

Wednesday, 22 November 2023

(9.30 am)

**PROFESSOR SIR CHRIS WHITTY (continued)**

**Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued)**

**LADY HALLETT:** Yes, Mr Keith.

**MR KEITH:** Good morning, Professor.

**A.** Good morning.

**Q.** I want to pick the chronological spread up, please, at the beginning of March, 2020.

Evidence has been given to the Inquiry that Professor Ferguson emailed an adviser in Number 10, Ben Warner, on 10 March, attaching a paper from Imperial College London entitled "Timing and triggering of non-pharmaceutical interventions", and he was extremely keen that the Prime Minister should see and understand the material which he had attached to his email. In the course of evidence to this Inquiry, he confirmed that he wouldn't have sent that email and the material had he been satisfied that his views were being properly reflected in the communications between SAGE and the government.

So may I just ask you: were you aware that Professor Ferguson had been in direct contact with Number 10?

**A.** I subsequently became aware Professor Ferguson was, and

1

procedural impropriety of what he did, it's because in that email and indeed in some emails that you wouldn't have seen because they were emails between Professors Ferguson and Edmunds and Farrar on 12 March, the following day.

A very high degree of alarm was expressed in their internal emails, and in fact in Professor Ferguson's email to Ben Warner, about the need for further action, for more urgent action. You may have seen the documents disclosed to you, but in those emails they talk about whether they're happy with the pace of actions and the changes that are being proposed on 12 March. You'll recall that there were measures imposed on 12 March:

"We need much more stringent control measures if we want to slow it down, not necessarily now but then very soon. There is an obsession with not getting an autumn/winter epidemic later this year. This is the tail wagging the dog."

Now, you weren't privy to those emails, but I want to ask you, are you content that the degree of alarm or concern being expressed by those members of SAGE, or in part members of SAGE, and these scientists who were advising was being properly communicated through to Downing Street? Was that level of concern or alarm known?

3

I think Professor Ferguson -- quite a lot of scientists felt that their view should be given directly to the Prime Minister, not all of them on SAGE. Professor Ferguson was particularly insistent on this on several occasions. To be honest, I thought it was a sensible document he sent, I didn't have any concerns about that, although I did think it was personally sensible to try to do it via kind of mediated route to avoid essentially a random selection of eminent scientists such as Professor Ferguson sending their views, in my view potentially in a confusing way, into 10 Downing Street.

Notably, he didn't copy Sir Patrick or me in on that email, which I think possibly would have been wise, even if he wanted to do it. But I don't think there was anything wrong with what he said, this is largely a "how do we make this a manageable process" point. And I think actually my view was that Sir Patrick in particular had relayed the views of Professor Ferguson fairly accurately actually -- well, not just fairly accurately, accurately -- to Number 10, but nevertheless I'm just sort of saying I think we have to be a bit careful how information flows in and out of 10 Downing Street.

**Q.** Quite so, and my question wasn't directed at the

2

**A.** Yes, and I think, shorn of the sometimes more hyperbolic language, the general points that were being made we would completely have agreed with and did communicate. And I think, in a sense, the demonstration of that, to some extent, is that for -- you know, the emails say, and I'm doing this from memory, "we need to be acting very soon", soon or very soon, I think those are the words being quoted, four days later the Prime Minister said everyone should stay at home.

**Q.** Indeed.

**A.** So I think that communication was occurring and there was inevitably a process of sort of negotiation about how this is going to be interpreted within Downing Street, but I think (a) they were correct to be concerned, so I completely agree with their concern, and (b) there was action subsequently by the government.

**Q.** Indeed. It may be thought, though, that by virtue of the fact that Professor Ferguson thought it necessary to communicate directly with Number 10, and the way in which these concerns were expressly internally, that there was a body of opinion within SAGE and externally who were concerned that the government bluntly just didn't get it. But you're content, are you, that it did?

**A.** I think it depends how you define the words "get it".

4

1 I think I'm content that the government was in receipt  
2 of the information from SAGE and the fact that people on  
3 SAGE felt urgency was needed. And this escalated and  
4 you can see this in the SAGE minutes. So, in fact this  
5 escalates further beyond the 12th.

6 Did I think that all parts of the Downing Street  
7 machinery equally were seized of the urgency of it?  
8 I was not. But in a sense the job of Sir Patrick and  
9 me, amongst others, but also perfectly reasonably  
10 Dr Warner, Mr Cummings and others, was to try to ensure  
11 that people in the centre did understand the urgency of  
12 action.

13 Because I think, and this goes back to the  
14 discussion we had yesterday, and I think this is quite  
15 a key point, the numbers we're talking about on the face  
16 of it at this point that were actually being reported  
17 were small. So if I can look, this is the 14th,  
18 I think, we're talking about, of March; is that correct?

19 **Q.** The email's -- the internal email is the 12th --

20 **A.** Yes, so at this point 590 cases have been reported and  
21 10 deaths. Of course we knew subsequently that they  
22 were higher than that.

23 What I think people were really not able to  
24 conceptualise was how exponential growth would turn from  
25 those apparently smaller numbers, still each one

5

1 really not getting what exponential growth was actually  
2 going to mean.

3 **Q.** They did of course subsequently fully understand?

4 **A.** Yeah.

5 **Q.** Can I now turn, please, to the issue of herd immunity.

6 **A.** Yeah.

7 **Q.** It is, you've described in your statement, technically  
8 possible for an infection to travel through a population  
9 naturally until such a point that population immunity is  
10 achieved, enough people get infected that the virus  
11 stops. And that's population or herd immunity.

12 There has been a very extensive debate, as you are  
13 very well aware, about whether or not herd immunity was  
14 ever a goal of government or an aim, as opposed to being  
15 a byproduct of any system of control or countermeasures  
16 being applied, that doesn't drive the system and the  
17 country down to zero Covid. Of course it's going to  
18 spread in some shape or form.

19 To get some idea of the scale, what percentage of  
20 the population, as it transpired, was infected by Covid,  
21 the coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, by June 2020? Just so we  
22 can get a feel for how extensive the prevalence was and  
23 the infections --

24 **A.** By June 20 -- well, I'd need -- I do have those data but  
25 I don't have them --

7

1 a tragedy but smaller numbers, to really very large  
2 numbers in an extremely short period of time because of  
3 the doubling time. And I think this is -- this bit,  
4 I think, is a period where getting that through,  
5 I think, was not always straightforward.

6 **Q.** Can you elaborate, please, Professor, on which parts of  
7 the system, in your view, might not have, to use that  
8 phrase, got it? You said obviously your task was to  
9 make sure they did understand, that was one of your  
10 primary functions, but there were plainly difficulties  
11 in getting the message across and on it being received  
12 in a proper manner. Which parts of the system did you  
13 sense were -- just simply didn't --

14 **A.** I --

15 **Q.** -- appreciate the emergency, the immediacy of the  
16 problem and the exponential growth?

17 **A.** I think actually it was a relatively widespread lack of  
18 understanding of where we were going to head. I think  
19 the people who had been heavily involved in looking at  
20 this, and, you know, certainly Mr Cummings would be one  
21 but there were many others, I think had realised by now  
22 that this was heading in a very difficult direction.  
23 But I don't think everybody in the building did.

24 So this was not an individual, and this again is  
25 a point I make repeatedly, this was a lot of people

6

1 **Q.** Very roughly.

2 **A.** Very roughly -- well, you know, let me go back a step,  
3 because I think, in a sense, I'm cautious even of the  
4 possibility that herd immunity was achievable at all, as  
5 ordinarily understood, and I think that's a caveat.

6 Let us make an assumption that at the extreme  
7 example, where Covid infection provided lifelong  
8 immunity completely, so you get an infection, you will  
9 never get another infection, even -- you would then need  
10 to, with the force of transmission we had, achieve --  
11 for the sake of argument around 80% of the population  
12 would have had to have become infected. With all the  
13 attendant risks. That's the key point which many of the  
14 people who didn't understand this did not get.

15 At the end of June, after an appalling first wave in  
16 which many people died, from memory I think less than  
17 20% of the population had been infected. I wouldn't  
18 want to be held to that number --

19 **Q.** No, no, just a broad figure.

20 **A.** Well, well short of what you'd have needed, even had  
21 herd immunity been a possibility. But, as I said in my  
22 witness statement, I spent much of my professional  
23 career dealing with infections for which herd immunity  
24 is never achieved, herd immunity as normally understood.  
25 So essentially -- so that's the first point.

8

1 The second point is herd immunity was used in two  
2 completely different ways, the term was, and this caused  
3 confusion to those who were confused by herd immunity,  
4 which in my view was a lot of people. Some people were  
5 meaning the herd immunity threshold, this is the point  
6 you're talking about, the point at which, for practical  
7 purposes, further waves are unlikely, which is very  
8 high. The modellers were using it in the sense of  
9 gradually increasing levels of immunity, meaning that  
10 the effective force of transmission gradually decreases  
11 but not to the point where there's no waves.

12 And I think there was muddle up between those two  
13 completely different uses of the term and frankly, and  
14 I touched on this yesterday, there was a large amount of  
15 chatter about this by people who had, at best, half  
16 understood the issue. So I think it became very  
17 confused. And, as you will have seen from my  
18 correspondence, my only contribution on this, really up  
19 to the point of about 20 March, was to say to people,  
20 "This is very complicated, please don't talk about it",  
21 not because I wanted to hide it but because I thought  
22 that a very uninformed discussion was forming that was  
23 not helping policymaking.

24 **Q.** Is that a reference in fact to WhatsApps that you sent  
25 to and from the Secretary of State and others in

9

1 herd immunity or population immunity. We're putting  
2 aside completely the question of vaccines.

3 So, as you described, you need to get to a very high  
4 level for this ever to work, if it can be ever said to  
5 work at all. What problems, generically, may be  
6 encountered if you were, for argument's sake, to seek to  
7 pursue such a policy? Is that significant part of the  
8 population which becomes open to infection, does it  
9 still remain at risk from obviously hospitalisation or  
10 death in terms of the impact of the infection?

11 **A.** Well, I mean, the first thing just to -- you say setting  
12 aside vaccines -- the one situation, in my view -- and  
13 I've said this before this pandemic and, you know, it's  
14 a fairly widespread view by those who understand  
15 herd immunity -- that you would ever aim to achieve  
16 herd immunity is by vaccination. That is the only  
17 situation that is a rational policy response. It  
18 just --

19 **Q.** I'm not asking --

20 **A.** Yeah, I just wanted to make that clear.

21 There are -- you know, the first question is: can  
22 you achieve it at all? And we had no idea whether, even  
23 in a theoretical situation, the population would by  
24 natural infection even get to the herd immunity  
25 threshold. First point. But much more importantly in

11

1 a CSA-CMO-PM group --

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** -- where you cautioned against the direction that the  
4 public debate about herd immunity has taken, and you  
5 tried to put it in its proper context?

6 **A.** Well, my view was it was a clearly ridiculous goal of  
7 policy and a very dangerous one, and I thought a lot of  
8 what was being said could have led to considerable  
9 confusion. And indeed did. And I think, you know, I've  
10 laid out several times in public and I did in my  
11 statement my view that it would have been inconceivable  
12 that this should have been an actual goal of policy  
13 because it would have led to extraordinarily high loss  
14 of life if -- you know, even if it had been achieved,  
15 which in reality it would probably not have been in the  
16 ordinary sense.

17 **Q.** Nevertheless, the phrase "herd immunity" was of course  
18 used by Sir Patrick publicly but by members of  
19 government, by some ministers and officials and  
20 advisers. Could you just explain further, please, what,  
21 if I may call it this, what the problems are with  
22 herd immunity? You explain in your statement that the  
23 more transmissible an infection is, the higher the  
24 proportion of the population needs to be in order for  
25 the population to become immune through this

10

1 the short term, essentially what you're saying if you go  
2 up to that threshold, which for the sake of argument  
3 is 80% of the population, were that to be the case, all  
4 of those people carry all of the risks of an infection.

5 And --

6 **Q.** Meaning?

7 **A.** Meaning overall 1% but in people who have got higher  
8 risks (older citizens, people with disabilities, people  
9 with immunosuppression and so on) very significant risks  
10 of mortality. So the impact of that on mortality would  
11 be very severe.

12 And I laid this out in a paper around the 21st,  
13 I think, of March to Number 10 and various other people,  
14 because I wanted them to understand this point, which  
15 I thought had become extremely muddled in the public  
16 debate. This will lead -- the only situation where that  
17 wasn't going to be the case was if there was a huge  
18 amount of asymptomatic transmission we were not  
19 detecting. In all other circumstances we would have  
20 been in a situation where very large loss of life would  
21 have occurred --

22 **Q.** Right.

23 **A.** -- had that been attempted.

24 **Q.** So for that part of the population which is unable to be  
25 shielded or cocooned or segmented, however you describe

12

1 it, it remains at risk of hospitalisation, of death, and  
2 therefore it just doesn't work, because they're already  
3 and they remain --

4 **A.** Exactly.

5 **Q.** -- open to infection.

6 Secondly, in practice, is it possible to  
7 hermetically seal particular segments of the population  
8 in order that they may not be open to infection under  
9 such a policy, were it to be pursued?

10 **A.** So I think that we'll come -- you may want to come back  
11 to the system we call shielding, but I always thought it  
12 was wholly impractical, for multiple reasons, to try to  
13 achieve that.

14 **Q.** Right.

15 **A.** And the two -- there are two in particular. The first  
16 one is in a sense theoretical. Let's say theoretically  
17 you could achieve a complete barrier between the virus  
18 and those people -- and my view was that was never going  
19 to be achievable, we'll come back to that -- these  
20 people would have to be in isolation for incredibly long  
21 periods of time, and that doesn't matter whether that's  
22 the Great Barrington Declaration kind of model or the  
23 model that was proposed by Professor Woolhouse or  
24 whatever, this is long periods of isolation for people  
25 who are very vulnerable, often in later stages of their

13

1 against severe disease. So even were people who  
2 otherwise are not vulnerable to disease to catch  
3 disease, their immune system will stop them getting to  
4 the point of intensive care or potentially dying.

5 That's different from herd immunity, that's to do  
6 with individual protection against severe disease. So  
7 that's -- in a sense they are not different sorts of  
8 immunity, although there is a large amount of technical  
9 issues around that, but the fact is you can get  
10 a disease a second time much less severely than the  
11 first time, that still means you catch it and still  
12 means you can transmit it -- with many infections; Covid  
13 is just one of them.

14 **Q.** Now, you've referred to the Great Barrington  
15 Declaration, which is a proposition, if you like,  
16 arguing for focused protection, a degree of segmentation  
17 or shielding which allows infection otherwise to spread  
18 through lower risk parts of the population. So in your  
19 view is that a variant, if you like, on a herd immunity  
20 goal?

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** Scientifically and ethically does it follow from what  
23 you've said that you had very great doubts about the  
24 wisdom of such an approach or such a declaration?

25 **A.** Yes, I thought it was flawed at multiple levels,

15

1 life. So there were practical reasons.

2 And then I could not see a situation where something  
3 which was so transmissible from people who were at least  
4 presymptomatic -- asymptomatic as we subsequently became  
5 confident -- would not eventually catch it anyway. So  
6 the idea you could somehow provide this barrier struck  
7 me as wholly impractical for those reasons as well.

8 So I just thought, you know, the various attempts on  
9 this were theoretically perfectly -- you know, you could  
10 debate them, but they were clearly not going to work and  
11 they were clearly going to lead to significant loss of  
12 life in my view. So that was why I was extremely  
13 cautious of them.

14 **Q.** Is there another issue in relation to the notion or the  
15 assumption that those people who, through population  
16 immunity become infected -- through this herd immunity  
17 process become infected, may not actually remain or  
18 become immune thereafter, there is a risk that they may  
19 in fact become reinfected at a later stage, so it simply  
20 wouldn't work?

21 **A.** Exactly. As indeed happened with Covid. And I think  
22 there is a big difference, and we are in a sense -- the  
23 fact that all of us are able to have this meeting here  
24 in an open room is because most people are protected,  
25 firstly by vaccination but they are also protected

14

1 I thought it made an assumption of full immunity that  
2 would be lifelong, which they didn't state, but it was  
3 an assumption which I thought was extremely unclear, and  
4 indeed proved to be incorrect.

5 As demonstrated -- as you just said, I considered  
6 the idea you could properly shield all the right people,  
7 or identify all the right people -- and just to take the  
8 case of Mr Johnson, the Prime Minister, he would not  
9 have been someone, I think, who would have been  
10 considered -- someone you would put in this group. He  
11 got very severe Covid. He is an example of the kind of  
12 person who you would not have been able to identify.  
13 Those you correctly identified you wouldn't have been  
14 able to shield. And the result of this would have been  
15 you would have had long periods of isolation at the end  
16 of which people would still have got Covid anyway.

17 So the idea that this was a sensible proposition  
18 struck me as zero actually.

19 **Q.** The Inquiry has seen, nevertheless, multiple references  
20 to herd immunity, of course, in emails, in WhatsApps, in  
21 SAGE minutes, and really across the board, and publicly  
22 the idea did take hold or the understanding did take  
23 hold to the effect that the government was pursuing to  
24 greater or lesser extent a policy of herd immunity. How  
25 did that come about then in light of what are very plain

16

1 concerns that you've expressed about the wisdom or  
2 validity of any such approach? How did this happen?  
3 **A.** Well, I can answer half of that, I think.  
4 I mean, there's no doubt that, rightly, the  
5 modellers and others were looking at this in their  
6 models to work out what would happen over time as people  
7 got infected. That's a perfectly appropriate thing to  
8 do. It was not to do with threshold of herd immunity,  
9 this was to do with the gradual accretion of population  
10 immunity whenever there is going to be transmission.

11 **Q.** Working out what was likely to happen --

12 **A.** Yeah, that was working out -- that was simply  
13 a calculation question, they were using it in that  
14 sense. And my view is "herd immunity" is the wrong term  
15 to use for that because it has -- for most people's  
16 understanding, it means the herd immunity threshold  
17 after vaccination, which is exactly how I think it was  
18 interpreted by others.

19 So I think that debate was a perfectly proper  
20 intellectual exercise that modellers in particular were  
21 undertaking, and I don't think there's any reason to  
22 doubt that.

23 Then I think there were some people who ran with  
24 this but I thought in a rather confused way, in trying  
25 to explain what would happen over time as waves of

17

1 **A.** Well, you are right that -- well, firstly, it's quite  
2 rare that I actually say of a group of distinguished  
3 other academics, "I utterly disagree with what you're  
4 saying". This is one of those few occasions. I think  
5 they were just wrong, straightforwardly.

6 The second thing is that you are right that if we --  
7 if this had been posited as "We know the vaccine is just  
8 around the corner, we've seen some vaccines that work,  
9 we've got six months", you could make the argument, but  
10 in that case why not wait to do it with the vaccine  
11 anyway? Because you've got a way of achieving  
12 herd immunity safely, relatively, relative to new  
13 infection -- big caveat -- a vaccine. Vaccine would  
14 achieve this without having to go through any of these  
15 processes. But that wasn't actually what they were  
16 suggesting, they were suggesting this in a sense absent  
17 of vaccine. They weren't suggesting you had to wait for  
18 a vaccine as part of their approach.

19 So I just thought it had a very large number of  
20 problems with it, and I thought it was one of the few  
21 areas where I thought it was sensible to knock it really  
22 hard out of the court rather than say, "This is  
23 an interesting point, let's debate it".

24 **MR KEITH:** Can I bring you back to my earlier question,  
25 please, Professor, which was this: it's obvious that

19

1 infection went through. My view was that wasn't  
2 a helpful conversation, which is what I was trying to  
3 say to people. And then there undoubtedly were some  
4 people who were seriously thinking, without having  
5 thought it through -- I don't think -- if they had  
6 thought it through I don't think they would have  
7 thought -- but I do think there were some people who  
8 were genuinely thinking, "Well, you know, this will go  
9 through and then it will be passed and it will be fine,  
10 in a short period". And I think that -- you know, those  
11 are different areas.

12 In general, my view is debating science in public is  
13 exactly the right thing to do. This is an area where  
14 I think it got extremely confused and I don't think  
15 helped the debate, because it was not based, in my view,  
16 on a proper understanding of the issues concerned.

17 **LADY HALLETT:** Sir Chris, I'm sorry to interrupt. Can  
18 I just go back to the Great Barrington Declaration?

19 In your opinion, that approach was flawed, but there  
20 were other experts who thought that it was the right way  
21 to go. Would the policy that those who signed the  
22 declaration promoted, would that not have bought some  
23 time, say, for example, for the development of  
24 vaccination? Would it necessarily have had to have been  
25 the long-term isolation that you talked about?

18

1 there were advisers in Number 10 and government  
2 ministers and officials and members of the press and  
3 large swathes of the public who understood that the  
4 government was pursuing a deliberate policy of  
5 herd immunity. On that premise, you may or may not  
6 disagree, but on that premise, how did they come to  
7 understand or to hold that belief?

8 Ministers and advisers and commentators were all  
9 talking about herd immunity and therefore it may  
10 reasonably have been assumed that that was a policy of  
11 government. Were you able to stop what was a canard  
12 being pursued in this way? I mean, was it open to you  
13 to try to stop this debate and to make plain that any  
14 idea that the government was deliberately pursuing  
15 a herd immunity was just wrong?

16 **A.** Yes, I tried to do three things, but I -- this is one of  
17 those debates I, as you probably will have worked out  
18 from the various in -- in sort of things you've seen,  
19 I tried to largely stay out of, but I wanted to do three  
20 things.

21 Firstly, for the small number of people who actually  
22 thought this was a good idea initially, entirely based  
23 on the fact they hadn't understood it, I tried to make  
24 sure they did understand it and to realise that the  
25 implications of this were not what they thought it was.

20

1 Secondly, I tried to encourage people not to try to  
2 discuss what I thought was a very complex issue, because  
3 immunity is -- we've just scratched on the surface.  
4 Actually we could have had an hour and a half on this  
5 and we'd still be going on how immunity and -- how it  
6 accrues. It's a very complex area of policy. So  
7 I tried to discourage this.

8 And thirdly, whenever asked, I stated, because it  
9 was true, that this was never a policy of government.

10 And, you know, all the things that SAGE was  
11 recommending, which were about reducing R below 1, which  
12 I was talking about all the way through February, are by  
13 definition completely incompatible with a policy of  
14 trying to achieve herd immunity, which in any case is  
15 the wrong policy.

16 **Q.** Yes.

17 **A.** Our aim was to get R below 1, and therefore to reduce  
18 the number of people infected, rightly. That was the  
19 correct policy response. And by definition that's going  
20 the opposite way to achieving herd immunity. So, in  
21 a sense, our policy was the exact opposite of one of  
22 trying to encourage infection which I thought was  
23 a foolish approach to take.

24 **Q.** In a general sense, the government failed collectively  
25 to understand what you were saying, and for a number

21

1 it was the use of those sorts of phrases and words that  
2 led to this understanding that it was a goal. Is that  
3 the nub of it?

4 **A.** Yeah, I mean, I think that -- the passive "it would  
5 become established" (misunderstanding of the science but  
6 in good faith) is quite different from actively trying  
7 to achieve it as a policy goal.

8 So I don't think -- even those anonymous briefings  
9 I don't think were saying the aim of it was going to  
10 happen, but it was essentially a mashed up understanding  
11 of some papers based on modelling which were not  
12 achieving -- aiming for this as a goal at all.

13 And I think, you know, if we were to go back in  
14 terms of our communication errors along the way, and  
15 there were a lot, this is firmly one of the ones where  
16 I think we didn't help the public by having a debate  
17 that, quite rightly, upset and confused a lot of people.

18 **Q.** Can we now look at behavioural fatigue. You may take  
19 the view that that's another area in which there was  
20 a communication difficulty or infelicity.

21 The material shows very plainly that there were  
22 debates within government, we've seen a witness  
23 statement from Mr Johnson in which he describes how he  
24 was told by you that there were limits to human  
25 patience, to the willingness of the population to do as

23

1 of weeks, in fact, it did in various different ways, and  
2 again this is not a personal issue, it did in various  
3 different ways promote and was seen to promote  
4 herd immunity as a goal, and that was an error?

5 **A.** I think -- well, I don't think anybody -- I never saw  
6 anybody on the record or anybody sensible aiming for it  
7 as a goal. I think some people tried to explain it as  
8 "this is what would happen over time". I think,  
9 frankly, unhelpfully. But -- and, you know, we'll talk  
10 about probably no doubt my own communication errors, and  
11 I definitely made communication errors through the  
12 pandemic, but my view was this was an area where the  
13 communications were a long way from helpful to the  
14 public, which is really what they should be about,  
15 because it gave an impression the government was  
16 pursuing a policy which it absolutely was not pursuing,  
17 and, reasonably, people were upset about that policy  
18 because it would have been the wrong policy, but it  
19 wasn't the policy.

20 **Q.** You've said you never saw anybody on the record or  
21 anybody sensible aiming for it as a goal. Can we just  
22 be quite clear about that. There were government  
23 ministers, unnamed individuals, who did openly say that  
24 they understood that herd immunity would become  
25 established, to use the words of the commentators, and

22

1 they were told, it's essential to get timing right.

2 There were press conferences, as you're very well aware,  
3 in which there were references to people becoming  
4 understandably fatigued.

5 The notion that people would become fatigued was not  
6 a surprising one, was it?

7 **A.** Yeah, so I think -- I mean, this is one where my  
8 communications were really poor, frankly, and I said in  
9 my statement this is probably my most prominent, at  
10 least in my view, communications error. So I think  
11 probably let's separate out three separate things.

12 The first one is: was there a lot of debate around  
13 whether over the period of the pandemic, that's  
14 an important point, people would become more and more --  
15 I'm going to use the word fatigued for the sake of  
16 argument, and it would become less easy for people to  
17 continue, less easy for people to support something.

18 And those debates were happening, there's no two  
19 ways about that. And there's a large academic  
20 literature on this, most of which is not in the UK. If  
21 you put in "pandemic fatigue" and "Covid" into Google  
22 Scholar or PubMed, you'll get large numbers of papers,  
23 you know, hundreds of papers, discussing it. Not  
24 discussing my views, discussing it in general. There  
25 was a WHO conference on pandemic fatigue in

24

1 October 2020. So this idea was in the general sphere --

2 **Q.** Milieu.

3 **A.** There was then a debate, rightly, in SAGE about this, in  
4 part triggered by me talking about it, foolishly, in  
5 press conferences in which -- I think it was around  
6 about 13 February from memory ...

7 **Q.** 9th and 12th.

8 **A.** Okay, 9th and 12th, apologies. And in that -- the end  
9 result of that was a statement by SAGE firmly that this  
10 should not be taken as a reason to delay an action.

11 And from that point onwards, not only did I not say  
12 anything more about it, because I was rightly told off  
13 by my behavioural science colleagues, because the way  
14 I'd phrased it, which is "behavioural fatigue", almost  
15 implied that it had come from them, which it absolutely  
16 had not, and I wanted -- I want to put on the record it  
17 definitely did not come from them.

18 And secondly they pointed out the fact that  
19 I'd explained it very poorly, which I had, and so  
20 I stopped, and I also steered other people away from  
21 doing so. So when other people said, "How shall we  
22 describe this thing?", I said "Don't, it's a bad idea,  
23 my fault this has entered parlance".

24 So, in a sense, the concept was not unreasonable,  
25 the debate was not unreasonable, but the discussion of

25

1 and muddling it up with those discussions was, in my  
2 view, unhelpful. So that was -- in a sense it was  
3 a double bad hit from that point of view.

4 **Q.** All right.

5 **A.** It was a useful thing, though, in my opinion, and I'm  
6 not sure my behavioural science colleagues would agree,  
7 to think about over the pandemic arc as a whole, which  
8 in my view was where we really had to be. And,  
9 you know, just numerically, if you look at subsequent  
10 lockdowns, for example, which were much more contested  
11 than the first one, they occurred at a much later stage,  
12 with many more deaths unfortunately, many more cases,  
13 than they did on the first one, because by this stage  
14 people's, in a sense, barrier to wanting to do this, at  
15 least politically, possibly, and personally, had moved  
16 on. And those countries that maintained a zero Covid  
17 approach by the end of their period I think found quite  
18 considerable difficulties in taking the population with  
19 them in some cases.

20 So I think, you know, if you view it over the  
21 pandemic as a whole, it's not an unreasonable thing to  
22 consider, but absolutely should not have been linked to,  
23 and I would completely accept this, the first decisions  
24 on exactly the timing of the first wave. And that's  
25 what SAGE said, and that was therefore the advice, very

27

1 it in public and linking it to the first lockdown were  
2 really unhelpful, and that's entirely on me on this one.

3 **Q.** And absolutely fairly, Professor, in your internal  
4 emails with the Secretary of State and other government  
5 ministers and advisers, you acknowledge it was a bad  
6 term and your fault to have used it. But I want to be  
7 absolutely plain where the choke point is in this. It  
8 wasn't the idea that people would become exhausted and  
9 fatigued by interventions, by countermeasures, and  
10 perhaps that would impact on compliance that was the  
11 problem, it was the notion that the fairly sensible,  
12 commonsensical point that they would become exhausted by  
13 countermeasures was thought to have its foundations in  
14 behavioural science or some sort of technical  
15 understanding --

16 **A.** Well, it was --

17 **Q.** -- that that was the problem?

18 **A.** Well, there were two problems, I think. There was that,  
19 which was my bad use of language entirely, but the other  
20 one was the, you know, there were very good reasons, as  
21 we discussed yesterday, why it was important not to  
22 start any activity before you needed to because of all  
23 the downsides that come from big social interventions,  
24 school and lockdown in particular.

25 This one was really irrelevant to those discussions

26

1 firmly, that Patrick Vallance and I gave subsequent to  
2 SAGE and it was in the minutes, it's reasonably clear on  
3 that, I think.

4 **Q.** Before turning to look at the first lockdown, which we  
5 need to do in some detail, I just want to raise a couple  
6 of other issues, and could I just invite you to try to  
7 give your answers as concisely as possible --

8 **A.** Apologies.

9 **Q.** No, no, there's no need to apologise, but we're very  
10 much constrained by time.

11 On 13 March there was a SAGE meeting.

12 INQ000109142.

13 At pages 2 to 3, SAGE says this:

14 "SAGE was unanimous ..."

15 If I can -- it may be over on page 3.

16 Yes, point 24, thank you:

17 "SAGE was unanimous that measures seeking to  
18 completely suppress spread of Covid-19 will cause  
19 a second peak. SAGE advises that it is a near certainty  
20 that countries such as China, where heavy suppression is  
21 underway, will experience a second peak once measures  
22 are relaxed."

23 Was that, in your understanding, a reference to the  
24 debate that we had yesterday about uncoiled spring?

25 **A.** Yes. And essentially what it's saying is if -- you can

28

1 choose to go for a complete suppression one, but if you  
 2 do so there will be an exit wave. That's not a --  
 3 that's an inevitability. And indeed, as I said,  
 4 countries which have gone down that route did have  
 5 an exit wave, fortunately after vaccination.

6 **Q.** SAGE was unanimous, do we take it therefore that that  
 7 was a view to which you ascribed?

8 **A.** I consider it a statement of fact.

9 **Q.** Indeed.

10 **A.** That doesn't mean it shouldn't be done, it's simply  
 11 a statement of epidemiological fact that that would  
 12 occur as a result, absent an incredibly effective  
 13 vaccine.

14 **Q.** And, of course, the consequence of that unanimous view,  
 15 Professor, was that SAGE was concerned that whatever  
 16 countermeasures might be proposed and implemented would  
 17 bring about the very thing which they were warning  
 18 against there, that's the nub of the debate or the  
 19 concern?

20 **A.** No, I would put it slightly differently, actually,  
 21 I would say that if policymakers wanted to go, and it  
 22 was a legitimate debate to have for policy leaders, for  
 23 a complete suppression approach, which would have meant  
 24 long periods of significantly more severe lockdowns than  
 25 we had, for -- because you have no immunity at all, then

29

1 countermeasures were going to be required, and of course  
 2 they were debated on the Monday and they were brought  
 3 into effect during the course of the week.

4 To what extent over that weekend, Professor, was it  
 5 appreciated that those countermeasures, the initial  
 6 countermeasures of that week, might not be enough and  
 7 that a lockdown, a mandatory stay-at-home order, would  
 8 have to be imposed? What was the degree, if any, of  
 9 inevitability?

10 **A.** Well, I think in a sense I take it -- I kind of take it  
 11 in stages, because if we go back to our ladder of  
 12 intervention in public health that I talked about  
 13 yesterday, clearly what the ideal would be is to get R  
 14 below 1 with the least disruptive combination of  
 15 measures that can be achieved.

16 So let's take that as kind of the framework. What  
 17 happened over this period was, in a sense, two separate  
 18 things which intersected. Firstly, a realisation that  
 19 we were a lot further along the path -- well,  
 20 significantly further along the path than we had thought  
 21 we were, meaning that a lot of thinking and a lot of  
 22 activity had to be accelerated that we'd thought could  
 23 have done later had to be brought forward in very short  
 24 order. And the second was a realisation that we were  
 25 really not going to get on top of this with anything

31

1 you had to accept that it wasn't you would just do that  
 2 and at the end of it there would be no Covid, you would  
 3 have to do that and at the end of it you would still  
 4 have to accept there would still be a wave.

5 Now, it might be wave much later down, when there  
 6 were medical countermeasures, there were large numbers  
 7 of legitimate arguments, but what you shouldn't do is go  
 8 into it as saying, "This is going to mean we will never  
 9 have any Covid at all". That was not a -- on the cards  
 10 epidemiologically, and I don't think anyone who  
 11 understands epidemics would dispute this statement as  
 12 a statement of fact.

13 **Q.** All right.

14 Now, during the weekend of 14 and 15 March, there  
 15 were, as you know, and you attended many of these  
 16 meetings, a number of meetings and a great deal of  
 17 debate within Number 10 as to whether or not the  
 18 countermeasures which had already been imposed, in fact  
 19 on 12 March, were going to be adequate, in light of the  
 20 understanding, the dawning realisation that we were  
 21 further ahead on the epidemiological trajectory than we  
 22 understood and that the consequences of that were going  
 23 to be very severe indeed.

24 In very broad terms, the Prime Minister and  
 25 officials and COBR and SAGE understood that further

30

1 other than quite a large number of measures.

2 Now, in theory, had the force of transmission been  
 3 somewhat lower, it might have been possible to get on  
 4 top of them, get R below 1 reliably, that's a key word,  
 5 "reliably", short of a full mandatory lockdown, in  
 6 theory. But once we got to above a certain point of  
 7 force of transmission, based on the modelling we had,  
 8 with all the caveats that go with that, it looked  
 9 extremely unlikely that we could reliably get to that  
 10 stage.

11 So I think, you know, we shouldn't see this as  
 12 a sort of yes/no on this. My view was that the measures  
 13 that were brought in on the 16th by the Prime Minister,  
 14 the stay-at-home orders and so on, were virtually  
 15 inevitable and had been, in my view, for some time, it  
 16 was a matter of when rather than whether. That was  
 17 a huge intellectual Rubicon in my view that the  
 18 government crossed at that stage, and I was very  
 19 relieved on the 16th when that occurred, actually.  
 20 As I say, we hadn't realised how close to that point we  
 21 were until very shortly before it. So that's that  
 22 correction.

23 **Q.** Can I just interrupt there to say, may we presume from  
 24 that that you were concerned that those 16 March  
 25 measures may not have been applied quite soon enough?

32



1 A. Oh no --

2 Q. You were obviously concerned --

3 A. So I think that there are two marginal areas where, in

4 this area, I would have a slight deviation from the

5 opinions of Sir Patrick. It's very slight, and it's

6 an opinion, not a ... thing.

7 I think it would have -- you know, if we were to run

8 this again, hopefully we, none of us, ever will, but in

9 theory I think we would have brought in the 16 March

10 measures several days earlier, not a long time earlier

11 but several days earlier. And personally I would have

12 added into those the measures on stopping hospitality,

13 because it seemed to me very strange that we had

14 a segment of the economy, a very important segment of

15 the economy under ordinary circumstances, whose

16 principal function is bringing together households,

17 that's its business model, at a time when not having

18 households together was a good idea.

19 So I think that -- you know, now we know what the

20 numbers are and now we know how it plays out, that's

21 what we would not do. I'm not sure it was obvious at the

22 time. I don't think -- you know, certainly prior to

23 the 12th I don't think many people were really saying

24 "This is the moment we have to do this", so the debate

25 is essentially over a four-day period at this stage,

33

1 debating this technically there was a hope that they

2 would work with some additions I've talked about on

3 hospitality, but no confidence that they would work, and

4 that was my position as well.

5 And, you know, had there been -- had this been

6 a very slow-moving epidemic, and some infections move

7 very slowly whilst still being very profound, HIV is

8 an example, we could have afforded potentially to wait

9 a few weeks and see what happened, but that clearly

10 wasn't the situation with this. And the problem was

11 between -- because it was doubling so fast, if you

12 waited the three weeks, probably, it would take to get

13 the information, you would be multiple doubling times

14 away from where you were then. So the word "reliably"

15 was very important.

16 Q. Do you say that there was, on the part of some or

17 a significant number of people who mattered, no

18 confidence that they would work, a desire to try this as

19 a suite of measures or as a measure because the

20 alternative was a terrible thing to countenance, to go

21 straight to, if it could practically be done, a full

22 mandatory stay-at-home lockdown, this had to be tried in

23 order to ensure that the next step perhaps might never

24 occur?

25 A. I think ... so this is the other bit where I think

35

1 but --

2 Q. All right.

3 A. -- looking where we were now --

4 Q. Can I pause you there because it is very important that

5 we understand the chronology.

6 So when those measures were imposed on 16 March

7 there was room for debate as to how early they could

8 have been imposed, there is some room for debate about

9 whether they should have been imposed earlier, a few

10 days earlier.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. You have used the word "reliable", there had to be

13 an assessment of how reliable those measures would be,

14 and obviously there was room for different views as to

15 what that reliability might be, what the compliance

16 would be, what the take-up would be in response.

17 Can I ask you, please, therefore: how confident --

18 what was the level of confidence in government that

19 those 16 March measures would work? Were they measures

20 that were very much a roll of the dice, "We had better

21 try this and we will see what happens", or "Are we

22 confident that this will work and there will be no need

23 for further more stringent countermeasures?" What was

24 the thinking?

25 A. Certainly I think that among the people who were

34

1 I slightly deviate from Sir Patrick again in a matter of

2 nuance, and this is entirely benefit of hindsight stuff,

3 this is absolutely not what we were debating at the

4 time. I don't think it's an absolute inevitability that

5 the introduction of the measures on the 16th plus issues

6 around hospitality in theory couldn't have actually held

7 the line, done at an early enough stage with a different

8 infection --

9 Q. Just pause there, "at an early enough stage", so had

10 they been introduced earlier the chance that they might

11 have worked goes up?

