14 the time that I wasn't aware of, because these issues  
15 were never raised with me personally.

16 **Q.** Scepticism. Is that a reference to -- you know very  
17 well that we're coming to this a little later -- the  
18 notion that individuals in central government were  
19 critical of your department, because they had taken agin  
20 you, they were tarring your department with the same  
21 brush as they were you, that there was a campaign, if  
22 you like, of spite and aggression against you and your  
23 department; is that what you're suggesting by the notion  
24 that there was scepticism towards the DHSC?

25 **A.** Well, there is healthy scepticism of the centre of

11

1 to the biggest public health crisis in a century?

2 I think it did -- if you look at the successes, for  
3 instance: on the growth of testing, once the department  
4 took that over, getting the vaccine roll-out up and  
5 running, various other projects.

6 So, you know, we can go through all of the detail.  
7 In terms of lessons learned, we need to -- what is  
8 crucial is that any department in future is ready to go.

9 And I make one final point, if I may, which is  
10 relevant to your question. At the start of the  
11 pandemic, the department, including me, was trying to  
12 wake up Whitehall to this threat, and early on the  
13 department ended up doing things which really aren't for  
14 a Health Department, but we were doing them because  
15 nobody else was.

16 **Q.** Could you give us one or two examples.

17 **A.** I'll give you one example, the -- shielding the  
18 vulnerable is a programme that eventually was run very,  
19 very well by Chris Townsend, who was brought in from  
20 outside, and MHCLG, departmentally. It was about how to  
21 get groceries to people, how to make sure that people  
22 got support, including from volunteers, how to make sure  
23 we looked after those who were the most vulnerable.  
24 That is clearly a cross-government effort and rightly  
25 led from a department that isn't the Health Department.

10

1 government of departments in which they challenge, hold  
2 to account and generally try to keep departments moving  
3 forward, you know, and I've been -- I, as  
4 a Cabinet Office minister, one of my roles was to make  
5 sure departments were delivering on what they'd said  
6 that they would deliver.

7 We've seen from the emails that I wasn't -- and the  
8 messages I wasn't aware of at the time, that clearly  
9 flipped over into an unhealthy toxic culture at the  
10 centre, where any -- anything that went wrong was seen  
11 as an almost intentional failure, and worse, that  
12 amongst some people misinformation about what the  
13 department was delivering was spread, including to the  
14 Prime Minister and at the very highest levels.

15 So a healthy culture involves challenge and  
16 scepticism, an unhealthy toxic culture involves  
17 a failure properly to engage and, instead, throwing of  
18 false allegations and extremely unpleasant language.

19 What you'll notice when you go through all of the  
20 documents is you just didn't have that within the Health  
21 family. I tried to lead a -- you know, a positive  
22 culture, a can-do culture, where if you -- if there was  
23 a problem, the question raised in the department was:  
24 how do we fix this? That didn't happen all the time, of  
25 course there were moments of frustration, but that was

12

1 my overall attitude in this -- areas I led, and you can  
2 see, unfortunately, that we rubbed up against this deep  
3 unpleasantness at the centre.

4 **Q.** If I may say so, you're doing extremely well,  
5 Mr Hancock, in terms of the speed of your response;  
6 could you, however, try to be a little bit more concise  
7 in your answers?

8 **A.** I will.

9 **Q.** I asked you deliberately to give the Inquiry some  
10 examples of where you feel the DHSC had excelled, and  
11 you've referred to testing, and you've referred to  
12 testing and you've referred to the vaccination  
13 programme, and also to shielding. The testing, it is  
14 self-evident, was a process that was under way and  
15 a great deal of time and energy was devoted to it  
16 throughout 2020 but it really only reached its fruition  
17 later in the year.

18 **A.** Yeah.

19 **Q.** Vaccination obviously was a matter only from 2021,  
20 largely --

21 **A.** No, the work on vaccination started in January 2020, and  
22 the DHSC of course --

23 **Q.** Mr Hancock, will you please wait for the question.

24 The vaccination programme was rolled out, of course,  
25 in 2021, and it's obvious that work was done on

13

1 the material.

2 Does that not all rather suggest that in those vital  
3 days of January through to March, the DHSC failed to  
4 tell central government how bad it was and what could be  
5 done to address the question of infection control?

6 **A.** No, that's completely the wrong way round. From the  
7 middle of January, we were trying to effectively raise  
8 the alarm. We were trying to wake up Whitehall to the  
9 scale of the problem. And this was a problem that  
10 couldn't be addressed only from the Health Department.  
11 Non-pharmaceutical interventions cannot be put in place  
12 by a health department, a health department cannot shut  
13 schools. It should have been grasped and led from the  
14 centre of government earlier. And you've seen evidence  
15 that repeatedly the department, across the department,  
16 and I tried to make this happen, and we were on  
17 occasions blocked and at other times I would say we  
18 were ... we were -- our concerns were not taken as  
19 seriously as they should have been, until the very end  
20 of February.

21 So, for instance, the very first time I tried to  
22 call a COBR, I was blocked, ultimately only for  
23 48 hours, because I then went to get other voices to  
24 call for a COBR, and it happened. And getting the  
25 machine at the centre of government up and running was

15

1 commissioning it and funding it and so on in advance.

2 That's self-evident. But the shielding programme was  
3 a cross-government exercise, led both by the DHSC and  
4 the General Public Sector Ministerial Implementation  
5 Group, latterly.

6 But in the early part of the year, so we're focusing  
7 of course in this module particularly on January,  
8 February, March, April, evidence has been given that the  
9 DHSC focused too much on itself and on the acute health  
10 system, NHS, as opposed to the wider long-term health of  
11 the public. By that, I mean a reference to -- and the  
12 witness meant a reference to -- health control, to  
13 infection control, to the core issue in the first part  
14 of the year of dealing with the spread of the virus.

15 Do you think that the DHSC on this crucial issue of  
16 infection control, of dealing with that part of the  
17 public health crisis, was up to the mark?

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** Now, in Sir Patrick Vallance's records, and in the  
20 evidence of Helen MacNamara, there are repeated  
21 references to how, in February and March, you were  
22 "desperate to own & lead", that you kept too much in the  
23 DHSC, that you were reluctant to explain that there was  
24 a risk of the NHS becoming overwhelmed, and you were bad  
25 at asking the Cabinet Office for help. You're aware of

14

1 incredibly hard and took a huge amount of effort. When  
2 it did finally get up and running at the end of  
3 February, then things started to move.

4 The -- and so I've heard these accusations that we  
5 tried to do too much. On the contrary, there was so  
6 much that needed to be done, and in some cases we just  
7 had to get on and do it. It would have been far better  
8 than if, instead of thinking that we were overreacting,  
9 as the COBR machine clearly thought we were, if they had  
10 embraced the challenges and it had been led from the  
11 centre.

12 If I think to -- you know, had there been -- under  
13 another regime, under another Cabinet Secretary,  
14 you know, I was -- I had been -- I was a minister under  
15 David Cameron, under Theresa May, if -- you know, the  
16 centre would have chaired those early COBRs. Yes, of  
17 course I, as Secretary of State, would have played a big  
18 part, but it would have been a cross-government effort,  
19 and in future that's what it -- that's what it should  
20 be. The lead government department model works very  
21 well for small crises, for medium-sized crises, but it  
22 does not work for a crisis that is  
23 a whole-of-government, indeed a whole-of-society crisis.

24 **Q.** We'll come back to COBR, and you're aware of course that  
25 I'll be asking you about particular COBR meetings.

16

1 You've given an example there of COBR, and you've  
2 put it in the context of the difficulties in getting the  
3 government machine going until the end of February.

4 **A.** Yes, at the centre. The department was working  
5 full-time on this from the middle of January.

6 **Q.** If it was hard to get the government machine going, and  
7 you've referred to the effort required and the  
8 difficulties that you encountered, may we take it from  
9 that that the system took time to be geared up at the  
10 centre of government?

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** Presumably there was an avoidable delay, therefore,  
13 baked into this governmental system. If it took time to  
14 get it going to react appropriately and sufficiently,  
15 then time would have been lost?

16 **A.** Well, to be fair, the early actions that were needed  
17 were essentially Health Department and Health -- the  
18 Health family actions: developing the early test, making  
19 sure that we supported the universities who were  
20 developing the vaccines, the very early contact tracing,  
21 the responses to the individual cases. You know, the  
22 first cases didn't come to the UK until the very end of  
23 January, start of February, and so the early actions  
24 were for the department. So I thought it was  
25 reasonable, for instance, the very first COBR that

17

1 symbolically very important, when the Chancellor of the  
2 Duchy of Lancaster got stuck in -- and you heard from  
3 him how he came to a COBR, was alarmed, asked some very  
4 good questions, followed that up with me, and from --  
5 and you might think that I was unhappy to receive that  
6 email and those questions. On the contrary, I was  
7 delighted, and he -- and after a discussion about where  
8 we were up to, he became a very, very strong ally in  
9 driving action all the way through the crisis. So from  
10 early March it shifted and it became a whole-government  
11 effort.

12 Of course in March/April the department continued to  
13 have to do much, much, much more, and increasing  
14 amounts, and so we were -- we were under enormous  
15 pressure and enormous stress. We brought in more  
16 resources, basically from wherever we could find them,  
17 and did everything that we could. But it was --  
18 you know, that ramp-up was extremely difficult.

19 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Hancock, I'm sorry to interrupt, could  
20 I just ask you to rewind, I didn't realise Mr Keith was  
21 moving on.

22 Going back to the time before the end of February,  
23 and I appreciate that you say central government should  
24 have got involved earlier, apart from the fact that  
25 other government departments would have done some of the

19

1 I should chair it. But there was a point when we needed  
2 to go broader than things that ought to be the remit of  
3 the department. My argument, my point in response to  
4 these allegations that we held too much within the  
5 department or that we didn't get on with stuff is: we --  
6 and we were -- somebody's accused the department of  
7 being overwhelmed. Well, we were certainly whelmed, we  
8 were certainly very, very busy, and we were having to do  
9 things that in future ought to be done by other  
10 departments or at the centre, because it should have  
11 been a whole-government response earlier. That's my --  
12 that's my reflection.

13 **Q.** What about after the end of February, so March and  
14 April --

15 **A.** Yeah.

16 **Q.** -- as the cross-government machine ramps up --

17 **A.** Yeah.

18 **Q.** -- as the scale of the crisis is finally understood and  
19 steps had to be taken, to what extent had the DHSC got  
20 on top of co-ordinating or promoting or suggesting the  
21 sorts of countermeasures and infection control measures  
22 that ultimately were at the heart of the government's  
23 response?

24 **A.** Well, so by -- from the end of February, when the  
25 Prime Minister took the chair at COBR, which was

18

1 work that you felt your department had to, was anything  
2 not done? I appreciate you shouldn't have been doing  
3 it, you say, but was anything not done because central  
4 government wasn't involved earlier?

5 **A.** Well, I think that for the future the plans for what  
6 NPIs to put in place, for instance, that isn't a Health  
7 Department thing. And once we got the structures  
8 properly set up, it wasn't a Health Department thing, it  
9 was a Cabinet Office thing, quite rightly.

10 So it was -- it was in mid to late February that the  
11 SAGE system got going on designing NPIs, and we also did  
12 some work on that in the department, especially in the  
13 area of the legals that were needed.

14 That sort of work, you know, hopefully for next time  
15 will already be on the books. You know, we should  
16 already have published legal draft legislation --  
17 published draft legislation that is ready in case it  
18 needs to be enacted.

19 Back then we had, thankfully, thanks to the  
20 preparation work, one of the areas of preparation work  
21 that went well, we had a draft Bill. In future that  
22 should already be published and scrutinised.

23 So there's two examples, the legals and the NPI.

24 **MR KEITH:** May we presume that, and you've just said, it was  
25 an incredibly difficult task faced by the DHSC --

20

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. -- but by the beginning of March, as you were grappling  
3 with the emerging scientific advice as to the state of  
4 the transmission of the outbreak, how far it had got, to  
5 what extent it had become sustained within the community  
6 in the United Kingdom --

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. -- dealing with the absence of plans and, as you say in  
9 your book, having to formulate a battleplan, having to  
10 consider for the first time in 100 years some of these  
11 extraordinary stringent countermeasures, the DHSC must  
12 have been under very considerable stress? I mean, this  
13 was not an obligation that you sought, you were a lead  
14 government department responding to a whole-government  
15 crisis, a whole-nation crisis.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Was the DHSC under stress? Was it in difficulties at  
18 the beginning of March?

19 A. We were under enormous stress, we were working  
20 incredibly hard, yes.

21 Q. Could we have INQ000129226, please, which is a text from  
22 yourself to Boris Johnson on 7 March, page 2. He asks  
23 you:  
24 "Anything I can do to help?"  
25 And:

21

1 should have a whole "national effort". So that pretty  
2 much covers all bases.

3 Q. Mr Hancock, you're aware that the very senior civil  
4 servant, Helen MacNamara, who was at one stage Deputy  
5 Cabinet Secretary, described you in evidence as having  
6 "nuclear levels of confidence", which she thought was  
7 a problem. Do you reject the notion that in your  
8 dealings with your colleagues, in terms of the  
9 impression that you gave, you were overconfident in  
10 presenting the undoubtedly extraordinarily difficult  
11 issues that your department faced?

12 A. It depends who with. I had enormous doubts at this  
13 point. I would ask people I trusted for advice, I had  
14 long discussions with, for instance, Chris Wormald,  
15 Chris Whitty, about how we were responding. We were --  
16 in a trusted environment we were self-critical about how  
17 we were responding. That's only natural, because we  
18 could see what was happening, and we could see that we  
19 were in the middle of something that hadn't happened for  
20 decades and it was on our watch, so to speak.

21 It's also -- I also thought it was necessary, and  
22 I can understand how some people will have interpreted  
23 the way that I now know that they did, although I didn't  
24 know this at the time because nobody raised any of these  
25 issues with me at the time, I can now -- I can see how,

23

1 "You are doing great keep going."  
2 And you say:  
3 "Kind of you to say. It's not easy. You are doing  
4 great too. Follow the science!"  
5 And you ask for help in relation to -- or you invite  
6 him to start thinking about how he could contribute to  
7 a call for a public effort, a clarion call for  
8 hand washing and "helping old folks if they have to stay  
9 home".  
10 "It's a great unifying clarion call for you to lead  
11 when the time is right."  
12 Was that not an opportunity for you to say to the  
13 Prime Minister, "Well, we absolutely have to get on top  
14 of the very real difficulties with the absence of real  
15 plans for infection control with the development,  
16 implementation of countermeasures, with the incredibly  
17 difficult issue of funding and planning for vaccines,  
18 shielding", all the other areas that your department was  
19 grappling with?

20 A. By this point the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office  
21 machine and Number 10 were wholly engaged. The  
22 Prime Minister, I think, chaired the first COBR on  
23 2 March, and so we'd had almost a week of me being able  
24 to say all of that. So I think this was a ... you know,  
25 he asked, "Anything I can do to help?" and I said we

22

1 you know, my sense of needing to keep driving the system  
2 forward might have had this impact on some people who --  
3 especially those who were more sceptical of the need of  
4 the government to act, frankly. We have seen some of  
5 the evidence that the same people who were accusing me  
6 of overconfidence, at the same time were trying -- were  
7 blocking the action that I was saying we needed.

8 And so you can -- I can now see the dynamics of, if  
9 they were against action being taken, and I was going in  
10 and saying, "We absolutely must do this" -- and I --  
11 you know, there was a huge amount of uncertainty, and  
12 a huge amount of worry, and I basically felt it was my  
13 professional duty to try to keep going, to keep driving  
14 forward.

15 Q. Who was against action being taken?

16 A. Well, we've -- I don't want to point fingers, because  
17 everybody was doing their best --

18 Q. Which government department significantly was against  
19 action being taken?

20 A. Well, for instance, the reluctance to get the COBR  
21 machine going. We've seen some of the evidence of  
22 certain individuals thinking that we were overreacting  
23 or the world had gone mad. There was a delay,  
24 an inexplicable delay at the centre to the publication  
25 of the action plan, which came on the 3rd, and we've

24

1 seen some evidence of why that happened.  
 2 So, look, there's various examples of it, but  
 3 I basically felt that I had to drive this thing forward,  
 4 and I felt that sense of responsibility. Of course --  
 5 and, you know, of course I understand that now some  
 6 people, you know, reacted in the way that they did, but  
 7 it was -- but it was a time of enormous uncertainty and  
 8 a time when I just felt we needed to keep driving the  
 9 system forward.

10 **Q.** We will look at some of the areas, indeed in fact all  
 11 the areas that you've identified, Mr Hancock, where  
 12 there may have been evidence of the government machine  
 13 being delayed or of action not being taken when it could  
 14 reasonably have been taken.

15 May the Inquiry presume and conclude from what  
 16 you've said about the difficulties in getting the  
 17 government machine going that there were these instances  
 18 of people pushing back or not doing perhaps what they  
 19 should have done, that by and large there was overall,  
 20 therefore, an avoidable delay --

21 **A.** Well -- sorry.

22 **Q.** -- between the beginning of February, and we'll look now  
 23 at the material that was available to you and to the  
 24 machine, and the lockdown decision of 23 March. It just  
 25 didn't have to have been that long?

25

1 **Q.** You have described, Mr Hancock, how you saw the  
 2 government machine trying to ramp itself up. You could  
 3 see the difficulties that, on your evidence, the  
 4 department and yourself encountered. You've given  
 5 evidence about the instances in which people pushed  
 6 back, or where there may have been a failure to act  
 7 reasonably speedily. So you must have been aware -- you  
 8 were the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care,  
 9 that things were not being progressed as you, in your  
 10 own words, would have wished, so you must have been  
 11 aware of the delay?

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** I don't -- the Inquiry has no interest in you trying  
 14 to -- and rightly so -- not identify individuals to  
 15 blame. But you must have been aware that  
 16 cross-government, systemically, the United Kingdom  
 17 Government was failing to respond sufficiently speedily  
 18 and well in this crisis. It's not a matter of  
 19 hindsight; you could see it happening at the time?

20 **A.** Well, I found frustrations in areas I wanted to put --  
 21 push forward at the time. The evidence I'm giving is  
 22 that now having seen it from the inside, in many cases  
 23 people had reasonable arguments for why they were doing  
 24 that. They were behaving professionally. There was  
 25 of course also this very unpleasant toxic culture, but

27

1 **A.** Can I answer that question contemporaneously and then  
 2 with hindsight? Contemporaneously, people were doing  
 3 their jobs to the best of their ability. The  
 4 Cabinet Secretary had a reason for not wanting to call  
 5 a COBR unnecessarily, and it took 48 hours to persuade  
 6 him, and that was because he thought they were overused  
 7 previously, he was worried that it was for use for  
 8 communications purposes. I did not want it for  
 9 communications purposes, I wanted it for substantive  
 10 reasons: to get the government machine moving.

11 There was -- people had good reasons at the time,  
 12 and maybe because they weren't faced, like I was, with  
 13 this -- with the daily evidence of this growing crisis,  
 14 they simply didn't cotton on to the fact that this  
 15 enormous wave was coming.

16 So I don't think it's fair to criticise people for  
 17 making professional judgements at the time.

18 With hindsight, knowing what we know now, it's  
 19 obvious to everybody that there should have been  
 20 a whole-of-government response from earlier, but you've  
 21 got to remember the fog of uncertainty and the lack of  
 22 data. You know, there weren't cases in the UK till the  
 23 end of January. The first death in the UK, very sadly,  
 24 in the UK, was on 1 March, so this was -- this was very,  
 25 very early on.

26

1 I think that became a problem later rather than early  
 2 on. I think it was just reasonable people doing their  
 3 jobs, saying, "Really?" You know, there are known costs  
 4 to the things that I was trying to do and unknown  
 5 benefits, because at this point it might still have all  
 6 been contained within China. So people saying, "Are you  
 7 sure you want to do this? Do we really want to tell the  
 8 public we might shut down whole cities?" Well, yes,  
 9 I did want to do that. But I can understand -- so I'm just  
 10 trying to empathise with why people reacted the way that  
 11 they did at the time.

12 **Q.** Now, you've mentioned plans, and the lack of planning is  
 13 an important part of the Inquiry's examination of this  
 14 area. In your statement, and you've acknowledged it  
 15 already, you observe that:

16 "There was no book or report to pull off a shelf to  
 17 tell us how to handle a pandemic ..."

18 In a WhatsApp message from you to Mr Cummings on  
 19 12 March -- could we have INQ000048313, page 68 -- in  
 20 the context, Mr Hancock, to put this in its correct  
 21 context:

22 "Watching question time we need to up a gear on  
 23 winning the public argument ..."

24 So it's in the context of the debate that was then  
 25 rumbling on --

28

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. -- in fact, about reasonable worst-case scenario,  
3 herd immunity, behavioural fatigue and so on and so  
4 forth.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. You say:  
7 "... we are better prepared than other countries."  
8 By 12 March, you were surely aware that we were not  
9 better prepared than other countries? There was -- and  
10 you've acknowledged it already -- a complete  
11 understanding that there was no scaled-up test, trace,  
12 isolate -- contact, isolate system beyond the first few  
13 index -- first few hundred cases. There was no  
14 effective means of infection control, there was no  
15 border plans or quarantine system in place. You knew  
16 there was sustained community transmission in the  
17 United Kingdom by this date and you knew that the  
18 infection fatality rate was 1%, 1% of all infected  
19 people would die.

20 Why did you say we were better prepared than other  
21 countries?

22 A. Well, I think there's two ways to answer that question.  
23 The first is this is about a communications question,  
24 and 12 March was -- this was the end of the period in  
25 which we were concerned about the timing of lockdown and

29

1 Q. But your evidence so far, Mr Hancock, has been very much  
2 to the effect that the DHSC was a siren voice calling  
3 for more to be done, for trying to push the government  
4 machine on. But by 12 March, as you knew very well, the  
5 United Kingdom Government had reached the end, even by  
6 that late stage, of the containment phase of the  
7 strategy. The virus was rife. Should you not have been  
8 taking this opportunity to tell your colleagues in  
9 government, telling the public, telling the citizens of  
10 this nation, "This wall of death is coming and we have  
11 no effective means to deal with it other than to impose  
12 infection control measures urgently and significantly"?

13 A. Well, in my public communications you will know that  
14 I had at that point been explaining that we might have  
15 to do that, yes. The -- but I'm also a team player and  
16 the government position was "not yet", so this was  
17 a message about how to best explain the government  
18 position of "not yet". But, as I say, the position of  
19 "not yet" was running to the end of its road and it was  
20 on the very next day that I first told the  
21 Prime Minister that I thought that we needed to lock  
22 down.

23 Q. Was that 13 March?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. It's not in your diary, so-called, I should say,

31

1 making sure that we didn't go too early, and the --  
2 I changed my view on that on the 13th.

3 Q. Can I -- I don't wish to be impolite -- just interrupt  
4 you there to say: is that a reference to the debate  
5 which rumbled on, in fact for quite some time, about the  
6 risk of going too early --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- in terms of any countermeasures that might be --

9 A. Yes, and for instance, I look back on the interview  
10 I gave on Sunday morning of 1 March, when I said  
11 of course there's a risk of going too early, and the  
12 interviewer said, "Yes, well, of course, we all  
13 understand that". So this was a widely shared belief  
14 that in hindsight was wrong, because our doctrine was  
15 wrong, as we discussed in the first module.

16 So this is a comms recommendation to the guy  
17 responsible for comms in Number 10. As it happened,  
18 what I think this actually shows is the end of the road  
19 for this argument, this argument that we didn't need to  
20 move, we should wait, it was better to wait. This  
21 argument came to its end essentially at this point.

22 Q. The point about it being a communications debate is well  
23 made. You're obviously being asked in the context of  
24 watching Question Time.

25 A. Yeah.

30

1 Mr Hancock. The entry for 13 March makes no reference  
2 to you telling the Prime Minister this vital piece of  
3 information, that he should lock down immediately.  
4 There is a whole page on how you woke up for the dawn  
5 flight to Belfast in Edinburgh Airport.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. There was from the Prime Ministerial meeting,  
8 Prime Ministerial papers, a video call at 9.30 that  
9 morning, and according to your book, you say:  
10 "I called the Prime Minister and told him we'd have  
11 to do some very rapid back-peddalling on the issue of  
12 herd immunity" --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. -- "then rang Patrick, who promised to do his best to  
15 repair the damage."

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. You then met with a First Minister in Belfast, you then  
18 went to Cardiff and so on.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Telling the Prime Minister of this country for the first  
21 time that he had to call an immediate lockdown is surely  
22 worthy of some recollection, is it not?

23 A. I didn't have full access to my papers for writing of  
24 that, and this came to light in looking -- in  
25 researching the papers ahead of this Inquiry. This is

32

1 after all the formal public inquiry.  
 2 What then happened is -- that was on the 13th, which  
 3 was the Friday -- on the 14th we then had the -- we had  
 4 formal meetings in the Cabinet Room on this subject, and  
 5 I again made my views very clear.

6 But if you think -- you know, this shift from "we  
 7 should wait because we've got to get the timing right"  
 8 to "we must act now" happened -- happened quickly. So,  
 9 for instance, on 13 March, there was a G7 call with  
 10 my -- and I was very struck especially by my Italian  
 11 opposite number because they had put in place the  
 12 lockdown across the whole of Italy by then, and he was  
 13 describing where they were up to, and it was ... it was  
 14 harrowing.

15 **Q.** Forgive me. Your book says:  
 16 "The account that follows has been meticulously  
 17 pieced together from my formal papers, notes, voice  
 18 memos, my communications, WhatsApps [we know from the  
 19 press] ..."

20 And it records, in 555 pages, all the relevant  
 21 important events, as you saw it, concerning the  
 22 coronaviral response. But there is no reference to you  
 23 telling the Prime Minister to call for an immediate  
 24 lockdown on 13 March, and you know that there are no  
 25 notes and no emails in the Inquiry's possession, because

33

1 prepped and refreshed".

2 **A.** Yeah.

3 **Q.** So just pausing there, that may give the impression that  
 4 whatever plans they were and whatever -- however  
 5 deficient or effective they were, they had been  
 6 recently -- because of the word "refreshed" -- prepped  
 7 and brought up to date?

8 **A.** Yeah.

9 **Q.** Very fairly you accept in your book --

10 **A.** Yeah.

11 **Q.** -- and in your statement that the only plan that there  
 12 was was a strategy plan from 2011 -- in the field of  
 13 central government response to a pandemic. Not NHS  
 14 surge capacity or beds but the central government  
 15 response to a pandemic. There was the 2011 strategy.

16 **A.** Yeah.

17 **Q.** A single document based doctrinally on a completely  
 18 inappropriate approach.

19 **A.** Yeah. This is what I thought at the time, as you can  
 20 see.

21 **Q.** But who told you that?

22 **A.** Public Health England, the World Health Organisation --

23 **Q.** Sorry, just pause there. The World Health  
 24 Organisation --

25 **A.** Yes.

35

1 we've given them to you, that record that conversation.

2 So I am required to ask you: how sure are you that  
 3 you told the Prime Minister that he had to call for  
 4 an immediate lockdown in a call on 13 March?

5 **A.** I can remember it, and it -- it came to light in looking  
 6 forward to this Inquiry. And what's more, the  
 7 corroborating evidence, if you like, is that it  
 8 happened -- is that on the -- it is recorded that on  
 9 the 14th, which was the Saturday, there was a --  
 10 significant discussions in Number 10 at which I made  
 11 this case again.

12 **Q.** All right.

13 Could we have INQ000048313, page 5, please, on the  
 14 screen.

15 This is a WhatsApp message between you and  
 16 Mr Cummings, a bit earlier, Mr Hancock --

17 **A.** Yeah.

18 **Q.** -- on 23 January. Evidence has been given to this  
 19 Inquiry by Mr Cummings that he WhatsApped you, as we can  
 20 see there, to ask you:

21 "To what extent have you investigated preparations  
 22 for something terrible like Ebola or flu pandemic?"

23 "Yes [you say]. We have full plans" --

24 **A.** Yeah.

25 **Q.** -- plural, "up to & including pandemic levels regularly

34

1 **Q.** -- doesn't, of course, hold the book for the  
 2 United Kingdom plans --

3 **A.** No, but it has -- it did analysis on which countries  
 4 were the best prepared, and we were the second overall.  
 5 So all I can tell you is what I thought at the time.  
 6 It's not what I think now.

7 **Q.** You wouldn't, as the Secretary of State, have phoned up  
 8 the World Health Organisation and said, "What are our  
 9 plans?" You would have made inquiries in your  
 10 department?

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** When you made those inquiries, "What plans are  
 13 there?" --

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** -- what information, what description of those plans  
 16 were you given?

17 **A.** Well, it was essentially the output of the Cygnus  
 18 exercise, the fact that we had legislative plans  
 19 available if necessary, we had both the legislative  
 20 vehicle of the 1984 Public Health Act and we had the  
 21 draft Bill, which by then I will have known about. We  
 22 had plans to get testing up and running within PHE.  
 23 Now, that obviously happened far too slowly thereafter,  
 24 but remember at this point PHE had performed extremely  
 25 well in the early couple of weeks of the pandemic by

36

1 developing a test within three days of receiving the  
2 data from China. We had by then in the department  
3 already discussed the vaccine, and we knew that we had  
4 a vaccine platform, that had been funded in order to  
5 respond to Ebola, that had the potential to be used in  
6 response to this new virus, at Oxford University.

7 So with hindsight, it would have been far better if  
8 I'd said, "I do know about this, I really need your  
9 help, the plans that we've got aren't up to it", but  
10 that wasn't what I -- it wasn't what I thought, what  
11 I was being told at the time.

12 **Q.** You're the Secretary of State for Health and Social  
13 Care --

14 **A.** Yeah.

15 **Q.** -- the country is facing an unknown but extremely  
16 serious pathogenic outbreak on 23 January, nobody knows  
17 how far it's going to spread at that stage, but you  
18 plainly need to know what the plans are. My question  
19 was put to you to elicit what your understanding was  
20 from your staff and your advisers and your officials of  
21 the government's central infection control plans.

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** Prosaically: do we shut schools?

24 **A.** Yes.

25 **Q.** Do we quarantine people? Do we have hand washing? Do

37

1 question, the premise of the question was wrong.

2 The reason that I held this confident view at that  
3 point is because, for instance, the Global Health  
4 Security Index, in 2019, said that we were the second  
5 best country prepared in the world, after the US, and  
6 that we were the best in the world in the subcategory of  
7 rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of  
8 an epidemic. The WHO said:

9 "The UK remains amongst the leaders worldwide in  
10 preparing for a pandemic."

11 This all turned out not to be true, but it is what  
12 I was being told at the time.

13 **Q.** All right.

14 On 6 February 2020, there was a Cabinet meeting,  
15 Mr Hancock. INQ000056137, page 6:

16 "Concluding, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH AND  
17 SOCIAL CARE said that he was grateful for the support of  
18 his Ministerial colleagues ... There were two cases in  
19 the UK ..."

20 They were, of course, as you've correctly  
21 identified, on 30 and 31 January.

22 "... and there would almost certainly be more. The  
23 approach to tackling the virus in the [United Kingdom]  
24 to date had been medic-led."

25 The central point, according to these minutes,

39

1 we self-isolate? If so, for how long and whether -- is  
2 it individually or is it for a household? Those sorts  
3 of issues. So not pandemic Bill proposals --

4 **A.** Why not? It's important as well.

5 **Q.** Mr Hancock, because that is not the question I've asked  
6 you. I want to know about what your understanding was  
7 of the state of play of the countermeasures, that's to  
8 say the infection control measures. Not vaccine  
9 proposals or Cygnus reports, which didn't deal,  
10 of course, with countermeasures or legislative  
11 proposals, but prosaically: how, as a country, are we  
12 going to stop the virus from spreading if it comes?

13 **A.** There's a number of things in your question I need to  
14 correct. Cygnus was involved with legislative  
15 proposals --

16 **Q.** I suggested it wasn't involved with proposals for  
17 countermeasures. It didn't propose particular  
18 countermeasures in its recommendations.

19 **A.** Cygnus was, contrary to your initial question, involved  
20 in legislative proposals. Furthermore, legislative  
21 proposals are countermeasures, because you can't isolate  
22 people against their will without legislation. So this  
23 attempt in the questioning to split off different parts  
24 of the overall response is false. That's what -- that's  
25 why I'm responding in the way that I am to your

38

1 Mr Hancock, that you then make, is "that the Government  
2 had a plan to deal with this illness".

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** You didn't in fact, within the Department of Health and  
5 Social Care, commission, until 10 February, the plan --  
6 the battleplan, as you describe it in your statement, or  
7 the action plan, as it was published on 3 March, and  
8 therefore what plan was it that you were referring your  
9 Cabinet colleagues to, to deal with the illness?

10 **A.** Well, firstly, we had the pandemic flu strategy set out  
11 in 2011, but by this point we had a whole series of  
12 different plans for expanding different areas.

13 So we had a plan for the expansion of testing within  
14 PHE. Now, that plan did not go fast enough and I had to  
15 take the -- I had to take serious action to change that  
16 in the middle of March.

17 We had a plan for the development of a vaccine, and  
18 we'd already put extra funds into the development of  
19 a vaccine by this point.

20 We had a whole series of plans.

21 In a number of questions you've said there was  
22 an absence of a plan. That is not true. There was  
23 a plan. In fact, there was a plan with detail on  
24 a whole different series of areas. My critique of the  
25 plan is that it was not an adequate plan, in doctrine or

40

1 in level of detail, and it's absolutely incumbent on  
2 this Inquiry to get to the substance of what the future  
3 plan should be, and it's that substance that really  
4 matters. So we had a plan, it was guided by the  
5 science.

6 By this point, I was much more worried than on  
7 23 January. The -- and, really, it was over the last  
8 week of January that my worry levels changed  
9 categorically because we saw the reasonable worst-case  
10 scenario and I remember that meeting very vividly, that  
11 was at the end of January. You'll also notice in here  
12 that I said:

13 "[In] The reasonable worst case scenario [we'd] see  
14 almost every government department affected ..."

15 Well, that was an understatement, I shouldn't have  
16 said "almost" -- and that "Colleagues should attend  
17 personally or designate a junior minister" who was  
18 "dedicated" to this task, "dedicated".

19 So this is clearly me saying to the rest of my  
20 Cabinet colleagues "We're all going to have to get stuck  
21 in on this", and yes, we did have a plan. It is  
22 entirely reasonable for me to both explain that we had  
23 a plan, indeed plans, in place, but also critique for  
24 the future where those plans were flawed.

25 **Q.** One further question on this topic, please, Mr Hancock.

41

1 stringent than had been envisaged in the original plan.  
2 **Q.** Could you please just answer the question. Were there,  
3 as far as you understood it, on the advice of your  
4 advisers and your colleagues, plans for countermeasures,  
5 for infection control measures, in existence and told --  
6 informed to the Cabinet in February 2020?

7 **A.** There was a plan, as set out and based on the  
8 2011 pan flu -- pandemic flu plan, updated with the  
9 conclusions of Cygnus, and in Module 1 we discussed at  
10 length the flaws in that plan.

11 The argument there wasn't a plan is false. Indeed,  
12 I've heard a number of Cabinet Office figures argue that  
13 there wasn't a plan. If you look at the 28 February  
14 submission to the Prime Minister by CCS, it sets out  
15 that we have very advanced plans, in fact it is much too  
16 bullish and self-confident, that note, and the idea that  
17 it was wrong to suggest that we had a plan is completely  
18 false.

19 I appreciate that some people in the Cabinet Office  
20 did then later catch up with the seriousness of the  
21 situation and become rather alarmed. I think that their  
22 reaction, when they finally woke up, in some cases was  
23 helpful, because the machine ground into action, in some  
24 cases it was not particularly helpful because it would  
25 have been better if they'd said, "We now realise there

43

1 On 14 February 2020, so a week or so later, we needn't  
2 put the document up, but at page 7 of the Cabinet  
3 minutes or the note of the meeting, again, your Cabinet  
4 colleagues are told the government had a plan --

5 **A.** Yes.

6 **Q.** -- informed by science.

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** Helen MacNamara has given evidence to the effect,  
9 through her witness statement, that time and time again  
10 Cabinet was assured that "We had plans in place". You  
11 have described the vaccine preparation work, what was  
12 done, and we'll come to the detail in due course, what  
13 was done by way of testing. So that we can clearly  
14 understand your response, are you saying that there was,  
15 throughout February, already in place a plan for  
16 countermeasures? That is to say, infection control  
17 measures, the sorts of measures which were ultimately  
18 put into place on 12 March, 16 March, 20 March and  
19 23 March?

20 **A.** I'm so sorry, we didn't put measures into place on  
21 12 March --

22 **Q.** 12 March was the first day on which measures were put  
23 into place, you will recall it was the order for  
24 symptomatic individuals to isolate for seven days.

25 **A.** The measures that were put in place were much more

42

1 is a problem, what have you been doing about it?" as  
2 opposed to -- as opposed to the toxic blame culture that  
3 we've seen and referred to already.

4 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, I'm coming to a completely different  
5 subject. Would you like to have a break then or would  
6 you like me to trundle on?

7 **LADY HALLETT:** I shall return at 11.20.

8 (11.04 am)

(A short break)

9  
10 (11.20 am)

11 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith.

12 **MR KEITH:** Mr Hancock, the different, the new issue is  
13 asymptomatic transmission.

14 **A.** Is it possible to add one small coda to an answer which  
15 I gave just before?

16 **Q.** By all means.

17 **A.** Because you expressed -- you were questioning me about  
18 my call to the Prime Minister on 13 March, and the fact  
19 that this wasn't in my book.

20 Since I wrote that book further evidence has come to  
21 light, because I have been preparing for the Inquiry,  
22 and if you look at INQ000226628, you will, for instance,  
23 see an email from me to the Prime Minister on 13 March  
24 arguing for a suppression strategy and, indeed, making  
25 the case that we should make the argument globally for

44

1 a suppression strategy because of the international  
2 exposure of the UK.  
3 So there is hard evidence that came to light since  
4 I wrote the book which explains why I have been able to  
5 expand further on this period in my testimony.  
6 **Q.** Mr Hancock, the Inquiry is well aware of that email.  
7 There is an email to the Prime Minister and there are  
8 a series of WhatsApps on 13 and 14 March in which you  
9 attempt to corral support for a global strategy of  
10 eradicating the virus.  
11 **A.** Yes.  
12 **Q.** In that email on 13 March, to which you wish us to have  
13 regard, do you use the words "immediate" or "lockdown"?  
14 **A.** I don't have it in front of me.  
15 **Q.** Do you use the words "immediate" or "lockdown"?  
16 **A.** I don't have it in front of me.  
17 **Q.** All right. Asymptomatic transmission.  
18 The great importance of asymptomatic transmission is  
19 that, until you know whether or not transmission is  
20 asymptomatic, you cannot work out from the number of  
21 people who are hospitalised, and from the number of  
22 those persons who are hospitalised who may die, what the  
23 full extent of the viral spread is. Because if you're  
24 asymptomatic, you may transmit the virus without showing  
25 symptoms and therefore it's impossible to know, unless

45

1 **A.** Yeah.  
2 **Q.** "PHE is adamant that a coronavirus can't be passed on,  
3 and that tests don't work on people without symptoms."  
4 On pages 2 to 3 of this document, 27 January:  
5 "I pushed him [that's Professor Sir Chris Whitty] on  
6 my worries about asymptomatic transmission. He said  
7 that the global scientific consensus is still that this  
8 is unlikely. But is 'unlikely' unlikely enough? If you  
9 can get it, pass it on and show no symptoms, it will be  
10 impossible to manage."  
11 **A.** Yes.  
12 **Q.** And on 29 January, page 4 of our document, you say:  
13 "Feeling like a broken record, [you] pushed PHE  
14 about asymptomatic transmission."  
15 **A.** Yes.  
16 **Q.** It is correct to say that in your book, for 3 April, you  
17 note the publication by the World Health Organisation of  
18 a report dated 2 April in which there is reference to  
19 evidence of documented asymptomatic transmission.  
20 **A.** Isn't that a CDC note, not a WHO note?  
21 **Q.** Yes -- in fact there are both, but yes, your book may  
22 refer to the CDC, but the WHO restated the position  
23 two days before on 2 April -- or a day before.  
24 So your regret appears to be that you were told --  
25 and certainly did not understand, because you weren't

47

1 you mass test the whole population, who has got the  
2 virus. So you can't work out what proportion will be  
3 hospitalised, what proportion will die, you can't see  
4 the scale of the problem.  
5 In your witness statement you say:  
6 "My single greatest regret is not pushing harder for  
7 asymptomatic transmission to be the baseline  
8 assumption ..."  
9 You say:  
10 "The global scientific consensus, reflected in the  
11 global scientific advice from the [World Health  
12 Organisation] until April 2020, was that there was no  
13 asymptomatic transmission."  
14 That's what you say in your statement, isn't it?  
15 **A.** Yes.  
16 **Q.** Yes. In your dairies, and we'll just very quickly -- in  
17 your book --  
18 **A.** Yeah.  
19 **Q.** -- page 2, you say, and it's quite difficult to see  
20 the --  
21 **A.** Page 22, I think.  
22 **Q.** No, it's page 2 of our document, Mr Hancock.  
23 **A.** Oh, I see, I understand.  
24 **Q.** We have transcribed the relevant extracts into  
25 a separate document.

46

1 told -- that there was likely to be or there may have  
2 been asymptomatic transmission, at an early enough stage  
3 when it really, really mattered. Is that the nub of it?  
4 **A.** Yes.  
5 **Q.** All right.  
6 There was a meeting on 27 January --  
7 **A.** Yeah.  
8 **Q.** -- INQ000106067, page 1 -- where the Chief Medical  
9 Officer says:  
10 "[The] CMO commented that previously our best  
11 understanding was that the virus was unlikely to  
12 transmit whilst patients were asymptomatic (but this  
13 was/is unable to be definitive). There is still a lack  
14 of clarity over what the Chinese official position is.  
15 CMO would expect that very symptomatic persons would be  
16 more likely to transmit the virus."  
17 Then:  
18 "CMO was confident but could not guarantee that  
19 asymptomatic persons would be less contagious than  
20 heavily symptomatic persons."  
21 If you could just hold that paragraph in your mind,  
22 Mr Hancock, and we'll look at a meeting the next day,  
23 28 January, INQ000233747, page 2, second bullet point:  
24 "CMO commented that today's data appears slightly  
25 less reassuring than yesterdays ... but the positive is

48

1 that there has been no sustained transmission outside of  
2 China. CMO commented that we cannot ... fully  
3 understand whether the measures imposed by China have  
4 had any significant impact in delaying transmission."

5 Then I think if we scroll back out there is then  
6 a reference to Germany. In this long page I'm unlikely  
7 to be able to find it.

8 **A.** "CMO commented that there is now credible evidence of  
9 asymptomatic transmission within Germany ..."

10 **Q.** Thank you very much. It's about a third to half the way  
11 down the page, if we could scroll in on that:

12 "CMO commented that there is now credible evidence  
13 of asymptomatic transmission within Germany ... PHE  
14 reiterated that there is no test for asymptomatic  
15 patients and that this would not be possible without  
16 invasive tests ..."

17 I apologise again to you, Mr Hancock, if you could  
18 bear that document in mind and then we'll look at a SAGE  
19 meeting of 4 February, INQ000051925, page 3,  
20 paragraph 19:

21 "Asymptomatic transmission cannot be ruled out and  
22 transmission from mildly symptomatic individuals is  
23 likely."

24 I'm going to summarise the remainder of the material  
25 bar one. There is a NERVTAG meeting on 21 February,

49

1 **Q.** -- in relation to the virus and its application abroad.

2 So what were you told --

3 **A.** Yeah.

4 **Q.** -- about that degree of difference? Were you told,  
5 "There is no asymptomatic transmission"? Which is what  
6 you appear to have been told.

7 **A.** Yeah.

8 **Q.** Or were you told, "It's very difficult to be sure" --

9 **A.** Yeah.

10 **Q.** -- "there are no certainties in this sphere, but it's  
11 possible" -- and then "likely" -- "to be asymptomatic  
12 transmission"? And of course ultimately, as you know  
13 very well, a precautionary approach is applied: "We  
14 can't take the risk that there isn't, we'd better work  
15 on the premise that there is"?

16 **A.** Yes. So this was --

17 **Q.** I apologise for a very long question.

18 **A.** No, it's an incredibly important subject.

19 This was a deep frustration to me at the time and  
20 is -- as I said, my single greatest regret with  
21 hindsight was not pushing on this harder and ultimately  
22 not overruling the formal scientific advice that I was  
23 receiving.

24 So there's only one thing in your summary that  
25 I would challenge, which is that the WHO statement of

51

1 INQ000119469, page 6, paragraph 3.4, "... the evidence  
2 suggests ...":

3 "[Professor John Edmunds] commented on this after  
4 the meeting taking into account the issue of  
5 asymptomatic cases, where the evidence suggests that 40%  
6 of virologically confirmed cases are asymptomatic."

7 And that is, of course, in the context of the virus  
8 at large but in particular its spread in Singapore,  
9 South Korea and Japan.

10 So that material, together, Mr Hancock, with another  
11 SAGE meeting on 4 February, tends to suggest that what  
12 the issue was, was whether or not there was  
13 a significant level of transmissibility in persons who  
14 were asymptomatic, that is to say showing no symptoms.  
15 Putting it another way, if they're not symptomatic,  
16 they've not showing symptoms, then their  
17 transmissibility, the degree of contagiousness, is  
18 likely to be lower.

19 This material doesn't say, in terms, "There is no  
20 asymptomatic transmission", it simply says -- it  
21 reflects the developing learning: it's not likely. But  
22 it becomes increasingly likely, and indeed by the  
23 NERVTAG meeting on 21 February there was clear material  
24 to suggest there is asymptomatic transmission --

25 **A.** Yes.

50

1 2 April that you referred to in fact said, and I quote:

2 "No documented asymptomatic transmission."

3 It was then on 3 April that the CDC came forward  
4 with a survey which demonstrated, to a point of  
5 scientific clarity, that there was highly likely to be  
6 asymptomatic transmission. And it was that CDC  
7 document, and I remember it very clearly at the time,  
8 that was instrumental in then changing the scientific  
9 evidence that underpinned the policy advice in the UK.

10 So I was aware from very early on of the concerns  
11 that there may be asymptomatic transmission. As you've  
12 noted, I raised the question on 27 January. I also  
13 discussed the question with Jens Spahn, my opposite  
14 number in Germany, to whom I was close. I asked the  
15 Director General of the WHO about the evidence from  
16 China, and he described the Chinese reports, which I'd  
17 seen in newspapers but also came formally through  
18 a diptel, although I don't recall seeing the diptel at  
19 the time, he described those as a translation error, and  
20 I was -- within the UK system they were also described  
21 to me as a translation error.

22 So I was aware of this from January, I understood  
23 the implications of significant asymptomatic  
24 transmission, and my recollection is I kept on pushing  
25 on this question in January and February, especially.

52

1 It became the settled international view that policy  
2 should be based on an assumption of the transmission  
3 mechanism of SARS-CoV-1 -- ie SARS, as it's commonly  
4 known -- because there was not scientifically robust  
5 information to contradict that. And here is an example  
6 of where the scientific method, which I enormously  
7 respect, comes into challenge in a period of enormous  
8 change and uncertainty. Because the scientists, to be  
9 able to base policy on a different assumption, wanted  
10 concrete scientifically credible evidence, and what  
11 I had was essentially anecdotal evidence, and it was  
12 only when the CDC had performed a formal study, which  
13 they published on 3 April, that the scientific  
14 establishment switched position.

15 It's understandable the scientists base their advice  
16 on the scientific method, and so it is a -- it is  
17 a problem, because there were other examples -- without  
18 wishing to go on too long, there are other examples,  
19 like in the discovery of treatments and the ruling out  
20 of treatments, like hydroxychloroquine, where some  
21 countries moved policy ahead of a scientific conclusion  
22 and got it wrong because the science actually -- if you  
23 waited for the scientific method to be applied, you got,  
24 in that case, the answer that hydroxychloroquine didn't  
25 make a difference.

53

- 1 **A.** Yes.  
2 **Q.** The two cannot live together. Either you were told and  
3 you didn't understand -- to the contrary, you were told  
4 there is no asymptomatic transmission, or you were told  
5 of concerns that there may be asymptomatic transmission  
6 and those concerns crystallised over time. Which is it?  
7 **A.** I have explained and I will try to do a better job of  
8 explaining --  
9 **Q.** No, Mr Hancock, please, if you would bear with us, which  
10 of those is the correct position? What was the  
11 understanding? It's one or the other.  
12 **A.** No, it isn't not one or the other, that's what I was  
13 going to explain. Okay? I will give you my evidence of  
14 what I knew at the time and felt at the time and  
15 understood at the time.

16 In late January I became aware of concerns that  
17 there may have been asymptomatic transmission, from  
18 China, from Germany. I challenged the system on whether  
19 there was or not.

20 What came back was that: yes, there was anecdotal  
21 evidence that there may have been asymptomatic  
22 transmission, but that we should not base policy on that  
23 assumption. Instead, the reasonable -- this is what was  
24 said to me -- the reasonable assumption should be made  
25 that Covid transmits as SARS did.

55

1 So the scientific method matters but it delayed the  
2 formal scientific advice telling us that we should base  
3 policy on an assumption that there can be asymptomatic  
4 transmission.

5 I'm sorry, that's a long answer, but it's a very,  
6 very important subject.

7 **Q.** Indeed.

8 My question was framed exclusively about your  
9 understanding.

10 **A.** Yes.

11 **Q.** In your book you repeatedly state you were told that the  
12 coronavirus can't be passed on by somebody without  
13 symptoms.

14 **A.** Yes, and that the previous six coronaviruses known to  
15 infect humans did not transmit asymptotically.

16 **Q.** In evidence, today, you have acknowledged that there  
17 were concerns that there may be asymptomatic  
18 transmission --

19 **A.** Yes, I had --

20 **Q.** -- and -- if you would just allow me.

21 **A.** Sorry.

22 **Q.** And in your statement you say it's your single greatest  
23 regret that you didn't push harder back against the  
24 notion, by implication, that you were told there was no  
25 asymptomatic transmission.

54

1 And if you read, for instance, the 2 April document  
2 on transmission advice and guidance for care homes, in  
3 it PHE explicitly state that policy is based on  
4 an assumption that transmission of Covid follows the  
5 same transmission mechanism as SARS, because there is  
6 not yet enough reliable evidence to update that -- that  
7 assumption. So that is why what you think are two  
8 incompatible statements are both true. We were worried  
9 about the anecdotal evidence, I was worried about it  
10 from January, and there was some evidence of it, often  
11 caveated, often with "unlikely" written by it. But  
12 policy was based on an assumption that Covid transmitted  
13 the same way as SARS, ie no asymptomatic transmission.  
14 That was a source of frustration to me, but I couldn't  
15 get PHE to change it because it was a clinical  
16 scientific decision, and I was the Secretary of State.  
17 The frustration I had is that with hindsight, I should  
18 have simply said, "That may be your scientific evidence  
19 and advice to me, however we shall base policy on  
20 an assumption that there is asymptomatic transmission".  
21 There would have been downsides to that assumption, and  
22 there's reasons that we didn't do that, but essentially  
23 my hunch, which was that there is, I should have used  
24 that to overrule the science. But you can understand  
25 why -- I did that on a couple of occasions, and we can

56

1 go through those if you like, for instance the returners  
 2 from Wuhan which I required to be quarantined when the  
 3 scientific advice was don't quarantine them. But that  
 4 is what explains the apparent incompatibility with the  
 5 statements that you set out, and that is the -- both the  
 6 evidence at the time and how I feel about it now.

7 **Q.** In any event, it was obvious, wasn't it, from the  
 8 lockdown in Italy in the 11 municipalities to which you  
 9 refer in your statement on 21 February --

10 **A.** Yeah.

11 **Q.** -- and the data from the Diamond Princess outbreak, the  
 12 cruise ship on which there were UK nationals, that there  
 13 was actually very significant asymptomatic transmission?  
 14 So would you agree that certainly by those dates,  
 15 22 February, the lockdown in Italy, and the  
 16 Diamond Princess data of mid-February, that there was  
 17 clear asymptomatic transmission?

18 **A.** No. I would -- I would say that with hindsight that is  
 19 now obvious; at the time there was a fog of uncertainty  
 20 over this question, as is -- as is clear in all of the  
 21 documentation that you've cited.

22 **Q.** Your department received reports showing, from the  
 23 Diamond Princess outbreak, that around 18% of the people  
 24 infected onboard that boat -- and it was a closed  
 25 environment, you will recall -- had showed no symptoms.

57

1 clear to the contrary. What I could have done was said,  
 2 "You know, that may be the formal scientific advice,  
 3 I am overruling it and saying, instead we're going to  
 4 assume asymptomatic transmission".

5 That would have had risks on the other side of  
 6 assuming spread where it may have been unlikely to  
 7 happen, and -- but with hindsight, of course, I wish I'd  
 8 done that, hence it is my single biggest regret.

9 But what I'm trying to put --

10 **Q.** Mr Hancock, perfectly understandable you would wish to  
 11 answer at length on this important issue, but could  
 12 I invite you just, please, to stick to the question.

13 **A.** Sure.

14 **Q.** INQ000229430, page 2, is a message between the  
 15 Government Chief Scientific Adviser and the Chief  
 16 Medical Officer on 24 July, where Sir Patrick Vallance  
 17 says:

18 "Why are PM and Matt Hancock saying we didn't know  
 19 about asymptomatic transmission?"

20 **A.** Exactly.

21 **Q.** [Chris Whitty] "I have no idea. We did not know how  
 22 important they were, that is correct. But we were aware  
 23 of the possibility.  
 24 "But it is correct we thought transmission was most  
 25 likely after [symptoms]

59

1 It was in the press, it's referred to in SAGE memoranda.  
 2 It was obvious there was asymptomatic transmission.

3 **A.** So why couldn't I get PHE to change the scientific  
 4 advice to base the assumption of transmission on  
 5 asymptomatic transmission as opposed to symptomatic  
 6 transmission? You can, I think -- I hope you can  
 7 understand how frustrating this was.

8 The answer to that question -- here I'm putting  
 9 myself -- because I was -- you know, I was in the pro,  
 10 "let's worry about asymptomatic transmission", camp.  
 11 The frustration was that the -- understandably, from  
 12 their point of view -- and here I'm putting myself in  
 13 their shoes -- the PHE scientists said, "We have not got  
 14 concrete evidence", the WHO, 2 April, "No documented  
 15 asymptomatic transmission". So the international  
 16 scientific consensus was that there is no documented  
 17 asymptomatic transmission, therefore policy was based on  
 18 the assumption that Covid transmitted as SARS.

19 I had, by this stage, a significant amount of  
 20 anecdotal evidence, and hence -- I've gone over this and  
 21 over this and over this in my mind -- if I had just  
 22 said, "The science is different", that would not have  
 23 carried the system with me, because I'm the  
 24 representative of the people, if you like, I'm -- as the  
 25 Secretary of State, and the scientific advice was very

58

1 "(Like sars)  
 2 [Unknown] "Not by March. I think we were pretty  
 3 clear that we thought there was asymptomatic  
 4 transmission."  
 5 "We will have to put up with quite a bit of this.  
 6 Just as well sage minutes are public domain."  
 7 And that's a reference, Mr Hancock, to the material  
 8 which I've summarised for you.

9 **A.** Do you know who "Unknown" is?

10 **Q.** "Unknown", as I've said, it's Sir Patrick Vallance.

11 **A.** Okay.

12 **Q.** The first entry is Sir Patrick Vallance.  
 13 So would you acknowledge that the Chief Medical  
 14 Officer and the Chief Scientific Adviser are stating  
 15 there that they did know and they told you and the  
 16 Prime Minister about the significance of asymptomatic  
 17 transmission and the degree of it, and they are  
 18 confounded by the notion that you and the Prime Minister  
 19 are now apparently saying you didn't know about it?

20 **A.** We're not apparently saying anything. We are clearly  
 21 stating the position that was put to us as the  
 22 scientific position, based on the global international  
 23 scientific position, which was to base policy on  
 24 an assumption of no asymptomatic transmission as set out  
 25 by PHE.

60

1 That is what is being referred to in the first of  
2 these messages and I -- I assume this is a shorthand  
3 from Patrick Vallance, saying "Why are PM and  
4 Matt Hancock saying we didn't know". What we were  
5 saying -- what we were saying was the error was that the  
6 scientific advice kept -- required -- or formally  
7 advised that policy should be based on an assumption of  
8 no asymptomatic transmission.

9 If -- and the problem here in this exchange is  
10 demonstrated by the words "pretty clear":

11 "... we were pretty clear that we thought ..."

12 Right?

13 If the Government Chief Scientific Adviser knew, as  
14 opposed to was "pretty clear" and "thought", then that  
15 may have changed the UK scientific position. But he  
16 didn't know, as we've seen, there was huge  
17 uncertainty -- I'm not blaming him at all for this --  
18 there was huge uncertainty on this question, and it is  
19 deeply frustrating to me now, and it was deeply  
20 frustrating to me at the time, that being "pretty clear"  
21 was not good enough to change the scientific advice  
22 I was receiving on which to base policy.

23 **Q.** All right.

24 In any event, your witness statement acknowledges  
25 that the importance of this debate is that if you don't

61

1 correct approach? You simply had to plan on the basis  
2 that it was, regardless of how strong the science was.  
3 So did it matter, ultimately, given that you did apply  
4 a precautionary approach?

5 **A.** This question did matter and it is not fair to say that  
6 the scientists knew for sure about this by mid-March.  
7 That's not how they --

8 **Q.** Mr Hancock --

9 **A.** -- that's not how it was represented.

10 **Q.** I've not asked you about that. I've asked you: does it  
11 matter that there was a debate, regardless of whether  
12 you were told or not, about the degree of asymptomatic  
13 transmission if, sensibly, the point was reached that  
14 you just had to plan on the basis that there was and  
15 decide what appropriate countermeasures could be  
16 promulgated and applied?

17 **A.** But that isn't what happened.

18 **Q.** Well, Mr Cummings' evidence to this Inquiry is that by  
19 11 March it was generally understood that a large  
20 percentage was being transmitted asymptotically, and  
21 in any event the planning material, the reasonable  
22 worst-case scenario approach, presumed that there would  
23 be a high degree of asymptomatic transmission. So did  
24 it matter?

25 **A.** Well, not -- that is not accurate -- as much of that

63

1 know the extent of asymptomatic transmission you can't  
2 get a handle on the extent of the virus and therefore  
3 what proportion of persons infected will die because you  
4 don't know how many people at the base level have got  
5 the infection who don't die. And you make the  
6 suggestion in your witness statement that what could  
7 have been done, in light of what you say is the lack of  
8 knowledge about the extent of asymptomatic transmission,  
9 is apply a precautionary approach?

10 **A.** Yes.

11 **Q.** That is to say, simply state as a matter of internal  
12 policy or approach --

13 **A.** Yes.

14 **Q.** -- "We don't know the extent of asymptomatic  
15 transmission, we may not know for some time, so why  
16 don't we just apply a careful precautionary approach,  
17 which is assume that it is at a significant level" -- in  
18 fact it turned out to be between 30% and 34%, but you  
19 could take any level, 20%, 25%, 30% -- and then decide  
20 upon the countermeasures that are necessary to be able  
21 to meet that threat in terms of infection control.

22 I apologise for the long preamble.

23 The stage was reached, wasn't it, in early March,  
24 around about the 10th and the 11th, that regardless of  
25 the science on asymptomatic transmission that was the

62

1 particular witness's evidence is not accurate -- that is  
2 not accurate in all areas. And that's the problem.

3 I based -- I took the precautionary principle, in  
4 some cases overruling the scientific advice on the  
5 precautionary side.

6 I mentioned, for instance, when the -- when we  
7 brought people back from Wuhan in late January, early  
8 February, the scientific advice from PHE was that they  
9 did not need to be quarantined and I overruled that and  
10 said that they needed to be quarantined, based on the  
11 precautionary principle. And this is -- but then, until  
12 the CDC evidence on 3 April, there were decisions taken  
13 based on the PHE assumption of no asymptomatic  
14 transmission.

15 Now, not all, and in some -- you know, in the case  
16 of lockdown, the asymptomatic or non-asymptomatic route  
17 of transmission wasn't really discussed. It was clear  
18 that the cases were going up and we needed to take  
19 action. The route of transmission, for that decision,  
20 was a second order consideration but it was a primary  
21 consideration in some other areas, and on those the  
22 official advice remained as it was until -- until  
23 3 April.

24 **Q.** Had you understood and had it been widely understood  
25 that there was significant asymptomatic transmission

64

1 earlier, what measures might have been available and  
2 might have been considered to be applied? You expressed  
3 this as being your greatest single regret.

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** What wasn't done on account of what you say was the  
6 information you were not provided with? What practical  
7 countermeasures might have been available which were not  
8 appreciated because of this fallacy?

9 **A.** Well, for instance, in the guidance to care homes on  
10 discharge from hospital --

11 **Q.** No, I've asked you about countermeasures in the context  
12 of infection control in March. I'm not talking about  
13 discharge from hospital. I'm talking about what  
14 policies in terms of preventing the spread of the  
15 infection round the United Kingdom, in response to which  
16 the government did of course impose measures on 12, 16,  
17 20 and 23 March ultimately --

18 **A.** Yeah.

19 **Q.** -- what measures might have been applied differently had  
20 this "misunderstanding", to use a neutral expression,  
21 not arisen?

22 **A.** I don't think it would have made a difference to those  
23 specific decisions. I think it made a decision -- it  
24 made a difference in terms of how infection prevention  
25 and control was done within health and care settings.

65

1 it, not promulgated to you? SAGE existed to provide  
2 the United Kingdom Government with scientific advice,  
3 they were contributors to SAGE, they communicated  
4 regularly within and without SAGE, with Professor Sir  
5 Chris Whitty, who, together with Sir Patrick Vallance,  
6 spoke to you and your officials on a daily basis --

7 **A.** Yes, and --

8 **Q.** Why did you not know this?

9 **A.** I knew what they knew and I read the SAGE minutes. And  
10 as you will see, the SAGE minutes and the various other  
11 things that I did see at the time clearly state that  
12 there may be or there is likely some or -- there are all  
13 sorts of formulations of -- in a fog of uncertainty,  
14 that -- but it was all, essentially, unproven anecdote,  
15 and --

16 **Q.** Well, can I pause you there, Mr Hancock? You appeared  
17 to give a suggestion that the information that you were  
18 given was, itself, contained within a fog of  
19 uncertainty. I've put to you the NERVTAG meeting of  
20 21 February stated:

21 "The evidence suggests that 40% of virologically  
22 confirmed cases are asymptomatic."

23 That's not much of a fog, is it?

24 **A.** I didn't see that evidence.

25 **Q.** INQ000119469, paragraph 3.4, page 6. This was the

67

1 **Q.** That's very clear.

2 How much time, if you like, doctrinally was given to  
3 this debate as the government machine trundled on in  
4 February and March?

5 **A.** Ironically in this case not enough. You know, if the  
6 Chief Scientific Adviser's view, as expressed later, in  
7 July, in that WhatsApp exchange with the Chief Medical  
8 Officer, if there had been a successful engagement  
9 between his view then, as in "we pretty much knew", and  
10 the PHE scientists who were making the recommendations  
11 for policy within health and care settings, if there had  
12 been better engagement there, for instance, then the  
13 scientific advice might, I don't know, we can't be sure,  
14 might have been different.

15 If, for instance, the -- the evidence I've now seen,  
16 which I wasn't aware of at the time, amongst some of the  
17 most eminent scientists in the UK, like  
18 Professor Ferguson and Professor Edmunds and others,  
19 that they had a high -- higher degree of confidence that  
20 there was asymptomatic transmission, if that had been  
21 successfully promulgated to the World Health  
22 Organisation, then we may have had a difference in the  
23 advice coming from the WHO. So we needed actually more  
24 debate about this, not less.

25 **Q.** Why was that crucial information, as you've described

66

1 reference to John Edmunds on NERVTAG, we looked at it  
2 about ten minutes ago.

3 Oh, so you didn't see it at the time?

4 **A.** NERVTAG? No. I saw SAGE minutes not NERVTAG minutes.

5 **Q.** All right.

6 There was another related issue, and you've referred  
7 to this in the context of the policy of discharging  
8 patients from hospital, and that's the testing for  
9 asymptomatic patients.

10 **A.** Just before you --

11 **Q.** Yes.

12 **A.** To make -- just to give one final point of evidence --

13 **Q.** Please.

14 **A.** -- on this contradistinction between what some of the  
15 scientists were saying and the scientific advice on  
16 which some of the policy was based. On 24 March, so  
17 later than these times you were discussing, PHE  
18 describes anecdotal cases of asymptomatic transmission,  
19 but concludes these, and now I quote, "do not provide  
20 evidence for asymptomatic transmission".

21 So that is the evidence that's being provided to me  
22 as conclusive. So I'm saying anecdotal and unconfirmed  
23 data about this. I'm -- I -- through this period I'm  
24 constantly pushing, as I was through January, for  
25 a conclusive science, and PHE's advice to me is: these

68

1 do not provide evidence for asymptomatic transmission.  
 2 So that is why there's an apparent distinction here, and  
 3 it is frustrating this wasn't cleared up earlier.  
 4 **Q.** Is the nub of it that -- you appear to be suggesting now  
 5 that you placed -- understandably, it's a related  
 6 agency -- you placed greater weight upon what you were  
 7 being told by PHE, perhaps formally, than the  
 8 information which was being relayed, both directly and  
 9 indirectly, routed through NERVTAG, SAGE, the CMO and  
 10 the GCSA, to central government?  
 11 **A.** It's a very good question. Did I place greater weight  
 12 on it? I'm not sure I saw it like that. I saw a --  
 13 I saw inconclusive evidence on the one hand and  
 14 categoric conclusions based on the scientific method,  
 15 ie "This is unproven", on the other.  
 16 **Q.** All right.  
 17 **A.** And we -- and those only finally got resolved at the  
 18 very start of April with the CDC evidence.  
 19 **Q.** On 11 March at a Cabinet meeting --  
 20 **A.** Yes.  
 21 **Q.** -- INQ000056132, page 4, you said:  
 22 "Unless individuals were symptomatic there was no  
 23 point in being tested: the test would not work."  
 24 **A.** Yeah.  
 25 **Q.** SAGE, and not NERVTAG but SAGE, the official advisory

69

1 **Q.** -- because you couldn't be certain that the negative  
 2 test result, if that's what it was, was accurate?  
 3 **A.** Yes.  
 4 **Q.** But you told Cabinet --  
 5 **A.** Yes.  
 6 **Q.** -- there is no point in being tested, the test would not  
 7 work.  
 8 **A.** Yes.  
 9 **Q.** There is a difference there, Mr Hancock.  
 10 **A.** Yes.  
 11 **Q.** Why was there a difference?  
 12 **A.** Well, being told that the test would not work is the  
 13 advice that I received from PHE from January. As it  
 14 happened -- I said a moment ago I saw the SAGE minutes.  
 15 I saw the SAGE minutes from some time into the crisis,  
 16 I did not see the very early SAGE minutes --  
 17 **Q.** Can I just pause you there, but you of course accept  
 18 that the Chief Medical Officer's evidence, which is that  
 19 anything that was important from SAGE was relayed to you  
 20 at the multitude of meetings at which --  
 21 **A.** Yes, but not in terms of linguistic analysis, and that  
 22 is what this debate and discussion comes down to, and  
 23 the misunderstanding that the Government Chief  
 24 Scientific Adviser had, as -- in his -- which came to  
 25 the fore in his evidence on this point.

71

1 body for -- scientific body for emergencies, which was  
 2 the sole route of scientific advice for the government,  
 3 had reported on 28 January, INQ000061510, page 3,  
 4 paragraph 8:  
 5 "Specific test should be ready by the end of week,  
 6 with capacity to run 400 to 500 tests ... Sensitivity of  
 7 test unclear, particularly in early phases of illness or  
 8 when symptoms are mild. Currently it would not be  
 9 useful to test asymptomatic individuals, as a negative  
 10 test result could not be interpreted with certainty."  
 11 **A.** Yep.  
 12 **Q.** The point made by SAGE, and it's apparent also from  
 13 Sir Patrick Vallance's dairies and from WhatsApps  
 14 between the CMO and the GCSA, is that the scientific  
 15 evidence was saying, you can test for asymptomatic  
 16 individuals -- and of course you knew very well that  
 17 contact tracing for the first few hundred individuals,  
 18 for travellers and index cases, requires testing of  
 19 everybody --  
 20 **A.** Yeah.  
 21 **Q.** -- whether they're asymptomatic or not?  
 22 **A.** Yeah.  
 23 **Q.** But that there were real problems with the certainty of  
 24 the outcome --  
 25 **A.** Correct.

70

1 If I can just set out the position as I saw it.  
 2 Apropos this SAGE conclusion, PHE stated clearly that  
 3 the test could not work to identify that people are  
 4 negative. And that happened in early January, that  
 5 advice. And the reason it was important at the time,  
 6 for policy reasons, was about testing at the border.  
 7 There was a debate about testing at the border.  
 8 I said: why don't we test at the border? And PHE  
 9 correctly said: if we test at the border we will not  
 10 get -- we will not find people because the tests are  
 11 unlikely to be sensitive -- as it says here -- on people  
 12 with -- who are asymptomatic.  
 13 And so I described, "tests will not work" in the  
 14 context of testing people who don't have symptoms in  
 15 order to prove that they are negative of coronavirus.  
 16 Of course, if a test has any sensitivity at all, then it  
 17 may find some people who are asymptomatic who -- where  
 18 contact tracing can be useful. In that context, tests  
 19 can -- can work, but they cannot be described as working  
 20 for the purpose of ruling that somebody is negative of  
 21 coronavirus.  
 22 **Q.** All right.  
 23 You accept that there was an important difference  
 24 between -- you described it as linguistic, but there is  
 25 an important difference between told that a test has

72

1 concerns about the level of certainty and being told  
2 that a test, to use your words, if the Cabinet minutes  
3 are right, "does not work".

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** How --

6 **A.** Does not work for what purpose, that's the key thing.

7 **Q.** Right. How could, on this vital issue -- because as you  
8 recognise, testing of asymptomatic patients became  
9 hugely vital to the discharge of patients from  
10 hospital --

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** -- to the spread of the virus around the care sector,  
13 adult care sector.

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** How, on this hugely important issue, could that  
16 distinction, that difference of understanding have  
17 resulted?

18 **A.** Well, let me explain.

19 **LADY HALLETT:** Actually, don't worry, Mr Hancock. I'm not  
20 sure that this is a point worth pursuing, Mr Keith.

21 I think Mr Hancock's given his explanation, which is he  
22 doesn't accept the meaning that he would attribute to  
23 his comments is the meaning that you suggest.

24 **MR KEITH:** I'll move on.

25 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.

73

1 In one case the witness said "I haven't got this in  
2 black and white"; well, of course not because it wasn't  
3 true. And in another case the witness said the  
4 accountability and governance arrangements didn't pick  
5 this up. Well, they didn't because, again, the  
6 allegation wasn't there.

7 What there was was a great deal of hard work on our  
8 side and a toxic culture that we had to work with, which  
9 seemed to want to find people to blame rather than spend  
10 all of their effort solving the problems. And it's --  
11 you know, maybe I -- you know, as I've said before,  
12 I drove the system hard, sometimes the people I was  
13 trying to push into action didn't think the action was  
14 necessary, and that's already been very clear.

15 **Q.** Mr --

16 **A.** I didn't know about most of this at the time. I knew  
17 that it was difficult getting stuff through the centre  
18 but nobody expressed any of these things to my face.

19 **Q.** Mr Cummings was not one of the people who against whom  
20 it might be said that he was resisting the government  
21 machine being moved onwards because the evidence plainly  
22 shows that around about 13/14 March he was one of the  
23 voices calling for more immediate action. But he says  
24 in terms not just that you lied but that you were unfit  
25 for the job. And, as you know, he and Mr Johnson

75

1 **MR KEITH:** Now, we've been exploring, Mr Hancock, some of  
2 the areas, asymptomatic transmission, the testing, what  
3 was said about the DHSC and its response, because, as  
4 you know very well, Mr Cummings, Sir Patrick Vallance in  
5 his dairies, Helen MacNamara, have made reference to you  
6 lying, to you getting overexcited and just saying stuff,  
7 that you say things which surprise people because they  
8 knew the evidence base wasn't there.

9 Out of fairness to you, and because this is a vital  
10 issue that goes to how well the system of government was  
11 operating -- you being, as you describe in your book, in  
12 the hot seat -- how could, to a significant extent,  
13 important government advisers and officials have  
14 concluded that the Secretary of State for Health in the  
15 maw of this public health crisis, the maw of the beast,  
16 was a liar?

17 **A.** Well, I was not. You will note that there is no  
18 evidence from anybody who I worked with in the  
19 department or the Health system who supported that --  
20 those false allegations. And indeed, where there have  
21 been specifics attached to any of those allegations  
22 I have gone through them and I'd be very happy to answer  
23 questions on any of them.

24 And then in a couple of occasions there were general  
25 sweeping allegations which had no evidence whatsoever.

74

1 debated that claim and there was a debate about you  
2 being sacked. The Inquiry has no interest in the truth  
3 of the allegations. It is impossible for the Inquiry to  
4 resolve them. But the fact that the Prime Minister, his  
5 chief adviser, the Deputy Cabinet Secretary, the  
6 Cabinet Secretary, all questioned your candour and, in  
7 large part, fitness for the job, is a vital issue to any  
8 examination of how well -- how well the system  
9 responded.

10 This is an extraordinary state of affairs.

11 **A.** Well, the Inquiry can, if it chooses, get to the bottom  
12 of each of the specific allegations because they are not  
13 true and I'm very happy to write with an explanation of  
14 each and every one of them.

15 The -- of course the impact of the toxic culture  
16 that essentially was caused by the chief adviser but  
17 that clearly you can now -- I can now see, not that  
18 I knew at the time, others were brought into, that was  
19 unhelpful.