12 A. Goes up. Well, you see, the chance that you will know

13 whether they have worked or not, sufficiently, goes up.

14 But in practice this was moving at such a speed that

15 that possibility I think was essentially not there

16 anyway. And I don't think -- you know, that is -- this

17 is all with the benefit of hindsight stuff. I think

18 actually at the time I think these were shunted

19 together. So in practice I think Sir Patrick's

20 statement is, in fact, correct. I'm just saying, in

21 theory, you could separate out the decisions taken on

22 the 16th, which I consider, as I say -- if you think

23 where the philosophy -- and I don't think he'd disagree

24 with this -- the philosophy of the then Prime Minister

25 was, this change is almost antithetical to his whole

36

1 philosophy of life, was my view at the time, and yet he  
 2 still made it, because we could see we were really  
 3 staring into an incredibly difficult situation.

4 **Q.** And is this the position also, that plainly a government  
 5 can introduce countermeasures, but they have to have  
 6 practical effect and they have to be workable and they  
 7 have to make sense, in practical terms, there has to be  
 8 built in necessarily a period of delay while the  
 9 appropriate plans are put into place, for example  
 10 shielding, you can't just simply impose a shielding  
 11 system overnight, practical arrangements have to be  
 12 made, so any order for a countermeasure of that type to  
 13 be put into place has to take into account the need for  
 14 the necessary preparations?

15 **A.** Yes, and I think as -- I mean, there is that, there is  
 16 that, but I also think that between the 16th and  
 17 the 23rd, when the full lockdown came into place,  
 18 I think three separate things happened. The first and  
 19 the most important was that the realisation that we were  
 20 going to need to do more, or at least might well have to  
 21 do more and wouldn't have the time to find out,  
 22 accelerated. And we had, and I think one of the most  
 23 important things that -- we hadn't definitely come to  
 24 this realisation on -- certainly just before the 16th,  
 25 the closure of education, which was, for this kind of

37

1 they were going to do it but quite a lot of -- a much  
 2 higher proportion of people said they weren't confident  
 3 other people were going to do it. And that's a very  
 4 corrosive situation. So, slightly counterintuitively,  
 5 the advantage of a mandatory lockdown is it essentially  
 6 says, "everybody in society is going to do this, so if  
 7 you make a sacrifice, your family makes a sacrifice, so  
 8 is everybody else".

9 So I think it had that additional benefit, I think,  
 10 of making clear to people that this was across the  
 11 board. There weren't going to be anyone who anyone  
 12 could see as freeloaders. This was simply, "we, the  
 13 state, are going to reflect the wishes of we, society",  
 14 which is that everybody will do this to protect the most  
 15 vulnerable. And I think it really -- it was that  
 16 progression, I think, which got us to the position where  
 17 we finally ended up on the 23rd.

18 **Q.** All right.  
 19 It's a very lengthy answer, understandably, so it's  
 20 reflective of the thinking which was going on in the  
 21 course of that week.

22 I now want to come to the following weekend, so the  
 23 weekend of the 21st/22nd.

24 You prepared a report on 21 March titled  
 25 "Coronavirus summary of strategic and tactical approach

39

1 pandemic, going to have to be for a long period, if it  
 2 happened at all, we were hoping that it would be  
 3 possible to just about get away without doing that, and  
 4 it became clear that didn't look a safe decision.

5 I considered the decision to close education except  
 6 for key workers and vulnerable children to be a really  
 7 important step, which everybody saw was one we would try  
 8 to avoid under all circumstances.

9 Then I think the second thing is we became  
 10 uncertain -- we were uncertain and we didn't get any  
 11 certainty to counteract that, whether the over 75%  
 12 reduction in mixing of the population that the modelling  
 13 implied we would definitely need to get R below 1 was  
 14 going to be achieved by voluntary measures alone.

15 **Q.** Yes.

16 **A.** And then I think the third one, which I think is often  
 17 underestimated, is actually the British people, to my  
 18 and most people's absolute lack of surprise, responded  
 19 to this incredibly, and the voluntary measures were  
 20 actually very firmly adhered to, and if you look at the  
 21 approval of doing this in the general public at that  
 22 stage, YouGov polling and others, over 90% of the  
 23 population were in favour.

24 But interestingly, what the polling also  
 25 demonstrated was that the great majority of people said

38

1 to the epidemic", and I just, if you'll bear with me,  
 2 I wish to try to summarise as best I can what that  
 3 meant.

4 You set out in the report in very clear terms how  
 5 coronavirus was capable of causing significant  
 6 mortality: direct mortality from people dying from the  
 7 virus, deaths from the virus; indirect deaths or  
 8 indirect causes of mortality from the NHS emergency  
 9 services being overwhelmed; a third cause, postponement  
 10 of elective care and non-urgent medical treatments  
 11 causing indirectly further deaths; and you also point to  
 12 the very significant economic disadvantages and  
 13 disparities which meant that, over the long term, there  
 14 might be an increase in death from poor physical and  
 15 mental health outcomes.

16 In that report, you set out from a technical public  
 17 health angle how direct and indirect mortality needs to  
 18 be lessened. Obviously you are trying to reduce the  
 19 number of deaths overall, directly and indirectly.

20 That paper and its description of how the imperative  
 21 in public health terms was to reduce death was obviously  
 22 a major driver towards the final lockdown decision. You  
 23 wouldn't have prepared the report otherwise.

24 With that understanding, Professor, what weight in  
 25 the ultimate analysis, in the final decision-making, was

40

1 placed upon that report and your analysis in the  
2 decision to lock down, which of course comprised  
3 a myriad of different considerations, medical, public  
4 health, societal, economic and so on and so forth? Was  
5 your report and your call for death to be reduced the  
6 game-changer, if you like, on that Monday, on the Sunday  
7 night/Monday?

8 **A.** No, I mean, I don't think it was. And to be really  
9 clear, I mean, these were points which I, Sir Patrick  
10 and many others had been making before, this was not --

11 **Q.** You had, of course.

12 **A.** -- the first time.

13 The reason for doing the report -- I'm trying not to  
14 be hubristic about this -- the reason for doing the  
15 report was I thought that there were quite a lot of  
16 unjoined up, perfectly sensible tactical decisions which  
17 didn't really take an overall strategic approach to the  
18 epidemic as a whole, not just the next few days but  
19 actually over the course of the epidemic, and I wanted  
20 there to be a single document short enough for people in  
21 a hurry to read that actually laid out the strategy and  
22 then also the tactical pillars and then what were the  
23 operational implications.

24 So the reason for the report was a sort of pulling  
25 together of lots of strands that were already occurring

41

1 rather than to try to drive thinking around the  
2 immediate decision. That was actually my view about the  
3 report.

4 **Q.** Right.

5 **A.** Many other decision -- discussions were having, with all  
6 of the same kind of elements as the report, but which  
7 were really saying "We must do something and, based on  
8 the modelling, we're going to have to do it now and  
9 quite forcefully". That -- but in sense those are  
10 happening in parallel but they are all of a piece. But  
11 I wouldn't want --

12 **Q.** Were you -- I'm sorry. Were you contributing,  
13 therefore, on the Sunday and the Monday --

14 **A.** Yeah.

15 **Q.** -- to that debate directly by saying, "You've got to  
16 take the more stringent measures" --

17 **A.** Yeah, in a sense --

18 **Q.** -- "because of the death concerns"?

19 **A.** Yes, I mean, I think -- I was, many others were, and in  
20 a sense the contemporaneous record of my views is this  
21 report and SAGE minutes. Those are really the two  
22 things which record them.

23 **Q.** Right.

24 So now, with that in mind, Professor, to what extent  
25 was there a debate on the Sunday and the Monday about

43

1 in one place, and also it was clearly already essential,  
2 it became more essential over time actually, to make  
3 clear to some of the senior policymakers that this would  
4 come to an end, because the danger was they just saw  
5 this as, "This will be night without end, we will be in  
6 a lockdown forever and what are we going to do?" So we  
7 needed to see there was a beginning, a middle and an end  
8 and there was a logic to whatever was being done.

9 But the report itself was simply a distillation of  
10 lots of things that were already going on. So, in my  
11 view, it wasn't new knowledge, it was simply a bringing  
12 together --

13 **Q.** I do apologise. I must ask you please to focus on the  
14 question, which was being asked for a reason, which is:  
15 to what extent do you assess -- or what impact do you  
16 assess that report had on the ultimate decision-making?

17 This was a report about reducing mortality, it was  
18 a report which called upon the government to be aware  
19 that the number of deaths -- or what was potentially  
20 enormous was going to be enormous unless steps were  
21 taken and this was something the government had to  
22 address?

23 **A.** I --

24 **Q.** What was the impact?

25 **A.** So my view is the report was more for a long-term impact

42

1 what the level of indirect/direct mortality was likely  
2 to be in light of any further countermeasures, that is  
3 to say the mandatory stay-at-home order, the final step  
4 being imposed?

5 Or putting it another way, how clear was the  
6 government that there would be a significant difference  
7 in the number of deaths, directly or indirectly, if  
8 a mandatory stay-at-home order were not to be imposed.  
9 What understanding was there of the impact of this  
10 decision-making on the likely number of deaths? Because  
11 death, bluntly, was of course the main driver in public  
12 health terms of the final lockdown decision.

13 **A.** So I think my view was that was the central driver, but  
14 it was also the recognition that it was the direct  
15 deaths from Covid but also the deaths that would accrue  
16 were the NHS to be even more under pressure than it  
17 actually was, which was very substantially under  
18 pressure. So those -- and that's sort of my second form  
19 of indirect deaths, that was the other very major thing  
20 to prevent as -- by using lockdown and other measures.

21 **Q.** And we're going to look at the NHS position in a moment.

22 But can I again ask you the question: was there  
23 an understanding, in any real sense, of what the  
24 differences in figures would be, figures for death, the  
25 numbers of deaths, between the existing countermeasures,

44

1 those of the 12th and 16th and 20th March and the final  
 2 countermeasure on 23 March? Did government, in  
 3 a general sense, ask itself this question: will there be  
 4 a significant difference in the number of deaths if we  
 5 do impose this final mandatory stay-at-home order or if  
 6 we don't? Or can we just not tell?

7 **A.** What we -- so what we were clear about -- and the answer  
 8 is yes, but by one remove. An important remove. And  
 9 the remove was the key was to get R below 1, because  
 10 until that happens the pandemic is doubling up every  
 11 number of days. And it was clear that by the stage  
 12 after the 16th, due to people's remarkable actions,  
 13 the R -- the doubling up number was going to be  
 14 extending. So it would not be, maybe, every three days,  
 15 it would certainly have gone on for longer, but it's  
 16 still doubling, and we had to get to a point where it  
 17 was halving, which is the key to get the R below 1, and  
 18 we were not confident that the measures prior to  
 19 the 23rd, based on the most recent data from the  
 20 modelling groups, that getting R below 1 was going to  
 21 occur with sufficient confidence that we could just say  
 22 "Let's wait and see". So we had to move --

23 **Q.** All right.

24 **A.** -- if that was the decision of ministers, that they  
 25 wanted to reduce mortality.

45

1 you're in an exponential growth curve the difference  
 2 between two doubling times when you're in high numbers  
 3 is absolutely massive numbers. So, you know, even if  
 4 you get it wrong by half a doubling time by this point  
 5 you're still talking about a very, very big difference  
 6 between one outcome and another.

7 What we were not confident at this point -- we were  
 8 confident that if R continued to be above 1, firstly,  
 9 a lot of people would die directly from Covid and,  
 10 secondly, that the NHS would come under even greater  
 11 pressure, and potentially catastrophic pressure and --

12 **Q.** Can I come to the NHS --

13 **A.** Yeah -- those were key -- those were key decisions.  
 14 I thought that the exact numbers you want to put to  
 15 those were, at this point, speculative and in a sense  
 16 didn't matter. We had to get R below 1, it was  
 17 absolutely essential.

18 **Q.** If I can attempt to summarise the nub of the position as  
 19 the government saw it: it couldn't know and would never  
 20 know precisely, or perhaps at all, what the differences  
 21 in mortality would be if it did or did not act by  
 22 imposing a lockdown, but it knew, because it was told by  
 23 you, that when dealing with a viral pandemic with  
 24 exponential growth there had to be a step taken, because  
 25 the nature of exponential growth is unless you do take

47

1 **Q.** Obviously you could only opine on the public health  
 2 aspect, on the question of direct or indirect mortality  
 3 and the impact on the NHS and so on.

4 Can you assist us with how that debate was framed,  
 5 Professor? Did the debate focus predominantly around  
 6 the need to get R below 1 or did it become a debate more  
 7 directly about having to act because of a belief that  
 8 there would be significantly more death if they did not  
 9 act in this way?

10 **A.** Well, in a sense, it was the second but because the  
 11 first was -- we were not sure of, because the key thing  
 12 was getting the R below 1 and the pandemic --

13 **Q.** Right.

14 **A.** -- would start to shrink -- this wave, rather.

15 **Q.** On this issue, of what the likely consequences would be  
 16 if they didn't act on direct and indirect mortality,  
 17 what degree of -- or what was the degree -- what  
 18 figures, what data was available to, essentially, the  
 19 Prime Minister and COBRA and Cabinet on that Monday in  
 20 terms of what the differences would be in terms of  
 21 deaths? Or was it just not something that could be  
 22 calculated?

23 **A.** Well, there were various models of it but I think -- and  
 24 this goes back -- I'm going to come back -- I've come to  
 25 this repeatedly but I think it is important -- once

46

1 that final ultimate step it's going to continue  
 2 exploding?

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** Is that the nub of it?

5 **A.** Yes. Me and others, to be clear, but that is the nub of  
 6 it.

7 **Q.** Right.

8 So what do you say, then, to the suggestion that the  
 9 government overreacted by way of the imposition of  
 10 a lockdown because of an unfounded fear that there would  
 11 be a significant increase in mortality if it did not  
 12 act?

13 **A.** Well, firstly, I think -- well, no one is absolutely  
 14 certain exactly what would have happened under that  
 15 circumstance, but I think there is a high chance,  
 16 I wouldn't like to put a percentage on it, but  
 17 non-trivial certainly, that R would have continued  
 18 above 1, and significantly above 1, and by this stage we  
 19 were talking about large numbers. So once you start  
 20 doubling up from large numbers, even if it's over four,  
 21 five, six weeks, you're still going to end up in a very,  
 22 very difficult place.

23 So I think it would have been very difficult to  
 24 justify if the aim of ministers was to minimise  
 25 mortality, which was very clearly their stated aim at

48

1 this point, to continue where we were. We had to do  
2 something which would make it as close to -- as good as  
3 we could get that the numbers would definitely start to  
4 fall because R had fallen below 1.

5 And we had seen, in a very different setting, in  
6 a different culture, et cetera, in China, this could be  
7 achieved. So it wasn't that this was a theoretical  
8 possibility, this had been achieved elsewhere, and we  
9 therefore needed to try to achieve that in the UK.

10 **Q.** Yes. No one suggests that it couldn't work. Of course  
11 it did work. But --

12 **A.** Well, I mean, if we hadn't seen it work elsewhere,  
13 I think that question would certainly have been asked.  
14 But as it had worked, it was -- in a sense you could  
15 say, "Well, it can do".

16 **Q.** And it did work of course --

17 **A.** Well, "work" is a relative term, but it certainly had  
18 an effect, yeah.

19 **Q.** So the primary objective, if you like, or one of the  
20 primary objectives, was to bring R below 1, because of  
21 the explosive --

22 **A.** Yeah, the primary strategic objective was to minimise  
23 mortality and the principal tactical driver was to get R  
24 below 1.

25 **Q.** Yes. Obviously, by 23 March the government had, in  
49

1 serious debate that said, at this point, "Let's wait",  
2 I think the debate at this point was the numbers here  
3 are looking reasonably stark.

4 **Q.** Let me put this point to you, please, Professor: no one  
5 wanted to take the risk because if you found out later  
6 that you weren't getting R below 1 then of course you'd  
7 be in even deeper trouble. The whole point about the  
8 introduction of the countermeasures the week before and  
9 the week before that was to try to bring R below 1; they  
10 obviously weren't introduced with a view, "Well, it's  
11 not going to work", but they were introduced in good  
12 faith to try to bring R below 1 in the same way as the  
13 ultimate lockdown measure sought to bring R below 1.

14 Why was there not further consideration given to  
15 allowing that strategic aim, the secondary aim, if you  
16 like, to be brought about, to be given effect by more  
17 time, given that those countermeasures the week before  
18 presumably were introduced with good sense, in good  
19 faith, to try to bring R below 1?

20 **A.** I mean, I think it was really very clear from our  
21 modelling colleagues and more widely that the force of  
22 transmission, the countermeasures we were going to need  
23 were, if anything, greater, that -- in a sense we  
24 realised as time went by the force of transmission was  
25 harder and harder to get on top of, we were further  
51

1 a series of measures, introduced interventions, on  
2 the 12th and on the 16th and on the 20th. To what  
3 extent was there debate on the Monday and on the Sunday  
4 night of whether it was sensible or appropriate or  
5 advisable to allow just a bit more time for those  
6 earlier countermeasures to do their work, to have  
7 effect? If, as it happened, those countermeasures  
8 collectively were assisting in bringing R below 1,  
9 perhaps not immediately but over time that there was  
10 a prospect that they would succeed in bringing R  
11 below 1, was there consideration of waiting or delaying  
12 to see whether or not this final draconian step was  
13 indeed necessary, perhaps another week to say "Let's  
14 wait to see whether these measures, having bedded down,  
15 are bringing about compliance, are reducing R below 1 so  
16 we don't have to do this"?

17 **A.** By the time we got to this weekend I think nobody would  
18 have wanted to take the risk that would have gone with  
19 that, because if you then found out a week later that  
20 you weren't in -- that you hadn't got R below 1 you  
21 would be in very deep trouble -- we were already in very  
22 deep trouble, even deeper trouble. And moreover it  
23 wasn't just a matter of trying to pull it down just  
24 below 1, it was really trying to shrink this wave as  
25 fast as possible. So I think -- I don't recall any  
50

1 along the curve than we thought we were going to be, it  
2 was clear we were not going to have enough data even to  
3 contemplate that for two, three weeks, which would -- in  
4 doubling time terms, it's potentially an extraordinarily  
5 big difference in transmission. So I think that the --  
6 in a sense, by this stage the debate really, I don't  
7 think, would have made sense that said, "Well, let's  
8 wait three weeks", because we're really talking two to  
9 three weeks at least before you could say, "Is this  
10 having an effect?" This wouldn't, by this stage, have  
11 been a safe thing to do if the principal aim is to avoid  
12 the worst possible implications for the NHS and  
13 increased mortality. So I think, in a sense, from  
14 a public health point of view, the arguments by this  
15 stage for action were very strong.

16 **Q.** What about a week, though? The countermeasures from the  
17 previous week presumably had some effect in bringing R  
18 down. You couldn't know whether they were bringing them  
19 down speedily or slowly towards 1, or let alone below 1,  
20 but presumably they had some impact, they were doing  
21 something?

22 **A.** Oh yes, and I think we all thought that they were going  
23 to slow down the rate of increase, but the question was  
24 were they going to lead to an actual halving rather than  
25 doubling occurring, and that was -- we were -- you know,  
52

1 certainly I was not in any way confident that that was  
2 going to happen. And if you're not confident in this  
3 kind of situation, this close to -- in a sense, this  
4 close to the edge, you can't afford to take that risk.  
5 So I think that is a -- you know, if the aim is to  
6 minimise mortality, which was clearly the aim of  
7 ministers by this stage.

8 **Q.** So is this the position, you couldn't know how effective  
9 the existing measures were, you would never know,  
10 likely, what impact they were having, but they were  
11 undoubtedly having some impact, but because you're  
12 dealing with an explosive, exponentially-growing virus,  
13 the only way to go, as you saw it, was to apply  
14 a variant of the principle of go early go hard, you've  
15 got to get on top of the problem and act harder --

16 **A.** Yeah.

17 **Q.** -- because the alternative of not acting is far worse;  
18 is that the nub of it?

19 **A.** That is the nub of it. And I think, you know, it was  
20 possible to do because, in fact, some fantastic civil  
21 servants -- I'll call out Clara Swinson, who has given  
22 a witness statement to you, but others -- had kind of  
23 done preparation for these kind of eventualities, but  
24 the nub of it is exactly as you say: that we had to get  
25 on top of it by this stage if we were not to take a very

53

1 considerably. At times there are references to the NHS  
2 being "severely disrupted", other times "under extreme  
3 pressure", "swamping" the NHS resources, "deluging" the  
4 system, there are references to placing "severe  
5 demands", the risk that the remaining peak will  
6 overwhelm the UK surge critical care bed capacity by  
7 eight-fold.

8 And if we move forwards to the most relevant time,  
9 21 March -- if you go back one page, please -- if we go  
10 back one further page, to the "Covid-19 Strategy  
11 Ministerial Group meeting" of 21 March, you will see  
12 there:

13 "... 'The CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER ...'"

14 And you gave quite detailed figures about ICU  
15 capacity.

16 "... said there had been 872 new cases identified  
17 the previous day. The critical question was how many  
18 cases were in the Intensive Treatment Unit ... this  
19 number was 335, of which 193 cases were in London."

20 And you describe how, in normal circumstances, there  
21 are 700 ITU beds in London.

22 If you go down to the bottom of the page, you will  
23 see there is a further reference to something that you  
24 said.

25 And then over the page, I think it's

55

1 significant risk with -- essentially with people's  
2 lives.

3 **Q.** Now, I've said repeatedly to you we would look at the  
4 position of the NHS, and this is the final topic that  
5 I'm going to ask you to address.

6 In your report, and more widely across government,  
7 it was plainly understood, and it had been understood  
8 for some weeks by 23 March, that unless an appropriate  
9 degree of control was exercised over the growth of the  
10 virus and R was reduced below 1 the NHS would be, just  
11 to use one particular word, overwhelmed.

12 Could we have, please, INQ000274026 on the screen,  
13 which is a document -- you've seen it before,  
14 Sir Chris -- in which there are charts dealing with, in  
15 a very broad sense, the likely impact upon the NHS.

16 INQ000274026.

17 **(Pause)**

18 I think I've provided the wrong reference. We'll  
19 look at this one first, then.

20 What we've done, Professor, is we've taken from as  
21 many of the SAGE and briefing and COBR minutes as we can  
22 the references to the likely impact upon the NHS. If we  
23 just scroll through it, I'm not going to put to you each  
24 one, that would be a ludicrous exercise, but you will  
25 get a flavour of how, by and large, the language varied

54

1 Sir Patrick Vallance:

2 "Responding, the GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER  
3 said that the data had been worked out in terms of  
4 doubling times. The supply of beds would become  
5 critical at about 3.5 doubling times on current  
6 projections."

7 And:

8 "The worst case scenario was that ITU capacity in  
9 London would be overwhelmed in nine days' time, but the  
10 projection was that this would happen in 15 days' time."

11 Moving forward to 22 and 23 March, perhaps we could  
12 pick it up at 23 March ministerial group meeting. We  
13 can see there is a reference at the bottom of that page  
14 to the chief executive officer of the NHS dealing with  
15 ratios in intensive care and how they were being  
16 stretched in London, and the CEO talks about ventilators  
17 and staffing and so on and so forth.

18 It is obvious that you and the government were  
19 provided with detailed information from the NHS, NHS  
20 sitrep reports. There was evidence from the chief  
21 executive of the NHS, evidence from Lord Stevens,  
22 a great deal of material talking about the likely impact  
23 on the NHS.

24 But what was ultimately, on 23 March, the final  
25 understanding as to the actuality of the likely impact

56

1 on the NHS if this step were not taken? There is no, it  
2 seems to us, clear exposition on what the threshold test  
3 was that was being applied. Was it eight-fold swamp?  
4 Was it overwhelmed? Was it severe pressure? Was it  
5 severe pressure with surge? Severe pressure without  
6 surge capacity?

7 What was the understanding as to what would likely  
8 happen to the NHS if a lockdown were not imposed?

9 **A.** Well, I think that the first thing that was going to get  
10 to the point where it was no longer able to function in  
11 any sense close to normal -- and to be clear, in every  
12 country in Europe the health service came under huge  
13 pressures, it's not -- this wasn't, this was inevitably  
14 going to happen in the event of the first wave and,  
15 indeed, subsequent waves, so just put to put that  
16 caveat, but the ICU system was the first thing that was  
17 going to get overtopped, to the point where actually it  
18 was no longer able to function under any normal  
19 circumstances.

20 And the reason I would be very cautious about exact  
21 numbers is the reason that you have from Sir Patrick and  
22 others about doubling times. Because if your doubling  
23 time is, for the sake of argument a week, a week,  
24 therefore, is the difference between the ICU just  
25 coping -- define that as you will -- and having twice as

57

1 was always going to be the biggest thing that we had to  
2 deal with. Ventilators we worried about a lot, which we  
3 will come on to in other modules no doubt.

4 So it wasn't a fixed number, that's the point I'm  
5 making on this.

6 **Q.** There was a surge capacity?

7 **A.** There was some degree of surge capacity. But once  
8 you're on an exponential growth rate, until you stop  
9 that exponential growth rate, you are going to be  
10 overtopped sooner or later. And our view was, at the  
11 rate we were going, it was going to be sooner.

12 I think putting exact numbers on that is a slightly  
13 spurious exercise for a variety of reasons, but that  
14 principle that you move from -- you are just below your  
15 absolute upper end of your margins to well above it in  
16 a very short time, I think is the key to understand  
17 here.

18 **Q.** But you didn't know for sure that there would be  
19 exponential growth because you couldn't know whether the  
20 previous countermeasures would work or to what extent  
21 they would work. You were assessing the risk that there  
22 would remain an exponential growth and that eventually  
23 the NHS would be overwhelmed?

24 **A.** Yes.

25 **Q.** Right. As at 23 March, did anybody within the NHS or on

59

1 many people as it can possible absorb. Two weeks at the  
2 same rate and it is four times.

3 So you've got a situation where you move -- you  
4 really have almost no margin for error. And the very --  
5 you know, the -- that is what we saw, was that the  
6 biggest pressure did come first to the intensive care  
7 system. It was across the whole board.

8 Now, the NHS responded absolutely extraordinarily by  
9 two mechanisms, we'll probably debate that in another  
10 module, but just to say that one of them was expansion  
11 of the ICU footprint, so in my own hospital that was --

12 **Q.** I'm so sorry, Professor, can I ask you please to remain  
13 focused on the issue of: what did you understand --  
14 *(unclear: multiple speakers)*

15 **A.** Well, this is -- in a sense this is the part of the  
16 answer, which is, the ICU footprint, as it normally  
17 stood, was expand -- could be expanded and was expanded  
18 well beyond what it previously was. So in a sense  
19 the -- you can -- and this is the framing I actually  
20 used at the time, you know, you have to reduce the  
21 flood, you also need to raise the river banks. And the  
22 raising the river banks bit was expanding the ICU and  
23 the general capacity of the NHS, Nightingale hospitals  
24 was the next stage along that, so -- but in reality the  
25 biggest limitation is always skilled personnel. That

58

1 the part of government say clearly, "The NHS will break  
2 if you do not take this particular step, because the  
3 footprint and the surge cannot accommodate, on our  
4 figures, the increase in beds and ICU beds that will be  
5 needed"? And that therefore you must take this step.  
6 That the NHS won't just buckle but it will break?

7 **A.** I think that this -- ultimately I think this  
8 understanding is what took ministers to the point of  
9 realising there was, if they wished to minimise  
10 mortality, no option. Was to understand that if they  
11 did not take this action it might not be 100% certain  
12 that the NHS would get to that point but there was  
13 a high enough probability that it was simply not  
14 something that was an acceptable thing for the  
15 government to do if its aim was to minimise mortality.

16 So that is -- very clearly, this risk was very, very  
17 heavy in driving, in my view, the decisions that  
18 ministers subsequently took.

19 **Q.** But you're coming back, there, to the main mortality  
20 risk, aren't you, or are you dealing there with the  
21 indirect --

22 *(unclear: multiple speakers)*

23 **A.** Yeah, this is essentially the combination of the direct  
24 mortality, what I called "A mortality" and the indirect  
25 mortality due to the emergency system being overwhelmed,

60

1 that's both the front door and the intensive care system  
 2 being overwhelmed. And it was to protect those two all  
 3 the way through the first two years of the pandemic  
 4 really that a very large number of the actions in social  
 5 distancing were taken, not only to do that but that was  
 6 a very large part of the reason that ministers took the  
 7 decisions they took.

8 **Q.** I want to be absolutely clear about this, on 23 March  
 9 there was nobody saying -- putting aside the terrible  
 10 pressure, the strain, and despite uses of words such as  
 11 "overtopping" or "overwhelming" or whatever epithet or  
 12 description might have been used -- the NHS will break  
 13 by a given date? The analysis was different, it was:  
 14 unless you take this step and promote the prospect or  
 15 increase the chances that you will bring R below 1, at  
 16 some point the NHS will break?

17 **A.** At some point.

18 **Q.** That's the analysis?

19 **A.** At some point soon.

20 **Q.** But no one knew when it would be?

21 **A.** No, because -- because of the nature of exponential  
 22 curves and the lack of contemporaneous data on the speed  
 23 of transmission by this stage, given the magnificent  
 24 response of people to the voluntary measures. But,  
 25 you know, I think this is not a risk, frankly, that any

61

1 **MR KEITH:** Eat Out to Help Out. Do you agree that there  
 2 wasn't a full or indeed perhaps any consultation with  
 3 the CMO or DCMO or the OCMO over that scheme?

4 **A.** Yes, my written statement makes clear there was no  
 5 consultation -- that we -- there was no consultation.

6 **Q.** I need to put to you that in his witness statement,  
 7 Boris Johnson says:

8 "... it was properly discussed, including with Chris  
 9 and Patrick ..."

10 Do you agree with that?

11 **A.** I -- on this one neither Patrick nor I can recall it,  
 12 and I think we would have done.

13 **Q.** In relation to the summer and the autumn, and I'm not  
 14 going to --

15 **A.** And actually -- if I can just add to that -- and I made,  
 16 fairly firmly, to Number 10, not to the Prime Minister,  
 17 the view that it would have been prudent, let's put it  
 18 that way, for them to have thought about discussing it  
 19 before it was launched.

20 And this was aimed at the centre. I was unsurprised  
 21 that Treasury and many other ministries were coming up  
 22 with various schemes, that's perfectly legitimate,  
 23 Number 10 held the ring and I felt -- so it may well be  
 24 correct that the Prime Minister was under the impression  
 25 he had been consulted, but it was not the fact that we

63

1 minister whose principal aim was to reduce mortality  
 2 would be wanting to take at this stage.

3 **Q.** So ultimately it was a risk analysis?

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** It wasn't -- and I ask this because of course so much  
 6 has been said in the public domain -- it wasn't because  
 7 there was data in front of ministers saying "The NHS  
 8 will collapse, you must therefore act", it was a risk  
 9 analysis: unless the R is brought below 1 and the  
 10 exponential growth is reversed, it will collapse at some  
 11 point, and you couldn't be sure that the existing  
 12 measures would suffice; that's the nub of it?

13 **A.** Yes, I mean, I ... I don't personally see a big  
 14 difference between the two positions you've taken but in  
 15 a sense I would agree with both of them, I think they  
 16 both end up in the same place.

17 **Q.** All right.

18 Now, just --

19 **LADY HALLETT:** I don't know how much more you have,  
 20 Mr Keith, I know there are many CP questions. I have  
 21 been asked to take a break.

22 **MR KEITH:** I was just going to put two final matters and  
 23 then, if it was alright to be allowed, to take a break  
 24 and then we can move to the rule 10s.

25 **LADY HALLETT:** Okay.

62

1 were consulted, and that difference I think is probably  
 2 worth just highlighting.

3 **Q.** The --

4 **A.** And I think we should have done.

5 **Q.** Yes. Yes, I mean, his assertion is it was properly  
 6 discussed. He doesn't say he was given the impression  
 7 it was discussed, he does appear to assert it was.

8 Briefly, and briefly because it is absolutely  
 9 apparent, you may agree, that throughout the summer and  
 10 the autumn SAGE, yourself, Sir Patrick, had a clear view  
 11 in public health technical terms as to the likelihood  
 12 or, perhaps, inevitability of a second wave, and  
 13 therefore you constantly consistently raised your  
 14 concerns, and there are multiple letters, strategy  
 15 notes, meetings at which you say: a second wave is  
 16 coming, if you relax too quickly, too early, the  
 17 combination of those relaxations, or if you don't take  
 18 in combination sufficient steps thereafter to restrict  
 19 the growth in R reproduction rate, you're going to end  
 20 up with another serious outbreak, second wave, and with  
 21 all the consequences that we're now so familiar with.

22 That position was a public health position. It was,  
 23 of course, for the government to decide how to weigh up  
 24 that position against economic, societal and many other  
 25 considerations.

64



1 Do you consider that, in public health terms, the  
 2 government had an option, and a realistic option, but to  
 3 impose the second lockdown? I'm very carefully not  
 4 asking you to enter into the debate about economic,  
 5 societal against public health considerations. Just on  
 6 the public health side, was there a public health  
 7 option?

8 **A.** By the time it had got to the stage of the second  
 9 lockdown, given the principal aims of ministers to  
 10 minimise mortality, I couldn't see many options.  
 11 Whether other decisions could have been taken earlier to  
 12 have prevented that I think is a separate and quite  
 13 important question, but in terms of -- once we got to  
 14 that point, I think the realisation was there wasn't  
 15 really much choice.

16 **Q.** And by that reference to earlier measures, had there  
 17 perhaps been a circuit breaker in September, had perhaps  
 18 a tier level system been introduced earlier and had time  
 19 to work over a longer period of time, there remains the  
 20 possibility that that second lockdown might not have  
 21 been necessary --

22 **A.** Yeah.

23 **Q.** -- or might not have been as long?

24 **A.** I think that is -- I think most people would say that's  
 25 the case. I think there are a variety of ways we could

65

1 potentially, where we would accelerate into a bend  
 2 unnecessarily and then have to slam on the brakes  
 3 because it was clear we were -- we'd overdone things.  
 4 And I think -- I'm not going to go through the long list  
 5 of things, you've got all the documents, but that  
 6 position I maintain fairly consistently.

7 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, those are all my questions.

8 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much. I shall return  
 9 at 11.15.

10 **(11.00 am)**

11 **(A short break)**

12 **(11.15 am)**

13 **LADY HALLETT:** We will complete your evidence before we  
 14 break for lunch, Sir Chris, I promise you.

15 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you, my Lady.

16 **LADY HALLETT:** Right, is it Mr Weatherby going first?

17 **Questions from MR WEATHERBY KC**

18 **MR WEATHERBY:** There we go, the microphone's working.  
 19 Professor Whitty, I'm going to ask you some  
 20 questions on behalf of the Covid Bereaved Families for  
 21 Justice UK group, which represents about 7,000 bereaved  
 22 families. I'm splitting my topics with Mr Wilcock, who  
 23 sits behind me.  
 24 I have three areas that I've got allocated to me.  
 25 I'm going to ask you some questions about asymptomatic

67

1 have potentially at least have had a less onerous  
 2 lockdown than we did on the second one.

3 The third one, in my view, because it was a new  
 4 variant, I think I would say probably we didn't have  
 5 many choices but on this one I thought it was inevitable  
 6 by the time we got there but wasn't necessarily  
 7 inevitable had previous decisions been different.

8 **Q.** But your reference to the third lockdown, is that  
 9 a reference to how the Alpha Kent, so-called originally,  
 10 variant swept everything else away because it,  
 11 of course, in epidemiological terms, swept across the  
 12 country?

13 **A.** Yeah, had hugely greater transmissibility, and at that  
 14 point I don't think -- so I don't think whatever  
 15 government had done up to the run-up, I don't think that  
 16 could have been avoided or significantly modified but  
 17 I do think there is a strong argument that we could have  
 18 ended up in a different trajectory between summer and,  
 19 for the sake of argument, New Year 2020.

20 **Q.** In public health terms, other steps could and perhaps  
 21 should have been taken that may have obviated the need  
 22 for the second and third lockdowns, at least in the form  
 23 in which they occurred?

24 **A.** Yeah, my worry, and you will have seen this from my  
 25 correspondence, was that we were kind of bunny hopping,

66

1 transmission, and then I've got two short topics, one  
 2 about HCIDs and laboratories, and one about travel  
 3 restrictions.

4 Now, with asymptomatic transmission, on  
 5 27 January 2020, you attended a briefing, a coronavirus  
 6 briefing, with the Secretary of State and other  
 7 officials, in PHE and various other people, where the  
 8 Secretary of State expressed concern at hearing that  
 9 there had been a report from the Chinese government that  
 10 Covid was transmitting asymptotically. Do you recall  
 11 that briefing?

12 **A.** I do in broad terms.

13 **Q.** Yes, okay. Well, I'm going to try to avoid putting  
 14 documents up, but if you need me to I'm very happy to  
 15 put the record of the briefing up for you, but just in  
 16 the interests of time I'm going to try to avoid that.

17 So the Secretary of State opened the meeting  
 18 expressing this concern, and then you're recorded as  
 19 expressing the view that up to this point it had been  
 20 assumed that asymptomatic transmission was possible but  
 21 unlikely, and the upshot of it was that the  
 22 Secretary of State ordered the department to seek  
 23 clarification.

24 Now, does that accord with your recollection?

25 **A.** That's like -- that's certainly a perfectly reasonable

68

1 position.

2 **Q.** Yes. Then we know that the following day, in fact, at  
3 13 minutes past 6 in the morning, there was an FCO  
4 diplomatic telegram, so this is 28 January. I think  
5 I will put this up, because it's just important to  
6 concentrate on it.

7 So it's INQ000064689, please.

8 It's point 2, and it simply refers to the reported  
9 number of cases in China. Then the second sentence:  
10 "On 26 January, Ma Xiaowei, Director of the National  
11 Health Commission, confirmed cases of asymptomatic  
12 human-to-human transmission, making control of the  
13 outbreak more challenging (though far from unique to  
14 this virus)."

15 And so it goes on. Yes?

16 **A.** Yeah.

17 **Q.** That had a wide circulation. You weren't specifically  
18 on the circulation list but can I assume that you got to  
19 see this?

20 **A.** I did.

21 **Q.** Now, later that same morning, at about 10 o'clock, you  
22 attended a NERVTAG meeting, and at that meeting Public  
23 Health England provided both a written briefing and  
24 an oral briefing, and the minutes of that NERVTAG  
25 meeting record PHE as saying that there was no official

69

1 **A.** So just to be clear, the fact of asymptomatic  
2 transmission occurring doesn't necessarily mean it is  
3 a major part of the issue.