20 On the other hand, in the heat of a crisis, people  
21 say things -- especially on WhatsApp, which is  
22 essentially conversational -- that they don't -- that,  
23 you know, that they may not -- may not be their full  
24 considered opinion. For instance, the Cabinet Secretary  
25 also described me as "can-do" in a note to the

76

1 Prime Minister. So, you know, I think there is  
2 a broader view. And also I got on with him perfectly  
3 well with him through the whole thing and -- and  
4 afterwards, and it's only because of this Inquiry that  
5 I've seen the language that he was using behind the  
6 scenes.

7 So, you know, was this a problem? Up to a point.

8 What is the lesson for the future? I think  
9 unfortunately the lesson for the future is systems need  
10 to be in place so that if there is a malign actor in  
11 Number 10 --

12 **Q.** Do you mean Mr Cummings?

13 **A.** Well, in this case that was the example, but there may  
14 be in the future. But if there are people whose  
15 behaviour is unprofessional, the system needs to be able  
16 to work despite that. That's why I think I place  
17 reliance on the COBR system and why I tried to use the  
18 COBR system. And I think that -- you know, that is the  
19 repository of emergency response knowledge,  
20 understanding, experience within government, and it was  
21 the appropriate place to run this response, until it  
22 became so big that it needed its own systems of  
23 decision-making and eventually the Covid-S and Covid-O  
24 system was put in place, which was -- which is what  
25 I would recommend for the future in an all-engulfing

77

1 the CDL really should be, also, the  
2 Deputy Prime Minister, you know, that is the role, it's  
3 how it's normally done, it's how it's done at the  
4 moment. Occasionally the Deputy Prime Minister is  
5 another Secretary of State, far better if CDL.

6 So you can escalate to a CDL to have  
7 a cross-government response. And then -- and that would  
8 also bring in more senior resource from other  
9 departments. And then you can escalate the COBR system  
10 to the Prime Minister. And then the escalation above  
11 that is to put in place specific structures, Cabinet  
12 subcommittees, for response to an all-engulfing crisis.

13 We tried with the MIG process, that was -- it  
14 helped, but it wasn't as good as the Covid-S/Covid-O  
15 structure which I think is a -- I think is the best in  
16 class of all my decade in government in terms of how to  
17 run a national-level response.

18 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.

19 **MR KEITH:** I need to ask you about three ancillary issues  
20 related to the issue of the atmosphere and the  
21 operations of Number 10, Mr Hancock, so we're not done  
22 with this subject yet, I'm afraid.

23 Firstly, evidence has been given that Mr Cummings  
24 may have exercised an unhealthy degree of influence on  
25 the Prime Minister. You may or may not be aware that it

79

1 crisis like this.

2 So, up to a point, it was a problem. Was it  
3 unpleasant? Yes. It was unpleasant for a whole load of  
4 my staff as well who were subject to this sort of abuse  
5 from the chief adviser. It went further -- wider than  
6 I thought at the time. But my job was to lead the  
7 Health and Care system, the whole thing, 1.4 million  
8 people in the NHS, over 3 million in social care, and so  
9 I just got on with doing that to the best of my ability.

10 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Hancock, can I interrupt. You said  
11 systems need to be in place and then you spoke about  
12 COBR and Covid-O, Covid-S, that we know did come in to  
13 place --

14 **A.** To a degree.

15 **LADY HALLETT:** Right. So what are you suggesting should  
16 happen in the future if you have, as you described it,  
17 a malign influence?

18 **A.** Well, whether or not you have a malign influence,  
19 unfortunately the system needs to be there in case --  
20 irrespective of the personalities of the people who are  
21 involved.

22 The way I would recommend it is that when you have  
23 a small or medium-sized crisis, the lead government  
24 department model works. When a crisis becomes clearly  
25 cross-governmental, then you need either the CDL -- and

78

1 is contested evidence. Some witnesses or one witness  
2 has said he did, another witness directly afterwards  
3 said he didn't.

4 **A.** Yeah.

5 **Q.** Are you in a position to comment on that particular  
6 aspect, that is to say whether or not a special adviser  
7 exercised too great an influence on the decision-making  
8 process?

9 And I invite you, please, to stick to this rigid  
10 structural issue. In terms of the decision-making  
11 ability of the Prime Minister, was there too great  
12 an influence operated?

13 **A.** At times, yes.

14 **Q.** Right.

15 **A.** And I'll be very specific about what I thought went  
16 wrong. As the COBR system was running, in February, the  
17 Prime Minister's chief adviser decided to -- that he  
18 didn't like the COBR system, that is on the record, and  
19 he decided instead to take all of the major daily  
20 decisions into his office, and he invited a subset of  
21 the people who needed to be there to these meetings. He  
22 didn't invite any ministers, he didn't regard ministers  
23 as a valuable contribution to any decision-making as far  
24 as I could see in the crisis, or indeed any other time.

25 And --

80

1 Q. So that's the COBR?

2 A. He took the decisions -- attempted to take them from the  
3 COBR process to a meeting that he ran daily at 8 am. He  
4 invited some of the right people but not all of them.  
5 He didn't check with me beforehand and clashed it  
6 directly with my daily meeting, which was frustrating  
7 because we had a daily meeting in the department to feed  
8 into the Prime Minister's meeting at 9.15.

9 The reason these meetings are important is because  
10 there is a proper government emergency response system,  
11 and it was actively circumvented, and in one of these  
12 early meetings the chief adviser said "Decisions don't  
13 need to go to the Prime Minister". Now, that is  
14 inappropriate in a democracy. And I saw it as simply as  
15 essentially a power grab, but it definitely got in the  
16 way of the -- of organising the response for the period  
17 it was in operation. It was then replaced with the MIG  
18 system, which was better.

19 Q. We will come back to that later.

20 So your position, is it -- and the Inquiry asks you  
21 because, of course, the Inquiry asked Mr Cummings to  
22 what extent the view taken by him and others of your  
23 unfitness for the job was a matter of atmospherics or  
24 toxicity or whether or not it actually affected the  
25 running of the government machine and led to deleterious

81

1 fear inculcated by the behaviour of this particular  
2 individual. He did, in the middle of this, in the  
3 middle of February, effectively cause the resignation of  
4 the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

5 Previously, just before --

6 Q. When --

7 A. It is important, because --

8 Q. No, no, Mr Hancock, please forgive me. The  
9 determination of what's important is really for the  
10 questioner. If my Lady believes that, during your  
11 answering, I am preventing you from raising something  
12 that is important, she will no doubt correct me.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. The issue of the resignation of the Chancellor of the  
15 Exchequer doesn't appear to me to be of great moment in  
16 the context of the coronaviral response.

17 A. It was, let me explain why.

18 Q. Well, if you wish to simply state it.

19 LADY HALLETT: Just let him explain it.

20 A. It was -- in just two sentences.

21 MR KEITH: Please, shortly.

22 A. It was, because it inculcated a culture of fear whereas  
23 what we needed was a culture where everybody was brought  
24 to the table and given their heads to do their level  
25 best in a once in a generation crisis.

83

1 consequences.

2 Do you assess that, generally, Mr Cummings' role, by  
3 contrast, of itself, had a significant impact on the  
4 smooth running or significant operation of the  
5 government machine?

6 A. Yes, of course.

7 Q. Right.

8 It is, it may be thought, to be rather remarkable,  
9 Mr Hancock, that whilst you couldn't have been unaware  
10 of the damage, as you say, being done to the government  
11 machine by Mr Cummings and -- he and others -- and  
12 I emphasise, you've referred to a malign influence, but  
13 it's not just Mr Cummings who questioned your fitness  
14 for the job -- how could, in the face of this  
15 unprecedented crisis, how could this position have been  
16 allowed to eventuate? If it was damaging the  
17 government's response to matters of life and death, it  
18 just couldn't have been allowed to continue, surely?

19 A. Yes, it was deeply, deeply frustrating, and on two  
20 levels. We've discussed the structural problem, which  
21 was essentially an adviser trying to take executive  
22 authority away from the Prime Minister for a period,  
23 until the Cabinet Secretary stopped it and put in place  
24 the MIG process. But there was also an -- effectively  
25 a cultural problem, which is that there was a culture of

82

1 The way to lead in a crisis like this is to give  
2 people the confidence to do what they think needs to  
3 happen, and it caused the opposite of that.

4 Q. May we, may her Ladyship presume from that answer that  
5 you would say the same in relation to the way in which  
6 Mark Sedwill, the Cabinet Secretary, was treated in May  
7 of 2020?

8 A. Well, I wasn't involved in that, but it would be far  
9 better for the system to have been run in a positive,  
10 collaborative spirit, as we tried to run the Health  
11 family. You know, that's not -- you know, there were  
12 tensions within the Health system, there are always  
13 trade-offs and challenges, but we essentially had  
14 a collaborative system where everybody came together and  
15 did their level best in a positive spirit, and when  
16 something went wrong we asked how to fix it. And that  
17 is how you -- it's the only way to lead very large  
18 organisations in a crisis.

19 Q. Indeed.

20 Now, Mr Hancock, can we come, please, to the  
21 chronology and your understanding of the crisis faced by  
22 the government, now we've put many of the structural and  
23 doctrinal pieces of this jigsaw into place.

24 In your statement, you say that on 9 January you  
25 received, because you'd asked for, a full written

84

1 briefing on the news reports that you had seen in the  
2 press. You made inquiries about, at that very early  
3 stage, Exercise Cygnus, you attempted to find out what  
4 the basic position was in relation to the vaccines, you  
5 spoke to the CMO repeatedly. I don't want to go into  
6 the detail of it, but you prepared -- you asked for and  
7 received a full written briefing on 9 January.

8 But you also say in your statement that you spoke to  
9 the Prime Minister in the voting lobby and told him  
10 about the new disease, and you -- in a later passage in  
11 your statement say you called him directly on at least  
12 four occasions "to try and impress upon him my concerns  
13 as to the potential impact from the virus".

14 Do we take from that sentence in your statement that  
15 you had repeatedly tried to speak to him about it  
16 because you assessed that the seriousness of the  
17 position was not being made plain to him? He didn't get  
18 the seriousness of the position?

19 **A.** No, in his conversations with me, he always acknowledged  
20 the potential seriousness, and at that stage his  
21 response was that I needed to keep an eye on it and do  
22 what I thought was necessary.

23 And by the way, I think that was an entirely  
24 appropriate response at that very, very early stage.  
25 After all, we have these potential pandemic threats all

85

1 of the position as you saw it. Is that a reference to  
2 people who mattered, that is to say, people who were in  
3 a position to be able to move the government machine  
4 forward, or were they just people you happened to speak  
5 to?

6 **A.** Everybody. Everybody. From -- you know, if you think  
7 about it like this --

8 **Q.** Just -- please, Mr Hancock, were they people who  
9 mattered at the senior levels of government or were they  
10 people you spoke to in the course of your day-to-day  
11 duties?

12 **A.** Both.

13 **Q.** All right.

14 On 13 January your statement describes how NERVTAG  
15 gave advice to the effect that there was, and  
16 I paraphrase, very little point in screening and your  
17 statement demonstrates how throughout January, but  
18 particularly following Chinese New Year, you were  
19 concerned about the relatively limited way in which the  
20 government was responding to the risk of infection  
21 through the borders, through the border, the references  
22 to handing out leaflets asking passengers whether they  
23 were ill, and you say in broad terms that you sought or  
24 at least wished to have debated the issue --

25 **A.** Yeah.

87

1 the time. There have been two in the last fortnight in  
2 the newspapers.

3 **Q.** Well, they're your words, and at least four occasions  
4 during January, and so we deduce from that you didn't  
5 just mean in that first early week or ten days, you  
6 meant throughout January?

7 **A.** No, I meant until around the middle of January.  
8 You know, the time -- my view of this moved from being,  
9 you know, one of many potential crises that are always  
10 on the radar of a Health Secretary to a full-scale  
11 national concern in the middle of January. And you'll  
12 know from the evidence that -- and I think it was  
13 22 January, from memory, that Chris Wormald delegated  
14 all other responsibilities in the Health Department  
15 other than what was then known as the coronavirus, so we  
16 took it very seriously, and made it an absolutely  
17 number one issue from the middle of January.

18 **Q.** Mr Hancock, will you forgive me if I just remind you,  
19 please, to keep your answers as concise as you feel you  
20 can.

21 **A.** Okay.

22 **Q.** In your statement you nevertheless assert that others  
23 appeared to be astonished or disinterested -- or you  
24 were astonished that some people were disinterested or  
25 less than interested, as you saw it, in the seriousness

86

1 **Q.** -- of a quarantine, travel ban, and that not enough in  
2 general terms was being done; is that a fair summary?

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** The Inquiry's heard a great deal of evidence from the  
5 scientists as to the scientific and practical  
6 realities --

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** -- of border controls. Is it fair to say that,  
9 notwithstanding your concerns and your prodding of the  
10 border system, ultimately, relatively speaking, very  
11 little was done by way of stringent restrictions being  
12 placed on the border to stop infection?

13 **A.** Yes.

14 **Q.** Right.

15 **A.** And I accepted their advice and then when the -- in  
16 mid-February, the virus blew up first in Italy, that was  
17 proof point they were right, because Italy had put in  
18 place more screening at the border and then they became  
19 the first place known to be widely infected in Europe,  
20 and that was confirmation, if you like, that the  
21 scientific advice had been right.

22 **Q.** Your statement also makes plain that you sought  
23 assurances as to what was in place in terms of the  
24 contact tracing programme, such as it was --

25 **A.** Yes.

88

1 Q. -- and you were -- you became aware, as perhaps you  
2 would have known already as the Secretary of State, that  
3 there was a limited process of test, trace and  
4 isolate -- test, trace, contact and isolate for  
5 high-consequence infectious diseases, for travellers,  
6 for the first few hundred of cases; that was the overall  
7 system?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. How soon did you appreciate that that system, limited as  
10 it was, was never going to be able to cope with the  
11 unprecedented demands of a pandemic with an infection  
12 fatality rate of 1%?

13 A. During February.

14 Q. During February, all right.

15 Sir Chris Whitty has described to the Inquiry that  
16 he had no illusions that the United Kingdom was well set  
17 up to meet the challenges of a major pandemic, in part  
18 because of the absence of a sophisticated TTI system.  
19 He knew the investment in health, public health, for the  
20 purposes of dealing with a pandemic was suboptimal, to  
21 use his words, and he knew that there were realistically  
22 few levers of power at the disposal of the government to  
23 be able to control the spread of an infection, short of  
24 the measures which ultimately came to be applied.

25 When did you begin to appreciate that that was the  
89

1 Q. Did that matter? May we presume from the fact you've  
2 mentioned it that it mattered?

3 A. Yes, it would have been far better if that time had all  
4 been spent on the gathering storm.

5 Q. All right.

6 On 23 January you'll recall that you gave  
7 a statement to Parliament. I refer to that because it  
8 is a matter of record, and not by way of an implied or  
9 indirect breach of Parliamentary privilege. Because on  
10 the same day you say in your statement that the Chief  
11 Medical Officer told you that there was a 50/50  
12 chance --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. -- the Wuhan quarantine would not work.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you deduce from that that if the quarantine in Wuhan  
17 did not work there was no practical means by which the  
18 further escape of the virus could be prevented?

19 A. Essentially that is what I was told.

20 Q. And that's why you were told by him also that there  
21 would be a global outbreak?

22 A. And there was a 50/50 chance of a global outbreak, not  
23 a 100% chance. And that is also -- I thought that it  
24 was a day earlier than the 23rd, but I'm not exactly  
25 sure of when he first said it to me, but this is also  
91

1 reality?

2 A. Again, during February. During January there was very  
3 high quality science undertaken, the scientific  
4 performance of PHE was superb, and the advice I got was  
5 reassuring that we were well placed. And it gradually  
6 became clear to me that this wasn't right.

7 Q. In your statement you referred to how, in late January  
8 and in spite of your contact with the Prime Minister,  
9 your team were still getting calls from Number 10 and  
10 being dragged into meetings about how you were going to  
11 deliver manifesto commitments.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What was that about?

14 A. Well, the Prime Minister had just won a thumping  
15 majority and his team, understandably, wanted to make  
16 sure that the manifesto was delivered in full over  
17 five years so that they could successfully run for  
18 re-election.

19 Q. Mr Hancock, you raised this in your own witness  
20 statement in the context of raising your concerns with  
21 the Prime Minister and then noting that your team was  
22 being sidelined or being diverted from dealing with the  
23 crisis because of the manifesto meetings. They're your  
24 words, not the Inquiry's.

25 A. Yes.

90

1 why I wanted a COBR to try to wake up Whitehall to this  
2 threat.

3 Q. You must have appreciated, Mr Hancock, having been told  
4 by the Chief Medical Officer that there was a 50/50  
5 chance that the quarantine wouldn't work, and if it  
6 didn't work the outbreak would be global --

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. -- that the virus was coming --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. -- that once the virus had spread beyond China --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- which of course it did at the end of January and the  
13 very beginning of February -- indeed it had started by  
14 that stage already but it wasn't sustained --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- that the virus was coming, that there was no means of  
17 stopping it?

18 A. If that 50 -- if we were in the wrong side of  
19 that 50/50, which it turned out that we were, yes.

20 That's exactly why I tried to get the whole government  
21 system going.

22 Q. So why did you and your department and the central  
23 government machine spend so many meetings -- so much  
24 time in meetings in February, March, there's a meeting  
25 on 2 March, there's a meeting with the Prime Minister on  
92

1 8 March, one with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on  
2 8 March, debating the probability, and it was expressed  
3 in terms of one in five, one in ten, one in two, of the  
4 reasonable worst-case scenario eventuating?

5 The reality was that once the virus had spread from  
6 China, it was game over, the virus would come. Why was  
7 so much time spent debating the relatively arid issue  
8 of: what is the probability of the reasonable worst-case  
9 scenario coming to pass?

10 **A.** I don't recall being involved in that debate or wasting  
11 any time on it at all. On the contrary, in late January  
12 I stated at -- and concluded, I think at COBR, that the  
13 reasonable worst-case scenario should be the planning  
14 assumption for the country. I have since discovered,  
15 through the paperwork for this Inquiry, that there was  
16 this wider debate about what were the chances of that.

17 Now, there's two parts. The first is: is it going  
18 to escape China? The second is: if it goes global, how  
19 bad will it be? Will we hit the reasonable worst-case  
20 scenario or something more central? I took the prior  
21 decision, based on the precautionary principle, at the  
22 start of this, I think it was on 29 January, that we  
23 should base our approach on the reasonable worst-case  
24 scenario happening.

25 It took -- as we've discussed earlier, it took time  
93

1 "The first was that the spread was confined within  
2 China, the second was that the spread was not limited to  
3 China and there would be a pandemic like scenario, with  
4 the UK impacted."

5 Sir Chris Whitty has acknowledged in evidence,  
6 Mr Hancock, that he was telling COBR there that if the  
7 second scenario came to pass, which was that the spread  
8 is not limited to China, there would be a pandemic, and  
9 by necessary implication it would hit --

10 **A.** Yes.

11 **Q.** -- the world --

12 **A.** Yes --

13 **Q.** And the UK would be one of the countries.

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** So what the Inquiry wants to understand is: to what  
16 extent was it ever thought by you or others: well, if it  
17 does leave China, it doesn't really matter or it may not  
18 matter absolutely because there are practical measures  
19 which may mean that it won't come to the United Kingdom,  
20 and if it does there is a means, practically, of  
21 stopping its spread?

22 **A.** That wasn't my view at all. On the contrary, this COBR  
23 meeting happened the day after we'd had the reasonable  
24 worst-case scenario meeting in the department, which is  
25 the first time that I was really faced up to the fact

95

1 to get the rest of the system to believe that that was  
2 not an overreaction and, as we've seen, some people  
3 describing my position as mad. It was not mad, it was  
4 the correct precautionary principle at the time, and  
5 of course, with hindsight, it was right.

6 **Q.** INQ000056226 is a COBR meeting on 29 January --

7 **A.** Right.

8 **Q.** -- which you chaired. And just while we get to that  
9 point, can I just ask you to confirm what you referred  
10 to earlier, which is that you had, I think around  
11 22 January, called for a COBR --

12 **A.** Yeah.

13 **Q.** -- but Downing Street had put obstacles in your path.  
14 And I just want to establish by way of the chronology.

15 **A.** That's a matter of fact. The --

16 **Q.** Yes. That's why I'm asking you --

17 **A.** I also requested that I make a statement to Parliament.  
18 That was also delayed because the Downing Street grid  
19 didn't include a pandemic.

20 **Q.** All right. But there was, of course, a COBR meeting on  
21 24 January, the first one that you chaired, and then  
22 there was the second one on the 29th, and this is --

23 **A.** Yeah.

24 **Q.** At page 5, paragraph 3, there were two scenarios to be  
25 considered said the CMO:

94

1 that hundreds of thousands of people would die if there  
2 was a reasonable worst-case scenario, or could die. And  
3 that's when I said, "Where are we up to on the vaccine?  
4 Can we accelerate the vaccine? Can we get testing  
5 going?", et cetera.

6 So by this point the Department of Health was fully  
7 engaged -- the permanent secretary was fully -- spending  
8 all of his time, and I was spending as much of my time  
9 as I could on this in case the second scenario, as it's  
10 called here, happened, in case there was a pandemic.

11 **Q.** If we then look at paragraph 4:

12 "The CMO said the Reasonable Worst Case Scenario  
13 (RWCS) was similar to the RWCS for pandemic influenza.  
14 That there was a 10 per cent likelihood of the RWCS  
15 happening but this figure had not been agreed by SAGE."

16 Can you explain to the Inquiry why, if on the one  
17 hand the CMO is saying to you, there's a 50/50 chance of  
18 it leaving, and if it does leave China, to paraphrase,  
19 game over --

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** -- but on the other there is this debate about the  
22 likelihood of the reasonable worst-case scenario  
23 happening. Either it leaves or it doesn't.

24 **A.** No.

25 **Q.** If it leaves, game over?

96

1 **A.** This figure, 10%, is a combination of two different  
 2 considerations: one, 50/50 will it leave China; the  
 3 second, if it goes global, are we going to be on the  
 4 central case, a less bad case or the reasonable worst  
 5 case?  
 6 So, for instance, in SARS, SARS did leave and go  
 7 global, but the impact on the UK was nowhere near the  
 8 reasonable worst case, in fact it was quite close to the  
 9 reasonable best case scenario.  
 10 **Q.** Indeed. What, though, determined, on the premise that  
 11 it did leave China and it was here, how bad it would be?  
 12 The infection fatality rate was the infection fatality  
 13 rate. The transmissibility was the transmissibility.  
 14 What would determine whether or not it was a 200,000  
 15 death pandemic, a 300,000, or a 500,000 death? What did  
 16 it depend on, Mr Hancock?  
 17 **A.** Well, the central variables in that are the IFR, as you  
 18 mentioned --  
 19 **Q.** Which was determined undoubtedly by the middle and  
 20 late -- well, certainly by the middle and late --  
 21 **A.** No, much later --  
 22 **Q.** -- of February --  
 23 **A.** -- than this, much later than this. So this is a --  
 24 **Q.** Let --  
 25 **A.** This is much earlier than we knew the IFR. We didn't  
 97

1 United Kingdom, and from that moment, certainly in the  
 2 department and the areas I led, that is the basis on  
 3 which we operated. We assumed it would come and we  
 4 assumed that it would be terrible, and unfortunately  
 5 that assumption turned out to be correct. On the  
 6 grounds that if it wasn't the reasonable worst-case  
 7 scenario, that would be better. So prepare for the  
 8 worst, and hope for the best. And in the end we  
 9 prepared for the worst and that's what happened.  
 10 **Q.** Sir Chris Whitty has observed that having a reasonable  
 11 worst-case scenario system is of itself somewhat  
 12 ludicrous, because the reasonable worst-case scenario  
 13 for a pandemic was predicated on it being unmitigated  
 14 and therefore, as he described it, wholly improbable.  
 15 So attention was paid to whether or not a wholly  
 16 improbable, at the very least unlikely, scenario would  
 17 ever happen, and then debate was then -- debate revolved  
 18 around the probability of that wholly improbable event  
 19 occurring.  
 20 **A.** Not in my recollection, and it certainly wasn't anything  
 21 I put any effort or time into.  
 22 **Q.** All right.  
 23 **A.** Until you made that proposition, I didn't really know  
 24 that there was a big debate about that, and I certainly  
 25 wasn't involved in it. My view was: reasonable  
 99

1 know the transmissibility rate. And then of course, the  
 2 third factor, the -- it would be the government and  
 3 society's response, which can affect the R rate.  
 4 So we didn't have the variables but we did know that  
 5 there was a significant chance of a pandemic. So it's  
 6 50/50% chance of a global pandemic, and then within that  
 7 there was a range of potential different outcomes from  
 8 essentially it just petering out like SARS did in the  
 9 west, all the way through to basically what happened,  
 10 because what happened was essentially the reasonable  
 11 worst-case scenario.  
 12 **Q.** Why then, once the variables had become clear --  
 13 **A.** A month later, yeah.  
 14 **Q.** -- why then was the reasonable worst-case scenario still  
 15 being debated, which it appears to be, in early March?  
 16 The SAGE minutes of 4 March, there's a COBR meeting on  
 17 9 March. The reasonable worst-case scenario debate  
 18 appears to have rumbled on and on long after it became  
 19 clear that the virus was coming and attention needed to  
 20 be paid to taking practical measures to stop it?  
 21 **A.** That's not my recollection. My recollection is at this  
 22 COBR meeting, if you go back down to the conclusions, we  
 23 presume that the reasonable worst-case scenario should  
 24 be the -- we decide that the reasonable worst-case  
 25 scenario should be the planning assumption of the  
 98

1 worst-case scenario is what we should plan for, can we  
 2 please all get on with it.  
 3 **Q.** All right.  
 4 4 February there was what has been described in the  
 5 Inquiry as a stocktake meeting.  
 6 INQ000146558.  
 7 **A.** Yeah.  
 8 **Q.** It's notable, Mr Hancock, because the CMO briefed the  
 9 Prime Minister on Covid-19 that day for the first time.  
 10 There is a reference to the Prime Minister meeting you,  
 11 the CST and colleagues from the centre today --  
 12 **A.** Yeah.  
 13 **Q.** -- and the CMO had been there. We can see from the  
 14 second paragraph. There was a short update on  
 15 coronavirus but the majority of the letter is concerned  
 16 with other DHSC and NHS matters.  
 17 Given that this was the first time that the CMO had  
 18 briefed the Prime Minister directly, and given the fact  
 19 that the public health beasts in the jungle, yourself  
 20 and the Prime Minister and others, were there, do you  
 21 feel that sufficient attention was paid to the debate on  
 22 coronavirus, bearing in mind what you've told us about  
 23 your concerns about the dawning crisis?  
 24 **A.** It would have been a far better use of time, with  
 25 hindsight, to have concentrated entirely on the  
 100

1 coronavirus crisis. The -- when a meeting is prepared  
2 from the Prime Minister, especially in normal times, as  
3 this was seen as normal times, and of course this was  
4 before there were any deaths in the UK, then they would  
5 prepare a huge amount of work on a particular subject.  
6 To get something else even onto the agenda is a --  
7 requires some effort, and that's what -- that's what we  
8 did.

9 **Q.** All right.

10 6 February there was a Cabinet meeting --

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** -- which you attended -- INQ000056137 -- we can see your  
13 name third down on the left-hand side.

14 Page 6, there's a reference to a tabletop exercise.

15 **A.** Yeah.

16 **Q.** Is that the exercise that became -- we can see it five  
17 lines from the bottom:

18 "There would be a tabletop exercise the following  
19 week."

20 Is that the exercise that became Exercise Nimbus?

21 **A.** Correct.

22 **Q.** Just dealing very briefly with Nimbus, evidence has been  
23 received by the Inquiry to the effect that Nimbus  
24 focused on the likely impact on the NHS, and it's  
25 obvious because one of the terrible things that you

101

1 remember the exact length of the exercise, was all  
2 about: how do we manage once we're in the peak, when we  
3 have all these deaths? And my clear, my only memory --  
4 my only sort of conclusion from it was: we must not let  
5 this happen. And of course the question of who decides  
6 should there need to be a prioritisation is a horrific  
7 one. Thankfully we never needed that. My view was that  
8 it should be clinicians, and that's in the minutes. And  
9 the -- but thankfully, as Sir Simon Stevens said, that  
10 situation never came to pass. Because -- partly  
11 because, coming out of Nimbus, my view was: well, we  
12 can't ever let ourselves get that way.

13 **Q.** You said it worked only in one sense. Do we take it  
14 from that that there were ways in which it didn't work?  
15 Were there opportunities lost there for learning, for  
16 perhaps the learning to be embedded into the machine?

17 **A.** Yeah.

18 **Q.** What were they?

19 **A.** If it had been based on the correct doctrine, which is  
20 that as soon as you know you're going to need to lock  
21 down, you lock down as early as possible, as we  
22 discussed in Module 1, then it -- the exercise should  
23 have been -- in my view, with hindsight, should have  
24 been, when we were faced with a decision do we lock down  
25 or not: are we going to lock down the country? And at

103

1 faced in the course of that exercise was having to  
2 address the possibility of, in the face of a pandemic,  
3 making triage decisions about life and death, so  
4 obviously health and public health and the NHS was  
5 an important issue.

6 Was that an exercise which you assessed was useful  
7 in terms of its attendees or the learning that came out  
8 of it? It's an exercise that was specifically designed  
9 to deal with a coronavirus.

10 **A.** Yeah.

11 **Q.** Did it work?

12 **A.** It worked only in one sense. So the Nimbus minutes  
13 demonstrate this -- INQ000195891 -- and the Nimbus  
14 minutes do show that the NHS asked the question of how  
15 to prioritise when there is insufficient NHS capacity.  
16 And there was a debate around that, as you can see, in  
17 the minutes, and then I concluded that it should be for  
18 clinicians not for ministers to make a decision on this  
19 basis, and that's how we went on and proceeded. That  
20 is -- the minutes are really clear on that, and that is  
21 also my clear recommendation -- my clear recollection.  
22 But there was really important lesson that came out of  
23 Nimbus, which was that there was no way we could allow  
24 the NHS to become overwhelmed. So the whole debate for  
25 however long it was, an hour and a half, I can't

102

1 what point? How much data do you need? Because  
2 of course these are all times of enormous uncertainty.  
3 How much data do you need before you make a decision?  
4 What are the thresholds for deciding to lock down? When  
5 are we going to -- what NPIs are we going to put in  
6 place and in what order? How do you do this, save lives  
7 in the least damaging way?

8 These are the questions we should have been  
9 addressing at Nimbus, not: are we going to find enough  
10 mortuary space? And who should decide on the  
11 prioritisation of NHS treatment?

12 **Q.** Just to unpick some of that, please, Mr Hancock. So  
13 there was an obvious debate around and understanding of  
14 the likely impact on the NHS of this case scenario  
15 eventuating. There couldn't not have been, given the  
16 debate about body bags and sheer numbers --

17 **A.** It was a sort of presumption at the start of the  
18 exercise.

19 **Q.** Indeed.

20 If the people who attended, ministers and officials  
21 and advisers, had no illusion but that a coronal virus  
22 pandemic, and we have debated of course the  
23 understanding as to when you realise the game was over  
24 and it was coming and there was no effective way of  
25 stopping it, having appreciated that these were the

104

1 sorts of deaths that were going to eventuate --

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** -- why was there not consideration given not just to the

4 doctrinal point that you raise, which is what do we do

5 about lockdowns and if we have a lockdown should we go

6 early, why was there not, in a more general sense, any

7 debate or thinking about infection control

8 countermeasures, home isolation, household isolation,

9 shutting schools, all the other measures which in due

10 course were imposed? That debate is absent. Why do you

11 think that was?

12 **A.** Because the Nimbus exercise was put together on the

13 basis of the 2011 pandemic flu strategy, which was based

14 on the wrong doctrine, that the government's job in

15 a pandemic is to manage the consequences of a pandemic,

16 not to stop it happening.

17 And that is an absolutely fundamental learning that

18 we must, as a country, embrace. If there's one thing

19 that this Inquiry learns and I'm very -- I think it's

20 very good that the Inquiry's proposing to do a report

21 after Modules 1 and 2, because this central question of

22 when do you lock down, what are the triggers, in what

23 order should NPIs be brought in, how much data do you

24 need -- because, of course, this is all done in a time

25 of growing data. If you wait you get more data and so

105

1 outbreak --

2 **A.** Yeah.

3 **Q.** -- it was a ministerial and advisory tabletop exercise

4 designed to try to address the very problem faced by the

5 United Kingdom, and it fundamentally -- fundamentally

6 there was a complete absence --

7 **A.** Yeah.

8 **Q.** -- of any attempt to identify what sort of measures

9 might be required and what the terrible thinking would

10 have to be about whether they are applied?

11 **A.** Yeah, the question simply wasn't asked.

12 **Q.** Right.

13 **LADY HALLETT:** Is that a ...

14 **MR KEITH:** Yes, my Lady.

15 **LADY HALLETT:** I shall return to 1.45.

16 (12.48 pm)

(The short adjournment)

17 (1.45 pm)

18 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith.

19 **MR KEITH:** Could we have, please, INQ000047779, page 2, on

20 the screen.

21 Mr Hancock, this is what's called a reasonable

22 worst-case scenario clinical alignment planning meeting.

23 There are references to the Chief Medical Officer,

24 and also to Sir Patrick Vallance, to reasonable

107

1 you can make decisions with more confidence. What are

2 the legal structures, what were the operational

3 structures that we should have ready in peacetime so

4 that we can then bring them up to speed quickly? For

5 instance, having a testing system ready to go, having

6 a vaccine contract ready, having the domestic vaccine

7 manufacture, which in my view is critical national

8 infrastructure and we should not rely on that happening

9 abroad. All of these questions are central to the -- in

10 my view, to the Inquiry, but they're also -- should have

11 been at the centre of Nimbus.

12 But I'm not criticising the people who put Nimbus

13 together, they were putting together an exercise that

14 was based on the then plan, the 2011 pandemic flu plan.

15 And at this point it was still 50/50 whether it would

16 escape China.

17 **Q.** Your point about learning lessons for the future needs

18 no emphasis.

19 Coming back to whether or not something went wrong,

20 functionally, with the outcome of that exercise, this

21 was an exercise which, wisely, was put into place to

22 deal with a coronavirus pandemic, to deal with

23 examination of the practical measures that might be

24 required, in the teeth of a pathogenic outbreak which

25 was already taking place, and it was a coronaviral

106

1 worst-case scenario. You can see there -- thank you

2 very much -- under the "reasonable worst-case scenario",

3 there is a reference to "50% proportion symptomatic".

4 So that goes back to the point you made earlier about,

5 well, regardless of our developing understanding, a wise

6 and sensible approach is to apply a precautionary

7 approach and just assume it's going to be a certain

8 level.

9 Could we just go back to the first page, please.

10 Sir Patrick Vallance, JVT, Keith Willett, Jenny Harries

11 and some other individuals dialled in.

12 Can you recall, it may be you can't, it's too long

13 ago, but do you recall whether or not this meeting was

14 brought to your attention?

15 **A.** I -- I can't -- I can't recall it specifically being

16 brought to my attention. That isn't to say it wasn't,

17 and it certainly would have informed the advice I was

18 getting from many of those present.

19 **Q.** A day before, according to your statement, on

20 13 February, Mr Hancock, paragraph 191, we needn't put

21 it up, you say that SAGE came to the view that China had

22 failed to contain coronavirus. So in the context of

23 this debate about the two scenarios, either they contain

24 it or they don't, and it becomes a worldwide pandemic,

25 can you recall your reaction on being told on

108

1 13 February that China had failed to contain the virus?  
 2 **A.** No, I don't recall being told that as early as that.  
 3 **Q.** This is from your statement, paragraph 191.  
 4 **A.** Can we turn to it?  
 5 **Q.** Could we have, please, the statement on the screen.  
 6 **A.** 191?  
 7 **Q.** It's paragraph 191. I'm afraid I don't have a page  
 8 number, but perhaps somebody behind me can assist.  
 9 **A.** Yes.  
 10 **Q.** If you've got the page number there, Mr Hancock.  
 11 **A.** The page number is 45. It says:  
 12 "On 13 February SAGE came to the view that China had  
 13 failed to contain Covid-19."  
 14 I don't recall when I was told that.  
 15 **Q.** Right. My next question: that was a seminal moment --  
 16 in the context of this debate, you were told there's  
 17 a 50/50 scenario, it's contained or it's not, and if  
 18 it's not, then, subject to sustained community  
 19 transmission, it's game over.  
 20 Being told formally, the government machine was  
 21 informed formally on 13 February that China had failed,  
 22 would you acknowledge that that was a vital moment?  
 23 **A.** It certainly should have been, yeah.  
 24 **Q.** Yes. On 14 February, the next day, INQ000056138,  
 25 page 7, you were present at that Cabinet of course.

109

1 we're in the Health Department and there's a load of  
 2 work on all sorts of things not to do with us.  
 3 The first papers on this that came to ministers came  
 4 from the Cabinet Office --  
 5 **Q.** Indeed, and they were -- as you rightly say, I think it  
 6 was the 24th not the 26th, but they are debated at great  
 7 length in SAGE around the time period that you've  
 8 indicated.  
 9 **A.** Yeah.  
 10 **Q.** But just coming back to the position now, mid-February,  
 11 and in the context of SAGE having appreciated that China  
 12 had failed to contain C-19, although there is  
 13 a reference to plans in place in the context of  
 14 infection control, the measures for infection control  
 15 were not even debated at SAGE until 24 or 26 February.  
 16 **A.** Yeah.  
 17 **Q.** The action plan which you commissioned on 10 February --  
 18 **A.** Yeah.  
 19 **Q.** -- wasn't published til 3 March.  
 20 **A.** Yeah.  
 21 **Q.** And as far as we can tell, there were no plans for,  
 22 expressly -- I accept everything you say about vaccines  
 23 and antivirals and all the other great work being done  
 24 by the DHSC -- there was nothing on infection control.  
 25 **A.** It would be wrong to task the DHSC with policies outside

111

1 Page 7, thank you.  
 2 "... THE GOVERNMENT'S CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER said  
 3 that if the virus became widespread ... there were plans  
 4 in place that could slow down its spread."  
 5 So that would appear to be a reference to infection  
 6 control, as opposed to vaccination or antiviral or  
 7 therapeutics and so on, Mr Hancock?  
 8 **A.** Yes.  
 9 **Q.** What did you understand that reference to "plans in  
 10 place" to be? And I should say, obviously, I'm asking  
 11 you about these minutes --  
 12 **A.** Yeah.  
 13 **Q.** -- we have no way of knowing how accurately they  
 14 reflected the course of the actual debate.  
 15 **A.** Well, I think we should expect them to be accurate  
 16 inasmuch as they are summaries, but I don't specifically  
 17 know what the CMO was referring to.  
 18 Nevertheless, at this point we were starting to  
 19 consider the sorts of NPI type measures that were then  
 20 later worked on by SAGE ahead of its paper on the 26th.  
 21 **Q.** Were you? Can you specifically recall the DHSC working  
 22 on NPIs on 14 February?  
 23 **A.** Discussing them at -- at that point in the middle of  
 24 February, I -- that's my recollection. I don't know  
 25 whether there's any paperwork, but I remember thinking:

110

1 of its remit.  
 2 **Q.** I'm not asking you to take responsibility for it, I'm  
 3 just saying you --  
 4 **A.** On the contrary, my recollection is that we did take  
 5 responsibility for it, we did work that was outwith our  
 6 remit, and I think that -- I think it was  
 7 Secretary of State Gove who said too much was asked of  
 8 the DHSC. I think that's a reasonable presumption,  
 9 because it wasn't happening elsewhere.  
 10 **Q.** What plans for infection control were in existence at  
 11 this Cabinet date, 14 February, Mr Hancock?  
 12 **A.** The plans in place at this point were based -- still  
 13 based on the 2011 strategy, as updated by the work that  
 14 had been done on the contain, delay, mitigate strategy.  
 15 **Q.** Doctrinally, the 2011 strategy was still maintaining  
 16 its --  
 17 **A.** Yes.  
 18 **Q.** -- it was still having an influence. What in practice,  
 19 what in hard copy or email were the plans for infection  
 20 control --  
 21 **A.** Yes.  
 22 **Q.** -- by 14 February?  
 23 **A.** So there -- they would have been based, again, on that  
 24 plan, but that plan was not focused on overall slowing  
 25 the spread of the virus.

112

- 1 **Q.** Thank you.
- 2 As the Secretary of State for Health, you have to
- 3 acknowledge, Mr Hancock, that by 14 February there were
- 4 still no plans for infection control in existence.
- 5 There was a 2011 strategy report. You had, to be fair
- 6 to you, commissioned a battleplan, but nothing had been
- 7 committed to paper, had it?
- 8 **A.** Well, the early -- the commission of an -- early work on
- 9 that battleplan had but if your point is, was enough
- 10 going on, absolutely not. To the degree that there was
- 11 something going on, it was clearly -- there was clearly
- 12 not enough. I can't speak to exactly what was there on
- 13 paper without you bringing it to my attention.
- 14 **Q.** Well, I can't prove an absence, can I, Mr Hancock? You
- 15 understand the question. The question was about whether
- 16 there were plans for infection control in existence.
- 17 On page 6, to go back one page, the Prime Minister,
- 18 in the context of the messaging so far, had said he
- 19 believed it had "struck the right balance between
- 20 preparing the public for what might happen and not
- 21 causing unnecessary alarm". Can you recall from your
- 22 attendance at the meeting to what extent the Cabinet and
- 23 the Prime Minister were still concerned about being
- 24 accused of overreaction or of alarmism?
- 25 **A.** Yes, there was --

113

- 1 I'm not exact -- as I said, I'm not exactly sure when
- 2 I was told that, but this meeting was the morning after
- 3 the minutes of SAGE coming to that conclusion. The
- 4 first thing.
- 5 Secondly, at this point, in the department and in
- 6 PHE and the health service, we were working extremely
- 7 hard to prepare for the pandemic. I'd commissioned the
- 8 action plan and work was under way on that. We were
- 9 attempting and pushing PHE to build the testing system,
- 10 and all of the other things that we were directly
- 11 responsible for. The -- as I say, we weren't directly
- 12 responsible for NPIs, and that's the focus of your
- 13 questioning.
- 14 **Q.** Thank you.
- 15 Can I just invite you to elaborate further on not
- 16 being responsible for NPIs. Obviously, you are the
- 17 Secretary of State for Health and Social Care --
- 18 **A.** Yeah.
- 19 **Q.** -- but you're also a Cabinet Minister -- if you would
- 20 just allow me, please, Mr Hancock -- and subject to
- 21 Cabinet collective responsibility, also of course
- 22 a major player at the highest level of government. To
- 23 what extent is it permissible for a Secretary of State
- 24 to say, on behalf of a department, particularly the
- 25 department which is concerned with health in a public

115

- 1 **LADY HALLETT:** Before you answer, which date?
- 2 **MR KEITH:** It's the same meeting, 14 February, my Lady.
- 3 **A.** Yes, that was -- that was a live consideration all the
- 4 way through.
- 5 **Q.** In summing up, on page 8, the Prime Minister noted that:
- 6 "... he was grateful to [you] and [your] department
- 7 for [your] work and in particular for getting the
- 8 balance of communications right. There was potential
- 9 for the virus to have a large impact on the
- 10 [United Kingdom's] economy and it was important to be
- 11 ready for that."
- 12 You don't appear to have said in terms to the
- 13 Prime Minister, and to your Cabinet colleagues,
- 14 "Containment has been lost, China has given up or has
- 15 lost the fight to contain coronavirus 19, we have no
- 16 practical measures for control, infection control, there
- 17 is no test and trace system capable of dealing with the
- 18 problem, and there are still no plans in existence for
- 19 providing any kind of practical support in terms of
- 20 countermeasures". Why did you not say those things?
- 21 **A.** That's not what I'd characterise the situation. The
- 22 first thing is that I have -- I'm not confident that by
- 23 this Cabinet meeting I will have known that SAGE had
- 24 concluded that containment was lost, and in fact I don't
- 25 think that I was told that for a number of days after,

114

- 1 health crisis, "The national countermeasures were not
- 2 strictly within our" --
- 3 **A.** Yeah.
- 4 **Q.** -- "purview, they're a matter for cross-government" --
- 5 **A.** Yeah.
- 6 **Q.** -- when obviously a great deal of time is spent in
- 7 cross-governmental meetings --
- 8 **A.** Yeah.
- 9 **Q.** -- you have thousands of calls, thousands of meetings,
- 10 thousands of officials working round the clock --
- 11 **A.** Yeah.
- 12 **Q.** -- between you all to get on top of this issue? Is that
- 13 a sustainable position?
- 14 **A.** It is, in as far as the point I made. And the point I'm
- 15 making is that there was a huge amount of work going on
- 16 on these things, including in the department.
- 17 The wider point I'm making is that there was a limit
- 18 to what we in the department could do, what it was
- 19 reasonable to do. We frequently strayed outside the
- 20 limit of what a Health Department ought to or normally
- 21 did, and so there's a -- so you're asking me for
- 22 essentially a paper trail around this. Of course in the
- 23 national meetings I should have, it was my role to, push
- 24 for these sorts of measures. The detail of who wrote
- 25 what the measures should be was not a matter for me.

116

1 That's the distinction I'm trying to make.

2 **Q.** Right. So which department of government carried the  
3 primary responsibility for thinking about, drawing up  
4 and debating the application of countermeasures,  
5 infection control countermeasures?

6 **A.** Infection control in the population as a whole, as  
7 opposed to in hospitals and care homes?

8 **Q.** Yes, national.

9 **A.** The Cabinet Office.

10 **Q.** Cabinet Office.

11 COBR on 18 February, INQ000056227, again you chair  
12 this COBR, Mr Hancock, it's one of the, I think, five or  
13 six COBRs at that time that you chaired.

14 Professor Sir Chris Whitty on page 5, paragraph 2,  
15 says -- provides an update on the global risk.

16 "Both escalation to a global pandemic, and isolation  
17 of the majority of cases to China remained realistic  
18 possibilities."

19 Now, mindful of what you said, that you don't know  
20 when you were told that SAGE had concluded that China  
21 had failed to contain coronavirus 19, this is now  
22 four days further on, did anybody think, as far as you  
23 were able to tell, to stop and say: well, if China has  
24 lost control, to what extent can we be assured that it  
25 is only still a realistic possibility that the majority

117

1 short, they were quite short --

2 **A.** Yeah, yeah.

3 **Q.** -- to enable them to be read by Cabinet Office --

4 **A.** Yeah.

5 **Q.** -- DHSC, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Number 10 and  
6 so on. But they weren't read by you?

7 **A.** They certainly were when they were presented to me, and  
8 they were -- and there came a -- and they were reported  
9 to me by the CMO, and this is my understanding of the  
10 situation at the time.

11 **Q.** Can I press you, please, to help us with when you first  
12 regularly started being presented with and reading the  
13 minutes.

14 **A.** I asked for them at some point in the middle of -- at  
15 some point in February to be regularly put in my box  
16 alongside being -- but the formal process was not  
17 that -- I mean, we can come on to this, because I've got  
18 quite a lot of thoughts about how this interaction  
19 operated and it's very, very important.

20 With hindsight, I think I should have gone and  
21 listened directly to the debate in SAGE. I don't think  
22 that would have queered the pitch, and -- but the  
23 process of SAGE was that SAGE was a committee that,  
24 remember at this point, did not have the sort of  
25 nationally known significance that it does now. It was

119

1 of cases will be confined to it?

2 There seems to be very little debate about this  
3 assumption.

4 **A.** This final sentence that you've brought up here is my  
5 recollection of what I was being advised at the time and  
6 what I thought at the time. So when I was struggling to  
7 answer the question of when I was told the conclusion  
8 from SAGE, this is closer to what I -- this is what  
9 I remember understanding at the --

10 **Q.** All right.

11 **A.** Yeah.

12 **Q.** On the 18th --

13 **A.** And you have to remember, in terms of process --  
14 apologies -- SAGE outcomes were reported to me by  
15 Professor Whitty.

16 **Q.** Did you not read the minutes?

17 **A.** Later in the pandemic I took the minutes directly but at  
18 this early stage, I -- the minute -- I was given  
19 a read-out from Professor Whitty.

20 **Q.** Did anybody know that the Secretary of State for Health  
21 was not reading the minutes day in, day out, from the  
22 sole scientific advisory committee on emergencies?

23 **A.** I don't know.

24 **Q.** The evidence before this Inquiry, Mr Hancock, is that  
25 the minutes were deliberately consensus driven and

118

1 a group of scientists who came together to make  
2 recommendations and bring the science to the CSO and the  
3 CMO.

4 **Q.** Regardless of their public prominence, Mr Hancock, the  
5 position is that SAGE was the sole body providing  
6 science on the characteristics of the virus, what it  
7 amounted to, what the threat was, what in theory could  
8 be done. And the minutes from that body, which were  
9 being produced on a tri-weekly basis, were not, you say,  
10 being put before the Secretary of State responsible for  
11 public health?

12 **A.** Not in the first instance, until I asked for them, but,  
13 also, the premise of your question is not correct. They  
14 were not the sole and only body, they had subcommittees  
15 like SPI-M, there was NERVTAG which reported formally  
16 into the department, and of course there was a much  
17 wider body of publicly debated scientific advice.

18 So SAGE was an important body but I think that it  
19 would be wrong to fetishise the existence and the role  
20 of SAGE.

21 **Q.** Was there another scientific body concerned with  
22 emergencies for the United Kingdom Government?

23 **A.** Yes, NERVTAG for instance, had --

24 **Q.** No, NERVTAG was a DHSC subcommittee which reported on  
25 new and emerging viral threats --

120

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- an advisory group reporting to DHSC. What other  
3 scientific emergency body provided advice to  
4 the United Kingdom Government?

5 A. As I said, NERVTAG did to me, through JVT, which was --  
6 he was my rapporteur on NERVTAG, and then SAGE, of  
7 course, had a number of subcommittees.

8 Q. Right.

9 On 18 February, your witness statement records,  
10 paragraph 194, that you were told by Public Health  
11 England that the country's approach to tracing all  
12 contacts was unsustainable?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you know that on the day or by the time that you  
15 chaired the COBR on 18 February?

16 A. I don't know.

17 Q. On page 7 of COBR, of those minutes, paragraph 17:  
18 "The ... CIVIL CONTINGENCIES SECRETARIAT said that  
19 there was work to be done to create a clear plan of  
20 activity (across the [United Kingdom] Government) from  
21 the moment of sustained transmission to its estimated  
22 peak, which was likely to be a period of three months."  
23 When you heard those words, did you understand that  
24 the director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was  
25 referring to a clear plan of activity for control,

121

1 and articulated, for instance, in the 28 February note  
2 from CCS to the Prime Minister, which was all a note  
3 about how to manage the consequences of a pandemic, not  
4 how to stop it.

5 Q. All right.

6 To get our bearings, Mr Hancock, there was half term  
7 between Friday 14 February and Monday 24 February, by  
8 and large. During that half term, Italy imposed  
9 a lockdown on 11 municipalities, reports were prepared  
10 on the significance of the Diamond Princess coronaviral  
11 outbreak, and although you have given evidence to the  
12 effect that it may not have been drawn to your  
13 attention, NERVTAG happened to have reported during that  
14 time, 21 February, that 40% of virologically confirmed  
15 cases were asymptomatic.

16 Can you assist the Inquiry, please, with what, if  
17 any, work was done on countermeasures for infection  
18 control between the COBR of 18 February -- and I've just  
19 shown you the reference to the CCS -- and 28 February,  
20 which was when a paper, as it happens, was prepared by  
21 them? Do you know whether any work was done other than  
22 in relation to that paper?

23 A. Yes, there was work, there was scientific work being  
24 done by SAGE on the consideration of NPIs. There was  
25 a note that was put together by SAGE, which is dated

123

1 infection control measures, ie to do with the subject  
2 matter of what became the 12, 16, 20, 23 March measures?

3 A. No, that was --

4 Q. What did you take that to be a reference to, then?

5 A. The director of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was  
6 a strong supporter of the 2011 approach, if I can call  
7 it --

8 Q. Mr Hancock, please forgive me. She said "there was work  
9 to be done to create a clear plan of activity". What  
10 did you understand, as the chair of that committee, that  
11 to be a reference to?

12 A. Er --

13 Q. Just what is it?

14 A. To the sort of work that was, for instance, highlighted  
15 in the Nimbus exercise. The activity proposed here is  
16 activity to prepare for a large-scale pandemic  
17 essentially unmitigated.

18 Q. But you yourself said Nimbus had no reference, and made  
19 no reference, to any countermeasures at all.

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. So what was this a reference to, then? If it was  
22 a reference --

23 A. It was a reference to all the other work that you would  
24 need if you didn't take any countermeasures. That was  
25 the view -- that was the position of CCS, as represented

122

1 26 February, that was considered at the 27 February  
2 meeting by SAGE.

3 Q. You referred to that earlier.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. Do you know whether or not pen was put to paper in any  
6 way by government to set out even a broad outline of  
7 what practical infection control measures might be  
8 required to be implemented?

9 A. Yes, the department was drafting what became the action  
10 plan. Now, there's a genesis of that plan. We  
11 started -- I commissioned a --

12 Q. Can I -- forgive me. I'm going to come to the plan in  
13 a moment.

14 A. Okay, but at this point it was being drafted, so, yeah.

15 Q. Right. So the plan which was published on 3 March was  
16 being worked on --

17 A. Drafted. And SAGE was doing scientific work, yeah.

18 Q. -- but there was no draft, anywhere, being circulated  
19 amongst relevant bodies, between COBR on 18 and  
20 28 February, when they reported, setting out possible  
21 countermeasures?

22 A. The work was being done on the action plan, that was the  
23 work going on in the department, and there was work  
24 being done within the SAGE structure, which came to the  
25 26 February paper, and furthermore there was work being

124

1 done by lawyers on the legal framework needed.

2 **Q.** The pandemic Bill, the Coronavirus Bill that became the  
3 Act, all that?

4 **A.** And the measures that were needed under the Public  
5 Health Act 1984 in order to have legal recourse for  
6 mandated quarantine.

7 **Q.** Legislative proposals are not non-pharmaceutical  
8 interventions.

9 **A.** Yes, they are.

10 **Q.** All right. Well --

11 **A.** As a matter of fact they are. And it's very important  
12 that I correct you on that point because if the Inquiry  
13 comes to the wrong conclusion on that, it's -- it will  
14 be a mistake.

15 Communications are very important non-pharmaceutical  
16 interventions. Legislation is a very important  
17 non-pharmaceutical intervention, because if you want to  
18 have, for instance, a stay-at-home measure, you can't  
19 have it, in a mandatory sense, without legislation.

20 So I'm emphatic on that point, because you've made  
21 that mistake twice.

22 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith, I think we're going round in  
23 circles. I think we were here this morning.

24 **MR KEITH:** On 28 February, a view was expressed by the  
25 Prime Minister, when this CCS report was debated, that

125

1 which is a very important part of the national debate --  
2 and I phoned up the Prime Minister -- and I remember it  
3 very well because he didn't -- he didn't take the call  
4 and then he called me back, and I was in a classroom in  
5 a primary school in Suffolk, in Haverhill, in my  
6 constituency, and I had to say to the kids, "I'm really  
7 sorry, the Prime Minister is calling, I've got to go",  
8 and it was quite a moment. I came out and I said  
9 "Prime Minister, you need to chair a COBR, and we need  
10 to be able to communicate properly, including on all of  
11 the programmes instead of having this political  
12 boycott".

13 And that led to -- I wanted a COBR that day, and  
14 I told him he should chair a COBR immediately. In the  
15 end, we had the COBR on the Monday, which I think was  
16 2 March. Over that weekend, I went out and  
17 communicated, in public, about all the things that we  
18 might have to do: we might have to close some schools,  
19 we might have to shut down whole cities, "I don't rule  
20 anything out", I said.

21 That all flowed from this phone call on the morning  
22 of 28 February, and I regard that as the moment that the  
23 centre of government, led by the Prime Minister, really  
24 started to come into action.

25 And if I may say so, with hindsight, Italy having

127

1 the biggest damage may be done by overreaction.

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** What was your response?

4 **A.** I don't recall being told that that was his view of the  
5 paper.

6 **Q.** On 28 February, your statement records, however, that --  
7 your belief that Number 10 was stopping the  
8 Prime Minister from saying publicly anything about the  
9 virus.

10 **A.** Yes. So the 27th -- sorry.

11 **Q.** And you knew that that was because there was a concern  
12 that it would be seen to be overreacting.

13 **A.** Yeah. The 28 February was an important day in the  
14 response, and it was important in this way: I had  
15 a read-out from the -- SAGE on the 27th which both took  
16 the paper on NPIs, that we've just been talking about,  
17 and also discussed the 1% IFR figure.

18 The 1% IFR figure is very important, because if you  
19 have a 1% fatality rate at 80% of the population getting  
20 it, you end up with a reasonable worst-case scenario of  
21 just over half a million people dying. And I found that  
22 out on the evening of the 27th, if I recall correctly.

23 On the 28th, I was still not being allowed to  
24 communicate in the way I'd want on this, not able to go  
25 on certain radio shows, including the Today programme --

126

1 locked down, initially locally in Lombardy, on  
2 21 January and then nationally locked down around, also,  
3 28 February, if at that moment, having seen the SAGE  
4 assumptions, which they didn't properly fully adopt but  
5 nevertheless -- and you've heard from the scientists on  
6 that -- if that -- at that moment we'd realised that it  
7 was definitely coming and the reasonable worst-case  
8 scenario was as awful as it was, that is the moment that  
9 we should, with hindsight, have acted, and we'd -- if  
10 we'd had the doctrine that I proposed -- which is as  
11 soon as you know you've got to lock down, you lock down  
12 as soon as possible -- then we would have got the  
13 lockdown done over that weekend, in on 2 March,  
14 three weeks earlier than before.

15 There is a doubling rate, at this point, estimated  
16 every three to four days. We would have been  
17 six doublings ahead of where we were, which means that  
18 fewer than a tenth of the number of people would have  
19 died in the first wave.

20 At the time there was still enormous uncertainty,  
21 the number of cases was still very low, in fact there  
22 were only 12 cases reported on 1 March. So you can  
23 understand why -- and the costs of what I'm just  
24 proposing were known and huge. So I can -- I defend the  
25 actions that were taken by the government at the time

128

1 knowing what we did, but with hindsight that's the  
 2 moment we should have done it, three weeks earlier, and  
 3 it would have -- it would have saved many, many lives.  
 4 **Q.** Monday 2 March?  
 5 **A.** That is with hindsight, having obviously thought about  
 6 this, and reflected on this, a huge deal over the last  
 7 few years. With hindsight, the moment we should have  
 8 been able -- the moment we -- the first moment we  
 9 realistically could have really cracked it was on  
 10 2 March, three weeks earlier than we did.  
 11 **Q.** Mr Hancock, you have been heard loud and clear.  
 12 At that meeting on COBR, 2 March, the Chief Medical  
 13 Officer said that interventions to delay the spread of  
 14 the virus must not be implemented too early.  
 15 **A.** Yes.  
 16 **Q.** It is clear from COBR minutes from 4 March, your witness  
 17 statement, paragraph 236, to the effect that there was  
 18 a real debate about whether the public might comply --  
 19 **A.** Yeah.  
 20 **Q.** -- your witness statement at 269, which is that you were  
 21 asked by people outside government why the government  
 22 was not introducing restrictions sooner, and you  
 23 responded by saying you'd received clinical advice to  
 24 the effect the government "should not go too soon", and  
 25 you also refer to how your sense was that the wider

129

1 a government thing, this is a whole of society question.  
 2 And there was a -- there was then, from that period,  
 3 that weekend, the discussion was then when to go, not  
 4 whether to go. So it switched from whether to go to  
 5 when to go. And we held fire because we didn't know how  
 6 long the public would put up with measures for, and that  
 7 was the clear scientific advice, and on this  
 8 Patrick Vallance and Chris Whitty were completely  
 9 united, I don't recall any distinction between their  
 10 views during this period, and then on 13 March we  
 11 effectively came to a different view. I've had the  
 12 chance to check, because you questioned my -- the phone  
 13 call I made to the Prime Minister, it was at 3.34 that  
 14 afternoon -- 3.24, I've been able to check my phone  
 15 records, which have come to light since --  
 16 **Q.** Just --  
 17 **A.** Hold on.  
 18 **Q.** No, no, Mr Hancock. You know perfectly well that we  
 19 have scoured every possible source for documents and  
 20 material relevant to the issues in this Inquiry. Are  
 21 you saying that you have a record of a phone call which  
 22 you've not disclosed to this Inquiry?  
 23 **A.** No, there isn't, there's only a record that the phone  
 24 call took place.  
 25 **Q.** So you don't know what you said in that phone call?

131

1 world was moving faster than the official advice was  
 2 being received.  
 3 For how long did this notion that, in terms of the  
 4 application of countermeasures, the country should not  
 5 go too early -- which transmorphed itself into a debate  
 6 on behavioural fatigue in due course --  
 7 **A.** Correct.  
 8 **Q.** How long and to what extent do you assess that that  
 9 debate slowed down the reaction so that we found  
 10 ourselves in the position which you've eloquently  
 11 described, which is not going as early as you now, with  
 12 hindsight, assess we should have done?  
 13 **A.** For two weeks, and you can trace it very clearly. If  
 14 you take 28 February as the moment when it became clear  
 15 that action was going to be needed, and the work was put  
 16 together over that weekend, the COBR on the 2nd, in the  
 17 end, the action plan finally published on the 3rd -- as  
 18 it happens, on the 1st, it was a Sunday, I spoke on the  
 19 Andrew Marr programme, and when asked, "Will you lock  
 20 down whole cities?" I said, "We can't rule anything  
 21 out".  
 22 Incidentally, to show where society was up to and  
 23 the broader debate, when I said, "You don't want to go  
 24 too early", you know, the response was, "Well, yes, we  
 25 all know, we all think that". So this is not just

130

1 **A.** I do.  
 2 **Q.** All right. Proceed.  
 3 **A.** So that's on the 13th. Evening of the 13th, I send the  
 4 email that we discussed earlier.  
 5 On the 14th we're in Downing Street and we have  
 6 a series of meetings, including some in the Cabinet Room  
 7 and some in the smaller office.  
 8 And then on the 15th had the formal meeting at which  
 9 we decided to take action.  
 10 **Q.** Please come back to the issue, which was the issue  
 11 I asked you about, which was the concern going too early  
 12 would --  
 13 **A.** Yes.  
 14 **Q.** -- limit effectiveness.  
 15 The CMO -- and we must be clear about this, of  
 16 course there was a whole-society anxiety, to use your  
 17 phrase, "whole-society", concern about should we be  
 18 contemplating --  
 19 **A.** Yes.  
 20 **Q.** -- the intolerable?  
 21 **A.** Yeah.  
 22 **Q.** Should the country countenance these extraordinarily  
 23 unprecedented measures?  
 24 **A.** With enormous costs.  
 25 **Q.** With enormous costs.

132

1 Well, I've asked you about a notion, which is  
 2 expressly referred to in the COBR meeting on 2 March,  
 3 which was that interventions to delay the spread of the  
 4 virus must not be implemented too early in order to  
 5 ensure maximum effectiveness.

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q.** Put aside the whole-society anxiety.

8 **A.** Yes.

9 **Q.** Your witness statement says you relayed to a particular  
 10 former Prime Minister who asked you why weren't we going  
 11 too early --

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** -- that you had been told on clinical advice --

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** -- that's your word --

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** -- clinical advice that we should not implement  
 18 countermeasures yet.

19 **A.** Yes.

20 **Q.** So what was the basis -- well, you've said it came from  
 21 the CMO and the GCSA.

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** This clinical notion --

24 **A.** Yes.

25 **Q.** -- you're saying, that lasted for two weeks?

133

1 this was the document that was drafted from around about  
 2 10 February to 3 March.

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** Did the government, did the DHSC, did you or  
 5 Sir Christopher Wormald ponder the wisdom of  
 6 commissioning a report on 10 February that by the time  
 7 it had done the rounds of government and been redrafted  
 8 and re-edited and so on and so forth was not published  
 9 until 3 March, by which time, as you've accepted,  
 10 containment for all practical intents and purposes had  
 11 been lost?

12 **A.** Well, I initially commissioned it as a Health action  
 13 plan, I wanted to set out in public what the department  
 14 needed to do. Sometimes when you're trying to drive  
 15 action in government, publishing something is one of the  
 16 quickest ways of doing it, because once it's published  
 17 everybody falls behind it and then you don't have any  
 18 arguments about what the plan should be. And that's --  
 19 and so publication is sometimes most important for the  
 20 purposes of driving action within government.

21 This has been criticised as being high level and  
 22 more of a comms plan. More accurately, I would say  
 23 of course it was about explaining to the public what  
 24 might come next, and I -- and we did a huge amount of  
 25 explaining off the back of it. But it was also about

135

1 **A.** Correct.

2 **Q.** All right. And do you assess, therefore, that that was  
 3 a major contributory feature to the government not  
 4 acting earlier?

5 **A.** With hindsight, yes. At the time, it was entirely  
 6 understandable.

7 **Q.** All right.

8 The action plan.

9 **A.** Yes.

10 **Q.** And we can deal with this, please, briefly.

11 **A.** Yeah.

12 **Q.** Because you've referred to it in a number of ways.

13 **A.** Yeah.

14 **Q.** The action plan was dated 3 March.

15 There it is, thank you.

16 Would you please just accept for the purposes of  
 17 speed that it was a document prepared across the  
 18 United Kingdom? We can see references to the DAs'  
 19 involvement there on the page.

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** We know that it was commissioned by you, according to  
 22 the evidence of Sir Chris Wormald, on 10 February. You  
 23 requested in an email to Kevin Dodds that the work be  
 24 commenced. It was developed under the leadership,  
 25 according to Sir Christopher Wormald, of the DHSC, and

134

1 telling the department -- and then in the end it ended  
 2 up as a cross-government document and a cross-UK  
 3 document -- about what we might have to do.

4 **Q.** You say, quite reasonably, that when you're trying to  
 5 drive action in government, publishing something is one  
 6 of the quickest ways of doing it?

7 **A.** Sometimes.

8 **Q.** Quite. On this occasion, in the face of a fast-moving  
 9 pandemic, it took 21 days from the commissioning to the  
 10 publication, so it wasn't terribly quick?

11 **A.** Well, in the grand scheme of government documents,  
 12 that's unbelievably fast, they normally take months.  
 13 The civil service team who worked on this were  
 14 absolutely brilliant inside the DHSC. It was then  
 15 slowed down when it was sent for clearance, and I think  
 16 there has been some discussion of that, and that was  
 17 deeply frustrating. But it was very, very important to  
 18 get out, to drive action internally, and also to start  
 19 to explain to the public the sorts of absolutely  
 20 extraordinary things that might have to happen. It was  
 21 the first time we communicated to the public that we  
 22 might have to shut schools, close down whole cities, and  
 23 ask people to isolate at home. These are huge  
 24 unprecedented interventions and it was very important to  
 25 start to communicate that to the public.

136

1 Q. I've not suggested that there wasn't merit in the  
2 document. I've asked you about the delay in its  
3 publication.

4 A. I wish it had come out quicker.

5 Q. At page 4, without going to it, the document claims that  
6 the United Kingdom is well prepared.

7 At page 10, in the context of the overarching  
8 strategy -- you'll recall, Mr Hancock, contain, delay,  
9 mitigate; you more than anybody will remember those  
10 words, of course -- the document significantly  
11 overpitched the reality. We weren't well prepared and,  
12 so far as the strategy envisaged future loss of  
13 containment and if control is lost then we'll move to  
14 delay --

15 A. Well, when this --

16 Q. -- it's already over?

17 A. Absolutely, when this was commissioned that was the  
18 clear strategy, and that strategy remained formally in  
19 place until the 12th, 13th 14th, exactly.

20 Q. 12 March, indeed, containment was officially departed  
21 from. Can I ask you --

22 LADY HALLETT: Forgive me interrupting. I've just had  
23 another look at the action plan. There's quite a lot of  
24 information in there. What I can't find is too much of  
25 the action points.

137

1 Q. Mr Hancock, forgive us, though, I asked you basically  
2 what the worth of it was. You've accepted that there  
3 are only, in your words, oblique references to the sort  
4 of countermeasures which ultimately came to pass.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Schools is different because that's based on the genesis  
7 of the 2011 strategy. Your officials and others worked  
8 for weeks on it, for three weeks.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. It was informative and perhaps revelatory to some.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. As the government's sole strategy document it had  
13 significant flaws?

14 A. It was, when it was commissioned we were still on the  
15 strategy which I have --

16 Q. Explained.

17 A. I've been pretty clear that I'm not a fan of the  
18 strategy that -- the doctrine that we went into this  
19 pandemic with.

20 Q. So why did you sign off on it?

21 A. Because that was our thinking at the time. And by the  
22 time it had then been delayed and stuck in the  
23 Cabinet Office, it was better to have it out and driving  
24 action than not at all.

25 Q. Than nothing?

139

1 A. No, there's not nearly as much as I wished there had  
2 been. They are in there, they're buried at the end, and  
3 it was enough to allow the media to then report it as we  
4 wished, which was: these are the sorts of things that  
5 might have to happen.

6 So closure of schools, for instance, these are --  
7 they're mentioned but they're not upfront nearly as much  
8 as they --

9 LADY HALLETT: They're not. It's --

10 A. -- should have been.

11 MR KEITH: You would say --

12 A. I'd say better than nothing.

13 Q. I was going to say: you would say better than nothing,  
14 and I suspect you'd also say: remember that at the time  
15 this was commissioned the DHSC expressly understood --  
16 and you've said yourself -- that it had its doctrinal  
17 genesis in the flu plan.

18 A. In 2011.

19 Q. And that's why there was a reference to closing schools,  
20 which was very much part of a flu plan, but no reference  
21 to the sorts of terrible countermeasures which we  
22 ultimately had to consider?

23 A. Well, there are oblique references but it was not as --  
24 obviously if I went back and rewrote it now it would be  
25 completely different.

138

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. All right.

3 Can I ask you briefly, please, about two other  
4 relevant events around this time. Did you call, in  
5 fact, the World Health Organisation about the need for  
6 a declaration of a pandemic on 2 March? It wasn't in  
7 fact announced until 11 March.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Had you also spoken to the World Health Organisation  
10 earlier about their declaration which you, as you saw  
11 it, was delayed because the PHEIC wasn't, in fact,  
12 announced until 30 January notwithstanding an earlier  
13 committee debate at the WHO?

14 A. Correct. I mean, I pushed and pushed and pushed on the  
15 WHO on both of those declarations.

16 Q. I want that to be acknowledged.

17 A. What I haven't been able to find is a record of the  
18 22 January call, which I remember, which is when I was  
19 told: we can't have a PHEIC because somebody's on  
20 a plane, and it was a ridiculous excuse. And I thought  
21 that there might be some politics -- it's not worth --  
22 which is outside the remit of this --

23 Q. Maybe you'll find that call in that little notebook that  
24 you've just produced.

25 A. It's not a notebook, it was a phone record.

140

1 **Q.** 2 March and another vital point -- the Minister for Care  
 2 was Helen Whately, was she not?  
 3 **A.** Yes.  
 4 **Q.** At that time.  
 5 You refer at paragraph 230 of your statement to how  
 6 at this time, 2 March, your department and she made  
 7 enquiries about the state of planning in the  
 8 care sector?  
 9 **A.** Yes.  
 10 **Q.** And was there a revelatory moment in relation to the  
 11 state of planning, not countermeasure planning but the  
 12 planning broadly, in the care sector?  
 13 **A.** Yes.  
 14 **Q.** And what was that?  
 15 **A.** So our early position had been, according -- essentially  
 16 the constitutional position, which is that care homes  
 17 are legally responsible to, contracted by, local  
 18 authorities, and therefore they reported action through  
 19 local resilience -- to local authorities, through local  
 20 resilience fora, up to MHCLG, and the department is  
 21 responsible for social care with respect to policy but  
 22 not to any of the legal contracting or indeed the  
 23 reporting.  
 24 That was the position going into the pandemic. It  
 25 is anachronistic and it has needed reform for a long,

141

1 **Q.** Alright.  
 2 **A.** So I'm aware the LGA have said: no, there were more  
 3 around. That may -- I don't know the facts of this,  
 4 what I do know is what I was told, and I was told -- I'd  
 5 asked to see them and there are only two and they were  
 6 inadequate.  
 7 **Q.** All right.  
 8 On 12 March, SAGE was presented with some slides.  
 9 INQ000056209.  
 10 At page 2, there is a reference in the first bullet  
 11 point:  
 12 "Note SAGE advise that interventions 1-4 should each  
 13 deliver benefits by delaying and flattening the peak  
 14 and/or lowering overall deaths ..."  
 15 If you retain that thought, please, Mr Hancock,  
 16 which is 12 March, and we'll look at the COBR minutes  
 17 for 12 March.  
 18 INQ000056221, page 5.  
 19 It's a COBR chaired by the Prime Minister. At  
 20 page 5, paragraph 2, you were there:  
 21 "The CHAIR invited the GCSA to outline the  
 22 objectives of implementing the interventions."  
 23 And you've explained how, of course, by this stage,  
 24 there is now debate about the nature of the infection  
 25 control interventions:

143

1 long time and those reforms have been delayed.  
 2 That was the position going in. Helen Whately then,  
 3 in early March, came to the very firm view that not  
 4 enough was happening. In February we had had  
 5 discussions with the care sector, we'd had roundtables,  
 6 but the policy position going in was that local  
 7 authorities are responsible, and ... and it turned out  
 8 that it was something else that we as a department had  
 9 to grip.  
 10 **Q.** Thank you for the description of the functional -- the  
 11 background. What you refer in paragraph 230 to,  
 12 however, is that in terms of the planning there is  
 13 obviously an obligation on the sector, Mr Hancock, to  
 14 produce plans for itself?  
 15 **A.** Oh, yes.  
 16 **Q.** Regardless of the financing --  
 17 **A.** Yes.  
 18 **Q.** -- regardless of the funding and so on and so forth, she  
 19 appreciated and she messaged you --  
 20 **A.** Yes.  
 21 **Q.** -- she'd only been provided with two existing pandemic  
 22 contingency plans in the whole of the care sector.  
 23 **A.** Yes.  
 24 **Q.** And that's what she told you?  
 25 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

142

1 "The GCSA said that the aim was not to completely  
 2 suppress the spread of the disease, not only was this  
 3 not possible, but it would likely lead to a larger  
 4 second peak later in the year ..."  
 5 So my question to you is this: you've helpfully  
 6 described that the reasonable worst-case scenario debate  
 7 didn't slow things down; the debate on what became  
 8 behavioural fatigue did very things down. To what  
 9 extent did the debate about if you mitigate and you  
 10 flatten a wave -- sorry, if you suppress completely the  
 11 wave and you go for an eradication policy or suppression  
 12 policy, it may bounce back like an uncoiled spring --  
 13 I've mixed my metaphors -- later in the year? To what  
 14 extent, if at all, did that concern or debate also  
 15 ensure or lead to a slowing down of practical action  
 16 being taken?  
 17 **A.** Hardly at all, because this argument by the Chief  
 18 Scientific Adviser that we should aim to -- with a good  
 19 outcome of herd immunity by September 2020, this  
 20 strategy or this objective was rapidly overtaken by the  
 21 decision on the -- formally taken, I think, on either  
 22 the 15th or the 16th to ask people to end all  
 23 unnecessary social contact.  
 24 **Q.** Absolutely. That's the end of it.  
 25 **A.** Yeah. Well, that was the suppression strategy in full

144

1 force by then.