4 **Q.** Yes, although the Chinese director was highlighting this  
5 as a particular issue?

6 **A.** As soon as you got any asymptomatic transmission it  
7 makes life more difficult, particularly when you don't  
8 have any tests --

9 **Q.** Yes.

10 **A.** -- because otherwise you rely -- for all your things,  
11 including things like contact tracing, are all depending  
12 on symptoms.

13 **Q.** Believe me, that's where I'm headed. But -- again,  
14 I think we may be in the land of understatement here,  
15 but this is a massive issue, asymptomatic transmission,  
16 isn't it, potentially?

17 **A.** I think, well, it depends on the scale of it.

18 **Q.** Yes.

19 **A.** And that really is the key point.

20 **Q.** Yes.

21 **A.** And I think another point, which of course you know but  
22 I'm just going to highlight, is there's a big difference  
23 between asymptomatic infection, someone getting  
24 infection without symptoms, and asymptomatic  
25 transmission --

71

1 or published evidence of asymptomatic Covid  
2 transmission.

3 **A.** I think it would be unreasonable to expect a 6 am diptel  
4 from Beijing to have intercepted a previously drafted  
5 note from PHE.

6 **Q.** Yes, so it's likely, isn't it, that whoever did that  
7 briefing, and presumably yourself as well, probably  
8 didn't see that diptel between 6 o'clock in the morning  
9 and 10 o'clock in the morning, but nevertheless it was  
10 there.

11 So objectively the position had moved on, even  
12 though presumably the PHE person and yourself didn't  
13 know at that point?

14 **A.** Yes. And -- but I think -- and I think that if you'll  
15 allow me, I think it's important to differentiate  
16 between two possibilities at this stage. One is that  
17 there is occasional asymptomatic transmission, which was  
18 relatively much more likely at this point was our  
19 assessment, and the second possibility is that  
20 asymptomatic transmission was a significant part of the  
21 transmission burden, and the third possibility actually,  
22 at the extreme end, that actually asymptomatic  
23 transmission on its own was capable of maintaining R  
24 above 1. Those are three different situations.

25 **Q.** Yes.

70

1 **Q.** Oh yes.

2 **A.** -- and I am just highlighting that because sometimes  
3 they get conflated.

4 **Q.** No, that and that's very helpful. But from early doors  
5 you were in discussions with other scientists about  
6 asymptomatic transmission because it is such  
7 an important issue?

8 **A.** Sure.

9 **Q.** By this point it's now becoming the official position of  
10 the Chinese government that it's a problem in China.  
11 I fully understand the caveats that you apply to it, but  
12 it was to become a major issue, asymptomatic  
13 transmission?

14 **A.** It was, yes.

15 **Q.** And this was a moment of alarm; yes?

16 **A.** It's the -- and I think that -- I've made this point in  
17 other contexts, the important thing to realise is this  
18 is not binary. As with much of science, this kind of  
19 gradually accrues over time.

20 **Q.** Yes.

21 **A.** It's not that you think one day asymptomatic  
22 transmission is not a problem and the next day you think  
23 it's a significant problem. It is a gradual process.  
24 This was a step along that path.

25 **Q.** Yes, indeed, but this is an important point.

72

1 **A.** Yes, no, absolutely.  
 2 **Q.** In fact, can we have up INQ000282774, page 2, please.  
 3 Now, during the meeting itself and immediately after  
 4 the meeting you engaged in WhatsApp chat with the other  
 5 UK CMOs, and I just want to read a short part of this.  
 6 It's page 2, please. Have you got page 2? Yes.  
 7 So Gregor Smith, the CMO for Scotland, 11.05:  
 8 "Just been in discussion with Søren Brostrøm, the  
 9 [director general] of the Danish system. Has told me  
 10 Germany now confirmed first case but appears to be  
 11 transmission within the country rather than China. Has  
 12 anyone else received this info?"  
 13 You then reply immediately:  
 14 "Yes but informally. We don't have firm data."  
 15 Michael McBride then joins in:  
 16 "Appears to have made the papers in  
 17 [Republic of Ireland] so in public domain."  
 18 Then:  
 19 "Having considered the EWRS ..."  
 20 Which is the early warning response system,  
 21 a European system -- thanks to my learned colleague for  
 22 prompting me on that:  
 23 "... notification as reported appears to be  
 24 consistent with asymptomatic transmission during the  
 25 incubation period."

73

1 drawing the distinction between transmission and  
 2 infection, also about the force of transmission, but  
 3 nevertheless this is a key issue and continues to be  
 4 a key issue --  
 5 **A.** Yes.  
 6 **Q.** -- for the reasons that you've adverted to a few minutes  
 7 ago?  
 8 **A.** Yeah.  
 9 **Q.** Because this is an issue which goes to testing, to PPE,  
 10 to infection control, all of those are massively  
 11 contributed to as issues by asymptomatic transmission?  
 12 **A.** Correct.  
 13 **Q.** Yes, okay.  
 14 So we then move on a week, and this, the same  
 15 written briefing from PHE that we've just referred to,  
 16 going to NERVTAG on the 28th, which says that there is  
 17 no official or published evidence of asymptomatic Covid  
 18 transmission.  
 19 The same document then goes to SAGE, and we know  
 20 that because it's on a government website, which we've  
 21 provided to the Inquiry, but we know the same document,  
 22 not updated, goes to the SAGE meeting a week later, at  
 23 which you're also present.  
 24 From the note of that SAGE meeting, the minute of  
 25 that SAGE meeting, there's no mention of your "we should

75

1 And you say:  
 2 "Agree. Compatible, probable but not conclusive.  
 3 Nertag agree that if there is asymptomatic transmission  
 4 it is likely (not definite) to be lower infectivity than  
 5 symptomatic."  
 6 So you're putting, again, the caveat about the force  
 7 of transmission?  
 8 **A.** Yes, and that's a slightly different caveat and it's  
 9 to -- it may well be, as it is in many other infections,  
 10 that for the same length of time with a symptomatic  
 11 person compared to an asymptomatic person your chance of  
 12 acquiring it from someone who is symptomatic may be  
 13 significantly or at least --  
 14 **Q.** Yes.  
 15 **A.** -- appreciably higher. That was the point I was making.  
 16 But I hope all of these are highly caveated statements,  
 17 correctly, because we really, at this point, were still  
 18 at the foothills of our understanding.  
 19 **Q.** Then, finally, the next line, from you:  
 20 "But we should now assume it may be happening."  
 21 **A.** Yes.  
 22 **Q.** So the key takeaway here is that you're all talking  
 23 about this, all the CMOs, the Secretary of State, the  
 24 Chinese government are highlighting it, this is a big  
 25 issue. You're today, and then, caveating it by properly

74

1 now assume it may be happening", there is no mention of  
 2 the Chinese government position on 26 or 28 January, and  
 3 in fact the only -- the key reference to asymptomatic  
 4 transmission for the record -- again, I can put it up if  
 5 you want, but I'm trying to avoid doing that, but it's  
 6 INQ000051925, and at paragraph 19 the SAGE minute says  
 7 this, that "asymptomatic cannot be ruled out".  
 8 Now, that's very different issue to the Chinese  
 9 government saying that it's happening or you saying that  
 10 we should assume it's happening, isn't it?  
 11 **A.** I considered all of those are actually compatible  
 12 statements. I think probably we could have written that  
 13 one slightly more strongly, but I think it was still the  
 14 view of most people at this point that, even if it was  
 15 occurring, it was a pretty small part of the  
 16 transmission burden. I think that is a pretty critical  
 17 part of trying to think this through.  
 18 **Q.** Yes, but the point I'm trying to discuss with you, and  
 19 you've agreed, I think, is that this is a massive issue  
 20 and that's why you're all talking about it?  
 21 **A.** Yes, I mean, it is a big issue --  
 22 **Q.** Why is it underplayed in the SAGE minutes a week after?  
 23 You have had the Chinese government, you've had your  
 24 view, why is it -- it's just being "can't be ruled out"?  
 25 That's not accurate, an objectively accurate reference?

76

1 A. Well, I think it depends what you are trying to think  
 2 through. If you wish, we can -- I can look at the exact  
 3 context and we can go down the exegesis of it, but what  
 4 we were really, at this point, still thinking was that  
 5 it was probably not a major driver of the epidemic.  
 6 Q. Okay.  
 7 A. By -- we certainly were not excluding, and it's clear  
 8 from this, excluding the possibility that individual  
 9 cases were occurring.  
 10 Q. Yes.  
 11 A. Those two are compatible statements.  
 12 Q. Yes, okay, I'm not quibbling with the semantics of it,  
 13 but here you and SAGE and everybody else is trying to  
 14 work out what to do next.  
 15 A. Yeah.  
 16 Q. And I'm putting to you that this is a point of alarm  
 17 where the testing, the PPE, and all the other things  
 18 we've discussed, really need to be ramped up because of  
 19 this, and that's right, isn't it?  
 20 A. You certainly need to be aware of the possibility --  
 21 Q. Yes.  
 22 A. -- and if there is a substantial amount of asymptomatic  
 23 transmission you've actually taken off the table several  
 24 of the tools we potentially had, including the case  
 25 finding and isolation, as (unclear).

77

1 widely.  
 2 And then there's a second caveat, which is that at  
 3 this point we were far from clear whether even if there  
 4 was asymptomatic infection whether the tests were  
 5 accurate --  
 6 Q. Yes.  
 7 A. -- I think, and this is debated in SAGE. So these are  
 8 the things I think that -- I just want to add these  
 9 layers of technical importance on top of the points  
 10 you're making, I'm not disagreeing with the points you  
 11 are making.  
 12 Q. And that's very fair, but nevertheless, in terms of  
 13 care homes and hospitals, the issue of asymptomatic  
 14 transmission should have been an issue which was "let's  
 15 get on with the test, let's scale up the test, let's get  
 16 the PPE", an important issue?  
 17 A. Well, I mean, all of them -- in a sense, my view is all  
 18 of those should have happened anyway. That's the --  
 19 *(unclear: multiple speakers)*  
 20 Q. Finally on this point, Mr Keith's already raised with  
 21 you the Diamond Princess. By the end of February, when  
 22 the analysis of the Diamond Princess came out and was in  
 23 the public domain, it had gone from the possibility of  
 24 asymptomatic transmission in early January to maybe the  
 25 probability of asymptomatic transmission, and now we

79

1 Q. Yes, okay, but in terms of testing you certainly haven't  
 2 taken it off the table in terms of care homes or  
 3 hospitals. The fact of asymptomatic transmission would  
 4 mean that you'd want more tests for that, not less?  
 5 A. But we didn't have any tests at this point, remember?  
 6 That's the key background to this, this is a period when  
 7 there are almost no tests in the UK and, therefore, if  
 8 you don't have symptoms as your principle, you're  
 9 basically saying, "Anyone could have it, essentially all  
 10 the tools are taken off the table".  
 11 I think it's important to understand that context.  
 12 You know, were I to rewrite those minutes I might change  
 13 the words very slightly, but I think the general  
 14 principle of them seems to be a reasonable one.  
 15 Q. I want to move on, but in terms of, "we didn't have the  
 16 tests", you did in fact have the tests, you just didn't  
 17 have them at scale?  
 18 A. Yeah, having to -- have the tests in the ability to --  
 19 Q. Yes.  
 20 A. So if you're only aiming tests at people who have  
 21 symptoms and you're aiming them at ten people with  
 22 symptoms from a geographically constrained area, then  
 23 a small number of tests are sufficient. As soon as you  
 24 say that anybody, irrespective of symptoms, can have  
 25 this virus, then you're going to have to use tests more

78

1 knew that asymptomatic transmission was having a real  
 2 impact. So again it's another staging post, isn't it?  
 3 A. Yeah, and we move along that path. I mean, to just go  
 4 forward a bit, I think we still don't actually have  
 5 confidence about what the proportion of asymptomatic  
 6 transmission at that point in time was --  
 7 Q. Yes.  
 8 A. -- even now, with all we know --  
 9 Q. Yes, but clearly a major, major issue.  
 10 A. Yes, it is a major issue.  
 11 Q. Do you think, with hindsight, looking back, that enough  
 12 was done as a result of the acknowledgement of  
 13 asymptomatic transmission being a reality in terms of  
 14 all the things that we've discussed?  
 15 A. Well, I think in a sense two things you suggested would  
 16 have been necessary either way. So the scaling up of  
 17 testing did not depend on an understanding of  
 18 asymptomatic transmission, neither did the need for  
 19 PPE --  
 20 Q. No.  
 21 A. -- of an appropriate nature. So those were not  
 22 predicated on asymptomatic transmission. The thing  
 23 which it would have, at this point in the pandemic -- at  
 24 other points it would have made a different situation --  
 25 but this is a point where all the cases at this point

80

1 were imported, it would have made a difference  
 2 potentially to our approach to contact tracing and so  
 3 on. But that's a slightly different point which I don't  
 4 think is where you're going.

5 **Q.** The urgency of getting all of those things in place was  
 6 underlined by the reality of asymptomatic transmission?

7 **A.** I think we should have heard the urgency either way.

8 **Q.** Maybe.

9 Okay, a second topic and quickly: HCID, high concern  
 10 infectious disease. On 1 March, you're concerned about  
 11 laboratories and the ability to analyse tests and you  
 12 engage in an email exchange -- and, again, I don't think  
 13 I need to put this up but I can if I need to. I'll give  
 14 the reference. It's INQ000223410, page 5. You say to  
 15 Professor Tom Evans, the PHE and the HSE, Health and  
 16 Safety Executive:

17 "I think this may well be about to go quite fast,  
 18 and we should certainly plan for that. We now have  
 19 a much better fix on the mortality rate in those who are  
 20 symptomatic with Covid-19, but there are large numbers  
 21 of asymptomatic and minimally symptomatic cases and the  
 22 cases in the hundreds and potentially thousands a day  
 23 may happen within weeks given what is happening  
 24 elsewhere. Testing will obviously be well above that.  
 25 I'm keen that we're able to diagnose them", and so on.

81

1 something is a very high significance to the person who  
 2 might catch it but they run significant public health  
 3 risks overall to the population and risks to the  
 4 individual patient if it is used inappropriately. So  
 5 I thought it was a sensible thing to have that  
 6 discussion with the relevant bodies who could then make  
 7 an independent assessment.

8 **Q.** Okay, I'm not asking you about the HCID designation  
 9 generally.

10 **A.** Okay.

11 **Q.** You're not involved in that in this email. What you're  
 12 saying in this email is that the laboratory safety  
 13 precautions that follow from it being an HCID should be  
 14 relaxed, effectively?

15 **A.** Well, in fact, what it means is a much larger number of  
 16 laboratories can then do tests than otherwise would be  
 17 able to. That really is what the point of this email is  
 18 effectively saying.

19 **Q.** Quite, and that's the point that I'm trying to  
 20 distinguish, is that you're not here saying to  
 21 Professor Evans or the PHE or the HSE "change the  
 22 designation". You're saying relax the provisions that  
 23 follow from the designation and with respect to  
 24 laboratories and that is a very necessary and sensible  
 25 step to take?

83

1 What you're asking for in this email chain is  
 2 a downgrading of the bio-safety provisions for the lab  
 3 analyses, the lab facilities for analysing Covid tests;  
 4 is that right?

5 **A.** Yes. So can I put the background as to why this is  
 6 important? High-consequence infectious diseases are  
 7 ones in general where you've got an extremely high risk  
 8 to those who are either treating or processing the  
 9 samples of the individual.

10 **Q.** Yes.

11 **A.** Now, there are significant disadvantages to the  
 12 individual patient from something being treated as  
 13 a high-consequence infectious disease if it is not at  
 14 a public health level. It will slow down testing,  
 15 potentially very substantially, because only a very  
 16 small number of laboratories can do it. It'll mean  
 17 they'll have to be moved around the country to places  
 18 where there are particular facilities and, in extreme  
 19 cases, they'll have to be barrier nursed in a way that  
 20 is much more useful to produce best care --

21 **Q.** Can I just cut across you? Sorry to interrupt you --

22 **A.** No, I think it's important because I think this debate,  
 23 as you've raised it, has been fully misunderstood by  
 24 many commentators, that the advantages for a  
 25 high-consequence infectious disease only exist if

82

1 **A.** Well, in a sense, my view is probably both a sensible  
 2 and certainly, on the laboratory side, it was clear we  
 3 would not be able to provide a safe service were that  
 4 relaxation not to occur.

5 **Q.** But you're not saying that other things should relax?

6 **A.** Not necessarily but actually my view by this stage was  
 7 we were likely to head that way fairly soon.

8 **Q.** Now, finally and quickly, travel restrictions. You've  
 9 set out your views on border controls and travel  
 10 restrictions in your statement, so I'm not going to go  
 11 into any detail at all. But you do say in respect to  
 12 Denmark in November of 2020 that it was sensible to take  
 13 a different view which was to impose restrictions on  
 14 travel to and from Denmark.

15 And that is different, is it, to the position in  
 16 January 2020 when the virus emerges from China?

17 **A.** Yeah, we had a very specific problem there which was  
 18 these were outbreaks in mink farms.

19 **Q.** Yes.

20 **A.** And the Danish government had taken a decision to stop  
 21 the entire trade and therefore eliminate this risk of  
 22 a potentially different and potentially vaccine-escaping  
 23 variant. So our view was this is a very temporary  
 24 measure where there is a high chance that the Danish  
 25 state will be able to get on top of this completely by

84

1 the actions it takes. So simply for the short period  
2 until they had achieved that, it was sensible to have  
3 measures in place. But this is very different to what  
4 we were facing in terms of a human pandemic coming from  
5 China.

6 **Q.** So at the outset, with China your view was that the  
7 outbreak in China had or was likely to escape China and  
8 therefore it was effectively impossible to put travel  
9 restrictions which would other than delay minimally the  
10 transmission of the virus to the UK?

11 **A.** Well, my view was that the Danish position was they were  
12 taking extreme measures to get on top of this with a  
13 very quick turn around and we only would need to  
14 consider this for a very limited point of time.

15 **Q.** Now, just picking that point up, so you're saying that  
16 there is a role for travel restrictions and border  
17 controls but on a targeted basis?

18 **A.** Exactly, and we did the same, if you recall, when  
19 for example the Omicron variant happened.

20 **Q.** Yes.

21 **A.** And it's largely to give us pause to get a bit of  
22 information, to understand the impact on vaccine  
23 immunity and so on.

24 **Q.** Yes.

25 **A.** So there are definitely areas and I think I explained to

85

1 we discussed this yesterday, would have been around the  
2 mass gatherings themselves, and, as I made clear  
3 yesterday, had we -- were we to do things again, that is  
4 an area we would have taken a different approach. But  
5 I don't think travel restrictions specifically would  
6 have been necessarily the appropriate tool to do had.

7 **Q.** Yes, okay. All right. Those were my questions,  
8 thank you.

9 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Mr Weatherby. Mr Wilcock.

#### 10 **Questions from MR WILCOCK**

11 **MR WILCOCK:** Morning.

12 Professor, I'm going to ask you some questions on  
13 topics on behalf of the Northern Ireland Covid Bereaved  
14 Families for Justice Campaign.

15 The first topic I want to ask you about is the  
16 recognition on SAGE to the unique problems facing  
17 Northern Ireland in responding to the pandemic.

18 To do that, could we please have INQ000282777,  
19 page 3 on screen. While it's coming up, this is  
20 an email that Dr Michael McBride, who was your  
21 counterpoint Chief Medical Officer in Northern Ireland,  
22 sent you on 10 March, in which he said that not only had  
23 he:

24 "... to seek to secure UK wide agreement [about]  
25 timing but also North/South otherwise ... [there was

87

1 Mr Keith that, were I to go back, I would have done some  
2 things rather differently from the China situation.

3 **Q.** Can I finally just turn to one example of that, that you  
4 have been asked about mass gatherings. I'm not going to  
5 ask you about mass gatherings but, with respect to  
6 a particular mass gathering, which is of particular  
7 concern to some of my families, the Liverpool football  
8 match, the Atlético Madrid-Liverpool match.

9 Would there be a role here for travel restrictions?  
10 Because here you have thousands of Spanish fans coming  
11 over on flights for a match and then being in  
12 hospitality and milling around Liverpool for the match,  
13 and at that point it was well known that Spain and  
14 Madrid were hotspots. So is this an area, as  
15 an example, where travel restrictions would go outside  
16 of your general view that they don't make an awful lot  
17 of difference? Would it be sensible to take a targeted  
18 approach in that sort of situation? Are you suggesting  
19 that you can stop transmission to the UK or community  
20 transmission? But it doesn't seem sensible, does it, to  
21 actually facilitate thousands of people from a hotspot?

22 **A.** I think it would be quite difficult to differentially  
23 have travel restrictions that were different for one  
24 legal activity compared to another legal activity. So  
25 I think actually the targeted way to deal with this, and

86

1 a] risk [of] mixed messages and confusion  
2 notwithstanding the complexity of the politics. An all  
3 UK/[Republic of Ireland] science & modelling arrangement  
4 would serve us well. I need to look East/West &  
5 North/South ..."

6 And that social distancing messages, timing of  
7 introduction, all needed to be addressed.

8 It must follow, therefore, that even though you must  
9 have been aware of it before, you were particularly  
10 conscious of the unique problems of responding to  
11 a pandemic on the island of Ireland by the time you  
12 received this message from Dr McBride?

13 **A.** I was, yeah.

14 **Q.** And would you agree with his opinion that the timing and  
15 consistency of introducing measures to combat Covid was  
16 complicated in Northern Ireland by its shared land  
17 border with the Republic?

18 **A.** Yes, and complicated in one sense in two dimensions:  
19 one, epidemiologically because the epidemiology of the  
20 Republic of Ireland has a very clear implication for  
21 Northern Ireland and vice versa.

22 **Q.** Yes.

23 **A.** And, secondly, complicated politically because, and I'm  
24 going to summarise unfairly, Sinn Féin and others from  
25 that political tradition were very keen to stay in some

88

1 kind of touching distance with the Republic of Ireland  
 2 's approach to Covid and other political traditions were  
 3 trying to stay in touch with the UK's approach to this.  
 4 But these were issues of policy, not issues of science.  
 5 So in a sense we had to acknowledge they were there  
 6 and then just let the political leaders take their final  
 7 decisions.

8 **Q.** It might be a good idea to leave the politics out of it,  
 9 but --

10 **A.** I'm making the point that they have actually -- both of  
 11 those are relevant in terms of how the policy was  
 12 developed.

13 **Q.** Thank you, Professor. But in terms of the development  
 14 of the epidemiological aspect, do you agree that the  
 15 early SAGE minutes contain no reference to these  
 16 particular difficulties in dealing with the early part  
 17 of Covid?

18 **A.** Well, the SAGE minutes in general only took a sort of  
 19 national within the UK or regional approach when there  
 20 was a very strong reason to do so, and this is because  
 21 SAGE was taking an overarching, you know, science policy  
 22 approach. Once we get down to later in the pandemic  
 23 much more detailed epidemiology of course then,  
 24 Northern Ireland has a very different kind of, you know,  
 25 epidemiological profile in some situations. But that

89

1 need for representation where that is useful, you also  
 2 have to ensure that the best people are around the table  
 3 in not too unwieldy a way and getting that balance right  
 4 is always going to be judgement call.

5 **Q.** Certainly by late March 2020, the Inquiry has heard  
 6 a statement from Professor Young, who you will know was  
 7 the then Chief Scientific Adviser for Northern Ireland,  
 8 that it was only after he became a full attendee in late  
 9 March 2020 that Northern Ireland had full participation  
 10 in SAGE?

11 **A.** Yes, and that should have happened earlier and I think  
 12 we would all agree that. And he is a very good  
 13 scientific colleague and has many insights that are  
 14 different from others. His own expertise I think is an  
 15 additional contribution. So I think that's an example  
 16 where you get both benefits: the geographical experience  
 17 but also a different disciplinary background and that,  
 18 I think, was useful for everybody.

19 **Q.** Now, to be fair to you, and, to put the full context of  
 20 what Professor Young said, he stated that although SAGE  
 21 didn't have the full participation from Northern  
 22 Ireland, it was made aware through the CMO of the main  
 23 conclusions and advice. And I imagine there he's  
 24 referring to the informal and formal contacts you had  
 25 that you told us about yesterday?

91

1 wasn't a SAGE issue, that was much more to do with  
 2 operations policy and how ministers act.

3 I think this is -- in a sense, this is to get back  
 4 to what was SAGE for? To provide overarching, often  
 5 quite high level, pure scientific advice. It didn't  
 6 have a policy role and I think it's important to  
 7 separate that out.

8 **Q.** In terms of the geographical diversity of representation  
 9 on SAGE, on Monday Sir Patrick Vallance told us that one  
 10 of the things he would like to change in terms of the  
 11 scientific input from bodies like SAGE was to make sure  
 12 it got, in his words, the geographical diversity right.  
 13 Do you agree?

14 **A.** I do, but with a big caveat. If you've got a small --  
 15 if you've got a smallish group -- and we had a long  
 16 debate about this yesterday, I'm not going to repeat  
 17 it -- and if your aim is to have the best scientists in  
 18 the UK, potentially internationally, but certainly in  
 19 the UK, available, you have got to start with where are  
 20 the centres of expertise? And for almost, for any given  
 21 problem, sometimes they'll be in one part of the UK,  
 22 sometimes in another, and often they are highly  
 23 concentrated in particular areas, particularly at  
 24 universities or even particular departments. That's  
 25 just a scientific reality. And, whilst balancing the

90

1 **A.** The CMOs were together as a group very closely and  
 2 continuously.

3 **Q.** My question is this, though: do you agree that it's one  
 4 thing to be aware of the conclusions and advice of SAGE  
 5 and quite another, particularly if you don't have the  
 6 expertise within the particular discipline, to have  
 7 a complete understanding of the range in views and the  
 8 weight of opinion expressed within the scientific  
 9 discussions which led to those conclusions?

10 **A.** I do, and therefore I agree with Sir Patrick's comments.

11 **Q.** Now, in terms of how you relayed, no doubt to the best  
 12 of your ability, what was said to SAGE to your  
 13 Northern Ireland counterpoint, is there any record of  
 14 how that was done or was that one of the informal  
 15 contacts you told us about yesterday which weren't  
 16 recorded?

17 **A.** I can't recall but, I mean, I was obviously in continual  
 18 discussions with Sir Michael McBride and that was the  
 19 principal conduit. But the Chief Scientific Adviser's  
 20 network has different mechanisms for communicating  
 21 amongst itself. Most of these communications in both of  
 22 those things are actually unminuted. They're informal.  
 23 But they're still effective because people know one  
 24 another and have quite an effective communication.

25 **Q.** I was really trying to gauge what we have to look back

92

1 on. Presumably the WhatsApp we've looked at when  
2 Mr Weatherby asked you questions is one thing we might  
3 look at.

4 **A.** You might be able to, but this is, you know, going back  
5 to my repeated comment that WhatsApp is an appalling  
6 mechanism for trying to discuss technical issues. We  
7 didn't do very much technical stuff via WhatsApp unless  
8 it was extremely straightforward, like there had been  
9 three new cases or something of that kind. Something of  
10 greater scientific subtlety, which is what you're  
11 driving at, really WhatsApp would not be an appropriate  
12 approach to trying to do that.

13 **Q.** Thank you.

14 Next topic: the Independent SAGE made/observed that  
15 managing the risks of importing cases from other  
16 countries with the consequent high risk of transmission  
17 was vital. This should be introduced as soon as  
18 possible treating Great Britain and the island of  
19 Ireland as distinct health territories and then in the  
20 end went on to say that the government has decided that  
21 everyone coming to the UK, except those travelling from  
22 the Republic of Ireland or transport workers, should be  
23 required to self-isolate for a period of 14 days. They  
24 welcomed that measure, although pointed out that there  
25 was a serious loophole in that it would be possible for

93

1 **Q.** Yes.

2 **A.** So this policy document was the views of the  
3 distinguished members of Independent SAGE. They're  
4 perfectly entitled to their policy position, but it is  
5 not in my view, equivalent to a SAGE science document,  
6 would be the first point I'd make.

7 The second point I'd make, and I don't think --  
8 I think this is an obvious point, but as you've raised  
9 it, the question of the alignment of Northern Ireland  
10 with Great Britain or with the Republic of Ireland is  
11 one of the most politically difficult areas in UK  
12 politics. This is a policy issue and specifically  
13 a political issue of the first order, and it would have  
14 been very surprising, in my view, for SAGE or for me to  
15 be giving views of this kind unless expressly asked to  
16 by senior politicians who understood what they were  
17 trying to do. This is a very, very difficult area.

18 So I just want to say, you know, I don't in any way  
19 dispute the rights of members of Independent SAGE to  
20 take whatever policy position they wish, but it wasn't  
21 a science-driven position, in my view, at least not  
22 principally, and it was a very political issue.

23 **Q.** It was science driven, wasn't it, in the sense that  
24 you've accepted that epidemiologically the fact that  
25 there are two islands?

95

1 someone to fly from somewhere where the level of  
2 infection is very high, such as New York, to Dublin and  
3 then change planes to travel to London.

4 And then this is the point I really want to bring  
5 your attention to. They say for this and other reasons  
6 related to the extent of movement across the Irish  
7 border, it makes much more sense to treat the two main  
8 islands of Britain and Ireland as separate entities for  
9 human health purposes, as is already the case for animal  
10 health, or for the UK and the Republic of Ireland to  
11 agree a common approach. Plainly, there are political  
12 issues raised within that as well but do you agree that  
13 it would have made more sense for those responding to  
14 the pandemic in the UK to either treat the two main  
15 islands of Britain and Ireland as separate entities or  
16 for the UK and the Republic of Ireland to agree a common  
17 approach?

18 **A.** You kindly gave me advance sight of the document which  
19 you're referring to from Independent SAGE, as they  
20 self-referred. I think, if you read that document  
21 carefully, you will see it is much more easily described  
22 as a policy document than it is as a science document.  
23 If you compare that document to SAGE minutes -- now,  
24 this is not a criticism, it's simply a statement of  
25 where I think they are.

94

1 **A.** In very broad terms it was but there isn't a very clear  
2 chain of logic, in my view, going through that document  
3 and I read it quite carefully last night. I would  
4 invite others who doubt what I'm saying to read it  
5 themselves.

6 **Q.** Does it follow from what you've said that the  
7 observations and recommendations in that Independent  
8 SAGE report were not considered by SAGE itself?

9 **A.** Independent SAGE, despite the rather confusingly similar  
10 name, existed for a rather different purpose to SAGE,  
11 let me put it that way, and I wouldn't see it as  
12 principally a scientific input. It was the views of  
13 some distinguished scientists, many of whom I know, in  
14 fact all of whom I know, and some of whom are also  
15 members of SAGE, and gave their views directly through  
16 that.

17 But the idea that Independent SAGE was a scientific  
18 input in the way that, let us say, SPI-M, O or SPI-B  
19 were an academic input, or the Royal Society or the  
20 Academy of Medical Sciences, I think would be to  
21 misunderstand their role. And I think they would agree  
22 with that statement, I don't think they saw themselves  
23 as equivalent to the Royal Society or one of the  
24 subgroups of SAGE.

25 **Q.** So in short, no, but for the reasons you've just given?

96



1 **A.** Correct.

2 **Q.** Final question: can we have the technical report you  
3 helped produce in December 2022 on screen.  
4 That's INQ000130955, and it's page 218.  
5 At the bottom of that page, it is noted that  
6 Northern Ireland only initially had:  
7 "... a short pilot project involving contacting  
8 a sample of people who had a confirmed positive test ...  
9 before ..."  
10 And I quote:  
11 "... a full operational contact tracing service was  
12 implemented from May 2020."  
13 Would it be fair to say that as a mere pilot project  
14 the contact tracing scheme in Northern Ireland was less  
15 developed than in other parts of the UK at that stage?  
16 **A.** Well, so the first thing is the technical report on this  
17 area wasn't drawing any judgement, it was simply to --  
18 **Q.** (*Unclear: simultaneous speakers*)  
19 **A.** No, no, but I'm just trying to put context for those  
20 who, unlike you, have not read it. It was trying to put  
21 context for some subsequent scientific comments we  
22 wanted to make but we thought this background was  
23 important.  
24 I wouldn't actually judge that any of the scaled-up  
25 test and isolate systems across the UK were anything

97

1 the Welsh bereaved.

2 My questions relate this morning to the interactions  
3 with the devolved administrations and of course  
4 specifically Wales, but I'd like to focus on SAGE first  
5 and then we'll try, if we've got time, to look at a few  
6 more topics such as data.  
7 So focusing firstly on your role as co-chair of SAGE  
8 and actually the extent to which the devolved  
9 administrations were on an equal footing within SAGE,  
10 I want to focus on the very early days of the pandemic,  
11 if I may.  
12 So we understand from the evidence that we've  
13 already heard in this Inquiry that, apart from DA  
14 attendance at the first two SAGE meetings in 2020, and  
15 that didn't include the Welsh, which I'm sure you know,  
16 we understand there was no further representation of  
17 a DA on SAGE until 3 March 2020, and we understand that  
18 was the Deputy CMO for Scotland.  
19 So just focusing on Welsh representation, if you can  
20 assist, we also understand that in terms of Wales' Chief  
21 Scientific Adviser for Health, Dr Rob Orford, he first  
22 attended on 5 March 2020 and we understand this was the  
23 13th SAGE meeting concerned with Covid.  
24 So my questions are these on this topic: first of  
25 all, is that correct, according to your recollection?

99

1 other than quite tricky to begin with. The point this  
2 was making, and the reason we put it into the document,  
3 is every one of the four nations of the UK took  
4 a different approach to this, that each had strengths  
5 and weaknesses at an operational level and, as a result,  
6 that played through to different impacts in terms of its  
7 downward pressure on transmission. But the big  
8 scientific things, which include in particular that it's  
9 much less likely to pick up asymptomatic transmission if  
10 people are starting with symptoms and that it has much  
11 less impact once you've got a very high rate of  
12 transmission, very large numbers, and when you have very  
13 small numbers they were common of course across all four  
14 nations because they're technical aspects of all test,  
15 trace and isolate systems under all circumstances.  
16 **Q.** Professor, thank you very much. There may be follow-up  
17 questions from what you've just said, but they're more  
18 appropriate, I think, for other modules rather than  
19 today.  
20 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you very much, Mr Wilcock.  
21 **MR WILCOCK:** My Lady, I'm just going to move.  
22 **MR KEITH:** I was told Ms Heaven had moved. Ms Heaven.  
23 **Questions from MS HEAVEN**  
24 **MS HEAVEN:** Good morning, Sir Chris. I represent the Covid  
25 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru, so in other words

98

1 **A.** I'm sure your knowledge of this is better than mine on  
2 exactly the details -- it's quite a while ago -- about  
3 exactly who was in each meeting. So I'm absolutely  
4 taking your word for it.  
5 **Q.** Take my word, yes. That's what the documents show.  
6 So it is correct, then. Would you therefore agree  
7 that this clearly indicates that the DAs and the Welsh  
8 Government and their advisers in particular, because  
9 that's who I'm interested in, were not included in SAGE  
10 meetings in the very early stages of the pandemic when  
11 they should have been?  
12 **A.** I think there are quite -- and I think this, in a sense,  
13 I've implied this but I'll state it more explicitly, in  
14 comments with your colleague from Northern Ireland.  
15 I think, as with many things, in the rather chaotic  
16 starting point when we were dealing with Covid at the  
17 beginning, if we were to re-do this again that is  
18 something we'd have done much more quickly and it was  
19 very useful to have the inputs of Dr Orford and Fliss  
20 Bennee and others from Wales.  
21 The representations people had in a sense were under  
22 two criteria, and some people had both, one of which was  
23 as observers, because it was a necessary part of the job  
24 of that organisation to be an observer. At this point  
25 many government departments, for example, were also not

100

1 observers who subsequently became observers. I'm not  
 2 drawing a parallel, I'm just saying that the system was  
 3 much less well developed than it subsequently became.  
 4 And then the second was identifying over time, SAGE was  
 5 initially a very small group of people and, as we  
 6 discussed yesterday, my view is it should have, and did,  
 7 expand out relatively quickly but in February it was  
 8 still pretty small.

9 I think having the addition of the inputs from  
 10 scientists from Wales was undoubtedly a benefit, and  
 11 they provided useful challenge in general as well as  
 12 insights from Wales. So, you know, it is something, if  
 13 we were doing this again, we'd have done differently,  
 14 that's for sure.

15 **Q.** Thank you. Well, I want to move it on then to some  
 16 comments that we have before the Inquiry from the First  
 17 Minister for Wales, Mark Drakeford, in a little bit more  
 18 detail. I won't bring it up on the screen to save time  
 19 but, for my Lady's note, this is paragraphs 30 to 31 of  
 20 Mr Drakeford's first witness statement.

21 And so Sir Chris I'll read to you for a moment and  
 22 then we'll break down some of the elements of what he  
 23 has to say. So it's this, and this is about the early  
 24 days and their involvement in SAGE. He says:

25 "I'm a strong supporter of the concept of SAGE but  
 101

1 your response, the first issue that he seems to be  
 2 raising is the lack of the reliable protocol and the  
 3 enhanced SAGE guidance essentially meaning the Welsh  
 4 Government had to go to COBR to get the SAGE advice and  
 5 they couldn't ask for SAGE advice unless they went  
 6 through COBR. So do you want to respond to that first,  
 7 please?

8 **A.** Yes, and I think I can almost short-cut out conversation  
 9 because, in a sense, you've got two separate groups of  
 10 things. There's a group of things which is about Wales  
 11 being represented both in access to the data that  
 12 already flowed from SAGE and in coming to the meetings,  
 13 and I think my previous comments on that apply which is  
 14 if we were doing this again we would do it differently.  
 15 It doesn't mean that there weren't very close -- again,  
 16 I had very close and often daily contacts with  
 17 Dr Frank Atherton, Dr Chris Jones, and others from the  
 18 chief medical officers group and there were other  
 19 contacts as well. So it wasn't that Wales was not  
 20 involved in discussions but you're right and exactly the  
 21 same applies as my previous comments was, yes, we should  
 22 have done that earlier.

23 The point about going through COBR, and I think this  
 24 is -- in this pandemic, more than any other, I would  
 25 say, SAGE got disconnected from the COBR mechanism. So  
 103

1 unfortunately there was no reliable protocol which made  
 2 it clear that SAGE worked for all four nations, not just  
 3 England. Enhanced SAGE guidance meant that the Welsh  
 4 Government, number one, had to ask COBR to make the SAGE  
 5 advice available to the Welsh Government and, number  
 6 two, could not ask SAGE to carry out bespoke research  
 7 for it without prior agreement from COBR. I consider  
 8 that from the very beginning the information flow should  
 9 have been made readily available to Wales and all the  
 10 devolved nations just as they were to England. In  
 11 addition, Wales should have had an equal right to go to  
 12 SAGE and to commission specific pieces of work,  
 13 for example ..."

14 And he says the Welsh Government were not invited to  
 15 the precautionary SAGE on 22 January 2020 but they got  
 16 an update to a SAGE mailbox that they had.

17 Another criticism he makes is that the scientific  
 18 papers received by SAGE were not shared with the  
 19 Welsh Government and in the early days they only got  
 20 summaries of the science as it emerged, and it would  
 21 have been useful for them to have had more. And he says  
 22 that they were only finally given access through an  
 23 online repository of SAGE documents as late as 8 April  
 24 2020.

25 So if we just break that down and then I can ask for  
 102

1 in kind of emergency theological terms SAGE is the  
 2 adviser to COBR, but actually COBR stopped meeting for  
 3 quite long periods of this emergency and SAGE continued  
 4 and was giving advice via other routes. So initially it  
 5 was all started from what is the COBR mechanism, how do  
 6 it through COBR? After a while, it became clear that  
 7 really wasn't relevant.

8 So that's around observer status documents and so  
 9 on, I think all the comments made are fair comments,  
 10 Mr Drakeford of course being very fair on this issue.

11 The second set of comments I have more caution  
 12 about, which was the idea that the Welsh Government, and  
 13 indeed any other bit of the system, could ask the  
 14 already massively overwhelmed modelling and  
 15 epidemiological system we had specific questions about  
 16 Wales because, if you make that assumption for Wales,  
 17 you have to make it for multiple other groups as well.  
 18 You can't just say for Wales and not for and list a long  
 19 list of other ones. And this would have been, I think,  
 20 much more problematic but we could certainly have had  
 21 the discussion about how that capacity could in some way  
 22 have been met.

23 So I think both the requests that Mr Drakeford makes  
 24 are reasonable ones. One of them should have happened;  
 25 the other one, I think, would have been harder, but for  
 104

1 largely logistical reasons.

2 **Q.** Just focusing on that date of 8 April 20, do you accept  
3 that that really was a bit late in terms of the online  
4 repository for documents to actually be available?

5 **A.** That follows from my previous answer, yes.

6 **Q.** Thank you.

7 So let's move on to the issue of data. You've been  
8 asked a moment ago by my learned friend about the  
9 evidence we've heard on and opinions given on  
10 geographical diversity on SAGE. I want to move on to  
11 a slightly different issue and that's the use of data by  
12 SAGE and whether this drew on the experiences in the  
13 devolved administrations.

14 So the Inquiry has heard evidence from Ailsa  
15 Henderson, a professor in political science, and she  
16 told the Inquiry that SAGE focused overwhelmingly on  
17 data from England, which she said was often described  
18 from her review of the papers as UK data, and she made  
19 the observation, and obviously one might see it as  
20 a criticism, that if an organisation such as SAGE does  
21 not have someone in possession of Scottish or Welsh data  
22 in the room, then the evidence base is partial.

23 So first of all, do you agree with that criticism of  
24 SAGE, that it did focus overwhelmingly on data from  
25 England? And if so, do you think that SAGE was overly

105

1 four nations, or at least each of the other three  
2 nations other than England, took slightly different  
3 approaches to the extent to which they did their own  
4 analysis or relied on a UK-wide analysis and at what  
5 level. But that gets us into levels of complexity  
6 I think my Lady would probably find were not appropriate  
7 at this point in time.

8 **Q.** But I think to some extent you might be agreeing with  
9 some of the thrust of what has been said by Professor  
10 Henderson but giving it a slightly more contextual  
11 explanation, if I put it like that, as to why that might  
12 have happened?

13 **A.** Yes, I would hold to my previous answer.

14 **Q.** Okay.

15 Now moving on then, please, you gave some positive  
16 evidence yesterday about the collaboration that you had  
17 with the DAs CMOs and I think you referenced 274  
18 meetings. Now, we know there came a point when steps to  
19 responding to the pandemic in UK Government diverged ed  
20 from what the DAs were doing. I'll just give you two  
21 examples that are very relevant to Wales.

22 In May 2020 in Wales we had Stay at Home whilst in  
23 England we had Stay Alert, and obviously, as you know,  
24 on 27 October 2020 Wales had its 17-day firebreak whilst  
25 England started a four-week national lockdown, and this

107

1 confined to an England-centric perspective?

2 **A.** Well, I think there's a very complicated answer to that,  
3 and I'm going to give you a simple answer but I'm very  
4 happy to go into the complexity if you want.

5 **LADY HALLETT:** Simple.

6 **MS HEAVEN:** Yes, I've got 15 minutes.

7 **A.** Yeah. So the simple answer is that the modellers and  
8 the data were taken from wherever you could get  
9 modellers and data. Data flows, even within England,  
10 were very problematic, as I think multiple witnesses  
11 have said, and I'll repeat it: they were very  
12 problematic, and that was part of the reason we had  
13 trouble in the first three months. Getting data flows  
14 from elsewhere in the UK also had challenges.

15 So there were actual data acquisition questions.  
16 There's also the four UK CMOs have absolute parity, in  
17 my view, but data is based on numbers and numerically  
18 there are many more people in England than Wales and  
19 therefore numerically of course you're going to have  
20 a greater dominance in terms of -- I don't mean in terms  
21 of any sense, other than narrowly, the numbers will be  
22 larger from England even were we to have good data from  
23 all four nations.

24 Now, as the pandemic progressed we got better and  
25 better data from different areas. Also, each of the

106

1 caused particular concerns around the border areas and  
2 risk of spread into Wales which I think was raised in  
3 COBR on 12 October 2020.

4 So my question is this: where there were proposed  
5 divergences in policy, such as the examples I've given  
6 you, were these discussed by CMOS in advance of policy  
7 implementation to consider the consequences of  
8 divergence and what advice should be given and, if they  
9 were, can you give an example involving Wales, please?

10 **A.** The UK CMOs wherever possible discussed all the science  
11 of things. We were aware of what the policy discussions  
12 were in each of the four nations. We absolutely felt  
13 I certainly felt, that the discussion should at that  
14 point then become the discussion between the CMO in  
15 Wales, Sir Frank, and the Welsh Government, same in  
16 Scotland and Northern Ireland. It wasn't for me to  
17 opine on what the policy position should be, given I had  
18 no responsibilities in those nations.

19 So essentially the science discussions were  
20 collective. The policy decisions were separate. Where  
21 we were able to and felt this wasn't running against  
22 political direction, we would share what other people  
23 were doing because it was useful to understand for  
24 exactly the reasons you give, there are border areas,  
25 there are a variety of other issues, but we had to be

108

1 careful that we didn't in any sense get entangled into  
2 politics and there were some political issues involved  
3 in this, perfectly legitimately, and we needed to  
4 stay -- steer clear of those.

5 **Q.** So does that mean that you didn't see it as your role as  
6 CMO as having a co-ordinating function in terms of the  
7 four nations approach?

8 **A.** I saw my role as to ensure that, as all the other CMOs  
9 did, that we had a collective scientific view, except  
10 where that scientifically made sense to be different.  
11 I fully saw that the correct discussion between the CMO  
12 and the nation or country involved was done within the  
13 nations.

14 **Q.** Now, this final question topic flows from the topic  
15 we've just looked at, and again it's from your  
16 statement -- we don't need to go to it -- but it's your  
17 first statement, page 73, paragraph 5.193 for the note.  
18 And there you talk about these debates around  
19 differences. You say:

20 "There were no instances I can recall where there  
21 was a significant scientific disagreement between UK  
22 CMOs, although we often tested one another's thinking."

23 And you say:

24 "Internally, the points of emphasis were different."

25 So can I just ask you this: can you give us an

109

1 that is the way that we tried to operate where there  
2 were difficult issues.

3 But I think we could go through multiple examples  
4 where we would test one another's ideas and might start  
5 from a different position and then debated it and  
6 I think that's the appropriate scientific approach.

7 **MS HEAVEN:** Well, thank you very much. Those are my  
8 questions, my Lady.

9 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you Ms Heaven. I'm afraid I'm going to  
10 have to ask everybody to stick to their time. I know  
11 it's not easy.

12 Ms Mitchell.

#### 13 Questions from MS MITCHELL KC

14 **MS MITCHELL:** Professor Whitty, I appear as instructed by  
15 Aamer Anwar & Company for the Scottish Covid Bereaved.

16 In your witness statement at paragraph 277 --  
17 I don't need that brought up, but just for my Lady's  
18 notes -- you said that you felt that when the views of  
19 other CMOs, the CMOs from the devolved administrations,  
20 were important for UK ministers to hear, you fed those  
21 in to your advice; is that correct?

22 **A.** That is correct. Where I felt they would be happy for  
23 me to do so.

24 **Q.** Indeed. Can I ask, please, about early March 2000(sic)  
25 and the question of mass gatherings. Now, we've heard

111

1 example so far as you can remember of testing the  
2 thinking in respect of the Welsh CMO or any other Welsh  
3 scientific adviser or any other points of emphasis that  
4 were different with them?

5 **A.** So there are quite a few examples and I wouldn't -- you  
6 know, some of them are rather arcane. Let's take one  
7 that was extremely important and very, very important we  
8 got right, which was the decision about, you know, the  
9 relative benefits and harms of vaccinating children and  
10 were the benefits sufficiently greater than any  
11 potential harms that they would be a sensible thing to  
12 do.

13 Each of the four CMOs came at this with slightly  
14 different starting points. Sir Frank certainly had  
15 a different position to everyone else. We each did have  
16 a different position. We then -- the way we dealt with  
17 this one, because it was a very difficult, very close  
18 call thing, is we consulted the presidents of all the  
19 Royal Colleges across the UK. We consulted the  
20 directors of public health in our jurisdictions and  
21 various academics and then we came to a collective view.

22 So that's an example where essentially we start from  
23 positions that are slightly different, appropriately  
24 different, tested one another's views, take external  
25 advice, and then make a collective view. In a sense,

110

1 quite a lot about mass gatherings. I don't need to go  
2 into that in any detail.

3 What I would like to know from you is were there  
4 different views expressed by the Scottish CMO in  
5 relation to mass gatherings and were they passed on to  
6 the UK ministers?

7 **A.** I honestly can't actually recall, and I'd need forward  
8 notification of that kind of question about exactly what  
9 his views were at that point in time.

10 **Q.** Okay.

11 So I wonder if we could have before the Inquiry  
12 INQ000129230. This is a text communication between  
13 Boris Johnson and Matt Hancock, and Matt Hancock states:

14 "I spoke to Chris Whitty at length about your  
15 concerns about the comms tomorrow getting over  
16 complicated. He thinks there is a really simple way of  
17 describing what we want people to do in future based on:  
18 from Monday if you're ill stay home.

19 "He is going to make sure that by Cobr we're in  
20 a good solid position.

21 "However, he also thinks that the Scots are going  
22 soft on mass gatherings -- and ... Nicola has decided  
23 she definitely wants to move on some totemic  
24 cancellations."

25 Now, of course, Professor Whitty, I appreciate that

112

1 these are not your words directly, these are the words  
2 of Matt Hancock to Mr Johnson, so the words of the  
3 Health Secretary to the Prime Minister, reporting  
4 purportedly what you said.

5 Do the comments on "going soft" and the phraseology  
6 "totemic" reflect your views at that time?

7 **A.** So I can say with some confidence that many of the  
8 reflections that other people reporting my views are not  
9 actually reporting what I would have said at the time.  
10 I certainly would have not used a phrase like "going  
11 soft". That would be the interpretation of Mr Hancock,  
12 perfectly appropriate if he wants, but my view might  
13 well have been, therefore, and in a sense this is  
14 answering your previous question, I must be identifying  
15 that I felt that in Scotland there was greater concern  
16 about mass gatherings than in England. I think that's  
17 a perfectly appropriate thing to state as a point of  
18 fact, provided I didn't think it was breaching any  
19 confidence that was given.

20 So do not take those words as my words or my views,  
21 take the general point that I'm making the point that  
22 actually there may be differences of opinion across the  
23 UK, which I think again is a reasonable thing to do.

24 **Q.** And so from that what we can glean is that you may have  
25 passed on the difference because of this text message?

113

1 **Q.** Moving on to a further issue, and it's an issue which  
2 has already been touched on by other core participants,  
3 and that is data problems.

4 In your technical report, the report you mentioned  
5 yesterday that is to be used by future CMOs and  
6 Deputy CMOs in the instance of a next pandemic, you've  
7 provided a technical report in that regard. I don't  
8 need that to be brought up, my Lady, but for reference  
9 the number is INQ000203933.

10 What I would like you to focus on here is that the  
11 first reflection and advice for a future government,  
12 Government Chief Scientific Adviser or GMO, is that  
13 scientific and medical advice will often need to be  
14 formulated on the basis of limited data.

15 Now, communications and data are something which  
16 we've heard quite a lot about already. We've heard two  
17 different things about Scotland. The first thing is  
18 that there were problems getting data from Scotland at  
19 the start of the pandemic, and the second is that there  
20 was a dataset called Eve 2 which was obtained and  
21 Patrick Vallance spoke highly of that.

22 What I'd like to ask you about is the first part,  
23 the difficulties in getting data. Do you recall that  
24 there was such a difficulty in getting data from  
25 Scotland?

115

1 **A.** Well, as I made clear in my statement, where I felt that  
2 wasn't breaching a confidentiality point or where  
3 I thought there was going to be no issues, I had no  
4 illusions that some of the issues that were being  
5 involved were political and, where I thought that was  
6 political, I stayed well clear of it and if I had  
7 information would keep it to myself. Sometimes I knew  
8 things that political leaders in England did not know or  
9 in the UK Government did not know and it was appropriate  
10 that I didn't pass them on. I will have taken the  
11 judgement that it was a perfectly reasonable thing to  
12 do, having presumably discussed this with Sir Gregor.

13 So I think all of these things, it's appropriate  
14 provided you make very clear in your own mind when  
15 something is a political or when it is an in confidence  
16 discussion and when it is simply a description of fact.

17 **Q.** I see. I think in fairness to you, to reflect your  
18 position now to the Inquiry, yesterday you gave evidence  
19 that whilst the advice to not shut down mass gatherings  
20 was technically correct, it was also logically  
21 incoherent and not helpful in alerting the public that  
22 at this time, ie March 2020, things should be anything  
23 but normality?

24 **A.** Yeah, that is exactly what I said and I still think  
25 that.

114

1 **A.** Well, in a sense, I would agree with both parts of your  
2 statement, first of which is I think the data in  
3 Scotland was some of the best in the UK but, secondly,  
4 that getting data into wider datasets, getting it used  
5 by the right people, proved very difficult and I think  
6 if you look -- you will have read this report,  
7 obviously, that you're just quoted -- there's an entire  
8 chapter about the difficulties of getting data not just  
9 across national boundaries but also within every nation.  
10 So this issue of trying to get data brought together so  
11 that you can actually merge it.

12 Now what Covid did demonstrate really clearly was  
13 when you achieve that you can get far better information  
14 for all four nations than if you are trying to do  
15 everything in piecemeal where every single hospital,  
16 every single region is holding its own data and not  
17 sharing it. So the sharing of data was one of the most  
18 powerful things we achieved both between nations and  
19 within nations.

20 **Q.** May I ask you about that achievement and how it came  
21 about. Firstly, just on this particular question, were  
22 you aware that there was a particular issue about data  
23 from Scotland, there being some kind of problem sharing  
24 it with the group?

25 **A.** I was aware that there were problems with data across

116

1 multiple domains, including Scotland, but also I could  
 2 have given a very long list from many parts of England,  
 3 indeed other nations.

4 **Q.** Were you aware of the specific nature of that  
 5 difficulty?

6 **A.** I may or may not have been. It would have depended what  
 7 kind of data it was, remembering that there is -- again,  
 8 a point I made yesterday, there's only one of me and  
 9 I was trying to operate in multiple domains. So some of  
 10 the details of this I may not have been aware of. The  
 11 person who's probably best able to answer this is  
 12 Professor Andrew Morris, who is both head of HDR UK,  
 13 which is the UK-wide data approach, and chaired the  
 14 Scottish Scientific Group and I think he would be in  
 15 a strong position to answer this question more  
 16 accurately.

17 **Q.** Thank you. Given that, I will move on from there.  
 18 Moving on, I want to ask you about a matter which  
 19 I raised with Sir Patrick Vallance when he gave evidence  
 20 and he said it would be better if I posed the question  
 21 to you, so I am now doing so.

22 On Monday I asked Sir Patrick Vallance about an  
 23 entry in his notes, that entry is INQ000273901. My Lady  
 24 latterly granted authority for that and the document is  
 25 available.

117

1 face-masks specifically. So I may be missing something.  
 2 So, in my view, I think the statement that the CMOs  
 3 worked together to get a document which we were all  
 4 pleased with I think is correct. I can't see how that  
 5 actually links on to the point about face masks  
 6 previously but please correct me if you know otherwise.

7 **Q.** No, thank you for that. We can perhaps then move on  
 8 slightly to the next question, which is: why would it be  
 9 recorded that you'd worked hard to do that? Does that  
 10 give us any understanding of the dynamics of what was  
 11 going on at the time, the decisions that were being  
 12 taken?

13 **A.** Decisions about children going back to school were  
 14 extraordinarily important for parents, for wider  
 15 families, for children, for teachers and for unions. We  
 16 really wanted to get it right and I think Sir Patrick  
 17 was aware of the fact. This wasn't because of major  
 18 disagreement, this was because we wanted to get this  
 19 right because it really mattered to people, and I think  
 20 I would encourage people who are concerned about why  
 21 would we take time on this to read that document. It's  
 22 not a sort of two paragraph one, it's quite a clear  
 23 laying out of the strengths and weaknesses of different  
 24 approaches, and that was not a trivial thing for us to  
 25 do and we needed to do it in a way that also paid regard

119

1 The extract from Sir Patrick Vallance's notebooks on  
 2 24/8/2020 says:  
 3 "Scotland breaks ranks over face coverings and  
 4 schools despite CMO having worked hard to get all CMOs  
 5 aligned to a very good statement released the day  
 6 before."  
 7 Now, I'd like to ask you in particular about this.  
 8 What I would like to establish with you, first of all,  
 9 was: what was the agreement that was come to the day  
 10 before it is said Scotland broke ranks?

11 **A.** So having heard your question and Sir Patrick's hospital  
 12 pass to me, but a fair one, on this I went back and  
 13 looked at what document I thought he was referring to.  
 14 As far as I can tell, this is a joint statement that the  
 15 CMOs made on education in general. It was not about  
 16 face masks specifically -- please tell me if I'm wrong  
 17 on this -- and it was a document, I actually think it's  
 18 one of the documents I feel was one of the best joint  
 19 CMO documents because it laid out for parents and for  
 20 teachers and for the wider public the benefits and the  
 21 potential disbenefits of children going back to school  
 22 at a point there was a lot of worry about this from  
 23 parents, from teachers, from unions and others, and it  
 24 laid out a whole series of areas.

25 I couldn't find in that a joint statement on

118

1 to the fact, for example, that the Scottish educational  
 2 system is different to the English one, and indeed Welsh  
 3 and Northern Ireland one, and went back on a different  
 4 date. So in fact the date of the document was driven,  
 5 in part, by Scottish educational timetables rather than  
 6 English educational timetables.

7 So I think his point that there was hard work  
 8 reflects just that, hard work. It doesn't reflect  
 9 disagreement; it reflects the fact we wanted to get this  
 10 right as a joint statement from us.

11 **Q.** So that work having been done, the hard work having been  
 12 done in that, what then of the fact that very, very  
 13 shortly after that it is said that Scotland broke ranks?  
 14 The question I want to ask you is: when the change was  
 15 made, did you speak to the Scottish CMO about it, and if  
 16 so what did she say?

17 **A.** What's the date here?

18 **Q.** So the date of -- the date -- hang on a second. The  
 19 date is 24/8/2020. So just before schools were going  
 20 back in Scotland, which I think --

21 **A.** So I think Sir Gregor was -- by this stage, was the CMO,  
 22 from memory. Honestly, I can't recall exactly what our  
 23 debates would have been. My view on this one would have  
 24 been that the general principles of face coverings and  
 25 their impact on the epidemic were a shared view for

120

1 SAGE. It was a difficult area on which a lot of people  
 2 had strong views actually in both directions and then  
 3 the issues around their specific use in schools and  
 4 then, within that, divided into communal areas and  
 5 classrooms were quite highly debated. I cannot recall  
 6 exactly at that point in time where different people  
 7 were on their relative balance between the benefits of  
 8 face-masks and the potential disadvantages of using them  
 9 in an educational setting and I think it would be  
 10 a mistake for me to try and speculate what either my  
 11 view or Sir Gregor's view over that were at that point.  
 12 **Q.** Yes, you've made that clear, but my question to you was:  
 13 did you speak to the Scottish CMO about the change, and  
 14 if so what was said?  
 15 **A.** I can't recall. I mean, this is a long time ago now.  
 16 **Q.** Thank you.  
 17 **A.** I had so many conversations with the CMO trying to  
 18 remember exactly which one happened is difficult.  
 19 **MS MITCHELL:** I wonder if my Lady would allow me to follow  
 20 up one question? I'm thinking --  
 21 **LADY HALLETT:** All right, Ms Mitchell, you've been very good  
 22 but we are --  
 23 **MS MITCHELL:** I'm still within time, my Lady, only just.  
 24 Given the various conversations that have been had  
 25 about the fact that you don't remember various  
 121

1 **THE WITNESS:** I will do my best, my Lady.  
 2 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you.  
 3 **Questions from PROFESSOR THOMAS KC**  
 4 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** Good afternoon, Professor Whitty. My  
 5 name is Leslie Thomas and I act on behalf of the  
 6 Federation of Ethnic Minority Healthcare Organisations.  
 7 A small handful of questions for you. I won't  
 8 detain you very long. Now, just a little context, we  
 9 recognise the challenges faced by various communities,  
 10 particularly those from Black, Asian and minority ethnic  
 11 backgrounds during the pandemic.  
 12 Now, as I delve into the specifics, I'm going to  
 13 first focus on the broader landscape, okay. So can we  
 14 agree on this. Can we agree that effective and timely  
 15 communication plays a crucial role in managing a public  
 16 health crisis?  
 17 **A.** That's obviously true.  
 18 **Q.** Yes. And given the commitment to enhancing public  
 19 health communications, would you agree that exploring  
 20 ways to improve messaging for specific communities such  
 21 as black, Asian and minority ethnic groups is crucial  
 22 for ensuring widespread understanding and compliance?  
 23 **A.** I do. And I go further than that in my statement, and  
 24 have done previously, in saying that I think this was  
 25 something we didn't do effectively at the beginning,  
 123

1 conversations, and absolutely no criticism can be made  
 2 of that, would it be an idea that all of these sorts of  
 3 discussions that are were recorded?  
 4 **A.** Well, the number of conversations I was having with my  
 5 CMO colleagues -- and I hope you would see this as  
 6 a positive thing rather than a negative thing -- were  
 7 continuous and often at very short notice. Recording  
 8 every single conversation you have is quite onerous.  
 9 So, as with many areas, my view is when we came to  
 10 a decision or we gave a piece of guidance that was  
 11 recorded and in fact I consider the record we just  
 12 discussed to be a very good record of a long debate we  
 13 had. Recording every single element along that debate  
 14 would have been -- would have slowed it down and made it  
 15 extraordinarily difficult during an emergency.  
 16 So whilst it would be useful to a subsequent  
 17 inquiry, its utility during -- it would have had  
 18 a negative effect on actually effectively trying to run  
 19 the emergency is my actual view.  
 20 **MS MITCHELL:** I'm obliged, my Lady.  
 21 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Ms Mitchell.  
 22 Mr Thomas. The questions are going to come from  
 23 behind you, but don't worry, all the advocates are used  
 24 to the idea. Okay. The point is just make sure that  
 25 you keep speaking to the microphone.  
 122

1 arguably could have done better throughout, but  
 2 I completely agree with that point.  
 3 **Q.** Okay, so you've pre-empted my next question, I'll just  
 4 put it for the record: that the public health messaging  
 5 in this case should and could have been improved?  
 6 **A.** Correct.  
 7 **Q.** We can agree that?  
 8 **A.** I -- we agree, yeah.  
 9 **Q.** All right, let me move on then.  
 10 Building --  
 11 **A.** And additionally -- I would like to add an additional  
 12 point, because I think it's important. Members of --  
 13 who you represent, did an absolutely astonishingly good  
 14 job at helping to ensure that did happen. It shouldn't  
 15 have relied just on them, I fully would acknowledge  
 16 that, but I do also want to acknowledge the work that  
 17 they did in -- often in their communities or more  
 18 widely, at various points along the pandemic. So  
 19 I think it's important to acknowledge that.  
 20 **Q.** Well, Professor, can I thank you for that, and I'm sure  
 21 that those I represent will take those kind words on  
 22 board.  
 23 Let me move on. I'm sure we can agree on this next  
 24 point. We can agree that understanding the factors  
 25 contributing to communication failures with ethnic and  
 124

1 linguistic minority communities is essential to address  
 2 and to rectify for future cases and future issues; we  
 3 can agree that, yes?  
 4 **A.** Yes, and from an early stage I completely recognised  
 5 that, and one of the things I did earlier on, I did  
 6 several other things, was to commission  
 7 Professor Kevin Fenton to do a report looking at some of  
 8 these issues. So we did quantitative data looking at  
 9 the relative risks in ethnic minority groups of  
 10 different sorts, but we also did qualitative data  
 11 discussing with communities and trying to understand  
 12 very much these issues.

13 So I completely agree with the point you're making,  
 14 I'm just saying we were alive to this certainly from  
 15 early April 2020.

16 **Q.** Can I just ask this: given the acknowledgement and your  
 17 candidness, I've just got to ask this question on behalf  
 18 of those I represent: what were the factors that  
 19 contributed to the failures? What happened?

20 **A.** Well, to give a -- there are several good reports which  
 21 I could direct you to, the first of which was  
 22 Professor Fenton's one, which I think is really worth  
 23 reading, but there have been several subsequent so I'm  
 24 not going to précis what I think were excellent pieces  
 25 of work, but I think there are two or three ones. There

125

1 **Q.** Thank you for that. I'm going to move on. I have just  
 2 a couple of minutes left, and I just have a couple more  
 3 questions for you.

4 Considering the multifaceted nature of the  
 5 challenges posed by the pandemic, would you agree that  
 6 it's important to assess whether the risk factor of  
 7 economic disadvantage was effectively addressed to  
 8 ensure comprehensive public health measures? What's  
 9 your view on that?

10 **A.** Well, I think in a sense the implication behind that,  
 11 which I agree with, is that some of, not all of, what  
 12 drove the differential impact of Covid on some people in  
 13 ethnic minority groups was underlying socioeconomic  
 14 disadvantage. There were many others. Actually, again,  
 15 I would point you to Professor Fenton's and various  
 16 other reports. But those are -- you know, what this  
 17 also demonstrated is that these are often people living  
 18 in communities where other areas of public health are  
 19 also not adequate, and I think Covid's shone a spotlight  
 20 on some of the areas of the country where we have the  
 21 greatest need, I think, to invest in public health for  
 22 exactly the reasons you're giving.

23 **Q.** Some might use the word "structural inequalities"?

24 **A.** That's one framing of it, yeah.

25 **Q.** All right, let me move on.

127

1 are very easy ones, in one sense, not as easy as they  
 2 may always sound, which are things like linguistic ones,  
 3 if you do it -- if you -- you know, not every major  
 4 language spoken in the UK was adequately picked up at  
 5 an early stage in terms of communications.

6 There were ones around channels of communication,  
 7 that many people, for example, were getting their  
 8 information not from Downing Street broadcasting or from  
 9 UK mainstream newspapers but from other important  
 10 newspaper -- news outlets from other nations. We didn't  
 11 pick that up I think early enough.

12 I think there are many issues where engaging with  
 13 local community leaders who can then help to get the  
 14 message to be understood correctly in an appropriate and  
 15 culturally sensitive way would have been much more  
 16 helpful, and this is where your members had such  
 17 a leadership role throughout the pandemic at multiple  
 18 points.

19 But there are a very large number of ones that sit  
 20 beneath those and I -- you know, I would -- you know,  
 21 given an hour I would given you again an hour's answer  
 22 for what is an important question, I just don't want --  
 23 I want to acknowledge I'm not doing it justice but also  
 24 say a lot of work was done on this. I -- still more  
 25 I think to learn.

126

1 Last area, and I'm going to look at this last area  
 2 through the lens of hindsight, okay? Can we agree that  
 3 it was at least possible to attempt to predict that  
 4 certain groups would be at higher risk, including  
 5 healthcare workers, you know, from minority or  
 6 minoritised groups, fairly early on in this pandemic?  
 7 Can we agree that?

8 **A.** I think it was possible to agree -- well, I think it was  
 9 possible to predict and I have gone into this in some  
 10 detail in my statement, so can I point your members to  
 11 my statement so they can see a full answer to this.

12 It was certainly possible to identify the fact there  
 13 would be areas of -- there would be people,  
 14 disadvantaged groups, who would be particularly  
 15 affected. My view then and subsequently is that not all  
 16 of them were fully predictable, including some of the  
 17 impacts of ethnic minority -- ethnicity absent the  
 18 socioeconomic deprivation points that you've previously  
 19 made. I think that was a more complicated area and that  
 20 took longer for us to unravel and properly to  
 21 understand, and therefore, more importantly, to work out  
 22 what we could do to address.

23 **Q.** But those areas which you could reasonably predict and  
 24 anticipate leads to this final question: once certain  
 25 areas could be predicted, right, what proactive steps

128



1 and measures were taken to protect those groups based on  
2 those protections?

3 **A.** Remembering that this is a highly contagious infection,  
4 the single most important thing to protect every group  
5 was to get Covid down in the entire community. Without  
6 doing that everything else falls by the wayside. So  
7 that was the single priority at the beginning.

8 As things went on, I was very, very keen to identify  
9 these points, and again laid out in my statement the  
10 multiple steps we took to try to understand this. And,  
11 you know, I accept the point you're making, but I think  
12 at the beginning the absolute priority was to pull down  
13 Covid rates in everybody, across the whole community.  
14 That is the best way to protect everybody.

15 **Q.** Professor, I accept what you say, but that "one size  
16 fits all" approach leaves particular groups to certain  
17 vulnerabilities, would you accept that?

18 **A.** Not at the very beginning. At the beginning you have to  
19 get the rates down for everybody, and in my view that  
20 was the overwhelming need.

21 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** Professor, thank you, that's all my  
22 questions.

23 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Mr Thomas, I'm sorry to have to be  
24 harsh with you.

25 **PROFESSOR THOMAS:** No, no, no, I've come to the end.  
129

1 the principal route by which we were trying to have  
2 these discussions about how to reduce the risks to  
3 people living with disabilities actually occurred in the  
4 first instance, and there were many things subsequently,  
5 through the shielding mechanism. And there were quite  
6 long discussions, which I did not lead on this occasion,  
7 because I -- apologies, I'm walking towards -- speaking  
8 into the microphone -- there were quite long discussions  
9 which I did not lead on this occasion but I was  
10 absolutely abreast of to try to work out what those  
11 groups are, and you can see the first shielding  
12 mechanism where we identified several groups living with  
13 disabilities and then a subsequent improvement on that  
14 first version which identified some additional ones  
15 subsequent to that.

16 **Q.** So I'm going to move on from it, but just to check,  
17 understood that answer but my question apropos what  
18 you've said in paragraph 11.12 is: did you have  
19 discussions directly with colleagues who came from  
20 disabled groups?

21 **A.** I had -- the reason I'm not giving a "yes" or "no"  
22 answer is I can't recall exactly which groups, and  
23 I think one of the problems I would have here is some  
24 groups would be explicitly identified as disabled groups  
25 and others would have a lot of people living with  
131

1 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Friedman, and I'm going to be harsh with  
2 you too, I am afraid.

3 **Questions from MR FRIEDMAN KC**

4 **MR FRIEDMAN:** I was going to say thank you, my Lady.

5 Sir Christopher, I act for four national disabled  
6 people's organisations. To save time, I'm just going to  
7 read from your Module 2 statement, that's Inquiry number  
8 INQ000251645, at page 204, paragraph 11.12, and it  
9 follows on from some of the questions you've just asked,  
10 because you say there:

11 "I was ... involved in discussions with healthcare  
12 colleagues from multiple ethnic minority and other  
13 cultural groups to get their insights into the  
14 experience of the communities they had closest links  
15 with, and to identify possible countermeasures to  
16 COVID-19 in those communities."

17 You give some exhibits as examples there and they're  
18 both dated March 2021, and you've given evidence just  
19 now, in effect, that this should have been done better  
20 and sooner, and we can see what you've said on the  
21 transcript. So my question for you is: did you have  
22 such discussions with healthcare colleagues from  
23 disabled groups?

24 **A.** I had discussions with people from multiple groups,  
25 I can't remember exactly which individual groups, but  
130

1 disabilities but would not be in that group, so I think  
2 it's -- the answer is I'd need to check, if that's  
3 a central question.

4 **Q.** Let me move on and ask you about learning disabled  
5 people and specific risk of Covid-19 to people with  
6 Down's Syndrome.

7 **A.** Yeah.

8 **Q.** Now, as a matter of record, they were not on the list of  
9 clinically extremely vulnerable groups in March 2020 but  
10 they were added to the list in November 2020.

11 **A.** Correct.

12 **Q.** So the first question is, bearing in mind that  
13 respiratory disorders are a predominant cause of death  
14 for people with Down's Syndrome, should they have been  
15 designated in the higher category of risk from  
16 March 2020?

17 **A.** So I think that -- in answering your question, I think  
18 it's important to remember that being on the shielding  
19 list was a huge imposition on the people who were in it,  
20 so the downsides to being -- to shielding were very  
21 substantial. So therefore the burden of proof, if you  
22 wish, had to be that there was a big risk that justified  
23 that significant disadvantage from a significantly  
24 greater degree of isolation, which in fact is  
25 particularly important for many people with learning  
132

1 disabilities and others.

2 So you could, you know, I think this is not an area  
3 where you just say, well, anybody who might be at risk  
4 you want to put into shielding. That would not be in  
5 the interests of those people.

6 There was an initial epidemiological signal that  
7 there might be an increased risk for people living with  
8 Down's Syndrome, and then that was subsequently followed  
9 up and, as you say, they were added to the shielding  
10 subsequently, but the aim was, in a sense, a balance of  
11 harm one, and initially balance of harm would have been  
12 do not put people into shielding who do not need it. As  
13 the risk emerged more clearly, then they were identified  
14 and then the disadvantages of shielding became justified  
15 by the increased risk.

16 But I think many people who were in shielding over  
17 the entire period of the pandemic when it was in place  
18 would reiterate to you that this was something with very  
19 significant downsides for those individuals, often for  
20 mental or physical health.

21 **Q.** Right, I'm going to take that answer and just mention to  
22 you that there are minutes of the NERVTAG clinical risk  
23 stratification subgroup in June 2020 identifying  
24 evidence from modelling of a high risk from Covid to  
25 those with Down's Syndrome which they wanted

133

1 example of it.

2 **Q.** Just so my Lady has the point, if I ask you how the  
3 delay from June to November could have been avoided,  
4 which is the question, your answer, as far as you're  
5 concerned, is it couldn't, because of the need to think  
6 matters through; is that what you're saying?

7 **A.** It wasn't because of the need to think matters through,  
8 I think that's a misunderstanding; it's because the size  
9 of the effect was not sufficiently large that the  
10 downsides of having shielding, if shielding was not  
11 needed, were at that point thought to be justified.

12 That's the answer, which is a different point to the  
13 point I think you're making.

14 **MR FRIEDMAN:** Thank you.

15 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Mr Friedman.

16 Mr Metzger.

#### 17 Questions from MR METZER KC

18 **MR METZER:** Thank you, my Lady.

19 Sir Christopher, I ask just a few questions on two  
20 topics on behalf of the Long Covid groups.

21 Were you aware that the Prime Minister wasn't  
22 convinced that Long Covid truly existed in 2020 and for  
23 a large part of 2021?

24 **A.** I was aware of that.

25 **Q.** Why didn't you, as Chief Medical Officer, disabuse the

135

1 consideration to be given to.

2 Sir Christopher, we obviously know the fatal  
3 outcomes in the end for younger adults with  
4 Down's Syndrome, it's a significant issue.

5 So just moving to November 2020, when they are put  
6 on the list, our second question is: how could such  
7 a delay in adding them to the list, particularly from  
8 June 2020 to November, have been avoided?

9 **A.** Well, firstly, I wasn't the person who was principally  
10 doing on the work on the list, although I was well aware  
11 of it, so just to be clear.

12 **Q.** Understood, yes.

13 **A.** But I would refer you to my previous answer, which was:  
14 we had identified that this was a possibility. The word  
15 that was used, from memory, in that NERVTAG document was  
16 "signal". Signal doesn't mean there is a big  
17 difference; it means there is something that is slightly  
18 out of the statistical norm that needs to be looked at  
19 and then was looked at and then they were added.

20 But I would go back to my previous point: adding  
21 point to the shielding list who were not going to  
22 benefit from it was not in their interests, it was  
23 actively against their interests, and it was getting  
24 that balance right for many other groups as well.  
25 Down's Syndrome was obviously a particularly important

134

1 Prime Minister of his belief that Long Covid was  
2 "bollocks" in October 2020, when there were discussions  
3 about the need for a second lockdown?

4 **A.** Well, the particular document with a handwritten note  
5 was not one I was privy to until it was published by  
6 the Inquiry, so to be clear.

7 The answer is: if I thought that there was  
8 an overriding need for the Prime Minister himself -- or  
9 herself, were it to be a different Prime Minister -- to  
10 know about this because it was going to make a big  
11 difference to people with Long Covid, that would have  
12 been a very material point, and I did, as you know, in  
13 2021, actually address issues of Long Covid directly  
14 with the Prime Minister.

15 However, at this point -- at the earlier points, my  
16 view was there were large numbers of things we needed to  
17 do for those living with Long Covid or who might have  
18 Long Covid in due course because of infection to do with  
19 research, which I launched multiple strands of research  
20 and analyses during 2020, and also NHS activity. None  
21 of these, in my view, required the Prime Minister to  
22 have a view on it one way or the other; we could just  
23 get on with it.

24 So these weren't things where the views of the Prime  
25 Minister, in a sense -- and I don't mean this in

136

1 a negative sense, I'm just stating this factually --  
 2 were relevant one way or the other. We could just do  
 3 the things we needed to do. Once I got to a point where  
 4 it was clear this might be a material issue for  
 5 decisions the Prime Minister himself could take, that  
 6 seemed the point where his private office said to me,  
 7 "Look, could we have this discussion" -- and I think you  
 8 have the correspondence on this -- I thought about it,  
 9 how we best do it, and we agreed on an approach to it.