2 **Q.** Yes. When did the debate about flattening versus  
3 suppression --

4 **A.** Over that weekend.

5 **Q.** -- uncoiled spring --

6 **A.** Yeah.

7 **Q.** -- first find its way into the WhatsApps, into the  
8 meetings, into SAGE, into COBR and so on?

9 **A.** It happened very rapidly on the 13th, 14th and 15 March.

10 **Q.** Well, I've put to you material from 12 March. There is  
11 a debate at COBR 8 on 9 March about delaying a peak --

12 **A.** But that was all about what is the right time for the  
13 intervention.

14 **Q.** So that was a debate about the point you've mentioned  
15 earlier about --

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** -- efficacy of intervention rather than uncoiled spring  
18 if I can call it that?

19 **A.** I don't know, really, what you mean by "uncoiled  
20 spring", but --

21 **Q.** There is concern that if you completely suppress the  
22 virus --

23 **A.** Yeah.

24 **Q.** -- as soon as you lift the restrictions it will uncoil  
25 and come back with a greater vengeance later.

145

1 SAGE on 10 March had been asked by Neil Ferguson -- or,  
2 rather, the officials at SAGE had been asked by  
3 Neil Ferguson do they know what an epidemic with 4,000  
4 deaths a day looks like.

5 And there were -- according to your witness  
6 statement there was much more data available by that  
7 weekend on the likely impact on the NHS.

8 **A.** Yes.

9 **Q.** Could you just assist with the contribution from the  
10 DHSC in terms of that acceleration? It looks as if  
11 Mr Cummings and some of his associates and colleagues  
12 and the scientists and the NHS were providing the  
13 stimulus, the spur to this acceleration. What was  
14 coming from the DHSC in terms of trying to change the  
15 position of the government? That is an entirely  
16 open-ended question. It may be you'll say you were the  
17 one who was pushing or Sir Christopher Wormald was  
18 pushing. Can you assist us?

19 **A.** The clinical advice coming from the department was  
20 coming from Chris Whitty.

21 My contribution in this period was that on the 12th  
22 I -- I'd decided at this point that we needed -- we were  
23 going to have to have a UK-wide response and, of course,  
24 health is a devolved matter -- and we can come back, if  
25 you want, to whether or not that's a good idea with

147

1 **A.** I see, as set out here.

2 As the -- I mean, short of a -- without a vaccine,  
3 of course, that is a risk.

4 **Q.** Of course.

5 **A.** And it was -- that was discussed, but it was very, very  
6 brief, the point -- the time in which that was the main  
7 concern was very brief.

8 **Q.** All right.

9 Now, whether one calls it a change in strategy or  
10 a dawning realisation or an acceleration --

11 **A.** Yeah.

12 **Q.** -- on that Friday -- or perhaps the Thursday 12 March,  
13 Friday 13 March and the weekend of the 14th and 15th,  
14 the government took what may be considered to be a very  
15 significant change of direction.

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** The Inquiry's received evidence that there was a body of  
18 scientific material built up by that stage from the  
19 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine --

20 **A.** Yeah.

21 **Q.** -- Professor Edmunds, Professor Ferguson at ICL.

22 **A.** Yeah.

23 **Q.** Also at SAGE. There were papers from, in particular,  
24 ICL. There were papers from Professor Riley.

25 Professor Ferguson had emailed Ben Warner on 10 March.

146

1 a contagious disease as opposed to a health service.

2 So I went to Edinburgh and then Belfast and Cardiff  
3 and discussed with my opposite numbers in the DAs, and  
4 then I had a G7 call, which I actually took in the  
5 Health Department in Cardiff, and this had a very, very  
6 significant impact on me, because I heard directly from  
7 my Italian opposite number. And we thought the Italians  
8 had acted early, but he was saying he wished he'd acted  
9 earlier still and this argument that you should delay  
10 and -- to time it right, he had no truck with.

11 So that had a very significant impact on me, and  
12 that was the point at which I started actively agitating  
13 for a -- for very firm action, for a lockdown. I spoke  
14 to the Prime Minister, I emailed him that evening. We  
15 have been through this a couple of times.

16 So essentially what happened was that over the  
17 period for the first two weeks of March until then, we  
18 continued to work on all of the Health-specific things  
19 that are necessary, the NHS response -- it was at that  
20 time we were working on -- we'd got the Nightingale  
21 hospitals programme --

22 **Q.** If I may say, acute health measures, perhaps?

23 **A.** The measures directly within the Health and Social Care  
24 Department's remit.

25 **Q.** Yes.

148

1 **A.** The question of lockdowns, by then, was correctly  
 2 located within the Cabinet Office as the lead department  
 3 on it. This had all happened since -- which effectively  
 4 was kicked off on the 2 March COBR, when the  
 5 Prime Minister took the chair. And so my time in that  
 6 period was essentially focused on: what are we going to  
 7 need in Health and Social Care area, given that this is  
 8 clearly coming?  
 9 **Q.** On Saturday 14 March, and I'm not going to take you  
 10 through what you know to be the number of meetings which  
 11 you attended --  
 12 **A.** Yeah.  
 13 **Q.** -- there were a number of crisis meetings attended by  
 14 various people.  
 15 **A.** Yeah.  
 16 **Q.** But you contributed to a WhatsApp group debate together  
 17 with the Chief Scientific Adviser, the Chief Medical  
 18 Officer, the Prime Minister and Mr Cummings, pithily  
 19 called the CSA-CMO-Matt-PM-Dom group.  
 20 INQ000048399, page 3.  
 21 On the 14th, on the Saturday, at 7.30, 7.30.49 -- it  
 22 may be over the page, yes, there we are, thank you --  
 23 there is a debate commenced by Mr Cummings:  
 24 "I think we need to move fast on social distancing,  
 25 work from home, oldies shouldn't go to weddings, closing  
 149

1 stop community testing and stop contact tracing.  
 2 I was ... I don't want to overplay it, because I didn't  
 3 actively stop it, but I was sceptical of whether we  
 4 should stop these things. I'd been trying to drive up  
 5 testing, trying to get PHE to engage the private sector  
 6 in testing, and I basically, at this point, had the  
 7 confidence to say what I'd previously thought, urged on  
 8 by the WHO, which was, "What on earth are we doing  
 9 stopping these things? We need to we need to keep  
 10 driving them".  
 11 **Q.** Quite.  
 12 The testing in the community had stopped. There was  
 13 no contact tracing thereafter in the community. There  
 14 was --  
 15 **A.** Not until I got it going again.  
 16 **Q.** Quite. There was no self-contact tracing. Why did you  
 17 say "Both of these are in hand"?  
 18 **A.** Because by then I'd issued the instruction internally  
 19 that we should not accept that these have to stop.  
 20 Now, on --  
 21 **Q.** Just pause there. Could you please help the Inquiry  
 22 with what those instructions were and when they were?  
 23 **A.** I don't know the detail of them, but what I remember is,  
 24 firstly, the -- the approaches were different on testing  
 25 and on contact tracing.  
 151

1 pubs and nightclubs..."  
 2 And so on and so forth. And then there is a debate,  
 3 Mr Hancock, just to refresh your memory, about how the  
 4 public need to be informed as to the nature of the  
 5 crisis and what needs to be done.  
 6 **A.** Yeah.  
 7 **Q.** Chris Whitty agrees. And you say this:  
 8 "We also need urgently to address the WHO criticisms  
 9 of our approach."  
 10 **A.** Yes.  
 11 **Q.** "- we need to ramp up testing not stop testing."  
 12 Just bearing in mind, of course, community testing  
 13 had stopped on 12 March?  
 14 **A.** Yeah.  
 15 **Q.** You had, and it's obvious from the paperwork, you'd  
 16 openly recognised the alarming news that there was no  
 17 sophisticated test and trace system beyond the  
 18 First Few 100, and then you say:  
 19 "- we need to continue contact tracing, and  
 20 introduce self contact tracing."  
 21 **A.** Yeah.  
 22 **Q.** "Both of these are in hand."  
 23 **A.** Yeah.  
 24 **Q.** What did you mean by "Both of these are in hand"?  
 25 **A.** On 12 March it had been announced that we were going to  
 150

1 **Q.** Indeed.  
 2 **A.** On testing, the problem at this point was that we didn't  
 3 have enough tests for community testing. And you'll  
 4 know that the action that I took -- "Both of these are  
 5 in hand" -- the action I took with David Halpern and  
 6 William Warr, who was at Number 10, was that we arranged  
 7 a meeting on 17 March to try to electrify the growth of  
 8 testing and at that meeting I took the responsibility  
 9 for testing from PHE back into the department, and drove  
 10 it very hard from there, and I'm happy to answer any  
 11 questions on that.  
 12 **Q.** Forgive me, Mr Hancock, you said "you'll know that the  
 13 action I took".  
 14 **A.** What?  
 15 **Q.** You said, "you'll know that the action that I took",  
 16 et cetera, et cetera, and --  
 17 **A.** Well, no --  
 18 **Q.** We --  
 19 **A.** Oh, sorry --  
 20 **Q.** I must put to you, I don't give evidence, I have never  
 21 given evidence in these proceedings, but you cannot say  
 22 "you, the Inquiry, will know that". The Inquiry does  
 23 not know that you took any of those steps or that both  
 24 of these are in hand.  
 25 **A.** I apologise. I should have said: as I set out in my  
 152

1 written statement, I took the responsibility for testing  
2 from PHE into the department and we set up the four  
3 pillars that became five pillars, that became the  
4 100,000 testing target, that became Test and Trace.

5 The second thing is on contact tracing, we'd  
6 stopped -- PHE had stopped contact tracing, and the  
7 action that we took after this was to restart contact  
8 tracing and do it at large scale using a scale model of  
9 how to deliver it rather than a specialist model, if  
10 I can put it that way, and also introduce self-contact  
11 tracing, which became the app.

12 So that is what I mean by "Both of these are in  
13 hand", it's shorthand for two absolutely enormous  
14 programmes that came from this.

15 **LADY HALLETT:** They'd all started by 14 March?

16 **A.** It -- I kicked it off after -- what happened was  
17 I basically was uncomfortable with these decisions that  
18 were made by -- that were advised and -- but I accepted  
19 them, so I accept responsibility, but I was  
20 uncomfortable with them. The WHO criticised us for  
21 them, and I listened very carefully to that WHO  
22 criticism, and essentially reversed the decisions.

23 **LADY HALLETT:** I think the point Mr Keith is getting at is:  
24 were these all in hand by 14 March, accepting all that  
25 you've said?

153

1 public would respond, and poor data..."

2 And you explain how "new evidence came to light"  
3 and, of course, SAGE says we're further along the  
4 epidemiological trajectory than it had understood, and  
5 so on and so forth.

6 "The discussion was centred on the timing of the  
7 lockdown, because of strong advice (for example from the  
8 Independent Scientific Pandemic Insights Group ...  
9 'SPI-B') that people would likely only put up with  
10 lockdown for a short period of time."

11 That advice, you say, "clearly turned out to be  
12 wrong".

13 Can I press you, please, then, for clarity. Are you  
14 saying that the only reason that we did not lock down  
15 earlier was because of that advice from SPI-B, along  
16 with the data problem which you identify earlier in the  
17 paragraph, but which advice you say clearly turned out  
18 to be wrong?

19 **A.** At this time, information was still sparse. The first  
20 death in the UK had happened on 1 March, and the case  
21 numbers were still, compared to what came later, very  
22 low. And so you have to understand these decisions in  
23 the context of what we did know and a lot of what we  
24 didn't know. So this is why I have a different view  
25 with hindsight compared to what happened at the time.

155

1 **A.** By "in hand", what I mean is we were getting on with  
2 making them happen.

3 **MR KEITH:** Right.

4 **A.** We didn't have a big testing programme, these things  
5 take months to build rather than being immediate, but  
6 I was -- the reason I put "Both of these are in hand" is  
7 I did not want to say, "This is a decision that I'm  
8 asking you, Prime Minister, to opine on", I'm just  
9 saying I've got on with this.

10 **Q.** I'll move on to the next point.

11 The lockdown decision. You have candidly and openly  
12 already acknowledged today that with hindsight we should  
13 have locked down much earlier, and you've given  
14 a helpful indication as to when that might have been  
15 possible. I just would like, please, to take you to  
16 paragraph 23 of your witness statement where you set out  
17 in broad terms that view. It's page 6 of the major  
18 statement, but I think it's important that absolutely on  
19 the record of your statement we can see how you've put  
20 it:

21 "With hindsight, and information we did not have at  
22 the time, it is now obvious we should have locked down  
23 much earlier. I say that with hindsight: it was not at  
24 all clear at the time. The scientific caution over  
25 locking down was based on uncertainty over how the

154

1 I think it is the case that the concern over timing  
2 the lockdown correctly was the main reason why it wasn't  
3 put in place sooner, but it's also true that SAGE  
4 changed its advice in terms of where we were on the  
5 epidemiological curve, because of new data that came to  
6 light.

7 **Q.** All right.

8 **A.** And -- they thought previously we were around four weeks  
9 "behind Italy", which was the metric that we were using.

10 Now, with hindsight, it didn't matter whether we  
11 were behind Italy two weeks or four weeks, we should  
12 have been -- as soon as you know you have got to lock  
13 down, you have got to lock down, but that was the --  
14 this was the data that came to light.

15 In fact, David Halpern put it rather -- he reminded  
16 me of a phone conversation I had with him when he was  
17 the first person to report on this, the key SAGE  
18 meeting, to me. I later had a formal read-out from the  
19 CMO, as I always did, but I heard from Halpern, and  
20 I remember being relieved because the anecdotal data  
21 I was getting out of the NHS and others was that we  
22 were -- this was going up the reasonable worst-case  
23 scenario curve, and then I -- it was -- formally came to  
24 us through SAGE that that's what was happening, and the  
25 irony was that that -- that to me didn't feel like new

156

1 information. It felt like formal confirmation of what  
 2 I'd been picking up from the -- from analysing the data  
 3 myself.  
 4 **Q.** Two points, please, Mr Hancock. You've referred to SAGE  
 5 of course saying: well, we're not as far behind Italy as  
 6 we understood we were.  
 7 **A.** Yeah.  
 8 **Q.** If I may suggest, it must be right to say it just didn't  
 9 matter, because nothing that you and the DHSC or nothing  
 10 the Cabinet Office was doing, nothing that SAGE and  
 11 NERVTAG and all the other various parts of government  
 12 was doing had been throughout February and early March  
 13 predicated on: what is Italy doing?  
 14 **A.** Correct.  
 15 **Q.** Italy was doing what Italy was doing. So there can be  
 16 no suggestion that that any failure, if there is  
 17 a failure, and if my Lady finds there was a failure to  
 18 impose the lockdown earlier, was because of a misjudged  
 19 reliance upon where Italy was in the epidemiological  
 20 trajectory.  
 21 **A.** No, no, on the contrary. On the contrary, if I may  
 22 explain. If --  
 23 **Q.** If you just accept that proposition.  
 24 **A.** I don't --  
 25 **Q.** We are in agreement. The UK Government wasn't planning  
 157

1 **A.** No, it's that Italy was an example.  
 2 **Q.** Indeed.  
 3 **A.** Yeah.  
 4 **Q.** The second point is this: that the clinical advice, as  
 5 you describe it in your own statement, to the effect  
 6 that going early would limit effectiveness --  
 7 **A.** Yeah.  
 8 **Q.** -- that is obviously and plainly an issue relevant to  
 9 a lockdown decision, a mandatory stay-at-home order,  
 10 because that is -- just wait -- that is obviously the  
 11 ultimate decision, it's a stay at home backed by force  
 12 of law. To what extent does that behavioural fatigue  
 13 notion explain or mitigate either delays in the system  
 14 of operation of government, if that's what my Lady finds  
 15 there to have been, or in the promulgation of plans, or  
 16 in any failure just to say how it was, "Control is lost,  
 17 the wave is coming, we must practically act now"? Where  
 18 do we put the behavioural fatigue fallacy into the  
 19 general picture?  
 20 **A.** It had an impact on the decision both to recommend  
 21 actions to the public, which is an NPI, because  
 22 communications are an NPI, and the mandatory decisions  
 23 that came thereafter, notably the closure of schools and  
 24 then the whole legal lockdown on the 23rd.  
 25 The period -- I see the period from the 16th to the  
 159

1 its response between January, February, March and  
 2 14 March on: what is Italy doing?  
 3 **A.** It was for a period --  
 4 **Q.** It was a --  
 5 **A.** If I can explain. If you think that what matter -- the  
 6 timing -- if you think you've only got a limited period  
 7 lockdown that you can put in place, the timing of that  
 8 lockdown matters, and watching the Italian curve was the  
 9 best way of thinking what would happen here, and -- so  
 10 the Italy data were important in that sense. And then  
 11 you had to judge, compared to where we were on Italy,  
 12 where to bring in the lockdown. And indeed we brought  
 13 in the lockdown earlier in the epidemiological curve  
 14 than Italy and others did.  
 15 My point is not about whether or not it's right to  
 16 base yourself off Italy. My point is, the whole  
 17 doctrine of waiting, sort of allowing it to come towards  
 18 you and, "Hold, hold and now we go", that was wrong.  
 19 **Q.** Yes.  
 20 **A.** Instead, the moment you need a lockdown, you need to  
 21 lock down.  
 22 **Q.** Indeed. I was making a point, for the absence of any  
 23 confusion or doubt, that there was no doctrinal approach  
 24 taken by the United Kingdom Government necessarily  
 25 predicated on the Italian approach, of course not?  
 158

1 23rd as essentially a ratcheting up of lockdown. We  
 2 went for a non-mandatory lockdown, followed by closure  
 3 of schools, followed by mandatory lockdown. The same  
 4 behavioural fatigue argument applied to all three. They  
 5 are just different levels of NPI.  
 6 **Q.** Right.  
 7 And now, perhaps before a break, I want to ask you  
 8 about the rationale for the lockdown.  
 9 It is vital, Mr Hancock. And the Inquiry has done  
 10 this in relation to a number of witnesses, at great  
 11 length, to examine the rationale both for and against  
 12 the imposition of the lockdown decision on 23 March, on  
 13 the premise it was the right decision but also on the  
 14 contrary position that it was the wrong decision.  
 15 So you have already explained how your position is  
 16 it was the right decision and indeed should have been  
 17 done, with hindsight, considerably earlier.  
 18 I want to just briefly look at the counterargument.  
 19 **A.** Yeah.  
 20 **Q.** It is obvious from the evidence in COBR, the evidence  
 21 before the Prime Minister, and in particular the COBR  
 22 meeting of Friday 20 March chaired by Michael Gove, that  
 23 material was being placed before the relevant bodies to  
 24 suggest, firstly, if we don't proceed to the final  
 25 ultimate, mandatory, backed-by-law stay-at-home order,  
 160

1 there will be many more deaths than there would  
2 otherwise be and, secondly, that the impact upon the NHS  
3 if those further final steps were not taken will be  
4 devastating.

5 The paperwork shows that on the Monday 23 March,  
6 there was a great deal of debate about non-compliance  
7 during the previous weekend, attendance at parks and so  
8 on and so forth. There is, by contrast, very little  
9 debate, on the face of the minutes from 23 March, of the  
10 data relating to the likely impact on the NHS and also  
11 on how many more deaths will be incurred if those steps  
12 aren't taken.

13 Do you follow? As the Secretary of State --

14 **A.** Yeah.

15 **Q.** -- I want to ask you, how clear were you that the data  
16 showing the terrible consequences of not acting -- how  
17 robust was it? How clearly was the position set out?

18 **A.** Well, by 23 March the trajectory of those data was  
19 unknowable, because the trajectory on the 16th was  
20 knowable, predicted and the reasonable worst-case  
21 scenario was happening. The -- of course we took very  
22 significant action on the 16th. The stay-at-home  
23 request, if I can put it that way, undoubtedly changed  
24 people's behaviour, and therefore will have reduced R.

25 **Q.** Indeed.

161

1 have got R below 1, but it is entirely unknowable  
2 whether that argument is true or not. I think it's  
3 false.

4 The -- and therefore -- so I hope this is making  
5 sense, because it's about how we -- essentially it got  
6 worse and worse along the lines of the reasonable  
7 worst-case scenario, and my objective at that point was  
8 to get as many levers pulled as hard as possible to stop  
9 the NHS from being overwhelmed.

10 And the NHS being overwhelmed is incredibly  
11 important because as soon as you run out of hospital  
12 capacity the IFR itself goes up and you get more deaths  
13 from non-Covid related health problems, and -- because  
14 people can't get treatment.

15 So the point of overwhelming hospitals is not just  
16 because there's a moral duty to treat everybody, it's  
17 because the number of deaths gets materially worse  
18 because essentially the -- people die because they don't  
19 get treatment. And that's what we needed to stop at  
20 that point and therefore we pulled everything.

21 **Q.** I've asked you about the data. The Inquiry well  
22 understands the risks of direct and indirect mortality.

23 **A.** Sure.

24 **Q.** You've said, on 16 March very significant action was  
25 taken. Those are your words.

163

1 **A.** Because of the two-week lag from a change in the  
2 behaviour of the public to a change in the measured case  
3 rate, we had no idea by how much it had reduced R.  
4 However, we took the view on the 20th that we needed to  
5 close schools. Previously we'd been hoping to get to  
6 Easter and then -- Easter school holidays and then  
7 consider whether they re-open after the Easter school  
8 holidays, but by the 20th we decided this was continuing  
9 to go up the reasonable worst-case scenario, we need to  
10 pull that lever too.

11 Then by the 21st, it -- essentially the data from --  
12 that we'd considered on the 16th, with the data going up  
13 the reasonable worst-case scenario, continued up the  
14 reasonable worst-case scenario, these were cases where  
15 people had caught it a couple of weeks earlier, so we  
16 had a greater confidence that we were on the reasonable  
17 worst-case scenario -- which is a terrible confidence to  
18 have -- and therefore decided to go the full measure.  
19 So it -- and do -- and pull every lever available to us.  
20 And that was the consideration.

21 So by the 23rd there wasn't a new forecast of what  
22 would happen under the measures that were extant at that  
23 point, because it would be two weeks before we knew the  
24 actual impact on the 16th. It is entirely reasonable to  
25 argue that the measures on the 16th themselves would

162

1 **A.** Mm-hm.

2 **Q.** And of course additional action was taken on 20th, the  
3 closure of schools, ordained by COBR, on the 18th.

4 The point is this, Mr Hancock: on the premise, which  
5 must be a reasonable premise, that the measures imposed  
6 on the 16th and 20th March were designed to work and  
7 were imposed because the government thought: this will  
8 bring R below 1. Why was more time not allowed the  
9 following week for those sensible measures, which in  
10 good faith the government had imposed, to see whether or  
11 not R would come down as far as would be necessary to  
12 prevent the collapse of the NHS, which might happen, on  
13 an exponential growth curve, at some indeterminate point  
14 in the future? There wasn't data before anybody  
15 saying -- and your answer may be it's impossible to  
16 provide a clear answer because you're dealing with the  
17 context of an exponential growth curve --

18 **A.** Correct.

19 **Q.** -- but there doesn't appear to have been any debate  
20 about, just bluntly, "We've done all this the previous  
21 week" -- the previous week's measures are very  
22 dramatic --

23 **A.** Yeah.

24 **Q.** -- it was, on 20 March, an order that all non-essential  
25 retail and travel and everything be -- everything was

164

1 shut by word -- by advice --

2 **A.** Yeah.

3 **Q.** -- schools were shut. The next step, on the Monday, was

4 producing -- or backing it with the force of law. Why

5 did nobody say, "Just hold on, we don't have to do this,

6 we've only just done these prior measures three days

7 before, we are entitled to conclude that the R rate is

8 being reduced, there is a high level of compliance, but

9 not as high as we would like and not as high as the data

10 would suggest is required, let's see whether or not our

11 measures work, at least for a few more days" --

12 **A.** Yeah.

13 **Q.** -- in order to pause and assess your very own steps --

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** -- before the ultimate --

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** -- the most divisive, politically divisive and

18 unprecedented step is taken?

19 **A.** Gosh, there's so many questions in what you've just put.

20 **LADY HALLETT:** There were.

21 **A.** The first thing is, it wasn't, actually, politically

22 divisive --

23 **MR KEITH:** No, it's become -- I apologise, I'm not

24 suggesting it was then. It is now.

25 **A.** Well, you know, there is a -- some people forget what

165

1 need to reduce by two-thirds human interactions, as rule

2 of thumb level, and we were not seeing that level of

3 reduction. I think the SAGE papers said that they were

4 looking for an 80% reduction --

5 **Q.** 75.

6 **A.** 75 -- to get -- in human interactions to have confidence

7 to get R below 1, because we thought it was between

8 3 and 4. That was not happening.

9 So there are the two data points, if you like.

10 **Q.** That's very clear.

11 The COBR minutes of the Monday indeed show that the

12 compliance rate was not up at 75% but it describes the

13 broad direction of travel as having some positive

14 trends: tube travel, shop -- attendances at shops and

15 work attendance, and so on and so forth, showed that

16 there were very significant drops in attendance. And

17 so, broadly speaking, there was a degree of significant

18 compliance.

19 But you've identified that the primary objective of

20 the government was to take action to meet the reasonable

21 worst-case scenario. That is to say, to make sure that

22 it didn't come to pass in its full horror. But you had

23 taken very significant steps just three days before.

24 Why, procedurally -- well, why not, in terms of

25 process, could you not have waited a few more days to

167

1 actually happened, but it wasn't divisive at all, there

2 was enormous consensual support across very large

3 swathes of the population and almost all political

4 leaders. In fact, the fact it happened in all

5 four nations, with -- led by five political parties, not

6 even four political parties, at the same time

7 demonstrates that.

8 Anyway, I set that to one side.

9 I think on the data the reasons are two-fold. The

10 first is to do with what I said before, the exponential

11 growth was happening -- you know, thankfully, as

12 a trained economist, I'm used to dealing with

13 exponential curves and understanding the stats and maths

14 behind them. We had greater and greater confidence that

15 we were on the reasonable worst-case scenario path, and

16 that would lead to over half a million deaths happening.

17 The problem with those forecasts was that they were

18 coming true. And people have criticised the

19 forecasts -- and of course the forecasts didn't happen

20 because we took action. And so that's the first thing,

21 increased confidence that the worst was happening.

22 The second thing was that at the same time, we did

23 have an assessment of the sorts of levels of reduction

24 of human interaction that would be needed to get

25 R below 1, because if R is at 3, to get it below 1 you

166

1 see whether or not the steps you'd already taken would

2 bring about the very response to the reasonable

3 worst-case scenario that you had taken those steps in

4 the first place to meet?

5 **A.** Because we didn't want to just not hit the reasonable

6 worst-case scenario of half a million deaths, we wanted

7 to reduce that very significantly, not least to ensure

8 that the NHS wasn't --

9 **Q.** Of course -- I'm sorry.

10 **A.** -- overtopped.

11 **Q.** Of course, strategically that must be right.

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** Let me put it another way. The plan was to reduce R

14 below 1 --

15 **A.** Yes.

16 **Q.** -- as quickly and as efficiently and as speedily as you

17 could.

18 On the Friday you had introduced a suite of measures

19 or a combined suite of measures designed to bring R

20 below 1. On Friday that is what you thought would do

21 the trick.

22 By Monday, there was a realisation it wouldn't work.

23 It wasn't working, COBR surmised, because the data

24 showed that the level of compliance with the measures

25 weren't high enough.

168

1 Why wasn't more time allowed to see whether they  
2 would reach that level of compliance, at which point you  
3 could be assured that the measures from the Friday were  
4 working?

5 **A.** Two reasons. Firstly, because we expected that the  
6 impact on people's behaviour would start as a maximum  
7 and then degrade. In the end the public were brilliant  
8 at -- and there wasn't that degradation at all. But  
9 that's what we were worried about.

10 The second is that, from my point of view as the  
11 Health Secretary, my absolute, totally primary task at  
12 this point was to ensure that nobody went without NHS  
13 provision, and that needed a very significant reduction  
14 from the reasonable worst-case scenario, and we only  
15 just got it low enough.

16 So, from my seat, I was just in favour of all the  
17 action you could possibly take. And I knew there would  
18 be other voices that would argue for caution, and in  
19 fact we did -- the marginal item was whether we should  
20 mandate the closure of outdoor building sites, and in  
21 the end we did not mandate that, but they almost  
22 entirely closed anyway.

23 So there was a -- of course there was an argument  
24 about how far do we go, and we effectively pulled every  
25 lever except that one, and -- but the building trade

169

1 lockdown decision, Mr Hancock.

2 Could we just have up INQ000274026.

3 This is a summary, and the Inquiry doesn't expect  
4 you to have read through it or to recollect, if you  
5 have, the detail of it. It's a summary of the  
6 references from SAGE meetings, COBR meetings,  
7 ministerial meetings and so on and so forth, of how the  
8 likely damage to the NHS, the impact, was put at various  
9 times. So sometimes there were references to the NHS  
10 being "overwhelmed", to it being "overtopped".

11 If we can come forward, please -- and it will mean  
12 scrolling through to about page 7 or 8 -- a bit more,  
13 please -- we've got there 21 March, the ministerial  
14 group meeting over the weekend, where some figures are  
15 given about ITU beds.

16 And this is to get your bearings, Mr Hancock.

17 And if we go further forward one page we will see  
18 information from the chief executive of the NHS about  
19 the number of beds, ventilator beds, number of beds in  
20 London and so on.

21 **A.** Yeah.

22 **Q.** You will see there was a reference by the Government  
23 Chief Scientific Adviser, four lines down from the  
24 bullet point relating to him:

25 "The worst case scenario was that ITU capacity in

171

1 decided to pull it for us.

2 **LADY HALLETT:** We're going to stop there, Mr Keith --

3 **MR KEITH:** Yes.

4 **LADY HALLETT:** -- otherwise I am going to have rebelling  
5 stenographers. I'm sorry, because it is mid-question.

6 I shall come back at 3.25.

7 **(3.12 pm)**

8 **(A short break)**

9 **(3.25 pm)**

10 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith.

11 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, in the course of, no doubt, an overlong  
12 question, I suggested at some point earlier today that  
13 SAGE had not debated social distancing countermeasures  
14 until -- I said 24 March, in fact it's 25 March, I think  
15 Mr Hancock thought it was 26 March -- of February, I'm  
16 so sorry, February. I have been asked by Mr Hill to  
17 make absolutely clear, and I'm delighted to do so, there  
18 was a debate on 4 February at SAGE about face masks,  
19 schools, PPE and a number of measures. On 13 February  
20 there was debate about mass gatherings, school, work and  
21 prisons and a number of other areas, and that the full  
22 suite, if I may call them that, of countermeasures was  
23 discussed on the 25th. So the lockdown, being one  
24 example, was on the 25th.

25 One final question, please, in relation to the

170

1 London would be overwhelmed ..."

2 So he uses the word "overwhelmed".

3 "... in nine days' time, but the projection ..."

4 The actuality, 15 days.

5 Then if we scroll through, further in the document  
6 you will see the 22 March ministerial group meeting,  
7 current number of deaths, number of beds, and  
8 a reference to the drive to free up capacity. 23 March,  
9 of course, the Monday, how the NHS is being stretched in  
10 intensive care. And over the page, page 11, the COBR  
11 and the Cabinet meeting 23rd/24th.

12 It is obvious -- and you have described to the  
13 Inquiry how COBR and the Prime Minister rationalised  
14 that the NHS would be overwhelmed -- at some point, if R  
15 continued on its exponential growth and was not brought  
16 below 1, inevitably, as certain as night follows day,  
17 the NHS would collapse because of the sheer number of  
18 deaths?

19 **A.** Yes -- not because of the sheer number of deaths,  
20 because of the cases.

21 **Q.** Cases and deaths. But the point is that the NHS would  
22 not survive, because of the nature of an exponential  
23 growth.

24 To what extent did the government collectively have  
25 a view as to when that point might be likely to arrive?

172

1 I put it that way because you've explained, as has  
 2 Professor Sir Chris Whitty, that the final analysis was  
 3 based upon the correct understanding that  
 4 an exponential --

5 **A.** Yes.

6 **Q.** -- growth would only ever end in disaster for the NHS?

7 **A.** For the NHS, yes.

8 **Q.** But could you and were you able to go any further in  
 9 terms of understanding when that was likely to be?  
 10 Would it be an overtop, would it be an overwhelming,  
 11 would it be a complete collapse, would it be in a matter  
 12 of weeks, would surge capacity be able to ameliorate the  
 13 position? Explain what the level of understanding was.

14 **A.** In a way, the true answer to that question is nobody  
 15 fully knew what that would look like, but we knew that  
 16 it would be catastrophic. And in the paperwork, as  
 17 you've just shown, when making the decision on the 23rd,  
 18 the advice was nine days in the reasonable worst-case  
 19 scenario, 15 days in the central scenario, but at that  
 20 point my worry was we were going up the reasonable  
 21 worst-case scenario, notwithstanding the decisions we'd  
 22 taken on the 16th and the 20th.

23 The -- what that would look like, what that would  
 24 mean would be people going without treatment. And I was  
 25 absolutely determined that that would not happen. And

173

1 system for an increase in staffed beds, in ICU beds, in  
 2 surge capacity --

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** -- notwithstanding that you could not know and you would  
 5 never know at what point collapse would come, it was  
 6 a risk that no secretary of state responsible for public  
 7 health could countenance?

8 **A.** Yes, that is a good summary.

9 **Q.** Right. Some other issues, please, Mr Hancock.

10 Public Health England. The Inquiry has understood  
 11 that Public Health England, well, was disbanded in the  
 12 middle of the pandemic, to use one of the witness  
 13 statements. Did you have concerns about the ability of  
 14 Public Health England in February, March, April, to  
 15 respond to the pandemic? And, if so, was that  
 16 a contributory factor to the disbandment of PHE and its  
 17 substitution by the UKHSA?

18 **A.** Yes, I did. Public Health England did an absolutely  
 19 superb job, especially on the scientific research, and  
 20 the best early example was developing the test in  
 21 an extremely short period of time. And in its lab work  
 22 and its analysis, it was first rate. Its genomics  
 23 programme was superb. There was one point in the  
 24 pandemic when we were sequencing half of the genomes of  
 25 Covid in the world.

175

1 that came back to the Nimbus discussion and other  
 2 discussions around that. So we took a huge amount of  
 3 action, and I thought that Simon Stevens, Lord Stevens,  
 4 described that extremely well in his evidence.

5 The -- I pushed for him to expand both the physical  
 6 capacity and expand the effective staffing. Because one  
 7 of the -- one of the challenges that has been put at  
 8 this stage is that -- and it's there in some of the  
 9 written evidence to the Inquiry, that we didn't know  
 10 exactly how many beds the NHS had, in quotes. Well,  
 11 what matters is not a physical bed, what matters is  
 12 a staffed bed. And that is flexible. In some cases we  
 13 took the staff ratio in intensive care, normally 1:1, up  
 14 to six patients to one nurse. So it is flexible.

15 The NHS would -- you said in your question, would  
 16 the NHS have survived? Of course the NHS would have  
 17 survived, it would have done its level best and is  
 18 an amazing and adaptable institution full of  
 19 extraordinary people, but it would not have been able to  
 20 provide care to everybody, and therefore the number of  
 21 people who died would have gone up even more than it  
 22 would have done just because of the virus.

23 **Q.** And therefore, is this a fair summary, notwithstanding  
 24 the remarkable ability of the NHS to cope,  
 25 notwithstanding the flexibility that there may be in the

174

1 However, my view on this accords very closely with  
 2 Chris Wormald's evidence, which is that its capacity to  
 3 scale was simply not there. It hadn't had the  
 4 experience of scaling. This isn't a criticism of any  
 5 individuals. It had a contact tracing system that was  
 6 based on top quality, highly trained experts, whereas  
 7 what we needed was much more like a call centre,  
 8 Henry Ford-style, high-volume contact tracing system  
 9 that we eventually built.

10 It was deeply frustrating that there was a --  
 11 an unenthusiasm, if I put it diplomatically, to engage  
 12 private sector testing capacity, and I personally had to  
 13 get involved in sorting that out --

14 **Q.** Can I just pause you there. You refer in your statement  
 15 to a particular problem in relation to the extent to  
 16 which PHE found itself able to assist a particular  
 17 commercial entity in its development of a test?

18 **A.** No, the problem was that it wouldn't -- it wouldn't  
 19 engage any private commercial entity. There were  
 20 a couple, which I mention in my statement, who I asked  
 21 them to contact, because they'd come to me. I wanted  
 22 them to support any private entity that could expand  
 23 testing. It wasn't about these particular companies,  
 24 what I wanted was testing capacity.

25 And there was a view which was that there is, across

176

1 the country, a large number of very small university or  
2 hospital-based and a couple of PHE-based labs, and that  
3 we should use these. But they were not of -- they were  
4 not scalable models, they were small, and they were  
5 essentially structured for science rather than  
6 structured for throughput. And so my concerns with PHE  
7 were really about its inability to scale. That was the  
8 first.

9 The second was about a longer-term change that  
10 I thought was needed, and this was the problem of PHE  
11 having two goals. It was --

12 **Q.** Was this the health improvement --

13 **A.** Correct. It was responsible for health improvement.  
14 That is, improvement of people's health when -- with  
15 respect to non-communicable diseases, obesity being the  
16 most important, but anti-smoking drives, for instance,  
17 very, very -- PHE was very strong in these areas, as  
18 well as responsible for communicable diseases, either  
19 the normal ones that happen all the time, you know, the  
20 occasional outbreak of legionnaires' disease or Mpox or  
21 what have you, and preparation for very rare but  
22 extremely high consequence communicable diseases akin to  
23 a pandemic.

24 And I have a background in -- at the  
25 Bank of England, and it is akin to financial stability.

177

1 early on.

2 From mid-March we did manage to develop this sort of  
3 capacity. It was slower than it should have been and  
4 it's a vital, vital lesson for the future that we need  
5 a testing system ready to go. And I'm worried that that  
6 is not there right now in case, in case there's  
7 a pandemic.

8 You know, maybe -- what happens if one of these  
9 things -- one of these diseases that we've read about in  
10 the last couple of weeks, the influenza in northern  
11 China, becomes pandemic? We need to be able to -- my  
12 question now, to the Secretary of State, would be: how  
13 quickly could we get to 100,000 tests? How quickly are  
14 we going to get a vaccine? How quickly are we going to  
15 have 5,000 people in a call centre doing contact  
16 tracing?

17 **Q.** Do you happen to know for a fact whether or not the  
18 hugely impressive and extremely extensive testing system  
19 that was, of course, ultimately put into place has  
20 become degraded since the end of the crisis or whether  
21 it is still in place?

22 **A.** No, of-course it's been stepped down. But you'd want to  
23 step some of it down, there's no -- we built a capacity  
24 of almost a million tests a day. You don't need  
25 a million tests a day in normal times. What you need is

179

1 Most of the time there isn't a problem with financial  
2 stability, but when there is a problem with financial  
3 stability you absolutely need an institution that is  
4 going to lead in the response; and we have one, it's the  
5 Bank of England.

6 **Q.** All right.

7 **A.** We did not have the equivalent, and now we do because of  
8 UKHSA.

9 **Q.** The second point you mention, the systemic change, if  
10 you like, to recognise that the new body focuses on  
11 health -- prevention, it's plainly understood. Was it  
12 in relation to the first point though truly the fault of  
13 Public Health England that it was unable to scale up the  
14 testing process? I mean, wasn't that a reflection of  
15 historical institutional failings, there just wasn't  
16 a system in place, and nobody, let alone PHE, could have  
17 scaled up in January, even if they had been minded to do  
18 so? Or do you think practically it had been open to  
19 them to take those steps but that they failed to do so?

20 **A.** I don't want to ascribe blame. It would have been  
21 better for the UK response had those companies that  
22 are -- that were experienced in diagnostics, albeit  
23 relatively small-scale, especially compared to some  
24 countries like Germany, had been given the full-hearted  
25 support, with the sputum(?) they needed, for instance,

178

1 the ability very rapidly to put it back in place.

2 **Q.** Yes.

3 **A.** So, for instance --

4 **Q.** Mr Hancock, I'm sorry to interrupt. You said:

5 "... I'm worried that that is not there right now in  
6 case ..."

7 **A.** Correct.

8 **Q.** So I'm asking you, do you know that it is now not there,  
9 or are you saying it is still there, it's been stepped  
10 down reasonably, but you've got concerns about whether  
11 it can be stepped back up?

12 **A.** That is what I'm concerned about.

13 For instance, recently the -- one of the major labs  
14 was put on the market. I think it would be better if it  
15 were mothballed and ready to go at the flick of  
16 a switch.

17 **Q.** All right.

18 **A.** And can I just make one point on this? We spend  
19 £50 billion a year on physical defence and we spend less  
20 than half a billion pounds a year on UKHSA. We spend  
21 less than 1% of our total budget for defence on health  
22 security, yet health security failings have killed more  
23 civilians than any other external threat since the  
24 Second World War, and maybe even further back than that,  
25 and I think this is a spectacular imbalance in the

180

1 amount of resources that we put into defence of this  
2 country against, say, a terror threat compared to  
3 a health threat.

4 I've got one particular axe to grind. I attended  
5 the National Security Council in my role as Secretary of  
6 State occasionally but the head of UKHSA should be on  
7 the National Security Council all of the time, not just  
8 brought in when there's a health issue on the agenda,  
9 because health security threats have been demonstrated  
10 to be the biggest threat to the civilian population of  
11 this country.

12 **Q.** A previous witness observed that had this been  
13 a threat --

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** -- in national security terms --

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** -- rather than a risk --

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** -- in public health terms, the government may have --  
20 well, it would have had different structures in place,  
21 but it may have responded significantly differently.

22 **A.** It would have had basically the same structures in  
23 place. It would have used them.

24 Imagine if I have gone to --

25 **Q.** I'm going to ask you very politely just not to go any

181

1 entirely within the Health remit, that would have been  
2 like an MoD minister, the defence secretary, chairing  
3 a COBR on a defence matter, totally reasonable at first.  
4 But when it became clear this was a 50/50 threat, given  
5 the reasonable worst-case scenario, then the whole  
6 National Security Secretariat and civil contingencies  
7 apparatus which exists should have been brought to bear  
8 on this crisis. And instead what happened was a special  
9 adviser in Number 10 decided to try to make all the  
10 decisions out of his office.

11 **Q.** Mr Hancock, again you've overly focused, if I may say  
12 so, on the structure and the committee structure.  
13 My Lady would be much more assisted, I think, by  
14 understanding whether, if it had been a national  
15 security threat, not just would there have been changes  
16 in the application or the approach or the utilisation of  
17 the committee structure, but would there have been  
18 a material response in the way in which the government  
19 responded, practically, in terms of the measures, the  
20 actions, the steps it might thereafter then take?

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** Right, thank you.

23 The 100,000 test goal of April.

24 **A.** Yes.

25 **Q.** I don't wish to linger on this subject. It is

183

1 further.

2 **A.** Just one --

3 **Q.** We understand, Mr Hancock, the point you make, and  
4 you've made this point in your witness statement. We  
5 understand the point about the difference between  
6 national security and threats and risks.

7 **A.** One sentence? If I'd gone, in mid-January, to the  
8 Cabinet Secretary setting out a 50/50 chance of  
9 a terrorist threat that might kill half a million  
10 people, I think the Prime Minister would have chaired  
11 the COBR, not me, don't you?

12 **Q.** I don't answer the questions here, Mr Hancock, but there  
13 is obviously force in your observation. But can I ask  
14 you to move it forward: it may or may not be that the  
15 absence of a chairing of that first COBR by the  
16 Prime Minister made a difference. That's a matter for  
17 my Lady to determine. Can you go further and say that  
18 over the course of, perhaps, the following four weeks --

19 **A.** Yeah.

20 **Q.** -- there was a -- there would have been a material  
21 difference in the whole system response?

22 **A.** Yes, yes.

23 **Q.** Right.

24 **A.** So I didn't specifically mean the very first one. It  
25 was reasonable very early on, the responses were almost

182

1 self-evident that it was a very considerable and  
2 impressive feat to ramp up the testing -- so that we can  
3 understand what the debate is -- from 10,000 a day at  
4 the end of March to 100,000 a day at the end of April.

5 The Inquiry has, however, received -- or it has  
6 seen, there is evidence in the WhatsApps and the private  
7 communications, considerable criticism of you in  
8 relation to that feat.

9 I'd like to suggest to you, and you will have no  
10 doubt reflected upon this, that there doesn't appear to  
11 have been criticism of the result or the ambition which,  
12 as I say, appeared to be very impressive, but that there  
13 was a lack of co-ordination first, that appears to be  
14 one criticism, and, secondly, a worry that by focusing  
15 on the end date, at the end of April, and by pulling the  
16 system towards that focus, it may have taken necessary  
17 focus away from other areas for which testing was no  
18 less important. Do you understand the point?

19 **A.** I -- I've tried to understand this point. It doesn't  
20 have a logical basis, but it was made at the time.

21 **Q.** We presume you will reject it.

22 **A.** Yeah. Certainly will.

23 **Q.** Okay. Well, Mr Hancock --

24 **A.** So -- for this reason --

25 **Q.** -- it's a serious matter --

184

1 **A.** It is, very, very serious, because I know now that there  
2 were people actively working against me on it, in the  
3 centre, which is appalling.

4 **Q.** Just pause there. Is that because you say in your  
5 statement that Number 10 intervened in the ramping up of  
6 testing capacity, which made it harder to achieve the  
7 goal? That's your statement.

8 **A.** The -- what Simon Case described to me as the long  
9 screwdriver, which is relatively junior people in  
10 Number 10 trying to go into the testing programme at  
11 a level too -- you know, too far down, too low, and  
12 issue diktats, was deeply unhelpful over this period.  
13 But -- and proper lines of accountability would have  
14 been -- following proper lines of accountability would  
15 have been much more effective.

16 But that -- that wasn't quite what I meant. What  
17 I meant was the criticism that, instead of going for  
18 100,000 tests there were other things tests could have  
19 been used for, is wrong and wrong in logic because we  
20 needed the tests -- of course we also needed to work out  
21 what we were going to use the tests for, and that was  
22 essentially a clinical decision, but what I needed to do  
23 from when I took over the responsibility for testing in  
24 the middle of -- on March 17, was drive the system,  
25 galvanise the system, as somebody put it, quite right,

185

1 I just ask you, and I'm doing this in order to be  
2 scrupulously fair to you, do you accept or reject the  
3 suggestion of creative counting?

4 **A.** I reject it. And on every different way you could  
5 possibly count these measures, we hit that target.

6 **Q.** All right.

7 Care homes. The detail of the adult care sector is  
8 for a later module, as I know you know, but  
9 a considerable amount of evidence has been given  
10 by-the-by in the context of this module about the centre  
11 of government's understanding of what the position was,  
12 firstly in relation to the discharge of patients from  
13 hospital to the care sector, and secondly, the extent of  
14 the testing that was available both for patients and  
15 also for staff in the care sector thereafter, at a later  
16 stage.

17 **A.** Yeah.

18 **Q.** And therefore I need to ask you briefly again what your  
19 reaction is.

20 The evidence has been given to this effect: that --  
21 and you've already referred to this -- the government's  
22 starting point is, of course, that local authorities  
23 manage and deal with risks in adult social care. That  
24 was evidence from Sir Chris Wormald. But it was also  
25 recognised, particularly in March, that the care sector

187

1 and announcing a target, even though I didn't know that  
2 we could hit it -- which is unusual in government,  
3 normally people only do things they're pretty sure they  
4 can achieve -- that was absolutely critical to driving  
5 the expansion of testing, which was so necessary in the  
6 rest of the response.

7 It is -- of course it's frustrating to me that in so  
8 doing and in taking that approach I -- obviously some  
9 people were upset by it. It baffles me why people were  
10 against the expansion of testing in that way.

11 **Q.** All right.

12 On 1 May the Cabinet Secretary WhatsApped you to say  
13 "Hi Matt. Well done this evening. Creative counting  
14 and 122k!"

15 You respond, although it looks like question marks,  
16 in fact it was a three kiss emoji.

17 **A.** I told you we got on well.

18 **Q.** Well, yes. But you appear also to be accepting his  
19 perhaps jocular observation that you'd engaged in  
20 creative counting.

21 **A.** This reference is about how we went about counting a new  
22 innovation, which was tests that people did at home, on  
23 which there was work in the department. The  
24 permanent secretary --

25 **Q.** Mr Hancock, I'm so sorry, in the interests of time, can

186

1 presented particular vulnerabilities and problems.

2 **A.** That was recognised in February when we saw that older  
3 people were the most vulnerable.

4 **Q.** Yes. I refer to March because you opened a coronavirus  
5 and social care meeting, a specific meeting on this  
6 issue on 6 March, and you referred to the higher risks  
7 attendant upon the sector.

8 On 17 March, the government announced -- well,  
9 NHS England issued a letter, as you'll well recall,  
10 requesting all parts of the NHS to free up maximum  
11 inpatient and critical care capacity, and the government  
12 issued its hospital discharge requirements on 19 March,  
13 and thereafter patients began to be moved, when they  
14 were medically able to do so, from hospitals to the  
15 care sector.

16 Can you please make absolutely plain whether or not  
17 those discharges to care homes from 18 March onwards  
18 were contingent in any way upon a negative test being  
19 available and applied?

20 **A.** In March they were not.

21 **Q.** Were any assurances given by you or others that testing  
22 would be in place for patients discharged from that date  
23 onwards?

24 **A.** The assurances that I gave were the -- were very  
25 precisely the policies that were in place at that time.

188

1 Q. It's not a trap. There were, as far as we can tell, no  
 2 assurances given by anybody that anybody would be tested  
 3 from 18 March prior to discharge. It's plain.  
 4 A. You know, I have been accused of various things over  
 5 this. The --  
 6 Q. Will you bear with me? I'm going to come to the  
 7 substance of the debate in a moment. But I wish you to  
 8 acknowledge that the suggestion that from 18 March  
 9 patients should have been tested but were not has no  
 10 legs in it. There were no assurances --  
 11 A. No, we didn't have enough tests.  
 12 Q. Precisely. There is a DHSC document dated 2 April,  
 13 INQ000233798, and it says on page 4:  
 14 "Negative tests ..."  
 15 You can see it's the sentence towards the bottom,  
 16 Mr Hancock.  
 17 A. Yeah.  
 18 Q. "Negative tests are not required transfer to  
 19 transfers/admissions into the care home."  
 20 A. That's right.  
 21 Q. But on page 5 there was guidance given that:  
 22 "Any [care home] resident presenting with  
 23 symptoms ..."  
 24 A. Yeah.  
 25 Q. "... of COVID-19 should be promptly isolated ... and  
 189

1 have --  
 2 Q. Do.  
 3 A. -- the opportunity to set it out a little bit.  
 4 The -- it is certainly true that, especially in  
 5 a pandemic, if you make a policy decision at the centre  
 6 then it takes time and it is sometimes uneven in how  
 7 that is promulgated. That's true across all policy,  
 8 especially when done at pace.  
 9 Nevertheless, even having said that, the testing  
 10 policies were -- that we put in place for adult social  
 11 care were essentially based on clinical advice of what  
 12 tests would be reliable and effective, combined with the  
 13 operational advice of how many tests were available.  
 14 So, for instance, there was a discussion on 14 April  
 15 when clinical advice for the first time said: yes, you  
 16 can test asymptomatic people and a negative test will be  
 17 reliable; really important, apropos our earlier  
 18 discussion.  
 19 But then we combined that with the operational  
 20 advice as to how many tests were available, by that  
 21 stage around 35,000. And you can see, for instance in  
 22 INQ000292608, that then the clinical advisers, in this  
 23 case the CMO, came back and then signed off on and  
 24 issued new advice as to what the policy should be for  
 25 testing.

191

1 separated in a single room with a separate bathroom ..."  
 2 If, of course -- as we can see from the heading --  
 3 they were already residents.  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. Right, so that's very clear.  
 6 Subsequently -- and I don't want to go through the  
 7 detail of them -- there were announcements about testing  
 8 of symptomatic care home staff.  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. 15 April, there was an action plan for adult social  
 11 care. There was an announcement on 28 April for  
 12 asymptomatic staff and resident care homes for over-65s.  
 13 Another announcement on 7 June, all about testing.  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Was the core point this: that whilst the government  
 16 could announce a policy of testing, because, for the  
 17 very reason you've identified, there was a shortage of  
 18 testing, it could give no guarantees as to whether  
 19 testing in reality would meet that aspiration? Outwith  
 20 your control, there may and were occasions -- or maybe  
 21 many occasions -- when testing was not available due to  
 22 the exigencies of the system, but that's nothing to do  
 23 with the policy announced by government.  
 24 Is that a fair summary?  
 25 A. It's a little bit more complex than that, and if I might  
 190

1 So the testing rules, who got the tests, what the  
 2 policy was, what order of priority we used tests in, was  
 3 based on clinical advice throughout.  
 4 Q. All right. That is understood, and nobody has suggested  
 5 otherwise. The point I'm making is a different one,  
 6 which is the DHSC, your clinical advisers, whoever it  
 7 was who promulgated the policies, could not day in, day  
 8 out, practically at residential care sector level --  
 9 A. Yeah.  
 10 Q. -- guarantee everybody a test or practically make them  
 11 available. This was an extremely complex, difficult  
 12 system, and you could not ensure or guarantee that there  
 13 would be tests available for everyone in accordance with  
 14 the policy.  
 15 A. So --  
 16 Q. It was impossible.  
 17 A. Yes. However, what I'm saying is when we were devising  
 18 the policy, we tried to take that into account as much  
 19 as possible --  
 20 Q. Sure.  
 21 A. -- but you can't take it into account entirely.  
 22 Q. Of course. I mean that's, if I may say so, an obvious  
 23 point.  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. So in the WhatsApp group to which you were

192

1 a contributor, the group I've mentioned earlier,  
 2 CSA-CMO-Matt-PM-Dom --  
 3 **A.** Yeah.  
 4 **Q.** -- you will recall, Mr Hancock, that in May Mr Cummings  
 5 says:  
 6 "I don't understand why we are still not testing  
 7 more ... care home staff including asymptomatic."  
 8 **A.** Yeah.  
 9 **Q.** And Sir Patrick Vallance says:  
 10 "The testing is fully owned in DHSC. If we don't  
 11 get on top of the ... spread then we risk the rest."  
 12 And you say:  
 13 "We have been doing this for the past week."  
 14 That's dated 3 May, and that must be a reference  
 15 back to probably the 28 April policy, or perhaps one of  
 16 the earlier policies.  
 17 Mr Cummings, as you know, sends round a message  
 18 saying "We're negligently killing the most vulnerable  
 19 and I'm extremely worried".  
 20 Trying to be as neutral as you can, in terms --  
 21 **A.** Yeah.  
 22 **Q.** -- of your dealings with Mr Cummings, was this  
 23 explosive -- the communications are very explosive --  
 24 this explosive row as to what was being done  
 25 a reflection of that difficulty, that policy may not

193

1 horrible virus affects older people most. So right from  
 2 the start, we've tried to throw a protective ring around  
 3 our care homes."  
 4 And you say "we've tried". You denied, on a show on  
 5 6 June, using the words "right from the start". And in  
 6 another place, in Parliament -- and I breach no  
 7 Parliamentary privilege rule by stating as a matter of  
 8 fact, because I'm not addressing the merits of what was  
 9 said in Parliament -- you said, "We absolutely did throw  
 10 a protective ring around social care".  
 11 So that's the context.  
 12 Going back to the press conference, you said, "Right  
 13 from the start, [it's been clear] we've tried to throw  
 14 a protective ring". Do you acknowledge that the phrase  
 15 "trying to throw a protective ring" and the reference to  
 16 "right from the start" was open to interpretation?  
 17 People would take from those words what they wished, and  
 18 there was certainly an argument for saying that that was  
 19 giving the clear impression that there was  
 20 an impermeable barrier, whether in terms of finance,  
 21 fiscal support, testing or discharge, staff, residential  
 22 movements within the care sector?  
 23 **A.** I entirely understand why people feel strongly about  
 24 this, and what I -- when I first said that, I then went  
 25 on to explain what I meant, that we'd put over

195

1 reflect the reality of what tests were actually in place  
 2 up and down the land in the care sector?  
 3 **A.** It was a reflection, in my opinion, of two things. The  
 4 first is that, that you can ... you can find examples on  
 5 the ground where the policy set in Whitehall doesn't  
 6 match entirely, but it's also a reflection of the fact  
 7 that unfortunately the Prime Minister's chief adviser  
 8 didn't always try to ascertain the facts before making  
 9 comments. He did this over the testing target towards  
 10 the end of March, which we hit, when he provided  
 11 misinformation to the Prime Minister, and --  
 12 **Q.** Mr Hancock, I've given you ample opportunity to comment  
 13 on the allegations that Mr Cummings has made about  
 14 you --  
 15 **A.** The point is they're false, so you can't actually take  
 16 anything that he wrote in that as true, because in that  
 17 case it didn't accord with the facts, and I just gave  
 18 another example, and therefore it's quite difficult to  
 19 answer in a substantive way about the planning of future  
 20 pandemics when the comments that I was receiving were  
 21 not based on the truth.  
 22 **Q.** All right.  
 23 Protective ring. On 15 May you said at  
 24 a Downing Street press conference:  
 25 "Right from the start it's been clear that this

194

1 £3 billion into the care sector in April -- in March and  
 2 April, that we'd released PPE, free PPE, that we'd put  
 3 in place infection control guidance based on the  
 4 scientific advice, et cetera. And in fact in that press  
 5 conference I went on to list the different things that  
 6 we were doing, and in fact as part of the plan we were  
 7 launching that day we made another £600 million  
 8 available for infection control purposes. And so I was  
 9 trying to simply summarise that we had taken action, and  
 10 I set out the action.  
 11 **Q.** That is understood. I cannot improve on the glorious  
 12 words of Professor Sir Jonathan Van-Tam, who says in his  
 13 statement:  
 14 "My view ... is ... a ring is a circle without  
 15 a break in it."  
 16 Whatever -- however you describe the protective  
 17 processes you put in place around the care sector, they  
 18 did not form an unbroken circle, did they?  
 19 **A.** It is quite clear from the evidence that  
 20 Professor Van-Tam is right.  
 21 **Q.** Yes. Thank you.  
 22 On 13 May, so around the same time -- could we have  
 23 INQ000102709, and it's the 13 May entry at 12.47, and it  
 24 may be page 219, but I'll be corrected if I'm wrong.  
 25 13 May, 12.47. Yes, there we are, thank you very much.

196

1 There's a reference to Jamie Njoku-Goodwin.  
 2 **A.** Yes.  
 3 **Q.** Is he one of your advisers, or is he --  
 4 **A.** Yes, he was my media adviser at the time. He is now  
 5 a director of strategy in Number 10.  
 6 **Q.** "Matt, we might have some issues with you telling the PM  
 7 we 'locked down' care homes before the rest of the  
 8 country."  
 9 So this is your adviser telling you that there may  
 10 be a need to correct, either directly or indirectly,  
 11 an impression seemingly given by you in your  
 12 communications with the Prime Minister; and the rest of  
 13 the page and the next two pages deal with your debate  
 14 about whether there was a justification for using those  
 15 words and how it might be justified retrospectively.  
 16 What was that debate about? In what way did the  
 17 Prime Minister believe that -- or your aide believe that  
 18 by saying "we locked down the care homes" you might not  
 19 have been entirely accurate?  
 20 **A.** Well, it depends on how you define "locked down", and --  
 21 **Q.** If you just tell us the debate. In what way do you say  
 22 you didn't say anything misleading, and in what way was  
 23 it being suggested against you that you had?  
 24 **A.** Well, it depends on whether you define the actions that  
 25 were taken in the publication on 13 March, that

197

1 **A.** I think that's what Jamie was trying to tell me.  
 2 **Q.** All right, thank you.  
 3 Another hugely -- well, it became a very divisive  
 4 issue, again, was the moving of personnel between  
 5 care homes.  
 6 **A.** Yes.  
 7 **Q.** Your statement makes plain --  
 8 **A.** Yeah.  
 9 **Q.** -- that you became aware of initial evidence --  
 10 **A.** Yes.  
 11 **Q.** -- showing that the movement of staff between care homes  
 12 was the main source of transmission.  
 13 **A.** Yeah.  
 14 **Q.** I pause there simply to say I don't intend to ask you  
 15 any questions and I would be grateful if you don't  
 16 answer or try to give an answer --  
 17 **A.** Yeah.  
 18 **Q.** -- about the degree to which the discharge of patients  
 19 from hospital contributed to infections in the  
 20 care homes --  
 21 **A.** Yeah.  
 22 **Q.** -- as opposed to the movement of staff.  
 23 **A.** Yeah.  
 24 **Q.** That's for another time.  
 25 But you became aware of evidence saying that the

199

1 guidance, as lockdown or not, and unless we -- I'm happy  
 2 to go into the detail.  
 3 **Q.** So it was in the context of the 13 March measures; is  
 4 that the answer?  
 5 **A.** Yes, because the critique being put at the time was that  
 6 we took action to protect people in care homes later  
 7 than locking down the rest of the country, and that was  
 8 not true, because we took action on 13 March with  
 9 respect to care homes.  
 10 Whether that action was strong enough or not to call  
 11 it lockdown -- for instance it included visitor  
 12 restrictions, I think -- is, that's the point of debate.  
 13 I think the answer is --  
 14 **Q.** In fact Mr Njoku-Goodwin sets out, at the bottom of the  
 15 page, in his WhatsApp what the measures were from  
 16 13 March. Those are the 13 March measures, aren't they?  
 17 "To minimise the risk of transmission, care home  
 18 providers are advised to review their visiting policy,  
 19 by asking no one to visit who has suspected Covid-19 or  
 20 is generally unwell, and by emphasising good hand  
 21 hygiene for visitors. Contractors ... should be kept to  
 22 a minimum. The review should consider the wellbeing of  
 23 residents ..."  
 24 In no universe, Mr Hancock, could those measures  
 25 possibly be described as locking down the care homes?

198

1 movement of staff was the main source of transmission.  
 2 **A.** Yes.  
 3 **Q.** Sir Patrick Vallance has, through his evening notes,  
 4 said that, or suggested that he had been telling you for  
 5 some time before that date, before 11 May, that the  
 6 movement of persons between care homes was a significant  
 7 issue and he says: we raised it in February. And he'd  
 8 been told by you that the movement of care homes wasn't  
 9 going to be stopped because it was "essential for that  
 10 sector".  
 11 Would you just briefly say whether or not you accept  
 12 the suggestion that Sir Patrick Vallance had been trying  
 13 to raise the issue with you before but had made no  
 14 progress, or do you deny that suggestion that you were  
 15 late to this particular issue and only moved belatedly?  
 16 **A.** The challenge here is that there was a balance between  
 17 two very difficult problems, and many problems during  
 18 the pandemic, many decisions were about balancing two  
 19 unpalatable outcomes.  
 20 Early in the pandemic we were acutely aware of  
 21 care homes in other countries where -- in particular  
 22 there was an example in Spain that was very vivid in my  
 23 memory -- where there hadn't been enough staff. In that  
 24 case there were no staff, and the residents had died.  
 25 Sadly in care homes people are both most vulnerable

200

1 to the virus and most in need of human interaction for  
2 their wellbeing and ultimately to live day to day.

3 So we were very, very worried about not having  
4 enough staff to keep people alive, at the same time as  
5 being very worried about the transmission of the virus.  
6 Now, of course, it comes down to the assumption you made  
7 about asymptomatic -- you make about asymptomatic  
8 transmission, and it comes down to the balance between  
9 these two awful considerations.

10 By April, when the -- when there was more -- when we  
11 had more time, and the care sector had had time to get  
12 its -- to deal with the logistical problems of  
13 restricting staff movement, we then took action, which  
14 I think we announced in the middle of May.

15 So I would -- my explanation for why Patrick might  
16 feel that way is that there is a scientific argument on  
17 the one hand and there is an operational argument on the  
18 other, and some of his greatest frustrations were when  
19 the scientific requirement and the operational  
20 constraints were in conflict with each other, as they  
21 were in this case.

22 **Q.** Forgive me. The very difficult conundrum faced by  
23 government is obvious. I wasn't asking you about that.  
24 I was asking you whether there is any truth to the  
25 suggestion that Sir Patrick Vallance had asked you and

201

1 **Q.** -- politically, notwithstanding a common clinical  
2 position.

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** So taking a presentational political angle on matters  
5 which were understood to be common ground clinically.

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q.** To what is that a reference?

8 **A.** Well, we worked very well together at health  
9 minister-Health Secretary level, and there is evidence  
10 of that in the WhatsApps, and we -- and I know that at  
11 CMO level they worked very well together, and  
12 Chris Whitty has testified to that.

13 The challenge was that when decisions went up from  
14 our level to First Minister and Prime Ministerial level,  
15 there would sometimes be an agreement on what to do but  
16 someone would go ahead and announce it beforehand,  
17 causing confusion, or a choice to do something which was  
18 substantively the same but presentationally different or  
19 marginally different, which I thought in some cases was  
20 for the sake of presentation.

21 My starting point was the scientific point which is  
22 that we live on an island or a set of islands and the  
23 virus does not recognise administrative boundaries, even  
24 ones that are centuries old like the Scottish and Welsh  
25 borders, and it is necessary to take decisions across

203

1 had told you that the issue of moving people between  
2 care homes was important and that you had rejected that  
3 as an issue -- he says "I got told off" -- and that you  
4 only belatedly appreciated that there was a very real  
5 problem. Is that true or not?

6 **A.** That is not correct. It's not a fair reflection of  
7 my -- my position. Firstly, I wouldn't deign to tell  
8 off Patrick Vallance, who is a very eminent scientist  
9 and businessman. Also, my challenge at the time as  
10 Secretary of State, indeed our challenge both as  
11 a department and with the care sector, who we discussed  
12 these matters with, was this balance between the need,  
13 the absolute need to have staff and the imperative to  
14 reduce transmission which was carried by staff, and  
15 these two difficult considerations were in conflict. It  
16 is not reasonable to just take one side of that  
17 argument, you have to take both into account.

18 **Q.** Moving on, a couple of discrete issues, please.

19 In your witness statement at paragraph 393 you refer  
20 to, in the context of the devolved administrations,  
21 difficulties encountered by the United Kingdom  
22 Government associated with the Scottish Government  
23 taking -- I'll summarise it in this way -- different  
24 positions presentationally or --

25 **A.** Yes.

202

1 the whole island that are consistent, and there was also  
2 obviously a communications challenge with the public.

3 So it was -- I found it unfortunate that sometimes,  
4 not all the time by any stretch, but sometimes when  
5 decisions went up, in particular in Scotland, the -- and  
6 in particular at First Minister level, there would then  
7 be a -- there would then be a political angle or  
8 presentational angle put on a decision based on the same  
9 science. It was frustrating.

10 **Q.** Moving now to the summer of 2020, and without going into  
11 the detail of the plan to rebuild or the exit from the  
12 first national lockdown, it's plain, Mr Hancock, that  
13 there was a vigorous debate about the speed at which the  
14 country should come out of the measures, and a debate  
15 about the speed at which the particular phases of the  
16 roadmap should be proceeded through.

17 **A.** Yeah.

18 **Q.** Your statement suggests that you had significant  
19 concerns about whether or not step 3 of the roadmap went  
20 too far, because it was obvious that cases were rising  
21 again, and you also questioned the tone and ambition of  
22 government publications, in particular one of the  
23 chapters of the plan to rebuild --

24 **A.** Can you remind me of the date of step 3?

25 **Q.** It's phase 3 ... I don't think I can assist on the

204

1 particular date of that phase. It matters not, because  
 2 it's --  
 3 **A.** Okay.  
 4 **Q.** -- obvious it was in May that the --  
 5 **A.** Cases only -- cases started rising mid-July, that's when  
 6 I really started worrying.  
 7 **Q.** Yes, but your statement says, "Step 3 went too far as  
 8 cases began rising again".  
 9 **A.** I see, yes.  
 10 **Q.** You also --  
 11 **A.** Subsequently, yes.  
 12 **Q.** -- in July later expressed concern to the Prime Minister  
 13 about the speed of release.  
 14 **A.** Yes.  
 15 **Q.** I don't want to trouble you with the detail, but in this  
 16 general debate about --  
 17 **A.** Yes.  
 18 **Q.** -- caution against speed of release --  
 19 **A.** Yes.  
 20 **Q.** -- you were for caution?  
 21 **A.** Yes.  
 22 **Q.** To what extent were your concerns heard and reflected in  
 23 the government's position thereafter?  
 24 **A.** Well, they were heard and they were reflected, I guess,  
 25 inasmuch as it might have been more -- there might have

205

1 step 3 of the roadmap went too far, which tends to  
 2 suggest that your concerns were not reflected in the  
 3 outcome of that roadmap because step 3 had been  
 4 promulgated, you thought they went too far, but it  
 5 couldn't be reversed?  
 6 **A.** Well, certainly not -- not fully reflected but,  
 7 you know, as throughout the autumn, the Prime Minister  
 8 balanced economic and health considerations, and I made  
 9 the health argument as well as I could and, you know,  
 10 this -- so this was an early precursor to the much more  
 11 involved debates over September and October.  
 12 **Q.** Do you recall ONS data being released on 29 July?  
 13 **A.** Yes, I remember that we -- the number of cases bottomed  
 14 out on 13 July and I remember the ONS, which came out  
 15 a little bit later but was more robust, the ONS survey  
 16 would come out shortly after that.  
 17 **Q.** The ONS data of that date showed, according to your  
 18 statement -- and it is of course right -- that cases had  
 19 risen, to use your word, dramatically.  
 20 **A.** Yes. From a very low base, but yes.  
 21 **Q.** Did you know in advance of the Eat Out to Help Out  
 22 scheme?  
 23 **A.** No, that was announced on the -- not ahead of its  
 24 announcement on 8 July.  
 25 **Q.** No.

207

1 been more opening had I not made these arguments.  
 2 My entire strategy at this point was to try to keep  
 3 R below 1, I thought that it was -- I was completely  
 4 alongside Chris Whitty during this period on this  
 5 strategy, which was: summer is the best time to release,  
 6 if R goes a bit above 1 over the summer, not the end of  
 7 the world so long as cases are very low, but then we'll  
 8 have to take action in the early autumn to get it down  
 9 again, but the critical thing is to keep it under  
 10 control; and in this period I articulated that -- what  
 11 I regarded as the government's strategy, which was we  
 12 suppress the virus until a vaccine can make us safe.  
 13 Now, after articulating that a few times, I then got  
 14 asked by Number 10 not to say it because we didn't know  
 15 we'd get a vaccine, but I was confident by this point  
 16 that we would get one, and anyway I couldn't see any  
 17 other way through this without far too many deaths.  
 18 **Q.** When were you asked by Number 10 not to say it?  
 19 **A.** I can't remember, it was in a press conference. We  
 20 would be able to -- we should be able to find the  
 21 paperwork if we dig further for it. It was --  
 22 **Q.** Just assist us, roughly.  
 23 **A.** It will have been in a press conference in July or  
 24 August.  
 25 **Q.** Your statement says in terms that you believe that

206

1 **A.** In fact, cases were still falling at that point.  
 2 **Q.** Did you raise your concern when the scheme was  
 3 announced? And of course it was announced in advance of  
 4 the beginning of August and meant to take effect on --  
 5 **A.** 3 August, I think.  
 6 **Q.** -- Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays for those four weeks  
 7 of August.  
 8 **A.** I didn't know about the Eat Out to Help Out scheme until  
 9 the Cabinet meeting on the morning of its announcement,  
 10 and it was one of a package of loosening, we were doing  
 11 a number of things to bring back a bit of freedom over  
 12 the summer.  
 13 **Q.** As the Secretary of State for Health, had you been told  
 14 and had you been asked for your view, what would you  
 15 have said?  
 16 **A.** I don't know.  
 17 **Q.** Well, Mr Hancock, you've told the Inquiry that there is,  
 18 in this debate between caution and allowing release, and  
 19 it's a difficult debate, a public health view --  
 20 **A.** Yeah.  
 21 **Q.** -- which you, as the Secretary of State, are plainly on  
 22 the side of caution --  
 23 **A.** Yes.  
 24 **Q.** -- because that's your job.  
 25 **A.** What mattered really in the opening then was that there

208

1 wasn't overall too much, and in the end there was  
 2 overall too much. Which individual items you -- of  
 3 opening you did or didn't do is second order compared to  
 4 the overall amount of openings. I was at the same time  
 5 campaigning to -- internally -- to get funding so that  
 6 those who tested positive would isolate, which we  
 7 eventually got put in place in September, and I thought  
 8 that was the most important use of money.