10 **Q.** Yes, I'm going to go to that in a moment, but you accept  
 11 that the evidence of Long Covid was not in any way  
 12 uncertain by that time in October 2020?

13 **A.** I do.

14 **Q.** Thank you.  
 15 Patrick --

16 **A.** Although our understanding of it was far from developed.  
 17 We've still got a long way to go. But it was very much  
 18 in its earlier stages.

19 **Q.** Yes, I mean, we don't need to go through papers, but  
 20 there was a literature review on Long Covid, Public  
 21 Health England had published guidance, and the National  
 22 Institute for Health and Care Research, of which you  
 23 were head, had produced a report, all by that time.

24 **A.** Yeah, I commissioned those works.

25 **Q.** Patrick Vallance had advised Cabinet on 13 October 2020

137

1 the treatment spheres, not in the political sphere.

2 **Q.** Leaving October aside, can I take you now to  
 3 February 2021, when Mr Shafi had sought from you  
 4 a proper briefing on Long Covid for the Prime Minister.  
 5 Of course, you know that was the same month the spring  
 6 roadmap on the release of restrictions was being drawn  
 7 up.

8 Did you advise the Prime Minister then about  
 9 Long Covid in February 2021?

10 **A.** Yes, the exact point where -- so, as you will recall  
 11 from -- because you've read the correspondence, my view,  
 12 having a lot of experience of having discussed things  
 13 with the Prime Minister on other areas, was that where  
 14 he was going to have to think through an issue where he  
 15 had one position and moved to another position, it was  
 16 less likely to work by just giving him a document. So  
 17 I wanted to have a conversation with him and I wanted to  
 18 do so at a time it seemed to me we could have a serious  
 19 conversation.

20 I'm confident we did have a conversation, and  
 21 I can't recall exactly what the date is, unfortunately.  
 22 I would have chosen a moment I thought it was likely to  
 23 be most useful to have the conversation, and I then  
 24 followed it up with a subsequent note -- I don't know  
 25 the gap between those -- which I think you have already

139

1 that young people suffering from Long Covid was  
 2 a relevant policy consideration in relation to  
 3 discussions about shielding the elderly only. Why  
 4 didn't you think it was important to advise him about  
 5 the risk of Covid-19 causing Long Covid in the young?

6 **A.** Well, I think, as I say, if I thought that there was  
 7 a decision that the Prime Minister himself needed to  
 8 take where this was a material issue, I would have  
 9 addressed it. It wasn't part of my job -- I still don't  
 10 think it's part of my job -- to disabuse even senior  
 11 political leaders of things which I'm not convinced they  
 12 fully understand, where I don't think it's material to  
 13 the public health outcomes.

14 **Q.** Did you not think it was important, as Chief Medical  
 15 Officer, to ensure that he had that level of knowledge,  
 16 particularly given the indiscriminate risk of Long  
 17 Covid?

18 **A.** Only if it would have made a difference to decisions  
 19 that the Prime Minister himself had to take. That is  
 20 the -- in a sense, that's the question. It's not my job  
 21 to try and provide public health -- more wide  
 22 information where that's not going to have  
 23 an implication, given all the other needs.

24 I did want to do a lot for Long Covid, we did do  
 25 a lot for Long Covid, but it was in the research and in

138

1 seen, entitled, "A short note on Long Covid".

2 **Q.** Yes, we'll come to that briefly in a moment.  
 3 Do you recall if you advised him after your  
 4 conversation with Mr Shafi in February 2021?

5 **A.** Well, that's what I've just said. I'm confident we had  
 6 the conversation; I'm not confident I can't recall  
 7 exactly when.

8 **Q.** Well, this may help: the Prime Minister himself said  
 9 that some time had passed before he was told by Mr Shafi  
 10 he had received advice on Long Covid, and said that in  
 11 May 2021 he requested a note from you on Long Covid,  
 12 suggesting it was around that time you were clear with  
 13 him about Long Covid, I think end of May, beginning of  
 14 June. Does that sound right?

15 **A.** Well, it is certainly the case that that's when I sent  
 16 the note, because that's when it's dated. I'm also  
 17 confident I didn't send the note in blind. My view was  
 18 I needed to have a conversation with the Prime Minister  
 19 before that. Where it lay between February and May,  
 20 I honestly can't remember, and I'm just trying to --  
 21 you know, it would be silly for me to try and say I can  
 22 recall, because I can't.

23 **Q.** Just to complete the point, then I'll move on: so it  
 24 wouldn't make sense, would it, he'd be requesting advice  
 25 from you again on Long Covid in May 2021 if you had

140

1 already advised him on it?

2 **A.** No, I mean, I think the sensible thing with many of  
3 these things is to have a first discussion where you go  
4 through people's existing understandings and allow  
5 people to test information, and then follow it up with  
6 a more formal laying out of the logic, and if you've  
7 read the note, which I'm sure you have, it was my  
8 attempt to distill, in quite a short note, what was then  
9 known about Long Covid. I think the indications are  
10 from your expert advisers that that was a fairly  
11 accurate note.

12 **Q.** Yes, because obviously by April 2021, an estimated  
13 1.1 million people had Long Covid, and you knew that.

14 **A.** That was in the note.

15 **Q.** Thank you.

16 I just want to take you on to the second topic only,  
17 please.

18 During press conferences in 2020, you told the  
19 public that the great majority of those suffering  
20 Covid-19 would be a short, mild illness. An example of  
21 that was 11 May 2020.

22 In 2020 itself, only Sir Stephen Powis warned the  
23 public about Long Covid at the press conference on  
24 20 October 2020, and the first time you mentioned  
25 Long Covid at a press conference was on 5 January 2021.

141

1 **LADY HALLETT:** You're not going to develop it very far,  
2 Mr Metzger, I'm afraid.

3 **MR METZER:** I will, my Lady.

4 **LADY HALLETT:** We've got another ten minutes to go before we  
5 can break for lunch.

6 **MR METZER:** I know.

7 You only mentioned Long Covid three times in press  
8 conferences in 2021. Do you accept that those three  
9 references were not sufficient to inform the public  
10 about the risk of indiscriminate, long-term,  
11 debilitating illness, and do you accept that, on  
12 reflection, messaging could and should have been  
13 improved?

14 **A.** Well, on the second of those, could messaging have been  
15 improved, I mean, the answer to that -- to almost any  
16 question you could ask on disability, on ethnic minority  
17 and various other things, the answer is of course going  
18 to be yes. Would my talking about it more frequently in  
19 a press conference, as opposed to multiple other  
20 channels of communication, have improved the situation  
21 for people living with Long Covid or prevented it? I'd  
22 need a chain of logic to be laid out that made it clear  
23 how that would have been achieved.

24 **Q.** Sorry, just to finish that, the question I put is that  
25 if the public had been aware of the risk of Long Covid

143

1 Why didn't you use the press conferences to update  
2 the public about the risk of long-term impacts of  
3 Covid-19 in 2020, when Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus had  
4 publicly acknowledged Long Covid needed recognition as  
5 early as August 2020?

6 **A.** Yeah, I think, as with many of the things, if I were to  
7 re-run the press conferences -- where much of it was not  
8 under my control, to be clear, a lot of it was derived  
9 from where individual journalists went and a variety of  
10 other things, but leaving that to one side -- I would  
11 have made an earlier mention of Long Covid. But it's  
12 not obvious exactly what I would have said at different  
13 points along the path. So I think, depending on where  
14 it was, I would have said different things.

15 So I don't think -- yeah, I'm just saying I think  
16 there isn't a single thing you could have said. Just to  
17 acknowledge that there was Long Covid would have been  
18 a useful thing to do. I think the acknowledgement would  
19 have been helpful at an earlier stage in public -- I was  
20 very clear it existed well before that -- in a press  
21 conference. But beyond that, a lot of this was around  
22 trying to help people make rational public health  
23 decisions, and I'm not confident exactly what the points  
24 are I would be making.

25 **Q.** Well, I'll just develop that one --

142

1 and they understood what it was, their symptoms, they  
2 could have addressed that.

3 **A.** Well, I think that was actually part of the way in which  
4 we were describing it to people about vaccination,  
5 for example, because here we had a tool that would  
6 help -- you know, the first thing I say in my what can  
7 you do about Long Covid is help people not get Covid,  
8 and obviously vaccination was an example. So we used it  
9 in that context. There, there is a useful thing we can  
10 say that is hopefully going to help some people not to  
11 acquire Long Covid who otherwise might have done so.

12 **LADY HALLETT:** That's it, I'm afraid, Mr Metzger.

13 **MR METZER:** Thank you, my Lady.

14 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Jacobs. And if you can bring in your  
15 questions, doing justice to them, in under ten minutes,  
16 I'd be grateful. At the moment we have no transcript  
17 because the stenographer has had such a tough morning.  
18 She can catch up by listening to recordings, but if you  
19 can ...

20 **MR JACOBS:** I'm optimistic, my Lady.

21 **LADY HALLETT:** Good.

22 **Questions from MR JACOBS**

23 **MR JACOBS:** Professor, do feel comfortable looking forward  
24 and speaking into the microphone. I have a few  
25 questions on behalf of the Trades Union Congress in

144

1 short time.

2 My questions are on the issue of financial support  
3 for self-isolation.

4 Firstly, can you just summarise briefly, if you  
5 would, the importance of financial support for  
6 self-isolation as you saw it?

7 **A.** Yes, I think that this was an extremely important area  
8 and one that was quite heatedly debated in government in  
9 reality. My view was that it was far easier to  
10 self-isolate, and indeed to self-isolate repeatedly, if  
11 people were contacts, if you were in a job which was in  
12 permanent employment -- a white collar job, academics,  
13 civil servants, various others -- than if you were in  
14 a self-employed environment, which many people,  
15 particularly on lower incomes, were, and it seemed to me  
16 therefore it was essential that we took account of that,  
17 particularly given that some of the highest incidence of  
18 Covid was in areas of relative deprivation, where there  
19 were higher rates of people who were not in continuous  
20 employment and therefore covered by ordinary sick leave  
21 measures.

22 **Q.** Would one example of that, one concrete example, be the  
23 outbreaks that were seen in Leicester in June 2020,  
24 where you get that intersection of outbreaks of low  
25 income work and so on?

145

1 of mechanism and relative --

2 **A.** Yes, all I am just saying is I engaged in debate saying  
3 this was an important issue; I didn't get involved in  
4 the debate about what the right mechanism for addressing  
5 it might be.

6 **Q.** Yes.

7 Mr Thomas just a few moments ago on behalf of FEHMO  
8 suggested that it was important to evaluate whether the  
9 risk factors of economic disadvantage and their  
10 relationship with disparate impacts of the pandemic were  
11 effectively addressed. Do you think this issue of  
12 financial support is one area where the risk factors  
13 were ineffectively addressed?

14 **A.** I would have preferred to have had an even more vigorous  
15 approach to this very specific issue, yes. And there is  
16 plenty of documentary evidence for that you'll have  
17 seen.

18 **Q.** Can we just look at one example of the issue being  
19 raised in government. If we could have the  
20 Patrick Vallance schedule, page 170. You will see  
21 an entry from 8 September 2020. Sir Patrick says, or  
22 writes:

23 "I made the point about having to give incentives  
24 for self-isolation, PM agreed and said he would take it  
25 up with [Chancellor] afterwards. Chris and I were

147

1 **A.** It may well have been. I think the logic there is real,  
2 but the data aren't there. The example where the data  
3 are clear is -- because it was so heavily studied, was  
4 in care homes. Care homes where sick pay was readily  
5 provided had lower rates of Covid in general than ones  
6 where sick pay was not, and I think that is reasonably  
7 clear, in a sense, direct evidence of the link between  
8 these.

9 **Q.** You describe heated debate around the issue. Given what  
10 might be thought to be the apparent sort of simple logic  
11 of people on low income may not be able to self-isolate  
12 without support, why did that logic not sort of win  
13 through into significant action?

14 **A.** Well, I mean, I think I can answer half the question --  
15 in fact, a quarter of the question, in a way. There is  
16 no doubt that I and many other people in -- from the  
17 health professions -- and others, Dido Harding,  
18 others -- highlighted this issue right from quite early  
19 on. Issues about how it should then be addressed are  
20 ones that I don't feel I have any particular competence  
21 in and I didn't offer a view as to what was the right  
22 mechanism to deal with this. It's actually quite  
23 a complex area. But the principle --

24 **Q.** Sorry, Professor, just given the time, we heard a bit  
25 about that from David Halpern, about the different types

146

1 aligned and presented what needs to be done. I left the  
2 call. Apparently it descended into chaos and CMO not  
3 clear where it will land."

4 Professor, if you recall why it descended into chaos  
5 let us know, but broadly, is this indicative of the  
6 difficulty in getting the importance of this issue to  
7 land with key decision-makers?

8 **A.** I mean, without remembering the exact meeting, the  
9 general tenor of this is one which I recognise.

10 **Q.** Final question: do you think that in order to respond  
11 more effectively for a future pandemic, and to lessen  
12 the disparate impacts of a future pandemic, we need to  
13 be ready to take a more robust approach to financially  
14 supporting self-isolation?

15 **A.** I think where self-isolation, and particularly repeated  
16 self-isolation -- I think that's an important additional  
17 point -- is likely to be part of the state's response to  
18 a major public health threat, I do consider this is  
19 an important issue that needs to be taken into account,  
20 and indeed I think we say so in our technical report  
21 because we thought this was an important public health  
22 point, not just -- just a wider point.

23 **MR JACOBS:** Professor, my Lady, thank you.

24 **LADY HALLETT:** Well done, Mr Jacobs.

25 That completes your evidence for this module,

148

1 Sir Chris, thank you very much indeed. I'm sorry if  
 2 it's all been a bit pressurised towards the end of this  
 3 morning. I suspect if I hadn't imposed such a tight  
 4 timetable we could have taken a week asking you  
 5 questions, if that's any consolation, possibly not.  
 6 But do please rest assured, and everybody else can  
 7 rest assured, that obviously I'll consider all the  
 8 material that has been provided in writing, it's not  
 9 just the evidence you give here orally that will be  
 10 considered, everything will be considered.  
 11 So thank you very much indeed for your time and your  
 12 patience and your help.

13 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you, my Lady.

14 **(The witness withdrew)**

15 **MR KEITH:** Thank you, my Lady.

16 **LADY HALLETT:** 2 o'clock.

17 **(1.03 pm)**

18 **(The short adjournment)**

19 **(2.00 pm)**

20 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith.

21 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, this afternoon's witness is Professor

22 Sir Jonathan Van-Tam.

23 **PROFESSOR SIR JONATHAN VAN-TAM (sworn)**

24 **Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY**

25 **MR KEITH:** Professor, I'm going to call you Professor,  
 149

1 career.

2 **Q.** And as a result, Professor, are you the senior editor of  
 3 the textbook *Introduction to Pandemic Influenza*, have  
 4 you published more than 200 peer-reviewed scientific  
 5 papers, and you hold a plethora of degrees, diplomas,  
 6 doctorates, fellowships and honorary fellowships?

7 **A.** That's correct.

8 **Q.** All right.

9 In terms of the positions that you've held, were you  
 10 head of the pandemic influenza office at the Health  
 11 Protection Agency Centre for Infections between 2004 and  
 12 2007?

13 **A.** Yes.

14 **Q.** You were, and you have been for a long time now,  
 15 a member of the -- well, you were a member of what was  
 16 then the SPI committee, you were a member of SAGE during  
 17 the swine flu pandemic; is that correct?

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** And were you the chair of NERVTAG from its inception in  
 20 2014? For how long were you the chair?

21 **A.** So NERVTAG actually was the kind of successor to SPI, so  
 22 it wasn't entirely a new committee, it was more kind of  
 23 reformatted. But from its inception, which I believe  
 24 was about 2014, through until the time when I became  
 25 DCMO, at that point I clearly could not continue in  
 151

1 rather than Sir Jonathan --

2 **A.** Of course.

3 **Q.** -- if that's acceptable. Could I ask you to give your  
 4 full name, please.

5 **A.** Yes, my name is Jonathan Stafford Nguyen-Van-Tam.

6 **Q.** Thank you very much, Professor.

7 Thank you for attending today, we appreciate that  
 8 you have been made to wait a very considerable amount of  
 9 time. Thank you also for the provision of your witness  
 10 statement dated 8 September 2023. There it is. All the  
 11 contents, the full contents of your statement, will  
 12 of course be considered. It is a significant and  
 13 substantial statement running to 146 pages.

14 You are by profession an epidemiologist, a physician  
 15 specialising in public health, mainly communicable  
 16 disease control. Have you spent most of your academic  
 17 career engaged scientifically on issues of epidemiology,  
 18 prevention and control of respiratory virus infections  
 19 and the like?

20 **A.** Yes, I have. I started my academic career, I guess, in  
 21 about 1991, and very quickly gravitated to the study of  
 22 respiratory virus infections, but notably influenza,  
 23 which has been the dominant public health threat from  
 24 respiratory viruses for a very long time, and I found  
 25 this area stimulating and stayed in that area all of my  
 150

1 NERVTAG, which has to be a committee that is independent  
 2 of government.

3 **Q.** Then in October 2017 did you become the Deputy Chief  
 4 Medical Officer particularly concerned with health  
 5 protection?

6 **A.** That is correct.

7 **Q.** Presumably your portfolio has always been, and was while  
 8 you were DCMO, a broad one?

9 **A.** Yes, it's really covered all the infectious diseases  
 10 threats, bioterrorism and biosecurity, so very broad,  
 11 and in the time that I have been in post it's pulled in  
 12 other emergencies such as the Novichok attacks, the  
 13 monkeypox crisis, and various other things, but also  
 14 including some pharmaceutical pieces, for example the  
 15 shortage of EpiPens.

16 **Q.** Then in March 2022 did you relinquish your position as  
 17 DCMO and then turn exclusively to the world of academia?

18 **A.** Yes, I did. I -- it was a planned move out of  
 19 government. I was a full-time academic for another year  
 20 and I'm now part-time one day a week at the University  
 21 of Nottingham and self-employed for the other four days.

22 **Q.** I'd like to ask you, please, firstly some questions  
 23 about the role of the DCMO, and with particular regard  
 24 to the fact that you were the DCMO concerned primarily  
 25 with health protection.  
 152

1 Is the role of DCMO, and the role of DCMO for health  
2 protection, functionally independent from government?  
3 Are you allowed to say what you want, within reason, and  
4 to express your professional views?

5 **A.** So the answer to that is in several parts. Yes,  
6 absolutely, as a subordinate of the Chief Medical  
7 Officer, then I have been given the -- you know, the  
8 permissions of that office to be independent of  
9 government, and feel I -- you know, it depends on your  
10 Chief Medical Officer, of course, to a large extent, but  
11 I feel that Sir Chris gave me very much a partnership of  
12 equals, gave me the opportunity, and respected my  
13 professional experience, and gave me the opportunity to  
14 speak independently.

15 That having been said, I do not think it would be  
16 right, and I'm a traditionalist who understands the  
17 chain of command very strictly, I do not think it would  
18 be right for a DCMO under any circumstances, other than  
19 the serious illness or death of the Chief Medical  
20 Officer, to start making comments that were particularly  
21 strategic or particularly, you know, wide-ranging in  
22 terms of their implications across government without  
23 a full and frank discussion, and the normal practice  
24 would be for that discussion to happen and then the  
25 Chief Medical Officer to make remarks on behalf of our

153

1 me and whichever private secretary was looking after me.  
2 It would fall to me to make the liaisons with Public  
3 Health England and with the wider health protection  
4 community, for example CDC in Atlanta. And then, at  
5 a certain stage, if this was something more than the  
6 routine or the trivial, to then start to have  
7 a conversation with the CMO about that.

8 So it came about because it was routine, I think is  
9 the answer.

10 **Q.** Give us, please, also a broad idea of what your  
11 important position at that time comprised. You  
12 presumably gave a great deal of advice regularly to the  
13 Secretary of State in the Department of Health and  
14 Social Care, to DHSC junior ministers, and to the DHSC  
15 itself. Presumably you also were asked to respond to  
16 requests for advice from central government, from the  
17 Prime Minister and other ministers, and by -- and from  
18 officials in the central government machine, if I may  
19 call it that. Is that a fair summary?

20 **A.** The answer to that is really in two parts. In kind of  
21 peacetime, the DCMO's role would be to, for example,  
22 observe the Joint Committee on Vaccination and  
23 Immunisation, observe NERVTAG, work closely with policy  
24 officials looking after vaccine and health protection  
25 policy, look after global public health with that policy

155

1 office, occasionally it would be delegated.

2 **Q.** So in that sense, Professor, you were accountable to the  
3 Chief Medical Officer, and is that why you say in your  
4 statement that you wouldn't issue a piece of evidence,  
5 for example, to a core decision-maker, without first  
6 satisfying yourself that it was in line with the Chief  
7 Medical Officer's own views?

8 **A.** Yes, it would depend on the subject. So, for example,  
9 if it was something quite technical, on the aerobiology  
10 of respiratory viruses and droplet distances and  
11 aerosols, then of course I would just, you know, kind of  
12 crack on with giving the advice, in the interests of  
13 speed and efficiency of government. But if it was  
14 something notable or significant, it would only be right  
15 for me to channel that through the Chief Medical  
16 Officer.

17 **Q.** The evidence shows very plainly that during the initial  
18 weeks of the crisis, so particularly between January and  
19 March of 2020, you took the lead, by virtue of your role  
20 as DCMO for health protection, on the initial phase of  
21 the response to the pandemic. How did that come about?

22 **A.** Yes, so that is -- it's basically business as usual  
23 within the Chief Medical Officer's office. We would not  
24 have expected Sir Chris to track all of the infectious  
25 disease happenings around the world, that would fall to

154

1 official team. But the amount of contact with the  
2 Cabinet Office and with Number 10 and other government  
3 departments would be relatively sparing at that point.

4 That of course changed as the magnitude of the  
5 SARS-CoV-2 crisis, you know, unfolded in front of us.  
6 But in normal times, there would be not that much  
7 contact at all, but that changed over time.

8 **Q.** Were you, for example, regularly attending Number 10  
9 Downing Street and therefore present in many of the  
10 decision-making meetings which took place there, or was  
11 that something that was ordinarily left to the Chief  
12 Medical Officer?

13 **A.** I can't recall that I ever went to the -- to Number 10  
14 Downing Street before the pandemic started, and I can't  
15 recall going to Downing Street for a meeting other than  
16 the 5 pm press conferences. I may have got that wrong,  
17 there may have been one or two occasions when I went to  
18 a Number 10 meeting, but really my contact with  
19 Number 10 was very constrained and related to those  
20 press conferences. So I really wasn't in much of the  
21 discussion that I know you have been asking other  
22 witnesses about.

23 The other thing I kind of want to say is that quite  
24 early on in the crisis, although, as you rightly point  
25 out in those early days I was really quite significantly

156

1 involved in the kind of alerting, once the kind of  
2 machinery of government, SAGE, COBR, had started to  
3 move, then one of the other things that I moved to very  
4 quickly, partly in conjunction with the Government Chief  
5 Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick, was getting ready and  
6 building up the momentum for the Vaccine Taskforce. And  
7 of course that started quite early officially, in April,  
8 and it really became the very dominant part of my work  
9 for, I would say, the rest of my time in government.

10 So whilst I was involved in many of the things  
11 you've talked about with other witnesses, it was pretty  
12 peripheral in relation to their roles, and I was  
13 beginning to really focus very hard on getting vaccines  
14 for the UK as fast as possible.

15 **Q.** You may have been attractively modest about the extent  
16 of your role, Professor, because the evidence makes  
17 plain that you were seen as a source of expert advice in  
18 particular as well on technical aspects of virus  
19 transmission, and you were hugely concerned not just  
20 with vaccines but with the development of  
21 therapeutics --

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** -- and all the issues that surround those two important  
24 areas. Is that fair?

25 **A.** That's very fair.

157

1 meetings that I have been into. There could be several  
2 every day at one point or another. And really,  
3 you know, you lose track of this, you're so tired and  
4 you're so overwhelmed by the workload, you literally go  
5 from one meeting to another, wherever your diary manager  
6 sends you next.

7 **Q.** The evidence shows that you also attended a very  
8 significant number of SAGES.

9 **A.** Yes.

10 **Q.** In particular you were present on the SAGE 18 meeting of  
11 Monday 23 March, about which I'll be asking you  
12 questions. Is that a fair summary?

13 **A.** That's fair.

14 May I make a little comment about SAGE?

15 **Q.** Please.

16 **A.** So I think the primary purpose of SAGE was for the  
17 government to garner a range of scientific opinions from  
18 independent experts, which to my mind it did very  
19 effectively, but -- and who knows, you know, in another  
20 time, another world, I might have been on SAGE by virtue  
21 of being a professor at the University of Nottingham.  
22 However, I was on SAGE -- partly, of course, for my  
23 scientific knowledge and advice, but I was still a DCMO,  
24 my boss, Sir Chris, was co-chair of SAGE, and it was  
25 important that those independent scientific voices were

159

1 **Q.** All right.

2 In terms of the significant structural bodies of  
3 which we've heard a great deal of evidence, COBR,  
4 Covid-S, Covid-O, four nations meetings, were you  
5 regularly in attendance at those meetings or were they  
6 fairly infrequent?

7 **A.** Yeah. So let me go through those.

8 COBR would be really one where my presence would be  
9 required only when Sir Chris was not available or had  
10 specifically delegated that I go to it. I can't think  
11 of an occasion when Chris said "I'm not going, you go",  
12 but I can think of at least one occasion where he was  
13 unavailable.

14 I may have been in the outer room at COBR, not  
15 participating, but observing, on one or two occasions,  
16 because of course, you know, these are things that don't  
17 happen very often and there's a lot of learning for a --  
18 somebody who's still relatively junior in government, as  
19 a DCMO to kind of learn stuff from observing in COBR.

20 **Q.** All right.

21 **A.** Next one --

22 **Q.** Covid-S, Covid-O?

23 **A.** I don't recall being in many Covid-S meetings, they're  
24 the ones designated S because of the presence of  
25 ministers. I have lost count of the number of Covid-O

158

1 in the room rather more than a kind of, you know, replay  
2 of the Chief Medical Officer office opinion.

3 So I would say that whilst I was certainly on SAGE,  
4 and I don't dispute any of the dates you could pull  
5 forwards about when I attended, I would say that my role  
6 was relatively muted, although I would say what I needed  
7 to say.

8 **Q.** Whilst on the subject of SAGE, Professor, you refer in  
9 your statement or you use these words in your statement,  
10 that "SAGE was strongly influenced by bio-mathematical  
11 modellers"?

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** What did you mean by that?

14 **A.** I meant that their information, in terms of providing  
15 reasonable trajectories and possibilities for what could  
16 happen as the epidemic waves of the pandemic played out,  
17 I felt that was really important, and I thought they had  
18 really unique skillsets.

19 Now, the context to that, and it's very important,  
20 is that I can only think of three people who served on  
21 SAGE in 2009 during the swine flu pandemic and again on  
22 SAGE this time, and that was Professor Ferguson,  
23 Professor Edmunds and myself. So over that period,  
24 I had come to learn and understand and trust the outputs  
25 from the modelling groups. I was very reassured that

160



1 actually what came to the table was a kind of consensus  
2 from multiple different modelling groups working  
3 independently across the country, Warwick included, and  
4 that's why I make that point in my statement.

5 **Q.** In truth, I wasn't asking you to express your views on  
6 the validity or worth of modelling or their work. It's  
7 only that the use of words such as "SAGE was strongly  
8 influenced by bio-mathematical modellers" might suggest  
9 that you were making an observation there about the  
10 relative lack of influence of other disciplines, perhaps  
11 infection control experts or community health control  
12 experts or public health clinicians, as opposed to the  
13 modellers.

14 **A.** I wasn't making that difference.

15 **Q.** That's not the point you were making, all right.

16 Then, finally, did you attend most NERVTAG meetings?

17 **A.** Well, I attended most NERVTAG meetings at the beginning,  
18 when NERVTAG were kind of synthesising the kind of  
19 pretty limited data coming out of China and then a few  
20 other countries in South East Asia.

21 As I said earlier, once kind of the momentum of my  
22 vaccines work built up, you know, it became more and  
23 more difficult to just be in two places at once, and  
24 I literally had to kind of send -- send a private  
25 secretary to sit in on the NERVTAG meeting or, indeed,

161

1 of workload. I did not expect my family to be  
2 threatened with having their throats cut. I did not  
3 expect the police to have to say, "Will you move out" in  
4 the middle of the night, in the middle of the evening,  
5 "Will you move out for a few days while we look at this  
6 and potentially make some arrests". You know, we didn't  
7 move out because of the cat, as it happened, we didn't  
8 want to leave the cat. But it was a very stressful time  
9 indeed. And, you know, my family didn't sign up for  
10 that.

11 I only make this point because I'm so worried that  
12 if there's a future crisis, people will not want to sign  
13 up for these roles and these jobs, because of the  
14 implications that come with them.

15 **Q.** If I may speak on behalf of myself, thank you for  
16 bringing that to the Inquiry's attention.

17 Moving on to two final preliminary subjects, your  
18 statement refers to the close collaboration throughout  
19 the pandemic between the Office of the Chief Medical  
20 Officer and the counterparts in Scotland, Wales and  
21 Northern Ireland, and a considerable amount of evidence  
22 has been heard about how, at the medical level, the CMO,  
23 OCMO, DCMO level, there was extensive collaboration.

24 Do you consider that that degree of collaboration of  
25 co-operation between the devolved administrations was

163

1 just get the read-out afterwards. It wasn't that  
2 I wasn't following what NERVTAG were saying, but  
3 I couldn't physically be there to shepherd every single  
4 item as time went on.

5 **Q.** Professor, I want to ask you about a sensitive matter  
6 which you've raised in your statement concerning the  
7 demands, the unprecedented workload that was placed upon  
8 you and the consequence of what you describe as  
9 extremely hateful messages received by you from the  
10 public, by email, some of which has led to the police  
11 becoming involved:

12 **A.** Yeah.

13 **Q.** Did you, as a result of the unprecedented demands placed  
14 upon you but also on account of these hateful messages,  
15 consider your position at any time?

16 **A.** Yes. So I may begin by thanking the vast, vast, vast  
17 majority of the public who when I meet them are just  
18 supportive and grateful, and I deeply appreciate that.

19 The workload was horrendous for all of us at the  
20 beginning, it certainly was in the kind of 16 hours  
21 a day mark, and it certainly was seven days a week, it  
22 was very, very intense. Where I think, you know, it  
23 finally got to me was the fact that I might have --  
24 yeah, I might have expected that if a crisis happened  
25 this was, you know, my responsibility to bear that kind

162

1 appropriate and that it worked well in face of the  
2 unprecedented demands of this pandemic?

3 **A.** So clearly this was a virus like most others that  
4 doesn't respect international borders, doesn't respect,  
5 you know, where you live in the UK to any great extent,  
6 and I felt that the medical colleagues in the devolved  
7 administrations had very much become my friends by the  
8 end of the experience, which is probably the kind of  
9 quickest way to give you some sense of how close and how  
10 bonded we felt as a group of professionals battling with  
11 the same kind of common cause in mind.

12 So, yeah, I think it worked very well.

13 **Q.** Was there also extensive co-operation with and  
14 collaboration with your international peers and  
15 colleagues throughout the course of the pandemic?

16 **A.** Yeah, well, one of the advantages of having, you know,  
17 been in the influenza world for 30-plus years is that  
18 you met a lot of people and they've stayed with you, in  
19 their territories, throughout all of their careers as  
20 well, so you have a lot of contacts to pull on. And  
21 I had a lot of international contacts and people  
22 overseas who I call professional friends, and I'd done  
23 really quite extensive work with CDC in the past, in the  
24 US, and had really quite strong links with Singapore.

25 But I think my statement gives you a list of all the

164

1 different countries with which we've engaged.

2 **Q.** There are very many.

3 Now, the timeline, and focusing on the first

4 few weeks of the emerging pandemic. I don't wish to go

5 through all the very many emails that you sent and

6 received or the many meetings and conversations that you

7 had with your colleagues within the Office of the Chief

8 Medical Officer about the emerging pandemic, but just to

9 pick up some of the high points.

10 If we could have INQ000151286.

11 You forwarded to your colleague, Professor Sir

12 Chris Whitty, and others, important information that you

13 had received by way of a forwarded email attaching what

14 is called a "ProMED Digest". We've heard evidence about

15 ProMED. Was this a summary of information that ProMED

16 had put out?

17 **A.** Yes, I mean, that's right, I've just forwarded it

18 straight on. And if you click on the link, you would

19 find that there's a little bit more, short paragraph, of

20 what the report was coming in from China about this

21 cluster of undiagnosed and slightly peculiar pneumonias.

22 Now, personally I -- it's very clear, and

23 I forwarded that ProMED email, I think I had probably

24 heard something a couple of days before that. I was at

25 home on leave at the time, so this would be, you know,

165

1 already reaching out to your professional colleagues

2 around the world, and other emails show --

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** -- all the ways in which you reached out to other

5 countries, this one happens to refer to the US, but is

6 this a good indication of how speedily and effectively

7 this system of international collaboration works?

8 **A.** I think it is. And it's also, I guess, on this

9 particular email, an illustration of my, you know,

10 networks, having run a WHO collaborating centre for

11 influenza from Nottingham, and my understanding of

12 NERVTAG and the fact that Dr Dabrera, from PHE, referred

13 to as Gavin in the email, actually tracks viruses for

14 NERVTAG and produces risk assessments on an ongoing

15 basis.

16 **Q.** The material shows that you forwarded this email and you

17 also started other email chains with colleagues at the

18 World Health Organisation as well as the CDC, and with

19 other colleagues around the world.

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** Thirdly, in relation to this email, you've used the word

22 "emerge", information about an "emerging" virus, in the

23 course of your evidence. Subsequently, it became

24 apparent, of course, that there had been cases in China.

25 **A.** Yep.

167

1 pretty much my first day back at work. It didn't add

2 information that, you know, isn't in the kind of ProMED

3 text, but it was really around the cusp of the New Year

4 that this started to emerge.

5 And it's common for me, if I see something that

6 I think "Ooh, yes, I just want to watch this a little

7 bit more carefully", to forward that to my health

8 protection policy colleagues, not to kind of get them

9 terribly excited at that point -- and as I pointed out,

10 you know, there's a caveat, it's a bit like a football

11 transfer, there's lots of rumours and, you know, half

12 truths on it, but just flagging it, you know, that this

13 is something I am going to watch -- I am going to

14 watch -- over the next few days, not something that I am

15 asking them to watch, merely just register that it's

16 there.

17 **Q.** Three brief points, if I may.

18 Firstly, the evidence appears to suggest that ProMED

19 is a valuable and consistent source of important

20 information, it does very valuable work, and

21 professionals such as yourself around the world rely to

22 some extent on ProMED's work?

23 **A.** It's informal, there's a lot of noise in there, but

24 I think it's valuable.

25 **Q.** Secondly, this email quite plainly shows that you're

166

1 **Q.** Genomic research has indicated that there had been cases

2 for China for some time.

3 **A.** Yep.

4 **Q.** Can you just make plain that this was the emergence, at

5 least insofar as you were concerned and the

6 United Kingdom was concerned --

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** -- of this novel coronavirus, but that of course doesn't

9 mean to say that there hadn't been a coronavirus

10 circulating in China for some time?

11 **A.** You're quite right, and you've picked me up on the word

12 "emerge", and I think that's a really good one, and

13 thank you for doing that.

14 I probably shouldn't have used the word "emerge",

15 because I think I'm kind of back-transferring the fact

16 that it was an emerging respiratory virus. This could

17 have been a chemical pneumonitis, it could have been

18 a cluster of Legionella cases that was, within a few

19 days, going to be very rapidly explained as something

20 terribly ordinary. So you're right.

21 And on the point about kind of the genomic

22 sequencing, I'm not an expert in this area but I gather

23 that it is perfectly possible, according to the

24 sequencing data, if you kind of back-model it, that this

25 virus might have emerged sooner than this report.

168

1 **MR KEITH:** On 8 January -- INQ000151293 -- having received  
2 information from the CDC, that's to say the institute in  
3 the United States, you sent an email to your colleagues  
4 saying:

5 "I had picked up a whisper from CDC that it was  
6 thinking novel (non SARS, non MERS) coronavirus. Indeed  
7 this is what [Professor Sir Chris Whitty] (and me) felt  
8 was most likely."

9 Then in the penultimate paragraph you say:

10 "Good that there remains no known [person-to-person]  
11 transmission."

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** Briefly, did you make that reference to person-to-person  
14 transmission because one of the most vital pieces of  
15 information in the early stages responding to a possible  
16 epidemic or pandemic is to know the nature of the  
17 transmission between people and whether or not,  
18 of course, it's sustainable?

19 **A.** Yes, absolutely. And just to qualify, "good that there  
20 remains no known person-to-person transmission" doesn't  
21 mean there is none, it means that there are no credible  
22 sources or descriptions of person-to-person transmission  
23 on the date that the email was written.

24 **Q.** Yes.

25 9 January. INQ000236466, on pages 2 to 3, in the  
169

1 **Q.** It tells you lot about the possible severity of the  
2 virus and it indicates something -- because if you've  
3 got a large number of hospitalisations a large  
4 proportion of those people infected in confirmed cases  
5 hospitalised -- something about the possible degree of  
6 transmissibility?

7 **A.** It could do. It doesn't really tell you anything about  
8 transmissibility, it tells you about severity.

9 **Q.** All right.

10 **A.** And it is caveated very clearly on the very small  
11 numbers, seven out of 59, which, you know, if you worked  
12 out the 95% confidence interval on that 12%, it would be  
13 pretty wide based on a total denominator of 59. So, you  
14 know ...

15 But the audience I'm talking to, you know, possibly  
16 the top epidemiologists in the country, will know this,  
17 and will understand what I'm saying through that.

18 **Q.** There's a reference then in the second paragraph to "our  
19 three triggers". Is that a reference to the triggers to  
20 which in fact Sir Chris Whitty spoke --

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** -- being triggers revolving around whether or not  
23 transmissibility extends to -- up to family level, the  
24 degree of transmissibility, to the possibility of  
25 healthcare workers becoming infected and falling ill,  
171

1 middle of an email string, you say in the first  
2 paragraph in your email to Chris Whitty:

3 "... notably ... zero reported case fatality so far,  
4 though 7 of 59 cases with severe disease is  
5 a significantly high 12% case-hospitalisation rate in my  
6 view, such that established person to person  
7 transmission would cause serious hospital surge  
8 pressures on a par with a severe panflu virus."

9 So without going into all the many issues or  
10 questions that that sentence gives rise to, can I just  
11 focus on the significantly "high 12%  
12 case-hospitalisation rate".