9 **Q.** Did you express serious reservations about the scheme,  
 10 once you became aware of it, given your well known  
 11 position as Secretary of State for Health on the balance  
 12 between release and positive promotion of eating out,  
 13 and caution?

14 **A.** Once it was announced it was a done deal that it was  
 15 government policy, I expressed caution and argued very  
 16 strongly against its extension at the end of August, and  
 17 I don't think its extension was ever seriously in  
 18 prospect.

19 **Q.** So you did argue very strongly against it, did you?

20 **A.** I argued that it shouldn't be extended.

21 **Q.** It was a serious issue, though, was it not, in terms of  
 22 the possible -- and I'm not going to go into the debate  
 23 about what the impact actually was in terms of  
 24 prevalence -- but in terms of at least the perception in  
 25 intervention areas it was a serious problem?

209

1 effect, with hindsight, you can go through and you can  
 2 look at, you know, ten measures and say we in the end  
 3 could have afforded seven of these, and whether Eat Out  
 4 to Help Out is on that list or not is a moot point.

5 That was the attitude that I took. I wanted to keep  
 6 R below 1.

7 **Q.** INQ000129458 is a WhatsApp from you to Simon Case:  
 8 "Just want to let you know directly that we have had  
 9 lots of feedback that Eat [Out] to help out is causing  
 10 problems in our intervention areas. I've kept it out of  
 11 the news but it's serious."

12 This is you, Mr Hancock.

13 **A.** Yes.

14 **Q.** "Have you told Rishi?"

15 Then Mr Case says again:

16 "I don't think he can afford to extend it!"

17 Then you:

18 "Yes we've told treasury -- we've been protecting  
 19 them in the comms & thankfully it hasn't bubble[d] up."

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** So the position you took was indeed that it was serious,  
 22 that's your word?

23 **A.** Yes.

24 **Q.** That you had told the Treasury?

25 **A.** Yes.

211

1 **A.** In intervention areas it was unhelpful that the state  
 2 should be subsidising people to go out at the same time  
 3 as asking people to be more cautious.

4 **Q.** It was serious?

5 **A.** Well, what I'd say is that I think there has been undue  
 6 focus on this one item, and where the then Chancellor is  
 7 absolutely right in his statement is he argues that this  
 8 was not the sole cause of the second wave, and what  
 9 matters is the --

10 **Q.** Mr Hancock, I've deliberately not asked you --

11 **LADY HALLETT:** Let Mr Hancock finish.

12 **A.** What matters was the overall -- what Chris Whitty at the  
 13 time called the R budget, the overall set of measures.  
 14 My goal was to keep R below 1. If keeping R below 1  
 15 with a tighter set of measures elsewhere but with this  
 16 scheme in place, if that could have kept R below 1  
 17 I would have been happy with it. And if -- within the  
 18 debate and negotiation, if it was easier to get -- keep  
 19 the Chancellor in a good place on other measures that  
 20 were necessary in order to keep R below 1 as a whole,  
 21 then tactically that would be something that I'd be  
 22 happy with.

23 What matters here is the overall budget and keeping  
 24 R below 1. In the end that loosening was too much. Eat  
 25 Out to Help Out was just one of many measures and in

210

1 **Q.** But whilst you did so, you protected the Treasury in the  
 2 news, you concealed your concerns about the seriousness  
 3 of the impact of this scheme, and you expressed thanks,  
 4 gratitude, it hadn't come to light?

5 **A.** That's because I abide by collective responsibility, and  
 6 I was being encouraged by various journalists who would  
 7 presume that I was against it to criticise the then  
 8 Chancellor, but I believe that government is team effort  
 9 and so I didn't want that to become a row in public.

10 I mean, there's -- you can see during the whole  
 11 pandemic the corrosive effect of leaks, and I was --  
 12 I was not part of that, and I don't appreciate -- and  
 13 I don't appreciate government by leak, and hence  
 14 I abided by collective responsibility on and off the  
 15 record. That's what I am saying there.

16 **Q.** As we are all aware, in the autumn rates continued to go  
 17 up, prevalence went up, there was a rule of six  
 18 introduced. In the context of this debate between  
 19 relaxation, protecting the economy, and caution and  
 20 keeping R below 1, did the Prime Minister take  
 21 a consistent approach to one or the other sides of that  
 22 argument?

23 **A.** I think it's fair to say that the Prime Minister felt  
 24 strongly the arguments for the protection of health and  
 25 the arguments for liberty and the protection of the

212

1 economy. My particular beef was that I didn't think  
2 there was a trade-off at all, and there wasn't -- it  
3 wasn't an either/or, you couldn't choose between either,  
4 and my intense frustration was that economists at the  
5 Treasury and elsewhere couldn't see that although you  
6 could protect the economy by not locking down this week  
7 or next week, the consequence, the second round  
8 consequence of that would be a firmer, more economically  
9 damaging lockdown in the future. And, you know, as  
10 a trained economist and knowing some of them, you know,  
11 the second round impact of a decision is what economics  
12 is all about, and they -- I couldn't get them to see, it  
13 was deeply frustrating, that it was against the economic  
14 interest as well as against the health interest to avoid  
15 the action that was necessary. The Prime Minister saw  
16 it as both and he felt very keenly the instincts on both  
17 sides.

18 **Q.** In your book, for 26 August -- it purports to be a diary  
19 entry but we now know that these are not diary  
20 entries --

21 **A.** Not "now know", I was clear when I published it.

22 **Q.** "For all our best efforts to avoid chaotic lurching, the  
23 Prime Minister has veered off."

24 Do you recall writing that in your book?

25 **A.** I do, and I remember that period.

213

1 faced with a scenario similar to that faced at the end  
2 of February. That's what you suggest in your statement.

3 **A.** Yeah. Actually case rates were higher than at the end  
4 of February.

5 **Q.** Yes. Well, that is your assessment, you say similar to  
6 that faced at the end of February.

7 What in general terms, as the Secretary of State,  
8 was your position in September? Were you arguing for,  
9 at that early stage, circuit breaker -- which is a short  
10 lockdown, if you like, I suppose -- or a longer national  
11 lockdown, or were you calling for the better  
12 implementation of local restrictions, or perhaps  
13 beefed up rules of six or whatever?

14 **A.** Well, I was --

15 **Q.** What was your position?

16 **A.** My position was to argue first and foremost for tougher  
17 local lockdowns and the tiers system with a stronger top  
18 tier, and I first put that forward at the end of August  
19 to my own team, we worked it up and took it to a Covid-O  
20 in the middle of September, and it was very frustrating  
21 that it took me a month to get that policy in place.  
22 Even more frustrating was that the top tier was not  
23 enough to get R below 1 and therefore not effective for  
24 the task. That was deeply frustrating.

25 The second thing was where national measures like

215

1 **Q.** So the answer to the question I put, which is "Did the  
2 Prime Minister take a consistent line?", is not that he  
3 was conscious of the debate both sides, but that you  
4 used your efforts as well as the efforts of others to  
5 avoid chaotic lurching on his part, and the clear  
6 impression you give in your own book, Mr Hancock, is  
7 that yet again he had veered off.

8 **LADY HALLETT:** What period are we talking about?

9 **MR KEITH:** 26 August.

10 **A.** So August, late August was frustrating because in July  
11 the Prime Minister had been extremely concerned that  
12 there was a second wave, and it's reflected in the  
13 various communications, and then came back from holiday  
14 and was much more concerned with not locking down, and  
15 I found that a problem.

16 **Q.** Mr Hancock, they're your words, "chaotic lurching".  
17 That's not entirely similar to suggesting that he was  
18 reasonably and sensibly taking a different view in light  
19 of new information or scientific advice, is it?

20 **A.** There's a -- there are different degrees of diplomacy  
21 with which you can answer, give an answer to the same  
22 question.

23 **Q.** In September, as you've indicated and as your statement  
24 makes plain, the data shows that infection rates were  
25 going up and, in a very broad sense, the country was

214

1 the rule of six were proposed, I was an enthusiastic  
2 supporter of them.

3 **Q.** And the Inquiry asks of course, and without going into  
4 the detail, because SPI-M-O --

5 **A.** Yeah.

6 **Q.** -- on 16 September mooted a planned circuit breaker  
7 around October --

8 **A.** Sorry, I didn't answer on circuit breaker, yeah.

9 **Q.** Exactly, on the second October half term; and on  
10 17 September SAGE recommends a circuit breaker.

11 **A.** Yeah.

12 **Q.** And then you'll recall that the Covid Taskforce on  
13 19 September -- I'm sure you'll recall this -- put  
14 forward to the Prime Minister a number of different  
15 measures: package A, package B, package C and  
16 a circuit breaker.

17 **A.** Yeah.

18 **Q.** Where were you, between 17 and 20 September, on the  
19 circuit breaker proposition?

20 **A.** I was in favour of tougher measures that could get R  
21 below 1, especially in the areas where intervention was  
22 most needed because cases were highest. I was -- I was  
23 not convinced by the circuit breaker proposal on two  
24 grounds.

25 The first is it's effectively just a short lockdown,

216

1 and if you put it in for two weeks, I could see why in  
 2 theory, if for two weeks no human would come into  
 3 contact with any other human, then the case numbers  
 4 would drop dramatically; but in the real world that  
 5 isn't how life works. For instance in hospitals, in  
 6 care homes, people have to interact.

7 And secondly, the political impact of repeat  
 8 circuit breakers would have been to lose the confidence  
 9 of those who we needed to have on board to make it  
 10 happen, and I thought we would -- I thought that  
 11 therefore a circuit breaker was not the best approach  
 12 because basically rates would just shoot up afterwards.  
 13 That is what happened when they tried one in Wales.

14 I was more strongly in favour -- the thing I wanted  
 15 to see was action to keep R below 1, and the way that  
 16 I thought that was best organised was a degree of  
 17 national action and then the tiers system making sure  
 18 you could get the thing -- the pandemic under control  
 19 where it was most virulent.

20 That was my view at the time. I can go through with  
 21 hindsight what I now think of it.

22 **Q.** Well, before you look at the hindsight angle, you say in  
 23 your statement:  
 24 "There were no excuses second time round" --  
 25 **A.** Yeah.

217

1 **Q.** Mr Hancock, SAGE recommended a circuit breaker on  
 2 17 September --

3 **A.** If I can finish my sentence. Because I discussed it  
 4 with the Chief Medical Officer at the time, and his view  
 5 was subtly different to SAGE's, he thought we needed to  
 6 put in the restrictions necessary to get R below 1 in  
 7 a way that would hold consistently through the winter,  
 8 and I thought that was a better proposition.

9 Now, with hindsight, should I have teamed up with  
 10 the formal SAGE conclusions, et cetera? Well, it would  
 11 have been better to have something rather than nothing,  
 12 but my concern with a circuit breaker, even with  
 13 hindsight, is that coming in and out and in and out of  
 14 lockdown is not sustainable, it is not fair on the  
 15 public, and it would have lost support amongst  
 16 legislators, and I don't think it would have worked.

17 With hindsight, the tiers system didn't work because  
 18 where we did put -- it didn't work firstly because  
 19 I wasn't allowed to have a top tier that was strong  
 20 enough, but even if we had people just moved, you know.  
 21 I came up -- we came up with the tiers system to make  
 22 sure that people in areas of low prevalence didn't get  
 23 the full whack of lockdown measures, and it is un --  
 24 you know, because I cared about places like  
 25 Herefordshire and Cornwall that hardly had any cases,

219

1 **Q.** -- that is to say in relation to the second lockdown.  
 2 **A.** Yeah.

3 **Q.** "Case numbers rose from mid-July 2020" --  
 4 **A.** Yeah.

5 **Q.** -- "and it was clear ..."  
 6 So this isn't hindsight, this is reality.  
 7 **A.** Yeah.

8 **Q.** "... and it was clear that a second wave was coming from  
 9 late August."  
 10 **A.** Indeed, I said so on the record.

11 **Q.** "I began to call for measures to suppress" --  
 12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** Not mitigate, but suppress:  
 14 "... the virus in early September."  
 15 **A.** Yes.

16 **Q.** "The only possible strategy was to suppress the  
 17 virus" --  
 18 **A.** Until a vaccine came good.

19 **Q.** "I regret I was unable to win that argument".  
 20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** Why did you not lend your support to the scientific  
 22 advice, which was to the effect that a circuit breaker  
 23 in September was required?  
 24 **A.** Well, that wasn't the unanimous scientific advice,  
 25 because --

218

1 and it seemed unfair that they should be locked down  
 2 because other places had higher prevalence. But the  
 3 truth is people travelled and the spread came out, and  
 4 Patrick Vallance was right about his critique of tiers  
 5 in his evidence. So I would not recommend tiers for the  
 6 future --

7 **Q.** Can I interrupt to say we're going to deal with tiers in  
 8 the morning.  
 9 **A.** Okay.

10 **Q.** On this issue of why you didn't endorse, as the  
 11 Secretary of State for Health, the person whom, by your  
 12 own words, was bound to take the public health  
 13 position --  
 14 **A.** Because it wouldn't have worked in practice, and when it  
 15 was tried in Wales it didn't work. What we needed was  
 16 a consistent lockdown for the winter that would've --

17 **Q.** You --  
 18 **A.** -- kept R below 1.

19 **Q.** On 17 September you couldn't have known that the  
 20 lockdown in Wales wouldn't have worked, it hadn't been  
 21 put into place; and weren't you meant to be following  
 22 the science?  
 23 **A.** No, I was meant to be guided by the science. That was  
 24 my whole approach, guided by the science, but if  
 25 I thought -- as I thought on this -- that it wouldn't

220

1 work, then I would take another decision. And anyway,  
 2 in discussions with the Chief Medical Officer, who was  
 3 my principal clinical adviser, the -- we both -- we  
 4 thought, or at least he thought it was reasonably  
 5 arguable that a single consistent policy to keep R below  
 6 1 would have been better. I just don't think in-out,  
 7 in-out, in-out would have worked over the winter.  
 8 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, is that a convenient moment?  
 9 **LADY HALLETT:** Is that where you'd like to finish for the  
 10 evening?  
 11 **MR KEITH:** Please.  
 12 **LADY HALLETT:** Well, you've had a very long day, Mr Hancock.  
 13 I'm sorry we can't finish you today, but I think you  
 14 were warned that we'd have to ask you to come back  
 15 tomorrow. There are quite a few questions from the core  
 16 participants, so as soon as Mr Keith is concerned, we'll  
 17 start those. We will definitely conclude your evidence  
 18 before I break for lunch.  
 19 **THE WITNESS:** I'm available as long as you need me.  
 20 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much. 10 o'clock tomorrow,  
 21 please.  
 22 **(4.38 pm)**  
 23 **(The hearing adjourned until 10 am**  
 24 **on Friday, 1 December 2023)**  
 25

	<b>INDEX</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	1	
	2	
	3	MR MATT HANCOCK (affirmed) ..... 1
	4	
	5	Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY ... 1
	6	
	7	
	8	
	9	
	10	
	11	
	12	
	13	
	14	
	15	
	16	
	17	
	18	
	19	
	20	
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	

<b>LADY HALLETT:</b> <b>[29]</b> 1/3 1/8 19/19 44/7 44/11 73/19 73/25 78/10 78/15 79/18 83/19 107/13 107/15 107/19 114/1 125/22 137/22 138/9 153/15 153/23 165/20 170/2 170/4 170/10 210/11 214/8 221/9 221/12 221/20 <b>MR KEITH:</b> <b>[21]</b> 1/4 1/13 20/24 44/4 44/12 73/24 74/1 79/19 83/21 107/14 107/20 114/2 125/24 138/11 154/3 165/23 170/3 170/11 214/9 221/8 221/11 <b>THE WITNESS:</b> <b>[2]</b> 1/12 221/19	<b>100,000 tests [1]</b> 185/18 <b>10th [1]</b> 62/24 <b>11 [2]</b> 57/8 172/10 <b>11 March [3]</b> 63/19 69/19 140/7 <b>11 May [1]</b> 200/5 <b>11 municipalities [1]</b> 123/9 <b>11.04 am [1]</b> 44/8 <b>11.20 [1]</b> 44/7 <b>11.20 am [1]</b> 44/10 <b>11th [1]</b> 62/24 <b>12 [4]</b> 42/22 65/16 122/2 137/20 <b>12 cases [1]</b> 128/22 <b>12 March [13]</b> 28/19 29/8 29/24 31/4 42/18 42/21 143/8 143/16 143/17 145/10 146/12 150/13 150/25 <b>12.47 [2]</b> 196/23 196/25 <b>12.48 pm [1]</b> 107/16 <b>122k [1]</b> 186/14 <b>12th [2]</b> 137/19 147/21 <b>13 [1]</b> 45/8 <b>13 February [5]</b> 108/20 109/1 109/12 109/21 170/19 <b>13 January [1]</b> 87/14 <b>13 July [1]</b> 207/14 <b>13 March [15]</b> 31/23 32/1 33/9 33/24 34/4 44/18 44/23 45/12 131/10 146/13 197/25 198/3 198/8 198/16 198/16 <b>13 May [3]</b> 196/22 196/23 196/25 <b>13/14 March [1]</b> 75/22 <b>13th [6]</b> 30/2 33/2 132/3 132/3 137/19 145/9 <b>14 April [1]</b> 191/14 <b>14 February [7]</b> 109/24 110/22 112/11 112/22 113/3 114/2 123/7 <b>14 February 2020 [1]</b> 42/1 <b>14 March [5]</b> 45/8 149/9 153/15 153/24 158/2 <b>14th [7]</b> 33/3 34/9 132/5 137/19 145/9 146/13 149/21 <b>15 [1]</b> 172/4 <b>15 April [1]</b> 190/10 <b>15 days [1]</b> 173/19 <b>15 March [1]</b> 145/9 <b>15 May [1]</b> 194/23	<b>15th [3]</b> 132/8 144/22 146/13 <b>16 [2]</b> 65/16 122/2 <b>16 March [2]</b> 42/18 163/24 <b>16 September [1]</b> 216/6 <b>16th [9]</b> 144/22 159/25 161/19 161/22 162/12 162/24 162/25 164/6 173/22 <b>17 [3]</b> 121/17 185/24 216/18 <b>17 March [2]</b> 152/7 188/8 <b>17 September [3]</b> 216/10 219/2 220/19 <b>176 pages [1]</b> 2/3 <b>18 [2]</b> 57/23 124/19 <b>18 February [4]</b> 117/11 121/9 121/15 123/18 <b>18 March [3]</b> 188/17 189/3 189/8 <b>18th [2]</b> 118/12 164/3 <b>19 [8]</b> 49/20 100/9 109/13 111/12 114/15 117/21 189/25 198/19 <b>19 March [1]</b> 188/12 <b>19 September [1]</b> 216/13 <b>191 [4]</b> 108/20 109/3 109/6 109/7 <b>194 [1]</b> 121/10 <b>1984 [2]</b> 36/20 125/5 <b>1:1 [1]</b> 174/13 <b>1st [1]</b> 130/18	<b>2020 [13]</b> 3/12 6/22 7/19 13/16 13/21 39/14 42/1 43/6 46/12 84/7 144/19 204/10 218/3 <b>2021 [3]</b> 1/22 13/19 13/25 <b>2023 [2]</b> 1/1 221/24 <b>20th [5]</b> 162/4 162/8 164/2 164/6 173/22 <b>21 days [1]</b> 136/9 <b>21 February [5]</b> 49/25 50/23 57/9 67/20 123/14 <b>21 January [1]</b> 128/2 <b>21 March [1]</b> 171/13 <b>219 [1]</b> 196/24 <b>21st [1]</b> 162/11 <b>22 [2]</b> 46/21 172/6 <b>22 February [1]</b> 57/15 <b>22 January [3]</b> 86/13 94/11 140/18 <b>23 [1]</b> 154/16 <b>23 January [4]</b> 34/18 37/16 41/7 91/6 <b>23 March [9]</b> 25/24 42/19 65/17 122/2 160/12 161/5 161/9 161/18 172/8 <b>230 [2]</b> 141/5 142/11 <b>236 [1]</b> 129/17 <b>23rd [5]</b> 91/24 159/24 160/1 162/21 173/17 <b>23rd/24th [1]</b> 172/11 <b>24 [1]</b> 111/15 <b>24 February [1]</b> 123/7 <b>24 January [1]</b> 94/21 <b>24 July [1]</b> 59/16 <b>24 March [2]</b> 68/16 170/14 <b>24th [2]</b> 111/6 172/11 <b>25 [1]</b> 62/19 <b>25 March [1]</b> 170/14 <b>25th [2]</b> 170/23 170/24 <b>26 [1]</b> 214/9 <b>26 August [1]</b> 213/18 <b>26 February [3]</b> 111/15 124/1 124/25 <b>26 June 2021 [1]</b> 1/22 <b>26 March [1]</b> 170/15 <b>269 [1]</b> 129/20 <b>26th [2]</b> 110/20 111/6 124/1 <b>27 February [1]</b> 124/1 <b>27 January [3]</b> 47/4 48/6 52/12 <b>27th [3]</b> 126/10 126/15 126/22 <b>28 April [2]</b> 190/11 193/15	<b>28 February [10]</b> 43/13 123/1 123/19 124/20 125/24 126/6 126/13 127/22 128/3 130/14 <b>28 January [2]</b> 48/23 70/3 <b>28th [1]</b> 126/23 <b>29 January [3]</b> 47/12 93/22 94/6 <b>29 July [1]</b> 207/12 <b>29th [1]</b> 94/22 <b>2nd [1]</b> 130/16
<b>1</b> <b>1 December 2023 [1]</b> 221/24 <b>1 March [4]</b> 26/24 30/10 128/22 155/20 <b>1 May [1]</b> 186/12 <b>1-4 [1]</b> 143/12 <b>1.4 million [1]</b> 78/7 <b>1.45 [1]</b> 107/15 <b>1.45 pm [1]</b> 107/18 <b>10 [18]</b> 22/21 30/17 34/10 77/11 79/21 90/9 96/14 97/1 119/5 126/7 137/7 152/6 183/9 185/5 185/10 197/5 206/14 206/18 <b>10 am [1]</b> 221/23 <b>10 February [5]</b> 40/5 111/17 134/22 135/2 135/6 <b>10 March [2]</b> 146/25 147/1 <b>10 o'clock [1]</b> 221/20 <b>10,000 [1]</b> 184/3 <b>10.00 am [1]</b> 1/2 <b>100 [2]</b> 91/23 150/18 <b>100 years [1]</b> 21/10 <b>100,000 [3]</b> 179/13 183/23 184/4 <b>100,000 testing [1]</b> 153/4	<b>2</b> <b>2 April [6]</b> 47/18 47/23 52/1 56/1 58/14 189/12 <b>2 March [12]</b> 22/23 92/25 127/16 128/13 129/4 129/10 129/12 133/2 140/6 141/1 141/6 149/4 <b>20 [3]</b> 62/19 65/17 122/2 <b>20 March [3]</b> 42/18 160/22 164/24 <b>20 September [1]</b> 216/18 <b>200,000 [1]</b> 97/14 <b>2011 [14]</b> 4/2 4/21 5/24 35/12 35/15 40/11 105/13 106/14 112/13 112/15 113/5 122/6 138/18 139/7 <b>2011 pan flu [1]</b> 43/8 <b>2015 [1]</b> 1/18 <b>2016 [1]</b> 1/18 <b>2018 [1]</b> 1/20 <b>2019 [1]</b> 39/4	<b>3</b> <b>3 April [5]</b> 47/16 52/3 53/13 64/12 64/23 <b>3 August [1]</b> 208/5 <b>3 billion [1]</b> 196/1 <b>3 June 2020 [1]</b> 7/19 <b>3 March [6]</b> 40/7 111/19 124/15 134/14 135/2 135/9 <b>3 May [1]</b> 193/14 <b>3 million [1]</b> 78/8 <b>3.12 pm [1]</b> 170/7 <b>3.24 [1]</b> 131/14 <b>3.25 [1]</b> 170/6 <b>3.25 pm [1]</b> 170/9 <b>3.34 [1]</b> 131/13 <b>3.4 [2]</b> 50/1 67/25 <b>30 [3]</b> 39/21 62/18 62/19 <b>30 January [1]</b> 140/12 <b>30 November 2023</b> <b>[1]</b> 1/1 <b>300,000 [1]</b> 97/15 <b>31 January [1]</b> 39/21 <b>34 [1]</b> 62/18 <b>35,000 [1]</b> 191/21 <b>393 [1]</b> 202/19 <b>3rd [2]</b> 24/25 130/17		
		<b>4</b> <b>4 February [4]</b> 49/19 50/11 100/4 170/18 <b>4 March [2]</b> 98/16 129/16 <b>4,000 [1]</b> 147/3 <b>4.38 pm [1]</b> 221/22 <b>40 [3]</b> 50/5 67/21 123/14 <b>400 [1]</b> 70/6 <b>45 [1]</b> 109/11 <b>48 hours [2]</b> 15/23 26/5		
		<b>5</b> <b>5,000 [1]</b> 179/15 <b>50 [13]</b> 91/11 91/22 92/4 92/18 92/19 96/17 97/2 98/6 106/15 108/3 109/17		

<b>5</b>	29/23 29/25 30/5 30/22 31/17 36/21 37/8 38/6 44/1 44/17 47/6 47/14 49/10 51/4 52/15 54/8 56/9 56/9 57/6 58/10 59/19 60/16 60/19 62/8 62/24 63/6 63/10 63/12 65/11 65/12 65/13 66/24 68/2 68/23 72/6 72/7 73/1 74/3 75/16 75/22 76/1 78/11 79/19 80/15 85/2 85/10 85/15 87/7 87/19 90/10 90/13 93/16 96/21 99/24 100/22 100/23 102/3 103/2 104/16 105/5 105/7 106/17 107/10 108/4 108/23 110/11 111/22 113/15 113/23 117/3 118/2 119/18 123/3 126/8 126/16 127/17 129/5 129/18 132/11 132/15 132/17 133/1 135/1 135/18 135/23 135/25 136/3 137/2 140/3 140/5 140/10 141/7 143/24 144/9 145/2 145/11 145/12 145/14 145/15 150/3 158/15 160/8 161/6 163/5 163/21 164/20 168/2 169/9 169/24 170/18 170/20 171/12 171/15 171/18 175/13 176/23 177/7 177/9 179/9 180/10 180/12 182/5 186/21 186/21 187/10 190/7 190/13 194/13 194/19 195/23 197/14 197/16 199/18 200/18 201/3 201/5 201/7 201/7 201/23 204/13 204/15 204/19 205/13 205/16 208/8 209/9 209/23 212/2 213/12 214/8 219/24 220/4	113/10 136/14 136/19 137/17 144/24 153/13 154/18 170/17 173/25 175/18 178/3 186/4 188/16 195/9 210/7 <b>abuse [1]</b> 78/4 <b>accelerate [1]</b> 96/4 <b>acceleration [3]</b> 146/10 147/10 147/13 <b>accept [11]</b> 35/9 71/17 72/23 73/22 111/22 134/16 151/19 153/19 157/23 187/2 200/11 <b>acceptance [1]</b> 3/11 <b>accepted [5]</b> 3/7 88/15 135/9 139/2 153/18 <b>accepting [2]</b> 153/24 186/18 <b>access [1]</b> 32/23 <b>accord [1]</b> 194/17 <b>accordance [1]</b> 192/13 <b>according [8]</b> 32/9 39/25 108/19 134/21 134/25 141/15 147/5 207/17 <b>accords [1]</b> 176/1 <b>account [9]</b> 2/15 9/12 12/2 33/16 50/4 65/5 192/18 192/21 202/17 <b>accountability [4]</b> 8/8 75/4 185/13 185/14 <b>accurate [6]</b> 63/25 64/1 64/2 71/2 110/15 197/19 <b>accurately [2]</b> 110/13 135/22 <b>accusations [1]</b> 16/4 <b>accused [3]</b> 18/6 113/24 189/4 <b>accusing [1]</b> 24/5 <b>achieve [2]</b> 185/6 186/4 <b>acknowledge [5]</b> 60/13 109/22 113/3 189/8 195/14 <b>acknowledged [7]</b> 28/14 29/10 54/16 85/19 95/5 140/16 154/12 <b>acknowledges [1]</b> 61/24 <b>across [8]</b> 15/15 33/12 121/20 134/17 166/2 176/25 191/7 203/25 <b>across very [1]</b> 166/2 <b>act [7]</b> 24/4 27/6 33/8 36/20 125/3 125/5 159/17 <b>acted [3]</b> 128/9 148/8	148/8 <b>acting [2]</b> 134/4 161/16 <b>action [58]</b> 19/9 24/7 24/9 24/15 24/19 24/25 25/13 40/7 40/15 43/23 64/19 75/13 75/13 75/23 111/17 115/8 124/9 124/22 127/24 130/15 130/17 132/9 134/8 134/14 135/12 135/15 135/20 136/5 136/18 137/23 137/25 139/24 141/18 144/15 148/13 152/4 152/5 152/13 152/15 153/7 161/22 163/24 164/2 166/20 167/20 169/17 174/3 190/10 196/9 196/10 198/6 198/8 198/10 201/13 206/8 213/15 217/15 217/17 <b>actions [8]</b> 7/24 17/16 17/18 17/23 128/25 159/21 183/20 197/24 <b>actively [4]</b> 81/11 148/12 151/3 185/2 <b>activity [5]</b> 121/20 121/25 122/9 122/15 122/16 <b>actor [1]</b> 77/10 <b>actual [2]</b> 110/14 162/24 <b>actuality [1]</b> 172/4 <b>actually [13]</b> 30/18 53/22 57/13 66/23 73/19 81/24 148/4 165/21 166/1 194/1 194/15 209/23 215/3 <b>acute [2]</b> 14/9 148/22 <b>acutely [1]</b> 200/20 <b>adamant [1]</b> 47/2 <b>adaptable [1]</b> 174/18 <b>add [1]</b> 44/14 <b>additional [2]</b> 2/5 164/2 <b>address [5]</b> 4/10 15/5 102/2 107/4 150/8 <b>addressed [1]</b> 15/10 <b>addressing [2]</b> 104/9 195/8 <b>adequate [3]</b> 3/22 4/20 40/25 <b>adjourned [1]</b> 221/23 <b>adjournment [1]</b> 107/17 <b>administrations [1]</b> 202/20 <b>administrative [1]</b> 203/23 <b>admissions [1]</b> 189/19	<b>adopt [1]</b> 128/4 <b>adult [5]</b> 73/13 187/7 187/23 190/10 191/10 <b>advance [3]</b> 14/1 207/21 208/3 <b>advanced [1]</b> 43/15 <b>advice [58]</b> 21/3 23/13 43/3 46/11 51/22 52/9 53/15 54/2 56/2 56/19 57/3 58/4 58/25 59/2 61/6 61/21 64/4 64/8 64/22 66/13 66/23 67/2 68/15 68/25 70/2 71/13 72/5 87/15 88/15 88/21 90/4 108/17 120/17 121/3 129/23 130/1 131/7 133/13 133/17 147/19 155/7 155/11 155/15 155/17 156/4 159/4 165/1 173/18 191/11 191/13 191/15 191/20 191/24 192/3 196/4 214/19 218/22 218/24 <b>advise [1]</b> 143/12 <b>advised [4]</b> 61/7 118/5 153/18 198/18 <b>adviser [19]</b> 59/15 60/14 61/13 71/24 76/5 76/16 78/5 80/6 80/17 81/12 82/21 144/18 149/17 171/23 183/9 194/7 197/4 197/9 221/3 <b>Adviser's [1]</b> 66/6 <b>advisers [7]</b> 37/20 43/4 74/13 104/21 191/22 192/6 197/3 <b>advisory [5]</b> 7/3 69/25 107/3 118/22 121/2 <b>affairs [1]</b> 76/10 <b>affect [1]</b> 98/3 <b>affected [2]</b> 41/14 81/24 <b>affects [1]</b> 195/1 <b>affirmed [2]</b> 1/6 222/3 <b>afford [1]</b> 211/16 <b>afforded [1]</b> 211/3 <b>afraid [2]</b> 79/22 109/7 <b>after [21]</b> 2/19 8/18 8/22 10/23 18/13 19/7 33/1 39/5 50/3 59/25 85/25 95/23 98/18 105/21 114/25 115/2 153/7 153/16 162/7 206/13 207/16 <b>afternoon [1]</b> 131/14 <b>afterwards [3]</b> 77/4 80/2 217/12 <b>again [19]</b> 8/6 33/5 34/11 42/3 42/9 49/17
<b>6</b>	<b>6 February [1]</b> 101/10 <b>6 February 2020 [1]</b> 39/14 <b>6 June [1]</b> 195/5 <b>6 March [1]</b> 188/6 <b>600 million [1]</b> 196/7 <b>65s [1]</b> 190/12 <b>68 [1]</b> 28/19			
<b>7</b>	<b>7 June [1]</b> 190/13 <b>7 March [1]</b> 21/22 <b>7.30 [1]</b> 149/21 <b>7.30.49 [1]</b> 149/21 <b>75 [3]</b> 167/5 167/6 167/12 <b>78 [1]</b> 7/17			
<b>8</b>	<b>8 am [1]</b> 81/3 <b>8 July [1]</b> 207/24 <b>8 March [2]</b> 93/1 93/2 <b>80 [2]</b> 126/19 167/4			
<b>9</b>	<b>9 January [2]</b> 84/24 85/7 <b>9 July 2018 [1]</b> 1/20 <b>9 March [2]</b> 98/17 145/11 <b>9.15 [1]</b> 81/8 <b>9.30 [1]</b> 32/8			
<b>A</b>	<b>abide [1]</b> 212/5 <b>abided [1]</b> 212/14 <b>ability [8]</b> 3/13 6/10 26/3 78/9 80/11 174/24 175/13 180/1 <b>able [24]</b> 3/14 22/23 45/4 49/7 53/9 62/20 77/15 87/3 89/10 89/23 117/23 126/24 127/10 129/8 131/14 140/17 173/8 173/12 174/19 176/16 179/11 188/14 206/20 206/20 <b>about [165]</b> 2/12 8/14 10/20 12/12 16/25 18/13 19/7 22/6 23/15 23/16 25/16 27/5 29/2			
	<b>above [2]</b> 79/10 206/6 <b>abroad [2]</b> 51/1 106/9 <b>absence [14]</b> 3/12 4/6 4/14 4/17 4/17 6/6 21/8 22/14 40/22 89/18 107/6 113/14 158/22 182/15 <b>absent [1]</b> 105/10 <b>absolute [2]</b> 169/11 202/13 <b>absolutely [23]</b> 3/20 7/11 22/13 24/10 41/1 86/16 95/18 105/17			

<b>A</b>	104/2 105/9 105/24 106/9 111/2 111/23 114/3 115/10 116/12 118/10 121/11 122/19 122/23 123/2 123/5 125/3 125/10 127/10 127/17 127/21 130/25 130/25 132/2 134/2 134/7 135/10 139/24 140/2 143/7 144/14 144/17 144/22 145/12 146/8 148/18 149/3 153/15 153/24 153/24 154/24 156/7 157/11 160/4 164/20 164/24 166/1 166/3 166/4 169/8 169/16 177/19 178/6 180/17 181/7 183/9 186/11 187/6 188/10 190/13 191/7 192/4 194/22 199/2 204/4 212/16 213/2 213/12 213/22	<b>also</b> [55] 2/4 7/23 13/13 20/11 23/21 23/21 27/25 31/15 41/11 41/23 52/12 52/17 52/20 70/12 76/25 77/2 79/1 79/8 82/24 85/8 88/22 91/20 91/23 91/25 94/17 94/18 102/21 106/10 107/25 115/19 115/21 120/13 126/17 128/2 129/25 135/25 136/18 138/14 140/9 144/14 146/23 150/8 153/10 156/3 160/13 161/10 185/20 186/18 187/15 187/24 194/6 202/9 204/1 204/21 205/10 <b>although</b> [6] 23/23 52/18 111/12 123/11 186/15 213/5 <b>always</b> [5] 84/12 85/19 86/9 156/19 194/8 <b>am</b> [12] 1/2 1/14 34/2 38/25 44/8 44/10 59/3 81/3 83/11 170/4 212/15 221/23 <b>amazing</b> [1] 174/18 <b>ambition</b> [2] 184/11 204/21 <b>ameliorate</b> [1] 173/12 <b>amongst</b> [5] 12/12 39/9 66/16 124/19 219/15 <b>amount</b> [12] 11/7 16/1 24/11 24/12 58/19 101/5 116/15 135/24 174/2 181/1 187/9 209/4 <b>amounted</b> [1] 120/7 <b>amounts</b> [1] 19/14 <b>ample</b> [1] 194/12 <b>anachronistic</b> [1] 141/25 <b>analysing</b> [1] 157/2 <b>analysis</b> [5] 7/24 36/3 71/21 173/2 175/22 <b>ancillary</b> [1] 79/19 <b>Andrew</b> [1] 130/19 <b>Andrew Marr</b> [1] 130/19 <b>anecdote</b> [1] 68/22 <b>anecdotal</b> [6] 53/11 55/20 56/9 58/20 68/18 156/20 <b>anecdote</b> [1] 67/14 <b>angle</b> [4] 203/4 204/7 204/8 217/22 <b>announce</b> [2] 190/16	203/16 <b>announced</b> [10] 140/7 140/12 150/25 188/8 190/23 201/14 207/23 208/3 208/3 209/14 <b>announcement</b> [4] 190/11 190/13 207/24 208/9 <b>announcements</b> [1] 190/7 <b>announcing</b> [1] 186/1 <b>another</b> [20] 5/20 16/13 16/13 50/10 50/15 68/6 75/3 79/5 80/2 120/21 137/23 141/1 168/13 190/13 194/18 195/6 196/7 199/3 199/24 221/1 <b>answer</b> [26] 26/1 29/22 43/2 44/14 53/24 54/5 58/8 59/11 74/22 84/4 114/1 118/7 152/10 164/15 164/16 173/14 182/12 194/19 198/4 198/13 199/16 199/16 214/1 214/21 214/21 216/8 <b>answering</b> [1] 83/11 <b>answers</b> [2] 13/7 86/19 <b>anti</b> [1] 177/16 <b>anti-smoking</b> [1] 177/16 <b>antiviral</b> [1] 110/6 <b>antivirals</b> [1] 111/23 <b>anxiety</b> [2] 132/16 133/7 <b>any</b> [54] 6/5 10/8 12/10 23/24 30/8 49/4 57/7 61/24 62/19 63/21 72/16 74/21 74/23 75/18 76/7 80/22 80/23 80/24 93/11 99/21 101/4 105/6 107/8 110/25 114/19 122/19 122/24 123/17 123/21 124/5 131/9 135/17 141/22 152/10 152/23 157/16 158/22 159/16 164/19 173/8 176/4 176/19 176/22 180/23 181/25 188/18 188/21 189/22 199/15 201/24 204/4 206/16 217/3 219/25 <b>anybody</b> [8] 6/15 74/18 117/22 118/20 137/9 164/14 189/2 189/2 <b>anything</b> [14] 9/16 12/10 20/1 20/3 21/24 22/25 60/20 71/19	99/20 126/8 127/20 130/20 194/16 197/22 <b>anyway</b> [4] 166/8 169/22 206/16 221/1 <b>anywhere</b> [1] 124/18 <b>apart</b> [1] 19/24 <b>apologies</b> [1] 118/14 <b>apologise</b> [5] 49/17 51/17 62/22 152/25 165/23 <b>apology</b> [1] 1/8 <b>app</b> [1] 153/11 <b>appalling</b> [1] 185/3 <b>apparatus</b> [1] 183/7 <b>apparent</b> [5] 4/12 8/23 57/4 69/2 70/12 <b>apparently</b> [2] 60/19 60/20 <b>appear</b> [8] 51/6 69/4 83/15 110/5 114/12 164/19 184/10 186/18 <b>appeared</b> [3] 67/16 86/23 184/12 <b>appears</b> [5] 47/24 48/24 98/15 98/18 184/13 <b>application</b> [4] 51/1 117/4 130/4 183/16 <b>applied</b> [9] 51/13 53/23 63/16 65/2 65/19 89/24 107/10 160/4 188/19 <b>apply</b> [4] 62/9 62/16 63/3 108/6 <b>appreciate</b> [7] 19/23 20/2 43/19 89/9 89/25 212/12 212/13 <b>appreciated</b> [6] 65/8 92/3 104/25 111/11 142/19 202/4 <b>approach</b> [22] 35/18 39/23 51/13 62/9 62/12 62/16 63/1 63/4 63/22 93/23 108/6 108/7 121/11 122/6 150/9 158/23 158/25 183/16 186/8 212/21 217/11 220/24 <b>approaches</b> [1] 151/24 <b>appropriate</b> [3] 63/15 77/21 85/24 <b>appropriately</b> [1] 17/14 <b>April</b> [27] 14/8 18/14 19/12 46/12 47/16 47/18 47/23 52/1 52/3 53/13 56/1 58/14 64/12 64/23 69/18 175/14 183/23 184/4 184/15 189/12 190/10 190/11 191/14 193/15 196/1 196/2 201/10 <b>April 2020</b> [1] 46/12
----------	---	--	---	--

<b>A</b>	<b>arguing [2]</b> 44/24 215/8	<b>aspect [1]</b> 80/6	72/17 73/8 74/2	<b>away [2]</b> 82/22 184/17	
<b>apropos [2]</b> 72/2 191/17	<b>argument [19]</b> 18/3 28/23 30/19 30/19 30/21 43/11 44/25 144/17 148/9 160/4 163/2 169/23 195/18 201/16 201/17 202/17 207/9 212/22 218/19	<b>aspiration [1]</b> 190/19	123/15 190/12 191/16 193/7 201/7 201/7	<b>awful [2]</b> 128/8 201/9	
<b>are [129]</b> 1/15 6/19 8/4 8/24 14/20 22/1 22/3 28/3 28/6 29/7 33/24 34/2 36/8 36/12 37/18 38/11 38/21 42/4 42/14 45/7 45/21 45/22 47/21 50/6 51/10 53/18 56/7 56/8 59/18 60/6 60/14 60/17 60/19 60/20 61/3 62/20 67/12 67/22 70/8 72/3 72/10 72/12 72/15 72/17 73/3 76/12 77/14 78/15 78/20 80/5 81/9 84/12 86/9 95/18 96/3 97/3 97/17 102/20 103/25 104/2 104/4 104/5 104/5 104/8 104/9 105/22 106/1 106/9 107/10 107/24 110/16 111/6 114/18 115/16 125/7 125/9 125/11 125/15 131/20 136/23 138/2 138/4 138/6 138/23 139/3 141/17 142/7 143/5 148/19 149/6 149/22 150/22 150/24 151/8 151/17 152/4 152/24 153/12 154/6 155/13 157/25 159/22 160/5 163/25 164/21 165/7 166/9 167/9 171/14 178/22 179/13 179/14 180/9 189/18 193/6 193/23 196/25 198/16 198/18 200/25 203/24 204/1 206/7 208/21 212/16 213/19 214/8 214/20 221/15	<b>assess [5]</b> 82/2 130/8 130/12 134/2 165/13	<b>assert [1]</b> 86/22	<b>axe [1]</b> 181/4		
<b>are [129]</b> 1/15 6/19 8/4 8/24 14/20 22/1 22/3 28/3 28/6 29/7 33/24 34/2 36/8 36/12 37/18 38/11 38/21 42/4 42/14 45/7 45/21 45/22 47/21 50/6 51/10 53/18 56/7 56/8 59/18 60/6 60/14 60/17 60/19 60/20 61/3 62/20 67/12 67/22 70/8 72/3 72/10 72/12 72/15 72/17 73/3 76/12 77/14 78/15 78/20 80/5 81/9 84/12 86/9 95/18 96/3 97/3 97/17 102/20 103/25 104/2 104/4 104/5 104/5 104/8 104/9 105/22 106/1 106/9 107/10 107/24 110/16 111/6 114/18 115/16 125/7 125/9 125/11 125/15 131/20 136/23 138/2 138/4 138/6 138/23 139/3 141/17 142/7 143/5 148/19 149/6 149/22 150/22 150/24 151/8 151/17 152/4 152/24 153/12 154/6 155/13 157/25 159/22 160/5 163/25 164/21 165/7 166/9 167/9 171/14 178/22 179/13 179/14 180/9 189/18 193/6 193/23 196/25 198/16 198/18 200/25 203/24 204/1 206/7 208/21 212/16 213/19 214/8 214/20 221/15	<b>assess [5]</b> 82/2 130/8 130/12 134/2 165/13	<b>assess [5]</b> 82/2 130/8 130/12 134/2 165/13	<b>asymptotically [2]</b> 54/15 63/20		
<b>area [3]</b> 20/13 28/14 149/7	<b>arid [1]</b> 93/7	<b>associated [1]</b> 202/22	<b>at [262]</b>	<b>B</b>	
<b>areas [22]</b> 2/5 4/23 13/1 20/20 22/18 25/10 25/11 27/20 40/12 40/24 64/2 64/21 74/2 99/2 170/21 177/17 184/17 209/25 210/1 211/10 216/21 219/22	<b>arisen [1]</b> 65/21	<b>assisted [2]</b> 2/2 183/13	<b>at 3 [1]</b> 166/25	<b>B' [1]</b> 155/9	
<b>aren't [4]</b> 10/13 37/9 161/12 198/16	<b>army [1]</b> 5/13	<b>associated [1]</b> 202/22	<b>at 80 [1]</b> 126/19	<b>back [40]</b> 1/9 11/5 11/6 16/24 19/22 20/19 25/18 27/6 30/9 32/11 49/5 54/23 55/20 64/7 81/19 98/22 106/19 108/4 108/9 111/10 113/17 127/4 132/10 135/25 138/24 144/12 145/25 147/24 152/9 170/6 174/1 180/1 180/11 180/24 191/23 193/15 195/12 208/11 214/13 221/14	<b>back-pedalling [1]</b> 32/11
<b>arguable [1]</b> 221/5	<b>around [23]</b> 57/23 62/24 73/12 75/22 86/7 94/10 99/18 102/16 104/13 111/7 116/22 128/2 135/1 140/4 143/3 156/8 174/2 191/21 195/2 195/10 196/17 196/22 216/7	<b>assumed [2]</b> 99/3 99/4	<b>atmosphere [1]</b> 79/20	<b>backed [2]</b> 159/11 160/25	
<b>argue [6]</b> 11/8 43/12 162/25 169/18 209/19 215/16	<b>arranged [1]</b> 152/6	<b>assuming [2]</b> 9/15 59/6	<b>atmospherics [1]</b> 81/23	<b>background [2]</b> 142/11 177/24	
<b>argued [2]</b> 209/15 209/20	<b>arrangements [1]</b> 75/4	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attached [1]</b> 74/21	<b>backing [1]</b> 165/4	
<b>argues [1]</b> 210/7	<b>arrive [1]</b> 172/25	<b>assumed [2]</b> 99/3 99/4	<b>attempt [3]</b> 38/23 45/9 107/8	<b>bad [5]</b> 14/24 15/4 93/19 97/4 97/11	
	<b>articulated [2]</b> 123/1 206/10	<b>assumed [2]</b> 99/3 99/4	<b>attempted [2]</b> 81/2 85/3	<b>baffles [1]</b> 186/9	
	<b>articulating [1]</b> 206/13	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attending [1]</b> 115/9	<b>bags [1]</b> 104/16	
	<b>as [288]</b>	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attend [1]</b> 41/16	<b>baked [1]</b> 17/13	
	<b>As I said [1]</b> 121/5	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attendance [4]</b> 113/22 161/7 167/15 167/16	<b>balance [6]</b> 113/19 114/8 200/16 201/8 202/12 209/11	
	<b>ascertain [1]</b> 194/8	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attendances [1]</b> 167/14	<b>balancing [1]</b> 200/18	
	<b>ascibe [1]</b> 178/20	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attendant [1]</b> 188/7	<b>ban [1]</b> 88/1	
	<b>aside [1]</b> 133/7	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attended [5]</b> 101/12 104/20 149/11 149/13 181/4	<b>Bank [2]</b> 177/25 178/5	
	<b>ask [20]</b> 2/13 19/20 22/5 23/13 34/2 34/20 79/19 94/9 136/23 137/21 140/3 144/22 160/7 161/15 181/25 182/13 187/1 187/18 199/14 221/14	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attendees [1]</b> 102/7	<b>bar [1]</b> 49/25	
	<b>asked [36]</b> 13/9 19/3 22/25 30/23 38/5 52/14 63/10 63/10 65/11 81/21 84/16 84/25 85/6 102/14 107/11 112/7 119/14 120/12 129/21 130/19 132/11 133/1 133/10 137/2 139/1 143/5 147/1 147/2 163/21 170/16 176/20 201/25 206/14 206/18 208/14 210/10	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attention [7]</b> 98/19 99/15 100/21 108/14 108/16 113/13 123/13	<b>barrier [1]</b> 195/20	
	<b>asking [13]</b> 14/25 16/25 87/22 94/16 110/10 112/2 116/21 154/8 180/8 198/19 201/23 201/24 210/3	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attitude [2]</b> 13/1 211/5	<b>base [13]</b> 53/9 53/15 54/2 55/22 56/19 58/4 60/23 61/22 62/4 74/8 93/23 158/16 207/20	
	<b>asks [3]</b> 21/22 81/20 216/3	<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>attribute [1]</b> 73/22	<b>based [33]</b> 4/2 4/3 35/17 43/7 53/2 56/3 56/12 58/17 60/22 61/7 64/3 64/10 64/13 68/16 69/14 93/21 103/19 105/13 106/14 112/12 112/13 112/23 139/6 154/25 173/3 176/6 177/2 177/2 191/11 192/3 194/21 196/3 204/8	
		<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>August [11]</b> 206/24 208/4 208/5 208/7 209/16 213/18 214/9 214/10 214/10 215/18 218/9	<b>baselines [1]</b> 46/7	
		<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>authorities [4]</b> 141/18 141/19 142/7 187/22	<b>bases [2]</b> 3/24 23/2	
		<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>available [15]</b> 25/23 36/19 65/1 65/7 147/6 162/19 187/14 188/19 190/21 191/13 191/20 192/11 192/13 196/8 221/19	<b>basic [1]</b> 85/4	
		<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>avoid [3]</b> 213/14 213/22 214/5	<b>basically [9]</b> 19/16 24/12 25/3 98/9 139/1 151/6 153/17 181/22	
		<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>avoidable [2]</b> 17/12 25/20		
		<b>assumption [22]</b> 4/3 46/8 53/2 53/9 54/3 55/23 55/24 56/4 56/7 56/12 56/20 56/21 58/4 58/18 60/24 61/7 64/13 93/14 98/25 99/5 118/3 201/6	<b>aware [24]</b> 6/19 11/14 12/8 14/25 16/24 23/3 27/7 27/11 27/15 29/8 45/6 52/10 52/22 55/16 59/22 66/16 79/25 89/1 143/2 199/9 199/25 200/20 209/10 212/16		

<b>B</b>	163/17 163/18 163/18	147/2 148/15 150/25	115/16 118/5 119/12	212/18 213/3 216/18
<b>basically... [1]</b>	164/7 164/16 166/20	151/4 154/14 156/12	119/16 120/9 120/10	<b>beyond [3]</b> 29/12
217/12	166/25 167/7 168/5	157/2 157/12 159/15	123/23 124/14 124/16	92/10 150/17
<b>basis [9]</b> 63/1 63/14	168/23 169/5 170/5	160/16 162/5 164/19	124/18 124/22 124/24	<b>big [5]</b> 9/21 16/17
67/6 99/2 102/19	172/17 172/19 172/20	170/16 174/7 174/19	124/25 126/4 126/23	77/22 99/24 154/4
105/13 120/9 133/20	172/22 173/1 174/6	178/17 178/18 178/20	130/2 135/21 144/16	<b>biggest [5]</b> 3/19 10/1
184/20	174/22 176/21 178/7	178/24 179/3 179/22	154/5 156/20 160/23	59/8 126/1 181/10
<b>bathroom [1]</b> 190/1	181/9 185/1 185/4	180/9 181/9 181/12	163/9 163/10 165/8	<b>Bill [5]</b> 20/21 36/21
<b>battleplan [4]</b> 21/9	185/19 188/4 190/16	182/20 183/1 183/7	170/23 171/10 171/10	38/3 125/2 125/2
40/6 113/6 113/9	194/16 195/8 198/5	183/14 183/15 183/17	172/9 177/15 188/18	<b>billion [3]</b> 180/19
<b>be [249]</b>	198/8 200/9 204/20	184/11 185/14 185/15	193/24 197/23 198/5	180/20 196/1
<b>bear [4]</b> 49/18 55/9	205/1 206/14 207/3	185/19 187/9 187/20	201/5 207/12 212/6	<b>bit [9]</b> 13/6 34/16
183/7 189/6	208/24 212/5 214/10	189/4 189/9 193/13	<b>belatedly [2]</b> 200/15	60/5 171/12 190/25
<b>bearing [2]</b> 100/22	216/4 216/22 217/12	194/25 195/13 197/19	202/4	191/3 206/6 207/15
150/12	218/25 219/3 219/17	200/4 200/8 200/12	<b>Belfast [3]</b> 32/5	208/11
<b>bearings [2]</b> 123/6	219/18 219/24 220/2	200/23 205/25 206/1	32/17 148/2	<b>black [1]</b> 75/2
171/16	220/14	206/23 207/3 208/13	<b>belief [2]</b> 30/13 126/7	<b>blame [5]</b> 9/17 27/15
<b>beast [1]</b> 74/15	<b>become [7]</b> 21/5	208/14 210/5 210/17	<b>believe [5]</b> 94/1	44/2 75/9 178/20
<b>beasts [1]</b> 100/19	43/21 98/12 102/24	211/18 214/11 217/8	197/17 197/17 206/25	<b>blaming [1]</b> 61/17
<b>became [29]</b> 4/12	165/23 179/20 212/9	219/11 220/20 221/6	212/8	<b>blazingly [1]</b> 7/12
19/8 19/10 28/1 53/1	<b>becomes [4]</b> 50/22	<b>before [30]</b> 19/22	<b>believed [1]</b> 113/19	<b>blew [1]</b> 88/16
55/16 73/8 77/22	78/24 108/24 179/11	44/15 47/23 47/23	<b>believes [1]</b> 83/10	<b>blocked [2]</b> 15/17
88/18 89/1 90/6 98/18	<b>becoming [1]</b> 14/24	68/10 75/11 83/5	<b>below [22]</b> 163/1	15/22
101/16 101/20 110/3	<b>bed [2]</b> 174/11	101/4 104/3 108/19	164/8 166/25 166/25	<b>blocking [1]</b> 24/7
122/2 124/9 125/2	174/12	114/1 118/24 120/10	167/7 168/14 168/20	<b>blocks [1]</b> 2/8
130/14 144/7 153/3	<b>beds [9]</b> 35/14	128/14 160/7 160/21	172/16 206/3 210/14	<b>bluntly [1]</b> 164/20
153/3 153/4 153/11	171/15 171/19 171/19	160/23 162/23 164/14	210/14 210/16 210/20	<b>board [1]</b> 217/9
183/4 199/3 199/9	171/19 172/7 174/10	165/7 165/15 166/10	210/24 211/6 212/20	<b>boat [1]</b> 57/24
199/25 209/10	175/1 175/1	167/23 194/8 197/7	215/23 216/21 217/15	<b>bodies [2]</b> 124/19
<b>because [160]</b> 7/10	<b>beef [1]</b> 213/1	200/5 200/5 200/13	219/6 220/18 221/5	160/23
8/17 10/14 11/8 11/14	<b>beefed [1]</b> 215/13	217/22 221/18	<b>below 1 [6]</b> 164/8	<b>body [12]</b> 70/1 70/1
11/19 15/23 18/10	<b>beefed up [1]</b> 215/13	<b>beforehand [2]</b> 81/5	166/25 167/7 172/16	104/16 120/5 120/8
20/3 23/17 23/24	<b>been [167]</b> 3/8 4/9	203/16	210/14 210/16	120/14 120/17 120/18
24/16 26/6 26/12 28/5	4/21 5/17 9/14 12/3	<b>began [3]</b> 188/13	<b>Ben [1]</b> 146/25	120/21 121/3 146/17
30/14 33/7 33/11	14/8 15/13 15/19 16/7	205/8 218/11	<b>Ben Warner [1]</b>	178/10
33/25 35/6 38/5 38/21	16/10 16/12 16/14	<b>begin [1]</b> 89/25	146/25	<b>book [21]</b> 2/10 6/2
39/3 41/9 43/23 43/24	16/18 17/15 18/11	<b>beginning [5]</b> 21/2	<b>benefits [2]</b> 28/5	6/6 8/21 21/9 28/16
44/17 44/21 45/1	20/2 21/12 25/12	21/18 25/22 92/13	143/13	32/9 33/15 35/9 36/1
45/23 47/25 53/4 53/8	25/14 25/25 26/19	208/4	<b>best [23]</b> 5/9 9/4	44/19 44/20 45/4
53/17 53/22 56/5	27/6 27/7 27/10 27/15	<b>behalf [1]</b> 115/24	24/17 26/3 31/17	46/17 47/16 47/21
56/15 58/9 58/23 62/3	28/6 31/1 31/7 31/14	<b>behaving [1]</b> 27/24	32/14 36/4 39/5 39/6	54/11 74/11 213/18
65/8 71/1 72/10 73/7	33/16 34/18 35/5 37/4	<b>behaviour [5]</b> 77/15	48/10 78/9 79/15	213/24 214/6
74/3 74/7 74/9 75/2	37/7 39/24 43/1 43/25	83/1 161/24 162/2	83/25 84/15 97/9 99/8	<b>books [1]</b> 20/15
75/5 75/21 76/12 77/4	44/1 44/21 45/4 48/2	169/6	158/9 174/17 175/20	<b>border [10]</b> 29/15
81/7 81/9 81/21 83/7	49/1 51/6 55/17 55/21	<b>behavioural [6]</b> 29/3	206/5 213/22 217/11	72/6 72/7 72/8 72/9
83/22 84/25 85/16	56/21 59/6 62/7 64/24	130/6 144/8 159/12	217/16	87/21 88/8 88/10
88/17 89/18 90/23	65/1 65/2 65/7 65/19	159/18 160/4	<b>better [25]</b> 16/7 29/7	88/12 88/18
91/7 91/9 94/18 95/18	66/8 66/12 66/14	<b>behind [7]</b> 77/5 109/8	29/9 29/20 30/20 37/7	<b>borders [2]</b> 87/21
98/10 99/12 100/8	66/20 74/1 74/21	135/17 156/9 156/11	43/25 51/14 55/7	203/25
101/25 103/10 103/11	75/14 79/23 82/9	157/5 166/14	66/12 79/5 81/18 84/9	<b>Boris [1]</b> 21/22
104/1 105/12 105/21	82/15 82/18 84/9 86/1	<b>being [80]</b> 3/19 18/7	91/3 99/7 100/24	<b>Boris Johnson [1]</b>
105/24 112/9 119/17	88/21 91/3 91/4 92/3	22/23 24/9 24/15	138/12 138/13 139/23	21/22
125/12 125/17 125/20	96/15 100/4 100/13	24/19 25/13 25/13	178/21 180/14 215/11	<b>both [29]</b> 14/3 36/19
126/11 126/18 127/3	100/24 101/22 103/19	27/9 30/22 30/23	219/8 219/11 221/6	41/22 47/21 56/8 57/5
131/5 131/12 134/12	103/23 103/24 104/8	37/11 39/12 61/1	<b>between [31]</b> 7/2	69/8 87/12 117/16
135/16 139/6 139/21	104/15 106/11 109/23	61/20 63/20 65/3	25/22 34/15 59/14	126/15 140/15 150/22
140/11 140/19 144/17	112/14 112/23 113/6	68/21 69/7 69/8 69/23	62/18 66/9 68/14	150/24 151/17 152/4
148/6 151/2 151/18	114/14 123/12 126/16	71/6 71/12 73/1 74/11	70/14 72/24 72/25	152/23 153/12 154/6
155/7 155/15 156/5	128/16 129/8 129/11	75/21 76/2 82/10	113/19 116/12 123/7	159/20 160/11 174/5
156/20 157/9 157/18	131/14 133/13 135/7	85/17 86/8 88/2 88/11	123/18 124/19 131/9	187/14 200/25 202/10
159/10 159/21 161/19	135/11 135/21 136/16	90/10 90/22 90/22	158/1 167/7 182/5	202/17 213/16 213/16
162/1 162/23 163/5	138/2 138/10 139/17	93/10 98/15 99/13	199/4 199/11 200/6	214/3 221/3
163/11 163/13 163/16	139/22 140/17 141/15	108/15 108/25 109/2	200/16 201/8 202/1	<b>bottom [4]</b> 76/11
	142/1 142/21 147/1	109/20 111/23 113/23	202/12 208/18 209/12	101/17 189/15 198/14

<b>B</b>	<b>busy [1]</b> 18/8 <b>but [240]</b>	220/3 <b>Cameron [1]</b> 16/15 <b>camp [1]</b> 58/10 <b>campaign [1]</b> 11/21 <b>campaigning [1]</b> 209/5 <b>can [117]</b> 2/3 2/12 8/19 10/6 12/22 13/1 21/24 22/25 23/22 23/25 23/25 24/8 24/8 26/1 28/9 30/3 34/5 34/19 35/19 36/5 42/13 47/9 54/3 56/24 56/25 58/6 58/6 67/16 70/15 71/17 72/1 72/18 72/19 72/19 76/11 76/17 76/17 76/25 78/10 79/6 79/9 84/20 86/20 94/9 96/4 96/4 96/16 98/3 100/1 100/13 101/12 101/16 102/16 106/1 106/4 108/1 108/12 108/25 109/4 109/8 110/21 111/21 113/14 113/21 115/15 117/24 119/11 119/17 122/6 123/16 124/12 128/22 128/24 130/13 134/10 134/18 137/21 140/3 145/18 147/18 147/24 153/10 154/19 155/13 157/15 158/5 158/7 161/23 171/11 176/14 180/11 180/18 182/13 182/17 184/2 186/4 186/25 188/16 189/1 189/15 190/2 191/16 191/21 193/20 194/4 194/4 204/24 204/25 206/12 211/1 211/1 211/16 212/10 214/21 217/20 219/3 220/7 <b>can't [24]</b> 38/21 46/2 46/3 47/2 51/14 54/12 62/1 66/13 102/25 103/12 108/12 108/15 108/15 113/12 113/14 125/18 130/20 137/24 140/19 163/14 192/21 194/15 206/19 221/13 <b>can-do [1]</b> 76/25 <b>candidly [1]</b> 154/11 <b>candour [1]</b> 76/6 <b>cannot [9]</b> 15/11 15/12 45/20 49/2 49/21 55/2 72/19 152/21 196/11 <b>capability [1]</b> 4/1 <b>capable [1]</b> 114/17 <b>capacity [16]</b> 35/14 70/6 102/15 163/12 171/25 172/8 173/12 174/6 175/2 176/2	176/12 176/24 179/3 179/23 185/6 188/11 <b>Cardiff [3]</b> 32/18 148/2 148/5 <b>care [70]</b> 1/19 3/1 3/16 27/8 37/13 39/17 40/5 56/2 65/9 65/25 66/11 73/12 73/13 78/7 78/8 115/17 117/7 141/1 141/8 141/12 141/16 141/21 142/5 142/22 148/23 149/7 172/10 174/13 174/20 187/7 187/7 187/13 187/15 187/23 187/25 188/5 188/11 188/15 188/17 189/19 189/22 190/8 190/11 190/12 191/11 192/8 193/7 194/2 195/3 195/10 195/22 196/1 196/17 197/7 197/18 198/6 198/9 198/17 198/25 199/5 199/11 199/20 200/6 200/8 200/21 200/25 201/11 202/2 202/11 217/6 <b>care home [5]</b> 189/19 189/22 190/8 193/7 198/17 <b>care homes [22]</b> 56/2 65/9 117/7 141/16 187/7 188/17 190/12 195/3 197/7 197/18 198/6 198/9 198/25 199/5 199/11 199/20 200/6 200/8 200/21 200/25 202/2 217/6 <b>care sector [16]</b> 73/12 73/13 141/8 141/12 142/5 187/7 187/13 187/15 187/25 188/15 194/2 195/22 196/1 196/17 201/11 202/11 <b>cared [1]</b> 219/24 <b>careful [1]</b> 62/16 <b>carefully [1]</b> 153/21 <b>carried [3]</b> 58/23 117/2 202/14 <b>case [78]</b> 20/17 29/2 34/11 41/9 41/13 44/25 53/24 63/22 64/15 66/5 75/1 75/3 77/13 78/19 93/4 93/8 93/13 93/19 93/23 95/24 96/2 96/9 96/10 96/12 96/22 97/4 97/4 97/5 97/8 97/9 98/11 98/14 98/17 98/23 98/24 99/6 99/11 99/12 100/1 104/14 107/23 108/1 108/2	126/20 128/7 144/6 155/20 156/1 156/22 161/20 162/2 162/9 162/13 162/14 162/17 163/7 166/15 167/21 168/3 168/6 169/14 171/25 173/18 173/21 179/6 179/6 180/6 183/5 185/8 191/23 194/17 200/24 201/21 211/7 211/15 215/3 217/3 218/3 <b>cases [37]</b> 16/6 17/21 17/22 26/22 27/22 29/13 39/18 43/22 43/24 50/5 50/6 64/4 64/18 67/22 68/18 70/18 89/6 117/17 118/1 123/15 128/21 128/22 162/14 172/20 172/21 174/12 203/19 204/20 205/5 205/5 205/8 206/7 207/13 207/18 208/1 216/22 219/25 <b>catastrophic [1]</b> 173/16 <b>catch [1]</b> 43/20 <b>categoric [1]</b> 69/14 <b>categorically [1]</b> 41/9 <b>caught [1]</b> 162/15 <b>cause [2]</b> 83/3 210/8 <b>caused [2]</b> 76/16 84/3 <b>causing [3]</b> 113/21 203/17 211/9 <b>caution [9]</b> 154/24 169/18 205/18 205/20 208/18 208/22 209/13 209/15 212/19 <b>cautious [1]</b> 210/3 <b>caveated [1]</b> 56/11 <b>CCS [5]</b> 43/14 122/25 123/2 123/19 125/25 <b>CDC [7]</b> 47/20 47/22 52/3 52/6 53/12 64/12 69/18 <b>CDL [4]</b> 78/25 79/1 79/5 79/6 <b>cent [1]</b> 96/14 <b>central [16]</b> 11/18 15/4 19/23 20/3 35/13 35/14 37/21 39/25 69/10 92/22 93/20 97/4 97/17 105/21 106/9 173/19 <b>centre [23]</b> 9/7 9/14 11/10 11/25 12/10 13/3 15/14 15/25 16/11 16/16 17/4 17/10 18/10 24/24 75/17 100/11 106/11 127/23 176/7 179/15 185/3 187/10 191/5
----------	--	--	---	--

<b>C</b>	<b>chief [28]</b> 48/8 59/15 59/15 60/13 60/14 61/13 66/6 66/7 71/18 71/23 76/5 76/16 78/5 80/17 81/12 91/10 92/4 107/24 110/2 129/12 144/17 149/17 149/17 171/18 171/23 194/7 219/4 221/2	130/20 136/22	49/2 49/8 49/12 69/9 70/14 85/5 94/25 96/12 96/17 100/8 100/13 100/17 110/17 119/9 120/3 132/15 133/21 149/19 156/19 191/23 193/2 203/11	<b>comes [6]</b> 38/12 53/7 71/22 125/13 201/6 201/8
<b>centred [1]</b> 155/6	<b>China [27]</b> 28/6 37/2 49/2 49/3 52/16 55/18 92/10 93/6 93/18 95/2 95/3 95/8 95/17 96/18 97/2 97/11 106/16 108/21 109/1 109/12 109/21 111/11 114/14 117/17 117/20 117/23 179/11	<b>citizens [1]</b> 31/9	<b>co [2]</b> 18/20 184/13	<b>coming [24]</b> 1/11 11/17 26/15 31/10 44/4 66/23 92/8 92/16 93/9 98/19 103/11 104/24 106/19 111/10 115/3 128/7 147/14 147/19 147/20 149/8 159/17 166/18 218/8 219/13
<b>centuries [1]</b> 203/24	<b>Chinese [3]</b> 48/14 52/16 87/18	<b>civil [7]</b> 23/3 119/5 121/18 121/24 122/5 136/13 183/6	<b>co-ordinating [1]</b> 18/20	<b>commented [6]</b> 48/10 48/24 49/2 49/8 49/12 50/3
<b>century [1]</b> 10/1	<b>choice [1]</b> 203/17	<b>civilian [1]</b> 181/10	<b>co-ordination [1]</b> 184/13	<b>comment [3]</b> 7/14 80/5 194/12
<b>certain [5]</b> 24/22 71/1 108/7 126/25 172/16	<b>choose [1]</b> 213/3	<b>civilians [1]</b> 180/23	<b>COBR [59]</b> 15/22 15/24 16/9 16/24 16/25 17/1 17/25 18/25 19/3 22/22 24/20 26/5 77/17 77/18 78/12 79/9 80/16 80/18 81/1 81/3 92/1 93/12 94/6 94/11 94/20 95/6 95/22 98/16 98/22 117/11 117/12 121/15 121/17 123/18 124/19 127/9 127/13 127/14 127/15 129/12 129/16 130/16 133/2 143/16 143/19 145/8 145/11 149/4 160/20 160/21 164/3 167/11 168/23 171/6 172/10 172/13 182/11 182/15 183/3	<b>commented [6]</b> 48/10 48/24 49/2 49/8 49/12 50/3
<b>certainly [17]</b> 8/20 18/7 18/8 39/22 47/25 57/14 97/20 99/1 99/20 99/24 108/17 109/23 119/7 184/22 191/4 195/18 207/6	<b>chooses [1]</b> 76/11	<b>claim [1]</b> 76/1	<b>COBRs [2]</b> 16/16 117/13	<b>comments [3]</b> 73/23 194/9 194/20
<b>certainties [1]</b> 51/10	<b>Chris [21]</b> 10/19 23/14 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 86/13 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 131/8 134/22 147/20 150/7 173/2 176/2 187/24 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>claims [1]</b> 137/5	<b>coda [1]</b> 44/14	<b>commercial [2]</b> 176/17 176/19
<b>certainty [3]</b> 70/10 70/23 73/1	<b>Chris Townsend [1]</b> 10/19	<b>clarion [2]</b> 22/7 22/10	<b>coda to [1]</b> 44/14	<b>commission [3]</b> 11/1 40/5 113/8
<b>cetera [5]</b> 96/5 152/16 152/16 196/4 219/10	<b>Chris Whitty [10]</b> 23/15 47/5 67/5 117/14 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4	<b>clarity [3]</b> 48/14 52/5 155/13	<b>collaborative [2]</b> 84/10 84/14	<b>commissioned [9]</b> 111/17 113/6 115/7 124/11 134/21 135/12 137/17 138/15 139/14
<b>chair [8]</b> 18/1 18/25 117/11 122/10 127/9 127/14 143/21 149/5	<b>Chris Wormald [2]</b> 23/14 86/13	<b>clashed [1]</b> 81/5	<b>collapse [4]</b> 164/12 172/17 173/11 175/5	<b>commitments [1]</b> 90/11
<b>chaired [9]</b> 16/16 22/22 94/8 94/21 117/13 121/15 143/19 160/22 182/10	<b>Chris Wormald's [1]</b> 176/2	<b>class [1]</b> 79/16	<b>colleagues [11]</b> 23/8 31/8 39/18 40/9 41/16 41/20 42/4 43/4 100/11 114/13 147/11	<b>committed [1]</b> 113/7
<b>chairing [2]</b> 182/15 183/2	<b>Christopher [3]</b> 134/25 135/5 147/17	<b>classroom [1]</b> 127/4	<b>collective [3]</b> 115/21 212/5 212/14	<b>committee [6]</b> 118/22 119/23 122/10 140/13 183/12 183/17
<b>challenge [14]</b> 7/12 9/4 9/16 9/21 9/25 12/1 12/15 51/25 53/7 200/16 202/9 202/10 203/13 204/2	<b>chronology [2]</b> 84/21 94/14	<b>clear [47]</b> 8/6 8/7 33/5 50/23 57/17 57/20 59/1 60/3 61/10 61/11 61/14 61/20 64/17 66/1 75/14 90/6 98/12 98/19 102/20 102/21 102/21 103/3 121/19 121/25 122/9 129/11 129/16 130/14 131/7 132/15 137/18 139/17 154/24 161/15 164/16 167/10 170/17 183/4 190/5 194/25 195/13 195/19 196/19 213/21 214/5 218/5 218/8	<b>collectively [1]</b> 172/24	<b>common [2]</b> 203/1 203/5
<b>challenged [1]</b> 55/18	<b>circle [2]</b> 196/14 196/18	<b>clearance [1]</b> 136/15	<b>combination [1]</b> 97/1	<b>commonly [1]</b> 53/3
<b>challenges [6]</b> 5/22 9/24 16/10 84/13 89/17 174/7	<b>circles [1]</b> 125/23	<b>cleared [1]</b> 69/3	<b>combined [3]</b> 168/19 191/12 191/19	<b>comms [4]</b> 30/16 30/17 135/22 211/19
<b>chance [9]</b> 91/12 91/22 91/23 92/5 96/17 98/5 98/6 131/12 182/8	<b>circuit [12]</b> 215/9 216/6 216/8 216/10 216/16 216/19 216/23 217/8 217/11 218/22 219/1 219/12	<b>clearly [18]</b> 10/24 12/8 16/9 41/19 42/13 52/7 60/20 67/11 72/2 76/17 78/24 113/11 113/11 130/13 149/8 155/11 155/17 161/17	<b>come [32]</b> 16/24 17/22 42/12 44/20 78/12 81/19 84/20 93/6 95/19 99/3 119/17 124/12 127/24 131/15 132/10 135/24 137/4 145/25 147/24 158/17 164/11 167/22 170/6 171/11 175/5 176/21 189/6 204/14 207/16 212/4 217/2 221/14	<b>communicable [3]</b> 177/15 177/18 177/22
<b>Chancellor [7]</b> 19/1 83/4 83/14 93/1 210/6 210/19 212/8	<b>circuit breaker [5]</b> 215/9 216/6 216/8 216/19 216/23	<b>clinically [1]</b> 203/5	<b>community [8]</b> 21/5 29/16 109/18 150/12 151/1 151/12 151/13 152/3	<b>communicate [3]</b> 126/24 127/10 136/25
<b>chances [1]</b> 93/16	<b>circuit breakers [1]</b> 217/8	<b>clinicians [2]</b> 102/18 103/8	<b>communications [15]</b> 2/17 26/8 26/9 29/23 30/22 31/13 33/18 114/8 125/15 159/22 184/7 193/23 197/12 204/2 214/13	<b>communicated [3]</b> 67/3 127/17 136/21
<b>change [12]</b> 40/15 53/8 56/15 58/3 61/21 146/9 146/15 147/14 162/1 162/2 177/9 178/9	<b>circulated [1]</b> 124/18	<b>clock [1]</b> 116/10	<b>companies [2]</b> 176/23 178/21	<b>compared [6]</b> 155/21 155/25 158/11 178/23 181/2 209/3
<b>changed [5]</b> 30/2 41/8 61/15 156/4 161/23	<b>circumvented [1]</b> 81/11	<b>close [6]</b> 11/3 52/14 97/8 127/18 136/22 162/5	<b>competing [1]</b> 8/3	
<b>changes [1]</b> 183/15	<b>cited [1]</b> 57/21	<b>closed [2]</b> 57/24 169/22		
<b>changing [1]</b> 52/8	<b>cities [4]</b> 28/8 127/19	<b>closely [1]</b> 176/1		
<b>chaotic [3]</b> 213/22 214/5 214/16		<b>closer [1]</b> 118/8		
<b>chapters [1]</b> 204/23		<b>closing [2]</b> 138/19 149/25		
<b>characterise [1]</b> 114/21		<b>closure [5]</b> 138/6 159/23 160/2 164/3 169/20		
<b>characteristics [1]</b> 120/6		<b>CMO [26]</b> 48/10 48/15 48/18 48/24		
<b>check [3]</b> 81/5 131/12 131/14				

<b>C</b>	118/1	<b>contagiousness [1]</b> 50/17	<b>contributory [2]</b> 134/3 175/16	34/7
<b>complete [3]</b> 29/10 107/6 173/11	<b>confirm [1]</b> 94/9	<b>contain [9]</b> 108/22 108/23 109/1 109/13 111/12 112/14 114/15 117/21 137/8	<b>control [42]</b> 14/12 14/13 14/16 15/5 18/21 22/15 29/14 31/12 37/21 38/8 42/16 43/5 62/21 65/12 65/25 89/23 105/7 110/6 111/14 111/14 111/24 112/10 112/20 113/4 113/16 114/16 114/16 117/5 117/6 117/24 121/25 122/1 123/18 124/7 137/13 143/25 159/16 190/20 196/3 196/8 206/10 217/18	<b>corrosive [1]</b> 212/11
<b>completely [10]</b> 15/6 35/17 43/17 44/4 131/8 138/25 144/1 144/10 145/21 206/3	<b>confirmation [2]</b> 88/20 157/1	<b>contained [3]</b> 28/6 67/18 109/17	<b>correct [30]</b> 2/23 7/6 8/15 28/20 31/24 38/14 47/16 55/10 59/22 59/24 63/1 70/25 83/12 94/4 99/5 101/21 103/19 120/13 125/12 130/7 134/1 140/14 142/25 157/14 164/18 173/3 177/13 180/7 197/10 202/6	<b>costs [4]</b> 28/3 128/23 132/24 132/25
<b>complex [2]</b> 190/25 192/11	<b>confirmed [3]</b> 50/6 67/22 123/14	<b>containment [6]</b> 31/6 114/14 114/24 135/10 137/13 137/20	<b>corral [1]</b> 45/9	<b>cotton [1]</b> 26/14
<b>compliance [6]</b> 161/6 165/8 167/12 167/18 168/24 169/2	<b>conflict [2]</b> 201/20 202/15	<b>contemplating [1]</b> 132/18	<b>could [77]</b> 1/13 7/17 7/22 10/16 13/6 15/4 19/16 19/17 19/19 21/21 22/6 23/18 23/18 25/13 27/2 27/19 28/19 34/13 43/2 48/18 48/21 49/11 49/17 59/1 59/11 62/6 62/19 63/15 70/10 72/3 73/7 73/15 74/12 80/24 82/14 82/15 90/17 91/18 96/2 96/9 102/23 107/20 108/9 109/5 110/4 116/18 120/7 129/9 147/9 151/21 167/25 168/17 169/3 169/17 171/2 173/8 175/4 175/7 176/22 178/16 179/13 185/18 186/2 187/4 190/16 190/18 192/7 192/12 196/22 198/24 207/9 210/16 211/3 213/6 216/20 217/1 217/18	<b>couldn't [13]</b> 15/10 56/14 58/3 71/1 82/9 82/18 104/15 206/16 207/5 213/3 213/5 213/12 220/19
<b>comply [1]</b> 129/18	<b>confused [1]</b> 60/18	<b>contemporaneous [5]</b> 2/16 2/18 2/20 8/17 8/25	<b>copy [2]</b> 2/10 112/19	<b>Council [2]</b> 181/5 181/7
<b>concealed [1]</b> 212/2	<b>confusion [2]</b> 158/23 203/17	<b>contemporaneously [3]</b> 8/20 26/1 26/2	<b>core [3]</b> 14/13 190/15 221/15	<b>COUNSEL [2]</b> 1/7 222/5
<b>concealed [1]</b> 212/2	<b>conscious [1]</b> 214/3	<b>contested [1]</b> 80/1	<b>Cornwall [1]</b> 219/25	<b>count [1]</b> 187/5
<b>concentrated [1]</b> 100/25	<b>consensual [1]</b> 166/2	<b>context [25]</b> 17/2 28/20 28/21 28/24 30/23 50/7 65/11 68/7 72/14 72/18 83/16 90/20 108/22 109/16 111/11 111/13 113/18 137/7 155/23 164/17 187/10 195/11 198/3 202/20 212/18	<b>coronal [1]</b> 104/21	<b>countenance [2]</b> 132/22 175/7
<b>concern [12]</b> 8/13 86/11 126/11 132/11 132/17 144/14 145/21 146/7 156/1 205/12 208/2 219/12	<b>consensus [4]</b> 46/10 47/7 58/16 118/25	<b>contract [1]</b> 106/6	<b>coronaviral [4]</b> 33/22 83/16 106/25 123/10	<b>counterargument [1]</b> 160/18
<b>concerned [10]</b> 29/25 87/19 100/15 113/23 115/25 120/21 180/12 214/11 214/14 221/16	<b>consequence [4]</b> 89/5 177/22 213/7 213/8	<b>contracted [1]</b> 141/17	<b>coronavirus [17]</b> 2/12 4/14 47/2 54/12 72/15 72/21 86/15 100/15 100/22 101/1 102/9 106/22 108/22 114/15 117/21 125/2 188/4	<b>countermeasure [1]</b> 141/11
<b>concerning [1]</b> 33/21	<b>consequences [6]</b> 3/13 4/4 82/1 105/15 123/3 161/16	<b>contracting [1]</b> 141/22	<b>coronaviruses [1]</b> 54/14	<b>countermeasures [30]</b> 18/21 21/11 22/16 30/8 38/7 38/10 38/17 38/18 38/21 42/16 43/4 62/20 63/15 65/7 65/11 105/8 114/20 116/1 117/4 117/5 122/19 122/24 123/17 124/21 130/4 133/18 138/21 139/4 170/13 170/22
<b>concerns [18]</b> 15/18 52/10 54/17 55/5 55/6 55/16 73/1 85/12 88/9 90/20 100/23 175/13 177/6 180/10 204/19 205/22 207/2 212/2	<b>consider [5]</b> 21/10 110/19 138/22 162/7 198/22	<b>contracted [1]</b> 141/17	<b>corral [1]</b> 45/9	<b>counting [4]</b> 186/13 186/20 186/21 187/3
<b>conclude [3]</b> 25/15 165/7 221/17	<b>considerable [4]</b> 21/12 184/1 184/7 187/9	<b>contractors [1]</b> 198/21	<b>correct [30]</b> 2/23 7/6 8/15 28/20 31/24 38/14 47/16 55/10 59/22 59/24 63/1 70/25 83/12 94/4 99/5 101/21 103/19 120/13 125/12 130/7 134/1 140/14 142/25 157/14 164/18 173/3 177/13 180/7 197/10 202/6	<b>countries [8]</b> 29/7 29/9 29/21 36/3 53/21 95/13 178/24 200/21
<b>concluded [5]</b> 74/14 93/12 102/17 114/24 117/20	<b>considerably [1]</b> 160/17	<b>contributor [1]</b> 193/1	<b>corrected [1]</b> 196/24	<b>country [16]</b> 32/20
<b>concludes [1]</b> 68/19	<b>consideration [6]</b> 64/20 64/21 105/3 114/3 123/24 162/20	<b>contributors [1]</b> 67/3	<b>correctly [5]</b> 39/20 72/9 126/22 149/1 156/2	
<b>Concluding [1]</b> 39/16	<b>considerations [4]</b> 97/2 201/9 202/15 207/8		<b>corroborating [1]</b>	
<b>conclusion [6]</b> 53/21 72/2 103/4 115/3 118/7 125/13	<b>considered [6]</b> 65/2 76/24 94/25 124/1 146/14 162/12			
<b>conclusions [4]</b> 43/9 69/14 98/22 219/10	<b>consistent [5]</b> 204/1 212/21 214/2 220/16 221/5			
<b>conclusive [2]</b> 68/22 68/25	<b>consistently [1]</b> 219/7			
<b>concrete [2]</b> 53/10 58/14	<b>consists [1]</b> 2/11			
<b>conference [5]</b> 194/24 195/12 196/5 206/19 206/23	<b>constantly [1]</b> 68/24			
<b>confidence [11]</b> 23/6 66/19 84/2 106/1 151/7 162/16 162/17 166/14 166/21 167/6 217/8	<b>constituency [1]</b> 127/6			
<b>confident [5]</b> 39/2 43/16 48/18 114/22 206/15	<b>constitutional [1]</b> 141/16			
<b>confined [2]</b> 95/1	<b>constraints [1]</b> 201/20			
	<b>contact [23]</b> 17/20 29/12 70/17 72/18 88/24 89/4 90/8 144/23 150/19 150/20 151/1 151/13 151/16 151/25 153/5 153/6 153/7 153/10 176/5 176/8 176/21 179/15 217/3			
	<b>contacts [1]</b> 121/12			
	<b>contagious [2]</b> 48/19 148/1			

<b>C</b>	<b>creative [3]</b> 186/13 186/20 187/3	79/23 81/21 82/11 82/13 147/11 149/18 149/23 193/4 193/17 193/22 194/13	126/13 127/13 147/4 172/16 179/24 179/25 184/3 184/4 192/7 192/7 196/7 201/2 201/2 221/12	93/7 117/4
<b>country... [15]</b> 37/15 38/11 39/5 93/14 103/25 105/18 130/4 132/22 177/1 181/2 181/11 197/8 198/7 204/14 214/25	<b>credible [3]</b> 49/8 49/12 53/10	<b>Cummings' [2]</b> 63/18 82/2	<b>days [18]</b> 4/25 5/11 15/3 37/1 42/24 47/23 86/5 114/25 117/22 128/16 136/9 165/6 165/11 167/23 167/25 172/4 173/18 173/19	<b>decade [1]</b> 79/16
<b>country's [1]</b> 121/11	<b>crises [3]</b> 16/21 16/21 86/9	<b>current [1]</b> 172/7	<b>deal [23]</b> 1/25 4/14 6/17 7/1 13/15 31/11 38/9 40/2 40/9 75/7 88/4 102/9 106/22 106/22 116/6 129/6 134/10 161/6 187/23 197/13 201/12 209/14 220/7	<b>decades [1]</b> 23/20
<b>couple [10]</b> 4/16 36/25 56/25 74/24 148/15 162/15 176/20 177/2 179/10 202/18	<b>crisis [37]</b> 3/4 4/11 4/11 6/5 6/24 7/7 10/1 14/17 16/22 16/23 18/18 19/9 21/15 21/15 26/13 27/18 71/15 74/15 76/20 78/1 78/23 78/24 79/12 80/24 82/15 83/25 84/1 84/18 84/21 90/23 100/23 101/1 116/1 149/13 150/5 179/20 183/8	<b>Currently [1]</b> 70/8	<b>dealing [10]</b> 4/4 14/14 14/16 21/8 89/20 90/22 101/22 114/17 164/16 166/12	<b>decide [4]</b> 62/19 63/15 98/24 104/10
<b>course [93]</b> 1/16 3/1 3/7 3/15 3/18 5/8 5/21 6/5 6/19 7/1 7/3 9/3 9/5 9/22 9/23 12/25 13/22 13/24 14/7 16/17 16/24 19/12 25/4 25/5 27/25 30/11 30/12 36/1 38/10 39/20 42/12 50/7 51/12 59/7 65/16 70/16 71/17 72/16 75/2 76/15 81/21 82/6 87/10 92/12 94/5 94/20 98/1 101/3 102/1 103/5 104/2 104/22 105/10 105/24 109/25 110/14 115/21 116/22 120/16 121/7 130/6 132/16 135/23 137/10 143/23 146/3 146/4 147/23 150/12 155/3 157/5 158/25 161/21 164/2 166/19 168/9 168/11 169/23 170/11 172/9 174/16 179/19 179/22 182/18 185/20 186/7 187/22 190/2 192/22 201/6 207/18 208/3 216/3	<b>critical [6]</b> 11/19 23/16 106/7 186/4 188/11 206/9	<b>Cygnus [7]</b> 4/21 36/17 38/9 38/14 38/19 43/9 85/3	<b>dealings [2]</b> 23/8 193/22	<b>decided [8]</b> 80/17 80/19 132/9 147/22 162/8 162/18 170/1 183/9
<b>critical [6]</b> 11/19 23/16 106/7 186/4 188/11 206/9	<b>criticise [2]</b> 26/16 212/7	<b>D</b>	<b>death [7]</b> 26/23 31/10 82/17 97/15 97/15 102/3 155/20	<b>decides [1]</b> 103/5
<b>criticised [3]</b> 135/21 153/20 166/18	<b>criticising [1]</b> 106/12	<b>daily [6]</b> 26/13 67/6 80/19 81/3 81/6 81/7	<b>deaths [16]</b> 101/4 103/3 105/1 143/14 147/4 161/1 161/11 163/12 163/17 166/16 168/6 172/7 172/18 172/19 172/21 206/17	<b>deciding [1]</b> 104/4
<b>criticising [1]</b> 106/12	<b>criticism [6]</b> 153/22 176/4 184/7 184/11 184/14 185/17	<b>dairies [9]</b> 2/10 2/14 2/24 7/18 8/17 8/21 46/16 70/13 74/5	<b>debate [67]</b> 2/11 28/24 30/4 30/22 61/25 63/11 66/3 66/24 71/22 72/7 76/1 93/10 93/16 96/21 98/17 99/17 99/17 99/24 100/21 102/16 102/24 104/13 104/16 105/7 105/10 108/23 109/16 110/14 118/2 119/21 127/1 129/18 130/5 130/9 130/23 140/13 143/24 144/6 144/7 144/9 144/14 145/2 145/11 145/14 149/16 149/23 150/2 161/6 161/9 164/19 170/18 170/20 184/3 189/7 197/13 197/16 197/21 198/12 204/13 204/14 205/16 208/18 208/19 209/22 210/18 212/18 214/3	<b>decision [29]</b> 25/24 56/16 64/19 65/23 77/23 80/7 80/10 80/23 93/21 102/18 103/24 104/3 144/21 154/7 154/11 159/9 159/11 159/20 160/12 160/13 160/14 160/16 171/1 173/17 185/22 191/5 204/8 213/11 221/1
<b>criticisms [2]</b> 11/10 150/8	<b>critique [4]</b> 40/24 41/23 198/5 220/4	<b>damage [4]</b> 32/15 82/10 126/1 171/8	<b>decision-making [4]</b> 77/23 80/7 80/10 80/23	<b>decisions [17]</b> 64/12 65/23 80/20 81/2 81/12 102/3 106/1 153/17 153/22 155/22 159/22 173/21 183/10 200/18 203/13 203/25 204/5
<b>critiqued [1]</b> 4/19	<b>cross [11]</b> 10/24 14/3 16/18 18/16 27/16 78/25 79/7 116/4 116/7 136/2 136/2	<b>damaging [3]</b> 82/16 104/7 213/9	<b>dedicated [2]</b> 140/6 140/10	<b>declarations [1]</b> 140/15
<b>cross-government [3]</b> 18/16 27/16 116/4	<b>cross-governmental [1]</b> 78/25	<b>DAs [1]</b> 148/3	<b>deduce [2]</b> 86/4 91/16	<b>deep [2]</b> 13/2 51/19
<b>cross-governmental meetings [1]</b> 116/7	<b>crucial [3]</b> 10/8 14/15 66/25	<b>DAs' [1]</b> 134/18	<b>deeply [9]</b> 61/19 61/19 82/19 82/19 136/17 176/10 185/12 213/13 215/24	<b>defence [5]</b> 180/19 180/21 181/1 183/2 183/3
<b>cruise [1]</b> 57/12	<b>cruise [1]</b> 57/12	<b>data [33]</b> 26/22 37/2 48/24 57/11 57/16 68/23 104/1 104/3 105/23 105/25 105/25 147/6 155/1 155/16 156/5 156/14 156/20 157/2 158/10 161/10 161/15 161/18 162/11 162/12 163/21 164/14 165/9 166/9 167/9 168/23 207/12 207/17 214/24	<b>defend [1]</b> 128/24	<b>deficient [1]</b> 35/5
<b>crystallised [1]</b> 55/6	<b>CSA [2]</b> 149/19 193/2	<b>dates [1]</b> 57/14	<b>define [2]</b> 197/20 197/24	<b>definitely [3]</b> 81/15 128/7 221/17
<b>CSA-CMO-Matt-PM-Dom [2]</b> 149/19 193/2	<b>CSO [1]</b> 120/2	<b>David [4]</b> 1/14 16/15 152/5 156/15	<b>definitive [1]</b> 48/13	<b>degradation [1]</b> 169/8
<b>CST [1]</b> 100/11	<b>CTF [1]</b> 11/6	<b>David Cameron [1]</b> 16/15	<b>degrade [1]</b> 169/7	<b>degraded [1]</b> 179/20
<b>cultural [1]</b> 82/25	<b>culture [15]</b> 9/9 9/13 9/18 12/9 12/15 12/16 12/22 12/22 27/25 44/2 75/8 76/15 82/25 83/22 83/23	<b>David Halpern [2]</b> 152/5 156/15	<b>degree [12]</b> 50/17 51/4 60/17 63/12 63/23 66/19 78/14 79/24 113/10 167/17	
<b>Cummings [17]</b> 28/18 34/16 34/19 74/4 75/19 77/12		<b>dawn [1]</b> 32/4		
		<b>dawning [2]</b> 100/23 146/10		
		<b>day [31]</b> 8/22 8/22 31/20 42/22 47/23 48/22 87/10 87/10 91/10 91/24 95/23 100/9 108/19 109/24 118/21 118/21 121/14		
		<b>debated [9]</b> 76/1 87/24 98/15 104/22 111/6 111/15 120/17 125/25 170/13		
		<b>debates [1]</b> 207/11		
		<b>debating [3]</b> 93/2		

<b>D</b>	186/23 202/11	11/24 13/10 13/22	25/25 26/14 30/1	<b>directly [14]</b> 5/7 69/8
<b>degree... [2]</b> 199/18	<b>Department's [1]</b> 148/24	14/3 14/9 14/15 14/23	30/19 32/23 38/9	80/2 81/6 85/11
217/16	<b>departmentally [1]</b> 10/20	15/3 18/19 20/25	38/17 40/4 42/20	100/18 115/10 115/11
<b>degrees [1]</b> 214/20	<b>departments [8]</b> 9/8	21/11 21/17 31/2 74/3	53/24 54/23 55/3	118/17 119/21 148/6
<b>deign [1]</b> 202/7	9/11 12/1 12/2 12/5	100/16 110/21 111/24	56/22 59/18 60/19	148/23 197/10 211/8
<b>delay [12]</b> 17/12	18/10 19/25 79/9	111/25 112/8 119/5	61/4 61/16 67/24 68/3	<b>director [4]</b> 52/15
24/23 24/24 25/20	<b>depend [1]</b> 97/16	120/24 121/2 134/25	75/4 75/5 75/13 75/16	121/24 122/5 197/5
27/11 112/14 129/13	<b>depends [3]</b> 23/12	135/4 136/14 138/15	80/3 80/18 80/22	<b>disaster [1]</b> 173/6
133/3 137/2 137/8	197/20 197/24	147/10 147/14 157/9	80/22 81/5 85/17 86/4	<b>disbanded [1]</b> 175/11
137/14 148/9	<b>Deputy [4]</b> 23/4 76/5	189/12 192/6 193/10	92/6 94/19 97/25 98/4	<b>disbandment [1]</b> 175/16
<b>delayed [6]</b> 25/13	79/2 79/4	<b>DHSC [1]</b> 7/23	99/23 103/14 122/24	<b>discharge [8]</b> 65/10
54/1 94/18 139/22	<b>Deputy Prime Minister [1]</b> 79/2	<b>DHSC's [1]</b> 3/13	127/3 127/3 128/4	65/13 73/9 187/12
140/11 142/1	<b>describe [4]</b> 40/6	<b>diagnostic [1]</b> 4/25	131/5 144/7 151/2	188/12 189/3 195/21
<b>delaying [3]</b> 49/4	74/11 159/5 196/16	<b>diagnostics [1]</b> 178/22	152/2 154/4 155/24	199/18
143/13 145/11	<b>described [21]</b> 23/5	<b>dialled [1]</b> 108/11	156/10 156/25 157/8	<b>discharged [1]</b> 188/22
<b>delays [1]</b> 159/13	27/1 42/11 52/16	<b>Diamond [4]</b> 57/11	166/19 167/22 168/5	<b>discharges [1]</b> 188/17
<b>delegated [1]</b> 86/13	52/19 52/20 66/25	57/16 57/23 123/10	174/9 182/24 186/1	<b>discharging [1]</b> 68/7
<b>deleterious [1]</b> 81/25	72/13 72/19 72/24	<b>Diamond Princess [4]</b> 57/11 57/16	189/11 194/8 194/17	<b>disclosed [1]</b> 131/22
<b>deliberately [3]</b> 13/9	76/25 78/16 89/15	57/23 123/10	197/22 206/14 208/8	<b>discovered [1]</b> 93/14
118/25 210/10	99/14 100/4 130/11	<b>diary [7]</b> 2/21 2/22	209/3 212/9 213/1	<b>discovery [1]</b> 53/19
<b>delighted [2]</b> 19/7	144/6 172/12 174/4	8/4 8/21 31/25 213/18	216/8 219/17 219/18	<b>discrete [1]</b> 202/18
170/17	185/8 198/25	213/19	219/22 220/10 220/15	<b>discussed [17]</b> 3/23
<b>deliver [4]</b> 12/6 90/11	<b>describes [4]</b> 8/2	<b>did [116]</b> 9/5 9/5 9/22	219/22 220/10 220/15	5/6 30/15 37/3 43/9
143/13 153/9	68/18 87/14 167/12	9/23 9/25 10/2 11/12	46/3 62/3 62/5 96/1	52/13 64/17 82/20
<b>delivered [1]</b> 90/16	<b>describing [2]</b> 33/13	16/2 19/17 20/11	96/2 163/18	93/25 103/22 126/17
<b>delivering [2]</b> 12/5	94/3	23/23 25/6 26/8 28/9	<b>died [3]</b> 128/19	132/4 146/5 148/3
12/13	<b>description [2]</b> 36/15	28/11 29/20 36/3	174/21 200/24	170/23 202/11 219/3
<b>demands [1]</b> 89/11	142/10	40/14 41/21 43/20	<b>difference [13]</b> 51/4	<b>discussing [2]</b> 68/17
<b>democracy [1]</b> 81/14	<b>designate [1]</b> 41/17	47/25 54/15 55/25	53/25 65/22 65/24	110/23
<b>demonstrate [2]</b> 9/19	<b>designed [4]</b> 102/8	56/25 59/21 60/15	66/22 71/9 71/11	<b>discussion [9]</b> 9/15
102/13	107/4 164/6 168/19	63/3 63/3 63/5 63/23	72/23 72/25 73/16	19/7 71/22 131/3
<b>demonstrated [3]</b> 52/4 61/10 181/9	<b>designing [1]</b> 20/11	64/9 65/16 67/8 67/11	182/5 182/16 182/21	136/16 155/6 174/1
<b>demonstrates [2]</b> 87/17 166/7	<b>desperate [1]</b> 14/22	69/11 71/16 78/12	<b>different [28]</b> 38/23	191/14 191/18
<b>denied [1]</b> 195/4	<b>despite [1]</b> 77/16	80/2 83/2 84/15 89/9	40/12 40/12 40/24	<b>discussions [5]</b> 23/14 34/10 142/5
<b>deny [1]</b> 200/14	<b>detail [14]</b> 10/6 40/23	89/25 91/1 91/16	44/4 44/12 53/9 58/22	174/2 221/2
<b>departed [1]</b> 137/20	41/1 42/12 85/6	91/17 92/12 92/22	66/14 97/1 98/7	<b>disease [4]</b> 85/10
<b>department [84]</b> 2/25	116/24 151/23 171/5	97/6 97/11 97/15 98/4	131/11 138/25 139/6	144/2 148/1 177/20
3/3 3/17 4/8 5/8 5/12	187/7 190/7 198/2	98/8 101/8 102/11	151/24 155/24 160/5	<b>diseases [5]</b> 89/5
5/21 7/5 7/13 9/2 10/3	204/11 205/15 216/4	110/9 112/4 112/5	181/20 187/4 192/5	177/15 177/18 177/22
10/8 10/11 10/13	<b>determination [1]</b> 83/9	114/20 116/21 117/22	196/5 202/23 203/18	179/9
10/14 10/25 10/25	<b>determine [2]</b> 97/14	118/16 118/20 119/24	203/19 214/18 214/20	<b>disinterested [2]</b> 86/23 86/24
11/2 11/5 11/7 11/19	182/17	121/5 121/14 121/23	216/14 219/5	<b>disposal [1]</b> 89/22
11/20 11/23 12/13	<b>determined [3]</b> 97/10	122/4 122/10 129/1	<b>differently [2]</b> 65/19	<b>distancing [2]</b> 149/24
12/23 15/10 15/12	97/19 173/25	129/10 130/3 135/4	181/21	170/13
15/12 15/15 15/15	<b>devastating [1]</b> 161/4	135/4 135/4 135/24	<b>difficult [14]</b> 9/16	<b>distinction [4]</b> 69/2
16/20 17/4 17/17	<b>develop [1]</b> 179/2	139/20 140/4 144/8	19/18 20/25 22/17	73/16 117/1 131/9
17/24 18/3 18/5 18/6	<b>developed [1]</b> 134/24	144/9 144/14 145/2	23/10 46/19 51/8	<b>diverted [1]</b> 90/22
19/12 20/1 20/7 20/8	<b>developing [6]</b> 17/18	150/24 151/16 154/7	75/17 192/11 194/18	<b>divisive [5]</b> 165/17
20/12 21/14 22/18	17/20 37/1 50/21	154/21 155/14 155/23	200/17 201/22 202/15	165/17 165/22 166/1
23/11 24/18 27/4	108/5 175/20	156/19 158/14 165/5	208/19	199/3
36/10 37/2 40/4 41/14	<b>development [4]</b> 22/15 40/17 40/18	166/22 169/19 169/21	<b>difficulties [8]</b> 4/15	<b>do [103]</b> 6/7 7/14 9/3
57/22 74/19 78/24	176/17	172/24 175/13 175/18	17/2 17/8 21/17 22/14	11/7 11/9 12/22 12/24
81/7 86/14 92/22	<b>devising [1]</b> 192/17	175/18 178/7 179/2	25/16 27/3 202/21	14/15 16/5 16/7 18/8
95/24 96/6 99/2 111/1	<b>devolved [2]</b> 147/24	186/22 194/9 195/9	<b>difficulty [2]</b> 9/21	19/13 21/24 22/25
114/6 115/5 115/24	202/20	196/18 196/18 197/16	193/25	23/7 24/10 28/4 28/7
115/25 116/16 116/18	<b>devoted [1]</b> 13/15	207/21 208/2 209/3	<b>dig [1]</b> 206/21	28/7 28/9 31/15 32/11
116/20 117/2 120/16	<b>DHSC [44]</b> 3/9 4/10	209/9 209/19 209/19	<b>diktats [1]</b> 185/12	32/14 37/8 37/23
124/9 124/23 135/13	6/22 7/2 7/8 7/11 7/21	212/1 212/20 214/1	<b>diplomacy [1]</b> 214/20	37/25 37/25 37/25
136/1 141/6 141/20	8/2 8/6 8/15 9/5 9/22	218/21 219/18	<b>diplomatically [1]</b> 176/11	45/13 45/15 55/7
142/8 147/19 148/5		219/18 196/18 197/16	<b>diptel [2]</b> 52/18 52/18	
149/2 152/9 153/2		207/21 208/2 209/3	<b>direct [1]</b> 163/22	
		209/9 209/19 209/19	<b>direction [3]</b> 4/9	
		212/1 212/20 214/1	146/15 167/13	
		218/21 219/18		
		<b>didn't [79]</b> 3/25 7/9		
		9/6 12/20 12/24 17/22		
		18/5 19/20 23/23		

<b>D</b>	151/8 157/10 157/12 157/13 157/15 157/15 158/2 179/15 186/8 187/1 193/13 196/6 208/10 <b>Dom [2]</b> 149/19 193/2 <b>domain [1]</b> 60/6 <b>domestic [1]</b> 106/6 <b>don't [71]</b> 8/16 8/24 24/16 26/16 27/13 30/3 45/14 45/16 47/3 52/18 57/3 61/25 62/4 62/5 62/14 62/16 65/22 66/13 72/8 72/14 73/19 76/22 81/12 85/5 93/10 108/24 109/2 109/7 109/14 110/16 110/24 114/12 114/24 117/19 118/23 119/21 121/16 126/4 127/19 130/23 131/9 131/25 135/17 143/3 145/19 151/2 151/23 152/20 157/24 160/24 163/18 165/5 178/20 179/24 182/11 182/12 183/25 190/6 193/6 193/10 199/14 199/15 204/25 205/15 208/16 209/17 211/16 212/12 212/13 219/16 221/6 <b>done [51]</b> 8/6 13/25 15/5 16/6 18/9 19/25 20/2 20/3 25/19 31/3 42/12 42/13 59/1 59/8 62/7 65/5 65/25 79/3 79/3 79/21 82/10 88/2 88/11 105/24 111/23 112/14 120/8 121/19 122/9 123/17 123/21 123/24 124/22 124/24 125/1 126/1 128/13 129/2 130/12 135/7 150/5 160/9 160/17 164/20 165/6 174/17 174/22 186/13 191/8 193/24 209/14 <b>doubling [1]</b> 128/15 <b>doublings [1]</b> 128/17 <b>doubt [5]</b> 9/24 83/12 158/23 170/11 184/10 <b>doubts [1]</b> 23/12 <b>down [50]</b> 28/8 31/22 32/3 49/11 71/22 98/22 101/13 103/21 103/21 103/24 103/25 104/4 105/22 110/4 127/19 128/1 128/2 128/11 128/11 130/9 130/20 136/15 136/22 144/7 144/8 144/15 154/13 154/22 154/25	155/14 156/13 156/13 158/21 164/11 171/23 179/22 179/23 180/10 185/11 194/2 197/18 197/20 198/7 198/25 201/6 201/8 206/8 213/6 214/14 220/1 <b>down' [1]</b> 197/7 <b>Downing [4]</b> 94/13 94/18 132/5 194/24 <b>Downing Street [3]</b> 94/13 94/18 132/5 <b>downsides [1]</b> 56/21 <b>draft [5]</b> 20/16 20/17 20/21 36/21 124/18 <b>drafted [3]</b> 124/14 124/17 135/1 <b>drafting [1]</b> 124/9 <b>dragged [1]</b> 90/10 <b>dramatic [1]</b> 164/22 <b>dramatically [2]</b> 207/19 217/4 <b>drawing [1]</b> 117/3 <b>drawn [1]</b> 123/12 <b>drive [7]</b> 25/3 135/14 136/5 136/18 151/4 172/8 185/24 <b>driven [1]</b> 118/25 <b>drives [1]</b> 177/16 <b>driving [8]</b> 19/9 24/1 24/13 25/8 135/20 139/23 151/10 186/4 <b>drop [1]</b> 217/4 <b>drops [1]</b> 167/16 <b>drove [2]</b> 75/12 152/9 <b>Duchy [1]</b> 19/2 <b>due [4]</b> 42/12 105/9 130/6 190/21 <b>during [13]</b> 83/10 86/4 89/13 89/14 90/2 90/2 123/8 123/13 131/10 161/7 200/17 206/4 212/10 <b>duties [1]</b> 87/11 <b>duty [2]</b> 24/13 163/16 <b>dying [1]</b> 126/21 <b>dynamics [1]</b> 24/8	5/11 10/12 11/5 14/6 16/16 17/16 17/18 17/20 17/23 19/10 26/25 28/1 30/1 30/6 30/11 36/25 48/2 52/10 62/23 64/7 70/7 71/16 72/4 81/12 85/2 85/24 86/5 98/15 103/21 105/6 109/2 113/8 113/8 118/18 129/14 130/5 130/11 130/24 132/11 133/4 133/11 141/15 142/3 148/8 157/12 159/6 175/20 179/1 182/25 200/20 206/8 207/10 215/9 218/14 <b>earth [1]</b> 151/8 <b>easier [1]</b> 210/18 <b>Easter [3]</b> 162/6 162/6 162/7 <b>easy [1]</b> 22/3 <b>Eat [5]</b> 207/21 208/8 210/24 211/3 211/9 <b>Eat Out [1]</b> 208/8 <b>eating [1]</b> 209/12 <b>Ebola [2]</b> 34/22 37/5 <b>economic [2]</b> 207/8 213/13 <b>economically [1]</b> 213/8 <b>economics [1]</b> 213/11 <b>economist [2]</b> 166/12 213/10 <b>economists [1]</b> 213/4 <b>economy [4]</b> 114/10 1212/19 213/1 213/6 <b>Edinburgh [2]</b> 32/5 148/2 <b>edited [1]</b> 135/8 <b>Edmunds [4]</b> 50/3 66/18 68/1 146/21 <b>effect [13]</b> 31/2 42/8 87/15 101/23 123/12 129/17 129/24 159/5 187/20 208/4 211/1 212/11 218/22 <b>effective [8]</b> 29/14 31/11 35/5 104/24 174/6 185/15 191/12 215/23 <b>effectively [7]</b> 15/7 82/24 83/3 131/11 149/3 169/24 216/25 <b>effectiveness [3]</b> 132/14 133/5 159/6 <b>efficacy [1]</b> 145/17 <b>efficiency [1]</b> 6/10 <b>efficiently [1]</b> 168/16 <b>effort [11]</b> 10/24 16/1 16/18 17/7 19/11 22/7 23/1 75/10 99/21	101/7 212/8 <b>efforts [3]</b> 213/22 214/4 214/4 <b>either [10]</b> 55/2 78/25 96/23 108/23 144/21 159/13 177/18 197/10 213/3 213/3 <b>elaborate [1]</b> 115/15 <b>election [1]</b> 90/18 <b>electrify [1]</b> 152/7 <b>elicit [1]</b> 37/19 <b>eloquently [1]</b> 130/10 <b>else [3]</b> 10/15 101/6 142/8 <b>elsewhere [3]</b> 112/9 210/15 213/5 <b>email [9]</b> 8/2 19/6 44/23 45/6 45/7 45/12 112/19 132/4 134/23 <b>emailed [2]</b> 146/25 148/14 <b>emails [2]</b> 12/7 33/25 <b>embedded [1]</b> 103/16 <b>embrace [1]</b> 105/18 <b>embraced [1]</b> 16/10 <b>emergencies [3]</b> 70/1 118/22 120/22 <b>emergency [5]</b> 3/10 6/6 77/19 81/10 121/3 <b>emerging [2]</b> 21/3 120/25 <b>eminent [2]</b> 66/17 202/8 <b>emoji [1]</b> 186/16 <b>empathise [1]</b> 28/10 <b>empathy [1]</b> 9/20 <b>emphasis [1]</b> 106/18 <b>emphasise [1]</b> 82/12 <b>emphasising [1]</b> 198/20 <b>emphatic [1]</b> 125/20 <b>enable [1]</b> 119/3 <b>enacted [1]</b> 20/18 <b>encountered [3]</b> 17/8 27/4 202/21 <b>encouraged [1]</b> 212/6 <b>end [42]</b> 15/19 16/2 17/3 17/22 18/13 18/24 19/22 26/23 29/24 30/18 30/21 31/5 31/19 41/11 70/5 92/12 99/8 126/20 127/15 130/17 136/1 138/2 144/22 144/24 169/7 169/21 173/6 179/20 184/4 184/4 184/15 184/15 194/10 206/6 209/1 209/16 210/24 211/2 215/1 215/3 215/6 215/18 <b>ended [5]</b> 10/13 11/4 11/4 136/1 147/16
----------	---	---	---	--

<b>E</b>	144/11	84/14 87/6 87/6	<b>exercise [21]</b> 4/21	209/9
<b>endorse [1]</b> 220/10	<b>error [3]</b> 52/19 52/21	135/17 163/16 174/20	14/3 36/18 85/3	<b>expressed [9]</b> 44/17
<b>energy [1]</b> 13/15	61/5	192/10	101/14 101/16 101/18	65/2 66/6 75/18 93/2
<b>engage [4]</b> 12/17	<b>escalate [2]</b> 79/6	<b>everyone [1]</b> 192/13	101/20 101/20 102/1	125/24 205/12 209/15
151/5 176/11 176/19	79/9	<b>everything [7]</b> 9/5	102/6 102/8 103/1	212/3
<b>engaged [3]</b> 22/21	<b>escalation [2]</b> 79/10	9/23 19/17 111/22	103/22 104/18 105/12	<b>expression [1]</b> 65/20
96/7 186/19	117/16	163/20 164/25 164/25	106/13 106/20 106/21	<b>expressly [3]</b> 111/22
<b>engagement [2]</b> 66/8	<b>escape [3]</b> 91/18	<b>evidence [89]</b> 1/16	107/3 122/15	133/2 138/15
66/12	93/18 106/16	2/1 3/7 3/21 5/2 14/8	<b>Exercise Cygnus [1]</b>	<b>extant [1]</b> 162/22
<b>England [12]</b> 3/19	<b>especially [11]</b> 20/12	14/20 15/14 23/5 24/5	85/3	<b>extend [1]</b> 211/16
7/2 35/22 121/11	24/3 33/10 52/25	24/21 25/1 25/12	<b>Exercise Nimbus [1]</b>	<b>extended [1]</b> 209/20
175/10 175/11 175/14	76/21 101/2 175/19	26/13 27/3 27/5 27/21	101/20	<b>extension [2]</b> 209/16
175/18 177/25 178/5	178/23 191/4 191/8	31/1 34/7 34/18 42/8	<b>exercised [2]</b> 79/24	209/17
178/13 188/9	216/21	44/20 45/3 47/19 49/8	80/7	<b>extensive [1]</b> 179/18
<b>engulfing [2]</b> 77/25	<b>essential [2]</b> 164/24	49/12 50/1 50/5 52/9	<b>exhibits [1]</b> 9/19	<b>extent [22]</b> 18/19
79/12	200/9	52/15 53/10 53/11	<b>exigencies [1]</b>	21/5 34/21 45/23 62/1
<b>enormous [14]</b> 9/1	<b>essentially [28]</b> 5/1	54/16 55/13 55/21	190/22	62/2 62/8 62/14 74/12
19/14 19/15 21/19	17/17 30/21 36/17	56/6 56/9 56/10 56/18	<b>existed [1]</b> 67/1	81/22 95/16 113/22
23/12 25/7 26/15 53/7	53/11 56/22 67/14	57/6 58/14 58/20	<b>existence [6]</b> 43/5	115/23 117/24 130/8
104/2 128/20 132/24	76/16 76/22 81/15	63/18 64/1 64/12	112/10 113/4 113/16	144/9 144/14 159/12
132/25 153/13 166/2	82/21 84/13 91/19	66/15 67/21 67/24	114/18 120/19	172/24 176/15 187/13
<b>enormously [1]</b> 53/6	98/8 98/10 116/22	68/12 68/20 68/21	<b>existing [1]</b> 142/21	205/22
<b>enough [22]</b> 2/4	122/17 141/15 148/16	69/1 69/13 69/18	<b>exists [1]</b> 183/7	<b>external [1]</b> 180/23
40/14 47/8 48/2 56/6	149/6 153/22 160/1	70/15 71/18 71/25	<b>exit [1]</b> 204/11	<b>extra [1]</b> 40/18
61/21 66/5 88/1 104/9	162/11 163/5 163/18	74/8 74/18 74/25	<b>expand [5]</b> 9/22 45/5	<b>extract [1]</b> 7/18
113/9 113/12 138/3	177/5 185/22 191/11	75/21 79/23 80/1	174/5 174/6 176/22	<b>extracts [1]</b> 46/24
142/4 152/3 168/25	<b>establish [1]</b> 94/14	86/12 88/4 95/5	<b>expanded [1]</b> 5/12	<b>extraordinarily [2]</b>
169/15 189/11 198/10	<b>establishment [1]</b>	101/22 118/24 123/11	<b>expanding [1]</b> 40/12	23/10 132/22
200/23 201/4 215/23	53/14	134/22 146/17 152/20	<b>expansion [3]</b> 40/13	<b>extraordinary [4]</b>
219/20	<b>estimated [2]</b> 121/21	152/21 155/2 160/20	186/5 186/10	21/11 76/10 136/20
<b>enquiries [1]</b> 141/7	128/15	160/20 174/4 174/9	<b>expect [4]</b> 9/6 48/15	174/19
<b>ensure [5]</b> 133/5	<b>et [5]</b> 96/5 152/16	176/2 184/6 187/9	110/15 171/3	<b>extremely [13]</b> 12/18
144/15 168/7 169/12	152/16 196/4 219/10	187/20 187/24 196/19	<b>expected [1]</b> 169/5	13/4 19/18 36/24
192/12	<b>et cetera [5]</b> 96/5	199/9 199/25 203/9	<b>experience [2]</b> 77/20	37/15 115/6 174/4
<b>enthusiastic [1]</b>	152/16 152/16 196/4	220/5 221/17	176/4	175/21 177/22 179/18
216/1	219/10	<b>evident [3]</b> 13/14	<b>experienced [1]</b>	192/11 193/19 214/11
<b>entire [1]</b> 206/2	<b>Europe [1]</b> 88/19	14/2 184/1	178/22	<b>eye [1]</b> 85/21
<b>entirely [14]</b> 41/22	<b>even [18]</b> 5/8 5/18	<b>evidently [1]</b> 11/13	<b>experts [1]</b> 176/6	<b>F</b>
85/23 100/25 134/5	5/18 11/12 31/5 101/6	<b>exact [2]</b> 103/1 115/1	<b>explain [15]</b> 14/23	<b>face [6]</b> 75/18 82/14
147/15 162/24 163/1	111/15 124/6 166/6	<b>exactly [8]</b> 59/20	31/17 41/22 55/13	102/2 136/8 161/9
169/22 183/1 192/21	174/21 178/17 180/24	91/24 92/20 113/12	73/18 83/17 83/19	170/18
194/6 195/23 197/19	186/1 191/9 203/23	115/1 137/19 174/10	96/16 136/19 155/2	<b>face masks [1]</b>
214/17	215/22 219/12 219/20	216/9	157/22 158/5 159/13	170/18
<b>entitled [2]</b> 2/14	<b>evening [8]</b> 8/5 8/20	<b>examination [3]</b>	173/13 195/25	<b>faced [13]</b> 6/6 20/25
165/7	126/22 132/3 148/14	28/13 76/8 106/23	<b>explained [5]</b> 55/7	23/11 26/12 84/21
<b>entity [3]</b> 176/17	186/13 200/3 221/10	<b>examine [1]</b> 160/11	139/16 143/23 160/15	95/25 102/1 103/24
176/19 176/22	<b>event [6]</b> 8/18 9/2	<b>example [10]</b> 10/17	173/1	107/4 201/22 215/1
<b>entries [2]</b> 8/4 213/20	57/7 61/24 63/21	17/1 53/5 77/13 155/7	<b>explaining [4]</b> 31/14	215/1 215/6
<b>entry [4]</b> 32/1 60/12	99/18	159/1 170/24 175/20	55/8 135/23 135/25	<b>facing [1]</b> 37/15
196/23 213/19	<b>events [2]</b> 33/21	194/18 200/22	<b>explains [2]</b> 45/4	<b>fact [38]</b> 19/24 25/10
<b>environment [2]</b>	140/4	<b>examples [7]</b> 10/16	57/4	26/14 29/2 30/5 36/18
23/16 57/25	<b>eventually [4]</b> 10/18	13/10 20/23 25/2	<b>explanation [3]</b> 73/21	40/4 40/23 43/15
<b>envisaged [2]</b> 43/1	77/23 176/9 209/7	53/17 53/18 194/4	76/13 201/15	44/18 47/21 52/1
137/12	<b>eventuate [2]</b> 82/16	<b>excelled [1]</b> 13/10	<b>explicitly [1]</b> 56/3	62/18 76/4 91/1 94/15
<b>epidemic [2]</b> 39/8	105/1	<b>except [1]</b> 169/25	<b>exploring [1]</b> 74/1	95/25 97/8 100/18
147/3	<b>eventuating [2]</b> 93/4	<b>exchange [2]</b> 61/9	<b>explosive [3]</b> 193/23	114/24 125/11 128/21
<b>epidemiological [4]</b>	104/15	66/7	193/23 193/24	140/5 140/7 140/11
155/4 156/5 157/19	<b>ever [5]</b> 95/16 99/17	<b>Exchequer [3]</b> 83/4	<b>exponential [7]</b>	156/15 166/4 166/4
158/13	103/12 173/6 209/17	83/15 93/1	164/13 164/17 166/10	169/19 170/14 179/17
<b>equivalent [1]</b> 178/7	<b>every [7]</b> 41/14 76/14	<b>exclusively [1]</b> 54/8	166/13 172/15 172/22	186/16 194/6 195/8
<b>Er [1]</b> 122/12	128/16 131/19 162/19	<b>excuse [1]</b> 140/20	173/4	196/4 196/6 198/14
<b>eradicating [1]</b> 45/10	169/24 187/4	<b>excuses [1]</b> 217/24	<b>exposed [1]</b> 7/20	208/1
<b>eradication [1]</b>	<b>everybody [11]</b> 24/17	<b>executive [2]</b> 82/21	<b>exposure [1]</b> 45/2	<b>factor [2]</b> 98/2
	26/19 70/19 83/23	171/18	<b>express [2]</b> 8/13	

<b>F</b>	67/20 80/16 83/3 88/16 89/13 89/14 90/2 92/13 92/24 97/22 100/4 101/10 108/20 109/1 109/12 109/21 109/24 110/22 110/24 111/10 111/15 111/17 112/11 112/22 113/3 114/2 117/11 119/15 121/9 121/15 123/1 123/7 123/7 123/14 123/18 123/19 124/1 124/1 124/20 124/25 125/24 126/6 126/13 127/22 128/3 130/14 134/22 135/2 135/6 142/4 157/12 158/1 170/15 170/16 170/18 170/19 175/14 188/2 200/7 215/2 215/4 215/6 <b>February 2020 [1]</b> 43/6 <b>feed [1]</b> 81/7 <b>feedback [1]</b> 211/9 <b>feel [7]</b> 13/10 57/6 86/19 100/21 156/25 195/23 201/16 <b>Feeling [1]</b> 47/13 <b>felt [9]</b> 20/1 24/12 25/3 25/4 25/8 55/14 157/1 212/23 213/16 <b>Ferguson [5]</b> 66/18 146/21 146/25 147/1 147/3 <b>fetishise [1]</b> 120/19 <b>few [12]</b> 5/4 29/12 29/13 70/17 89/6 89/22 129/7 150/18 165/11 167/25 206/13 221/15 <b>few weeks [1]</b> 5/4 <b>fewer [1]</b> 128/18 <b>field [1]</b> 35/12 <b>fight [1]</b> 114/15 <b>figure [4]</b> 96/15 97/1 126/17 126/18 <b>figures [2]</b> 43/12 171/14 <b>final [7]</b> 10/9 68/12 118/4 160/24 161/3 170/25 173/2 <b>finally [5]</b> 16/2 18/18 43/22 69/17 130/17 <b>finance [1]</b> 195/20 <b>financial [3]</b> 177/25 178/1 178/2 <b>financing [1]</b> 142/16 <b>find [13]</b> 19/16 49/7 72/10 72/17 75/9 85/3 104/9 137/24 140/17 140/23 145/7 194/4 206/20 <b>finds [2]</b> 157/17	159/14 <b>fingers [1]</b> 24/16 <b>finish [4]</b> 210/11 219/3 221/9 221/13 <b>fire [1]</b> 131/5 <b>firm [2]</b> 142/3 148/13 <b>firmer [1]</b> 213/8 <b>first [68]</b> 3/24 4/16 5/4 6/14 14/13 15/21 17/22 17/25 21/10 22/22 26/23 29/12 29/13 29/23 30/15 31/20 32/17 32/20 42/22 60/12 61/1 70/17 86/5 88/16 88/19 89/6 91/25 93/17 94/21 95/1 95/25 100/9 100/17 108/9 111/3 114/22 115/4 119/11 120/12 128/19 129/8 136/21 143/10 145/7 148/17 150/18 155/19 156/17 165/21 166/10 166/20 168/4 175/22 177/8 178/12 182/15 182/24 183/3 184/13 191/15 194/4 195/24 203/14 204/6 204/12 215/16 215/18 216/25 <b>First Few 100 [1]</b> 150/18 <b>first few hundred [3]</b> 29/13 70/17 89/6 <b>First Minister [2]</b> 203/14 204/6 <b>firstly [8]</b> 40/10 79/23 151/24 160/24 169/5 187/12 202/7 219/18 <b>fiscal [1]</b> 195/21 <b>fitness [2]</b> 76/7 82/13 <b>five [6]</b> 90/17 93/3 101/16 117/12 153/3 166/5 <b>five years [1]</b> 90/17 <b>fix [2]</b> 12/24 84/16 <b>flak [2]</b> 11/13 11/13 <b>flatten [1]</b> 144/10 <b>flattening [2]</b> 143/13 145/2 <b>flawed [1]</b> 41/24 <b>flaws [2]</b> 43/10 139/13 <b>flexibility [1]</b> 174/25 <b>flexible [2]</b> 174/12 174/14 <b>flick [1]</b> 180/15 <b>flight [1]</b> 32/5 <b>flipped [1]</b> 12/9 <b>flowed [1]</b> 127/21 <b>flu [10]</b> 4/3 5/24 34/22 40/10 43/8 43/8 105/13 106/14 138/17 138/20	<b>flu plan [1]</b> 138/17 <b>focus [4]</b> 115/12 184/16 184/17 210/6 <b>focused [5]</b> 14/9 101/24 112/24 149/6 183/11 <b>focuses [1]</b> 178/10 <b>focusing [2]</b> 14/6 184/14 <b>fog [5]</b> 26/21 57/19 67/13 67/18 67/23 <b>fold [1]</b> 166/9 <b>folks [1]</b> 22/8 <b>follow [4]</b> 2/9 4/6 22/4 161/13 <b>followed [3]</b> 19/4 160/2 160/3 <b>following [6]</b> 87/18 101/18 164/9 182/18 185/14 220/21 <b>follows [3]</b> 33/16 56/4 172/16 <b>fora [1]</b> 141/20 <b>force [4]</b> 145/1 159/11 165/4 182/13 <b>Ford [1]</b> 176/8 <b>fore [1]</b> 71/25 <b>forecast [1]</b> 162/21 <b>forecasts [3]</b> 166/17 166/19 166/19 <b>forefront [1]</b> 9/3 <b>foremost [1]</b> 215/16 <b>forget [1]</b> 165/25 <b>forgive [9]</b> 33/15 83/8 86/18 122/8 124/12 137/22 139/1 152/12 201/22 <b>form [1]</b> 196/18 <b>formal [13]</b> 2/15 33/1 33/4 33/17 51/22 53/12 54/2 59/2 119/16 132/8 156/18 157/1 219/10 <b>formally [9]</b> 52/17 61/6 69/7 109/20 109/21 120/15 137/18 144/21 156/23 <b>former [1]</b> 133/10 <b>formulate [1]</b> 21/9 <b>formulations [1]</b> 67/13 <b>forth [8]</b> 29/4 135/8 142/18 150/2 155/5 161/8 167/15 171/7 <b>fortnight [1]</b> 86/1 <b>forward [14]</b> 12/3 24/2 24/14 25/3 25/9 27/21 34/6 52/3 87/4 171/11 171/17 182/14 215/18 216/14 <b>found [6]</b> 27/20 126/21 130/9 176/16 204/3 214/15 <b>four [12]</b> 85/12 86/3	117/22 128/16 153/2 156/8 156/11 166/5 166/6 171/23 182/18 208/6 <b>four days [2]</b> 117/22 128/16 <b>four lines [1]</b> 171/23 <b>four nations [1]</b> 166/5 <b>four weeks [4]</b> 156/8 156/11 182/18 208/6 <b>framed [1]</b> 54/8 <b>framework [1]</b> 125/1 <b>frankly [2]</b> 11/11 24/4 <b>free [3]</b> 172/8 188/10 196/2 <b>freedom [1]</b> 208/11 <b>frequently [1]</b> 116/19 <b>Friday [9]</b> 33/3 123/7 146/12 146/13 160/22 168/18 168/20 169/3 221/24 <b>front [2]</b> 45/14 45/16 <b>fruition [1]</b> 13/16 <b>frustrating [15]</b> 58/7 61/19 61/20 69/3 81/6 82/19 136/17 176/10 186/7 204/9 213/13 214/10 215/20 215/22 215/24 <b>frustration [6]</b> 12/25 51/19 56/14 56/17 58/11 213/4 <b>frustrations [2]</b> 27/20 201/18 <b>full [17]</b> 1/13 17/5 32/23 34/23 45/23 76/23 84/25 85/7 86/10 90/16 144/25 162/18 167/22 170/21 174/18 178/24 219/23 <b>full-hearted [1]</b> 178/24 <b>full-time [1]</b> 17/5 <b>fully [7]</b> 49/2 96/6 96/7 128/4 173/15 193/10 207/6 <b>functional [1]</b> 142/10 <b>functionally [1]</b> 106/20 <b>fundamental [1]</b> 105/17 <b>fundamentally [2]</b> 107/5 107/5 <b>funded [1]</b> 37/4 <b>funding [5]</b> 7/5 14/1 22/17 142/18 209/5 <b>funds [1]</b> 40/18 <b>further [18]</b> 1/24 2/2 41/25 44/20 45/5 78/5 91/18 115/15 117/22 155/3 161/3 171/17 172/5 173/8 180/24 182/1 182/17 206/21
----------	--	---	---	--

<b>F</b>	<b>getting [14]</b> 10/4 11/9 15/24 17/2 25/16 74/6 75/17 90/9 108/18 114/7 126/19 153/23 154/1 156/21	104/9 105/1 108/7 113/10 113/11 116/15 124/12 124/23 125/22 130/11 130/15 132/11 133/10 137/5 138/13 141/24 142/2 142/6 147/23 149/6 149/9 150/25 151/15 156/22 159/6 162/12 170/2 170/4 173/20 173/24 178/4 179/14 179/14 181/25 185/17 185/21 189/6 195/12 200/9 204/10 209/22 214/25 216/3 220/7	82/5 82/10 84/22 87/3 87/9 87/20 89/22 92/20 92/23 98/2 109/20 115/22 116/4 117/2 120/22 121/4 121/20 124/6 127/23 128/25 129/21 129/21 129/24 131/1 134/3 135/4 135/7 135/15 135/20 136/2 136/5 136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	152/7 164/13 164/17 166/11 172/15 172/23 173/6
<b>furthermore [2]</b> 38/20 124/25	<b>give [15]</b> 1/8 1/13 10/16 10/17 13/9 35/3 55/13 67/17 68/12 84/1 152/20 190/18 199/16 214/6 214/21	178/4 179/14 179/14 181/25 185/17 185/21 189/6 195/12 200/9 204/10 209/22 214/25 216/3 220/7	109/20 115/22 116/4 117/2 120/22 121/4 121/20 124/6 127/23 128/25 129/21 129/21 129/24 131/1 134/3 135/4 135/7 135/15 135/20 136/2 136/5 136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	<b>guarantee [3]</b> 48/18 192/10 192/12
<b>future [19]</b> 10/8 16/19 18/9 20/5 20/21 41/2 41/24 77/8 77/9 77/14 77/25 78/16 106/17 137/12 164/14 179/4 194/19 213/9 220/6	<b>given [36]</b> 1/9 5/2 14/8 17/1 27/4 34/1 34/18 36/16 42/8 63/3 66/2 67/18 73/21 79/23 83/24 100/17 100/18 104/15 105/3 114/14 118/18 123/11 149/7 152/21 154/13 171/15 178/24 183/4 187/9 187/20 188/21 189/2 189/21 194/12 197/11 209/10	<b>gone [7]</b> 24/23 58/20 74/22 119/20 174/21 181/24 182/7	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	<b>guarantees [1]</b> 190/18
<b>G</b>	<b>giving [2]</b> 27/21 195/19	<b>good [17]</b> 1/4 2/4 5/3 7/24 19/4 26/11 61/21 69/11 79/14 105/20 144/18 147/25 164/10 175/8 198/20 210/19 218/18	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	<b>guess [1]</b> 205/24
<b>G7 [2]</b> 33/9 148/4	<b>global [15]</b> 39/3 45/9 46/10 46/11 47/7 60/22 91/21 91/22 92/6 93/18 97/3 97/7 98/6 117/15 117/16	<b>Goodwin [2]</b> 197/1 198/14	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	<b>guidance [5]</b> 56/2 65/9 189/21 196/3 198/1
<b>galvanise [1]</b> 185/25	<b>globally [1]</b> 44/25	<b>Gosh [1]</b> 165/19	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	<b>guided [3]</b> 41/4 220/23 220/24
<b>game [5]</b> 93/6 96/19 96/25 104/23 109/19	<b>glorious [1]</b> 196/11	<b>got [44]</b> 4/24 10/22 18/19 19/2 19/24 20/7 20/11 21/4 26/21 33/7 37/9 46/1 53/22 53/23 58/13 62/4 69/17 75/1 77/2 78/9 81/15 90/4 109/10 119/17 127/7 128/11 128/12 148/20 151/15 154/9 156/12 156/13 158/6 163/1 163/5 169/15 171/13 180/10 181/4 186/17 192/1 202/3 206/13 209/7	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	<b>guy [1]</b> 30/16
<b>gathering [1]</b> 91/4	<b>go [48]</b> 9/5 9/24 10/6 10/8 12/19 18/2 30/1 40/14 53/18 57/1 81/13 85/5 97/6 98/22 105/5 106/5 108/9 113/17 126/24 127/7 129/24 130/5 130/23 131/3 131/4 131/4 131/5 144/11 149/25 158/18 162/9 162/18 169/24 171/17 173/8 179/5 180/15 181/25 182/17 185/10 190/6 198/2 203/16 209/22 210/2 211/1 212/16 217/20	<b>Gove [2]</b> 112/7 160/22	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>gatherings [1]</b> 170/20	<b>goal [3]</b> 183/23 185/7 210/14	<b>governance [1]</b> 75/4	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>gave [8]</b> 2/1 23/9 30/10 44/15 87/15 91/6 188/24 194/17	<b>goals [1]</b> 177/11	<b>government [120]</b> 3/2 4/8 6/6 8/12 9/14 10/24 11/11 11/18 12/1 14/3 15/4 15/14 15/25 16/18 16/20 16/23 17/3 17/6 17/10 18/11 18/16 19/10 19/23 19/25 20/4 21/14 21/14 24/4 24/18 25/12 25/17 26/10 26/20 27/2 27/16 27/17 31/3 31/5 31/9 31/16 31/17 35/13 35/14 40/1 41/14 42/4 59/15 61/13 65/16 66/3 67/2 69/10 70/2 71/23 74/10 74/13 75/20 77/20 78/23 79/7 79/16 81/10 81/25	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>GCSA [5]</b> 69/10 70/14 133/21 143/21 144/1	<b>goes [6]</b> 74/10 93/18 97/3 108/4 163/12 206/6	<b>grid [1]</b> 94/18	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>gear [1]</b> 28/22	<b>going [78]</b> 6/9 7/13 9/3 11/2 11/9 17/3 17/6 17/14 19/22 20/11 22/1 24/9 24/13 24/21 25/17 30/6 30/11 37/17 38/12 41/20 49/24 55/13 59/3 64/18 89/10 90/10 92/21 93/17 96/5 97/3 103/20 103/25 104/5 104/5	<b>grind [1]</b> 181/4	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>geared [1]</b> 17/9		<b>grip [3]</b> 7/23 7/24 142/9	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>general [9]</b> 1/17 14/4 52/15 74/24 88/2 105/6 159/19 205/16 215/7		<b>groceries [1]</b> 10/21	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>generally [4]</b> 12/2 63/19 82/2 198/20		<b>ground [3]</b> 43/23 194/5 203/5	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>generation [1]</b> 83/25		<b>grounds [2]</b> 99/6 216/24	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>generosity [1]</b> 9/20		<b>group [10]</b> 14/5 120/1 121/2 149/16 149/19 155/8 171/14 172/6 192/25 193/1	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>genesis [3]</b> 124/10 138/17 139/6		<b>grow [1]</b> 9/22	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>genomes [1]</b> 175/24		<b>growing [2]</b> 26/13 105/25	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>genomics [1]</b> 175/22		<b>growth [8]</b> 10/3	136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>Germany [6]</b> 49/6 49/9 49/13 52/14 55/18 178/24			136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>get [63]</b> 9/23 10/21 11/1 11/9 15/23 16/2 16/7 17/6 17/14 18/5 22/13 24/20 26/10 33/7 36/22 41/2 41/20 47/9 56/15 58/3 62/2 72/10 76/11 85/17 92/20 94/1 94/8 96/4 100/2 101/6 103/12 105/25 116/12 123/6 136/18 151/5 162/5 163/8 163/12 163/14 163/19 166/24 166/25 167/6 167/7 171/16 176/13 179/13 179/14 193/11 201/11 206/8 206/15 206/16 209/5 210/18 213/12 215/21 215/23 216/20 217/18 219/6 219/22			136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	
<b>gets [1]</b> 163/17			136/11 146/14 147/15 157/11 157/25 158/24 159/14 164/7 164/10 167/20 171/22 172/24 181/19 183/18 186/2 188/8 188/11 190/15 190/23 201/23 202/22 202/22 204/22 209/15 212/8 212/13	

<b>H</b>	<b>have [305]</b>	140/5 140/9 147/24	125/23 146/1 158/9	159/9 159/11 160/25
<b>hand... [6]</b> 153/13	<b>haven't [2]</b> 75/1	148/1 148/5 148/18	182/12 200/16 210/23	161/22 186/22 189/19
153/24 154/1 154/6	140/17	148/22 148/23 149/7	<b>Herefordshire [1]</b>	189/22 190/8 193/7
198/20 201/17	<b>Haverhill [1]</b> 127/5	163/13 169/11 175/7	219/25	198/17
<b>hand washing [2]</b>	<b>having [22]</b> 18/8 21/9	175/10 175/11 175/14	<b>Hi [1]</b> 186/13	<b>homes [22]</b> 56/2 65/9
22/8 37/25	21/9 23/5 27/22 92/3	175/18 177/12 177/13	<b>high [11]</b> 63/23 66/19	117/7 141/16 187/7
<b>handing [1]</b> 87/22	99/10 102/1 104/25	177/14 178/11 178/13	89/5 90/3 135/21	188/17 190/12 195/3
<b>handle [3]</b> 6/3 28/17	106/5 106/5 106/6	180/21 180/22 181/3	165/8 165/9 165/9	197/7 197/18 198/6
62/2	111/11 112/18 127/11	181/8 181/9 181/19	168/25 176/8 177/22	198/9 198/25 199/5
<b>happen [19]</b> 12/24	127/25 128/3 129/5	183/1 203/8 203/9	<b>high-consequence</b>	199/11 199/20 200/6
15/16 59/7 78/16 84/3	167/13 177/11 191/9	207/8 207/9 208/13	<b>[1]</b> 89/5	200/8 200/21 200/25
99/17 103/5 113/20	201/3	208/19 209/11 212/24	<b>high-volume [1]</b>	202/2 217/6
136/20 138/5 154/2	<b>he [80]</b> 6/22 7/9 8/5	213/14 220/11 220/12	176/8	<b>hope [3]</b> 58/6 99/8
158/9 162/22 164/12	19/3 19/7 19/8 21/22	<b>Health Secretary [1]</b>	<b>higher [4]</b> 66/19	163/4
166/19 173/25 177/19	22/6 22/25 26/6 26/7	169/11	188/6 215/3 220/2	<b>hopefully [1]</b> 20/14
179/17 217/10	32/3 32/21 33/12 34/3	<b>Health-specific [1]</b>	<b>highest [3]</b> 12/14	<b>hoping [1]</b> 162/5
<b>happened [29]</b> 15/24	34/19 39/17 47/6	148/18	115/22 216/22	<b>horrible [1]</b> 195/1
23/19 25/1 30/17 33/2	52/16 52/19 61/15	<b>healthy [2]</b> 11/25	<b>highlighted [1]</b>	<b>horrific [1]</b> 103/6
33/8 33/8 34/8 36/23	73/21 73/22 75/20	12/15	122/14	<b>horror [1]</b> 167/22
63/17 71/14 72/4 87/4	75/22 75/23 75/25	<b>heard [11]</b> 16/4 19/2	<b>highly [2]</b> 52/5 176/6	<b>hospital [9]</b> 65/10
95/23 96/10 98/9	77/5 80/2 80/3 80/17	43/12 88/4 121/23	<b>Hill [1]</b> 170/16	65/13 68/8 73/10
98/10 99/9 123/13	80/19 80/20 80/21	128/5 129/11 148/6	<b>him [21]</b> 19/3 22/6	163/11 177/2 187/13
145/9 148/16 149/3	80/22 81/2 81/3 81/3	156/19 205/22 205/24	26/6 32/10 47/5 61/17	188/12 199/19
153/16 155/20 155/25	81/5 82/11 83/2 85/17	<b>hearing [1]</b> 221/23	77/2 77/3 81/22 83/19	<b>hospital-based [1]</b>
166/1 166/4 183/8	85/19 89/16 89/19	<b>heart [1]</b> 18/22	85/9 85/11 85/12	177/2
217/13	89/21 91/25 95/6	<b>hearted [1]</b> 178/24	85/15 85/17 91/20	<b>hospitalised [3]</b>
<b>happening [15]</b>	99/14 113/18 114/6	<b>heat [1]</b> 76/20	127/14 148/14 156/16	45/21 45/22 46/3
23/18 27/19 93/24	121/6 127/3 127/3	<b>heavily [1]</b> 48/20	171/24 174/5	<b>hospitals [5]</b> 117/7
96/15 96/23 105/16	127/4 127/14 148/8	<b>held [3]</b> 18/4 39/2	<b>hindsight [34]</b> 2/19	148/21 163/15 188/14
106/8 112/9 142/4	148/8 148/10 156/15	131/5	26/2 26/18 27/19	217/5
156/24 161/21 166/11	156/16 172/2 194/9	<b>Helen [7]</b> 8/14 14/20	30/14 37/7 51/21	<b>hot [1]</b> 74/12
166/16 166/21 167/8	194/10 194/16 197/3	23/4 42/8 74/5 141/2	56/17 57/18 59/7 94/5	<b>hour [1]</b> 102/25
<b>happens [3]</b> 123/20	197/3 197/4 197/4	142/2	100/25 103/23 119/20	<b>hours [2]</b> 15/23 26/5
130/18 179/8	200/4 200/7 202/3	<b>Helen MacNamara</b>	127/25 128/9 129/1	<b>household [2]</b> 38/2
<b>happy [6]</b> 74/22	210/7 211/16 213/16	<b>[5]</b> 8/14 14/20 23/4	129/5 129/7 130/12	105/8
76/13 152/10 198/1	214/2 214/7 214/17	42/8 74/5	134/5 154/12 154/21	<b>how [98]</b> 6/3 6/7
210/17 210/22	219/5 221/4	<b>Helen Whately [2]</b>	154/23 155/25 156/10	10/20 10/21 10/22
<b>hard [10]</b> 16/1 17/6	<b>he'd [2]</b> 148/8 200/7	141/2 142/2	160/17 211/1 217/21	12/24 14/21 15/4 19/3
21/20 45/3 75/7 75/12	<b>he's [1]</b> 5/2	<b>help [12]</b> 14/25 21/24	217/22 218/6 219/9	21/4 22/6 23/15 23/16
112/19 115/7 152/10	<b>head [1]</b> 181/6	22/5 22/25 37/9	219/13 219/17	23/22 23/25 27/1
163/8	<b>heading [1]</b> 190/2	119/11 151/21 207/21	<b>his [29]</b> 32/14 39/18	28/17 31/17 32/4 34/2
<b>harder [4]</b> 46/6 51/21	<b>heads [1]</b> 83/24	208/8 210/25 211/4	66/9 71/24 71/25	37/17 38/1 38/11 57/6
54/23 185/6	<b>health [109]</b> 1/19	211/9	73/21 73/23 74/5 76/4	58/7 59/21 62/4 63/2
<b>hardly [2]</b> 144/17	2/25 3/3 3/10 3/15	<b>helped [1]</b> 79/14	80/20 85/19 85/20	63/7 63/9 65/24 66/2
219/25	3/18 3/19 5/21 6/23	<b>helpful [3]</b> 43/23	89/21 90/15 96/8	73/5 73/7 73/15 74/10
<b>Harries [1]</b> 108/10	7/2 7/13 10/1 10/14	43/24 154/14	126/4 147/11 174/4	74/12 76/8 76/8 79/3
<b>harrowing [1]</b> 33/14	10/25 11/2 11/5 12/20	<b>helpfully [1]</b> 144/5	183/10 186/18 196/12	79/3 79/16 82/14
<b>has [46]</b> 2/9 8/6 14/8	14/9 14/10 14/12	<b>helping [1]</b> 22/8	198/15 200/3 201/18	82/15 84/16 84/17
27/13 31/1 33/16	14/17 15/10 15/12	<b>hence [3]</b> 58/20 59/8	210/7 214/5 219/4	87/14 87/17 89/9 90/7
34/18 36/3 42/8 44/20	15/12 17/17 17/17	212/13	220/4 220/5	90/10 93/18 97/11
46/1 49/1 72/16 72/25	17/18 20/6 20/8 27/8	<b>Henry [1]</b> 176/8	<b>historical [1]</b> 178/15	102/14 102/19 103/2
76/2 79/23 80/2 89/15	35/22 35/22 35/23	<b>Henry Ford-style [1]</b>	<b>hit [6]</b> 93/19 95/9	104/1 104/3 104/6
95/5 99/10 100/4	36/8 36/20 37/12 39/3	176/8	168/5 186/2 187/5	105/23 110/13 119/18
101/22 114/14 114/14	39/16 40/4 46/11	<b>her [2]</b> 42/9 84/4	194/10	123/3 123/4 129/25
114/14 117/23 135/21	47/17 65/25 66/11	<b>her Ladyship [1]</b>	<b>hm [1]</b> 164/1	130/3 130/8 131/5
136/16 141/25 160/9	66/21 74/14 74/15	84/4	<b>hold [9]</b> 9/11 12/1	141/5 143/23 150/3
173/1 174/7 175/10	74/19 78/7 84/10	<b>herd [3]</b> 29/3 32/12	36/1 48/21 131/17	153/9 154/19 154/25
179/19 184/5 184/5	84/12 86/10 86/14	144/19	158/18 158/18 165/5	155/2 159/16 160/15
187/9 187/20 189/9	89/19 89/19 96/6	<b>herd immunity [3]</b>	219/7	161/11 161/15 161/16
192/4 194/13 198/19	100/19 102/4 102/4	29/3 32/12 144/19	<b>holiday [1]</b> 214/13	161/17 162/3 163/5
200/3 203/12 210/5	111/1 113/2 115/6	<b>here [18]</b> 8/25 41/11	<b>holidays [2]</b> 162/6	169/24 171/7 172/9
213/23	115/17 115/25 116/1	53/5 58/8 58/12 61/9	162/8	172/13 174/10 179/12
<b>hasn't [1]</b> 211/19	116/20 118/20 120/11	69/2 72/11 96/10	<b>home [15]</b> 22/9 105/8	179/13 179/14 186/21
	121/10 125/5 135/12	97/11 118/4 122/15	125/18 136/23 149/25	191/6 191/13 191/20