13 It's not possible, is it, to know from the number of  
14 people who are hospitalised or who may die from  
15 a pathogenic outbreak, the full extent of the outbreak,  
16 because you don't -- that doesn't tell you how many  
17 people have got mild symptoms or no symptoms, and  
18 therefore constitute the body of the iceberg?

19 **A.** Correct, yeah. And all we can go on at this point and  
20 be very clear about is that these are very small  
21 numbers, these are 59 cases, we don't know what the  
22 level of case ascertainment is in total, but, in a kind  
23 of worst-case scenario, if these were genuinely the  
24 59 cases, then 12% of them requiring hospital care is  
25 not insignificant.  
170

1 and also to geographical spread?

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** Are those the triggers?

4 **A.** Yes, indeed. And I think Chris was very clear yesterday  
5 about his kind of concerns that maybe "triggers" wasn't  
6 quite the right word, but we all use words sometimes in  
7 the heat of a crisis that we don't mean, and I don't  
8 think he was saying that there were specific triggers  
9 for anything beyond heightened concern. However that's  
10 defined. It's difficult to say.

11 **Q.** On 13 January you attended a NERVTAG meeting as  
12 an observer, according to your statement. The minutes  
13 are INQ000021307.

14 An important part of this meeting, if we look at  
15 page 6, is the issue of risk. The current PHE risk  
16 assessment for this virus was presented, and then  
17 there's a number of elements.

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** And the conclusion which NERVTAG reaches.

20 Could you just confirm your understanding of what is  
21 meant by this risk assessment? Is it an assessment of  
22 the risk at that point or is it a prospective  
23 assessment, a contingent assessment of the future?

24 **A.** It's an assessment of the risk at that point, based upon  
25 the extant data at that point, as available to PHE.  
172

1 I think this is a good moment for me to try to  
 2 contribute to the Inquiry in a way that makes the future  
 3 better for the UK than the past, and one of the things  
 4 that I think where the risk assessment system has failed  
 5 us is that whilst it may be extremely accurate, and I'm  
 6 absolutely not calling into question the judgement of  
 7 any of my PHE or wider health protection colleagues  
 8 about the risk assessment, the problem is that it  
 9 relates to the current moment and that, unfortunately,  
 10 when you then try to say "Oh, what does it mean for the  
 11 future?" you get into massive uncertainty. And that's  
 12 part of the problem, possibly why it's never been done,  
 13 but equally it doesn't give any kind of flavour to the  
 14 less experienced reader about what the range of  
 15 possibilities kind of is in the future, if you like.

16 And I think that's really difficult, because,  
 17 you know, NERVTAG is tracking new and emerging  
 18 respiratory virus infections and, you know, often keeps  
 19 them on the radar because they have some degree of  
 20 pandemic potential, so you could almost say that  
 21 everything's got the possibility of kind of, you know,  
 22 inflating into a big crisis at some point. So it is  
 23 difficult and it would be very nuanced to do it, but  
 24 I think it's very unfortunate that this can be read as  
 25 "Oh, well, it's low, just forget about it".

173

1 February, March.

2 Was there any real change, however, in the response  
 3 of yourself, NERVTAG and those opining on this subject  
 4 in terms of recognising the very limited epidemiological  
 5 advantages of border controls and also the very  
 6 significant practical difficulties?

7 **A.** I recall that the -- and, you know, the science advice  
 8 on port of entry screening has been fairly consistent  
 9 all the way through, that it's pretty inefficient, and  
 10 it just boils down to the length of a flight, shall we  
 11 say, for argument's sake, from Hong Kong versus the  
 12 incubation period of a typical respiratory virus. If  
 13 you are infected in Hong Kong just before you board the  
 14 flight, I can absolutely guarantee you'll be  
 15 asymptomatic and you'll be PCR negative for respiratory  
 16 viruses when you get off the plane at Heathrow. You'll  
 17 become ill, if you're going to become ill, several days  
 18 later, when you're, you know, nicely ensconced back in  
 19 your domestic setting in the UK. That is the principle  
 20 of why it only really picks up a tiny fraction of the  
 21 cases that might enter that way.

22 **Q.** On 15 January you advised your DHSC colleagues on the  
 23 subject of person-to-person transmission --  
 24 INQ000151316 -- and on page 1 you said, in the third  
 25 paragraph:

175

1 **Q.** And of course an important part of any risk assessment  
 2 process is the message that is communicated thereby?

3 **A.** But just to come back on the risk assessments, NERVTAG  
 4 was very rigorous about these being dynamic, and with  
 5 every NERVTAG meeting anything that was on the risk  
 6 assessment chart, as it were, Dr Dabrera would update  
 7 with the latest information. It was quite a job for him  
 8 to keep on top of it all but he did a great job.

9 **Q.** Now if we scroll back out and go to page 8,  
 10 paragraph 5.8, we can see a reference to port of entry  
 11 screening. Port of entry screening was, I think,  
 12 a matter for DHSC; is that correct?

13 **A.** I think it was in the beginning.

14 **Q.** Yes. NERVTAG noted that the body of scientific evidence  
 15 and previous experiences indicate that port of entry  
 16 screening has very low efficacy and the benefit is very  
 17 unlikely to outweigh the substantial effort, cost and  
 18 disruption?

19 **A.** Yes.

20 **Q.** The issue of screening, the issue of more stringent  
 21 restrictions at borders, the issue of closure,  
 22 quarantine, whatever it might be, screening or  
 23 restriction, came back to NERVTAG and to you, indeed,  
 24 and to others, repeatedly, because of course it was  
 25 an issue that was revisited throughout January,

174

1 "For now we do have [person-to-person transmission]  
 2 by the sound of it; but it does feel, from the statement  
 3 made, like H5N1 in 2004 where we did see  
 4 [person-to-person transmission] that was largely limited  
 5 to really close contacts ... and where the length of the  
 6 chains of transmission were short ... suggesting  
 7 inefficacy transmissibility between humans."

8 Was this an important moment because it was you  
 9 informing your colleagues that you'd answered the  
 10 question you'd poled in the earlier email, which is: is  
 11 there person-to-person transmission?

12 **A.** Yes, but extremely limited. As a virus that is  
 13 essentially from another species, when it first  
 14 encounters humans, if it can cross the species barrier  
 15 at all, then you get very occasional incursions into  
 16 humans that can cause very severe disease in the tiny,  
 17 tiny minority of exposures, or the tiny, tiny number of  
 18 circumstances in which there is an exposure.

19 The next, and I'm not a virologist, so you might  
 20 want a virologist on the stand at some point, but the  
 21 next kind of evolutionary step of a virus is to adapt to  
 22 its new host and to -- in the process of that it may  
 23 become more transmissible in its new host. But it won't  
 24 just go from can't transmit to fully transmissible in  
 25 one step; it will take this kind of interim step --

176

1 I don't want to give it a kind of consciousness and  
2 a being, but it will take that kind of interim step to  
3 be inefficient but capable of person-to-person  
4 transmission. And I think that's what this report  
5 refers to.

6 And as you know we've had inefficient transmission  
7 person-to-person of H5N1, avian influenza, for several  
8 decades now, in fact since 1997 on and off, and that  
9 virus has not produced a pandemic. So this is not  
10 an interpretable signal that, you know, armageddon is  
11 about to happen.

12 **Q.** Nevertheless, your statement, Professor, states that on  
13 16 January you first became seriously concerned about  
14 the threat that this virus potentially posed to the  
15 United Kingdom --

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** -- and you say this:

18 "By that date, it was clear that this was a novel  
19 coronavirus, it was fairly clear that human to human  
20 transmission was occurring, and my view was that this  
21 would be a significant pandemic."

22 And before you answer, elsewhere in your statement  
23 you use several words but you emphasised that we would  
24 experience a severe pandemic in the United Kingdom.

25 **A.** Yeah.

177

1 you that my instincts were telling me, and I'm sure  
2 I had that conversation at home, that we were in for  
3 a bad time.

4 **Q.** To make plain, Professor, the degree of, or the  
5 certainty or lack of it or the degree to which you took  
6 this view, you say in your statement:

7 "... I absolutely understood in my mind's eye that  
8 ... it was a matter of when, not if, things would  
9 progress."

10 **A.** In my mind's eye, yes. Absolutely. That doesn't mean  
11 at that point that I felt that all the data were in  
12 place to prove my point or the instinct, and I think  
13 that's something that you explored with Sir Chris  
14 yesterday --

15 **Q.** Yes, indeed.

16 **A.** -- and I would like to come back to that, if that's  
17 all right.

18 **Q.** I'm going to ask you about that in a moment.

19 Just on those words, my second question in relation  
20 to that sentence was, when you say there would be  
21 a severe pandemic, although not there but elsewhere, you  
22 refer to in the United Kingdom, is it self-evident that  
23 by pandemic you meant a pandemic impacting upon the  
24 United Kingdom?

25 **A.** I did, yes.

179

1 **Q.** So may I just ask you firstly: what did you mean by  
2 "would"? Did you mean we might, we may, or we will, or  
3 something in between?

4 **A.** Okay, let me just answer that particular point there.

5 When I wrote the word "would", I can't put myself  
6 back, you know, in that time and say what was I thinking  
7 when I wrote "would", but I think I was saying on the  
8 balance of probabilities my instincts were telling me  
9 that this was going to cause us real trouble and be  
10 a pandemic.

11 Now, the piece of information you've put up on the  
12 screen, it's still up on my screen, relates to  
13 information from the World Health Organisation, but  
14 of course my instincts are based on a lot -- things  
15 a lot more -- wider than that, they're based upon  
16 looking at the news and seeing, you know, just the kind  
17 of footage from Wuhan province, Wuhan City, and starting  
18 to think this doesn't look or feel like something that  
19 is a small cluster. It's also based on the fact that,  
20 you know, I have 30 years' experience of communicable  
21 disease control and have often been the one in the  
22 office who has been kind of picked out, because of my  
23 specialist interest, to deal with outbreaks of  
24 respiratory viruses. And so this is all very soft but  
25 it was my instinct, and I think it's right to report to

178

1 **Q.** Yes.

2 **A.** A pandemic is a worldwide epidemic, of something novel  
3 usually.

4 **Q.** Why were you not confident or, putting it the other way  
5 round, why were you concerned that the virus would not  
6 be restricted to China, that if it left China it would  
7 come to Western Europe and to the United Kingdom, and  
8 that if it reached the United Kingdom it would not be  
9 controlled, all of which are necessary steps in the  
10 conclusion there would be, instinctively, a pandemic,  
11 you believed, in the United Kingdom and it would be  
12 very, very bad?

13 **A.** I just know how notoriously difficult to control  
14 respiratory viruses are, I knew this -- by this stage it  
15 appeared to be a novel coronavirus, I knew the  
16 diagnostics would not be necessarily sophisticated or  
17 upscaled anywhere in the world at this point, and just  
18 my general experience told me that I didn't like the  
19 look or feel of this.

20 **Q.** Indeed, you're right, you said in your statement that  
21 you of course spoke to Professor Sir Chris Whitty about  
22 this, the CMO, you're the DCMO, and your statement  
23 records that his response had been to agree that the  
24 situation may well escalate but for now we needed to  
25 wait and monitor developments closely?

180

1 A. Yes. Yes.  
 2 Q. Before you answer, I just need to put to you something  
 3 else, another point you make in your statement, which is  
 4 that in the extremely difficult and complex field of  
 5 being an epidemiologist, when confronted with  
 6 information suggesting the spread of a viral pandemic,  
 7 there are -- there is -- you describe a spectrum of ways  
 8 in which you can respond, and there are people who act  
 9 on instinct more, perhaps there are more people who like  
 10 to pause and wait and accumulate data, and that's what  
 11 you've put in your statement.

12 May we take it that both your positions, your more  
 13 instinctive one, perhaps Professor Sir Chris Whitty's  
 14 desire to accumulate more information, wait and see,  
 15 both fall within that spectrum of reasonable response?

16 A. Well, that's right. You get a range of opinions on  
 17 science, you get a range of opinions on when the data  
 18 are certain enough to tell you what you're seeing, and  
 19 then you have to overlay on top of that personalities.  
 20 And, you know, much as Chris and I are great friends,  
 21 and, you know, very dear colleagues, and I genuinely  
 22 mean that, we are different personalities, and we both  
 23 say we're different personalities. You know, I'm the  
 24 one who chases the ball, Chris is the one who would look  
 25 at the ball first and make a more qualified and

181

1 limited --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- about the transmissibility and the nature of this  
 4 pathogenic outbreak?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. But Sir Christopher's position, perhaps reflective of  
 7 his position as the CMO, paid greater weight towards the  
 8 consequences of pressing the alarm button, how quickly  
 9 the government could be made to respond and made to sit  
 10 up and take notice and to treat this issue seriously?

11 A. Yes, so --

12 Q. That's the divide?

13 A. You're absolutely right. I don't think Sir Chris was  
 14 remotely tardy, but I do think he was doing his job as  
 15 the CMO, which is different to my job as DCMO, which is  
 16 more of a kind of sentinel alerting role.

17 LADY HALLETT: To be fair to Sir Chris too, you're not going  
 18 to get any government to move on the basis of  
 19 Professor Van-Tam's instincts, are you?

20 A. No, absolutely not. Absolutely not. And I didn't  
 21 expect it, I was just air -- you know, we have a very  
 22 open office, we don't -- you know, we say what we think,  
 23 we talk to each other as professional colleagues and  
 24 Chris has made that very clear that we -- you know,  
 25 professionally, you know, that's how it should be, and

183

1 thoughtful decision about whether it was worth chasing.

2 So --

3 LADY HALLETT: I think he is right, if I may say so.

4 A. So, you know, there is that difference, and I understood  
 5 entirely that I was conveying my instincts at that  
 6 point, but I think Sir Chris was entirely right, given  
 7 his much more profound experience of government, that --  
 8 you know, he knew when to press buttons that I didn't.  
 9 In any case, I was subordinate to Chris and I respect  
 10 the chain of command, so I was perfectly content with  
 11 the response that I received, and, you know, it wouldn't  
 12 have been possible to kind of wake up SAGE and wake up  
 13 COBR because I was getting a bit excited about something  
 14 based on instinct. And there weren't a lot of data at  
 15 that point.

16 That position changed of course very quickly indeed,  
 17 and it was six days -- and the data were changing daily  
 18 at that point, but it was only six days before SAGE was  
 19 enacted for the first time, and it was only eight days  
 20 before COBR was enacted. So I feel the system was kind  
 21 of at that point beginning to kind of work, if you like.

22 MR KEITH: May we leave it on this basis, Professor: your  
 23 instinct appears, if I may say so, to have been more of  
 24 an epidemiological instinct, it was an instinctive  
 25 response to the data, such as it was, and it was very

182

1 so it's a safe space to say "Look, I've got a bad  
 2 feeling about this".

3 LADY HALLETT: Did you say earlier you were involved in the  
 4 swine flu response?

5 A. Yes.

6 LADY HALLETT: Wasn't the Chief Medical Officer at that  
 7 stage criticised for pressing a warning button too soon  
 8 or too -- I can't remember, was there some --

9 A. I don't recall that, but -- no, I just don't recall it.  
 10 Couldn't comment.

11 MR KEITH: Evidence has been received from other scientists  
 12 and epidemiologists to this effect: because of the  
 13 characteristics of a viral pathogenic outbreak, viruses  
 14 can explode, they can move extremely fast, there is  
 15 a premium on speed of reaction, because once you get  
 16 behind the response curve you can find yourself very  
 17 quickly in very deep trouble. To what extent should  
 18 an instinctive response, and you're an expert  
 19 epidemiologist, have been allowed to push the system  
 20 further forward or to push it further forward than it  
 21 was, given the nature of the field in which you  
 22 practice, dealing with a deadly viral pandemic?

23 A. Well, you're kind of right, in that, you know, things  
 24 can get out of control with respiratory viruses very  
 25 fast, but it does depend upon the doubling time. And,

184

1 you know, the doubling time for some viruses is very  
2 low, not particularly respiratory viruses but the  
3 doubling time for some viruses is low. The doubling  
4 time in the end, when we had quality data, for  
5 SARS-CoV-2 was certainly in the range of sometimes  
6 five days, sometimes ten, but that's the kind of broad  
7 range of doubling times.

8 So yes, there's a point about moving fast, but  
9 you've got to understand the doubling time before you  
10 can know just how much of a hurry you're in, and we  
11 couldn't do that at this point.

12 **Q.** All right.

13 **A.** There's a secondary point that I think is really  
14 important for the Inquiry globally in terms of the  
15 interpretation of data, in terms of what was coming in  
16 from the surveillance system, and when and how people  
17 acted.

18 If you receive data that shows an increase in  
19 infections, then you're actually receiving data on human  
20 behaviours that occurred, roughly speaking, seven days  
21 ago, and you have a question mark about what happened in  
22 the interim seven days. If you receive data on  
23 hospitalisations and, you know, they look a bit kind  
24 of -- a bit fruity, then you're actually receiving data  
25 on exposures to the virus that occurred probably

185

1 **Q.** -- throughout the February half term, so in a broad  
2 sense, you were, if I may say so, absolutely right.

3 By the middle of February, what view, if any, had  
4 you reached, the alarm having been raised, as to the  
5 speed with which the government machine as a whole was  
6 responding?

7 And I want you to answer that both by reference to  
8 the plans, plans for countermeasures, or plans for  
9 border controls or hand washing or school closures or  
10 whatever it might be, and also control. Was there  
11 a sufficient understanding of the practical limitations  
12 of control measures? Sir Chris Whitty has said he was  
13 under no illusions that control measures would by and  
14 large be affected because there was no scaled-up test  
15 and trace system.

16 So were you concerned by mid-February at the speed  
17 of process, the speed of progress of the government, or  
18 were you content with the reaction?

19 **A.** Look, the data were getting worse with each passing SAGE  
20 meeting, and I think the minutes of the SAGE meetings  
21 speak for themselves on that. The situation was not  
22 improving, in terms of, you know, the data that NERVTAG  
23 were looking at. I knew that SAGE was properly engaged  
24 by this point. I knew that the outputs of SAGE were  
25 feeding into central government. I didn't really have

187

1 10-14 days ago. Because we know with SARS-CoV-2 you're  
2 not admitted to hospital the moment you get SARS-CoV-2,  
3 you're admitted when you become breathless, you know,  
4 five or seven or even ten days later.

5 **Q.** And this is why it is so vital with viral pandemics,  
6 viral pathogenic outbreaks, not to fall behind the  
7 curve?

8 **A.** But it's also why you're always working with one hand  
9 behind your back -- tied behind your back, because the  
10 data you're receiving on cases and hospitalisations  
11 pertain to exposures that are, by that point historical.

12 **Q.** There is always a time lag in the information --

13 **A.** Indeed.

14 **Q.** -- that is absolutely required to be able to react --

15 **A.** And I wanted to land that point, so thank you for that.

16 **Q.** In your statement, you say elsewhere that, moving on  
17 now, and the government machine having been woken up and  
18 numerous COBR and SAGE and NERVTAG meetings having taken  
19 place, by February half term you believe you understood  
20 that the virus had actually been present in the  
21 United Kingdom for several weeks before that. Now,  
22 evidence has been received by the Inquiry to the effect  
23 that indeed there were hundreds, perhaps many more,  
24 seedings in the United Kingdom --

25 **A.** Yes.

186

1 any sight or visibility of what was going on at that  
2 level.

3 **Q.** Right.

4 **A.** I'm afraid I can't really answer the question more than  
5 I have.

6 **Q.** No, it's very helpful.

7 Do we take it, therefore, that you weren't privy,  
8 for example, to the plans coming out of the Civil  
9 Contingencies Secretariat on 28 February or the debate  
10 on countermeasures in SAGE on 24 February? Those  
11 weren't matters with which you were concerned?

12 **A.** I can't recall which SAGES I was in or not, but if I was  
13 in a SAGE or part of a SAGE, because I had other  
14 meetings as well, you know, I might -- I will have been  
15 witness to those. But I certainly wasn't present when  
16 those kind of discussions were taken back in to  
17 Cabinet Office or Number 10 to understand, you know,  
18 what their kind of official and political response was  
19 starting to be.

20 **Q.** Having reached the view that you've expressed on  
21 16 January and having reached the view that you've  
22 expressed in relation to the extent of the sustained  
23 community transmission of the virus by mid-February, did  
24 you reach a view as to the timeliness or not --  
25 absolutely open-ended -- of the countermeasures that did

188

1 in due course come to be imposed? So the --  
 2 **A.** Yes.  
 3 **Q.** -- measures of 12 March, 16 March and 20 March?  
 4 **A.** So it won't really surprise you that I'm pretty aligned  
 5 with Sir Chris on this. You know, my kind of instinct  
 6 reaction was "not a day too soon". With the benefit of  
 7 hindsight I think I reflect that these measures would  
 8 have all been better kind of certainly seven days  
 9 earlier than they were, possibly a little longer than  
 10 that.

11 So somewhere in the kind of 7-14-day window,  
 12 you know, that would have been perhaps a bit more  
 13 timely.

14 **Q.** And is that a reference to all the countermeasures, so  
 15 those on the 12th and then the 16th and the 20th, and  
 16 then ultimately, of course, the lockdown, 23rd?

17 **A.** It's --

18 **Q.** So they could all have been applied a bit earlier?

19 **A.** Yeah, I think that's fair.

20 **Q.** All right.

21 **A.** Yeah, I think that's fair. But particularly, you know,  
 22 the move into lockdown. But I do appreciate that there  
 23 were things going on the weekend before which made the  
 24 data look suddenly much worse than they had previously  
 25 looked. So I think, you know, there was an element of

189

1 the number of people requiring admission with Covid  
 2 severe enough to warrant hospital care could not have  
 3 been admitted. With some, you know, pretty awful  
 4 potential considerations at that point.

5 **MR KEITH:** Since you have gone there, we have gone slightly  
 6 out of the chronology, but that's no bad thing,  
 7 Professor, could I ask you to look at a SAGE meeting of  
 8 23 March, of course the date that the mandatory  
 9 stay-at-home order was imposed -- INQ000129072 --  
 10 because in fact you were present at that SAGE, you may  
 11 or may not recall.

12 INQ000129072.

13 And at paragraph 7 these words appear -- or rather,  
 14 perhaps, let's start at 6:

15 "6. The NHS is surging bed capacity over the next  
 16 fortnight, with a focus on London.

17 "7. The data suggest that London is 1-2 weeks ahead  
 18 of the rest of the UK on the epidemic curve. Case  
 19 numbers in London could exceed NHS capacity within the  
 20 next 10 days on the current trajectory."

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** Firstly, that last assessment "could exceed NHS  
 23 capacity", was that premised upon no further lockdown or  
 24 no further stringent measures being imposed, and  
 25 therefore reliance on the measures from the previous

191

1 a change there that really kind of galvanised hearts and  
 2 minds.

3 **Q.** But not a change that in fact sweeps away your  
 4 observation or your assessment that it could all have  
 5 been earlier?

6 **A.** Yeah.

7 **Q.** Yes.

8 **LADY HALLETT:** If you had any of the measures short of the  
 9 mandatory lockdown imposed earlier, in the 7-14 days, in  
 10 your expert opinion, was there a chance we could have  
 11 avoided the mandatory lockdown or is it impossible to  
 12 say?

13 **A.** I think it's largely impossible to say, but I think, for  
 14 me, the balance of probabilities, looking at just how  
 15 infectious this virus was proving to be in places like  
 16 Italy, France, that, you know, there were just -- almost  
 17 certainly no alternatives. And, you know, my view,  
 18 I don't know if you're going to come to it, I'll just  
 19 say it anyway, my view is that although there had been  
 20 lots of expressions about the NHS overwhelm that was  
 21 possible, overtopping, overwhelming, et cetera, my view  
 22 is that, as is the same as Sir Chris, we would have  
 23 first run out of high intensity care beds, and it is  
 24 possible within a couple of weeks, if we had not acted  
 25 when we did, that we would have reached a position where

190

1 week, that's to say the 16th and 20th, or case numbers  
 2 could exceed even if we do impose the mandatory  
 3 stay-at-home order, do you know?

4 **A.** Yes, so I don't know, but the way I interpreted it for  
 5 sure was that if the current rate of growth continues,  
 6 case numbers could exceed NHS capacity. Now, NHS  
 7 capacity has to be something that is a little bit fluid  
 8 in terms of regions. London was ahead of the curve,  
 9 I don't doubt that if London was full, for want of  
 10 a better word, there would then be an overflow of London  
 11 patients into other parts of the NHS, you know, because  
 12 that's what we do, and that's particularly what  
 13 intensive care units do as a matter of kind of routine  
 14 practice.

15 And that has implications for places not in London  
 16 and further out of the city who are behind the curve,  
 17 who essentially -- because people don't, you know, go  
 18 into intensive care and come out the next day, they  
 19 certainly weren't at this point -- that has implications  
 20 for whether the remaining capacity in the regions, for  
 21 want of a better word -- and, you know, I'm quite  
 22 sensitive about this because I live in the regions,  
 23 I don't live in London -- you know, what that does to  
 24 the remaining capacity.

25 So "exceed NHS capacity" is possibly a slightly

192



1 loose term because you can kind of sleep out by region,  
2 but it still has implications for the totality of the  
3 NHS bed capability.

4 **Q.** The material around this time uses, as you've already  
5 identified, a number of different ways of describing the  
6 impact on the NHS, "overwhelming", "overtopping" --

7 **A.** Yeah.

8 **Q.** -- "exceeding capacity", "straining the surge capacity",  
9 and so on and so forth. Is this the position as you  
10 understood it at that SAGE meeting: there was no hard  
11 data saying there is a stop point, a hard date by which  
12 the NHS will be broken, but that, instead, if the  
13 epidemiological trajectory or curve continues in the way  
14 that it has, it will inevitably be broken at some  
15 indeterminate point in the future, is that the nub of  
16 it?

17 **A.** Yeah, so "hard stop" is a really kind of bad expression  
18 for the reasons I've given, that, you know, if you're  
19 short of capacity in one area you kind of move out and  
20 ship out and sleep out into the other areas, but the NHS  
21 is nevertheless finite in the number of staff and the  
22 number of beds, and so I think that's right, I think  
23 that's the --

24 **Q.** The correct analysis?

25 **A.** You did say something else and I've forgotten.

193

1 month, then you absolutely -- and if everybody complies  
2 with the measures on that date, you change exposures  
3 from that date, you therefore change case incidence,  
4 shall we say, five to seven days later, something like  
5 that, so you don't see the impact of that. You then  
6 don't see the impact of those new cases for another  
7 seven days, until they require hospital care, so that  
8 kind of takes us into -- quite a way into the next  
9 month, and by the exhibit you've just put up, the  
10 doubling time for intensive care unit patients at this  
11 point was estimated to be three to four days.

12 So how can you wait for -- to see the results of  
13 those measures when you in such a kind of difficult  
14 position in terms of bed number doubling?

15 **Q.** There was nevertheless some way of assessing compliance  
16 or the reaction to or the response to those earlier  
17 existing measures because there was some information at  
18 the weekend about levels of compliance, and you'll  
19 recall the fact that the press and the television showed  
20 large numbers of people attending national parks over  
21 that weekend. So there was data about that. Is  
22 therefore the position that the quandary the government  
23 was in this: nobody could say for sure what the impact  
24 had been or would be of the existing measures, no one  
25 could know for sure, because, as you say, it would take

195

1 **Q.** No, no, I think that was all I said.

2 **A.** Okay.

3 **Q.** Secondly, obviously on that 23 March only a few days had  
4 passed since the measures had been imposed the previous  
5 week --

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q.** -- on the 16th and then the 20th, the household  
8 isolation -- the individual isolation, then the  
9 household isolation, then the request that all  
10 non-essential businesses and travel stop and that people  
11 endeavour to stay at home.

12 What was your understanding of what the likely  
13 impact of those measures was in terms of the R figure?  
14 Because, as Sir Christopher has explained it, it's not  
15 that government was grappling with absolute data as to  
16 when or how the NHS would collapse, it is just that if  
17 the reproduction figure was not brought below 1, the  
18 exponential growth would continue and that point would  
19 inevitably be reached.

20 What debate was there about giving more time for the  
21 measures the week before time to bed in and for the  
22 R figure to come down in the expectation or hope that it  
23 would come down before that future date of collapse of  
24 the NHS would be reached?

25 **A.** Well, if you enact measures on, say, the 20th of the

194

1 days if not weeks for the impact to become clear, what  
2 therefore the impact would be and that was  
3 an unconscionable risk to run? If you don't know what  
4 the beneficial impact had been of the week before, you  
5 cannot continue on the basis that you've just got to  
6 hope it will work, given the characteristics of the  
7 viral pandemic?

8 **A.** So I understand the question entirely. What I don't  
9 think I can do is give you the kind of technical answer  
10 you require, which I think the modellers would need to  
11 give you, about what their views were about the  
12 likelihood of those phase one measures, if that's the  
13 right word, having the desired impact.

14 **Q.** I --

15 **A.** I wasn't --

*(unclear: multiple speakers)*

17 **Q.** I don't wish you to speak on behalf of the modellers --

18 **A.** No, and I can't really give you an answer then.

19 **Q.** But was this not a debate that was taking place within  
20 SAGE on that day: how do we weigh up the prospect that  
21 the phase one measures are going to work to get us out  
22 of the hole against the risk that if we don't act now  
23 with further more stringent measures it will be too  
24 late?

25 That's the crisis, that's the dichotomy?

196

- 1 **A.** Yes, I've pledged to be truthful and I will, and I can't  
2 remember.
- 3 **Q.** All right.
- 4 Can I now raise just some separate disparate areas.  
5 That *Coronavirus: action plan*, of 3 March --
- 6 **A.** Yes.
- 7 **Q.** -- did you have a hand, Professor, in its drafting or  
8 its promulgation?
- 9 **A.** I undoubtedly received a copy of it to make some kind of  
10 track changes and suggestions to it. In fact I think if  
11 you were able to kind of look at the email records you  
12 would probably see that that was the case.
- 13 It was another job to do. I was rather more focused  
14 on specific jobs I had to do connected with fighting the  
15 virus than writing about -- writing a glossy pamphlet  
16 about how I was going to, you know, play my role in it  
17 or how the government was going to do it or -- so I'll  
18 be perfectly truthful with you: it was another job that  
19 probably wasn't very welcome at the time, and, you know,  
20 I just thought well, you know, see it through.
- 21 **Q.** May --
- 22 **A.** Let others do it.
- 23 **Q.** May I ask you this. You've told us how you'd already  
24 reached the view in mid-February that --
- 25 **A.** Yeah.

197

- 1 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Keith.
- 2 **MR KEITH:** Professor, mass gatherings.
- 3 **A.** Yes.
- 4 **Q.** I detect a quiet groan. It was an issue upon which you  
5 advised the Secretary of State for the Department for  
6 Culture, Media and Sport in late February, and you also  
7 provided advice to DHSC colleagues at the same time.  
8 You met with officials in the DCMS in early March, you  
9 provided further advice and further papers for a number  
10 of government departments in the middle of March,  
11 14 March.
- 12 So you were, to a considerable extent, the go-to  
13 person on this issue. In summary, scientifically,  
14 epidemiologically, was there a consistent line of advice  
15 given by the OCMO to the effect that banning mass  
16 gatherings or closing sporting events or sporting  
17 occasions would be unlikely to make much of a difference  
18 epidemiologically?
- 19 **A.** Yes. I mean, our -- our position, my position has  
20 always been that mass gatherings, particularly outdoor  
21 ones, are -- if you cancel them, they're a very limited  
22 epidemiological effect. And if you take into account  
23 the kind of pathways around them, it is the activities  
24 around them that is, you know, potentially more  
25 concerning, in relation to kind of pubs, bars,

199

- 1 **Q.** -- there was sustained community transmission,  
2 essentially containment had been lost, you must have  
3 wondered around about 2 March, when you were  
4 contributing to the final draft: why am I writing -- why  
5 am I assisting the drafting of a document which is based  
6 on the premise that containment has not yet been lost,  
7 and indeed the government didn't announce it was lost  
8 until 12 March?
- 9 **A.** The drafting of government documents takes forever and  
10 a day, and, you know, it wasn't really something that  
11 I was focused on or really had the kind of mental and  
12 professional energy to worry about.
- 13 **Q.** All right.
- 14 **LADY HALLETT:** I've written down "I was focusing on actions  
15 not planned -- not words".
- 16 **A.** Yes, I was, I'm afraid.
- 17 **MR KEITH:** Well, that perhaps is a very useful description  
18 of certain publications.
- 19 My Lady, is that a convenient point?
- 20 **LADY HALLETT:** It is, certainly. We take a 15-minute break,  
21 Professor, so I shall return at 3.25. But we shall  
22 complete your evidence today, I promise.
- 23 **(3.12 pm)**
- 24 **(A short break)**
- 25 **(3.25 pm)**

198

- 1 restaurants, et cetera.
- 2 But even so, in relation, for example, to --  
3 you know, I know you've already discussed a couple of  
4 big sporting events in different countries with various  
5 witnesses. In terms of the kind of totality of movement  
6 between countries, the effect of kind of cancellation of  
7 these events is really, epidemiologically, quite small.  
8 I have also heard Sir Chris's comments, and I have to  
9 say I think he's got a very valid point, that there is  
10 a political layer above this, around the optics and what  
11 the continuation of mass gatherings means, signifies to  
12 the public, you know, because -- you know, when the  
13 football's over there's not much left to do in life, as  
14 it were.
- 15 So from that perspective --
- 16 **Q.** Well, I have to interrupt you there, Professor. That is  
17 your personal view.
- 18 **A.** Yes, indeed. Yes. But the point is, you know, it's  
19 very symbolic for a lot of people, what these mass  
20 gatherings are, and I think Chris summarised it very  
21 well, I don't think I can add to that.
- 22 **LADY HALLETT:** Can I just ask you one extra question,  
23 Professor, I think it's something Mr Weatherby was  
24 asking about earlier, and that is: but what if your  
25 football match involves a whole bunch, thousands of

200

1 people flying in from another country where there is  
2 a hotspot of infection or hotspots of infection?  
3 **A.** So that partly depends on whether there are lots of  
4 other people coming in through kind of routine tourism  
5 and so forth from that other country, and it really  
6 depends on whether you have a belief that the virus is  
7 already seeded here in the UK, and whether that  
8 additional movement would really be an amplification in  
9 relation to what is already going on under the surface  
10 in your own country, particularly in those kind of early  
11 months when we know we couldn't test at the capacity  
12 required to understand the UK case burden.

13 **LADY HALLETT:** I'm no scientist, but aren't you just raising  
14 the risk? It's not going to help matters.

15 **A.** I think it's perfectly fair to say that it won't help  
16 matters, but equally it isn't going to have a -- it just  
17 isn't going to have a significant negative impact either  
18 in relation to the totality of what else is going on.

19 So it's back to this point that I think there is --  
20 it's always very difficult in this space to separate out  
21 the optics from the actual epidemiological effects.  
22 But, you know, I refer -- I can recall emails from  
23 other -- other experts, I think Professor Ferguson,  
24 Professor Edmunds, also agreeing that the effect of mass  
25 gatherings is --

201

1 of close contact, low ventilation, with this virus,  
2 you're likely to get transmission.

3 The ... the however many tens of thousands one could  
4 get into a stadium will be dwarfed by the however many  
5 millions that are gathering in pubs to watch it on  
6 Sky TV. So, you know, there's a broader context here of  
7 what the sporting event generates in terms of people  
8 coming together, quite often to drink alcohol, which we  
9 know reduces social barriers, to observe a sporting  
10 event.

11 **Q.** Indeed. The easing of restrictions.

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** On 26 May you contributed to a joint letter to  
14 Simon Case, the then permanent secretary in Number 10.

15 **A.** Yes.

16 **Q.** Could we have INQ000069418.

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** In essence, in general terms, you and your colleagues  
19 were writing to the government to say this. You are  
20 aware that different government departments are eager to  
21 restart their industries, you're obviously acutely aware  
22 of the damage and harm that is being done to the health  
23 and welfare of societies by virtue of the restrictions,  
24 but you nevertheless felt it important enough to warn  
25 that the combined effect of seemingly incremental and

203

1 **MR KEITH:** Professor Ferguson in fact was asked to advise  
2 specifically on this point and we've seen the evidence.

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** When you say "political" and you referred to the  
5 "optics", do you mean in fact that, in terms of the  
6 public health message that went out, the continuation of  
7 mass sporting events was, with hindsight, ill-advised,  
8 it just sent the wrong message?

9 **A.** It was unhelpful, it was unhelpful.

10 **Q.** You can't talk about closing primary schools and allow  
11 sporting events to continue, can you?

12 **A.** It was unhelpful.

13 **Q.** All right. Then secondly this, just on the  
14 epidemiological side, there is some suggestion in the  
15 material that whilst it's clear that outdoor sporting  
16 events epidemiologically are insignificant because  
17 they're outdoor, there may have been an underestimate of  
18 the epidemiological consequences of queuing to get into  
19 games or perhaps using public transport or the use of  
20 trains, and, as my Lady has observed, that's one way  
21 perhaps in which people may be coming together to go to  
22 a game and therefore there was an epidemiological risk  
23 there which perhaps wasn't fully appreciated at the time  
24 this advice was given?

25 **A.** Whenever you get people gathering together in conditions

202

1 narrow easings raised an essentially intolerable risk  
2 that the R reproduction number would run out of control  
3 again.

4 Why was it necessary to write this letter as opposed  
5 to just continue to contribute to the sum of government  
6 learning by the advices that you were giving with your  
7 colleagues day in, day out, at meetings, by email and so  
8 on and so forth?

9 **A.** Yeah, okay. So the actual restriction, the easing of  
10 restrictions that was happening was happening on  
11 a piecemeal basis, government by government department  
12 kind of setting by setting by setting, and it was  
13 relatively easy to justify for an individual setting  
14 that, you know, this was kind of okay to ease  
15 restrictions. However, when you put all of those  
16 together, there was a risk. I didn't -- your words were  
17 "intolerable", they're not mine, but there was a risk  
18 that this would all go too fast.

19 **Q.** Well, you say "severe risk" --

20 *(unclear: multiple speakers)*

21 **A.** Yeah, "intolerable" is not a word, I don't think --

22 **Q.** All right, well --

23 **A.** But there was a risk that this would all go too fast,  
24 and there was a risk that -- we knew there would be  
25 further waves of infection, epidemiologists knew that,

204

1 at some point. There was a risk that if you kind of let  
2 it go, let it kind of rebuild and get a lot of momentum,  
3 you would then enter the next wave from a fairly high  
4 level and therefore have less warning and therefore with  
5 more consequences.

6 So that was the kind of science reasoning behind the  
7 letter. Why the letter rather than just continuing to  
8 co-operate? And I think that was about, certainly for  
9 me, and I can only speak for my signature on the letter,  
10 I wanted to leave a mark in the sand here.