<b>H</b>	<b>I believe [1]</b> 212/8	53/6	<b>I meant [4]</b> 86/7	<b>I send [1]</b> 132/3
<b>how... [3]</b> 197/15	<b>I breach [1]</b> 195/6	<b>I entirely [1]</b> 195/23	185/16 185/17 195/25	<b>I set [4]</b> 3/20 152/25
197/20 217/5	<b>I break [1]</b> 221/18	<b>I expressed [1]</b>	<b>I mention [1]</b> 176/20	166/8 196/10
<b>however [11]</b> 13/6	<b>I called [1]</b> 32/10	209/15	<b>I mentioned [1]</b> 64/6	<b>I shall [3]</b> 44/7
35/4 56/19 102/25	<b>I came [2]</b> 127/8	<b>I feel [1]</b> 57/6	<b>I might [1]</b> 190/25	107/15 170/6
126/6 142/12 162/4	219/21	<b>I felt [1]</b> 25/4	<b>I must [1]</b> 152/20	<b>I should [9]</b> 2/9 18/1
176/1 184/5 192/17	<b>I can [19]</b> 21/24	<b>I first [3]</b> 31/20	<b>I need [3]</b> 38/13	31/25 56/17 56/23
196/16	22/25 23/22 23/25	195/24 215/18	79/19 187/18	110/10 116/23 119/20
<b>huge [13]</b> 11/7 16/1	23/25 24/8 34/5 36/5	<b>I found [4]</b> 27/20	<b>I needed [2]</b> 85/21	152/25
24/11 24/12 61/16	72/1 76/17 122/6	126/21 204/3 214/15	185/22	<b>I shouldn't [1]</b> 41/15
61/18 101/5 116/15	128/24 145/18 153/10	<b>I gave [3]</b> 30/10	<b>I not [1]</b> 206/1	<b>I spoke [2]</b> 130/18
128/24 129/6 135/24	158/5 161/23 204/25	44/15 188/24	<b>I now [2]</b> 23/23	148/13
136/23 174/2	217/20 219/3	<b>I get [1]</b> 58/3	217/21	<b>I started [1]</b> 148/12
<b>hugely [4]</b> 73/9 73/15	<b>I can't [7]</b> 102/25	<b>I give [1]</b> 1/8	<b>I overruled [1]</b> 64/9	<b>I stated [1]</b> 93/12
179/18 199/3	108/15 108/15 113/12	<b>I got [4]</b> 77/2 90/4	<b>I paraphrase [1]</b>	<b>I suggested [2]</b> 38/16
<b>human [6]</b> 166/24	113/14 137/24 206/19	151/15 202/3	87/16	170/12
167/1 167/6 201/1	<b>I cannot [1]</b> 196/11	<b>I guess [1]</b> 205/24	<b>I pause [2]</b> 67/16	<b>I suppose [1]</b> 215/10
217/2 217/3	<b>I cared [1]</b> 219/24	<b>I had [17]</b> 11/1 16/14	199/14	<b>I suspect [1]</b> 138/14
<b>humans [1]</b> 54/15	<b>I certainly [1]</b> 99/24	23/12 23/13 25/3	<b>I personally [1]</b>	<b>I take [1]</b> 4/16
<b>hunch [1]</b> 56/23	<b>I challenged [1]</b>	31/14 40/14 40/15	176/12	<b>I then [3]</b> 15/23
<b>hundred [3]</b> 29/13	55/18	53/11 54/19 56/17	<b>I phoned [1]</b> 127/2	195/24 206/13
70/17 89/6	<b>I changed [1]</b> 30/2	58/19 58/21 126/14	<b>I place [2]</b> 69/11	<b>I think [64]</b> 3/24 9/1
<b>hundreds [1]</b> 96/1	<b>I commissioned [1]</b>	127/6 148/4 156/16	77/16	9/13 10/2 16/12 20/5
<b>Hunt [1]</b> 1/21	124/11	<b>I have [15]</b> 44/21	<b>I press [2]</b> 119/11	22/22 22/24 28/1 28/2
<b>Hunt's [1]</b> 4/22	<b>I concluded [1]</b>	45/4 55/7 59/21 74/22	155/13	29/22 30/18 36/6
<b>hydroxychloroquine</b>	102/17	93/14 114/22 139/15	<b>I proposed [1]</b>	43/21 46/21 49/5 58/6
<b>[2]</b> 53/20 53/24	<b>I correct [1]</b> 125/12	152/20 155/24 170/16	128/10	65/23 73/21 77/1 77/8
<b>hygiene [2]</b> 146/19	<b>I could [5]</b> 59/1 80/24	177/24 181/24 189/4	<b>I published [1]</b>	77/16 77/18 79/15
198/21	96/9 207/9 217/1	219/9	213/21	79/15 85/23 86/12
<b>I</b>	<b>I couldn't [3]</b> 56/14	<b>I haven't [2]</b> 75/1	<b>I pushed [3]</b> 47/5	93/12 93/22 94/10
	206/16 213/12	140/17	140/14 174/5	105/19 110/15 111/5
<b>I abide [1]</b> 212/5	<b>I defend [1]</b> 128/24	<b>I heard [2]</b> 148/6	<b>I put [5]</b> 99/21 154/6	112/6 112/6 112/8
<b>I abided [1]</b> 212/14	<b>I described [1]</b> 72/13	156/19	173/1 176/11 214/1	117/12 119/20 120/18
<b>I accept [2]</b> 111/22	<b>I did [7]</b> 26/8 28/9	<b>I held [1]</b> 39/2	<b>I quote [3]</b> 5/25 52/1	125/22 125/23 127/15
153/19	56/25 67/11 71/16	<b>I hope [2]</b> 58/6 163/4	68/19	136/15 144/21 149/24
<b>I accepted [2]</b> 88/15	154/7 175/18	<b>I initially [1]</b> 135/12	<b>I raised [1]</b> 52/12	153/23 154/18 156/1
153/18	<b>I didn't [13]</b> 19/20	<b>I interrupt [2]</b> 78/10	<b>I read [1]</b> 67/9	163/2 166/9 167/3
<b>I actually [1]</b> 148/4	23/23 32/23 67/24	220/7	<b>I really [2]</b> 37/8 205/6	170/14 180/14 180/25
<b>I again [1]</b> 33/5	75/16 99/23 151/2	<b>I invite [2]</b> 59/12 80/9	<b>I recall [1]</b> 126/22	182/10 183/13 198/12
<b>I also [3]</b> 23/21 52/12	182/24 186/1 208/8	<b>I just [17]</b> 2/7 2/12	<b>I received [1]</b> 71/13	198/13 199/1 201/14
94/17	212/9 213/1 216/8	8/19 19/20 25/8 71/17	<b>I refer [2]</b> 91/7 188/4	208/5 210/5 212/23
<b>I always [1]</b> 156/19	<b>I discussed [1]</b> 219/3	78/9 86/18 94/9 94/14	<b>I regard [2]</b> 7/14	221/13
<b>I am [6]</b> 1/14 34/2	<b>I do [4]</b> 37/8 132/1	115/15 154/15 176/14	127/22	<b>I thought [22]</b> 17/24
38/25 59/3 83/11	143/4 213/25	180/18 187/1 194/17	<b>I regarded [1]</b> 206/11	31/21 35/19 36/5
170/4	<b>I don't [42]</b> 8/16	221/6	<b>I regret [1]</b> 218/19	37/10 78/6 80/15
<b>I answer [1]</b> 26/1	24/16 26/16 27/13	<b>I kept [1]</b> 52/24	<b>I reject [1]</b> 187/4	85/22 91/23 118/6
<b>I apologise [5]</b> 49/17	30/3 45/14 45/16	<b>I kicked [1]</b> 153/16	<b>I remember [11]</b>	140/20 174/3 177/10
51/17 62/22 152/25	52/18 65/22 66/13	<b>I knew [5]</b> 55/14 67/9	41/10 52/7 110/25	203/19 206/3 209/7
165/23	85/5 93/10 109/2	75/16 76/18 169/17	118/9 127/2 140/18	217/10 217/10 217/16
<b>I appreciate [3]</b>	109/7 109/14 110/16	<b>I know [4]</b> 8/17 185/1	151/23 156/20 207/13	219/8 220/25 220/25
19/23 20/2 43/19	110/24 114/24 118/23	187/8 203/10	207/14 213/25	<b>I told [2]</b> 127/14
<b>I argued [1]</b> 209/20	119/21 121/16 126/4	<b>I later [1]</b> 156/18	<b>I said [12]</b> 22/25	186/17
<b>I articulated [1]</b>	127/19 131/9 143/3	<b>I led [2]</b> 13/1 99/2	30/10 41/12 51/20	<b>I took [11]</b> 64/3 93/20
206/10	151/2 151/23 152/20	<b>I listened [1]</b> 153/21	71/14 96/3 115/1	118/17 152/4 152/5
<b>I ask [2]</b> 140/3	157/24 178/20 182/12	<b>I made [4]</b> 34/10	127/8 127/20 130/20	152/8 152/13 152/15
182/13	183/25 190/6 193/6	116/14 131/13 207/8	166/10 170/14	153/1 185/23 211/5
<b>I asked [7]</b> 13/9	199/14 204/25 205/15	<b>I make [2]</b> 10/9 94/17	<b>I said: why [1]</b> 72/8	<b>I tried [5]</b> 12/21 15/16
52/14 119/14 120/12	208/16 209/17 212/12	<b>I may [7]</b> 10/9 13/4	<b>I saw [8]</b> 68/4 69/12	15/21 77/17 92/20
132/11 139/1 176/20	212/13 219/16	127/25 157/8 157/21	69/12 69/13 71/14	<b>I trusted [1]</b> 23/13
<b>I based [1]</b> 64/3	<b>I drove [1]</b> 75/12	170/22 183/11	71/15 72/1 81/14	<b>I understand [2]</b> 25/5
<b>I basically [4]</b> 24/12	<b>I emailed [1]</b> 148/14	<b>I mean [8]</b> 14/11	<b>I say [5]</b> 8/24 31/18	46/23
25/3 151/6 153/17	<b>I emphasise [1]</b>	21/12 119/17 146/2	115/11 154/23 184/12	<b>I understood [1]</b>
<b>I became [1]</b> 55/16	82/12	153/12 154/1 178/14	<b>I see [3]</b> 46/23 146/1	52/22
	<b>I enormously [1]</b>	212/10	159/25	<b>I want [5]</b> 38/6

<b>I</b>	49/24 54/5 58/8 58/12 58/23 58/24 59/9 61/17 65/12 65/13 68/22 68/23 68/23 69/12 73/19 76/13 79/22 91/24 94/16 105/19 106/12 109/7 110/10 112/2 112/2 114/22 115/1 115/1 116/14 116/17 117/1 124/12 125/20 127/6 128/23 139/17 143/2 149/9 152/10 154/7 154/8 165/23 166/12 168/9 170/5 170/15 170/17 179/5 180/4 180/5 180/8 180/12 181/25 186/25 187/1 189/6 192/5 192/17 193/19 195/8 196/24 198/1 209/22 216/13 221/13 221/19 <b>I'm afraid [1]</b> 79/22 <b>I've [37]</b> 1/9 4/18 4/19 12/3 16/4 38/5 43/12 58/20 60/8 60/10 63/10 63/10 65/11 66/15 67/19 75/11 77/5 119/17 123/18 127/7 131/11 131/14 133/1 137/1 137/2 137/22 139/17 144/13 145/10 154/9 163/21 181/4 184/19 193/1 194/12 210/10 211/10 <b>ICL [2]</b> 146/21 146/24 <b>ICU [1]</b> 175/1 <b>idea [4]</b> 43/16 59/21 147/25 162/3 <b>identified [4]</b> 25/11 39/21 167/19 190/17 <b>identify [4]</b> 27/14 72/3 107/8 155/16 <b>ie [4]</b> 53/3 56/13 69/15 122/1 <b>if [172]</b> 5/8 5/18 5/19 10/2 10/9 11/10 11/21 12/22 12/22 13/4 16/8 16/9 16/12 16/15 17/6 17/13 22/8 24/8 33/6 34/7 36/19 37/7 38/1 38/12 43/13 43/25 44/22 45/23 47/8 48/21 49/5 49/11 49/17 50/15 53/22 54/20 55/9 56/1 57/1 58/21 58/24 61/9 61/13 61/25 63/13 66/2 66/5 66/8 66/11 66/15 66/20 71/2 72/1 72/9 72/16 73/2 76/11 77/10 77/14 78/16 79/5 82/16 83/10 83/18 86/18 87/6	88/20 91/3 91/16 92/5 92/18 92/18 93/18 95/6 95/16 95/20 96/1 96/11 96/16 96/18 96/25 97/3 98/22 99/6 103/19 104/20 105/5 105/18 105/25 109/10 109/17 110/3 113/9 115/19 117/23 122/6 122/21 122/24 123/16 125/12 125/17 126/18 126/22 127/25 128/3 128/6 128/9 130/13 137/13 138/24 143/15 144/9 144/10 144/14 145/18 145/21 147/10 147/24 148/22 153/9 157/8 157/16 157/17 157/21 157/22 157/23 158/5 158/5 158/6 159/14 160/24 161/3 161/11 161/23 166/25 167/9 170/22 171/4 171/11 171/17 172/5 172/14 175/15 176/11 178/9 178/17 179/8 180/14 181/24 182/7 183/11 183/14 190/2 190/25 191/5 192/22 193/10 196/24 197/21 199/15 206/6 206/21 210/14 210/16 210/17 210/18 215/10 217/1 217/2 219/3 219/20 220/24 <b>IFR [5]</b> 97/17 97/25 126/17 126/18 163/12 <b>ill [1]</b> 87/23 <b>illness [3]</b> 40/2 40/9 70/7 <b>illusion [1]</b> 104/21 <b>illusions [1]</b> 89/16 <b>Imagine [1]</b> 181/24 <b>imbalance [1]</b> 180/25 <b>immediate [7]</b> 32/21 33/23 34/4 45/13 45/15 75/23 154/5 <b>immediately [2]</b> 32/3 127/14 <b>immunity [3]</b> 29/3 32/12 144/19 <b>impact [24]</b> 5/7 6/9 24/2 49/4 76/15 82/3 85/13 97/7 101/24 104/14 114/9 147/7 148/6 148/11 159/20 161/2 161/10 162/24 169/6 171/8 209/23 212/3 213/11 217/7 <b>impacted [1]</b> 95/4 <b>imperative [1]</b> 202/13 <b>impermeable [1]</b> 195/20	<b>implement [1]</b> 133/17 <b>implementation [3]</b> 14/4 22/16 215/12 <b>implemented [3]</b> 124/8 129/14 133/4 <b>implementing [1]</b> 143/22 <b>implication [2]</b> 54/24 95/9 <b>implications [1]</b> 52/23 <b>implied [1]</b> 91/8 <b>impolite [1]</b> 30/3 <b>importance [2]</b> 45/18 61/25 <b>important [41]</b> 19/1 28/13 33/21 38/4 51/18 54/6 59/11 59/22 71/19 72/5 72/23 72/25 73/15 74/13 81/9 83/7 83/9 83/12 102/5 102/22 114/10 119/19 120/18 125/11 125/15 125/16 126/13 126/14 126/18 127/1 135/19 136/17 136/24 154/18 158/10 163/11 177/16 184/18 191/17 202/2 209/8 <b>impose [3]</b> 31/11 65/16 157/18 <b>imposed [6]</b> 49/3 105/10 123/8 164/5 164/7 164/10 <b>imposing [1]</b> 1/11 <b>imposition [1]</b> 160/12 <b>impossible [5]</b> 45/25 47/10 76/3 164/15 192/16 <b>impress [1]</b> 85/12 <b>impression [5]</b> 23/9 35/3 195/19 197/11 214/6 <b>impressive [3]</b> 179/18 184/2 184/12 <b>improbable [3]</b> 99/14 99/16 99/18 <b>improve [1]</b> 196/11 <b>improvement [3]</b> 177/12 177/13 177/14 <b>inability [1]</b> 177/7 <b>inadequacy [1]</b> 3/9 <b>inadequate [2]</b> 5/5 143/6 <b>inappropriate [2]</b> 35/18 81/14 <b>inasmuch [2]</b> 110/16 205/25 <b>Incidentally [1]</b> 130/22 <b>include [1]</b> 94/19 <b>included [1]</b> 198/11	<b>including [9]</b> 10/11 10/22 12/13 34/25 116/16 126/25 127/10 132/6 193/7 <b>incompatibility [1]</b> 57/4 <b>incompatible [1]</b> 56/8 <b>inconclusive [1]</b> 69/13 <b>increase [1]</b> 175/1 <b>increased [1]</b> 166/21 <b>increasing [1]</b> 19/13 <b>increasingly [1]</b> 50/22 <b>incredibly [6]</b> 16/1 20/25 21/20 22/16 51/18 163/10 <b>inculcated [2]</b> 83/1 83/22 <b>incumbent [1]</b> 41/1 <b>incurred [1]</b> 161/11 <b>indeed [27]</b> 6/18 16/23 25/10 41/23 43/11 44/24 50/22 54/7 74/20 80/24 84/19 92/13 97/10 104/19 111/5 137/20 141/22 152/1 158/12 158/22 159/2 160/16 161/25 167/11 202/10 211/21 218/10 <b>Independent [1]</b> 155/8 <b>indeterminate [1]</b> 164/13 <b>index [4]</b> 29/13 39/4 70/18 221/25 <b>indicated [2]</b> 111/8 214/23 <b>indication [1]</b> 154/14 <b>indirect [2]</b> 91/9 163/22 <b>indirectly [2]</b> 69/9 197/10 <b>individual [4]</b> 9/24 17/21 83/2 209/2 <b>individually [1]</b> 38/2 <b>individuals [11]</b> 11/18 24/22 27/14 42/24 49/22 69/22 70/9 70/16 70/17 108/11 176/5 <b>inevitably [1]</b> 172/16 <b>inexplicable [1]</b> 24/24 <b>infect [1]</b> 54/15 <b>infected [4]</b> 29/18 57/24 62/3 88/19 <b>infection [42]</b> 14/13 14/16 15/5 18/21 22/15 29/14 29/18 31/12 37/21 38/8 42/16 43/5 62/5 62/21
----------	--	---	--	---

<b>I</b>	48/8	185/17	106/21 120/16 127/24	116/12 132/10 132/10
<b>infection...</b> [28] 65/12	<b>INQ000119469</b> [2]	<b>instincts</b> [1] 213/16	130/5 139/18 141/24	159/8 181/8 185/12
65/15 65/24 87/20	50/1 67/25	<b>institution</b> [2] 174/18	145/7 145/7 145/8	188/6 199/4 200/7
88/12 89/11 89/23	<b>INQ000129226</b> [1]	178/3	145/8 152/9 153/2	200/13 200/15 202/1
97/12 97/12 105/7	21/21	<b>institutional</b> [2] 7/1	159/18 179/19 181/1	202/3 209/21 220/10
110/5 111/14 111/14	<b>INQ000129458</b> [1]	178/15	185/10 189/19 192/18	<b>issued</b> [4] 151/18
111/24 112/10 112/19	211/7	<b>instruction</b> [1]	192/21 196/1 198/2	188/9 188/12 191/24
113/4 113/16 114/16	<b>INQ000146558</b> [1]	151/18	202/17 204/10 209/22	<b>issues</b> [9] 11/14
117/5 117/6 122/1	100/6	<b>instructions</b> [1]	216/3 217/2 220/21	23/11 23/25 38/3
123/17 124/7 143/24	<b>INQ000195891</b> [1]	151/22	<b>intolerable</b> [1]	79/19 131/20 175/9
196/3 196/8 214/24	102/13	<b>instrumental</b> [1] 52/8	132/20	197/6 202/18
<b>infections</b> [1] 199/19	<b>INQ000226628</b> [1]	<b>insufficient</b> [1]	<b>introduce</b> [2] 150/20	<b>it</b> [700]
<b>infectious</b> [1] 89/5	44/22	102/15	153/10	<b>it's</b> [108] 2/18 2/23
<b>influence</b> [7] 78/17	<b>INQ000229430</b> [1]	<b>intend</b> [1] 199/14	<b>introduced</b> [2]	6/25 13/25 22/3 22/10
78/18 79/24 80/7	59/14	<b>intense</b> [1] 213/4	168/18 212/18	23/21 26/16 26/18
80/12 82/12 112/18	<b>INQ000233747</b> [1]	<b>intensive</b> [2] 172/10	<b>introducing</b> [1]	27/18 28/24 31/25
<b>influenza</b> [2] 96/13	48/23	174/13	129/22	36/6 37/17 38/4 41/1
179/10	<b>INQ000233798</b> [1]	<b>intentional</b> [1] 12/11	<b>invasive</b> [1] 49/16	41/3 45/25 46/19
<b>information</b> [14] 1/25	189/13	<b>intents</b> [1] 135/10	<b>investigated</b> [1]	46/22 49/10 50/21
32/3 36/15 53/5 65/6	<b>INQ000273901</b> [1]	<b>interact</b> [1] 217/6	34/21	51/8 51/10 51/18 53/3
66/25 67/17 69/8	7/17	<b>interaction</b> [3]	<b>investment</b> [1] 89/19	53/15 54/5 54/22
137/24 154/21 155/19	<b>INQ000274026</b> [1]	119/18 166/24 201/1	<b>invite</b> [5] 22/5 59/12	55/11 58/1 60/10 69/5
157/1 171/18 214/19	171/2	<b>interactions</b> [2]	80/9 80/22 115/15	69/11 70/12 75/10
<b>informative</b> [1]	<b>INQ000292608</b> [1]	167/1 167/6	<b>invited</b> [3] 80/20 81/4	77/4 79/2 79/3 79/3
139/10	191/22	<b>interest</b> [4] 27/13	143/21	79/3 82/13 84/17 96/9
<b>informed</b> [5] 42/6	<b>inquiries</b> [3] 36/9	76/2 213/14 213/14	<b>involved</b> [11] 19/24	98/5 100/8 101/24
43/6 108/17 109/21	36/12 85/2	<b>interested</b> [1] 86/25	20/4 38/14 38/16	102/8 105/19 108/7
150/4	<b>inquiry</b> [47] 1/7 2/6	<b>interests</b> [1] 186/25	38/19 78/21 84/8	108/12 109/7 109/17
<b>infrastructure</b> [1]	2/9 3/10 13/9 25/15	<b>internal</b> [2] 7/20	93/10 99/25 176/13	109/17 109/18 109/19
106/8	27/13 32/25 33/1 34/6	62/11	207/11	114/2 117/12 119/19
<b>initial</b> [2] 38/19 199/9	34/19 41/2 44/21 45/6	<b>internally</b> [3] 136/18	<b>involvement</b> [1]	125/11 125/13 135/16
<b>initially</b> [2] 128/1	63/18 76/2 76/3 76/11	151/18 209/5	134/19	137/16 138/9 140/21
135/12	77/4 81/20 81/21	<b>international</b> [4] 45/1	<b>involves</b> [2] 12/15	140/25 143/19 150/15
<b>innovation</b> [1]	89/15 93/15 95/15	53/1 58/15 60/22	12/16	153/13 154/17 154/18
186/22	96/16 100/5 101/23	<b>internationally</b> [1]	<b>Ironically</b> [1] 66/5	156/3 158/15 159/1
<b>inpatient</b> [1] 188/11	105/19 106/10 118/24	5/3	<b>irony</b> [1] 156/25	159/11 163/2 163/5
<b>INQ000047779</b> [1]	123/16 125/12 131/20	<b>interpretation</b> [1]	<b>irrespective</b> [1]	163/16 164/15 165/23
107/20	131/22 151/21 152/22	195/16	78/20	170/14 171/5 174/8
<b>INQ000048313</b> [2]	152/22 160/9 163/21	<b>interpreted</b> [2] 23/22	<b>is</b> [500]	178/4 178/11 179/4
28/19 34/13	171/3 172/13 174/9	70/10	<b>is 45</b> [1] 109/11	179/22 180/9 184/25
<b>INQ000048399</b> [1]	175/10 184/5 208/17	<b>interrupt</b> [5] 19/19	<b>is anachronistic</b> [1]	186/7 189/1 189/3
149/20	216/3 222/5	30/3 78/10 180/4	141/25	189/15 190/25 194/6
<b>INQ000051925</b> [1]	<b>Inquiry's</b> [6] 28/13	220/7	<b>island</b> [2] 203/22	194/18 194/25 195/13
49/19	33/25 88/4 90/24	<b>interrupting</b> [1]	204/1	196/23 202/6 204/12
<b>INQ000056132</b> [1]	105/20 146/17	137/22	<b>islands</b> [1] 203/22	204/25 205/2 208/19
69/21	<b>inside</b> [3] 7/21 27/22	<b>intervened</b> [1] 185/5	<b>isn't</b> [14] 6/11 10/25	211/11 212/23 214/12
<b>INQ000056137</b> [2]	136/14	<b>intervention</b> [7]	20/6 46/14 47/20	216/25
39/15 101/12	<b>Insights</b> [1] 155/8	125/17 145/13 145/17	51/14 55/12 63/17	<b>Italian</b> [4] 33/10
<b>INQ000056138</b> [1]	<b>instance</b> [35] 3/25	209/25 210/1 211/10	108/16 131/23 176/4	148/7 158/8 158/25
109/24	5/13 10/3 15/21 17/25	216/21	178/1 217/5 218/6	<b>Italians</b> [1] 148/7
<b>INQ000056209</b> [1]	20/6 23/14 24/20 30/9	<b>interventions</b> [9]	<b>isolate</b> [9] 29/12	<b>Italy</b> [20] 33/12 57/8
143/9	33/9 39/3 44/22 56/1	15/11 125/8 125/16	29/12 38/1 38/21	57/15 88/16 88/17
<b>INQ000056221</b> [1]	57/1 64/6 65/9 66/12	129/13 133/3 136/24	42/24 89/4 89/4	123/8 127/25 156/9
143/18	66/15 76/24 97/6	143/12 143/22 143/25	136/23 209/6	156/11 157/5 157/13
<b>INQ000056226</b> [1]	106/5 120/12 120/23	<b>interview</b> [1] 30/9	<b>isolated</b> [1] 189/25	157/15 157/15 157/19
94/6	122/14 123/1 125/18	<b>interviewer</b> [1] 30/12	<b>isolation</b> [3] 105/8	158/2 158/10 158/11
<b>INQ000056227</b> [1]	138/6 177/16 178/25	<b>interviews</b> [1] 2/17	105/8 117/16	158/14 158/16 159/1
117/11	180/3 180/13 191/14	<b>into</b> [50] 2/7 9/24	<b>issue</b> [36] 4/17 14/13	<b>item</b> [2] 169/19 210/6
<b>INQ000061510</b> [1]	191/21 198/11 217/5	11/6 12/9 17/13 40/18	14/15 22/17 32/11	<b>items</b> [1] 209/2
70/3	<b>instances</b> [2] 25/17	42/18 42/20 42/23	44/12 50/4 50/12	<b>its</b> [39] 3/2 9/4 13/16
<b>INQ000102709</b> [1]	27/5	43/23 46/24 50/4 53/7	59/11 68/6 73/7 73/15	28/20 30/21 31/19
196/23	<b>instead</b> [9] 12/17	71/15 75/13 76/18	74/10 76/7 79/20	38/18 50/8 51/1 74/3
<b>INQ000106067</b> [1]	16/8 55/23 59/3 80/19	80/20 81/8 84/23 85/5	80/10 83/14 86/17	77/22 95/21 102/7
	127/11 158/20 183/8	90/10 99/21 103/16	87/24 93/7 102/5	110/4 110/20 112/1

<b>I</b>	<b>Johnson [2]</b> 21/22 75/25 <b>Jonathan [1]</b> 196/12 <b>Jonathan Van-Tam [1]</b> 196/12 <b>journalists [1]</b> 212/6 <b>judge [1]</b> 158/11 <b>judgements [1]</b> 26/17 <b>July [13]</b> 1/18 1/20 7/24 59/16 66/7 205/5 205/12 206/23 207/12 207/14 207/24 214/10 218/3 <b>June [4]</b> 1/22 7/19 190/13 195/5 <b>jungle [1]</b> 100/19 <b>junior [2]</b> 41/17 185/9 <b>just [110]</b> 2/7 2/12 3/16 8/19 9/19 12/20 16/6 19/20 20/24 25/8 25/24 28/2 28/9 30/3 35/3 35/23 43/2 44/15 46/16 48/21 54/20 58/21 59/12 60/6 62/16 63/14 68/10 68/12 71/17 72/1 74/6 75/24 78/9 82/13 82/18 83/5 83/19 83/20 86/5 86/18 87/4 87/8 90/14 94/8 94/9 94/14 98/8 101/22 104/12 105/3 108/7 108/9 111/10 112/3 115/15 115/20 122/13 123/18 126/16 126/21 128/23 130/25 131/16 134/16 137/22 140/24 147/9 150/3 150/12 151/21 154/8 154/15 157/8 157/23 159/10 159/16 160/5 160/18 163/15 164/20 165/5 165/6 165/19 167/23 168/5 169/15 169/16 171/2 173/17 174/22 176/14 178/15 180/18 181/7 181/25 182/2 183/15 185/4 187/1 194/17 197/21 200/11 202/16 206/22 210/25 211/8 216/25 217/12 219/20 221/6 <b>justification [1]</b> 197/14 <b>justified [1]</b> 197/15 <b>JVT [2]</b> 108/10 121/5	<b>Keith [11]</b> 1/3 19/20 44/11 73/20 107/19 108/10 125/22 153/23 170/2 170/10 221/16 <b>Keith Willett [1]</b> 108/10 <b>kept [7]</b> 14/22 52/24 61/6 198/21 210/16 211/10 220/18 <b>Kevin [1]</b> 134/23 <b>Kevin Dodds [1]</b> 134/23 <b>key [2]</b> 73/6 156/17 <b>kicked [2]</b> 149/4 153/16 <b>kids [1]</b> 127/6 <b>kill [1]</b> 182/9 <b>killed [1]</b> 180/22 <b>killing [1]</b> 193/18 <b>kind [2]</b> 22/3 114/19 <b>Kingdom [19]</b> 21/6 27/16 29/17 31/5 36/2 39/23 65/15 67/2 89/16 95/19 99/1 107/5 120/22 121/4 121/20 134/18 137/6 158/24 202/21 <b>Kingdom's [1]</b> 114/10 <b>kiss [1]</b> 186/16 <b>knew [22]</b> 29/15 29/17 31/4 37/3 55/14 61/13 63/6 66/9 67/9 67/9 70/16 74/8 75/16 76/18 89/19 89/21 97/25 126/11 162/23 169/17 173/15 173/15 <b>know [134]</b> 8/16 8/17 8/24 10/6 11/11 11/16 12/3 12/21 16/12 16/14 16/15 17/21 19/18 20/14 20/15 22/24 23/23 23/24 24/1 24/11 25/5 25/6 26/18 26/22 28/3 31/13 33/6 33/18 33/24 37/8 37/18 38/6 45/19 45/25 51/12 58/9 59/2 59/18 59/21 60/9 60/15 60/19 61/4 61/16 62/1 62/4 62/14 62/15 64/15 66/5 66/13 67/8 74/4 75/11 75/11 75/16 75/25 76/23 77/1 77/7 77/18 78/12 79/2 84/11 84/11 86/8 86/9 86/12 87/6 98/1 98/4 99/23 103/20 110/17 110/24	117/19 118/20 118/23 121/14 121/16 123/21 124/5 128/11 130/24 130/25 131/5 131/18 131/25 134/21 143/3 143/4 145/19 147/3 149/10 151/23 152/4 152/12 152/15 152/22 152/23 155/23 155/24 156/12 165/25 166/11 174/9 175/4 175/5 177/19 179/8 179/17 180/8 185/1 185/11 186/1 187/8 187/8 189/4 193/17 203/10 206/14 207/7 207/9 207/21 208/8 208/16 211/2 211/8 213/9 213/10 213/19 213/21 219/20 219/24 <b>knowable [1]</b> 161/20 <b>knowing [4]</b> 26/18 110/13 129/1 213/10 <b>knowledge [2]</b> 62/8 77/19 <b>known [12]</b> 28/3 36/21 53/4 54/14 86/15 88/19 89/2 114/23 119/25 128/24 209/10 220/19 <b>knows [1]</b> 37/16 <b>Korea [1]</b> 50/9	43/20 66/6 68/17 81/19 85/10 97/21 97/23 98/13 110/20 118/17 144/4 144/13 145/25 155/21 156/18 187/8 187/15 198/6 205/12 207/15 <b>latterly [1]</b> 14/5 <b>launching [1]</b> 196/7 <b>law [3]</b> 159/12 160/25 165/4 <b>lawyers [1]</b> 125/1 <b>lead [17]</b> 1/7 3/2 12/21 14/22 16/20 21/13 22/10 78/6 78/23 84/1 84/17 144/3 144/15 149/2 166/16 178/4 222/5 <b>leaders [2]</b> 39/9 166/4 <b>leadership [1]</b> 134/24 <b>leaflets [1]</b> 87/22 <b>leak [1]</b> 212/13 <b>leaks [1]</b> 212/11 <b>learn [1]</b> 5/19 <b>learned [1]</b> 10/7 <b>learning [6]</b> 50/21 102/7 103/15 103/16 105/17 106/17 <b>learns [1]</b> 105/19 <b>least [9]</b> 85/11 86/3 87/24 99/16 104/7 165/11 168/7 209/24 221/4 <b>leave [5]</b> 95/17 96/18 97/2 97/6 97/11 <b>leaves [2]</b> 96/23 96/25 <b>leaving [1]</b> 96/18 <b>led [13]</b> 5/1 10/25 11/10 13/1 14/3 15/13 16/10 39/24 81/25 99/2 127/13 127/23 166/5 <b>left [1]</b> 101/13 <b>left-hand [1]</b> 101/13 <b>legal [6]</b> 20/16 106/2 125/1 125/5 141/22 159/24 <b>legally [1]</b> 141/17 <b>legals [2]</b> 20/13 20/23 <b>legionnaires' [1]</b> 177/20 <b>legislation [5]</b> 20/16 20/17 38/22 125/16 125/19 <b>legislative [7]</b> 36/18 36/19 38/10 38/14 38/20 38/20 125/7 <b>legislators [1]</b> 219/16 <b>legs [1]</b> 189/10
<b>J</b>	<b>Jamie [2]</b> 197/1 199/1 <b>Jamie Njoku-Goodwin [1]</b> 197/1 <b>January [54]</b> 3/12 4/11 13/21 14/7 15/3 15/7 17/5 17/23 26/23 34/18 37/16 39/21 41/7 41/8 41/11 47/4 47/12 48/6 48/23 52/12 52/22 52/25 55/16 56/10 64/7 68/24 70/3 71/13 72/4 84/24 85/7 86/4 86/6 86/7 86/11 86/13 86/17 87/14 87/17 90/2 90/7 91/6 92/12 93/11 93/22 94/6 94/11 94/21 128/2 140/12 140/18 158/1 178/17 182/7 <b>January 2020 [2]</b> 3/12 13/21 <b>Japan [1]</b> 50/9 <b>Jenny [1]</b> 108/10 <b>Jenny Harries [1]</b> 108/10 <b>Jens [1]</b> 52/13 <b>Jens Spahn [1]</b> 52/13 <b>Jeremy [2]</b> 1/21 4/22 <b>Jeremy Hunt MP [1]</b> 1/21 <b>Jeremy Hunt's [1]</b> 4/22 <b>jigsaw [1]</b> 84/23 <b>job [9]</b> 55/7 75/25 76/7 78/6 81/23 82/14 105/14 175/19 208/24 <b>jobs [2]</b> 26/3 28/3 <b>jocular [1]</b> 186/19 <b>John [3]</b> 1/14 50/3 68/1 <b>John Edmunds [1]</b> 68/1	<b>June [4]</b> 1/22 7/19 190/13 195/5 <b>jungle [1]</b> 100/19 <b>junior [2]</b> 41/17 185/9 <b>just [110]</b> 2/7 2/12 3/16 8/19 9/19 12/20 16/6 19/20 20/24 25/8 25/24 28/2 28/9 30/3 35/3 35/23 43/2 44/15 46/16 48/21 54/20 58/21 59/12 60/6 62/16 63/14 68/10 68/12 71/17 72/1 74/6 75/24 78/9 82/13 82/18 83/5 83/19 83/20 86/5 86/18 87/4 87/8 90/14 94/8 94/9 94/14 98/8 101/22 104/12 105/3 108/7 108/9 111/10 112/3 115/15 115/20 122/13 123/18 126/16 126/21 128/23 130/25 131/16 134/16 137/22 140/24 147/9 150/3 150/12 151/21 154/8 154/15 157/8 157/23 159/10 159/16 160/5 160/18 163/15 164/20 165/5 165/6 165/19 167/23 168/5 169/15 169/16 171/2 173/17 174/22 176/14 178/15 180/18 181/7 181/25 182/2 183/15 185/4 187/1 194/17 197/21 200/11 202/16 206/22 210/25 211/8 216/25 217/12 219/20 221/6 <b>justification [1]</b> 197/14 <b>justified [1]</b> 197/15 <b>JVT [2]</b> 108/10 121/5	<b>Keith Willett [1]</b> 108/10 <b>kept [7]</b> 14/22 52/24 61/6 198/21 210/16 211/10 220/18 <b>Kevin [1]</b> 134/23 <b>Kevin Dodds [1]</b> 134/23 <b>key [2]</b> 73/6 156/17 <b>kicked [2]</b> 149/4 153/16 <b>kids [1]</b> 127/6 <b>kill [1]</b> 182/9 <b>killed [1]</b> 180/22 <b>killing [1]</b> 193/18 <b>kind [2]</b> 22/3 114/19 <b>Kingdom [19]</b> 21/6 27/16 29/17 31/5 36/2 39/23 65/15 67/2 89/16 95/19 99/1 107/5 120/22 121/4 121/20 134/18 137/6 158/24 202/21 <b>Kingdom's [1]</b> 114/10 <b>kiss [1]</b> 186/16 <b>knew [22]</b> 29/15 29/17 31/4 37/3 55/14 61/13 63/6 66/9 67/9 67/9 70/16 74/8 75/16 76/18 89/19 89/21 97/25 126/11 162/23 169/17 173/15 173/15 <b>know [134]</b> 8/16 8/17 8/24 10/6 11/11 11/16 12/3 12/21 16/12 16/14 16/15 17/21 19/18 20/14 20/15 22/24 23/23 23/24 24/1 24/11 25/5 25/6 26/18 26/22 28/3 31/13 33/6 33/18 33/24 37/8 37/18 38/6 45/19 45/25 51/12 58/9 59/2 59/18 59/21 60/9 60/15 60/19 61/4 61/16 62/1 62/4 62/14 62/15 64/15 66/5 66/13 67/8 74/4 75/11 75/11 75/16 75/25 76/23 77/1 77/7 77/18 78/12 79/2 84/11 84/11 86/8 86/9 86/12 87/6 98/1 98/4 99/23 103/20 110/17 110/24	<b>known [12]</b> 28/3 36/21 53/4 54/14 86/15 88/19 89/2 114/23 119/25 128/24 209/10 220/19 <b>knows [1]</b> 37/16 <b>Korea [1]</b> 50/9
	<b>K</b>	<b>lab [1]</b> 175/21 <b>labs [2]</b> 177/2 180/13 <b>lack [7]</b> 7/23 9/20 26/21 28/12 48/13 62/7 184/13 <b>Lady [11]</b> 1/4 44/4 83/10 107/14 114/2 157/17 159/14 170/11 182/17 183/13 221/8 <b>Ladyship [1]</b> 84/4 <b>lag [1]</b> 162/1 <b>Lancaster [1]</b> 19/2 <b>land [1]</b> 194/2 <b>language [2]</b> 12/18 77/5 <b>large [11]</b> 25/19 50/8 63/19 76/7 84/17 114/9 122/16 123/8 153/8 166/2 177/1 <b>largely [1]</b> 13/20 <b>larger [1]</b> 144/3 <b>last [4]</b> 41/7 86/1 129/6 179/10 <b>lasted [1]</b> 133/25 <b>late [11]</b> 20/10 31/6 55/16 64/7 90/7 93/11 97/20 97/20 200/15 214/10 218/9 <b>later [26]</b> 8/23 11/13 11/17 13/17 28/1 42/1	<b>L</b>	

<b>L</b>			
<b>lend [1]</b> 218/21	<b>likely [20]</b> 48/1 48/16 49/23 50/18 50/21 50/22 51/11 52/5 59/25 67/12 101/24 104/14 121/22 144/3 147/7 155/9 161/10 171/8 172/25 173/9	128/2 154/13 154/22 197/18 197/20 220/1	16/9 17/3 17/6 18/16 22/21 24/21 25/12 25/17 25/24 26/10 27/2 31/4 43/23 66/3 75/21 81/25 82/5 82/11 87/3 92/23 103/16 109/20
<b>length [5]</b> 43/10 59/11 103/1 111/7 160/11	<b>limit [4]</b> 116/17 116/20 132/14 159/6	<b>locking [5]</b> 154/25 198/7 198/25 213/6 214/14	<b>MacNamara [5]</b> 8/14 14/20 23/4 42/8 74/5
<b>lengthy [1]</b> 2/2	<b>limited [6]</b> 87/19 89/3 89/9 95/2 95/8 158/6	<b>logic [1]</b> 185/19	<b>mad [3]</b> 24/23 94/3 94/3
<b>less [8]</b> 48/19 48/25 66/24 86/25 97/4 180/19 180/21 184/18	<b>line [1]</b> 214/2	<b>logical [1]</b> 184/20	<b>made [33]</b> 8/20 30/23 33/5 34/10 36/9 36/12 55/24 65/22 65/23 65/24 70/12 74/5 85/2 85/17 86/16 99/23 108/4 116/14 122/18 125/20 131/13 141/6 153/18 182/4 182/16 184/20 185/6 194/13 196/7 200/13 201/6 206/1 207/8
<b>lesson [4]</b> 77/8 77/9 102/22 179/4	<b>lines [5]</b> 101/17 163/6 171/23 185/13 185/14	<b>logistical [1]</b> 201/12	<b>main [4]</b> 146/6 156/2 199/12 200/1
<b>lessons [3]</b> 5/19 10/7 106/17	<b>linger [1]</b> 183/25	<b>Lombardy [1]</b> 128/1	<b>maintaining [1]</b> 112/15
<b>let [10]</b> 73/18 83/17 83/19 97/24 103/4 103/12 168/13 178/16 210/11 211/8	<b>linguistic [2]</b> 71/21 72/24	<b>London [3]</b> 146/19 171/20 172/1	<b>major [7]</b> 6/14 80/19 89/17 115/22 134/3 154/17 180/13
<b>let's [2]</b> 58/10 165/10	<b>links [1]</b> 7/1	<b>long [21]</b> 14/10 23/14 25/25 38/1 49/6 51/17 53/18 54/5 62/22 98/18 102/25 108/12 130/3 130/8 131/6 141/25 142/1 185/8 206/7 221/12 221/19	<b>majority [5]</b> 8/22 90/15 100/15 117/17 117/25
<b>letter [2]</b> 100/15 188/9	<b>list [2]</b> 196/5 211/4	<b>long-term [1]</b> 14/10	<b>make [33]</b> 2/9 2/13 2/25 5/23 10/9 10/21 10/22 12/4 15/16 40/1 44/25 53/25 62/5 68/12 90/15 94/17 102/18 104/3 106/1 117/1 120/1 167/21 170/17 180/18 182/3 183/9 188/16 191/5 192/10 201/7 206/12 217/9 219/21
<b>level [26]</b> 41/1 50/13 62/4 62/17 62/19 73/1 79/17 83/24 84/15 108/8 115/22 135/21 165/8 167/2 167/2 168/24 169/2 173/13 174/17 185/11 192/8 203/9 203/11 203/14 203/14 204/6	<b>listened [2]</b> 119/21 153/21	<b>longer [2]</b> 177/9 215/10	<b>maligned [4]</b> 77/10 78/17 78/18 82/12
<b>levels [8]</b> 12/14 23/6 34/25 41/8 82/20 87/9 160/5 166/23	<b>little [10]</b> 11/17 13/6 87/16 88/11 118/2 140/23 161/8 190/25 191/3 207/15	<b>look [17]</b> 10/2 25/2 25/10 25/22 30/9 43/13 44/22 48/22 49/18 96/11 137/23 143/16 160/18 173/15 173/23 211/2 217/22	<b>manage [6]</b> 47/10 103/2 105/15 123/3 179/2 187/23
<b>lever [3]</b> 162/10 162/19 169/25	<b>live [4]</b> 55/2 114/3 201/2 203/22	<b>looked [2]</b> 10/23 68/1	<b>mandate [2]</b> 169/20 169/21
<b>levers [2]</b> 89/22 163/8	<b>lives [2]</b> 104/6 129/3	<b>looking [3]</b> 32/24 34/5 167/4	<b>mandated [1]</b> 125/6
<b>LGA [1]</b> 143/2	<b>living [2]</b> 6/14 6/16	<b>looks [3]</b> 147/4 147/10 186/15	<b>mandatory [6]</b> 125/19 159/9 159/22 160/2 160/3 160/25
<b>liar [1]</b> 74/16	<b>load [2]</b> 78/3 111/1	<b>loosening [1]</b> 210/24	
<b>liberty [1]</b> 212/25	<b>lobbing [1]</b> 8/7	<b>loosenings [1]</b> 208/10	
<b>lied [1]</b> 75/24	<b>lobby [1]</b> 85/9	<b>Lord [3]</b> 6/20 8/13 174/3	
<b>life [3]</b> 82/17 102/3 217/5	<b>local [8]</b> 141/17 141/19 141/19 141/19 142/6 187/22 215/12 215/17	<b>Lord Sedwill [2]</b> 6/20 8/13	
<b>lift [1]</b> 145/24	<b>locally [1]</b> 128/1	<b>Lord Stevens [1]</b> 174/3	
<b>light [11]</b> 32/24 34/5 44/21 45/3 62/7 131/15 155/2 156/6 156/14 212/4 214/18	<b>located [1]</b> 149/2	<b>lose [1]</b> 217/8	
<b>like [43]</b> 11/22 26/12 34/7 34/22 44/5 44/6 47/13 53/19 53/20 57/1 58/24 60/1 66/2 66/17 69/12 78/1 80/18 84/1 87/7 88/20 95/3 98/8 120/15 144/12 147/4 154/15 156/25 157/1 165/9 167/9 173/15 173/23 176/7 178/10 178/24 183/2 184/9 186/15 203/24 215/10 215/25 219/24 221/9	<b>lock [15]</b> 31/21 32/3 103/20 103/21 103/24 103/25 104/4 105/22 128/11 128/11 130/19 155/14 156/12 156/13 158/21	<b>loss [1]</b> 137/12	
<b>likelihood [2]</b> 96/14 96/22	<b>lockdown [46]</b> 25/24 29/25 32/21 33/12 33/24 34/4 45/13 45/15 57/8 57/15 64/16 105/5 123/9 128/13 148/13 154/11 155/7 155/10 156/2 157/18 158/7 158/8 158/12 158/13 158/20 159/9 159/24 160/1 160/2 160/3 160/8 160/12 170/23 171/1 198/1 198/11 204/12 213/9 215/10 215/11 216/25 218/1 219/14 219/23 220/16 220/20	<b>lost [10]</b> 17/15 103/15 114/14 114/15 114/24 117/24 135/11 137/13 159/16 219/15	
	<b>lockdowns [3]</b> 105/5 149/1 215/17	<b>lot [3]</b> 119/18 137/23 155/23	
	<b>locked [7]</b> 128/1	<b>lots [2]</b> 5/14 211/9	
		<b>loud [1]</b> 129/11	
		<b>low [7]</b> 128/21 155/22 169/15 185/11 206/7 207/20 219/22	
		<b>lower [1]</b> 50/18	
		<b>lowering [1]</b> 143/14	
		<b>ludicrous [1]</b> 99/12	
		<b>lunch [1]</b> 221/18	
		<b>lurching [3]</b> 213/22 214/5 214/16	
		<b>lying [1]</b> 74/6	
		<b>M</b>	
		<b>machine [23]</b> 15/25	
			<b>manifesto [3]</b> 90/11 90/16 90/23
			<b>manufacture [1]</b> 106/7
			<b>many [20]</b> 27/22 62/4 84/22 86/9 92/23 108/18 129/3 129/3 161/1 161/11 163/8 165/19 174/10 190/21 191/13 191/20 200/17 200/18 206/17 210/25
			<b>March [128]</b> 14/8 14/21 15/3 18/13 19/10 19/12 21/2 21/18 21/22 22/23 25/24 26/24 28/19 29/8 29/24 30/10 31/4 31/23 32/1 33/9 33/24 34/4 40/7 40/16 42/18 42/18 42/18 42/19 42/21 42/22 44/18 44/23 45/8 45/12 60/2 62/23 63/6 63/19 65/12 65/17 66/4 68/16 69/19 75/22 92/24 92/25 93/1 93/2 98/15 98/16 98/17 111/19 122/2 124/15 127/16 128/13 128/22 129/4 129/10 129/12 129/16 131/10 133/2 134/14 135/2 135/9 137/20 140/6 140/7 141/1 141/6 142/3 143/8 143/16 143/17 145/9 145/10 145/11 146/12 146/13 146/25 147/1 148/17 149/4 149/9 150/13 150/25 152/7 153/15 153/24 155/20 157/12 158/1 158/2 160/12 160/22 161/5 161/9 161/18 163/24 164/6 164/24 170/14 170/14 170/15 171/13 172/6 172/8 175/14 179/2 184/4 185/24 187/25 188/4 188/6 188/8 188/12 188/17 188/20 189/3 189/8 194/10 196/1 197/25 198/3 198/8 198/16 198/16
			<b>March 17 [1]</b> 185/24
			<b>March/April [1]</b> 19/12
			<b>marginal [1]</b> 169/19
			<b>marginally [1]</b> 203/19
			<b>mark [3]</b> 6/20 14/17 84/6
			<b>Mark Sedwill [2]</b> 6/20 84/6
			<b>market [1]</b> 180/14
			<b>marks [1]</b> 186/15
			<b>Marr [1]</b> 130/19

<b>M</b>	200/5 201/14 205/4	210/19 210/25 211/2	61/2	<b>minister [83]</b> 1/17
<b>masks [1]</b> 170/18	<b>May 2015 [1]</b> 1/18	215/25 216/15 216/20	<b>messaging [1]</b>	6/22 9/9 12/4 12/14
<b>mass [2]</b> 46/1 170/20	<b>maybe [6]</b> 26/12	218/11 219/23	113/18	16/14 18/25 22/13
<b>massive [1]</b> 7/20	75/11 140/23 179/8	<b>mechanism [2]</b> 53/3	<b>met [1]</b> 32/17	22/20 22/22 31/21
<b>match [1]</b> 194/6	180/24 190/20	56/5	<b>metaphors [1]</b>	32/2 32/10 32/17
<b>material [14]</b> 15/1	<b>me [67]</b> 10/11 11/15	<b>media [2]</b> 138/3	144/13	32/20 33/23 34/3
25/23 49/24 50/10	19/4 22/23 23/25 24/5	197/4	<b>method [5]</b> 53/6	41/17 43/14 44/18
50/19 50/23 60/7	33/15 41/19 41/22	<b>medic [1]</b> 39/24	53/16 53/23 54/1	44/23 45/7 60/16
63/21 131/20 145/10	44/6 44/17 44/23	<b>medic-led [1]</b> 39/24	69/14	60/18 76/4 77/1 79/2
146/18 160/23 182/20	45/14 45/16 51/19	<b>Medical [13]</b> 48/8	<b>meticulously [1]</b>	79/4 79/10 79/25
183/18	52/21 54/20 55/24	59/16 60/13 66/7	33/16	80/11 81/13 82/22
<b>materially [1]</b> 163/17	56/14 56/19 58/23	71/18 91/11 92/4	<b>metric [1]</b> 156/9	85/9 90/8 90/14 90/21
<b>materials [1]</b> 2/20	61/19 61/20 68/21	107/24 110/2 129/12	<b>MHCLG [2]</b> 10/20	92/25 100/9 100/10
<b>maths [1]</b> 166/13	68/25 73/18 76/25	149/17 219/4 221/2	141/20	100/18 100/20 101/2
<b>Matt [9]</b> 1/5 1/6 59/18	81/5 83/8 83/12 83/15	<b>medically [1]</b> 188/14	<b>Michael [1]</b> 160/22	113/17 113/23 114/5
61/4 149/19 186/13	83/17 85/19 86/18	<b>Medicine [1]</b> 146/19	<b>Michael Gove [1]</b>	114/13 115/19 123/2
193/2 197/6 222/3	90/6 91/25 109/8	<b>medium [2]</b> 16/21	160/22	125/25 126/8 127/2
<b>Matt Hancock [3]</b> 1/5	115/20 116/21 116/25	78/23	<b>mid [10]</b> 20/10 57/16	127/7 127/9 127/23
59/18 61/4	118/14 119/7 119/9	<b>medium-sized [2]</b>	63/6 88/16 111/10	131/13 133/10 141/1
<b>matter [27]</b> 4/25	121/5 122/8 124/12	16/21 78/23	170/5 179/2 182/7	143/19 148/14 149/5
13/19 27/18 62/11	127/4 137/22 148/6	<b>meet [5]</b> 62/21 89/17	205/5 218/3	149/18 154/8 160/21
63/3 63/5 63/11 63/24	148/11 152/12 156/16	167/20 168/4 190/19	<b>mid-February [3]</b>	172/13 182/10 182/16
81/23 91/1 91/8 94/15	156/18 156/25 168/13	<b>meeting [49]</b> 32/7	57/16 88/16 111/10	183/2 194/11 197/12
95/17 95/18 116/4	176/21 182/11 185/2	39/14 41/10 42/3 48/6	<b>mid-January [1]</b>	197/17 203/9 203/14
116/25 122/2 125/11	185/8 186/7 186/9	48/22 49/19 49/25	182/7	204/6 205/12 207/7
147/24 156/10 157/9	189/6 199/1 201/22	50/4 50/11 50/23	<b>mid-July [2]</b> 205/5	212/20 212/23 213/15
158/5 173/11 182/16	204/24 215/21 221/19	67/19 69/19 81/3 81/6	218/3	213/23 214/2 214/11
183/3 184/25 195/7	<b>mean [18]</b> 14/11	81/7 81/8 92/24 92/25	<b>mid-March [2]</b> 63/6	216/14
<b>mattered [5]</b> 48/3	21/12 77/12 86/5	94/6 94/20 95/23	179/2	<b>Minister's [3]</b> 80/17
87/2 87/9 91/2 208/25	95/19 119/17 140/14	95/24 98/16 98/22	<b>mid-question [1]</b>	81/8 194/7
<b>matters [13]</b> 41/4	145/19 146/2 150/24	100/5 100/10 101/1	170/5	<b>minister-Health [1]</b>
54/1 82/17 100/16	153/12 154/1 171/11	101/10 107/23 108/13	<b>middle [17]</b> 15/7 17/5	203/9
158/8 174/11 174/11	173/24 178/14 182/24	113/22 114/2 114/23	23/19 40/16 83/2 83/3	<b>ministerial [9]</b> 14/4
202/12 203/4 205/1	192/22 212/10	115/2 124/2 129/12	86/7 86/11 86/17	32/7 32/8 39/18 107/3
210/9 210/12 210/23	<b>meaning [2]</b> 73/22	132/8 133/2 152/7	97/19 97/20 110/23	171/7 171/13 172/6
<b>Matthew [1]</b> 1/14	73/23	152/8 156/18 160/22	119/14 175/12 185/24	203/14
<b>maw [2]</b> 74/15 74/15	<b>means [8]</b> 1/10 29/14	171/14 172/6 172/11	201/14 215/20	<b>ministerially [1]</b> 3/17
<b>maximum [3]</b> 133/5	31/11 44/16 91/17	188/5 188/5 208/9	<b>MIG [3]</b> 79/13 81/17	<b>ministers [5]</b> 80/22
169/6 188/10	92/16 95/20 128/17	<b>meetings [20]</b> 16/25	82/24	80/22 102/18 104/20
<b>may [80]</b> 1/8 1/18	<b>meant [9]</b> 14/12 86/6	33/4 71/20 80/21 81/9	<b>might [40]</b> 8/10 19/5	111/3
3/10 4/8 8/11 10/9	86/7 185/16 185/17	81/12 90/10 90/23	24/2 28/5 28/8 30/8	<b>minute [1]</b> 118/18
13/4 16/15 17/8 20/24	195/25 208/4 220/21	92/23 92/24 116/7	31/14 65/1 65/2 65/7	<b>minutes [31]</b> 39/25
25/12 25/15 27/6 35/3	220/23	116/9 116/23 132/6	65/19 66/13 66/14	42/3 60/6 67/9 67/10
45/22 45/24 47/21	<b>measure [2]</b> 125/18	145/8 149/10 149/13	75/20 106/23 107/9	68/2 68/4 68/4 71/14
48/1 52/11 54/17 55/5	162/18	171/6 171/6 171/7	113/20 124/7 127/18	71/15 71/16 73/2
55/17 55/21 56/18	<b>measured [1]</b> 162/2	<b>memoranda [1]</b> 58/1	127/18 127/19 129/18	98/16 102/12 102/14
59/2 59/6 61/15 62/15	<b>measures [61]</b> 18/21	<b>memory [5]</b> 6/14	135/24 136/3 136/20	102/17 102/20 103/8
66/22 67/12 72/17	31/12 38/8 42/17	86/13 103/3 150/3	136/22 138/5 140/21	110/11 115/3 118/16
76/23 76/23 77/13	42/17 42/20 42/22	200/23	154/14 164/12 172/25	118/17 118/21 118/25
79/24 79/25 79/25	42/25 43/5 49/3 65/1	<b>memos [2]</b> 2/16	182/9 183/20 190/25	119/13 120/8 121/17
82/8 84/4 84/4 84/6	65/16 65/19 89/24	33/18	197/6 197/15 197/18	129/16 143/16 161/9
91/1 95/17 95/19	95/18 98/20 105/9	<b>mention [2]</b> 176/20	201/15 205/25 205/25	167/11
108/12 123/12 126/1	106/23 107/8 110/19	178/9	<b>mild [1]</b> 70/8	<b>misinformation [2]</b>
127/25 143/3 144/12	111/14 114/16 116/24	<b>mentioned [7]</b> 28/12	<b>mildly [1]</b> 49/22	12/12 194/11
146/14 147/16 148/22	116/25 122/1 122/2	64/6 91/2 97/18 138/7	<b>million [9]</b> 78/7 78/8	<b>misjudged [1]</b> 157/18
149/22 157/8 157/21	124/7 125/4 131/6	145/14 193/1	126/21 166/16 168/6	<b>misleading [1]</b>
164/15 170/22 174/25	132/23 148/22 148/23	<b>merit [1]</b> 137/1	179/24 179/25 182/9	197/22
181/19 181/21 182/14	162/22 162/25 164/5	<b>merits [1]</b> 195/8	196/7	<b>mistake [2]</b> 125/14
182/14 183/11 184/16	164/9 164/21 165/6	<b>mess [1]</b> 7/21	<b>mind [5]</b> 48/21 49/18	125/21
186/12 190/20 192/22	165/11 168/18 168/19	<b>message [5]</b> 28/18	58/21 100/22 150/12	<b>misunderstanding</b>
193/4 193/14 193/25	168/24 169/3 170/19	31/17 34/15 59/14	<b>minded [1]</b> 178/17	<b>[2]</b> 65/20 71/23
194/23 196/22 196/23	183/19 187/5 198/3	193/17	<b>mindful [1]</b> 117/19	<b>mitigate [5]</b> 112/14
196/24 196/25 197/9	198/15 198/16 198/24	<b>messaged [1]</b> 142/19	<b>minimise [1]</b> 198/17	137/9 144/9 159/13
	204/14 210/13 210/15	<b>messages [2]</b> 12/8	<b>minimum [1]</b> 198/22	218/13

<b>M</b>	<b>mortuary [1]</b> 104/10	221/12 221/16 222/3	214/14 221/20	79/17 86/11 106/7
<b>mitigation [3]</b> 8/10 8/11 39/7	<b>most [16]</b> 10/23 59/24 66/17 75/16	<b>Mr Cummings [17]</b> 28/18 34/16 34/19	<b>multitude [1]</b> 71/20	116/1 116/23 117/8
<b>mixed [1]</b> 144/13	135/19 165/17 177/16	74/4 75/19 77/12	<b>municipalities [2]</b> 57/8 123/9	127/1 181/5 181/7
<b>Mm [1]</b> 164/1	178/1 188/3 193/18	79/23 81/21 82/11	<b>must [18]</b> 21/11	181/15 182/6 183/6
<b>Mm-hm [1]</b> 164/1	195/1 200/25 201/1	82/13 147/11 149/18	24/10 27/7 27/10	183/14 204/12 215/10
<b>MoD [1]</b> 183/2	209/8 216/22 217/19	149/23 193/4 193/17	27/15 33/8 92/3 103/4	215/25 217/17
<b>model [4]</b> 16/20 78/24 153/8 153/9	<b>mothballed [1]</b> 180/15	193/22 194/13	105/18 129/14 132/15	<b>nationally [2]</b> 119/25 128/2
<b>models [1]</b> 177/4	<b>move [8]</b> 16/3 30/20 73/24 87/3 137/13	<b>Mr Cummings' [2]</b> 63/18 82/2	133/4 152/20 157/8	<b>nationals [1]</b> 57/12
<b>modular [1]</b> 1/10	149/24 154/10 182/14	<b>Mr Hancock [88]</b> 1/8 1/15 13/5 13/23 19/19	159/17 164/5 168/11	<b>nations [1]</b> 166/5
<b>module [12]</b> 1/16 2/1 3/7 3/21 3/23 5/6 14/7	<b>moved [6]</b> 53/21 75/21 86/8 188/13	23/3 25/11 27/1 28/20	193/14	<b>natural [2]</b> 9/7 23/17
30/15 43/9 103/22	200/15 219/20	31/1 32/1 34/16 38/5	<b>my [124]</b> 1/4 2/23	<b>nature [3]</b> 143/24 150/4 172/22
187/8 187/10	<b>movement [6]</b> 199/11 199/22 200/1	39/15 40/1 41/25	3/21 6/16 12/4 13/1	<b>near [1]</b> 97/7
<b>Module 1 [8]</b> 1/16 2/1 3/7 3/21 3/23 5/6 43/9	200/6 200/8 201/13	44/12 45/6 46/22	18/3 18/3 18/11 18/12	<b>nearly [2]</b> 138/1 138/7
103/22	<b>movements [2]</b> 7/4 195/22	48/22 50/10 55/9	24/1 24/12 30/2 31/13	<b>necessarily [1]</b> 158/24
<b>Modules [1]</b> 105/21	<b>moving [9]</b> 12/2 19/21 26/10 130/1	59/10 60/7 63/8 67/16	32/23 33/5 33/10	<b>necessary [15]</b> 2/8 23/21 36/19 62/20
<b>Modules 1 [1]</b> 105/21	136/8 199/4 202/1	71/9 73/19 74/1 78/10	33/10 33/17 33/18	75/14 85/22 95/9
<b>moment [22]</b> 71/14 79/4 83/15 99/1	202/18 204/10	79/21 82/9 83/8 84/20	37/18 40/24 41/8	148/19 164/11 184/16
109/15 109/22 121/21	<b>MP [2]</b> 1/15 1/21	86/18 87/8 90/19 92/3	41/19 44/4 44/18	186/5 203/25 210/20
124/13 127/8 127/22	<b>Mpox [1]</b> 177/20	95/6 97/16 100/8	44/19 45/5 46/6 47/6	213/15 219/6
128/3 128/6 128/8	<b>Mr [127]</b> 1/3 1/6 1/8	104/12 107/22 108/20	51/20 52/13 52/24	<b>need [46]</b> 9/22 10/7 24/3 28/22 30/19 37/8
129/2 129/7 129/8	1/15 13/5 13/23 19/19	109/10 112/11 113/3	54/8 55/13 56/23	37/18 38/13 64/9 77/9
129/8 130/14 141/10	19/20 23/3 25/11 27/1	113/14 115/20 117/12	58/21 59/8 75/18 78/4	78/11 78/25 79/19
158/20 189/7 221/8	28/18 28/20 31/1 32/1	118/24 120/4 122/8	78/6 78/9 79/16 81/6	81/13 103/6 103/20
<b>moments [1]</b> 12/25	34/16 34/16 34/19	123/6 129/11 131/18	83/10 85/12 86/8 94/3	104/1 104/3 105/24
<b>Monday [8]</b> 123/7	38/5 39/15 40/1 41/25	137/8 139/1 142/13	95/22 96/8 98/21	122/24 127/9 127/9
127/15 129/4 161/5	44/11 44/12 45/6	143/15 150/3 152/12	98/21 99/20 99/25	140/5 149/7 149/24
165/3 167/11 168/22	46/22 48/22 49/17	157/4 160/9 164/4	102/21 102/21 103/3	150/4 150/8 150/11
172/9	50/10 55/9 59/10 60/7	170/15 171/1 171/16	103/3 103/4 103/7	150/19 151/9 151/9
<b>money [2]</b> 4/13 209/8	63/8 63/18 67/16 71/9	175/9 180/4 182/3	103/11 103/23 106/7	158/20 158/20 162/9
<b>month [2]</b> 98/13 215/21	73/19 73/20 73/21	182/12 183/11 184/23	106/10 107/14 108/16	167/1 178/3 179/4
<b>months [4]</b> 8/13 121/22 136/12 154/5	74/1 74/4 75/15 75/19	186/25 189/16 193/4	109/15 110/24 112/4	179/11 179/24 179/25
<b>moot [1]</b> 211/4	75/25 77/12 78/10	194/12 198/24 204/12	113/13 114/2 116/23	187/18 197/10 201/1
<b>mooted [1]</b> 216/6	79/21 79/23 81/21	208/17 210/10 210/11	118/4 119/9 119/15	202/12 202/13 221/19
<b>moral [1]</b> 163/16	82/2 82/9 82/11 82/13	211/12 214/6 214/16	121/6 127/5 131/12	<b>needed [37]</b> 5/17 16/6 17/16 18/1 20/13
<b>more [52]</b> 5/14 7/14 8/20 13/6 19/13 19/15	83/8 84/20 86/18 87/8	219/1 221/12	131/14 144/5 144/13	24/7 25/8 31/21 64/10
24/3 31/3 34/6 39/22	90/19 92/3 95/6 97/16	<b>Mr Hancock's [1]</b> 73/21	147/21 148/3 148/7	64/18 66/23 77/22
41/6 42/25 48/16	100/8 104/12 107/19	<b>Mr Hill [1]</b> 170/16	149/5 152/25 157/17	80/21 83/23 85/21
66/23 75/23 79/8	107/22 108/20 109/10	<b>Mr Johnson [1]</b> 75/25	158/15 158/16 159/14	98/19 103/7 125/1
88/18 93/20 105/6	110/7 112/11 113/3	<b>Mr Keith [10]</b> 1/3 19/20 44/11 73/20	163/7 169/10 169/11	125/4 130/15 135/14
105/25 106/1 135/22	113/14 115/20 117/12	107/19 125/22 153/23	169/16 170/11 173/20	141/25 147/22 162/4
135/22 137/9 143/2	118/24 120/4 122/8	170/2 170/10 221/16	176/1 176/20 177/6	163/19 166/24 169/13
147/6 161/1 161/11	123/6 125/22 129/11	<b>Mr Njoku-Goodwin</b>	179/11 181/5 182/17	176/7 177/10 178/25
163/12 164/8 165/11	131/18 137/8 139/1	<b>[1]</b> 198/14	183/13 194/3 196/14	185/20 185/20 185/22
167/25 169/1 171/12	142/13 143/15 147/11	<b>much [50]</b> 9/15 14/9	197/4 200/22 201/15	216/22 217/9 219/5
174/21 176/7 180/22	149/18 149/23 150/3	14/22 16/5 16/6 18/4	202/7 202/7 202/9	220/15
183/13 185/15 190/25	152/12 153/23 157/4	19/13 19/13 19/13	203/21 206/2 210/14	<b>needing [1]</b> 24/1
193/7 201/10 201/11	160/9 164/4 170/2	23/2 31/1 41/6 42/25	213/1 213/4 215/16	<b>needn't [2]</b> 42/1 108/20
205/25 206/1 207/10	170/10 170/15 170/16	43/15 49/10 63/25	215/19 217/20 219/3	<b>needs [6]</b> 20/18 77/15 78/19 84/2
207/15 210/3 213/8	171/1 171/16 175/9	66/2 66/9 67/23 92/23	219/12 220/24 221/3	106/17 150/5
214/14 215/22 217/14	180/4 182/3 182/12	93/7 96/8 97/21 97/23	221/8	<b>negative [9]</b> 70/9 71/1 72/4 72/15 72/20
<b>morning [8]</b> 1/4 30/10 32/9 115/2	183/11 184/23 186/25	97/25 104/1 104/3	<b>my Lady [11]</b> 1/4 44/4 83/10 107/14	188/18 189/14 189/18
125/23 127/21 208/9	189/16 193/4 193/4	105/23 108/2 112/7	114/2 157/17 159/14	191/16
220/8	193/17 193/22 194/12	120/16 137/24 138/1	170/11 182/17 183/13	<b>negligently [1]</b> 193/18
<b>mortality [1]</b> 163/22	194/13 198/14 198/24	138/7 138/20 147/6	221/8	
	204/12 208/17 210/10	154/13 154/23 162/3	<b>myself [3]</b> 58/9 58/12 157/3	
	210/11 211/12 211/15	176/7 183/13 185/15		
	214/6 214/16 219/1	192/18 196/25 207/10	<b>N</b>	
		209/1 209/2 210/24	<b>name [2]</b> 1/13 101/13	
			<b>nation [2]</b> 21/15	
			31/10	
			<b>national [19]</b> 3/3 23/1	

<b>N</b>	<b>negotiation [1]</b> 210/18	<b>normal [4]</b> 101/2 101/3 177/19 179/25	110/22 115/12 115/16 123/24 126/16	159/10 182/13 186/8 204/2
<b>Neil [2]</b> 147/1 147/3	<b>Neil Ferguson [2]</b> 147/1 147/3	<b>normally [5]</b> 79/3 116/20 136/12 174/13 186/3	<b>nub [2]</b> 48/3 69/4	<b>occasion [1]</b> 136/8
<b>neither [1]</b> 6/23	<b>NERVTAG [16]</b> 49/25 50/23 67/19 68/1 68/4 68/4 69/9 69/25 87/14 120/15 120/23 120/24 121/5 121/6 123/13 157/11	<b>northern [1]</b> 179/10	<b>nuclear [1]</b> 23/6	<b>occasional [1]</b> 177/20
<b>neutral [2]</b> 65/20 193/20	<b>never [6]</b> 11/15 89/10 103/7 103/10 152/20 175/5	<b>not [323]</b>	<b>number [51]</b> 2/5 8/13 22/21 30/17 33/11 34/10 38/13 40/21 43/12 45/20 45/21 52/14 77/11 79/21 86/17 90/9 109/8 109/10 109/11 114/25 119/5 121/7 126/7 128/18 128/21 134/12 148/7 149/10 149/13 152/6 160/10 163/17 170/19 170/21 171/19 171/19 172/7 172/7 172/17 172/19 174/20 177/1 183/9 185/5 185/10 197/5 206/14 206/18 207/13 208/11 216/14	<b>occasionally [2]</b> 79/4 181/6
<b>nevertheless [4]</b> 86/22 110/18 128/5 191/9	<b>new [13]</b> 37/6 44/12 85/10 87/18 120/25 155/2 156/5 156/25 162/21 178/10 186/21 191/24 214/19	<b>not: [1]</b> 104/9	<b>Number 10 [15]</b> 22/21 30/17 34/10 77/11 79/21 90/9 119/5 126/7 152/6 183/9 185/5 185/10 197/5 206/14 206/18	<b>occasions [7]</b> 15/17 56/25 74/24 85/12 86/3 190/20 190/21
<b>news [4]</b> 85/1 150/16 211/11 212/2	<b>New Year [1]</b> 87/18	<b>notable [1]</b> 100/8	<b>number one [1]</b> 86/17	<b>occurring [1]</b> 99/19
<b>newspapers [2]</b> 52/17 86/2	<b>news [4]</b> 85/1 150/16 211/11 212/2	<b>notably [1]</b> 159/23	<b>numbers [5]</b> 104/16 148/3 155/21 217/3 218/3	<b>October [3]</b> 207/11 216/7 216/9
<b>next [11]</b> 5/19 20/14 31/20 48/22 109/15 109/24 135/24 154/10 165/3 197/13 213/7	<b>newspapers [2]</b> 52/17 86/2	<b>note [11]</b> 42/3 43/16 47/17 47/20 47/20 74/17 76/25 123/1 123/2 123/25 143/12	<b>nurse [1]</b> 174/14	<b>off [16]</b> 5/15 6/2 28/16 38/23 135/25 139/20 149/4 153/16 158/16 191/23 202/3 202/8 212/14 213/2 213/23 214/7
<b>next week [1]</b> 213/7	<b>next [11]</b> 5/19 20/14 31/20 48/22 109/15 109/24 135/24 154/10 165/3 197/13 213/7	<b>notebook [2]</b> 140/23 140/25	<b>o'clock [1]</b> 221/20	<b>office [21]</b> 1/18 9/7 9/9 9/10 11/6 12/4 14/25 20/9 22/20 43/12 43/19 80/20 111/4 117/9 117/10 119/3 132/7 139/23 149/2 157/10 183/10
<b>NHS [41]</b> 3/19 7/2 14/10 14/24 35/13 78/8 100/16 101/24 102/4 102/14 102/15 102/24 104/11 104/14 147/7 147/12 148/19 156/21 161/2 161/10 163/9 163/10 164/12 168/8 169/12 171/8 171/9 171/18 172/9 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/7 174/10 174/15 174/16 174/16 174/24 188/9 188/10	<b>next week [1]</b> 213/7	<b>noted [3]</b> 9/9 52/12 114/5	<b>oath [1]</b> 3/8	<b>offered [2]</b> 8/11 8/12
<b>NHS England [1]</b> 188/9	<b>NHS [41]</b> 3/19 7/2 14/10 14/24 35/13 78/8 100/16 101/24 102/4 102/14 102/15 102/24 104/11 104/14 147/7 147/12 148/19 156/21 161/2 161/10 163/9 163/10 164/12 168/8 169/12 171/8 171/9 171/18 172/9 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/7 174/10 174/15 174/16 174/16 174/24 188/9 188/10	<b>notes [6]</b> 2/16 8/5 8/20 33/17 33/25 200/3	<b>obesity [1]</b> 177/15	<b>official [4]</b> 48/14 59/16 60/14 66/8 91/11 92/4 107/24 110/2 129/13 149/18 219/4 221/2
<b>night [1]</b> 172/16	<b>NHS England [1]</b> 188/9	<b>nothing [11]</b> 8/6 111/24 113/6 138/12 138/13 139/25 157/9 157/9 157/10 190/22 219/11	<b>objective [3]</b> 144/20 163/7 167/19	<b>officials [8]</b> 8/12 37/20 67/6 74/13 104/20 116/10 139/7 147/2
<b>nightclubs [1]</b> 150/1	<b>night [1]</b> 172/16	<b>notice [2]</b> 12/19 41/11	<b>objectives [1]</b> 143/22	<b>offs [1]</b> 84/13
<b>Nightingale [1]</b> 148/20	<b>nightclubs [1]</b> 150/1	<b>noting [1]</b> 90/21	<b>obligation [2]</b> 21/13 142/13	<b>often [2]</b> 56/10 56/11
<b>Nimbus [14]</b> 101/20 101/22 101/23 102/12 102/13 102/23 103/11 104/9 105/12 106/11 106/12 122/15 122/18 174/1	<b>Nightingale [1]</b> 148/20	<b>notion [9]</b> 11/18 11/23 23/7 54/24 60/18 130/3 133/1 133/23 159/13	<b>obligations [1]</b> 3/4	<b>Oh [4]</b> 46/23 68/3 142/15 152/19
<b>nine [2]</b> 172/3 173/18	<b>nine days [1]</b> 173/18	<b>notwithstanding [8]</b> 2/13 88/9 140/12 173/21 174/23 174/25 175/4 203/1	<b>oblique [2]</b> 138/23 139/3	<b>Okay [7]</b> 55/13 60/11 86/21 124/14 184/23 205/3 220/9
	<b>Njoku [2]</b> 197/1 198/14	<b>November [1]</b> 1/1	<b>observation [3]</b> 6/25 182/13 186/19	<b>old [2]</b> 22/8 203/24
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23	<b>now [63]</b> 6/20 11/5 14/19 23/23 23/25 24/8 25/5 25/22 26/18 27/22 28/12 33/8 36/6 36/23 40/14 43/25 49/8 49/12 57/6 57/19 60/19 61/19 64/15 66/15 68/19 69/4 74/1 76/17 76/17 81/13 84/20 84/22 93/17 111/10 117/19 117/21 119/25 124/10 130/11 138/24 143/24 146/9 151/20 154/22 156/10 158/18 159/17 160/7 165/24 178/7 179/6 179/12 180/5 180/8 185/1 197/4 201/6 204/10 206/13 213/19 213/21 217/21 219/9	<b>observe [1]</b> 28/15	<b>oldies [1]</b> 149/25
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23	<b>nowhere [1]</b> 97/7	<b>observed [2]</b> 99/10 181/12	<b>on [534]</b>
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23	<b>NPI [5]</b> 20/23 110/19 159/21 159/22 160/5	<b>obstacles [1]</b> 94/13	<b>onboard [1]</b> 57/24
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23	<b>NPIs [10]</b> 11/4 20/6 20/11 104/5 105/23	<b>obvious [17]</b> 6/10 7/12 13/25 26/19 57/7 57/19 58/2 101/25 104/13 150/15 154/22 160/20 172/12 192/22 201/23 204/20 205/4	<b>once [11]</b> 8/6 10/3 20/7 83/25 92/10 93/5 98/12 103/2 135/16 209/10 209/14
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23		<b>obviously [18]</b> 1/25 2/10 8/11 13/19 30/23 36/23 102/4 110/10 115/16 116/6 129/5 138/24 142/13 159/8	<b>one [77]</b> 3/1 5/20 10/9 10/16 10/17 12/4 20/20 23/4 41/25 44/14 49/25 51/24 55/11 55/12 68/12 69/13 75/1 75/19 75/22 76/14 80/1 81/11 86/9 86/17 93/1
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23		<b>o</b>	<b>officially [1]</b> 137/20
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23		<b>o'clock [1]</b> 221/20	<b>officials [8]</b> 8/12 37/20 67/6 74/13 104/20 116/10 139/7 147/2
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23		<b>oath [1]</b> 3/8	<b>officials [8]</b> 8/12 37/20 67/6 74/13 104/20 116/10 139/7 147/2
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 52/2 54/24 55/4 55/9 55/12 56/13 57/18 57/25 58/14 58/16 59/21 60/24 61/8 64/13 65/11 68/4 69/22 71/6 74/17 74/25 76/2 83/8 83/8 83/12 85/19 86/7 89/16 91/17 92/16 96/24 97/21 102/23 104/21 104/24 106/18 109/2 110/13 111/21 113/4 114/15 114/17 114/18 120/24 122/3 122/18 122/19 124/18 131/18 131/18 131/23 138/1 138/20 143/2 148/10 150/16 151/13 151/16 152/17 157/16 157/21 157/21 158/23 159/1 162/3 165/23 170/11 175/6 176/18 179/22 179/23 184/9 184/17 189/1 189/9 189/10 189/11 190/18 195/6 198/19 198/24 200/13 200/24 207/23 207/25 217/2 217/24 220/23		<b>obesity [1]</b> 177/15	<b>offs [1]</b> 84/13
	<b>no [115]</b> 6/2 7/24 8/7 9/23 9/24 13/21 15/6 27/13 28/16 29/11 29/13 29/14 31/11 32/1 33/22 33/24 33/25 36/3 46/12 46/22 47/9 49/1 49/14 50/14 50/19 51/5 51/10 51/18 5			

<p><b>O</b></p> <p><b>one... [52]</b> 93/3 93/3 93/3 94/21 94/22 95/13 96/16 97/2 101/25 102/12 103/7 103/13 105/18 113/17 117/12 135/15 136/5 146/9 147/17 166/8 169/25 170/23 170/25 171/17 174/6 174/7 174/14 175/12 175/23 178/4 179/8 179/9 180/13 180/18 181/4 182/2 182/7 182/24 184/14 192/5 193/15 197/3 198/19 201/17 202/16 204/22 206/16 208/10 210/6 210/25 212/21 217/13</p> <p><b>one page [2]</b> 113/17 171/17</p> <p><b>ones [2]</b> 177/19 203/24</p> <p><b>only [35]</b> 8/22 13/16 13/19 15/10 15/22 23/17 35/11 51/24 53/12 69/17 77/4 84/17 102/12 103/3 103/4 103/13 117/25 120/14 128/22 131/23 139/3 142/21 143/5 144/2 155/9 155/14 158/6 165/6 169/14 173/6 186/3 200/15 202/4 205/5 218/16</p> <p><b>ONS [4]</b> 207/12 207/14 207/15 207/17</p> <p><b>onto [2]</b> 5/15 101/6</p> <p><b>onwards [4]</b> 4/3 75/21 188/17 188/23</p> <p><b>open [4]</b> 147/16 162/7 178/18 195/16</p> <p><b>open-ended [1]</b> 147/16</p> <p><b>opened [1]</b> 188/4</p> <p><b>opening [3]</b> 206/1 208/25 209/3</p> <p><b>openings [1]</b> 209/4</p> <p><b>openly [2]</b> 150/16 154/11</p> <p><b>operated [3]</b> 80/12 99/3 119/19</p> <p><b>operating [1]</b> 74/11</p> <p><b>operation [5]</b> 5/11 9/11 81/17 82/4 159/14</p> <p><b>operational [7]</b> 7/20 8/8 106/2 191/13 191/19 201/17 201/19</p> <p><b>operations [1]</b> 79/21</p> <p><b>opine [1]</b> 154/8</p> <p><b>opinion [2]</b> 76/24 194/3</p>	<p><b>opportunities [1]</b> 103/15</p> <p><b>opportunity [4]</b> 22/12 31/8 191/3 194/12</p> <p><b>opposed [9]</b> 14/10 44/2 44/2 58/5 61/14 110/6 117/7 148/1 199/22</p> <p><b>opposite [5]</b> 33/11 52/13 84/3 148/3 148/7</p> <p><b>or [180]</b> 6/2 6/5 6/6 7/3 7/3 8/22 9/16 9/20 10/16 11/3 18/5 18/10 18/20 18/20 22/5 24/23 25/13 25/18 27/6 28/16 29/15 34/22 35/5 35/14 38/2 38/9 38/10 40/6 40/25 41/17 42/1 42/3 44/5 45/13 45/15 45/19 47/23 48/1 50/12 51/8 55/4 55/11 55/12 55/19 61/6 62/12 63/12 64/16 67/12 67/12 70/7 70/21 74/19 78/18 78/23 79/25 80/1 80/6 80/24 81/23 81/24 81/24 82/4 86/5 86/23 86/23 86/24 87/4 87/9 87/23 90/22 91/8 93/10 93/20 95/16 95/17 96/2 96/23 97/4 97/14 97/15 99/15 99/21 102/7 103/25 105/7 106/19 108/13 108/24 109/17 110/6 110/6 111/15 112/19 113/24 114/14 116/20 117/12 121/14 124/5 135/4 141/22 143/14 144/11 144/14 144/15 144/20 144/22 146/9 146/10 146/12 147/1 147/17 147/25 152/23 156/11 157/9 158/15 158/23 159/13 159/15 159/15 163/2 164/10 165/4 165/10 168/1 168/19 171/4 171/12 177/1 177/20 177/20 178/18 179/17 179/20 180/9 182/14 183/16 183/16 184/5 184/11 187/2 188/16 188/21 190/20 192/10 192/12 193/15 195/21 197/3 197/10 197/17 198/1 198/10 198/19 199/16 200/4 200/11 200/14 202/5 202/24 203/17 203/18 203/22 204/7 204/11 204/19 206/23 209/3</p>	<p>211/4 212/21 213/3 213/7 214/19 215/10 215/11 215/12 215/13 221/4</p> <p><b>ordained [1]</b> 164/3</p> <p><b>order [16]</b> 37/4 42/23 64/20 72/15 104/6 105/23 125/5 133/4 159/9 160/25 164/24 165/13 187/1 192/2 209/3 210/20</p> <p><b>ordinating [1]</b> 18/20</p> <p><b>ordination [1]</b> 184/13</p> <p><b>Organisation [8]</b> 35/22 35/24 36/8 46/12 47/17 66/22 140/5 140/9</p> <p><b>organisations [1]</b> 84/18</p> <p><b>organised [1]</b> 217/16</p> <p><b>organising [1]</b> 81/16</p> <p><b>original [1]</b> 43/1</p> <p><b>other [51]</b> 1/9 8/4 10/5 15/17 15/23 18/9 19/25 22/18 29/7 29/9 29/20 31/11 53/17 53/18 55/11 55/12 59/5 64/21 67/10 69/15 76/20 79/8 80/24 86/14 86/15 96/21 100/16 105/9 108/11 111/23 115/10 121/2 122/23 123/21 140/3 157/11 169/18 170/21 174/1 175/9 180/23 184/17 185/18 200/21 201/18 201/20 206/17 210/19 212/21 217/3 220/2</p> <p><b>others [15]</b> 3/20 5/14 8/14 66/18 76/18 81/22 82/11 86/22 95/16 100/20 139/7 156/21 158/14 188/21 214/4</p> <p><b>otherwise [3]</b> 161/2 170/4 192/5</p> <p><b>ought [3]</b> 18/2 18/9 116/20</p> <p><b>our [25]</b> 5/3 15/18 23/20 30/14 36/8 46/22 47/12 48/10 75/7 93/23 108/5 112/5 116/2 123/6 139/21 141/15 150/9 165/10 180/21 191/17 195/3 202/10 203/14 211/10 213/22</p> <p><b>ourselves [2]</b> 103/12 130/10</p> <p><b>out [80]</b> 3/20 10/4 13/24 39/11 40/10 43/7 43/14 45/20 46/2 49/5 49/21 53/19 57/5</p>	<p>60/24 62/18 72/1 74/9 85/3 87/22 92/19 98/8 99/5 102/7 102/22 103/11 118/19 118/21 124/6 124/20 126/15 126/22 127/8 127/16 127/20 130/21 135/13 136/18 137/4 139/23 142/7 146/1 152/25 154/16 155/11 155/17 156/18 156/21 161/17 163/11 176/13 182/8 183/10 185/20 191/3 192/8 196/10 198/14 204/14 207/14 207/14 207/16 207/21 207/21 208/8 208/8 209/12 210/2 210/25 210/25 211/3 211/4 211/9 211/9 211/10 219/13 219/13 220/3 221/6 221/7 221/7</p> <p><b>outbreak [11]</b> 21/4 37/16 57/11 57/23 91/21 91/22 92/6 106/24 107/1 123/11 177/20</p> <p><b>outcome [4]</b> 70/24 106/20 144/19 207/3</p> <p><b>outcomes [3]</b> 98/7 118/14 200/19</p> <p><b>outdoor [1]</b> 169/20</p> <p><b>outline [2]</b> 124/6 143/21</p> <p><b>output [1]</b> 36/17</p> <p><b>outside [6]</b> 10/20 49/1 111/25 116/19 129/21 140/22</p> <p><b>outwith [2]</b> 112/5 190/19</p> <p><b>over [45]</b> 1/20 8/13 10/4 11/3 12/9 41/7 48/14 55/6 57/20 58/20 58/21 58/21 78/8 90/16 93/6 96/19 96/25 104/23 109/19 126/21 127/16 128/13 129/6 130/16 137/16 145/4 148/16 149/22 154/24 154/25 156/1 166/16 171/14 172/10 182/18 185/12 185/23 189/4 190/12 194/9 195/25 206/6 207/11 208/11 221/7</p> <p><b>over-65s [1]</b> 190/12</p> <p><b>overall [14]</b> 9/25 13/1 25/19 36/4 38/24 89/6 112/24 143/14 209/1 209/2 209/4 210/12 210/13 210/23</p> <p><b>overarching [1]</b> 137/7</p> <p><b>overconfidence [1]</b></p>	<p>24/6</p> <p><b>overconfident [1]</b> 23/9</p> <p><b>overexcited [1]</b> 74/6</p> <p><b>overlong [1]</b> 170/11</p> <p><b>overly [1]</b> 183/11</p> <p><b>overpitched [1]</b> 137/11</p> <p><b>overplay [1]</b> 151/2</p> <p><b>overreacting [3]</b> 16/8 24/22 126/12</p> <p><b>overreaction [3]</b> 94/2 113/24 126/1</p> <p><b>overrule [1]</b> 56/24</p> <p><b>overruled [1]</b> 64/9</p> <p><b>overruling [3]</b> 51/22 59/3 64/4</p> <p><b>overtaken [1]</b> 144/20</p> <p><b>overtop [1]</b> 173/10</p> <p><b>overtopped [2]</b> 168/10 171/10</p> <p><b>overused [1]</b> 26/6</p> <p><b>overwhelmed [9]</b> 14/24 18/7 102/24 163/9 163/10 171/10 172/1 172/2 172/14</p> <p><b>overwhelming [2]</b> 163/15 173/10</p> <p><b>own [9]</b> 14/22 27/10 77/22 90/19 159/5 165/13 214/6 215/19 220/12</p> <p><b>owned [1]</b> 193/10</p> <p><b>Oxford [1]</b> 37/6</p> <p><b>Oxford University [1]</b> 37/6</p> <hr/> <p><b>P</b></p> <p><b>pace [1]</b> 191/8</p> <p><b>paced [1]</b> 3/5</p> <p><b>package [4]</b> 208/10 216/15 216/15 216/15</p> <p><b>package A [1]</b> 216/15</p> <p><b>package B [1]</b> 216/15</p> <p><b>package C [1]</b> 216/15</p> <p><b>page [56]</b> 7/17 7/22 8/1 21/22 28/19 32/4 34/13 39/15 42/2 46/19 46/21 46/22 47/12 48/8 48/23 49/6 49/11 49/19 50/1 59/14 67/25 69/21 70/3 94/24 101/14 107/20 108/9 109/7 109/10 109/11 109/25 110/1 113/17 113/17 114/5 117/14 121/17 134/19 137/5 137/7 143/10 143/18 143/20 149/20 149/22 154/17 171/12 171/17 172/10 172/10 189/13 189/21</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<p><b>P</b></p> <p><b>page...</b> [4] 196/24 197/13 198/15 222/2</p> <p><b>page 1</b> [1] 48/8</p> <p><b>page 10</b> [1] 137/7</p> <p><b>page 11</b> [1] 172/10</p> <p><b>page 2</b> [7] 21/22 46/19 46/22 48/23 59/14 107/20 143/10</p> <p><b>page 219</b> [1] 196/24</p> <p><b>Page 22</b> [1] 46/21</p> <p><b>page 3</b> [3] 49/19 70/3 149/20</p> <p><b>page 4</b> [4] 47/12 69/21 137/5 189/13</p> <p><b>page 5</b> [6] 34/13 94/24 117/14 143/18 143/20 189/21</p> <p><b>page 587</b> [1] 7/22</p> <p><b>Page 594</b> [1] 8/1</p> <p><b>page 6</b> [6] 39/15 50/1 67/25 101/14 113/17 154/17</p> <p><b>page 68</b> [1] 28/19</p> <p><b>page 7</b> [5] 42/2 109/25 110/1 121/17 171/12</p> <p><b>page 78</b> [1] 7/17</p> <p><b>page 8</b> [1] 114/5</p> <p><b>pages</b> [4] 2/3 33/20 47/4 197/13</p> <p><b>pages 2</b> [1] 47/4</p> <p><b>paid</b> [3] 98/20 99/15 100/21</p> <p><b>pan</b> [1] 43/8</p> <p><b>pandemic</b> [73] 2/10 2/14 2/20 3/9 3/11 4/2 4/4 4/5 5/8 5/15 5/16 5/17 5/20 5/24 6/3 6/14 7/13 8/21 10/11 28/17 34/22 34/25 35/13 35/15 36/25 38/3 39/10 40/10 43/8 85/25 89/11 89/17 89/20 94/19 95/3 95/8 96/10 96/13 97/15 98/5 98/6 99/13 102/2 104/22 105/13 105/15 105/15 106/14 106/22 108/24 115/7 117/16 118/17 122/16 123/3 125/2 136/9 139/19 140/6 141/24 142/21 155/8 175/12 175/15 175/24 177/23 179/7 179/11 191/5 200/18 200/20 212/11 217/18</p> <p><b>pandemic-related</b> [1] 5/16</p> <p><b>pandemics</b> [1] 194/20</p> <p><b>paper</b> [10] 110/20 113/7 113/13 116/22</p>	<p>123/20 123/22 124/5 124/25 126/5 126/16</p> <p><b>papers</b> [9] 2/15 32/8 32/23 32/25 33/17 111/3 146/23 146/24 167/3</p> <p><b>paperwork</b> [6] 93/15 110/25 150/15 161/5 173/16 206/21</p> <p><b>par</b> [2] 7/8 7/9</p> <p><b>paragraph</b> [21] 48/21 49/20 50/1 67/25 70/4 94/24 96/11 100/14 108/20 109/3 109/7 117/14 121/10 121/17 129/17 141/5 142/11 143/20 154/16 155/17 202/19</p> <p><b>paragraph 17</b> [1] 121/17</p> <p><b>paragraph 19</b> [1] 49/20</p> <p><b>paragraph 191</b> [3] 108/20 109/3 109/7</p> <p><b>paragraph 194</b> [1] 121/10</p> <p><b>paragraph 2</b> [2] 117/14 143/20</p> <p><b>paragraph 23</b> [1] 154/16</p> <p><b>paragraph 230</b> [2] 141/5 142/11</p> <p><b>paragraph 236</b> [1] 129/17</p> <p><b>paragraph 3</b> [1] 94/24</p> <p><b>paragraph 3.4</b> [2] 50/1 67/25</p> <p><b>paragraph 393</b> [1] 202/19</p> <p><b>paragraph 4</b> [1] 96/11</p> <p><b>paragraph 8</b> [1] 70/4</p> <p><b>paragraph in</b> [1] 48/21</p> <p><b>paraphrase</b> [2] 87/16 96/18</p> <p><b>parks</b> [1] 161/7</p> <p><b>Parliament</b> [4] 91/7 94/17 195/6 195/9</p> <p><b>Parliamentary</b> [2] 91/9 195/7</p> <p><b>part</b> [13] 9/17 14/6 14/13 14/16 16/18 28/13 76/7 89/17 127/1 138/20 196/6 212/12 214/5</p> <p><b>participants</b> [1] 221/16</p> <p><b>particular</b> [24] 16/25 38/17 50/8 64/1 80/5 83/1 101/5 114/7 133/9 146/23 160/21 176/15 176/16 176/23</p>	<p>181/4 188/1 200/15 200/21 204/5 204/6 204/15 204/22 205/1 213/1</p> <p><b>particularly</b> [6] 14/7 43/24 70/7 87/18 115/24 187/25</p> <p><b>parties</b> [2] 166/5 166/6</p> <p><b>partly</b> [2] 9/11 103/10</p> <p><b>parts</b> [5] 8/16 38/23 93/17 157/11 188/10</p> <p><b>parts'</b> [1] 8/3</p> <p><b>pass</b> [6] 47/9 93/9 95/7 103/10 139/4 167/22</p> <p><b>passage</b> [1] 85/10</p> <p><b>passed</b> [2] 47/2 54/12</p> <p><b>passengers</b> [1] 87/22</p> <p><b>past</b> [1] 193/13</p> <p><b>path</b> [2] 94/13 166/15</p> <p><b>pathogenic</b> [2] 37/16 106/24</p> <p><b>patients</b> [13] 48/12 49/15 68/8 68/9 73/8 73/9 174/14 187/12 187/14 188/13 188/22 189/9 199/18</p> <p><b>Patrick</b> [22] 7/18 8/5 8/14 14/19 32/14 59/16 60/10 60/12 61/3 67/5 70/13 74/4 107/25 108/10 131/8 193/9 200/3 200/12 201/15 201/25 202/8 220/4</p> <p><b>Patrick Vallance</b> [4] 61/3 131/8 202/8 220/4</p> <p><b>Patrick's</b> [1] 8/16</p> <p><b>pause</b> [9] 8/19 35/23 67/16 71/17 151/21 165/13 176/14 185/4 199/14</p> <p><b>pausing</b> [1] 35/3</p> <p><b>Paymaster</b> [1] 1/17</p> <p><b>Paymaster General</b> [1] 1/17</p> <p><b>peacetime</b> [1] 106/3</p> <p><b>peak</b> [5] 103/2 121/22 143/13 144/4 145/11</p> <p><b>pedalling</b> [1] 32/11</p> <p><b>pen</b> [1] 124/5</p> <p><b>people</b> [93] 5/14 8/7 10/21 10/21 12/12 23/13 23/22 24/2 24/5 25/6 25/18 26/2 26/11 26/16 27/5 27/23 28/2 28/6 28/10 29/19 37/25 38/22 43/19 45/21 47/3 57/23</p>	<p>58/24 62/4 64/7 72/3 72/10 72/11 72/14 72/17 74/7 75/9 75/12 75/19 76/20 77/14 78/8 78/20 80/21 81/4 84/2 86/24 87/2 87/2 87/4 87/8 87/10 94/2 96/1 104/20 106/12 126/21 128/18 129/21 136/23 144/22 149/14 155/9 162/15 163/14 163/18 165/25 166/18 173/24 174/19 174/21 179/15 182/10 185/2 185/9 186/3 186/9 186/9 186/22 188/3 191/16 195/1 195/17 195/23 198/6 200/25 201/4 202/1 210/2 210/3 217/6 219/20 219/22 220/3</p> <p><b>people's</b> [3] 161/24 169/6 177/14</p> <p><b>per</b> [1] 96/14</p> <p><b>percentage</b> [1] 63/20</p> <p><b>perception</b> [1] 209/24</p> <p><b>perfect</b> [1] 5/18</p> <p><b>perfectly</b> [3] 59/10 77/2 131/18</p> <p><b>performance</b> [1] 90/4</p> <p><b>performed</b> [2] 36/24 53/12</p> <p><b>perhaps</b> [14] 4/7 25/18 69/7 89/1 103/16 109/8 139/10 146/12 148/22 160/7 182/18 186/19 193/15 215/12</p> <p><b>period</b> [24] 29/24 45/5 53/7 68/23 81/16 82/22 111/7 121/22 131/2 131/10 147/21 148/17 149/6 155/10 158/3 158/6 159/25 159/25 175/21 185/12 206/4 206/10 213/25 214/8</p> <p><b>permanent</b> [2] 96/7 186/24</p> <p><b>permanent secretary</b> [2] 96/7 186/24</p> <p><b>permissible</b> [1] 115/23</p> <p><b>person</b> [2] 156/17 220/11</p> <p><b>personalities</b> [1] 78/20</p> <p><b>personally</b> [3] 11/15 41/17 176/12</p> <p><b>personnel</b> [6] 4/13 5/13 5/14 7/4 7/11 199/4</p> <p><b>persons</b> [7] 45/22</p>	<p>48/15 48/19 48/20 50/13 62/3 200/6</p> <p><b>persuade</b> [1] 26/5</p> <p><b>petering</b> [1] 98/8</p> <p><b>pharmaceutical</b> [4] 15/11 125/7 125/15 125/17</p> <p><b>phase</b> [3] 31/6 204/25 205/1</p> <p><b>phase 3</b> [1] 204/25</p> <p><b>phases</b> [2] 70/7 204/15</p> <p><b>PHE</b> [35] 4/24 7/21 36/22 36/24 40/14 47/2 47/13 49/13 56/3 56/15 58/3 58/13 60/25 64/8 64/13 66/10 68/17 69/7 71/13 72/2 72/8 90/4 115/6 115/9 151/5 152/9 153/2 153/6 175/16 176/16 177/2 177/6 177/10 177/17 178/16</p> <p><b>PHE's</b> [1] 68/25</p> <p><b>PHE-based</b> [1] 177/2</p> <p><b>PHEIC</b> [2] 140/11 140/19</p> <p><b>phone</b> [8] 127/21 131/12 131/14 131/21 131/23 131/25 140/25 156/16</p> <p><b>phoned</b> [2] 36/7 127/2</p> <p><b>phrase</b> [2] 132/17 195/14</p> <p><b>physical</b> [3] 174/5 174/11 180/19</p> <p><b>pick</b> [1] 75/4</p> <p><b>picking</b> [1] 157/2</p> <p><b>picture</b> [1] 159/19</p> <p><b>piece</b> [1] 32/2</p> <p><b>pieced</b> [3] 2/15 2/21 33/17</p> <p><b>pieces</b> [1] 84/23</p> <p><b>pillars</b> [2] 153/3 153/3</p> <p><b>pitch</b> [1] 119/22</p> <p><b>pithily</b> [1] 149/18</p> <p><b>place</b> [56] 2/7 4/20 15/11 20/6 29/15 33/11 41/23 42/10 42/15 42/18 42/20 42/23 42/25 69/11 77/10 77/16 77/21 77/24 78/11 78/13 79/11 82/23 84/23 88/18 88/19 88/23 104/6 106/21 106/25 110/4 110/10 111/13 112/12 131/24 137/19 156/3 158/7 168/4 178/16 179/19 179/21 180/1 181/20 181/23</p>
--	--	--	---	---

<b>P</b>	<b>played [1]</b> 16/17	53/9 53/21 54/3 55/22	196/2	184/21 212/7
<b>place... [12]</b> 188/22	<b>player [2]</b> 31/15	56/3 56/12 56/19	<b>practical [13]</b> 3/24	<b>presumed [1]</b> 63/22
188/25 191/10 194/1	115/22	58/17 60/23 61/7	6/9 65/6 88/5 91/17	<b>presumption [2]</b>
195/6 196/3 196/17	<b>please [42]</b> 2/7 2/12	61/22 62/12 66/11	95/18 98/20 106/23	104/17 112/8
209/7 210/16 210/19	13/23 21/21 34/13	68/7 68/16 72/6	114/16 114/19 124/7	<b>pretty [9]</b> 23/1 60/2
215/21 220/21	41/25 43/2 55/9 59/12	141/21 142/6 144/11	135/10 144/15	61/10 61/11 61/14
<b>placed [5]</b> 69/5 69/6	68/13 80/9 83/8 83/21	144/12 190/16 190/23	<b>practically [6]</b> 95/20	61/20 66/9 139/17
88/12 90/5 160/23	84/20 86/19 87/8	191/5 191/7 191/24	159/17 178/18 183/19	186/3
<b>places [2]</b> 219/24	100/2 104/12 107/20	192/2 192/14 192/18	192/8 192/10	<b>prevalence [4]</b>
220/2	108/9 109/5 115/20	193/15 193/25 194/5	<b>practice [2]</b> 112/18	209/24 212/17 219/22
<b>plain [10]</b> 2/9 2/13	119/11 122/8 123/16	198/18 209/15 215/21	220/14	220/2
2/25 85/17 88/22	132/10 134/10 134/16	221/5	<b>preamble [1]</b> 62/22	<b>prevent [1]</b> 164/12
188/16 189/3 199/7	140/3 143/15 151/21	<b>politely [1]</b> 181/25	<b>precautionary [10]</b>	<b>prevented [1]</b> 91/18
204/12 214/24	154/15 155/13 157/4	<b>political [7]</b> 127/11	51/13 62/9 62/16 63/4	<b>preventing [2]</b> 65/14
<b>plainly [5]</b> 37/18	170/25 171/11 171/13	166/3 166/5 166/6	64/3 64/5 64/11 93/21	83/11
75/21 159/8 178/11	175/9 188/16 202/18	203/4 204/7 217/7	94/4 108/6	<b>prevention [2]</b> 65/24
208/21	221/11 221/21	<b>politically [3]</b> 165/17	<b>precisely [2]</b> 188/25	178/11
<b>plan [65]</b> 4/3 4/17	<b>plural [1]</b> 34/25	165/21 203/1	189/12	<b>previous [5]</b> 54/14
4/18 4/21 5/18 5/24	<b>pm [10]</b> 59/18 61/3	<b>politics [1]</b> 140/21	<b>precursor [1]</b> 207/10	161/7 164/20 164/21
24/25 35/11 35/12	107/16 107/18 149/19	<b>ponder [1]</b> 135/5	<b>predecessors [1]</b>	181/12
40/2 40/5 40/7 40/8	170/7 170/9 193/2	<b>poor [1]</b> 155/1	6/16	<b>previously [6]</b> 26/7
40/13 40/14 40/17	197/6 221/22	<b>population [5]</b> 46/1	<b>predicated [3]</b> 99/13	48/10 83/5 151/7
40/22 40/23 40/23	<b>point [105]</b> 5/24 8/25	117/6 126/19 166/3	157/13 158/25	156/8 162/5
40/25 40/25 41/3 41/4	10/9 18/1 18/3 22/20	181/10	<b>predicted [1]</b> 161/20	<b>primary [5]</b> 64/20
41/21 41/23 42/4	23/13 24/16 28/5	<b>position [47]</b> 4/22	<b>premise [7]</b> 39/1	117/3 127/5 167/19
42/15 43/1 43/7 43/8	30/21 30/22 31/14	31/16 31/18 31/18	51/15 97/10 120/13	169/11
43/10 43/11 43/13	36/24 39/3 39/25	47/22 48/14 53/14	160/13 164/4 164/5	<b>Prime [77]</b> 6/22
43/17 63/1 63/14	40/11 40/19 41/6	55/10 60/21 60/22	<b>preparation [7]</b> 3/9	12/14 18/25 22/13
100/1 106/14 106/14	48/23 52/4 58/12	60/23 61/15 72/1 80/5	3/12 4/6 20/20 20/20	22/20 22/22 31/21
111/17 112/24 112/24	63/13 68/12 69/23	81/20 82/15 85/4	42/11 177/21	32/2 32/7 32/8 32/10
115/8 121/19 121/25	70/12 71/6 71/25	85/17 85/18 87/1 87/3	<b>preparations [1]</b>	32/20 33/23 34/3
122/9 124/10 124/10	73/20 77/7 78/2 87/16	94/3 111/10 116/13	34/21	43/14 44/18 44/23
124/12 124/15 124/22	88/17 94/9 96/6 104/1	120/5 122/25 130/10	<b>prepare [4]</b> 99/7	45/7 60/16 60/18 76/4
130/17 134/8 134/14	105/4 106/15 106/17	141/15 141/16 141/24	101/5 115/7 122/16	77/1 79/2 79/4 79/10
135/13 135/18 135/22	108/4 110/18 110/23	142/2 142/6 147/15	<b>prepared [13]</b> 29/7	79/25 80/11 80/17
137/23 138/17 138/20	112/12 113/9 115/5	160/14 160/15 161/17	29/9 29/20 36/4 39/5	81/8 81/13 82/22 85/9
168/13 190/10 196/6	116/14 116/14 116/17	173/13 187/11 202/7	85/6 99/9 101/1 123/9	90/8 90/14 90/21
204/11 204/23	119/14 119/15 119/24	203/2 205/23 209/11	123/20 134/17 137/6	92/25 100/9 100/10
<b>plane [1]</b> 140/20	124/14 125/12 125/20	211/21 215/8 215/15	137/11	100/18 100/20 101/2
<b>planned [1]</b> 216/6	128/15 141/1 143/11	215/16 220/13	<b>preparing [3]</b> 39/10	113/17 113/23 114/5
<b>planning [15]</b> 4/2 4/7	145/14 146/6 147/22	<b>positions [1]</b> 202/24	44/21 113/20	114/13 123/2 125/25
22/17 28/12 63/21	148/12 151/6 152/2	<b>positive [7]</b> 12/21	<b>prepped [2]</b> 35/1	126/8 127/2 127/7
93/13 98/25 107/23	153/23 154/10 158/15	48/25 84/9 84/15	35/6	127/9 127/23 131/13
141/7 141/11 141/11	158/16 158/22 159/4	167/13 209/6 209/12	<b>present [2]</b> 108/18	133/10 143/19 148/14
141/12 142/12 157/25	162/23 163/7 163/15	<b>possession [1]</b> 33/25	109/25	149/5 149/18 154/8
194/19	163/20 164/4 164/13	<b>possibilities [1]</b>	<b>presentation [1]</b>	160/21 172/13 182/10
<b>plans [46]</b> 3/21 4/14	169/2 169/10 169/12	117/18	203/20	182/16 194/7 194/11
4/18 4/19 4/20 4/23	170/12 171/24 172/14	<b>possibility [4]</b> 7/4	<b>presentational [2]</b>	197/12 197/17 203/14
5/5 5/5 5/9 5/23 20/5	172/21 172/25 173/20	59/23 102/2 117/25	203/4 204/8	205/12 207/7 212/20
21/8 22/15 28/12	175/5 175/23 178/9	<b>possible [13]</b> 44/14	<b>presentationally [2]</b>	212/23 213/15 213/23
29/15 34/23 35/4 36/2	178/12 180/18 182/3	49/15 51/11 103/21	202/24 203/18	214/2 214/11 216/14
36/9 36/12 36/15	182/4 182/5 184/18	124/20 128/12 131/19	<b>presented [4]</b> 119/7	<b>Prime Minister [65]</b>
36/18 36/22 37/9	184/19 187/22 190/15	144/3 154/15 163/8	119/12 143/8 188/1	6/22 12/14 18/25
37/18 37/21 40/12	192/5 192/23 194/15	192/19 209/22 218/16	<b>presenting [2]</b> 23/10	22/13 22/20 22/22
40/20 41/23 41/24	198/12 203/21 203/21	<b>possibly [3]</b> 169/17	189/22	31/21 32/2 32/10
42/10 43/4 43/15	206/2 206/15 208/1	187/5 198/25	<b>press [10]</b> 33/19 58/1	32/20 33/23 34/3
110/3 110/9 111/13	211/4	<b>post [1]</b> 1/21	85/2 119/11 155/13	43/14 44/18 44/23
111/21 112/10 112/12	<b>pointing [1]</b> 4/9	<b>potential [7]</b> 37/5	194/24 195/12 196/4	45/7 60/16 60/18 76/4
112/19 113/4 113/16	<b>points [5]</b> 4/16 8/7	85/13 85/20 85/25	206/19 206/23	77/1 79/4 79/10 79/25
114/18 142/14 142/22	137/25 157/4 167/9	86/9 98/7 114/8	<b>pressure [1]</b> 19/15	80/11 81/13 82/22
159/15	<b>policies [6]</b> 65/14	<b>pounds [1]</b> 180/20	<b>Presumably [1]</b>	90/8 90/21 92/25
<b>platform [1]</b> 37/4	111/25 188/25 191/10	<b>power [2]</b> 81/15	17/12	100/9 100/10 100/18
<b>play [1]</b> 38/7	192/7 193/16	89/22	<b>presume [7]</b> 20/24	100/20 101/2 113/17
	<b>policy [37]</b> 52/9 53/1	<b>PPE [3]</b> 170/19 196/2	25/15 84/4 91/1 98/23	113/23 114/5 114/13



<b>R</b>	<b>realities [1]</b> 88/6	180/13	82/12 90/7 94/9 124/3	157/19
<b>rang [1]</b> 32/14	<b>reality [6]</b> 90/1 93/5	<b>recognise [3]</b> 73/8	133/2 134/12 157/4	<b>relieved [1]</b> 156/20
<b>range [1]</b> 98/7	137/11 190/19 194/1	178/10 203/23	187/21 188/6	<b>reluctance [1]</b> 24/20
<b>rapid [2]</b> 32/11 39/7	218/6	<b>recognised [3]</b>	<b>referring [3]</b> 40/8	<b>reluctant [1]</b> 14/23
<b>rapidly [3]</b> 144/20	<b>really [25]</b> 10/13	150/16 187/25 188/2	110/17 121/25	<b>rely [1]</b> 106/8
145/9 180/1	13/16 28/3 28/7 37/8	<b>recollect [1]</b> 171/4	<b>reflect [1]</b> 194/1	<b>remainder [1]</b> 49/24
<b>rapporteur [1]</b> 121/6	41/3 41/7 48/3 48/3	<b>recollection [9]</b>	<b>reflected [9]</b> 46/10	<b>remained [3]</b> 64/22
<b>rare [1]</b> 177/21	64/17 79/1 83/9 95/17	32/22 52/24 98/21	110/14 129/6 184/10	117/17 137/18
<b>ratcheting [1]</b> 160/1	95/25 99/23 102/20	98/21 99/20 102/21	205/22 205/24 207/2	<b>remains [1]</b> 39/9
<b>rate [12]</b> 29/18 89/12	102/22 127/6 127/23	110/24 112/4 118/5	207/6 214/12	<b>remarkable [2]</b> 82/8
97/12 97/13 98/1 98/3	129/9 145/19 177/7	<b>recollections [1]</b>	<b>reflection [6]</b> 18/12	174/24
126/19 128/15 162/3	191/17 205/6 208/25	2/23	178/14 193/25 194/3	<b>remember [20]</b> 26/21
165/7 167/12 175/22	<b>reason [9]</b> 26/4 39/2	<b>recommend [4]</b>	194/6 202/6	34/5 36/24 41/10 52/7
<b>rates [4]</b> 212/16	72/5 81/9 154/6	77/25 78/22 159/20	<b>reflects [1]</b> 50/21	103/1 110/25 118/9
214/24 215/3 217/12	155/14 156/2 184/24	220/5	<b>reform [1]</b> 141/25	118/13 119/24 127/2
<b>rather [16]</b> 2/18 4/4	190/17	<b>recommendation [2]</b>	<b>reforms [1]</b> 142/1	137/9 138/14 140/18
11/11 15/2 28/1 43/21	<b>reasonable [60]</b> 8/10	30/16 102/21	<b>refresh [1]</b> 150/3	151/23 156/20 206/19
75/9 82/8 145/17	17/25 27/23 28/2 29/2	<b>recommendations</b>	<b>refreshed [2]</b> 35/1	207/13 207/14 213/25
147/2 153/9 154/5	41/9 41/13 41/22	<b>[3]</b> 38/18 66/10	35/6	<b>remind [2]</b> 86/18
156/15 177/5 181/17	55/23 55/24 63/21	120/2	<b>regard [4]</b> 7/14 45/13	204/24
219/11	93/4 93/8 93/13 93/19	<b>recommended [1]</b>	80/22 127/22	<b>reminded [1]</b> 156/15
<b>ratio [1]</b> 174/13	93/23 95/23 96/2	219/1	<b>regarded [1]</b> 206/11	<b>remit [7]</b> 2/25 18/2
<b>rationale [2]</b> 160/8	96/12 96/22 97/4 97/8	<b>recommends [1]</b>	<b>regardless [8]</b> 8/10	112/1 112/6 140/22
160/11	97/9 98/10 98/14	216/10	62/24 63/2 63/11	148/24 183/1
<b>rationalised [1]</b>	98/17 98/23 98/24	<b>record [11]</b> 34/1	108/5 120/4 142/16	<b>repair [1]</b> 32/15
172/13	99/6 99/10 99/12	47/13 80/18 91/8	142/18	<b>repeat [1]</b> 217/7
<b>re [4]</b> 2/21 90/18	99/25 107/22 107/25	131/21 131/23 140/17	<b>regime [1]</b> 16/13	<b>repeated [1]</b> 14/20
135/8 162/7	108/2 112/8 116/19	140/25 154/19 212/15	<b>regret [7]</b> 46/6 47/24	<b>repeatedly [4]</b> 15/15
<b>re-edited [1]</b> 135/8	126/20 128/7 144/6	218/10	51/20 54/23 59/8 65/3	54/11 85/5 85/15
<b>re-election [1]</b> 90/18	156/22 161/20 162/9	<b>recorded [1]</b> 34/8	218/19	<b>replaced [1]</b> 81/17
<b>re-open [1]</b> 162/7	162/13 162/14 162/16	<b>records [5]</b> 14/19	<b>regularly [4]</b> 34/25	<b>report [11]</b> 6/2 6/7
<b>re-pieced [1]</b> 2/21	162/24 163/6 164/5	33/20 121/9 126/6	67/4 119/12 119/15	6/21 28/16 47/18
<b>reach [1]</b> 169/2	166/15 167/20 168/2	131/15	<b>reiterated [1]</b> 49/14	105/20 113/5 125/25
<b>reached [4]</b> 13/16	168/5 169/14 173/18	<b>recourse [1]</b> 125/5	<b>reject [5]</b> 7/10 23/7	135/6 138/3 156/17
31/5 62/23 63/13	173/20 182/25 183/3	<b>redrafted [1]</b> 135/7	184/21 187/2 187/4	<b>reported [9]</b> 70/3
<b>react [1]</b> 17/14	183/5 202/16	<b>reduce [4]</b> 167/1	<b>rejected [1]</b> 202/2	118/14 119/8 120/15
<b>reacted [2]</b> 25/6	<b>reasonably [6]</b> 25/14	168/7 168/13 202/14	<b>related [6]</b> 5/15 5/16	120/24 123/13 124/20
28/10	27/7 136/4 180/10	<b>reduced [3]</b> 161/24	68/6 69/5 79/20	128/22 141/18
<b>reaction [4]</b> 43/22	214/18 221/4	162/3 165/8	163/13	<b>reporting [2]</b> 121/2
108/25 130/9 187/19	<b>reasons [6]</b> 26/10	<b>reduction [4]</b> 166/23	<b>relating [2]</b> 161/10	141/23
<b>read [10]</b> 56/1 67/9	26/11 56/22 72/6	167/3 167/4 169/13	171/24	<b>reports [5]</b> 38/9
118/16 118/19 119/3	166/9 169/5	<b>refer [9]</b> 47/22 57/9	<b>relation [13]</b> 22/5	52/16 57/22 85/1
119/6 126/15 156/18	<b>reassuring [2]</b> 48/25	91/7 129/25 141/5	51/1 84/5 85/4 123/22	123/9
171/4 179/9	90/5	142/11 176/14 188/4	141/10 160/10 170/25	<b>repository [1]</b> 77/19
<b>read-out [1]</b> 156/18	<b>rebellious [1]</b> 170/4	202/19	176/15 178/12 184/8	<b>representative [1]</b>
<b>reading [2]</b> 118/21	<b>rebuild [2]</b> 204/11	<b>reference [36]</b> 11/16	187/12 218/1	58/24
119/12	204/23	14/11 14/12 30/4 32/1	<b>relatively [5]</b> 87/19	<b>represented [2]</b> 63/9
<b>ready [9]</b> 10/8 20/17	<b>recall [23]</b> 42/23	33/22 47/18 49/6 60/7	88/10 93/7 178/23	122/25
70/5 106/3 106/5	52/18 57/25 91/6	68/1 74/5 87/1 100/10	185/9	<b>request [1]</b> 161/23
106/6 114/11 179/5	93/10 108/12 108/13	101/14 108/3 110/5	<b>relaxation [1]</b> 212/19	<b>requested [2]</b> 94/17
180/15	108/15 108/25 109/2	110/9 111/13 122/4	<b>relayed [3]</b> 69/8	134/23
<b>real [7]</b> 4/15 22/14	109/14 110/21 113/21	122/11 122/18 122/19	71/19 133/9	<b>requesting [1]</b>
22/14 70/23 129/18	126/4 126/22 131/9	122/21 122/22 122/23	<b>release [5]</b> 205/13	188/10
202/4 217/4	137/8 188/9 193/4	123/19 138/19 138/20	205/18 206/5 208/18	<b>required [11]</b> 4/10
<b>realisation [2]</b>	207/12 213/24 216/12	143/10 171/22 172/8	209/12	17/7 34/2 57/2 61/6
146/10 168/22	216/13	186/21 193/14 195/15	<b>released [2]</b> 196/2	106/24 107/9 124/8
<b>realise [3]</b> 19/20	<b>receive [1]</b> 19/5	197/1 203/7	207/12	165/10 189/18 218/23
43/25 104/23	<b>received [11]</b> 1/16	<b>references [8]</b> 14/21	<b>relevant [8]</b> 10/10	<b>requirement [1]</b>
<b>realised [1]</b> 128/6	2/9 57/22 71/13 84/25	87/21 107/24 134/18	33/20 46/24 124/19	201/19
<b>realistic [2]</b> 117/17	85/7 101/23 129/23	138/23 139/3 171/6	131/20 140/4 159/8	<b>requirements [1]</b>
117/25	130/2 146/17 184/5	171/9	160/23	188/12
<b>realistically [2]</b> 89/21	<b>receiving [4]</b> 37/1	<b>referred [18]</b> 13/11	<b>reliable [3]</b> 56/6	<b>requires [2]</b> 70/18
129/9	51/23 61/22 194/20	13/11 13/12 17/7 44/3	191/12 191/17	101/7
	<b>recently [2]</b> 35/6	52/1 58/1 61/1 68/6	<b>reliance [2]</b> 77/17	<b>research [1]</b> 175/19

<b>R</b>	115/11 115/12 115/16 120/10 141/17 141/21 142/7 175/6 177/13 177/18 <b>rest [9]</b> 4/8 11/8 41/19 94/1 186/6 193/11 197/7 197/12 198/7 <b>restart [1]</b> 153/7 <b>restated [1]</b> 47/22 <b>restricting [1]</b> 201/13 <b>restrictions [6]</b> 88/11 129/22 145/24 198/12 215/12 219/6 <b>result [3]</b> 70/10 71/2 184/11 <b>resulted [1]</b> 73/17 <b>retail [1]</b> 164/25 <b>retain [1]</b> 143/15 <b>retrospectively [1]</b> 197/15 <b>return [2]</b> 44/7 107/15 <b>returners [1]</b> 57/1 <b>revelatory [2]</b> 139/10 141/10 <b>reversed [2]</b> 153/22 207/5 <b>review [2]</b> 198/18 198/22 <b>revolved [1]</b> 99/17 <b>rewind [1]</b> 19/20 <b>rewrote [1]</b> 138/24 <b>ridiculous [1]</b> 140/20 <b>rife [1]</b> 31/7 <b>right [86]</b> 1/23 2/18 7/16 9/5 9/23 22/11 33/7 34/12 39/13 45/17 48/5 61/12 61/23 68/5 69/16 72/22 73/3 73/7 78/15 80/14 81/4 82/7 87/13 88/14 88/17 88/21 89/14 90/6 91/5 94/5 94/7 94/20 99/22 100/3 101/9 107/12 109/15 113/19 114/8 117/2 118/10 121/8 122/20 123/5 124/15 125/10 132/2 134/2 134/7 140/2 143/7 145/12 146/8 148/10 154/3 156/7 157/8 158/15 160/6 160/13 160/16 168/11 175/9 178/6 179/6 180/5 180/17 182/23 183/22 185/25 186/11 187/6 189/20 190/5 192/4 194/22 194/25 195/1 195/5 195/12 195/16 196/20 199/2 207/18 210/7 220/4 <b>rightly [5]</b> 10/24 11/6	20/9 27/14 111/5 <b>rigid [1]</b> 80/9 <b>Riley [1]</b> 146/24 <b>ring [6]</b> 194/23 195/2 195/10 195/14 195/15 196/14 <b>rise [2]</b> 9/4 9/25 <b>risen [1]</b> 207/19 <b>Rishi [1]</b> 211/14 <b>rising [4]</b> 9/21 204/20 205/5 205/8 <b>risk [11]</b> 14/24 30/6 30/11 51/14 87/20 117/15 146/3 175/6 181/17 193/11 198/17 <b>risks [5]</b> 59/5 163/22 182/6 187/23 188/6 <b>road [2]</b> 30/18 31/19 <b>roadmap [4]</b> 204/16 204/19 207/1 207/3 <b>robust [3]</b> 53/4 161/17 207/15 <b>role [7]</b> 5/3 5/3 79/2 82/2 116/23 120/19 181/5 <b>roles [1]</b> 12/4 <b>roll [1]</b> 10/4 <b>roll-out [1]</b> 10/4 <b>rolled [1]</b> 13/24 <b>room [3]</b> 33/4 132/6 190/1 <b>rose [2]</b> 7/11 218/3 <b>roughly [1]</b> 206/22 <b>round [8]</b> 15/6 65/15 116/10 125/22 193/17 213/7 213/11 217/24 <b>rounds [1]</b> 135/7 <b>roundtables [1]</b> 142/5 <b>route [3]</b> 64/16 64/19 70/2 <b>routed [1]</b> 69/9 <b>row [2]</b> 193/24 212/9 <b>rubbed [1]</b> 13/2 <b>rule [6]</b> 127/19 130/20 167/1 195/7 212/17 216/1 <b>ruled [1]</b> 49/21 <b>rules [2]</b> 192/1 215/13 <b>ruling [2]</b> 53/19 72/20 <b>rumbled [2]</b> 30/5 98/18 <b>rumbling [1]</b> 28/25 <b>run [8]</b> 10/18 70/6 77/21 79/17 84/9 84/10 90/17 163/11 <b>running [8]</b> 10/5 15/25 16/2 31/19 36/22 80/16 81/25 82/4 <b>RWCS [3]</b> 96/13 96/13 96/14	<b>S</b> <b>sacked [1]</b> 76/2 <b>sadly [2]</b> 26/23 200/25 <b>safe [1]</b> 206/12 <b>sage [66]</b> 20/11 49/18 50/11 58/1 60/6 67/1 67/3 67/4 67/9 67/10 68/4 69/9 69/25 69/25 70/12 71/14 71/15 71/16 71/19 72/2 96/15 98/16 108/21 109/12 110/20 111/7 111/11 111/15 114/23 115/3 117/20 118/8 118/14 119/21 119/23 119/23 120/5 120/18 120/20 121/6 123/24 123/25 124/2 124/17 124/24 126/15 128/3 143/8 143/12 145/8 146/23 147/1 147/2 155/3 156/3 156/17 156/24 157/4 157/10 167/3 170/13 170/18 171/6 216/10 219/1 219/10 <b>SAGE's [1]</b> 219/5 <b>said [86]</b> 4/9 4/19 6/22 12/5 20/24 22/25 25/16 30/10 30/12 36/8 37/8 39/4 39/8 39/17 40/21 41/12 41/16 43/25 47/6 51/20 52/1 55/24 56/18 58/13 58/22 59/1 60/10 64/10 69/21 71/14 72/9 74/3 75/1 75/3 75/11 75/20 78/10 80/2 80/3 81/12 91/25 94/25 96/3 96/12 103/9 103/13 110/2 112/7 113/18 114/12 115/1 117/19 121/5 121/18 122/8 122/18 127/8 127/20 129/13 130/20 130/23 131/25 133/20 138/16 143/2 144/1 152/12 152/15 152/25 153/25 163/24 166/10 167/3 170/14 174/15 180/4 191/9 191/15 194/23 195/9 195/9 195/12 195/24 200/4 208/15 218/10 <b>said: [1]</b> 72/8 <b>sake [1]</b> 203/20 <b>same [20]</b> 1/8 11/20 24/5 24/6 56/5 56/13 84/5 91/10 114/2 160/3 166/6 166/22 181/22 196/22 201/4	203/18 204/8 209/4 210/2 214/21 <b>sars [10]</b> 53/3 53/3 55/25 56/5 56/13 58/18 60/1 97/6 97/6 98/8 <b>SARS-CoV-1 [1]</b> 53/3 <b>Saturday [3]</b> 34/9 149/9 149/21 <b>save [1]</b> 104/6 <b>saved [1]</b> 129/3 <b>saw [16]</b> 27/1 33/21 41/9 68/4 69/12 69/12 69/13 71/14 71/15 72/1 81/14 86/25 87/1 140/10 188/2 213/15 <b>say [102]</b> 5/23 8/24 13/4 15/17 19/23 20/3 21/8 22/2 22/3 22/12 22/24 29/6 29/20 30/4 31/18 31/25 32/9 34/23 38/8 42/16 46/5 46/9 46/14 46/19 47/12 47/16 50/14 50/19 54/22 57/18 62/7 62/11 63/5 65/5 74/7 76/21 80/6 82/10 84/5 84/24 85/8 85/11 87/2 87/23 88/8 91/10 108/16 108/21 110/10 111/5 111/22 114/20 115/11 115/24 117/23 120/9 127/6 127/25 135/22 136/4 138/11 138/12 138/13 138/13 138/14 147/16 148/22 150/7 150/18 151/7 151/17 152/21 154/7 154/23 155/11 155/17 157/8 159/16 165/5 167/21 181/2 182/17 183/11 184/12 185/4 186/12 192/22 193/12 195/4 197/21 197/22 199/14 200/11 206/14 206/18 210/5 211/2 212/23 215/5 217/22 218/1 220/7 <b>saying [36]</b> 24/7 24/10 28/3 28/6 41/19 42/14 59/3 59/18 60/19 60/20 61/3 61/4 61/5 61/5 68/15 68/22 70/15 74/6 96/17 112/3 126/8 129/23 131/21 133/25 148/8 154/9 155/14 157/5 164/15 180/9 192/17 193/18 195/18 197/18 199/25 212/15 <b>says [20]</b> 5/25 8/5 33/15 48/9 50/20 59/17 72/11 75/23 109/11 117/15 133/9
----------	--	--	---	---

<b>S</b>	53/13 53/16 53/21 53/23 54/1 54/2 56/16 56/18 57/3 58/3 58/16 58/25 59/2 59/15 60/14 60/22 60/23 61/6 61/13 61/15 61/21 64/4 64/8 66/6 66/13 67/2 68/15 69/14 70/1 70/2 70/14 71/24 88/5 88/21 90/3 118/22 120/17 120/21 121/3 123/23 124/17 131/7 144/18 146/18 149/17 154/24 155/8 171/23 175/19 196/4 201/16 201/19 203/21 214/19 218/21 218/24	36/7 37/12 39/16 56/16 58/25 74/14 76/5 76/6 76/24 79/5 82/23 84/6 86/10 89/2 96/7 112/7 113/2 115/17 115/23 118/20 120/10 161/13 169/11 175/6 179/12 181/5 182/8 183/2 186/12 186/24 202/10 203/9 208/13 208/21 209/11 215/7 220/11	<b>self-critical</b> [1] 23/16 <b>self-evident</b> [3] 13/14 14/2 184/1 <b>self-isolate</b> [1] 38/1 <b>seminal</b> [1] 109/15 <b>send</b> [1] 132/3 <b>sends</b> [1] 193/17 <b>senior</b> [5] 7/10 8/12 23/3 79/8 87/9 <b>sense</b> [11] 7/6 24/1 25/4 102/12 103/13 105/6 125/19 129/25 158/10 163/5 214/25 <b>sensible</b> [2] 108/6 164/9 <b>sensibly</b> [2] 63/13 214/18 <b>sensitive</b> [1] 72/11 <b>sensitivity</b> [2] 70/6 72/16 <b>sent</b> [1] 136/15 <b>sentence</b> [5] 85/14 118/4 182/7 189/15 219/3 <b>sentences</b> [1] 83/20 <b>separate</b> [2] 46/25 190/1 <b>separated</b> [1] 190/1 <b>September</b> [14] 144/19 207/11 209/7 214/23 215/8 215/20 216/6 216/10 216/13 216/18 218/14 218/23 219/2 220/19 <b>September 2020</b> [1] 144/19 <b>sequencing</b> [1] 175/24 <b>series</b> [5] 40/11 40/20 40/24 45/8 132/6 <b>serious</b> [12] 3/8 3/12 37/16 40/15 184/25 185/1 209/9 209/21 209/25 210/4 211/11 211/21 <b>seriously</b> [3] 15/19 86/16 209/17 <b>seriousness</b> [6] 43/20 85/16 85/18 85/20 86/25 212/2 <b>servant</b> [1] 23/4 <b>served</b> [2] 1/19 1/21 <b>service</b> [3] 115/6 136/13 148/1 <b>set</b> [22] 3/20 20/8 40/10 43/7 57/5 60/24 72/1 89/16 124/6 135/13 146/1 152/25 153/2 154/16 161/17 166/8 191/3 194/5 196/10 203/22 210/13 210/15 <b>sets</b> [2] 43/14 198/14	<b>setting</b> [2] 124/20 182/8 <b>settings</b> [2] 65/25 66/11 <b>settled</b> [1] 53/1 <b>seven</b> [2] 42/24 211/3 <b>seven days</b> [1] 42/24 <b>shall</b> [4] 44/7 56/19 107/15 170/6 <b>shared</b> [1] 30/13 <b>she</b> [8] 23/6 83/12 122/8 141/2 141/6 142/18 142/19 142/24 <b>she'd</b> [1] 142/21 <b>sheer</b> [3] 104/16 172/17 172/19 <b>shelf</b> [2] 6/2 28/16 <b>shielding</b> [4] 10/17 13/13 14/2 22/18 <b>shift</b> [2] 5/21 33/6 <b>shifted</b> [1] 19/10 <b>ship</b> [1] 57/12 <b>shoes</b> [1] 58/13 <b>shoot</b> [1] 217/12 <b>shop</b> [1] 167/14 <b>shops</b> [1] 167/14 <b>short</b> [12] 44/9 89/23 100/14 107/17 119/1 119/1 146/2 155/10 170/8 175/21 215/9 216/25 <b>shortage</b> [1] 190/17 <b>shorthand</b> [2] 61/2 153/13 <b>shortly</b> [2] 83/21 207/16 <b>should</b> [91] 2/9 15/13 15/19 16/19 18/1 18/10 19/23 20/15 20/22 23/1 25/19 26/19 30/20 31/7 31/25 32/3 33/7 41/3 41/16 44/25 53/2 54/2 55/22 55/24 56/17 56/23 61/7 70/5 78/15 79/1 93/13 93/23 98/23 98/25 100/1 102/17 103/6 103/8 103/22 103/23 104/8 104/10 105/5 105/23 106/3 106/8 106/10 109/23 110/10 110/15 116/23 116/25 119/20 127/14 128/9 129/2 129/7 129/24 130/4 130/12 132/17 132/22 133/17 135/18 138/10 143/12 144/18 148/9 151/4 151/19 152/25 154/12 154/22 156/11 160/16 169/19 177/3 179/3 181/6 183/7 189/9 189/25 191/24
----------	--	---	--	---

<b>S</b>	93/14 131/15 149/3 179/20 180/23 <b>Singapore [1]</b> 50/8 <b>single [8]</b> 35/17 46/6 51/20 54/22 59/8 65/3 190/1 221/5 <b>Sir [31]</b> 7/18 8/5 8/14 8/16 14/19 47/5 59/16 60/10 60/12 67/4 67/5 70/13 74/4 89/15 95/5 99/10 103/9 107/25 108/10 117/14 134/22 134/25 135/5 147/17 173/2 187/24 193/9 196/12 200/3 200/12 201/25 <b>Sir Chris Whitty [3]</b> 89/15 95/5 99/10 <b>Sir Chris Wormald [2]</b> 134/22 187/24 <b>Sir Christopher Wormald [3]</b> 134/25 135/5 147/17 <b>Sir Patrick Vallance [12]</b> 8/14 59/16 60/10 60/12 67/5 74/4 107/25 108/10 193/9 200/3 200/12 201/25 <b>Sir Patrick Vallance's [4]</b> 7/18 8/5 14/19 70/13 <b>Sir Patrick's [1]</b> 8/16 <b>Sir Simon Stevens [1]</b> 103/9 <b>siren [1]</b> 31/2 <b>sites [1]</b> 169/20 <b>situation [4]</b> 43/21 103/10 114/21 119/10 <b>six [7]</b> 54/14 117/13 128/17 174/14 212/17 215/13 216/1 <b>six doublings [1]</b> 128/17 <b>sized [2]</b> 16/21 78/23 <b>slides [1]</b> 143/8 <b>slightly [1]</b> 48/24 <b>slow [3]</b> 11/9 110/4 144/7 <b>slowed [2]</b> 130/9 136/15 <b>slower [1]</b> 179/3 <b>slowing [2]</b> 112/24 144/15 <b>slowly [1]</b> 36/23 <b>small [6]</b> 16/21 44/14 78/23 177/1 177/4 178/23 <b>small-scale [1]</b> 178/23 <b>smaller [1]</b> 132/7 <b>smoking [1]</b> 177/16 <b>smooth [1]</b> 82/4 <b>so [246]</b> <b>so-called [2]</b> 2/24	31/25 <b>social [20]</b> 1/19 3/1 3/16 27/8 37/12 39/17 40/5 78/8 115/17 141/21 144/23 148/23 149/7 149/24 170/13 187/23 188/5 190/10 191/10 195/10 <b>social care [4]</b> 78/8 141/21 188/5 195/10 <b>society [6]</b> 16/23 130/22 131/1 132/16 132/17 133/7 <b>society's [1]</b> 98/3 <b>sole [6]</b> 70/2 118/22 120/5 120/14 139/12 210/8 <b>solving [1]</b> 75/10 <b>some [71]</b> 2/7 8/17 8/23 9/18 12/12 13/9 16/6 19/3 19/25 20/12 21/10 23/22 24/2 24/4 24/21 25/1 25/5 25/10 30/5 32/11 32/22 43/19 43/22 43/23 53/20 56/10 62/15 64/4 64/15 64/21 66/16 67/12 68/14 68/16 71/15 72/17 74/1 80/1 81/4 86/24 94/2 101/7 104/12 108/11 119/14 119/15 127/18 132/6 132/7 136/16 139/10 140/21 143/8 147/11 164/13 165/25 167/13 170/12 171/14 172/14 174/8 174/12 175/9 178/23 179/23 186/8 197/6 200/5 201/18 203/19 213/10 <b>somebody [4]</b> 54/12 72/20 109/8 185/25 <b>somebody's [2]</b> 18/6 140/19 <b>somehow [1]</b> 9/17 <b>someone [1]</b> 203/16 <b>something [15]</b> 6/17 23/19 34/22 83/11 84/16 93/20 101/6 106/19 113/11 135/15 136/5 142/8 203/17 210/21 219/11 <b>sometimes [9]</b> 75/12 135/14 135/19 136/7 171/9 191/6 203/15 204/3 204/4 <b>somewhat [1]</b> 99/11 <b>soon [9]</b> 89/9 103/20 128/11 128/12 129/24 145/24 156/12 163/11 221/16 <b>sooner [2]</b> 129/22 156/3	<b>sophisticated [2]</b> 89/18 150/17 <b>sorry [18]</b> 1/10 19/19 25/21 35/23 42/20 54/5 54/21 126/10 127/7 144/10 152/19 168/9 170/5 170/16 180/4 186/25 216/8 221/13 <b>sort [10]</b> 20/14 78/4 103/4 104/17 107/8 119/24 122/14 139/3 158/17 179/2 <b>sort of [7]</b> 78/4 103/4 107/8 119/24 122/14 158/17 179/2 <b>sorting [1]</b> 176/13 <b>sorts [12]</b> 18/21 38/2 42/17 67/13 105/1 110/19 111/2 116/24 136/19 138/4 138/21 166/23 <b>sought [3]</b> 21/13 87/23 88/22 <b>source [4]</b> 56/14 131/19 199/12 200/1 <b>South [1]</b> 50/9 <b>South Korea [1]</b> 50/9 <b>space [1]</b> 104/10 <b>Spahn [1]</b> 52/13 <b>Spain [1]</b> 200/22 <b>sparse [1]</b> 155/19 <b>speak [4]</b> 23/20 85/15 87/4 113/12 <b>speaking [2]</b> 88/10 167/17 <b>special [2]</b> 80/6 183/8 <b>specialist [1]</b> 153/9 <b>specific [7]</b> 65/23 70/5 76/12 79/11 80/15 148/18 188/5 <b>specifically [5]</b> 102/8 108/15 110/16 110/21 182/24 <b>specifics [1]</b> 74/21 <b>spectacular [1]</b> 180/25 <b>speed [7]</b> 13/5 106/4 134/17 204/13 204/15 205/13 205/18 <b>speedily [3]</b> 27/7 27/17 168/16 <b>spend [5]</b> 75/9 92/23 180/18 180/19 180/20 <b>spending [2]</b> 96/7 96/8 <b>spent [3]</b> 91/4 93/7 116/6 <b>sphere [1]</b> 51/10 <b>SPI [3]</b> 120/15 155/15 216/4 <b>SPI-B [1]</b> 155/15 <b>SPI-M [1]</b> 120/15	<b>SPI-M-O [1]</b> 216/4 <b>spirit [2]</b> 84/10 84/15 <b>spite [2]</b> 11/22 90/8 <b>split [1]</b> 38/23 <b>spoke [7]</b> 67/6 78/11 85/5 85/8 87/10 130/18 148/13 <b>spoken [1]</b> 140/9 <b>spread [23]</b> 12/13 14/14 37/17 39/7 45/23 50/8 59/6 65/14 73/12 89/23 92/10 93/5 95/1 95/2 95/7 95/21 110/4 112/25 129/13 133/3 144/2 193/11 220/3 <b>spreading [1]</b> 38/12 <b>spring [4]</b> 144/12 145/5 145/17 145/20 <b>spur [1]</b> 147/13 <b>sputum [1]</b> 178/25 <b>stability [3]</b> 177/25 178/2 178/3 <b>staff [17]</b> 37/20 78/4 174/13 187/15 190/8 190/12 193/7 195/21 199/11 199/22 200/1 200/23 200/24 201/4 201/13 202/13 202/14 <b>staffed [2]</b> 174/12 175/1 <b>staffing [1]</b> 174/6 <b>stage [17]</b> 23/4 31/6 37/17 48/2 58/19 62/23 85/3 85/20 85/24 92/14 118/18 143/23 146/18 174/8 187/16 191/21 215/9 <b>start [15]</b> 10/10 17/23 22/6 69/18 93/22 104/17 136/18 136/25 169/6 194/25 195/2 195/5 195/13 195/16 221/17 <b>started [10]</b> 13/21 16/3 92/13 119/12 124/11 127/24 148/12 153/15 205/5 205/6 <b>starting [3]</b> 110/18 187/22 203/21 <b>state [42]</b> 1/19 3/15 4/22 6/16 8/15 16/17 21/3 27/8 36/7 37/12 38/7 39/16 54/11 56/3 56/16 58/25 62/11 67/11 74/14 76/10 79/5 83/18 89/2 112/7 113/2 115/17 115/23 118/20 120/10 141/7 141/11 161/13 175/6 179/12 181/6 202/10 208/13 208/21 209/11 210/1 215/7 220/11 <b>stated [3]</b> 67/20 72/2
----------	--	---	--	--

<b>S</b>	123/4 150/11 151/1 151/1 151/3 151/4 151/19 163/8 163/19 170/2 <b>stopped [6]</b> 82/23 150/13 151/12 153/6 153/6 200/9 <b>stopping [5]</b> 92/17 95/21 104/25 126/7 151/9 <b>storm [1]</b> 91/4 <b>straightforward [1]</b> 7/15 <b>strategically [1]</b> 168/11 <b>strategy [29]</b> 5/25 31/7 35/12 35/15 40/10 44/24 45/1 45/9 105/13 112/13 112/14 112/15 113/5 137/8 137/12 137/18 137/18 139/7 139/12 139/15 139/18 144/20 144/25 146/9 197/5 206/2 206/5 206/11 218/16 <b>strayed [1]</b> 116/19 <b>Street [4]</b> 94/13 94/18 132/5 194/24 <b>strengthen [1]</b> 5/10 <b>stress [4]</b> 19/15 21/12 21/17 21/19 <b>stretch [1]</b> 204/4 <b>stretched [1]</b> 172/9 <b>strictly [1]</b> 116/2 <b>strikes [2]</b> 5/8 7/13 <b>stringent [3]</b> 21/11 43/1 88/11 <b>strong [9]</b> 4/24 5/4 19/8 63/2 122/6 155/7 177/17 198/10 219/19 <b>stronger [1]</b> 215/17 <b>strongly [5]</b> 195/23 209/16 209/19 212/24 217/14 <b>struck [2]</b> 33/10 113/19 <b>structural [3]</b> 80/10 82/20 84/22 <b>Structurally [1]</b> 7/7 <b>structure [8]</b> 1/10 4/13 7/3 79/15 124/24 183/12 183/12 183/17 <b>structured [3]</b> 6/23 177/5 177/6 <b>structures [6]</b> 20/7 79/11 106/2 106/3 181/20 181/22 <b>struggling [1]</b> 118/6 <b>stuck [3]</b> 19/2 41/20 139/22 <b>study [1]</b> 53/12 <b>stuff [3]</b> 18/5 74/6 75/17 <b>style [1]</b> 176/8	<b>stylistically [1]</b> 2/21 <b>subcategory [1]</b> 39/6 <b>subcommittee [1]</b> 120/24 <b>subcommittees [3]</b> 79/12 120/14 121/7 <b>subject [12]</b> 9/14 33/4 44/5 51/18 54/6 78/4 79/22 101/5 109/18 115/20 122/1 183/25 <b>submission [1]</b> 43/14 <b>suboptimal [1]</b> 89/20 <b>Subsequently [2]</b> 190/6 205/11 <b>subset [1]</b> 80/20 <b>subsidising [1]</b> 210/2 <b>substance [3]</b> 41/2 41/3 189/7 <b>substantive [2]</b> 26/9 194/19 <b>substantively [1]</b> 203/18 <b>substitution [1]</b> 175/17 <b>subtly [1]</b> 219/5 <b>successes [1]</b> 10/2 <b>successful [1]</b> 66/8 <b>successfully [2]</b> 66/21 90/17 <b>such [2]</b> 9/21 88/24 <b>sufficient [1]</b> 100/21 <b>sufficiently [2]</b> 17/14 27/17 <b>Suffolk [2]</b> 1/15 127/5 <b>suggest [11]</b> 15/2 43/17 50/11 50/24 73/23 157/8 160/24 165/10 184/9 207/2 215/2 <b>suggested [6]</b> 38/16 137/1 170/12 192/4 197/23 200/4 <b>suggesting [6]</b> 11/23 18/20 69/4 78/15 165/24 214/17 <b>suggestion [8]</b> 62/6 67/17 157/16 187/3 189/8 200/12 200/14 201/25 <b>suggests [4]</b> 50/2 50/5 67/21 204/18 <b>suite [3]</b> 168/18 168/19 170/22 <b>summaries [1]</b> 110/16 <b>summarise [4]</b> 8/4 49/24 196/9 202/23 <b>summarised [1]</b> 60/8 <b>summary [7]</b> 51/24 88/2 171/3 171/5 174/23 175/8 190/24 <b>summer [5]</b> 6/22	204/10 206/5 206/6 208/12 <b>summing [1]</b> 114/5 <b>Sunday [2]</b> 30/10 130/18 <b>superb [4]</b> 7/11 90/4 175/19 175/23 <b>supplementary [1]</b> 2/4 <b>support [10]</b> 10/22 39/17 45/9 114/19 166/2 176/22 178/25 195/21 218/21 219/15 <b>supported [2]</b> 17/19 74/19 <b>supporter [2]</b> 122/6 216/2 <b>suppose [1]</b> 215/10 <b>suppress [8]</b> 4/5 144/2 144/10 145/21 206/12 218/11 218/13 218/16 <b>suppression [5]</b> 44/24 45/1 144/11 144/25 145/3 <b>sure [23]</b> 10/21 10/22 12/5 17/19 28/7 30/1 34/2 51/8 59/13 63/6 66/13 69/12 73/20 90/16 91/25 115/1 163/23 167/21 186/3 192/20 216/13 217/17 219/22 <b>surely [3]</b> 29/8 32/21 82/18 <b>surge [3]</b> 35/14 173/12 175/2 <b>surmised [1]</b> 168/23 <b>surprise [1]</b> 74/7 <b>surveillance [1]</b> 5/1 <b>survey [2]</b> 52/4 207/15 <b>survive [1]</b> 172/22 <b>survived [2]</b> 174/16 174/17 <b>suspect [1]</b> 138/14 <b>suspected [1]</b> 198/19 <b>sustainable [2]</b> 116/13 219/14 <b>sustained [6]</b> 21/5 29/16 49/1 92/14 109/18 121/21 <b>swathes [1]</b> 166/3 <b>sweeping [1]</b> 74/25 <b>switch [1]</b> 180/16 <b>switched [2]</b> 53/14 131/4 <b>symbolically [1]</b> 19/1 <b>symptomatic [9]</b> 42/24 48/15 48/20 49/22 50/15 58/5 69/22 108/3 190/8 <b>symptoms [11]</b> 45/25 47/3 47/9 50/14 50/16	54/13 57/25 59/25 70/8 72/14 189/23 <b>system [57]</b> 14/10 17/9 17/13 20/11 24/1 25/9 29/12 29/15 52/20 55/18 58/23 74/10 74/19 75/12 76/8 77/15 77/17 77/18 77/24 78/7 78/19 79/9 80/16 80/18 81/10 81/18 84/9 84/12 84/14 88/10 89/7 89/9 89/18 92/21 94/1 99/11 106/5 114/17 115/9 150/17 159/13 175/1 176/5 176/8 178/16 179/5 179/18 182/21 184/16 185/24 185/25 190/22 192/12 215/17 217/17 219/17 219/21 <b>systemic [1]</b> 178/9 <b>systemically [1]</b> 27/16 <b>systems [3]</b> 77/9 77/22 78/11
			<b>T</b>	
			<b>table [1]</b> 83/24 <b>tabletop [3]</b> 101/14 101/18 107/3 <b>tackling [1]</b> 39/23 <b>tactically [1]</b> 210/21 <b>take [42]</b> 3/10 4/16 11/12 17/8 40/15 40/15 51/14 62/19 64/18 80/19 81/2 82/21 85/14 103/13 112/2 112/4 122/4 122/24 127/3 130/14 132/9 136/12 149/9 154/5 154/15 167/20 169/17 178/19 183/20 192/18 192/21 194/15 195/17 202/16 202/17 203/25 206/8 208/4 212/20 214/2 220/12 221/1 <b>taken [27]</b> 11/5 11/19 15/18 18/19 24/9 24/15 24/19 25/13 25/14 64/12 81/22 128/25 144/16 144/21 158/24 161/3 161/12 163/25 164/2 165/18 167/23 168/1 168/3 173/22 184/16 196/9 197/25 <b>takes [1]</b> 191/6 <b>taking [8]</b> 31/8 50/4 98/20 106/25 186/8 202/23 203/4 214/18 <b>talking [4]</b> 65/12 65/13 126/16 214/8	