11 **Q.** Why was it necessary to leave a mark in the sand if you  
12 were, as were of course, the DCMO giving advice on  
13 a daily basis to government with your colleagues?

14 **A.** Because people like you have come back to it now and  
15 it's kind of on record that I was concerned enough to  
16 write a formal letter to Cab Sec at this point because  
17 of those concerns that I've already relayed to you and  
18 the room.

19 **Q.** But they were concerns that you would have been  
20 ordinarily expressing in the course of your day to day  
21 meetings, because all of you were exclusively concerned,  
22 of course, with the pandemic and with the easing of  
23 restrictions and the debate that was going on?

24 **A.** Sometimes a letter is needed.

25 **Q.** Why was it needed?

205

1 going to go into, about the necessity for  
2 circuit breakers, then the introduction, instead, of  
3 a tier system in October --

4 **A.** Yeah.

5 **Q.** -- and then ultimately the lockdown at the beginning of  
6 November.

7 **A.** Yeah.

8 **Q.** In general terms do you assess that this warning, which  
9 is what it surely was, because the last paragraph shows  
10 what might happen if control is lost, was generally  
11 heeded?

12 **A.** You know ... I suppose the epidemiology really just  
13 speaks for itself at this point --

14 **Q.** But could you tell us, please.

15 **A.** Yeah. You know, it was clear that we were losing  
16 control of the virus bit by bit through the autumn  
17 again, and it was clear that the tier system, to my  
18 mind, was not working efficiently. That isn't to say  
19 that theoretically it couldn't have worked efficiently,  
20 but there were just too many delays in implementing  
21 tiered restrictions. Those on top of the fact that your  
22 data you're dealing with, again I go back to the point,  
23 reflect exposures two weeks before, or at least a week  
24 before. So, you know, you're already kind of, you know,  
25 dealing with yesterday's data trying to make decisions,

207

1 **A.** As I said, to lay down a trail in writing that was  
2 incontrovertible that we wanted to say that this needed  
3 to be taken very carefully.

4 **LADY HALLETT:** That suggests you didn't think your oral  
5 advice was being taken sufficiently seriously.

6 **A.** I think ... I think it could partly suggest that, but it  
7 could also partly reflect the kind of fragmentation of  
8 decisions across different sectors, and therefore  
9 possibly the Cab Sec, not being an epidemiologist that  
10 I'm aware of, not being able to crystallise the  
11 net result of those individual sector liftings and frame  
12 that in terms of the national epidemiology.

13 So, you know, I don't think it was because we'd kind  
14 of felt we'd run out of road in terms of, you know,  
15 getting traction with officials from other government  
16 departments, not at all, but I just think it was more  
17 about the totality and somebody who is responsible for  
18 the totality actually being presented with that concern.

19 **MR KEITH:** Professor, it is common ground, it's well  
20 established, that, as these things go, the level of  
21 prevalence remained relatively high or at least not very  
22 low throughout the course of the summer months. We came  
23 out of the restrictions with the prevalence still at  
24 a relatively significant level, and that didn't change.

25 Then in September, there was a debate, which we're not

206

1 so -- and the tier system just seemed interminably slow  
2 between a decision and the negotiation on the economic  
3 packages to enable it to happen. And --

4 **Q.** Can we just focus on that for a moment --

5 **A.** Yeah.

6 **Q.** -- and could you just further explain that observation.

7 The evidence is that in the October tier system, not the  
8 December one, but in the October one, there was  
9 a process by which local authorities who were subject to  
10 higher levels of tiering could negotiate financial  
11 packages.

12 **A.** I believe so, yes.

13 **Q.** Was your concern that there was a delay built into the  
14 system between the moment at which the Joint  
15 Biosecurity -- the Joint Bio Centre would advise that  
16 a particular area had to go, epidemiologically, into  
17 a higher tier --

18 **A.** Yeah.

19 **Q.** -- to the point at which it was actually ordered,  
20 because there had to be a process of negotiation in the  
21 middle?

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** All right. And then because of your point about the  
24 importance of not falling behind the curve and not  
25 knowing what the data in fact shows because the data is

208

1 a bit old, that gave rise to a very real problem?

2 **A.** Yes, yeah. And the tier system led to some other

3 problems too. So, for example, Liverpool did really

4 well at one point and managed to kind of --

5 significantly to kind of turn their numbers down,

6 Manchester got into more difficulty, but there were

7 widespread reports of -- that, you know, people from

8 Manchester going to nightclubs in Liverpool to

9 circumnavigate the kind of geographical boundary of the

10 tiers. So at a practical level I think it was very

11 difficult to make it work and it probably looked better

12 than it really was, which is why I just don't think the

13 tier system served us very well at all.

14 **Q.** You focused on the events in October, Professor. My

15 question in fact was designed to elicit from you

16 an answer as to the general governmental response from

17 the time at which you sent the letter in May. Was the

18 reality that the warning was not heeded to this extent:

19 control of the disease was lost, the steps taken by

20 government in September by way of the decision not to

21 impose a circuit breaker, the decision in October to

22 have the tier system that you've described, failed to do

23 that very -- failed to perform the very aim, the

24 strategy which you had identified as being necessary to

25 ensure that there wasn't a new loss of control and a new

209

1 Finally, two last subjects. Moonshot.

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** You were on the Moonshot scientific advisory group --

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** -- the first meeting of which took place on 25 August.

6 We've heard very little about the Moonshot; what was,

7 briefly, the Moonshot idea or exercise?

8 **A.** So I'll give you my best understanding of it, which may

9 not be perfect. The understanding of Moonshot was to

10 try to restore the UK to a point where we had almost no

11 Covid. And to do that, to detect every single case

12 there was kind of cooking or ongoing in the UK at the

13 same time.

14 **Q.** A mass test?

15 **A.** So mass population testing in a very short window of

16 time. Now, I never got to the point where I understood

17 whether this could be done in one day or done in

18 three days, but even three days would be, you know,

19 20 million people a day, so I never really kind of

20 understood that concept.

21 But it didn't make any epidemiological sense to me.

22 Because let us say that your testing day was Monday,

23 yeah?

24 **Q.** For a whole swathe of --

25 **A.** Yes.

211

1 second wave?

2 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

3 **Q.** All right, thank you.

4 Eat Out to Help Out.

5 **A.** Yes.

6 **Q.** Did you, Professor, were you consulted on that scheme?

7 We've asked the same question of Sir Patrick Vallance

8 and Sir Chris Whitty. Were you involved in that?

9 **A.** Absolutely not. The first I heard about it was,

10 I think, on the TV.

11 **Q.** I think that indicates what view you would have taken

12 had you been consulted?

13 **A.** Say it again?

14 **Q.** What view would you taken had you been consulted?

15 **A.** So had I been consulted I wouldn't have made any

16 distinction between Eat Out to Help Out and any other

17 epidemiological event that brought different households

18 into close contact with each other for the purposes of

19 socialising, eating and consuming alcohol.

20 The net epidemiological effect, you know, is kind of

21 agnostic to what's on the menu, as it were. But I would

22 have said, "This is -- this is exactly encouraging what

23 we have been trying to suppress and get on top of in the

24 last few months". So it didn't feel sensible to me.

25 **Q.** All right.

210

1 **Q.** -- for a whole region.

2 **A.** For a whole region, yeah, yeah. And there would be

3 a number of people who were exposed to the virus on the

4 Sunday, who absolutely would test negative on the

5 Monday, because they were incubating the organism, who

6 would get a kind of clear result, as it were, by Tuesday

7 or Wednesday, but who by Thursday may well have

8 symptoms.

9 So actually you would have to repeat this over

10 several days and keep people in isolation from each

11 other to avoid further exposure to kind of get to the

12 point where everyone was clear.

13 And I just couldn't see it working. I was sent to

14 the Moonshot meeting, I can't remember who sent me, but

15 I was told to go along to the Moonshot meeting. And

16 I went along, I tried to offer some, you know,

17 non-negative, constructive comments, but I couldn't see

18 it working ever.

19 **Q.** That's the epidemiological answer. Practically, as at

20 that time, in August, do you recall whether or not the

21 United Kingdom in fact had a fully scaled-up system of

22 PCR, antigen or free flow tests that would have allowed

23 these sorts of numbers to be tested simultaneously?

24 **A.** I mean, that's a memory test and I can't remember the

25 figures, but my kind of gut feel is no. And of course

212

1 there were other far more important testing environments  
2 such as hospitals and care homes.

3 **Q.** Indeed.

4 Finally, communications. In your statement you  
5 refer to the fact that there was a Japanese poster  
6 called the "Three Cs" (closed spaces, crowded places and  
7 close-contact settings), the merits of which commended  
8 themselves to you, and you sent a copy of that poster to  
9 the Cabinet Office in mid-June, so not during the  
10 lockdown and not "Save the NHS" time, but afterwards.

11 **A.** No, no.

12 **Q.** Why did you send a copy of that poster to the  
13 Cabinet Office in mid-June?

14 **A.** Well, I can't remember when I first discovered the  
15 existence of the Japanese "Three Cs" concept, but it  
16 immediately resonated with me. And, you know, all I can  
17 say is it resonated with me personally because I felt it  
18 would be a way, if we did it right, by which we could  
19 coach the public to look at any situation and just,  
20 you know, remember three Cs. It's pretty simple.  
21 Literally, is it closed? Corollary: and what's the  
22 ventilation like? Is it crowded? Are you putting a lot  
23 of people into that closed space? And is the purpose of  
24 them being there to have close contact with each other?

25 And I felt that you could teach people to  
213

1 pandemic, including on Covid wards.

2 Now, on 9 January, so very, very early in the story,  
3 you attended a PHE strategic response group where it was  
4 agreed that Covid would be treated as a high-consequence  
5 infectious disease, HCID, although I think it was  
6 formally classified as such a few days later. Is that  
7 right?

8 **A.** I think it's right.

9 **Q.** Okay. Well, I have the document, I'm happy to put it  
10 up, but I'm trying to --

11 **A.** No, that's fine.

12 **Q.** -- work at pace.

13 The minute of that meeting, I'll give the reference  
14 for the record, it's INQ000119453, and the minute  
15 records that it was recognised that Covid, like SARS,  
16 was a virus with "higher airborne transmissibility", and  
17 that would mean, wouldn't it, that it was recognised  
18 that it was transmitted either by aerosol or droplet  
19 transmission; is that right?

20 **A.** So higher airborne transmissibility --

21 **Q.** Yes.

22 **A.** -- does mean that it could be transmitted via the  
23 airborne route, which includes large droplets and also  
24 includes fine particles, also referred to as aerosols.

25 **Q.** Yes. Thank you.

215

1 self-regulate almost and risk manage their own  
2 behaviours, their own exposures, if we could kind of  
3 make that concept work in the UK. And I --

4 **Q.** Had it been very successful in Japan?

5 **A.** I can't give you the answer to that, all I can say is --  
6 you know, repeat what you said to me, that it absolutely  
7 resonated with me.

8 **Q.** All right. You sent it to the Cabinet Office, you were  
9 told that it would be considered, this type of messaging  
10 might be -- it would be explored as to how it could be  
11 integrated into the campaign. Did you hear any more?

12 **A.** No.

13 **Q.** You were the DCMO for health protection in the face of  
14 this pandemic?

15 **A.** Yeah.

16 **MR KEITH:** All right. Thank you very much.

17 **LADY HALLETT:** Mr Weatherby.

#### 18 Questions from MR WEATHERBY KC

19 **MR WEATHERBY:** Professor, I ask questions on behalf of the  
20 Covid Bereaved Families for Justice United Kingdom, it  
21 represents many bereaved families across the  
22 United Kingdom, and for the purposes of the questions  
23 I'm going to ask you it's important to record that some  
24 of them are bereaved of healthcare workers and some of  
25 them themselves were healthcare workers during the  
214

1 **A.** But aerosol or airborne transmission is not part of the  
2 definition --

3 **Q.** No.

4 **A.** -- of a high-consequence infectious disease.

5 **Q.** Thank you for that clarification, I wasn't in fact  
6 suggesting it was.

7 **A.** No.

8 **Q.** But that's what was recorded in the discussion, during  
9 which it was agreed between you and the PHE group that  
10 it would be in fact classified as a high-consequence  
11 infectious disease.

12 **A.** Yeah, and the reason for that classification at that  
13 point was that primarily I think at that point we really  
14 did not understand with any certainty the infection or  
15 case fatality rate, we didn't know how lethal this virus  
16 was --

17 **Q.** Yes.

18 **A.** -- and the HCID classification is used for things which  
19 you know are very lethal and used for things which  
20 you -- where you have uncertainty as to the lethality.

21 **Q.** Yes.

22 **A.** It's the way you kind of start with a new organism.

23 **Q.** Indeed, and in fact the document goes on to say that it  
24 was agreed to follow a "safety first principle" --

25 **A.** Yes.

216

1 Q. -- which I think is what you just helpfully explained to  
2 us.  
3 And in fact the discussion and the classification at  
4 that stage was then added to by guidance, and again I'll  
5 read it rather than putting it on screen if I may, but  
6 I can if you want me to, it's at INQ000184034, and for  
7 the record it's paragraph 4.3, and the guidance on  
8 15 January that was issued with respect to this --  
9 A. Could I have that up, if that's all right?  
10 Q. Yes.

11 Could we have that up then? I'll repeat the -- it's  
12 INQ000184034.

13 (Pause)

14 Right. Sorry, could we have the first page up first  
15 so we can orientate as to what it is. Thank you.

16 So it's the "Wuhan novel coronavirus ... infection  
17 preferential prevention and control guidance",  
18 15 January.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So could we go to the paragraph that had helpfully  
21 already been put up -- thank you, 4.3 -- the page  
22 before, I think, yeah, 4.3.

23 So what was required was, firstly, an isolation room  
24 with negative pressure relative to the surrounding  
25 areas, or a neutral-pressure single room, and then a use  
217

1 in guidance saying confirmed cases should be transferred  
2 to HCID treatment centres, but that could easily be  
3 changed when an agreed surge trigger is met."

4 And then this:

5 "Personally, I would want to maintain the HCID label  
6 if it became more widespread, to maintain appropriate  
7 IPC [infection prevention control] precautions and  
8 general levels of clinical concern/awareness around the  
9 new disease, as long [as] we still think it meets the  
10 stated criteria."

11 Yeah?

12 So what that means in summary is that you're  
13 agreeing with the PHE official that once the spread of  
14 the virus reaches a particular point it's not required  
15 that they should be -- that patients should be within  
16 an HCID centre.

17 Now --

18 A. Not quite --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- true.

21 I think what I was flagging, that the HCID process,  
22 if you like, and the use of those very high -- high  
23 security beds, there was a step down and a known step  
24 down to the 500 or so infectious disease beds, which  
25 are -- again have --

219

1 specifically set out -- use of an FFP3 respirator by all  
2 persons entering the room. And then, I won't go through  
3 it but you can see it there, full PPE.

4 Yes?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. So that's what was --

7 A. And this is guidance issued by Public Health England.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But this is sensible precautions for this type of virus,  
11 isn't it?

12 A. It's sensible and pretty standard precautions --

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. -- for HCIDs at this point in time --

15 Q. Okay. So then move to 21 January and again I think we  
16 should have this up, it's INQ000151342, and this is  
17 an email exchange between yourself and a PHE official.

18 It's been redacted, so I don't know who it is, but  
19 it doesn't matter, but it's an email exchange, and the  
20 person confirms that:

21 "... There is no agreed requirement to stop calling  
22 a disease an HCID, in order for confirmed cases to be  
23 managed outside HCID centres. Management in specific  
24 HCID treatment centres is (deliberately) not part of the  
25 agreed definition/criteria for HCID; we do have a line  
218

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. -- enhanced infection control, but that there was no  
3 provision or understanding about what happened when you  
4 got to the end of those 500 beds.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And it was very clear that we were going to get to there  
7 quite quickly.

8 Q. Okay. Can I take this in stages?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. So the HCID scheme, if I can put it that way, is that  
11 there are -- there's a standing capacity of high  
12 isolation beds --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- so if there's a need for isolation the HCID patient  
15 is put in there. But it's well recognised that if  
16 there's more than a small number of such patients --

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. -- then that can't --

19 A. They just can't function --

20 Q. -- completely impracticable to have a standing capacity  
21 of thousands of empty beds?

22 A. Indeed.

23 Q. So it starts off with an HCID unit, small number of  
24 beds, and then if that isn't sufficient you then have to  
25 open it up?

220

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- and you move on to the high dependency unit --

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. -- capacity or whatever you have, and you have to use

5 practical means to expand the capacity to the best

6 isolation that you can manage within the capacity that

7 you have; is that right?

8 A. Yeah, that seems okay.

9 Q. Okay. But what is being said here is that although that

10 is fine, what should be maintained are the IPC

11 precautions around that?

12 A. Yeah, so that was personally my view.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. The other factor that was later -- you know, I was later

15 made aware of that -- is that specimen handling and the

16 whole process of treating patients under kind of HCID

17 rules means that your total capacity is lower and your

18 speed of movement and handling of specimens particularly

19 is lower and more cumbersome, and the classification of

20 HCIDs lies with the Advisory Committee on Dangerous

21 Pathogens --

22 Q. I'm coming to that.

23 A. Good.

24 Q. So the point is that it's recognised that you have to be

25 flexible about capacity and therefore the HCID

221

1 Q. -- as we heard from Professor Whitty this morning, there

2 was then a question right at the beginning of March

3 about the biosafety requirements of dealing with samples

4 in labs?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. So perfectly sensibly the CMO, the Office of the CMO --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- then consulted with PHE and the HSE and got the

9 biosafety requirements stepped down so that the testing

10 could be maintained or the analysis of the testing; yes?

11 A. I think so, yeah.

12 Q. Yes.

13 Then we move to 3 March, and again I'm trying to go

14 at some speed here, so please stay with me, but then

15 a DHSC official messaged that the standing capacity for

16 airborne HCIDs had been exceeded and therefore there was

17 this outward movement from the very high isolation

18 capacity outwards. Now, that you probably won't

19 remember the date --

20 A. No.

21 Q. -- but that was 3 March. I can take you to the

22 document, but I don't think it's necessary, but were you

23 aware at this sort of time, the beginning of March, of

24 that happening in accordance with what we've just been

25 through in January?

223

1 classification allows for a surge, a trigger which opens

2 up the capacity and you have to do the best you can with

3 the capacity.

4 A. So I don't think it allows for it in the sense that it

5 has always allowed for it --

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. -- I think this was new thinking.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I think this was a new situation.

10 Q. The guidance we've just been to --

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. -- sets out the need for the isolation units but not in

13 terms of specifically HCID units, but it does

14 specifically refer to the FFP3s --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- and the particular requirements of personal

17 protection for the staff, and that's the distinction I'm

18 drawing. So that's the -- whether it's the HCID

19 guidance or not, that's the guidance that was in place

20 here which I've just taken you to.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. Yes?

23 A. I'm all right so far.

24 Q. Yes. So by the beginning of March --

25 A. Yes.

222

1 A. I can't remember the date.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. But I entirely expected that we could not --

4 Q. Sure.

5 A. -- continue to manage the very fast growing epidemic of

6 hospitalised patients on the infectious diseases

7 network --

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. -- within the infectious diseases network.

10 Q. Yes. But this was -- what we've just been through,

11 21 January email, the expectation was that if this did

12 become widespread that this would be necessary, and here

13 we are at the beginning of March, it has been necessary,

14 the plan, such as it was -- it wasn't unexpected?

15 A. No, no, I think I kind of flagged that --

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. -- that there was probably a gap in the plans that

18 didn't kind of bridge between what we classically

19 envisaged HCIDs to be handling --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. -- such as Ebola cases, to something that was then

22 becoming a --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- persistent and widespread infection.

25 But let me just add a little bit to that, where the

224



1 threat of infection to others was changing over time, so  
 2 it was not exclusively about the healthcare environment,  
 3 and it was starting to be more about the general  
 4 community environment. In other words, the  
 5 opportunities for exposure to the virus were starting to  
 6 change. Whereas, you know, if you have -- you can have  
 7 the -- you can have the infectious diseases unit, the  
 8 HCID, full of Ebola cases but there's no risk in the  
 9 wider community.

10 **Q.** Yes, okay.

11 **A.** It's contained. This was very materially different --

12 **Q.** Okay, so I'll now move on to the final part of where I'm  
 13 headed with this, and that's 13 March, and NERVTAG met.  
 14 I think we need this up. It's INQ000212195 --

15 **A.** Oh, thank you.

16 **Q.** -- and that's 13 March, and if we could, and this is  
 17 a meeting where the HCID classification is considered.  
 18 And just to remind ourselves, this is where we're in the  
 19 crisis phase, the exponential rise in Covid cases.  
 20 Okay?

21 So if we could move to page 4, please, and  
 22 paragraph 2.5, and this refers to -- this is relevant to  
 23 you, "Action: JVT", and then:  
 24 "JVT noted that the guidance was needed to help  
 25 relief pressure points on the NHS in England ..."

225

1 that?

2 **A.** No, I don't think that's the case at all.

3 **Q.** Have I misread that?

4 **A.** Well, I mean, clearly they're sequential minutes, but  
 5 the minutes aren't written the moment --

6 **Q.** Yes.

7 **A.** -- a NERVTAG meeting is finished. I don't suppose we  
 8 have the publication date on these minutes, do we?

9 **Q.** I'm not aware of that.

10 **A.** No, we --

11 **Q.** Yes.

12 **A.** -- just don't.

13 **Q.** Okay.

14 **A.** That would be worth looking into.

15 **Q.** Yes.

16 **A.** But likely, having received an instruction from one  
 17 independent advisory body in the shape of NERVTAG, who  
 18 were requesting that ACDP looked at this, likely I moved  
 19 very fast on that --

20 **Q.** Yes.

21 **A.** -- and likely this should have been reported --

22 **Q.** Yes.

23 **A.** -- as an action --

24 **Q.** Okay.

25 **A.** -- linked -- that I had done really quickly, and this

227

1 And then there is the example of ambulances; yes?

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** Then if we move on to 2.9, please, the new guidance  
 4 that's been proposed is then stepping down from FFP3  
 5 proper respirators to the kind of blue surgical masks  
 6 that many of us are familiar with --

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** -- having gone through it. So a real step down in PPE  
 9 for people who are dealing with Covid patients at that  
 10 point at the crisis stage.

11 And then, if I may, 2.10, there's a recommendation  
 12 there that the reclassification of Covid from an HCID is  
 13 considered by the advisory committee --

14 **A.** Yeah.

15 **Q.** -- which you were referring to earlier.

16 And then finally on this document, 2.11, please,  
 17 there is an update where you had spoken to  
 18 Professor Evans, who had advised that HCID statement was  
 19 discussed "and the committee were unanimous in  
 20 supporting the declassification ... of HCID".

21 Now, just to complete the picture -- well, first of  
 22 all, you've therefore got the recommendation that it's  
 23 reconsidered, and then you've got effectively a decision  
 24 in the next paragraph referred to which suggests that  
 25 a decision has already been taken. Can you help us with

228

1 was almost a kind of post-meeting note that --

2 **Q.** I see.

3 **A.** -- that was the consequence.

4 **Q.** Okay.

5 **A.** I just can't spread any further light on that.

6 **Q.** No.

7 **A.** But I -- you know, I refute the suggestion that this was  
 8 a fait accompli.

9 **Q.** Yes.

10 **A.** I'm extremely fastidious about --

11 **Q.** Yes.

12 **A.** -- appropriate procedure, and if NERVTAG had asked for  
 13 that, I would have asked ACDP --

14 **Q.** Yes.

15 **A.** -- in due course.

16 **Q.** Yes.

17 **A.** This would not be kind of retro-constructed --

18 **Q.** Okay.

19 **A.** -- as you might have been suggesting.

20 **Q.** Right. Well, I'm exploring rather than suggesting --

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** -- but the one paragraph says --

23 **A.** It does.

24 **Q.** -- a recommendation effectively --

25 **A.** Yes, and the next one --

228

1 Q. -- and the next one refers to --  
 2 A. Yeah.  
 3 Q. -- what's effectively a decision.  
 4 A. Yeah.  
 5 Q. And the reason that you were -- however it lands -- in  
 6 touch with the professor about this is because they were  
 7 effectively the decision-making body?  
 8 A. ACDP.  
 9 Q. Yes.  
 10 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 11 Q. Yes.  
 12 A. And it would be worth possibly seeking some  
 13 supplementary evidence from the ACDP minutes to  
 14 understand --  
 15 Q. Well, it may not be --  
 16 A. -- how that happened.  
 17 Q. It may not matter, but I was then just going to take you  
 18 to one final document, which is INQ000119498, which is  
 19 the 16 March document at the top, although it does say  
 20 19 March at the bottom, it probably doesn't matter, but  
 21 just to orientate us in terms of the date.  
 22 But this is the "Four Nations HCID Definition and  
 23 List Group", chaired by the head of emerging infections,  
 24 and I won't take you through it but this is ostensibly  
 25 a review of the HCID position and then changes the

229

1 Q. But the two dates, the 13th and the 16th, it does seem  
 2 by the time this review has taken place the decision's  
 3 already been taken?  
 4 A. Ah, look, I can't --  
 5 Q. Okay.  
 6 A. -- give you -- I just can't give you any clarity on  
 7 that.  
 8 Q. Final --  
 9 A. If I could, I would.  
 10 Q. Final point, the upshot of this is that right at the  
 11 crisis point the classification of Covid is being  
 12 downplayed and one of the key points, perhaps the key  
 13 point here, is that healthcare workers, there's now no  
 14 requirement for them to have respirators, the  
 15 requirement is for them to have simple surgical masks.  
 16 Why is it that that happens in the eye of the storm,  
 17 when the cases are going exponentially and healthcare  
 18 workers are at the highest risk; why is that happening  
 19 now?  
 20 A. There wasn't the clearest understanding at that stage  
 21 that there was -- that fine droplet transmission was  
 22 dominant, and I can only surmise that the people who  
 23 wrote the guidance, Public Health England, felt that the  
 24 predominant route of infections was droplet and,  
 25 therefore, a surgical face mask was adequate. But

231

1 position at the end of the document, and it -- of  
 2 importance here is that this is a four nations group, so  
 3 this is where the four nations are brought together.  
 4 So in terms of this, first -- I've got two points on  
 5 this, just to finish with, but who is actually making  
 6 the decision here? Is it the professor from the group  
 7 that you were in touch with on the 13th or is it the  
 8 four nations group? Were the four nations CMOs involved  
 9 in this? I mean, what was the process here?  
 10 A. I am pretty certain -- but I can't answer the question  
 11 about whether the HCID definitions group was a subgroup  
 12 of ACDP -- but clearly my instruction was to contact  
 13 ACDP.  
 14 Q. Yes.  
 15 A. And it may well be that this is some kind of subgroup of  
 16 ACDP --  
 17 Q. Yes.  
 18 A. -- but the participants are from the public health  
 19 agencies --  
 20 Q. Yes.  
 21 A. -- Public Health England, Health Protection Scotland,  
 22 Public Health Wales and Public Health Agency of  
 23 Northern Ireland, and therefore quorate, and I --  
 24 Q. Okay.  
 25 A. -- can't tell you who they were.

230

1 I can't give you a better answer than that.  
 2 Q. Yes. Well, I mean, you were involved in these  
 3 discussions. Let me just put this to you: was this  
 4 decision to reduce the protection for healthcare workers  
 5 because there simply weren't enough FFP3 respirators?  
 6 A. Not by me.  
 7 MR WEATHERBY: Thank you.  
 8 LADY HALLETT: Mr Weatherby, I appreciate you have been  
 9 trying to stick to your time, and I'm very grateful.  
 10 Did you want to ask the question about why did it take  
 11 so long for medical masks to be recommended?  
 12 MR WEATHERBY: I wasn't going to go there, but thank you.  
 13 LADY HALLETT: Thank you.  
 14 Right, I think it's now Ms Heaven.

#### Questions from MS HEAVEN

14 MS HEAVEN: Good afternoon, Professor.  
 15 A. Good afternoon.  
 16 Q. I represent the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for  
 17 Justice Cymru and I just have five minutes so I will  
 18 take it quickly if I may.  
 19 Just one topic from myself and that is in relation  
 20 to the four meetings convened by Mr Gove in his capacity  
 21 as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and your  
 22 perspective on how useful they were to a four nations  
 23 approach to handling the pandemic. We understand from  
 24  
 25

232

1 your witness statement that you attended some of these  
2 meetings, so if I can take it in a staged approach  
3 please.

4 **A.** Yeah, okay.

5 **Q.** We understand they started around May 2020, that's the  
6 evidence we have.

7 **A.** I'll have to go with that, I can't tell you.

8 **Q.** In terms of the purpose of these meetings you say in  
9 your witness statement, this is paragraph 5.12, that  
10 they were chaired by Mr Gove and the purpose was to  
11 exchange information and to co-ordinate across the  
12 devolved administrations.

13 So it would seem from that explanation that you're  
14 not suggesting to this Inquiry that Mr Gove was using  
15 these meetings to gather views from the devolved  
16 administrations to inform UK Government decision-making,  
17 that was not the purpose; is that correct?

18 **A.** No, not really, it was a much kind of -- it was a softer  
19 exchange of views, I think really mainly by the  
20 ministers who were on that call, about kind of what was  
21 happening, and literally exchange of views and  
22 information. And I was there in the room, really, in  
23 case there was a technical question.

24 **Q.** I'll come in a minute to some specific examples of what  
25 may and may not have been said and jog your memory if  
233

1 the First Minister of Wales in particular, Mr Drakeford,  
2 and, I think it's fair to say, Nicola Sturgeon, they  
3 both acknowledge to this Inquiry that the meetings were  
4 helpful and constructive. However, I do want to just  
5 probe your memory on a few criticisms that in particular  
6 Mr Drakeford has ventilated to the Inquiry about the  
7 effectiveness and indeed the overall usefulness of these  
8 meetings, and really it's to understand whether you  
9 heard any of these complaints being raised in this  
10 forum.

11 But can I check first: do you remember now being in  
12 meetings with Mr Gove and Mr Drakeford?

13 **A.** I definitely recall Ms Sturgeon being present, I'm  
14 pretty sure Mr Drakeford was present too, at some  
15 points, but it's just a blur to me now.

16 **Q.** It's just a blur. But just thinking about how many you  
17 attended, I think you say in your statement that largely  
18 it was you that attended?

19 **A.** Yes, it was.

20 **Q.** Okay.

21 So, these are some of the concerns or complaints  
22 that Mr Drakeford has given to the Inquiry, and I want  
23 just to ask you if each one or any of them --

24 **A.** If any of them chime, yeah.

25 **Q.** -- you heard him saying that, or indeed any member of  
235

1 I may.

2 **A.** Okay, yes, of course.

3 **Q.** Just on purpose -- before we move on to that -- was it  
4 also your understanding at the time that another purpose  
5 of Mr Gove's meetings was essentially to insulate the  
6 Prime Minister -- the then Prime Minister, Mr Johnson --  
7 from having to deal with the devolved administrations?  
8 Because, as we know, he thought it was optically wrong  
9 for him to have to have regular meetings with them. Was  
10 that your understanding at the time?

11 **A.** I've no idea, I can't answer that question at all.  
12 I didn't enter the meetings with that kind of --

13 **Q.** No.

14 **A.** -- degree of allegiance to --

15 **Q.** Well, was that ever discussed in your presence?

16 **A.** -- CDL --

17 **Q.** Was that ever discussed in your presence?

18 **A.** No.

19 **Q.** "This is the purpose of the meetings"?

20 **A.** Absolutely not, no.

21 **Q.** So on usefulness, you say in your witness statement that  
22 you did witness effective communication between core  
23 decision-makers and the devolved administrations, and  
24 you cite an example of the meetings with Mr Gove, and  
25 I think that there probably isn't any dispute between  
234

1 the DAs saying that.

2 So the first one is this: there was a lack -- the  
3 meetings were ad hoc and there was a lack of formal  
4 structure to when they happened; did you hear that  
5 complaint?

6 **A.** No, and part -- somewhere in my dim and distant memory  
7 I recall these were Wednesdays, at either 5 pm or 6 pm.

8 They weren't at a terribly sociable time, you know, in  
9 terms of family life. And I do -- somewhere I think I'm  
10 recalling that they were Wednesdays.

11 **Q.** Next one, please, that there was a concern, and it might  
12 be fair to say that this was held quite strongly by  
13 Mr Drakeford, that these meetings, whilst helpful, were  
14 no substitute for high level ministerial meetings; did  
15 you hear that complaint?

16 **A.** Nothing heard.

17 **Q.** And this is a very important one, because it might be  
18 suggested that this goes to the issue of whether or not  
19 there was a coherent four nations approach, and this is  
20 that the clarity of messaging was a challenge for all  
21 four nations and that more unanimity would be helpful,  
22 and that could only happen if the UK Government gave  
23 more notice of its decisions and announcements to the  
24 devolved governments.

25 Now that features regularly in written  
236

1 communications certainly between the DAs and Mr Gove.  
 2 Did you hear that complaint?  
 3 **A.** I did not hear that.  
 4 As a slightly broader sentiment, I think I heard  
 5 that there was some frustration about the timing of  
 6 communication. Equally, I do recall on a couple of  
 7 occasions that Scotland went first on a couple of  
 8 points.  
 9 **Q.** But certainly I think what you're suggesting is some of  
 10 the concern was coming from the devolved administrations  
 11 that the UK Government was perhaps making decisions and  
 12 briefing the press without telling them first?  
 13 **A.** It doesn't sound like a totally strange concept, but  
 14 I don't recall it from those meetings, I really don't.  
 15 **Q.** So, finally then, did you hear any complaint from any  
 16 member of the devolved administrations, including Wales,  
 17 at these meetings about communications?  
 18 **A.** I was there in a technical capacity and the answer is  
 19 I can't recall but I don't think so.  
 20 **MS HEAVEN:** Okay, thank you very much.  
 21 Those are my questions.  
 22 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Ms Heaven.  
 23 Mr Jacobs, last again.  
 24 **MR JACOBS:** I don't mind, my Lady.  
 25 **LADY HALLETT:** Don't worry, Professor, Mr Jacobs is used to  
 237

1 tiny bit off script, I will be very short.  
 2 Professor Whitty referred to heated debate within  
 3 government on the issue. Is that something that you  
 4 were party or was that really his preserve given his  
 5 particular involvement in meetings in Downing Street and  
 6 so on?  
 7 **A.** The package of support handed down to people who had to  
 8 self-isolate who were, for example, self-employed was  
 9 just kind of way above my pay grade.  
 10 **Q.** Fine.  
 11 Can I just ask this then: was this issue on the  
 12 importance of financial support something that was  
 13 foreseeable prior to the onset of the pandemic, and  
 14 I have in mind your own sort of research and  
 15 expertise --  
 16 **A.** So --  
 17 **Q.** -- yes, prior?  
 18 **A.** I think in influenza pandemic planning, and if you go  
 19 back to influenza pandemic exercises undertaken by the  
 20 government, the concept of school closures was pretty  
 21 well rehearsed -- to the extent that anything is ever  
 22 rehearsed through, you know, a short exercise -- but  
 23 I think the kind of, you know, society-wide kind of  
 24 lockdown and social distancing measures, particularly  
 25 ones that were then, you know, applied multiple times  
 239

1 having people turn their back on him, he doesn't take  
 2 offence, but you have to keep your voice to the  
 3 microphone, that's why, I'm afraid. He's used to it,  
 4 we're not being rude to him.  
 5 **Questions from MR JACOBS**  
 6 **MR JACOBS:** Professor, I can be, I think, very short, as it  
 7 happens. My questions are on the same topic as the  
 8 questions I directed to your colleague Professor Whitty  
 9 this morning, namely financial for support  
 10 self-isolation.  
 11 **A.** Yeah.  
 12 **Q.** Could I actually just start with this: do you agree with  
 13 Professor Whitty's evidence of earlier today as to the  
 14 importance of financial support for self-isolation?  
 15 **A.** I think it was, you know, very easy, or relatively easy,  
 16 for people in well paid jobs with very good employers  
 17 who would allow them to self-isolate and who could  
 18 continue to do their work in a kind of isolated way in  
 19 the home. But I think it was enormously difficult for  
 20 people who were not fortunate enough in our society to  
 21 have those kind of jobs, who had jobs where it was kind  
 22 of essential, to earn money, to actually be out of the  
 23 house, and I think this was an essential part of the  
 24 package.  
 25 **Q.** Professor, my Lady, if you don't mind me going a very  
 238

1 during the pandemic in total to kind of put the brakes  
 2 on each time, I think that was just, you know, way out  
 3 of -- way beyond anything that had ever been planned and  
 4 therefore -- and most of those exercises were about kind  
 5 of technical issues related to antivirals, vaccines,  
 6 health service responses. I'm not aware of any response  
 7 on, you know, any rehearsal or concept of economic  
 8 support being aired widely before this.  
 9 **Q.** Yes, that's helpful to understand. I had in mind  
 10 something slightly narrower.  
 11 **A.** Oh, I'm sorry.  
 12 **Q.** You refer in your statement to a 2017 article that you,  
 13 I think, co-authored about influenza, I think in that  
 14 specific context in care homes.  
 15 **A.** Yes.  
 16 **Q.** And you referred in that article, didn't you, to  
 17 care home workers being a group that, given their low  
 18 pay --  
 19 **A.** Yes.  
 20 **Q.** -- and insecure work --  
 21 **A.** Yes.  
 22 **Q.** -- were at high risk of working while sick?  
 23 **A.** Yes.  
 24 **Q.** So, in that sense, is it right that the link between  
 25 insecure work, prevalence of working while sick was  
 240

1 something that was understood really from the outset of  
 2 the pandemic?  
 3 **A.** I think it was quite narrowly understood in the context  
 4 of care home workers and in the context of that being  
 5 a very historically low pay sector, and in particular --  
 6 there's a point there you didn't mention about the  
 7 care home worker who works in two or three different  
 8 care homes because they can get a shift here, a shift  
 9 there, and together by going to three different homes in  
 10 a week that makes up the family income; and of course,  
 11 you know, that's, you know, kind of epidemiologically  
 12 not a good idea when there's a respiratory virus  
 13 circulating widely across the community.  
 14 **MR JACOBS:** Thank you, Professor, and I think that may be  
 15 an issue taken up with other witnesses as well.  
 16 Thank you, my Lady.  
 17 **LADY HALLETT:** Thank you, Mr Jacobs.  
 18 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, may I detain you just for one moment,  
 19 which is that: although he's not made a Rule 10  
 20 application, Mr Friedman King's Counsel has asked very  
 21 nicely whether or not, based upon something that  
 22 Professor Sir Jonathan Van-Tam has said in his  
 23 statement, we would refer back to that article and just  
 24 elicit a single point which may mean we needn't put it  
 25 to Professor Jenny Harries next week.  
 241