<b>T</b>	<b>testified [1]</b> 203/12	212/3	81/17 86/15 88/15	106/9 110/11 116/16
<b>Tam [3]</b> 5/2 196/12	<b>testimony [1]</b> 45/5	<b>that [1288]</b>	88/18 90/21 94/21	116/24 132/22 136/23
196/20	<b>testing [61]</b> 3/25 10/3	<b>that 50/50 [1]</b> 92/19	96/11 98/1 98/6 98/12	138/4 138/6 150/22
<b>target [4]</b> 153/4	13/11 13/12 13/13	<b>that's [87]</b> 1/23 2/18	98/14 99/17 99/17	150/24 151/4 151/9
186/1 187/5 194/9	36/22 40/13 42/13	6/10 9/4 9/8 9/14 14/2	101/4 102/17 103/22	151/17 151/19 152/4
<b>tarring [1]</b> 11/20	68/8 70/18 72/6 72/7	15/6 16/19 16/19	106/4 106/14 109/18	152/21 152/24 153/12
<b>task [5]</b> 20/25 41/18	72/14 73/8 74/2 96/4	18/11 18/12 23/17	110/19 121/6 122/4	153/17 153/24 154/4
111/25 169/11 215/24	106/5 115/9 150/11	38/7 38/24 38/24	122/21 127/4 128/2	154/6 155/22 162/14
<b>Taskforce [1]</b> 216/12	150/11 150/12 151/1	46/14 47/5 54/5 55/12	128/12 131/2 131/3	165/6 176/23 177/3
<b>team [7]</b> 31/15 90/9	151/5 151/6 151/12	60/7 63/7 63/9 64/2	131/10 132/8 135/17	177/17 179/8 179/9
90/15 90/21 136/13	151/24 152/2 152/3	66/1 67/23 68/8 68/21	136/1 136/14 137/13	187/5 201/9 202/12
212/8 215/19	152/8 152/9 153/1	71/2 73/6 75/14 77/16	138/3 139/22 142/2	202/15 206/1 211/3
<b>teamed [1]</b> 219/9	153/4 154/4 176/12	81/1 84/11 91/20	145/1 148/2 148/4	213/19
<b>teeth [1]</b> 106/24	176/23 176/24 178/14	92/20 94/15 94/16	148/17 149/1 150/2	<b>they [117]</b> 4/18 4/19
<b>tell [13]</b> 6/3 6/7 15/4	179/5 179/18 184/2	96/3 98/21 99/9 101/7	150/18 151/18 155/13	5/17 11/19 11/20
28/7 28/17 31/8 36/5	184/17 185/6 185/10	101/7 102/19 103/8	156/23 158/10 159/24	11/21 12/1 12/6 15/19
111/21 117/23 189/1	185/23 186/5 186/10	110/24 112/8 114/21	162/6 162/6 162/11	16/9 22/8 23/23 24/9
197/21 199/1 202/7	187/14 188/21 190/7	115/12 117/1 122/20	165/24 169/7 172/5	25/6 25/18 26/6 26/12
<b>telling [11]</b> 31/9 31/9	190/13 190/16 190/18	129/1 132/3 133/15	183/5 183/20 191/6	26/14 27/23 27/24
32/2 32/20 33/23 54/2	190/19 190/21 191/9	135/18 136/12 138/19	191/19 191/22 191/23	28/11 33/11 33/13
95/6 136/1 197/6	191/25 192/1 193/6	139/6 142/24 142/25	193/11 195/24 201/13	35/4 35/5 35/5 39/20
197/9 200/4	193/10 194/9 195/21	144/24 147/25 156/24	204/6 204/7 206/7	43/22 52/20 53/13
<b>ten [4]</b> 68/2 86/5 93/3	<b>tests [25]</b> 47/3 49/16	159/14 163/19 166/20	206/13 208/25 210/6	59/22 60/15 60/15
211/2	70/6 72/10 72/13	167/10 169/9 182/16	210/21 211/15 211/17	60/17 63/7 64/8 64/10
<b>ten days [1]</b> 86/5	72/18 152/3 179/13	185/7 189/20 190/5	212/7 214/13 216/12	66/19 67/3 67/3 67/9
<b>ten minutes [1]</b> 68/2	179/24 179/25 185/18	190/22 191/7 192/22	217/3 217/17 221/1	72/15 72/19 74/7 75/5
<b>tends [2]</b> 50/11 207/1	185/18 185/20 185/21	193/14 195/11 198/12	<b>theory [2]</b> 120/7	76/12 76/22 76/23
<b>tensions [1]</b> 84/12	186/22 189/11 189/14	199/1 199/24 205/5	217/2	84/2 87/4 87/8 87/9
<b>tenth [1]</b> 128/18	189/18 191/12 191/13	208/24 211/22 212/5	<b>therapeutics [1]</b>	87/22 88/17 88/18
<b>term [5]</b> 14/10 123/6	191/20 192/1 192/2	212/15 214/17 215/2	110/7	90/17 101/4 103/18
123/8 177/9 216/9	192/13 194/1	<b>their [21]</b> 24/17 26/3	<b>there [405]</b>	106/13 107/10 108/23
<b>terms [44]</b> 3/13 3/24	<b>text [1]</b> 21/21	26/3 28/2 38/22 43/21	<b>there's [31]</b> 20/23	108/24 110/13 110/16
4/1 4/7 4/12 7/7 10/7	<b>than [52]</b> 2/19 4/5	50/16 53/15 58/12	25/2 29/22 30/11	111/5 111/6 112/23
13/5 23/8 30/8 50/19	8/21 16/8 18/2 28/1	58/13 75/10 76/23	38/13 51/24 56/22	119/1 119/6 119/7
62/21 65/14 65/24	29/7 29/9 29/20 31/11	83/24 83/24 84/15	69/2 92/24 92/25	119/7 119/8 119/8
71/21 75/24 79/16	41/6 43/1 48/19 48/25	88/15 120/4 131/9	93/17 96/17 98/16	120/13 120/14 124/20
80/10 87/23 88/2	68/17 69/7 75/9 78/5	140/10 198/18 201/2	101/14 105/18 109/16	125/9 125/11 128/4
88/23 93/3 102/7	86/15 86/25 91/24	<b>them [38]</b> 5/15 9/11	110/25 111/1 116/21	136/12 138/2 138/8
114/12 114/19 118/13	97/23 97/23 97/25	10/14 19/16 34/1 57/3	124/10 131/23 137/23	141/18 143/5 147/3
130/3 142/12 147/10	123/21 128/14 128/18	74/22 74/23 76/4	138/1 163/16 165/19	151/22 156/8 160/4
147/14 154/17 156/4	129/10 130/1 137/9	76/14 81/2 81/4 106/4	179/6 179/23 181/8	162/7 163/18 166/17
167/24 173/9 181/15	138/12 138/13 139/24	110/15 110/23 119/3	197/1 212/10 214/20	167/3 169/1 169/21
181/19 183/19 193/20	139/25 145/17 153/9	119/14 120/12 123/21	<b>thereafter [7]</b> 36/23	177/3 177/3 177/4
195/20 206/25 209/21	154/5 155/4 158/14	143/5 151/10 151/23	151/13 159/23 183/20	177/4 178/17 178/19
209/23 209/24 215/7	161/1 174/21 177/5	153/19 153/20 153/21	187/15 188/13 205/23	178/25 186/3 188/13
<b>terrible [7]</b> 34/22	179/3 180/20 180/21	154/2 166/14 170/22	<b>therefore [20]</b> 9/16	188/20 190/3 195/17
99/4 101/25 107/9	180/23 180/24 181/17	176/21 176/22 178/19	17/12 25/20 40/8	196/17 196/18 198/16
138/21 161/16 162/17	190/25 198/7 215/3	181/23 190/7 192/10	45/25 58/17 62/2	201/20 203/11 205/24
<b>terribly [1]</b> 136/10	219/11	211/19 213/10 213/12	99/14 134/2 141/18	205/24 207/4 213/12
<b>terror [1]</b> 181/2	<b>thank [17]</b> 1/11 1/24	216/2	161/24 162/18 163/4	217/13 220/1
<b>terrorist [1]</b> 182/9	49/10 73/25 79/18	<b>themselves [1]</b>	163/20 174/20 174/23	<b>they'd [4]</b> 12/5 43/25
<b>test [33]</b> 4/25 17/18	108/1 110/1 113/1	162/25	187/18 194/18 215/23	153/15 176/21
29/11 37/1 46/1 49/14	115/14 134/15 142/10	<b>then [119]</b> 1/18 11/11	217/11	<b>they're [14]</b> 7/9 50/15
69/23 70/5 70/7 70/9	149/22 183/22 196/21	15/23 16/3 17/15	<b>Theresa [1]</b> 16/15	70/21 86/3 90/23
70/10 70/15 71/2 71/6	196/25 199/2 221/20	20/19 26/1 28/24	<b>Theresa May [1]</b>	106/10 116/4 138/2
71/12 72/3 72/8 72/9	<b>thank you [13]</b> 1/11	32/14 32/17 32/17	16/15	138/7 138/7 138/9
72/16 72/25 73/2 89/3	1/24 73/25 79/18	33/2 33/3 33/12 36/21	<b>these [62]</b> 5/16 8/16	186/3 194/15 214/16
89/4 114/17 150/17	110/1 113/1 115/14	37/2 40/1 43/20 44/5	8/19 8/24 9/19 11/14	<b>they've [1]</b> 50/16
153/4 175/20 176/17	134/15 142/10 149/22	48/17 49/5 49/5 49/18	16/4 18/4 21/10 23/24	<b>thing [20]</b> 20/7 20/8
183/23 188/18 191/16	183/22 196/21 199/2	50/16 51/11 52/3 52/8	25/17 39/25 61/2	20/9 25/3 51/24 73/6
191/16 192/10	<b>thankfully [5]</b> 20/19	61/14 62/19 64/11	68/17 68/19 68/25	77/3 78/7 105/18
<b>tested [5]</b> 69/23 71/6	103/7 103/9 166/11	66/9 66/12 66/22	75/18 80/21 81/9	114/22 115/4 131/1
189/2 189/9 209/6	211/19	72/16 74/24 78/11	81/11 85/25 103/3	153/5 165/21 166/20
	<b>thanks [2]</b> 20/19	78/25 79/7 79/9 79/10	104/2 104/8 104/25	166/22 206/9 215/25

<b>T</b>	178/19 178/21 188/17 195/17 197/14 198/16 198/24 208/6 209/6 217/9 221/17	<b>throwing [1]</b> 12/17 <b>thumb [1]</b> 167/2 <b>thumping [1]</b> 90/14 <b>Thursday [2]</b> 1/1 146/12 <b>Thursdays [1]</b> 208/6 <b>tier [3]</b> 215/18 215/22 219/19 <b>tiers [7]</b> 215/17 217/17 219/17 219/21 220/4 220/5 220/7 <b>tighter [1]</b> 210/15 <b>til [1]</b> 111/19 <b>till [1]</b> 26/22 <b>time [133]</b> 5/19 11/14 12/8 12/24 13/15 15/21 17/5 17/9 17/13 17/15 19/22 20/14 21/10 22/11 23/24 23/25 24/6 25/7 25/8 26/11 26/17 27/19 27/21 28/11 28/22 30/5 30/24 32/21 35/19 36/5 37/11 39/12 42/9 42/9 51/19 52/7 52/19 55/6 55/14 55/14 55/15 57/6 57/19 61/20 62/15 66/2 66/16 67/11 68/3 71/15 72/5 75/16 76/18 78/6 80/24 86/1 86/8 91/3 92/24 93/7 93/11 93/25 94/4 95/25 96/8 96/8 99/21 100/9 100/17 100/24 105/24 111/7 116/6 117/13 118/5 118/6 119/10 121/14 123/14 128/20 128/25 134/5 135/6 135/9 136/21 138/14 139/21 139/22 140/4 141/4 141/6 142/1 145/12 146/6 148/10 148/20 149/5 154/22 154/24 155/10 155/19 155/25 164/8 166/6 166/22 169/1 172/3 175/21 177/19 178/1 181/7 184/20 186/25 188/25 191/6 191/15 196/22 197/4 198/5 199/24 200/5 201/4 201/11 201/11 202/9 204/4 206/5 209/4 210/2 210/13 217/20 217/24 219/4 <b>times [10]</b> 15/17 68/17 80/13 101/2 101/3 104/2 148/15 171/9 179/25 206/13 <b>timing [6]</b> 29/25 33/7 155/6 156/1 158/6 158/7 <b>today [6]</b> 54/16	100/11 126/25 154/12 170/12 221/13 <b>today's [2]</b> 1/4 48/24 <b>together [17]</b> 2/15 2/22 4/25 33/17 50/10 55/2 67/5 84/14 105/12 106/13 106/13 120/1 123/25 130/16 149/16 203/8 203/11 <b>told [58]</b> 31/20 32/10 34/3 35/21 37/11 39/12 42/4 43/5 47/24 48/1 51/2 51/4 51/6 51/8 54/11 54/24 55/2 55/3 55/4 60/15 63/12 69/7 71/4 71/12 72/25 73/1 85/9 91/11 91/19 91/20 92/3 100/22 108/25 109/2 109/14 109/16 109/20 114/25 115/2 117/20 118/7 121/10 126/4 127/14 133/13 140/19 142/24 143/4 143/4 186/17 200/8 202/1 202/3 208/13 208/17 211/14 211/18 211/24 <b>tomorrow [2]</b> 221/15 221/20 <b>tone [1]</b> 204/21 <b>too [35]</b> 14/9 14/22 16/5 18/4 22/4 30/1 30/6 30/11 36/23 43/15 53/18 80/7 80/11 108/12 112/7 129/14 129/24 130/5 130/24 132/11 133/4 133/11 137/24 162/10 185/11 185/11 185/11 204/20 205/7 206/17 207/1 207/4 209/1 209/2 210/24 <b>took [42]</b> 1/20 5/14 10/4 16/1 17/9 17/13 18/25 26/5 64/3 81/2 86/16 93/20 93/25 93/25 118/17 126/15 131/24 136/9 146/14 148/4 149/5 152/4 152/5 152/8 152/13 152/15 152/23 153/1 153/7 161/21 162/4 166/20 174/2 174/13 185/23 198/6 198/8 201/13 211/5 211/21 215/19 215/21 <b>tool [1]</b> 5/11 <b>top [8]</b> 18/20 22/13 116/12 176/6 193/11 215/17 215/22 219/19 <b>topic [1]</b> 41/25 <b>total [1]</b> 180/21 <b>totally [2]</b> 169/11 183/3	<b>tougher [2]</b> 215/16 216/20 <b>towards [5]</b> 11/24 158/17 184/16 189/15 194/9 <b>Townsend [1]</b> 10/19 <b>toxic [8]</b> 9/13 9/18 12/9 12/16 27/25 44/2 75/8 76/15 <b>toxicity [1]</b> 81/24 <b>trace [7]</b> 29/11 89/3 89/4 114/17 130/13 150/17 153/4 <b>tracing [18]</b> 17/20 70/17 72/18 88/24 121/11 150/19 150/20 151/1 151/13 151/16 151/25 153/5 153/6 153/8 153/11 176/5 176/8 179/16 <b>trade [3]</b> 84/13 169/25 213/2 <b>trade-offs [1]</b> 84/13 <b>trail [1]</b> 116/22 <b>trained [3]</b> 166/12 176/6 213/10 <b>trajectory [4]</b> 155/4 157/20 161/18 161/19 <b>transcribed [1]</b> 46/24 <b>transfer [1]</b> 189/18 <b>transfers [1]</b> 189/19 <b>transfers/admissions [1]</b> 189/19 <b>translation [2]</b> 52/19 52/21 <b>transmissibility [5]</b> 50/13 50/17 97/13 97/13 98/1 <b>transmission [78]</b> 21/4 29/16 44/13 45/17 45/18 45/19 46/7 46/13 47/6 47/14 47/19 48/2 49/1 49/4 49/9 49/13 49/21 49/22 50/20 50/24 51/5 51/12 52/2 52/6 52/11 52/24 53/2 54/4 54/18 54/25 55/4 55/5 55/17 55/22 56/2 56/4 56/5 56/13 56/20 57/13 57/17 58/2 58/4 58/5 58/6 58/10 58/15 58/17 59/4 59/19 59/24 60/4 60/17 60/24 61/8 62/1 62/8 62/15 62/25 63/13 63/23 64/14 64/17 64/19 64/25 66/20 68/18 68/20 69/1 74/2 109/19 121/21 198/17 199/12 200/1 201/5 201/8 202/14 <b>transmit [4]</b> 45/24 48/12 48/16 54/15
----------	--	--	--	---

<b>T</b>	62/18 92/19 99/5 142/7 155/11 155/17	<b>uncoiled [4]</b> 144/12 145/5 145/17 145/19	<b>unhelpful [4]</b> 9/15 76/19 185/12 210/1	<b>up [93]</b> 5/11 7/5 10/4 10/12 10/13 11/4 11/4 11/9 11/12 13/2 14/17 15/8 15/25 16/2 17/9 18/16 19/4 19/8 19/18 20/8 27/2 28/22 29/11 32/4 33/13 34/25 35/7 36/7 36/22 37/9 42/2 43/20 43/22 60/5 64/18 69/3 75/5 77/7 78/2 88/16 89/17 92/1 95/25 96/3 106/4 108/21 114/5 114/14 117/3 118/4 126/20 127/2 130/22 131/6 136/2 141/20 146/18 150/11 151/4 153/2 155/9 156/22 157/2 160/1 162/9 162/12 162/13 163/12 167/12 171/2 172/8 173/20 174/13 174/21 178/13 178/17 180/11 184/2 185/5 188/10 194/2 203/13 204/5 211/19 212/17 212/17 214/25 215/13 215/19 217/12 219/9 219/21 219/21
<b>transmits [1]</b> 55/25	<b>twice [1]</b> 125/21	<b>uncomfortable [2]</b> 153/17 153/20	<b>unifying [1]</b> 22/10	<b>update [3]</b> 56/6 100/14 117/15
<b>transmitted [3]</b> 56/12 58/18 63/20	<b>two [41]</b> 3/24 10/16 20/23 29/22 39/18 47/23 55/2 56/7 82/19 83/20 86/1 93/3 93/17 94/24 97/1 108/23 130/13 133/25 140/3 142/21 143/5 148/17 153/13 156/11 157/4 162/1 162/23 166/9 167/1 167/9 169/5 177/11 194/3 197/13 200/17 200/18 201/9 202/15 216/23 217/1 217/2	<b>unconfirmed [1]</b> 68/22	<b>united [21]</b> 21/6 27/16 29/17 31/5 36/2 39/23 65/15 67/2 89/16 95/19 99/1 107/5 114/10 120/22 121/4 121/20 131/9 134/18 137/6 158/24 202/21	<b>updated [2]</b> 43/8 112/13
<b>transmorphed [1]</b> 130/5	<b>two days [1]</b> 47/23	<b>under [21]</b> 3/8 4/21 7/8 7/9 13/14 16/12 16/13 16/14 16/15 19/14 21/12 21/17 21/19 28/9 108/2 115/8 125/4 134/24 162/22 206/9 217/18	<b>United Kingdom [13]</b> 21/6 29/17 31/5 36/2 39/23 65/15 89/16 95/19 99/1 107/5 121/20 134/18 137/6	<b>upfront [1]</b> 138/7
<b>trap [1]</b> 189/1	<b>two sentences [1]</b> 83/20	<b>under way [2]</b> 13/14 115/8	<b>United Kingdom's [1]</b> 114/10	<b>upon [10]</b> 3/4 62/20 69/6 85/12 157/19 161/2 173/3 184/10 188/7 188/18
<b>travel [4]</b> 88/1 164/25 167/13 167/14	<b>two weeks [7]</b> 130/13 133/25 148/17 156/11 162/23 217/1 217/2	<b>underpinned [1]</b> 52/9	<b>universe [1]</b> 198/24	<b>upset [1]</b> 186/9
<b>travelled [1]</b> 220/3	<b>two-week [1]</b> 162/1	<b>understand [24]</b> 23/22 25/5 30/13 42/14 46/23 47/25 49/3 55/3 56/24 58/7 95/15 110/9 113/15 121/23 122/10 128/23 155/22 182/3 182/5 184/3 184/18 184/19 193/6 195/23	<b>universities [1]</b> 17/19	<b>urgently [2]</b> 31/12 150/8
<b>travellers [2]</b> 70/18 89/5	<b>type [1]</b> 110/19	<b>understandably [3]</b> 58/11 69/5 90/15	<b>university [2]</b> 37/6 177/1	<b>us [21]</b> 6/3 10/16 11/13 28/17 39/5 45/12 54/2 55/9 60/21 100/22 111/2 119/11 139/1 147/18 153/20 156/24 162/19 170/1 197/21 206/12 206/22
<b>treasury [4]</b> 211/18 211/24 212/1 213/5	<b>UK [22]</b> 3/25 17/22 26/22 26/23 26/24 39/9 39/19 45/2 52/9 52/20 57/12 61/15 66/17 95/4 95/13 97/7 101/4 136/2 147/23 155/20 157/25 178/21	<b>understandable [3]</b> 53/15 59/10 134/6	<b>unknowable [2]</b> 161/19 163/1	<b>use [17]</b> 2/14 3/4 7/9 26/7 45/13 45/15 65/20 73/2 77/17 89/21 100/24 132/16 175/12 177/3 185/21 207/19 209/8
<b>treat [1]</b> 163/16	<b>UK's [1]</b> 5/3	<b>understanding [21]</b> 9/20 29/11 37/19 38/6 48/11 54/9 55/11 73/16 77/20 84/21 104/13 104/23 108/5 118/9 119/9 166/13 173/3 173/9 173/13 183/14 187/11	<b>unknown [5]</b> 28/4 37/15 60/2 60/9 60/10	<b>used [7]</b> 37/5 56/23 166/12 181/23 185/19 192/2 214/4
<b>treated [1]</b> 84/6	<b>UKHSA [4]</b> 175/17 178/8 180/20 181/6	<b>understandably [3]</b> 58/11 69/5 90/15	<b>unless [3]</b> 45/25 69/22 198/1	<b>useful [3]</b> 70/9 72/18 102/6
<b>treatment [4]</b> 104/11 163/14 163/19 173/24	<b>ultimate [3]</b> 159/11 160/25 165/15	<b>understands [1]</b> 163/22	<b>unlikely [8]</b> 47/8 47/8 48/11 49/6 56/11 59/6 72/11 99/16	<b>uses [1]</b> 172/2
<b>treatments [2]</b> 53/19 53/20	<b>ultimately [14]</b> 5/13 15/22 18/22 42/17 51/12 51/21 63/3 65/17 88/10 89/24 138/22 139/4 179/19 201/2	<b>understatement [1]</b> 41/15	<b>unmitigated [2]</b> 99/13 122/17	<b>using [6]</b> 2/20 77/5 153/8 156/9 195/5 197/14
<b>trends [1]</b> 167/14	<b>un [1]</b> 219/23	<b>understood [15]</b> 18/18 43/3 52/22 55/15 63/19 64/24 64/24 138/15 155/4 157/6 175/10 178/11 192/4 196/11 203/5	<b>unnecessarily [1]</b> 26/5	<b>usual [1]</b> 3/2
<b>tri [1]</b> 120/9	<b>unable [3]</b> 48/13 178/13 218/19	<b>undertaken [1]</b> 90/3	<b>unnecessary [2]</b> 113/21 144/23	
<b>triage [1]</b> 102/3	<b>unanimous [1]</b> 218/24	<b>undoubtedly [3]</b> 23/10 97/19 161/23	<b>unpalatable [1]</b> 200/19	
<b>trick [1]</b> 168/21	<b>unaware [1]</b> 82/9	<b>undue [1]</b> 210/5	<b>unpick [1]</b> 104/12	
<b>tried [16]</b> 12/21 15/16 15/21 16/5 77/17 79/13 84/10 85/15 92/20 184/19 192/18 195/2 195/4 195/13 217/13 220/15	<b>unbelievably [1]</b> 136/12	<b>unenthusiasm [1]</b> 176/11	<b>unpleasant [4]</b> 12/18 27/25 78/3 78/3	
<b>triggers [1]</b> 105/22	<b>unbroken [1]</b> 196/18	<b>uneven [1]</b> 191/6	<b>unpleasantness [1]</b> 13/3	
<b>Tropical [1]</b> 146/19	<b>uncertainty [12]</b> 24/11 25/7 26/21 53/8 57/19 61/17 61/18 67/13 67/19 104/2 128/20 154/25	<b>unfair [1]</b> 220/1	<b>unprecedented [6]</b> 9/2 82/15 89/11 132/23 136/24 165/18	
<b>trouble [1]</b> 205/15	<b>unfit [1]</b> 75/24	<b>unfit [1]</b> 75/24	<b>unprofessional [1]</b> 77/15	
<b>truck [1]</b> 148/10	<b>unfitness [1]</b> 81/23	<b>unfortunate [1]</b> 204/3	<b>unproven [2]</b> 67/14 69/15	
<b>true [15]</b> 3/20 39/11 40/22 56/8 75/3 76/13 156/3 163/2 166/18 173/14 191/4 191/7 194/16 198/8 202/5	<b>unfortunate [1]</b> 204/3	<b>unfortunately [5]</b> 13/2 77/9 78/19 99/4 194/7	<b>unsustainable [1]</b> 121/12	
<b>truth [4]</b> 76/2 194/21 201/24 220/3	<b>uncoil [1]</b> 145/24	<b>unhappy [1]</b> 19/5	<b>until [26]</b> 15/19 17/3 17/22 40/5 45/19 46/12 64/11 64/22 64/22 77/21 82/23 86/7 99/23 111/15 120/12 135/9 137/19 140/7 140/12 148/17 151/15 170/14 206/12 208/8 218/18 221/23	
<b>try [12]</b> 12/2 13/6 24/13 55/7 85/12 92/1 107/4 152/7 183/9 194/8 199/16 206/2		<b>unhealthy [3]</b> 12/9 12/16 79/24	<b>unusual [1]</b> 186/2	
<b>trying [25]</b> 4/5 10/11 15/7 15/8 24/6 27/2 27/13 28/4 28/10 31/3 59/9 75/13 82/21 117/1 135/14 136/4 147/14 151/4 151/5 185/10 193/20 195/15 196/9 199/1 200/12			<b>unwell [1]</b> 198/20	
<b>TTI [1]</b> 89/18				
<b>tube [1]</b> 167/14				
<b>Tuesdays [1]</b> 208/6				
<b>turn [1]</b> 109/4				
<b>turned [7]</b> 39/11				

<b>U</b>	107/4 108/2 118/2 119/19 119/19 125/11 125/15 125/16 126/18 127/1 127/3 128/21 130/13 136/17 136/17 136/24 138/20 142/3 144/8 145/9 146/5 146/5 146/7 146/14 148/5 148/5 148/11 148/13 152/10 153/21 155/21 161/8 161/21 163/24 164/21 165/13 166/2 167/10 167/16 167/23 168/2 168/7 169/13 176/1 177/1 177/17 177/17 177/17 177/21 180/1 181/25 182/24 182/25 184/1 184/12 185/1 185/1 188/24 190/5 190/17 193/23 196/25 199/3 200/17 200/22 201/3 201/3 201/5 201/22 202/4 202/8 203/8 203/11 206/7 207/20 209/15 209/19 213/16 214/25 215/20 221/12 221/20	<b>visitors [1]</b> 198/21 <b>vital [11]</b> 15/2 32/2 73/7 73/9 74/9 76/7 109/22 141/1 160/9 179/4 179/4 <b>vivid [1]</b> 200/22 <b>vividly [1]</b> 41/10 <b>voice [3]</b> 2/16 31/2 33/17 <b>voices [3]</b> 15/23 75/23 169/18 <b>volume [1]</b> 176/8 <b>volunteers [1]</b> 10/22 <b>voting [1]</b> 85/9 <b>vulnerabilities [1]</b> 188/1 <b>vulnerable [5]</b> 10/18 10/23 188/3 193/18 200/25	99/6 99/20 99/25 107/11 108/16 111/19 112/9 136/10 137/1 140/6 140/11 156/2 157/25 162/21 164/14 165/21 166/1 168/8 168/23 169/1 169/8 176/23 178/14 178/15 185/16 200/8 201/23 209/1 213/2 213/3 218/24 219/19 <b>wasting [1]</b> 93/10 <b>watch [1]</b> 23/20 <b>watching [3]</b> 28/22 30/24 158/8 <b>wave [8]</b> 26/15 128/19 144/10 144/11 159/17 210/8 214/12 218/8 <b>way [53]</b> 4/7 13/14 15/6 19/9 23/23 25/6 28/10 38/25 42/13 49/10 50/15 56/13 78/22 81/16 84/1 84/5 84/17 85/23 87/19 88/11 91/8 94/14 98/9 102/23 103/12 104/7 104/24 110/13 114/4 115/8 124/6 126/14 126/24 145/7 153/10 158/9 161/23 168/13 173/1 173/14 183/18 186/10 187/4 188/18 194/19 197/16 197/21 197/22 201/16 202/23 206/17 217/15 219/7 <b>ways [6]</b> 5/6 29/22 103/14 134/12 135/16 136/6 <b>we [490]</b> <b>we'd [21]</b> 4/3 22/23 32/10 40/18 41/13 51/14 95/23 128/6 128/9 128/10 142/5 148/20 153/5 162/5 162/12 173/21 195/25 196/2 196/2 206/15 221/14 <b>we'll [11]</b> 9/24 16/24 25/22 42/12 46/16 48/22 49/18 137/13 143/16 206/7 221/16 <b>we're [15]</b> 11/17 14/6 41/20 59/3 60/20 79/21 103/2 111/1 125/22 132/5 155/3 157/5 170/2 193/18 220/7 <b>we've [25]</b> 9/18 12/7 24/16 24/21 24/25 33/7 34/1 37/9 44/3 61/16 74/1 82/20 84/22 93/25 94/2 126/16 164/20 165/6	171/13 179/9 195/2 195/4 195/13 211/18 211/18 <b>web [1]</b> 8/3 <b>weddings [1]</b> 149/25 <b>Wednesdays [1]</b> 208/6 <b>week [12]</b> 22/23 41/8 42/1 70/5 86/5 101/19 162/1 164/9 164/21 193/13 213/6 213/7 <b>week's [1]</b> 164/21 <b>weekend [9]</b> 127/16 128/13 130/16 131/3 145/4 146/13 147/7 161/7 171/14 <b>weekly [1]</b> 120/9 <b>weeks [21]</b> 5/4 36/25 128/14 129/2 129/10 130/13 133/25 139/8 139/8 148/17 156/8 156/11 156/11 162/15 162/23 173/12 179/10 182/18 208/6 217/1 217/2 <b>weight [2]</b> 69/6 69/11 <b>well [123]</b> 3/15 3/18 4/8 4/14 4/16 7/9 8/16 8/19 10/19 11/17 11/25 13/4 16/21 17/16 18/7 18/24 20/5 20/21 22/13 24/16 24/20 25/21 27/18 27/20 28/8 29/22 30/12 30/22 31/4 31/13 36/17 36/25 38/4 40/10 41/15 45/6 51/13 60/6 63/18 63/25 65/9 67/16 70/16 71/12 73/18 74/4 74/10 74/17 75/2 75/5 76/8 76/8 76/11 77/3 77/13 78/4 78/18 83/18 84/8 86/3 89/16 90/5 90/14 95/16 97/17 97/20 103/11 108/5 110/15 113/8 113/14 117/23 125/10 127/3 130/24 131/18 133/1 133/20 135/12 136/11 137/6 137/11 137/15 138/23 144/25 145/10 152/17 157/5 161/18 163/21 165/25 167/24 174/4 174/10 175/11 177/18 181/20 184/23 186/13 186/17 186/18 188/8 188/9 197/20 197/24 199/3 203/8 203/8 203/11 205/24 207/6 207/9 208/17 209/10 210/5 213/14 214/4 215/5 215/14 217/22 218/24
<b>V</b>	107/4 108/2 118/2 119/19 119/19 125/11 125/15 125/16 126/18 127/1 127/3 128/21 130/13 136/17 136/17 136/24 138/20 142/3 144/8 145/9 146/5 146/5 146/7 146/14 148/5 148/5 148/11 148/13 152/10 153/21 155/21 161/8 161/21 163/24 164/21 165/13 166/2 167/10 167/16 167/23 168/2 168/7 169/13 176/1 177/1 177/17 177/17 177/17 177/21 180/1 181/25 182/24 182/25 184/1 184/12 185/1 185/1 188/24 190/5 190/17 193/23 196/25 199/3 200/17 200/22 201/3 201/3 201/5 201/22 202/4 202/8 203/8 203/11 206/7 207/20 209/15 209/19 213/16 214/25 215/20 221/12 221/20 <b>video [1]</b> 32/8 <b>view [37]</b> 11/3 30/2 39/2 53/1 58/12 66/6 66/9 77/2 81/22 86/8 95/22 99/25 103/7 103/11 103/23 106/7 106/10 108/21 109/12 122/25 125/24 126/4 131/11 142/3 154/17 155/24 162/4 169/10 172/25 176/1 176/25 196/14 208/14 208/19 214/18 217/20 219/4 <b>views [2]</b> 33/5 131/10 <b>vigorous [1]</b> 204/13 <b>viral [2]</b> 45/23 120/25 <b>virologically [3]</b> 50/6 67/21 123/14 <b>virulent [1]</b> 217/19 <b>virus [41]</b> 14/14 31/7 37/6 38/12 39/23 45/10 45/24 46/2 48/11 48/16 50/7 51/1 62/2 73/12 85/13 88/16 91/18 92/8 92/10 92/16 93/5 93/6 98/19 104/21 109/1 110/3 112/25 114/9 120/6 126/9 129/14 133/4 145/22 174/22 195/1 201/1 201/5 203/23 206/12 218/14 218/17 <b>visit [1]</b> 198/19 <b>visiting [1]</b> 198/18 <b>visitor [1]</b> 198/11	<b>wait [6]</b> 13/23 30/20 30/20 33/7 105/25 159/10 <b>waited [2]</b> 53/23 167/25 <b>waiting [1]</b> 158/17 <b>wake [3]</b> 10/12 15/8 92/1 <b>Wales [3]</b> 217/13 220/15 220/20 <b>wall [1]</b> 31/10 <b>want [27]</b> 2/7 24/16 26/8 28/7 28/7 28/9 38/6 75/9 85/5 94/14 125/17 126/24 130/23 140/16 147/25 151/2 154/7 160/7 160/18 161/15 168/5 178/20 179/22 190/6 205/15 211/8 212/9 <b>wanted [12]</b> 26/9 27/20 53/9 90/15 92/1 127/13 135/13 168/6 176/21 176/24 211/5 217/14 <b>wanting [1]</b> 26/4 <b>wants [1]</b> 95/15 <b>War [1]</b> 180/24 <b>warned [1]</b> 221/14 <b>Warner [1]</b> 146/25 <b>Warr [1]</b> 152/6 <b>was [955]</b> <b>was/is [1]</b> 48/13 <b>washing [2]</b> 22/8 37/25 <b>wasn't [59]</b> 4/17 6/15 11/14 12/7 12/8 20/4 20/8 37/10 37/10 38/16 43/11 43/13 44/19 57/7 62/23 64/17 65/5 66/16 69/3 74/8 75/2 75/6 79/14 84/8 90/6 92/14 95/22	99/6 99/20 99/25 107/11 108/16 111/19 112/9 136/10 137/1 140/6 140/11 156/2 157/25 162/21 164/14 165/21 166/1 168/8 168/23 169/1 169/8 176/23 178/14 178/15 185/16 200/8 201/23 209/1 213/2 213/3 218/24 219/19 <b>wasting [1]</b> 93/10 <b>watch [1]</b> 23/20 <b>watching [3]</b> 28/22 30/24 158/8 <b>wave [8]</b> 26/15 128/19 144/10 144/11 159/17 210/8 214/12 218/8 <b>way [53]</b> 4/7 13/14 15/6 19/9 23/23 25/6 28/10 38/25 42/13 49/10 50/15 56/13 78/22 81/16 84/1 84/5 84/17 85/23 87/19 88/11 91/8 94/14 98/9 102/23 103/12 104/7 104/24 110/13 114/4 115/8 124/6 126/14 126/24 145/7 153/10 158/9 161/23 168/13 173/1 173/14 183/18 186/10 187/4 188/18 194/19 197/16 197/21 197/22 201/16 202/23 206/17 217/15 219/7 <b>ways [6]</b> 5/6 29/22 103/14 134/12 135/16 136/6 <b>we [490]</b> <b>we'd [21]</b> 4/3 22/23 32/10 40/18 41/13 51/14 95/23 128/6 128/9 128/10 142/5 148/20 153/5 162/5 162/12 173/21 195/25 196/2 196/2 206/15 221/14 <b>we'll [11]</b> 9/24 16/24 25/22 42/12 46/16 48/22 49/18 137/13 143/16 206/7 221/16 <b>we're [15]</b> 11/17 14/6 41/20 59/3 60/20 79/21 103/2 111/1 125/22 132/5 155/3 157/5 170/2 193/18 220/7 <b>we've [25]</b> 9/18 12/7 24/16 24/21 24/25 33/7 34/1 37/9 44/3 61/16 74/1 82/20 84/22 93/25 94/2 126/16 164/20 165/6	171/13 179/9 195/2 195/4 195/13 211/18 211/18 <b>web [1]</b> 8/3 <b>weddings [1]</b> 149/25 <b>Wednesdays [1]</b> 208/6 <b>week [12]</b> 22/23 41/8 42/1 70/5 86/5 101/19 162/1 164/9 164/21 193/13 213/6 213/7 <b>week's [1]</b> 164/21 <b>weekend [9]</b> 127/16 128/13 130/16 131/3 145/4 146/13 147/7 161/7 171/14 <b>weekly [1]</b> 120/9 <b>weeks [21]</b> 5/4 36/25 128/14 129/2 129/10 130/13 133/25 139/8 139/8 148/17 156/8 156/11 156/11 162/15 162/23 173/12 179/10 182/18 208/6 217/1 217/2 <b>weight [2]</b> 69/6 69/11 <b>well [123]</b> 3/15 3/18 4/8 4/14 4/16 7/9 8/16 8/19 10/19 11/17 11/25 13/4 16/21 17/16 18/7 18/24 20/5 20/21 22/13 24/16 24/20 25/21 27/18 27/20 28/8 29/22 30/12 30/22 31/4 31/13 36/17 36/25 38/4 40/10 41/15 45/6 51/13 60/6 63/18 63/25 65/9 67/16 70/16 71/12 73/18 74/4 74/10 74/17 75/2 75/5 76/8 76/8 76/11 77/3 77/13 78/4 78/18 83/18 84/8 86/3 89/16 90/5 90/14 95/16 97/17 97/20 103/11 108/5 110/15 113/8 113/14 117/23 125/10 127/3 130/24 131/18 133/1 133/20 135/12 136/11 137/6 137/11 137/15 138/23 144/25 145/10 152/17 157/5 161/18 163/21 165/25 167/24 174/4 174/10 175/11 177/18 181/20 184/23 186/13 186/17 186/18 188/8 188/9 197/20 197/24 199/3 203/8 203/8 203/11 205/24 207/6 207/9 208/17 209/10 210/5 213/14 214/4 215/5 215/14 217/22 218/24

<b>W</b>	149/4 151/22 154/14 156/16 172/25 173/9 173/17 175/24 177/14 178/2 181/8 183/4 185/23 188/2 188/13 190/21 191/8 191/15 192/17 194/10 194/20 195/24 201/10 201/10 201/10 201/18 203/13 204/4 205/5 206/18 208/2 213/21 217/13 220/14	74/7 74/25 75/8 76/21 77/24 77/24 79/15 81/6 81/18 82/20 82/25 84/5 87/19 89/24 91/17 92/12 92/19 94/8 94/10 95/7 95/19 95/24 97/19 98/3 98/15 99/3 101/12 102/6 102/23 103/14 103/19 105/4 105/9 105/13 106/7 106/21 106/24 111/17 114/1 115/25 117/2 120/8 120/15 120/24 121/5 121/22 123/2 123/20 123/25 124/15 124/24 126/15 127/1 127/15 128/4 128/10 128/17 129/20 130/5 130/10 130/11 131/15 131/21 132/8 132/10 132/11 133/1 133/3 135/9 138/4 138/20 138/21 139/4 139/15 140/10 140/18 140/18 140/22 141/16 143/16 146/6 148/4 148/12 149/3 149/10 151/8 153/11 155/16 155/17 156/9 159/21 162/17 164/4 164/9 164/12 169/2 176/2 176/16 176/20 176/25 183/7 183/18 184/11 184/17 185/3 185/6 185/9 186/2 186/5 186/22 186/23 192/6 192/25 194/10 199/18 201/13 202/14 203/5 203/17 203/19 203/21 204/13 204/15 206/5 206/11 207/1 207/14 208/21 209/2 209/6 214/1 214/21 215/9 218/22	60/9 62/5 66/10 66/23 67/5 72/12 72/14 72/17 72/17 74/18 74/19 75/19 78/4 78/20 80/21 82/13 87/2 87/2 87/8 103/5 104/10 104/20 106/12 112/7 116/24 120/1 133/10 136/13 140/13 140/15 147/17 150/8 151/8 152/6 153/20 153/21 174/21 176/20 192/1 192/7 196/12 198/19 202/8 202/11 209/6 212/6 217/9 221/2	23/22 25/10 31/13 36/21 38/22 42/23 44/22 46/2 46/3 47/9 55/7 55/13 57/25 60/5 62/3 67/10 72/9 72/10 72/13 74/17 81/19 83/12 86/18 93/19 93/19 97/2 114/23 118/1 125/13 130/19 137/9 145/24 152/22 161/1 161/3 161/11 161/24 164/7 171/11 171/17 171/22 172/6 184/9 184/21 184/22 189/6 191/16 193/4 206/23 221/17
<b>well... [2]</b> 219/10 221/12	<b>where [40]</b> 8/5 12/10 12/22 13/10 19/7 25/11 27/6 33/13 41/24 48/8 50/5 53/6 53/20 59/6 59/16 72/17 74/20 83/23 84/14 96/3 128/17 130/22 154/16 156/4 157/19 158/11 158/12 159/17 162/14 171/14 194/5 200/21 200/23 210/6 215/25 216/18 216/21 217/19 219/18 221/9	<b>whoever [1]</b> 192/6	<b>Willett [1]</b> 108/10	
<b>well known [1]</b> 209/10	<b>whereas [2]</b> 83/22 176/6	<b>whole [37]</b> 16/23 16/23 18/11 19/10 21/14 21/15 23/1 26/20 28/8 32/4 33/12 40/11 40/20 40/24 46/1 77/3 78/3 78/7 92/20 102/24 117/6 127/19 130/20 131/1 132/16 132/17 133/7 136/22 142/22 158/16 159/24 182/21 183/5 204/1 210/20 212/10 220/24	<b>William [1]</b> 152/6	
<b>wellbeing [2]</b> 198/22 201/2	<b>whenever [1]</b> 19/16	<b>whole-society [2]</b> 132/17 133/7	<b>William Warr [1]</b> 152/6	
<b>Welsh [1]</b> 203/24	<b>whether [54]</b> 5/18 8/16 8/24 11/3 38/1 45/19 49/3 50/12 55/18 63/11 70/21 78/18 80/6 81/24 87/22 97/14 99/15 106/15 106/19 107/10 108/13 110/25 113/15 123/21 124/5 129/18 131/4 131/4 146/9 147/25 151/3 156/10 158/15 162/7 163/2 164/10 165/10 168/1 169/1 169/19 179/17 179/20 180/10 183/14 188/16 190/18 195/20 197/14 197/24 198/10 200/11 201/24 204/19 211/3	<b>wholly [4]</b> 22/21 99/14 99/15 99/18	<b>win [1]</b> 218/19	
<b>went [25]</b> 12/10 15/23 20/21 32/18 78/5 80/15 84/16 102/19 106/19 127/16 138/24 139/18 148/2 160/2 169/12 186/21 195/24 196/5 203/13 204/5 204/19 205/7 207/1 207/4 212/17	<b>while [1]</b> 94/8	<b>whom [3]</b> 52/14 75/19 220/11	<b>winning [1]</b> 28/23	
<b>we [331]</b>	<b>whilest [4]</b> 48/12 82/9 190/15 212/1	<b>whose [1]</b> 77/14	<b>winter [3]</b> 219/7 220/16 221/7	
<b>weren't [10]</b> 4/19 26/12 26/22 47/25 115/11 119/6 133/10 137/11 168/25 220/21	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>why [54]</b> 25/1 27/23 28/10 29/20 38/4 38/25 45/4 56/7 56/25 58/3 59/18 61/3 62/15 66/25 67/8 69/2 71/11 72/8 77/16 77/17 83/17 91/20 92/1 92/20 92/22 93/6 94/16 96/16 98/12 98/14 105/3 105/6 105/10 114/20 128/23 129/21 133/10 138/19 139/20 151/16 155/24 156/2 164/8 165/4 167/24 167/24 169/1 186/9 193/6 195/23 201/15 217/1 218/21 220/10	<b>wisdom [1]</b> 135/5	
<b>West Suffolk [1]</b> 1/15	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>wide [1]</b> 147/23	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whack [1]</b> 219/23	<b>who [72]</b> 6/15 10/19 10/23 17/19 23/4 23/12 24/2 24/3 24/5 24/15 32/14 35/21 39/8 41/17 45/21 45/22 45/22 46/1 47/20 47/22 50/13 51/25 52/15 58/14	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wish [8]</b> 30/3 45/12 59/7 59/10 83/18 137/4 183/25 189/7	
<b>what [275]</b>	<b>who's [3]</b> 34/6 83/9 107/22	<b>wider [7]</b> 3/17 14/10 78/5 93/16 116/17 120/17 129/25	<b>wisdom [1]</b> 135/5	
<b>what's [3]</b> 34/6 83/9 107/22	<b>which [190]</b> 2/3 2/10 4/1 4/7 4/23 8/11 10/9 10/13 12/1 18/25 21/21 23/6 24/18 24/25 27/5 29/25 30/5 33/2 34/9 34/10 36/3 36/21 38/9 42/17 42/22 44/14 45/4 45/8 45/12 47/18 51/5 51/25 52/4 52/16 53/6 53/12 55/6 55/9 56/23 57/2 57/8 57/12 60/8 60/23 61/22 62/17 65/7 65/15 66/16 68/16 69/8 70/1 71/18 71/20 71/24 73/21	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>Whately [2]</b> 141/2 142/2	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whatever [4]</b> 35/4 35/4 196/16 215/13	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>wider [7]</b> 3/17 14/10 78/5 93/16 116/17 120/17 129/25	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>WhatsApp [8]</b> 28/18 34/15 66/7 76/21 149/16 192/25 198/15 211/7	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>WhatsApped [2]</b> 34/19 186/12	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>WhatsAppes [7]</b> 2/16 33/18 45/8 70/13 145/7 184/6 203/10	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whatsoever [1]</b> 74/25	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whelmed [1]</b> 18/7	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>when [99]</b> 1/20 1/22 4/10 5/8 7/7 7/12 9/1 9/15 12/19 16/1 18/1 18/24 19/1 22/11 25/8 25/13 30/10 36/12 43/22 48/3 53/12 57/2 64/6 64/6 70/8 78/22 78/24 83/6 84/15 88/15 89/25 91/25 96/3 101/1 102/15 103/2 103/24 104/4 104/23 105/22 109/14 115/1 116/6 117/20 118/6 118/7 119/7 119/11 121/23 123/20 124/20 125/25 130/14 130/19 130/23 131/3 131/5 135/14 136/4 136/15 137/15 137/17 139/14 140/18 145/2	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whenever [1]</b> 19/16	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whether [54]</b> 5/18 8/16 8/24 11/3 38/1 45/19 49/3 50/12 55/18 63/11 70/21 78/18 80/6 81/24 87/22 97/14 99/15 106/15 106/19 107/10 108/13 110/25 113/15 123/21 124/5 129/18 131/4 131/4 146/9 147/25 151/3 156/10 158/15 162/7 163/2 164/10 165/10 168/1 169/1 169/19 179/17 179/20 180/10 183/14 188/16 190/18 195/20 197/14 197/24 198/10 200/11 201/24 204/19 211/3	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>where [40]</b> 8/5 12/10 12/22 13/10 19/7 25/11 27/6 33/13 41/24 48/8 50/5 53/6 53/20 59/6 59/16 72/17 74/20 83/23 84/14 96/3 128/17 130/22 154/16 156/4 157/19 158/11 158/12 159/17 162/14 171/14 194/5 200/21 200/23 210/6 215/25 216/18 216/21 217/19 219/18 221/9	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whereas [2]</b> 83/22 176/6	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>wherever [1]</b> 19/16	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whether [54]</b> 5/18 8/16 8/24 11/3 38/1 45/19 49/3 50/12 55/18 63/11 70/21 78/18 80/6 81/24 87/22 97/14 99/15 106/15 106/19 107/10 108/13 110/25 113/15 123/21 124/5 129/18 131/4 131/4 146/9 147/25 151/3 156/10 158/15 162/7 163/2 164/10 165/10 168/1 169/1 169/19 179/17 179/20 180/10 183/14 188/16 190/18 195/20 197/14 197/24 198/10 200/11 201/24 204/19 211/3	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>which [190]</b> 2/3 2/10 4/1 4/7 4/23 8/11 10/9 10/13 12/1 18/25 21/21 23/6 24/18 24/25 27/5 29/25 30/5 33/2 34/9 34/10 36/3 36/21 38/9 42/17 42/22 44/14 45/4 45/8 45/12 47/18 51/5 51/25 52/4 52/16 53/6 53/12 55/6 55/9 56/23 57/2 57/8 57/12 60/8 60/23 61/22 62/17 65/7 65/15 66/16 68/16 69/8 70/1 71/18 71/20 71/24 73/21	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>who [72]</b> 6/15 10/19 10/23 17/19 23/4 23/12 24/2 24/3 24/5 24/15 32/14 35/21 39/8 41/17 45/21 45/22 45/22 46/1 47/20 47/22 50/13 51/25 52/15 58/14	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whoever [1]</b> 192/6	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whole [37]</b> 16/23 16/23 18/11 19/10 21/14 21/15 23/1 26/20 28/8 32/4 33/12 40/11 40/20 40/24 46/1 77/3 78/3 78/7 92/20 102/24 117/6 127/19 130/20 131/1 132/16 132/17 133/7 136/22 142/22 158/16 159/24 182/21 183/5 204/1 210/20 212/10 220/24	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whole-society [2]</b> 132/17 133/7	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>wholly [4]</b> 22/21 99/14 99/15 99/18	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whom [3]</b> 52/14 75/19 220/11	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>whose [1]</b> 77/14	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>why [54]</b> 25/1 27/23 28/10 29/20 38/4 38/25 45/4 56/7 56/25 58/3 59/18 61/3 62/15 66/25 67/8 69/2 71/11 72/8 77/16 77/17 83/17 91/20 92/1 92/20 92/22 93/6 94/16 96/16 98/12 98/14 105/3 105/6 105/10 114/20 128/23 129/21 133/10 138/19 139/20 151/16 155/24 156/2 164/8 165/4 167/24 167/24 169/1 186/9 193/6 195/23 201/15 217/1 218/21 220/10	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>wider [7]</b> 3/17 14/10 78/5 93/16 116/17 120/17 129/25	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>widespread [1]</b> 110/3	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>will [56]</b> 2/8 5/20 5/21 13/8 13/23 20/15	<b>Whitehall [5]</b> 10/12 11/8 15/8 92/1 194/5	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19	<b>wisely [1]</b> 108/5	
<b>willett [1]</b> 108/10	<b>Whitty [17]</b> 23/15 47/5 59/21 67/5 89/15 95/5 99/10 117/14 118/15 118/19 131/8 147/20 150/7 173/2 203/12 206/4 210/12	<b>widely [3]</b> 30/13 64/24 88/19		

<b>W</b>	<b>worry [6]</b> 24/12 41/8 58/10 73/19 173/20 184/14	122/23 126/12 128/12 128/16 128/18 129/3 129/3 131/6 132/12 134/16 135/22 138/11 138/13 138/24 144/3 154/15 155/1 155/9 158/9 159/6 161/1 162/22 162/23 162/25 164/11 164/11 165/9 165/10 166/16 166/24 168/1 168/20 169/2 169/6 169/17 169/18 172/1 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/10 173/10 173/11 173/11 173/12 173/15 173/16 173/23 173/23 173/24 173/25 174/15 174/15 174/16 174/17 174/19 174/21 174/22 175/4 175/5 178/20 179/12 180/14 181/20 181/22 181/23 182/10 182/20 183/1 183/13 183/15 183/17 185/13 185/14 188/22 189/2 190/19 191/12 192/13 195/17 199/15 200/11 201/15 203/15 203/16 204/6 204/7 206/16 206/20 207/16 208/14 209/6 210/17 210/21 212/6 213/8 217/2 217/4 217/8 217/10 217/12 219/7 219/10 219/15 219/16 220/5 221/1 221/6 221/7	<b>Y</b>	80/13 82/6 82/19 88/3 88/7 88/13 88/25 89/8 90/12 90/25 91/3 91/15 92/11 92/15 92/19 94/16 95/10 95/12 95/14 96/20 101/11 105/2 107/14 109/9 109/24 110/8 112/17 112/21 113/25 114/3 117/8 120/23 121/1 121/13 123/23 124/9 125/9 126/2 126/10 129/15 130/24 132/13 132/19 133/6 133/8 133/12 133/14 133/16 133/19 133/22 133/24 134/5 134/9 134/20 135/3 139/9 139/11 140/1 141/3 141/9 141/13 142/15 142/17 142/20 142/23 142/25 145/2 145/16 146/16 147/8 148/25 149/22 150/10 158/19 165/14 165/16 168/12 168/15 170/3 172/19 173/5 173/7 175/3 175/8 175/18 180/2 181/14 181/16 181/18 182/22 182/22 183/21 183/24 186/18 188/4 190/4 190/9 190/14 191/15 192/17 192/24 196/21 196/25 197/2 197/4 198/5 199/6 199/10 200/2 202/25 203/3 203/6 205/7 205/9 205/11 205/14 205/17 205/19 205/21 207/13 207/20 207/20 208/23 211/13 211/18 211/20 211/23 211/25 215/5 218/12 218/15 218/20
<b>word [6]</b> 35/6 133/15 165/1 172/2 207/19 211/22	<b>worrying [1]</b> 205/6	122/23 126/12 128/12 128/16 128/18 129/3 129/3 131/6 132/12 134/16 135/22 138/11 138/13 138/24 144/3 154/15 155/1 155/9 158/9 159/6 161/1 162/22 162/23 162/25 164/11 164/11 165/9 165/10 166/16 166/24 168/1 168/20 169/2 169/6 169/17 169/18 172/1 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/10 173/10 173/11 173/11 173/12 173/15 173/16 173/23 173/23 173/24 173/25 174/15 174/15 174/16 174/17 174/19 174/21 174/22 175/4 175/5 178/20 179/12 180/14 181/20 181/22 181/23 182/10 182/20 183/1 183/13 183/15 183/17 185/13 185/14 188/22 189/2 190/19 191/12 192/13 195/17 199/15 200/11 201/15 203/15 203/16 204/6 204/7 206/16 206/20 207/16 208/14 209/6 210/17 210/21 212/6 213/8 217/2 217/4 217/8 217/10 217/12 219/7 219/10 219/15 219/16 220/5 221/1 221/6 221/7	<b>yeah [119]</b> 6/8 13/18 18/15 18/17 21/1 21/7 29/1 29/5 30/25 32/6 32/13 32/16 34/17 34/24 35/2 35/8 35/10 35/16 35/19 37/14 46/18 47/1 48/7 51/3 51/7 51/9 57/10 65/18 69/24 70/20 70/22 80/4 83/13 87/25 91/13 92/7 92/9 94/12 94/23 98/13 100/7 100/12 101/15 102/10 103/17 107/2 107/7 107/11 109/23 110/12 111/9 111/16 111/18 111/20 115/18 116/3 116/5 116/8 116/11 118/11 119/2 119/2 119/4 124/4 124/14 124/17 126/13 129/19 132/21 134/11 134/13 139/5 140/8 144/25 145/6 145/23 146/11 146/20 146/22 149/12 149/15 150/6 150/14 150/21 150/23 157/7 159/3 159/7 160/19 161/14 164/23 165/2 165/12 171/21 182/19 184/22 187/17 189/17 189/24 192/9 193/3 193/8 193/21 199/8 199/13 199/17 199/21 199/23 204/17 208/20 215/3 216/5 216/8 216/11 216/17 217/25 218/2 218/4 218/7	80/13 82/6 82/19 88/3 88/7 88/13 88/25 89/8 90/12 90/25 91/3 91/15 92/11 92/15 92/19 94/16 95/10 95/12 95/14 96/20 101/11 105/2 107/14 109/9 109/24 110/8 112/17 112/21 113/25 114/3 117/8 120/23 121/1 121/13 123/23 124/9 125/9 126/2 126/10 129/15 130/24 132/13 132/19 133/6 133/8 133/12 133/14 133/16 133/19 133/22 133/24 134/5 134/9 134/20 135/3 139/9 139/11 140/1 141/3 141/9 141/13 142/15 142/17 142/20 142/23 142/25 145/2 145/16 146/16 147/8 148/25 149/22 150/10 158/19 165/14 165/16 168/12 168/15 170/3 172/19 173/5 173/7 175/3 175/8 175/18 180/2 181/14 181/16 181/18 182/22 182/22 183/21 183/24 186/18 188/4 190/4 190/9 190/14 191/15 192/17 192/24 196/21 196/25 197/2 197/4 198/5 199/6 199/10 200/2 202/25 203/3 203/6 205/7 205/9 205/11 205/14 205/17 205/19 205/21 207/13 207/20 207/20 208/23 211/13 211/18 211/20 211/23 211/25 215/5 218/12 218/15 218/20
<b>words [22]</b> 2/15 3/5 7/9 7/10 27/10 45/13 45/15 61/10 73/2 86/3 89/21 90/24 121/23 137/10 139/3 163/25 195/5 195/17 196/12 197/15 214/16 220/12	<b>worse [4]</b> 12/11 163/6 163/6 163/17	122/23 126/12 128/12 128/16 128/18 129/3 129/3 131/6 132/12 134/16 135/22 138/11 138/13 138/24 144/3 154/15 155/1 155/9 158/9 159/6 161/1 162/22 162/23 162/25 164/11 164/11 165/9 165/10 166/16 166/24 168/1 168/20 169/2 169/6 169/17 169/18 172/1 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/10 173/10 173/11 173/11 173/12 173/15 173/16 173/23 173/23 173/24 173/25 174/15 174/15 174/16 174/17 174/19 174/21 174/22 175/4 175/5 178/20 179/12 180/14 181/20 181/22 181/23 182/10 182/20 183/1 183/13 183/15 183/17 185/13 185/14 188/22 189/2 190/19 191/12 192/13 195/17 199/15 200/11 201/15 203/15 203/16 204/6 204/7 206/16 206/20 207/16 208/14 209/6 210/17 210/21 212/6 213/8 217/2 217/4 217/8 217/10 217/12 219/7 219/10 219/15 219/16 220/5 221/1 221/6 221/7	18/15 18/17 21/1 21/7 29/1 29/5 30/25 32/6 32/13 32/16 34/17 34/24 35/2 35/8 35/10 35/16 35/19 37/14 46/18 47/1 48/7 51/3 51/7 51/9 57/10 65/18 69/24 70/20 70/22 80/4 83/13 87/25 91/13 92/7 92/9 94/12 94/23 98/13 100/7 100/12 101/15 102/10 103/17 107/2 107/7 107/11 109/23 110/12 111/9 111/16 111/18 111/20 115/18 116/3 116/5 116/8 116/11 118/11 119/2 119/2 119/4 124/4 124/14 124/17 126/13 129/19 132/21 134/11 134/13 139/5 140/8 144/25 145/6 145/23 146/11 146/20 146/22 149/12 149/15 150/6 150/14 150/21 150/23 157/7 159/3 159/7 160/19 161/14 164/23 165/2 165/12 171/21 182/19 184/22 187/17 189/17 189/24 192/9 193/3 193/8 193/21 199/8 199/13 199/17 199/21 199/23 204/17 208/20 215/3 216/5 216/8 216/11 216/17 217/25 218/2 218/4 218/7	90/12 90/25 91/3 91/15 92/11 92/15 92/19 94/16 95/10 95/12 95/14 96/20 101/11 105/2 107/14 109/9 109/24 110/8 112/17 112/21 113/25 114/3 117/8 120/23 121/1 121/13 123/23 124/9 125/9 126/2 126/10 129/15 130/24 132/13 132/19 133/6 133/8 133/12 133/14 133/16 133/19 133/22 133/24 134/5 134/9 134/20 135/3 139/9 139/11 140/1 141/3 141/9 141/13 142/15 142/17 142/20 142/23 142/25 145/2 145/16 146/16 147/8 148/25 149/22 150/10 158/19 165/14 165/16 168/12 168/15 170/3 172/19 173/5 173/7 175/3 175/8 175/18 180/2 181/14 181/16 181/18 182/22 182/22 183/21 183/24 186/18 188/4 190/4 190/9 190/14 191/15 192/17 192/24 196/21 196/25 197/2 197/4 198/5 199/6 199/10 200/2 202/25 203/3 203/6 205/7 205/9 205/11 205/14 205/17 205/19 205/21 207/13 207/20 207/20 208/23 211/13 211/18 211/20 211/23 211/25 215/5 218/12 218/15 218/20
<b>work [71]</b> 5/15 5/16 11/1 13/21 13/25 16/22 20/1 20/12 20/14 20/20 20/20 42/11 45/20 46/2 47/3 51/14 69/23 71/7 71/12 72/3 72/13 72/19 73/3 73/6 75/7 75/8 77/16 91/14 91/17 92/5 92/6 101/5 102/11 103/14 111/2 111/23 112/5 112/13 113/8 114/7 115/8 116/15 121/19 122/8 122/14 122/23 123/17 123/21 123/23 123/23 124/17 124/22 124/23 124/23 124/25 130/15 134/23 148/18 149/25 164/6 165/11 167/15 168/22 170/20 175/21 185/20 186/23 219/17 219/18 220/15 221/1	<b>worst [49]</b> 29/2 41/9 41/13 63/22 93/4 93/8 93/13 93/19 93/23 95/24 96/2 96/12 96/22 97/4 97/8 98/11 98/14 98/17 98/23 98/24 99/6 99/8 99/9 99/11 99/12 100/1 107/23 108/1 108/2 126/20 128/7 144/6 156/22 161/20 162/9 162/13 162/14 162/17 163/7 166/15 166/21 167/21 168/3 168/6 169/14 171/25 173/18 173/21 183/5	122/23 126/12 128/12 128/16 128/18 129/3 129/3 131/6 132/12 134/16 135/22 138/11 138/13 138/24 144/3 154/15 155/1 155/9 158/9 159/6 161/1 162/22 162/23 162/25 164/11 164/11 165/9 165/10 166/16 166/24 168/1 168/20 169/2 169/6 169/17 169/18 172/1 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/10 173/10 173/11 173/11 173/12 173/15 173/16 173/23 173/23 173/24 173/25 174/15 174/15 174/16 174/17 174/19 174/21 174/22 175/4 175/5 178/20 179/12 180/14 181/20 181/22 181/23 182/10 182/20 183/1 183/13 183/15 183/17 185/13 185/14 188/22 189/2 190/19 191/12 192/13 195/17 199/15 200/11 201/15 203/15 203/16 204/6 204/7 206/16 206/20 207/16 208/14 209/6 210/17 210/21 212/6 213/8 217/2 217/4 217/8 217/10 217/12 219/7 219/10 219/15 219/16 220/5 221/1 221/6 221/7	145/6 145/23 146/11 146/20 146/22 149/12 149/15 150/6 150/14 150/21 150/23 157/7 159/3 159/7 160/19 161/14 164/23 165/2 165/12 171/21 182/19 184/22 187/17 189/17 189/24 192/9 193/3 193/8 193/21 199/8 199/13 199/17 199/21 199/23 204/17 208/20 215/3 216/5 216/8 216/11 216/17 217/25 218/2 218/4 218/7	90/12 90/25 91/3 91/15 92/11 92/15 92/19 94/16 95/10 95/12 95/14 96/20 101/11 105/2 107/14 109/9 109/24 110/8 112/17 112/21 113/25 114/3 117/8 120/23 121/1 121/13 123/23 124/9 125/9 126/2 126/10 129/15 130/24 132/13 132/19 133/6 133/8 133/12 133/14 133/16 133/19 133/22 133/24 134/5 134/9 134/20 135/3 139/9 139/11 140/1 141/3 141/9 141/13 142/15 142/17 142/20 142/23 142/25 145/2 145/16 146/16 147/8 148/25 149/22 150/10 158/19 165/14 165/16 168/12 168/15 170/3 172/19 173/5 173/7 175/3 175/8 175/18 180/2 181/14 181/16 181/18 182/22 182/22 183/21 183/24 186/18 188/4 190/4 190/9 190/14 191/15 192/17 192/24 196/21 196/25 197/2 197/4 198/5 199/6 199/10 200/2 202/25 203/3 203/6 205/7 205/9 205/11 205/14 205/17 205/19 205/21 207/13 207/20 207/20 208/23 211/13 211/18 211/20 211/23 211/25 215/5 218/12 218/15 218/20
<b>work [71]</b> 5/15 5/16 11/1 13/21 13/25 16/22 20/1 20/12 20/14 20/20 20/20 42/11 45/20 46/2 47/3 51/14 69/23 71/7 71/12 72/3 72/13 72/19 73/3 73/6 75/7 75/8 77/16 91/14 91/17 92/5 92/6 101/5 102/11 103/14 111/2 111/23 112/5 112/13 113/8 114/7 115/8 116/15 121/19 122/8 122/14 122/23 123/17 123/21 123/23 123/23 124/17 124/22 124/23 124/23 124/25 130/15 134/23 148/18 149/25 164/6 165/11 167/15 168/22 170/20 175/21 185/20 186/23 219/17 219/18 220/15 221/1	<b>worst-case [41]</b> 29/2 41/9 63/22 93/4 93/8 93/13 93/19 93/23 95/24 96/2 96/22 98/11 98/14 98/17 98/23 98/24 99/6 99/11 99/12 100/1 107/23 108/1 108/2 126/20 128/7 144/6 156/22 161/20 162/9 162/13 162/14 162/17 163/7 166/15 167/21 168/3 168/6 169/14 173/18 173/21 183/5	122/23 126/12 128/12 128/16 128/18 129/3 129/3 131/6 132/12 134/16 135/22 138/11 138/13 138/24 144/3 154/15 155/1 155/9 158/9 159/6 161/1 162/22 162/23 162/25 164/11 164/11 165/9 165/10 166/16 166/24 168/1 168/20 169/2 169/6 169/17 169/18 172/1 172/14 172/17 172/21 173/6 173/10 173/10 173/11 173/11 173/12 173/15 173/16 173/23 173/23 173/24 173/25 174/15 174/15 174/16 174/17 174/19 174/21 174/22 175/4 175/5 178/20 179/12 180/14 181/20 181/22 181/23 182/10 182/20 183/1 183/13 183/15 183/17 185/13 185/14 188/22 189/2 190/19 191/12 192/13 195/17 199/15 200/11 201/15 203/15 203/16 204/6 204/7 206/16 206/20 207/16 208/14 209/6 210/17 210/21 212/6 213/8 217/2 217/4 217/8 217/10 217/12 219/7 219/10 219/15 219/16 220/5 221/1 221/6 221/7	145/6 145/23 146/11 146/20 146/22 149/12 149/15 150/6 150/14 150/21 150/23 157/7 159/3 159/7 160/19 161/14 164/23 165/2 165/12 171/21 182/19 184/22 187/17 189/17 189/24 192/9 193/3 193/8 193/21 199/8 199/13 199/17 199/21 199/23 204/17 208/20 215/3 216/5 216/8 216/11 216/17 217/25 218/2 218/4 218/7	90/12 90/25 91/3 91/15 92/11 92/15 92/19 94/16 95/10 95/12 95/14 96/20 101/11 105/2 107/14 109/9 109/24 110/8 112/17 112/21 113/25 114/3 117/8 120/23 121/1 121/13 123/23 124/9 125/9 126/2 126/10 129/15 130/24 132/13 132/19 133/6 133/8 133/12 133/14 133/16 133/19 133/22 133/24 134/5 134/9 134/20 135/3 139/9 139/11 140/1 141/3 141/9 141/13 142/15 142/17 142/20 142/23 142/25 145/2 145/16 146/16 147/8 148/25 149/22 150/10 158/19 165/14 165/16 168/12 168/15 170/3 172/19 173/5 173/7 175/3 175/8 175/18 180/2 181/14 181/16 181/18 182/22 182/22 183/21 183/24 186/18 188/4 190/4 190/9 190/14 191/15 192/17 192/24 196/21 196/25 197/2 197/4 198/5 199/6 199/10 200/2 202/25 203/3 203/6 205/7 205/9 205/11 205/14 205/17 205/1

<p><b>Y</b></p> <p><b>you'd... [7]</b> 129/23 138/14 150/15 168/1 179/22 186/19 221/9</p> <p><b>you'll [13]</b> 12/19 41/11 86/11 91/6 137/8 140/23 147/16 152/3 152/12 152/15 188/9 216/12 216/13</p> <p><b>you're [16]</b> 5/23 11/23 13/4 14/25 16/24 23/3 30/23 37/12 45/23 103/20 115/19 116/21 133/25 135/14 136/4 164/16</p> <p><b>you've [62]</b> 9/9 9/13 9/19 13/11 13/11 13/12 15/14 17/1 17/1 17/7 20/24 25/11 25/16 26/20 27/4 28/12 28/14 29/10 39/20 40/21 52/11 57/21 66/25 68/6 82/12 91/1 100/22 109/10 111/7 118/4 125/20 128/5 128/11 130/10 131/22 133/20 134/12 135/9 138/16 139/2 140/24 143/23 144/5 145/14 153/25 154/13 154/19 157/4 158/6 163/24 165/19 167/19 173/1 173/17 180/10 182/4 183/11 187/21 190/17 208/17 214/23 221/12</p> <p><b>your [183]</b> 1/13 2/10 2/14 2/24 3/4 3/7 5/25 6/9 6/10 7/9 8/21 10/10 11/19 11/20 11/22 13/5 13/7 20/1 21/9 22/18 23/7 23/8 23/11 27/3 27/9 28/14 31/1 31/8 31/25 32/9 33/15 35/9 35/11 36/9 37/8 37/19 37/20 37/20 37/20 38/6 38/13 38/19 38/25 40/6 40/8 42/3 42/14 43/3 43/4 46/5 46/14 46/16 46/17 47/16 47/21 47/24 48/21 51/24 54/8 54/11 54/22 54/22 56/18 57/9 57/22 61/24 62/6 65/3 67/6 73/2 74/11 76/6 81/20 81/22 82/13 83/10 84/21 84/24 85/8 85/11 85/14 86/3 86/19 86/22 87/10 87/14 87/16 88/9 88/9 88/22 90/7 90/8 90/9 90/19</p>	<p>90/20 90/21 90/23 91/10 92/22 94/13 100/23 101/12 106/17 108/14 108/19 108/25 109/3 113/9 113/21 114/6 114/7 114/13 115/12 120/13 121/9 123/12 126/3 126/6 126/7 129/16 129/20 129/25 132/16 133/9 133/15 139/3 139/7 141/5 141/6 147/5 150/3 154/16 154/19 159/5 160/15 163/25 164/15 165/13 171/16 174/15 176/14 182/4 182/13 185/4 185/7 187/18 190/20 192/6 193/22 197/3 197/9 197/11 197/13 197/17 199/7 202/19 204/18 205/7 205/22 206/25 207/2 207/17 207/19 208/2 208/14 208/24 209/10 211/22 212/2 213/18 213/24 214/4 214/6 214/16 214/23 215/2 215/5 215/8 215/15 217/23 218/21 220/11 221/17</p> <p><b>yourself [7]</b> 4/10 21/22 27/4 100/19 122/18 138/16 158/16</p>			
--	--	--	--	--