1 across that kind of extraordinarily awful behaviour in  
 2 another context and I know the impact it can have upon  
 3 the recipients, the victims, and the victims' families,  
 4 even if they don't receive threats, which by the sounds  
 5 of it yours may have done. It's just too awful to  
 6 contemplate.  
 7 I just want you to be reminded -- you probably don't  
 8 need reminding, but just in case you do -- the vast  
 9 majority of the population abhor such conduct, and we  
 10 are enormously grateful to you and your colleagues for  
 11 the way in which you served the public of this country,  
 12 of the whole of the United Kingdom, in a time of  
 13 national emergency. So please ignore the violent,  
 14 criminal, idiot element and remember the rest of us are  
 15 grateful.  
 16 Thank you.  
 17 **(The witness withdrew)**  
 18 **LADY HALLETT:** Sorry, I'm losing my voice.  
 19 **MR KEITH:** My Lady, thank you.  
 20 **LADY HALLETT:** 9.30 tomorrow.  
 21 **(4.27 pm)**  
 22 **(The hearing adjourned until 9.30 am**  
 23 **on Thursday, 23 November 2023)**  
 24  
 25

1 **Further questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY**  
 2 **MR KEITH:** Professor, in that 2017 article, did you and your  
 3 co-authors warn in fact of the potentially devastating  
 4 consequences of explosive outbreaks in care homes in the  
 5 context of runaway viral infection?  
 6 **A.** I guess we did in, as much that we looked at the  
 7 literature and we understood the mortality rate. It is  
 8 possible, when an infectious virus gets into a very  
 9 vulnerable population who live at essentially quite  
 10 close quarters to each other -- the literature was all  
 11 about influenza rather than SARS-CoV-2, so there are  
 12 differences there, but that these were vulnerable  
 13 populations, extremely vulnerable populations, I think  
 14 has been known for a very long while and I personally  
 15 have dealt over the years -- and I can't quite give you  
 16 the details -- as a registrar in public health, with  
 17 a number of really difficult to control explosive  
 18 outbreaks of influenza in care home settings, nursing or  
 19 care home settings.  
 20 **MR KEITH:** Thank you.  
 21 **LADY HALLETT:** That concludes the evidence for today.  
 22 Thank you very much indeed, Professor Van-Tam.  
 23 I don't know if you heard what I said to  
 24 Sir Chris Whitty in Module 1, but in relation to the  
 25 abuse and threats that you described earlier, I've come  
 242

<b>INDEX</b>	
	<b>PAGE</b>
3 PROFESSOR SIR CHRIS WHITTY (continued) .....	1
4 Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY ... 1	
5 (continued)	
6 Questions from MR WEATHERBY KC .....	67
7 Questions from MR WILCOCK .....	87
8 Questions from MS HEAVEN .....	98
9 Questions from MS MITCHELL KC .....	111
10 Questions from PROFESSOR THOMAS KC .....	123
11 Questions from MR FRIEDMAN KC .....	130
12 Questions from MR METZER KC .....	135
13 Questions from MR JACOBS .....	144
14 PROFESSOR SIR JONATHAN VAN-TAM (sworn) .....	149
15 Questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	149
16 Questions from MR WEATHERBY KC .....	214
17 Questions from MS HEAVEN .....	232
18 Questions from MR JACOBS .....	238
19 Further questions from LEAD COUNSEL TO THE ...	242
20 INQUIRY	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

<b>LADY HALLETT:</b> <b>[45]</b> 1/5 18/17 62/19 62/25 67/8 67/13 67/16 87/9 98/20 106/5 111/9 121/21 122/21 123/2 129/23 130/1 135/15 143/1 143/4 144/12 144/14 144/21 148/24 149/16 149/20 182/3 183/17 184/3 184/6 190/8 198/14 198/20 199/1 200/22 201/13 206/4 214/17 232/8 232/13 237/22 237/25 241/17 242/21 243/18 243/20 <b>MR FRIEDMAN: [2]</b> 130/4 135/14 <b>MR JACOBS: [6]</b> 144/20 144/23 148/23 237/24 238/6 241/14 <b>MR KEITH: [22]</b> 1/6 19/24 62/22 63/1 67/7 98/22 149/15 149/21 149/25 169/1 182/22 184/11 191/5 198/17 199/2 202/1 206/19 214/16 241/18 242/2 242/20 243/19 <b>MR METZER: [4]</b> 135/18 143/3 143/6 144/13 <b>MR WEATHERBY:</b> <b>[4]</b> 67/18 214/19 232/7 232/12 <b>MR WILCOCK: [2]</b> 87/11 98/21 <b>MS HEAVEN: [5]</b> 98/24 106/6 111/7 232/16 237/20 <b>MS MITCHELL: [4]</b> 111/14 121/19 121/23 122/20 <b>PROFESSOR</b> <b>THOMAS: [3]</b> 123/4 129/21 129/25 <b>THE WITNESS: [3]</b> 67/15 123/1 149/13  '  's [1] 89/2 'The [1] 55/13  <b>1</b> <b>1 March [1]</b> 81/10 <b>1-2 weeks [1]</b> 191/17 <b>1.03 pm [1]</b> 149/17 <b>1.1 million [1]</b> 141/13 <b>10 [18]</b> 1/11 1/24 2/12 2/21 4/19 12/13 20/1 30/17 63/16 63/23 156/2 156/8	156/13 156/18 156/19 188/17 203/14 241/19 <b>10 days [1]</b> 191/20 <b>10 deaths [1]</b> 5/21 <b>10 Downing Street</b> <b>[1]</b> 2/24 <b>10 March [2]</b> 1/12 87/22 <b>10 o'clock [2]</b> 69/21 70/9 <b>10-14 days [1]</b> 186/1 <b>100 [1]</b> 60/11 <b>10s [1]</b> 62/24 <b>11 May 2020 [1]</b> 141/21 <b>11.00 am [1]</b> 67/10 <b>11.05 [1]</b> 73/7 <b>11.12 [2]</b> 130/8 131/18 <b>11.15 [1]</b> 67/9 <b>11.15 am [1]</b> 67/12 <b>12 [4]</b> 170/5 170/11 170/24 171/12 <b>12 March [6]</b> 3/4 3/12 3/13 30/19 189/3 198/8 <b>12 October 2020 [1]</b> 108/3 <b>12th [8]</b> 5/5 5/19 25/7 25/8 33/23 45/1 50/2 189/15 <b>13 February [1]</b> 25/6 <b>13 January [1]</b> 172/11 <b>13 March [3]</b> 28/11 225/13 225/16 <b>13 minutes [1]</b> 69/3 <b>13 October 2020 [1]</b> 137/25 <b>13th [3]</b> 99/23 230/7 231/1 <b>14 [2]</b> 30/14 93/23 <b>14 March [1]</b> 199/11 <b>146 pages [1]</b> 150/13 <b>14th [1]</b> 5/17 <b>15 days' [1]</b> 56/10 <b>15 January [3]</b> 175/22 217/8 217/18 <b>15 March [1]</b> 30/14 <b>15 minutes [1]</b> 106/6 <b>16 hours [1]</b> 162/20 <b>16 January [2]</b> 177/13 188/21 <b>16 March [6]</b> 32/24 33/9 34/6 34/19 189/3 229/19 <b>16th [13]</b> 32/13 32/19 36/5 36/22 37/16 37/24 45/1 45/12 50/2 189/15 192/1 194/7 231/1 <b>17-day [1]</b> 107/24 <b>170 [1]</b> 147/20 <b>18 [1]</b> 159/10	<b>19 [10]</b> 28/18 55/10 76/6 81/20 130/16 132/5 138/5 141/20 142/3 232/18 <b>19 March [1]</b> 229/20 <b>193 [1]</b> 55/19 <b>1991 [1]</b> 150/21 <b>1997 [1]</b> 177/8  <b>2</b> <b>2 March [1]</b> 198/3 <b>2 o'clock [1]</b> 149/16 <b>2.00 pm [1]</b> 149/19 <b>2.10 [1]</b> 226/11 <b>2.11 [1]</b> 226/16 <b>2.5 [1]</b> 225/22 <b>2.9 [1]</b> 226/3 <b>20 [3]</b> 7/24 8/17 105/2 <b>20 March [2]</b> 9/19 189/3 <b>20 million [1]</b> 211/19 <b>20 October [1]</b> 141/24 <b>200 peer-reviewed</b> <b>[1]</b> 151/4 <b>2000 [1]</b> 111/24 <b>2004 [2]</b> 151/11 176/3 <b>2007 [1]</b> 151/12 <b>2009 [1]</b> 160/21 <b>2014 [2]</b> 151/20 151/24 <b>2017 [3]</b> 152/3 240/12 242/2 <b>2020 [43]</b> 1/9 7/21 25/1 66/19 68/5 84/12 84/16 91/5 91/9 97/12 99/14 99/17 99/22 102/15 102/24 107/22 107/24 108/3 114/22 118/2 120/19 125/15 132/9 132/10 132/16 133/23 134/5 134/8 135/22 136/2 136/20 137/12 137/25 141/18 141/21 141/22 141/24 142/3 142/5 145/23 147/21 154/19 233/5 <b>2021 [11]</b> 130/18 135/23 136/13 139/3 139/9 140/4 140/11 140/25 141/12 141/25 143/8 <b>2022 [2]</b> 97/3 152/16 <b>2023 [3]</b> 1/1 150/10 243/23 <b>204 [1]</b> 130/8 <b>20th [6]</b> 45/1 50/2 189/15 192/1 194/7 194/25 <b>21 January [2]</b> 218/15 224/11 <b>21 March [3]</b> 39/24	55/9 55/11 <b>218 [1]</b> 97/4 <b>21st [1]</b> 12/12 <b>21st/22nd [1]</b> 39/23 <b>22 [1]</b> 56/11 <b>22 January 2020 [1]</b> 102/15 <b>22 November 2023</b> <b>[1]</b> 1/1 <b>22nd [1]</b> 39/23 <b>23 March [11]</b> 45/2 49/25 54/8 56/11 56/12 56/24 59/25 61/8 159/11 191/8 194/3 <b>23 November 2023</b> <b>[1]</b> 243/23 <b>23rd [4]</b> 37/17 39/17 45/19 189/16 <b>24 [1]</b> 28/16 <b>24 February [1]</b> 188/10 <b>24/8/2020 [2]</b> 118/2 120/19 <b>25 August [1]</b> 211/5 <b>26 [1]</b> 76/2 <b>26 January [1]</b> 69/10 <b>26 May [1]</b> 203/13 <b>27 [1]</b> 107/24 <b>27 January 2020 [1]</b> 68/5 <b>274 [1]</b> 107/17 <b>277 [1]</b> 111/16 <b>28 February [1]</b> 188/9 <b>28 January [2]</b> 69/4 76/2 <b>28th [1]</b> 75/16  <b>3</b> <b>3 March [2]</b> 223/13 223/21 <b>3 March 2020 [1]</b> 99/17 <b>3.12 pm [1]</b> 198/23 <b>3.25 [1]</b> 198/21 <b>3.25 pm [1]</b> 198/25 <b>3.5 doubling [1]</b> 56/5 <b>30 [1]</b> 101/19 <b>30 years' [1]</b> 178/20 <b>30-plus [1]</b> 164/17 <b>31 [1]</b> 101/19 <b>335 [1]</b> 55/19  <b>4</b> <b>4.27 pm [1]</b> 243/21 <b>4.3 [3]</b> 217/7 217/21 217/22  <b>5</b> <b>5 January 2021 [1]</b> 141/25 <b>5 March 2020 [1]</b> 99/22	<b>5 pm [2]</b> 156/16 236/7 <b>5.12 [1]</b> 233/9 <b>5.193 [1]</b> 109/17 <b>5.8 [1]</b> 174/10 <b>500 [2]</b> 219/24 220/4 <b>59 [3]</b> 170/4 171/11 171/13 <b>59 cases [2]</b> 170/21 170/24 <b>590 [1]</b> 5/20  <b>6</b> <b>6 o'clock [1]</b> 70/8 <b>6 pm [1]</b> 236/7  <b>7</b> <b>7,000 [1]</b> 67/21 <b>7-14 days [1]</b> 190/9 <b>7-14-day [1]</b> 189/11 <b>700 [1]</b> 55/21 <b>73 [1]</b> 109/17 <b>75 [1]</b> 38/11  <b>8</b> <b>8 April [1]</b> 102/23 <b>8 April 20 [1]</b> 105/2 <b>8 January [1]</b> 169/1 <b>8 September 2020 [1]</b> 147/21 <b>8 September 2023 [1]</b> 150/10 <b>80 [2]</b> 8/11 12/3 <b>872 [1]</b> 55/16  <b>9</b> <b>9 January [2]</b> 169/25 215/2 <b>9.30 [1]</b> 243/20 <b>9.30 am [2]</b> 1/2 243/22 <b>90 [1]</b> 38/22 <b>95 [1]</b> 171/12 <b>9th [2]</b> 25/7 25/8  <b>A</b> <b>Aamer [1]</b> 111/15 <b>Aamer Anwar [1]</b> 111/15 <b>abhor [1]</b> 243/9 <b>ability [3]</b> 78/18 81/11 92/12 <b>able [18]</b> 5/23 14/23 16/12 16/14 20/11 57/10 57/18 81/25 83/17 84/3 84/25 93/4 108/21 117/11 146/11 186/14 197/11 206/10 <b>about [211]</b> 2/7 3/8 3/10 4/12 5/15 5/18 7/13 9/6 9/15 9/19 9/20 10/4 15/23 16/25 17/1 18/25 20/9 21/11 21/12 22/10 22/14
---	--	--	--	---

<b>A</b>	48/18 48/18 59/15 70/24 81/24 200/10 239/9	173/5	<b>actuality [1]</b> 56/25	<b>adults [1]</b> 134/3
<b>about... [190]</b> 22/17 22/22 24/19 25/3 25/4 25/6 25/12 27/7 28/24 29/17 31/12 34/8 35/2 38/3 41/14 42/17 43/2 43/25 45/7 46/7 47/5 48/19 50/15 51/7 51/16 52/16 55/14 56/5 56/16 56/22 57/20 57/22 59/2 61/8 63/18 65/4 67/21 67/25 68/2 68/2 69/21 72/5 74/6 74/23 75/2 76/20 80/5 81/10 81/17 83/8 86/4 86/5 87/15 87/24 90/16 91/25 92/15 100/2 101/23 103/10 103/23 104/12 104/15 104/21 105/8 107/16 109/18 110/8 111/24 112/1 112/8 112/14 112/15 113/16 115/16 115/17 115/22 116/8 116/20 116/21 116/22 117/18 117/22 118/7 118/15 118/22 119/5 119/13 119/20 120/15 121/13 121/25 131/2 132/4 136/3 136/10 137/8 138/3 138/4 139/8 140/13 141/9 141/23 142/2 143/10 143/18 144/4 144/7 146/19 146/25 146/25 147/4 147/23 150/21 151/24 152/23 154/21 155/7 155/8 156/22 157/11 157/15 159/11 159/14 160/5 161/9 162/5 163/22 165/8 165/14 165/20 167/22 168/21 170/20 171/1 171/5 171/7 171/8 172/5 173/8 173/14 173/25 174/4 177/11 177/13 179/18 180/21 182/1 182/13 183/3 184/2 185/8 185/21 190/20 192/22 194/20 195/18 195/21 196/11 196/11 197/15 197/16 198/3 198/12 200/24 202/10 205/8 206/17 207/1 208/23 210/9 211/6 220/3 221/25 223/3 225/2 225/3 228/10 229/6 230/11 232/10 233/20 235/6 235/16 237/5 237/17 240/4 240/13 241/6 242/11 <b>above [9]</b> 32/6 47/8	<b>above 1 [1]</b> 48/18 <b>abreast [1]</b> 131/10 <b>absent [3]</b> 19/16 29/12 128/17 <b>absolute [6]</b> 36/4 38/18 59/15 106/16 129/12 194/15 <b>absolutely [36]</b> 22/16 25/15 26/3 26/7 27/22 36/3 47/3 47/17 48/13 58/8 61/8 64/8 73/1 100/3 108/12 122/1 124/13 131/10 153/6 169/19 173/6 175/14 179/7 179/10 183/13 183/20 183/20 186/14 187/2 188/25 195/1 210/9 212/4 214/6 229/10 234/20 <b>absorb [1]</b> 58/1 <b>abuse [1]</b> 242/25 <b>academia [1]</b> 152/17 <b>academic [5]</b> 24/19 96/19 150/16 150/20 152/19 <b>academics [3]</b> 19/3 110/21 145/12 <b>Academy [1]</b> 96/20 <b>accelerate [1]</b> 67/1 <b>accelerated [2]</b> 31/22 37/22 <b>accept [10]</b> 27/23 30/1 30/4 105/2 129/11 129/15 129/17 137/10 143/8 143/11 <b>acceptable [2]</b> 60/14 150/3 <b>accepted [1]</b> 95/24 <b>access [2]</b> 102/22 103/11 <b>accommodate [1]</b> 60/3 <b>accompli [1]</b> 228/8 <b>accord [1]</b> 68/24 <b>accordance [1]</b> 223/24 <b>according [3]</b> 99/25 168/23 172/12 <b>account [5]</b> 37/13 145/16 148/19 162/14 199/22 <b>accountable [1]</b> 154/2 <b>accretion [1]</b> 17/9 <b>accrue [1]</b> 44/15 <b>accrues [2]</b> 21/6 72/19 <b>accumulate [2]</b> 181/10 181/14 <b>accurate [5]</b> 76/25 76/25 79/5 141/11	<b>achieve [10]</b> 8/10 11/15 11/22 13/13 13/17 19/14 21/14 23/7 49/9 116/13 <b>achieved [10]</b> 7/10 8/24 10/14 31/15 38/14 49/7 49/8 85/2 116/18 143/23 <b>achievement [1]</b> 116/20 <b>achieving [3]</b> 19/11 21/20 23/12 <b>acknowledge [8]</b> 26/5 89/5 124/15 124/16 124/19 126/23 142/17 235/3 <b>acknowledged [1]</b> 142/4 <b>acknowledgement</b> <b>[3]</b> 80/12 125/16 142/18 <b>acquire [1]</b> 144/11 <b>acquiring [1]</b> 74/12 <b>acquisition [1]</b> 106/15 <b>across [22]</b> 6/11 16/21 39/10 54/6 58/7 66/11 82/21 94/6 97/25 98/13 110/19 113/22 116/9 116/25 129/13 153/22 161/3 206/8 214/21 233/11 241/13 243/1 <b>act [12]</b> 46/7 46/9 46/16 47/21 48/12 53/15 62/8 90/2 123/5 130/5 181/8 196/22 <b>acted [2]</b> 185/17 190/24 <b>acting [2]</b> 4/6 53/17 <b>action [11]</b> 3/8 3/9 4/16 5/12 25/10 52/15 60/11 146/13 197/5 225/23 227/23 <b>actions [5]</b> 3/11 45/12 61/4 85/1 198/14 <b>actively [2]</b> 23/6 134/23 <b>activities [1]</b> 199/23 <b>activity [5]</b> 26/22 31/22 86/24 86/24 136/20 <b>actual [6]</b> 10/12 52/24 106/15 122/19 201/21 204/9	<b>actually [64]</b> 2/18 2/20 5/16 6/17 7/1 14/17 16/18 19/2 19/15 20/21 21/4 29/20 32/19 36/6 36/18 38/17 38/20 41/19 41/21 42/2 43/2 44/17 57/17 58/19 63/15 70/21 70/22 76/11 77/23 80/4 84/6 86/21 86/25 89/10 92/22 97/24 99/8 104/2 105/4 112/7 113/9 113/22 116/11 118/17 119/5 121/2 122/18 127/14 131/3 136/13 144/3 146/22 151/21 161/1 167/13 185/19 185/24 186/20 206/18 208/19 212/9 230/5 238/12 238/22 <b>acutely [1]</b> 203/21 <b>ad [1]</b> 236/3 <b>ad hoc [1]</b> 236/3 <b>adapt [1]</b> 176/21 <b>add [6]</b> 63/15 79/8 124/11 166/1 200/21 224/25 <b>added [5]</b> 33/12 132/10 133/9 134/19 217/4 <b>adding [2]</b> 134/7 134/20 <b>addition [2]</b> 101/9 102/11 <b>additional [6]</b> 39/9 91/15 124/11 131/14 148/16 201/8 <b>additionally [1]</b> 124/11 <b>additions [1]</b> 35/2 <b>address [5]</b> 42/22 54/5 125/1 128/22 136/13 <b>addressed [7]</b> 88/7 127/7 138/9 144/2 146/19 147/11 147/13 <b>addressing [1]</b> 147/4 <b>adequate [3]</b> 30/19 127/19 231/25 <b>adequately [1]</b> 126/4 <b>adhered [1]</b> 38/20 <b>adjourned [1]</b> 243/22 <b>adjournment [1]</b> 149/18 <b>administrations [12]</b> 99/3 99/9 105/13 111/19 163/25 164/7 233/12 233/16 234/7 234/23 237/10 237/16 <b>admission [1]</b> 191/1 <b>admitted [3]</b> 186/2 186/3 191/3	<b>advance [2]</b> 94/18 108/6 <b>advantage [1]</b> 39/5 <b>advantages [3]</b> 82/24 164/16 175/5 <b>adverted [1]</b> 75/6 <b>advice [28]</b> 27/25 90/5 91/23 92/4 102/5 103/4 103/5 104/4 108/8 110/25 111/21 114/19 115/11 115/13 140/10 140/24 154/12 155/12 155/16 157/17 159/23 175/7 199/7 199/9 199/14 202/24 205/12 206/5 <b>advices [1]</b> 204/6 <b>advisable [1]</b> 50/5 <b>advise [4]</b> 138/4 139/8 202/1 208/15 <b>advised [7]</b> 137/25 140/3 141/1 175/22 199/5 202/7 226/18 <b>adviser [8]</b> 1/11 56/2 91/7 99/21 104/2 110/3 115/12 157/5 <b>Adviser's [1]</b> 92/19 <b>advisers [6]</b> 10/20 20/1 20/8 26/5 100/8 141/10 <b>advises [1]</b> 28/19 <b>advising [1]</b> 3/23 <b>advisory [4]</b> 211/3 221/20 226/13 227/17 <b>advocates [1]</b> 122/23 <b>aerobiology [1]</b> 154/9 <b>aerosol [2]</b> 215/18 216/1 <b>aerosols [2]</b> 154/11 215/24 <b>affected [2]</b> 128/15 187/14 <b>afford [1]</b> 53/4 <b>afforded [1]</b> 35/8 <b>afraid [7]</b> 111/9 130/2 143/2 144/12 188/4 198/16 238/3 <b>after [13]</b> 8/15 17/17 29/5 45/12 73/3 76/22 91/8 104/6 120/13 140/3 155/1 155/24 155/25 <b>after vaccination [1]</b> 17/17 <b>afternoon [3]</b> 123/4 232/16 232/17 <b>afternoon's [1]</b> 149/21 <b>afterwards [3]</b> 147/25 162/1 213/10 <b>again [32]</b> 6/24 22/2 33/8 36/1 44/22 71/13

<b>A</b>	<b>alcohol [2]</b> 203/8 210/19	208/23 210/3 210/25 214/8 214/16 217/9 222/23	190/19 215/5 221/9 229/19 241/19	209/16 212/19 214/5 230/10 232/1 234/11 237/18	
<b>again... [26]</b> 74/6 76/4 80/2 81/12 87/3 100/17 101/13 103/14 103/15 109/15 113/23 117/7 126/21 127/14 129/9 140/25 160/21 204/3 207/17 207/22 210/13 217/4 218/15 219/25 223/13 237/23	<b>Alert [1]</b> 107/23	<b>allegiance [1]</b> 234/14	<b>always [12]</b> 6/5 13/11 58/25 59/1 91/4 126/2 152/7 186/8 186/12 199/20 201/20 222/5	<b>answered [1]</b> 176/9	
<b>against [9]</b> 10/3 15/1 15/6 29/18 64/24 65/5 108/21 134/23 196/22	<b>alerting [3]</b> 114/21 157/1 183/16	<b>allocated [1]</b> 67/24	<b>am [15]</b> 1/2 67/10 67/12 70/3 72/2 117/21 130/2 147/2 166/13 166/13 166/14 198/4 198/5 230/10 243/22	<b>answering [2]</b> 113/14 132/17	
<b>agencies [1]</b> 230/19	<b>aligned [3]</b> 118/5 148/1 189/4	<b>allow [6]</b> 50/5 70/15 121/19 141/4 202/10 238/17	<b>ambulances [1]</b> 226/1	<b>answers [1]</b> 28/7	
<b>Agency [2]</b> 151/11 230/22	<b>alignment [1]</b> 95/9	<b>alive [1]</b> 125/14	<b>among [1]</b> 34/25	<b>anticipate [1]</b> 128/24	
<b>agnostic [1]</b> 210/21	<b>all [150]</b> 2/3 5/6 8/4 8/12 11/5 11/22 12/3 12/4 12/19 14/23 16/6 16/7 20/8 21/10 21/12 23/12 26/22 27/4 29/25 30/9 30/13 32/8 34/2 36/17 38/2 38/8 39/18 43/5 43/10 45/23 47/20 52/22 61/2 62/17 64/21 67/5 67/7 71/10 71/11 74/16 74/22 74/23 75/10 76/11 76/20 77/17 78/9 79/17 79/17 80/8 80/14 80/25 81/5 84/11 87/7 88/2 88/7 91/12 96/14 98/13 98/14 98/15 99/25 102/2 102/9 104/5 104/9 105/23 106/23 108/10 109/8 110/18 114/13 116/14 118/4 118/8 119/3 121/21 122/2 122/23 124/9 127/11 127/25 128/15 129/16 129/21 137/23 138/23 147/2 149/2 149/7 150/10 150/25 151/8 152/9 154/24 156/7 157/23 158/1 158/20 161/15 162/19 164/19 164/25 165/5 167/4 170/9 170/19 171/9 172/6 174/8 175/9 176/15 178/24 179/11 179/17 180/9 185/12 189/8 189/14 189/18 189/20 190/4 194/1 194/9 197/3 198/13 202/13 204/15 204/18 204/22 204/23 205/21 206/16 208/23 209/13 210/3 210/25 213/16 214/5 214/8 214/16 217/9 218/1 222/23 226/22 227/2 234/11 236/20 242/10	<b>allows [3]</b> 15/17 222/1 222/4	<b>almost [12]</b> 25/14 36/25 58/4 78/7 90/20 103/8 143/15 173/20 190/16 211/10 214/1 228/1	<b>amongst [2]</b> 5/9 92/21	<b>antigen [1]</b> 212/22
<b>ago [7]</b> 75/7 100/2 105/8 121/15 147/7 185/21 186/1	<b>agree [38]</b> 4/15 27/6 62/15 63/1 63/10 64/9 74/2 74/3 88/14 89/14 90/13 91/12 92/3 92/10 94/11 94/12 94/16 96/21 100/6 105/23 116/1 123/14 123/14 123/19 124/2 124/7 124/8 124/23 124/24 125/3 125/13 127/5 127/11 128/2 128/7 128/8 180/23 238/12	<b>alone [2]</b> 38/14 52/19	<b>amount [7]</b> 9/14 12/18 15/8 77/22 150/8 156/1 163/21	<b>antithetical [1]</b> 36/25	
<b>agreed [10]</b> 4/3 76/19 137/9 147/24 215/4 216/9 216/24 218/21 218/25 219/3	<b>agrees [3]</b> 107/8 201/24 219/13	<b>along [12]</b> 23/14 31/19 31/20 52/1 58/24 72/24 80/3 122/13 124/18 142/13 212/15 212/16	<b>amplification [1]</b> 201/8	<b>Anwar [1]</b> 111/15	
<b>agreeing [3]</b> 107/8 201/24 219/13	<b>agreement [3]</b> 87/24 102/7 118/9	<b>Alpha [1]</b> 66/9	<b>analyse [1]</b> 81/11	<b>any [73]</b> 2/6 7/15 17/2 17/21 19/14 20/13 21/14 26/22 30/9 31/8 37/12 38/10 44/2 44/23 50/25 53/1 57/11 57/18 61/25 63/2 71/6 71/8 78/5 84/11 90/20 92/13 95/18 97/17 97/24 103/24 104/13 106/21 109/1 110/2 110/3 110/10 112/2 113/18 119/10 137/11 143/15 146/20 149/5 153/18 160/4 162/15 164/5 173/7 173/13 174/1 175/2 182/9 183/18 187/3 188/1 190/8 210/15 210/16 211/21 213/19 214/11 216/14 228/5 231/6 234/25 235/9 235/23 235/24 235/25 237/15 237/15 240/6 240/7	<b>anybody [8]</b> 22/5 22/6 22/6 22/20 22/21 59/25 78/24 133/3
<b>ahead [3]</b> 30/21 191/17 192/8	<b>Ah [1]</b> 231/4	<b>already [26]</b> 13/2 30/18 41/25 42/1 42/10 50/21 79/20 94/9 99/13 103/12 104/14 115/2 115/16 139/25 141/1 167/1 193/4 197/23 200/3 201/7 201/9 205/17 207/24 217/21 226/25 231/3	<b>analyses [2]</b> 82/3 136/20	<b>anything [11]</b> 2/16 25/12 31/25 51/23 97/25 114/22 171/7 172/9 174/5 239/21 240/3	
<b>Ailsa [1]</b> 105/14	<b>aim [16]</b> 7/14 11/15 21/17 23/9 48/24 48/25 51/15 51/15 52/11 53/5 53/6 60/15 62/1 90/17 133/10 209/23	<b>alright [1]</b> 62/23	<b>animal [1]</b> 94/9	<b>anyone [5]</b> 30/10 39/11 39/11 73/12 78/9	
<b>aimed [1]</b> 63/20	<b>aiming [5]</b> 22/6 22/21 23/12 78/20 78/21	<b>also [56]</b> 5/9 14/25 25/20 37/4 37/16 38/24 40/11 41/22 42/1 44/14 44/15 58/21 75/2 75/23 87/25 91/1 91/17 96/14 99/20 100/25 106/14 106/16 106/25 112/21 114/20 116/9 117/1 119/25 124/16 125/10 126/23 127/17 127/19 136/20 140/16 150/9 152/13 155/10 155/15 159/7 162/14 164/13 167/8 167/17 172/1 175/5 178/19 186/8 187/10 199/6 200/8 201/24 206/7 215/23 215/24 234/4 242/10	<b>announce [1]</b> 198/7	<b>anyway [6]</b> 14/5 16/16 19/11 36/16 79/18 190/19	
<b>aims [1]</b> 65/9	<b>air [1]</b> 183/21	<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>announcements [1]</b> 236/23	<b>apart [1]</b> 99/13	
<b>airborne [5]</b> 215/16 215/20 215/23 216/1 223/16	<b>aired [1]</b> 240/8	<b>although [16]</b> 2/7 15/8 71/4 91/20 93/24 109/22 134/10 137/16 156/24 160/6 179/21	<b>anonymous [1]</b> 23/8	<b>apologies [3]</b> 25/8 28/8 131/7	
<b>alarm [7]</b> 3/6 3/20 3/24 72/15 77/16 183/8 187/4	<b>alarm [7]</b> 3/6 3/20 3/24 72/15 77/16 183/8 187/4	<b>alternative [2]</b> 35/20 53/17	<b>another [30]</b> 8/9 14/14 23/19 44/5 47/6 50/13 58/9 64/20 71/21 80/2 86/24 90/22 92/5 92/24 102/17 139/15 143/4 152/19 159/2 159/5 159/19 159/20 176/13 181/3 195/6 197/13 197/18 201/1 234/4 243/2	<b>apologise [2]</b> 28/9 42/13	
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>another's [3]</b> 109/22 110/24 111/4	<b>appalling [2]</b> 8/15 93/5	
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>answer [41]</b> 17/3 39/19 45/7 58/16 105/5 106/2 106/3 106/7 107/13 117/11 117/15 126/21 128/11 131/17 131/22 132/2 133/21 134/13 135/4 135/12 136/7 143/15 143/17 146/14 153/5 155/9 155/20 177/22 178/4 181/2 187/7 188/4 196/9 196/18	<b>apparent [3]</b> 64/9 146/10 167/24	
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>answers [1]</b> 28/7	<b>apparently [2]</b> 5/25 148/2	
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>anybody [8]</b> 22/5 22/6 22/6 22/20 22/21 59/25 78/24 133/3	<b>appear [3]</b> 64/7 111/14 191/13	
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>anyone [5]</b> 30/10 39/11 39/11 73/12 78/9		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>anything [11]</b> 2/16 25/12 31/25 51/23 97/25 114/22 171/7 172/9 174/5 239/21 240/3		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>anyway [6]</b> 14/5 16/16 19/11 36/16 79/18 190/19		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>apart [1]</b> 99/13		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>apologies [3]</b> 25/8 28/8 131/7		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>apologise [2]</b> 28/9 42/13		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>appalling [2]</b> 8/15 93/5		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>apparent [3]</b> 64/9 146/10 167/24		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>apparently [2]</b> 5/25 148/2		
		<b>alternatives [1]</b> 190/17	<b>appear [3]</b> 64/7 111/14 191/13		



<p><b>A</b></p> <p><b>appeared [1]</b> 180/15</p> <p><b>appears [5]</b> 73/10 73/16 73/23 166/18 182/23</p> <p><b>application [1]</b> 241/20</p> <p><b>applied [5]</b> 7/16 32/25 57/3 189/18 239/25</p> <p><b>applies [1]</b> 103/21</p> <p><b>apply [3]</b> 53/13 72/11 103/13</p> <p><b>appreciably [1]</b> 74/15</p> <p><b>appreciate [6]</b> 6/15 112/25 150/7 162/18 189/22 232/8</p> <p><b>appreciated [2]</b> 31/5 202/23</p> <p><b>approach [30]</b> 15/24 17/2 18/19 19/18 21/23 27/17 29/23 39/25 41/17 81/2 86/18 87/4 89/2 89/3 89/19 89/22 93/12 94/11 94/17 98/4 109/7 111/6 117/13 129/16 137/9 147/15 148/13 232/25 233/2 236/19</p> <p><b>approaches [2]</b> 107/3 119/24</p> <p><b>appropriate [18]</b> 17/7 37/9 50/4 54/8 80/21 87/6 93/11 98/18 107/6 111/6 113/12 113/17 114/9 114/13 126/14 164/1 219/6 228/12</p> <p><b>appropriately [1]</b> 110/23</p> <p><b>approval [1]</b> 38/21</p> <p><b>April [5]</b> 102/23 105/2 125/15 141/12 157/7</p> <p><b>April 2020 [1]</b> 125/15</p> <p><b>apropos [1]</b> 131/17</p> <p><b>arc [1]</b> 27/7</p> <p><b>arcane [1]</b> 110/6</p> <p><b>are [171]</b> 3/12 3/20 4/7 4/23 7/12 9/7 10/21 11/21 13/15 13/25 14/22 14/23 14/24 14/25 15/2 15/7 16/25 18/11 19/1 19/6 21/12 28/22 33/3 33/20 34/21 37/9 39/13 40/18 42/6 43/9 43/10 43/21 50/15 50/15 51/3 54/14 55/1 55/4 55/21 59/9 59/14 60/20 62/20 64/14 65/25 67/7 70/24</p>	<p>71/11 74/16 74/24 75/10 76/11 77/1 77/11 78/7 78/10 78/23 79/7 79/11 81/19 81/20 82/6 82/8 82/11 82/18 85/25 86/18 89/11 90/19 90/22 91/2 91/13 92/22 94/11 94/25 95/25 96/14 98/10 99/24 100/12 104/9 104/24 106/18 107/21 108/24 108/25 110/5 110/6 110/23 111/7 112/21 113/1 113/1 113/8 115/15 116/14 119/20 121/22 122/3 122/22 122/23 125/20 125/25 126/1 126/2 126/12 126/19 127/16 127/17 127/18 131/11 132/13 133/22 134/5 141/9 142/24 145/2 146/3 146/19 150/14 151/2 153/3 158/16 162/17 165/2 169/21 170/14 170/20 170/21 172/3 172/13 175/13 178/14 180/9 180/14 181/7 181/8 181/9 181/18 181/20 181/22 183/19 186/11 192/16 196/21 199/21 200/20 201/3 202/16 203/5 203/19 203/20 213/22 214/24 216/19 219/25 220/11 221/10 224/13 226/6 226/9 230/3 230/18 231/17 231/18 235/21 237/21 238/7 242/11 243/10 243/14</p> <p><b>area [23]</b> 18/13 21/6 22/12 23/19 33/4 78/22 86/14 87/4 95/17 97/17 121/1 128/1 128/1 128/19 133/2 145/7 146/23 147/12 150/25 150/25 168/22 193/19 208/16</p> <p><b>areas [24]</b> 18/11 19/21 33/3 67/24 85/25 90/23 95/11 106/25 108/1 108/24 118/24 121/4 122/9 127/18 127/20 128/13 128/23 128/25 139/13 145/18 157/24 193/20 197/4 217/25</p> <p><b>aren't [4]</b> 60/20 146/2 201/13 227/5</p> <p><b>arguably [1]</b> 124/1</p> <p><b>arguing [1]</b> 15/16</p> <p><b>argument [7]</b> 8/11 12/2 19/9 24/16 57/23</p>	<p>66/17 66/19</p> <p><b>argument's [2]</b> 11/6 175/11</p> <p><b>arguments [2]</b> 30/7 52/14</p> <p><b>armageddon [1]</b> 177/10</p> <p><b>around [36]</b> 8/11 12/12 15/9 19/8 24/12 25/5 36/6 43/1 46/5 82/17 85/13 86/12 87/1 91/2 104/8 108/1 109/18 121/3 126/6 140/12 142/21 146/9 154/25 166/3 166/21 167/2 167/19 171/22 193/4 198/3 199/23 199/24 200/10 219/8 221/11 233/5</p> <p><b>arrangement [1]</b> 88/3</p> <p><b>arrangements [1]</b> 37/11</p> <p><b>arrests [1]</b> 163/6</p> <p><b>article [4]</b> 240/12 240/16 241/23 242/2</p> <p><b>as [268]</b></p> <p><b>As I said [1]</b> 206/1</p> <p><b>As I say [1]</b> 32/20</p> <p><b>ascertainment [1]</b> 170/22</p> <p><b>ascribed [1]</b> 29/7</p> <p><b>Asia [1]</b> 161/20</p> <p><b>Asian [2]</b> 123/10 123/21</p> <p><b>aside [4]</b> 11/2 11/12 61/9 139/2</p> <p><b>ask [46]</b> 1/22 3/20 34/17 42/13 44/22 45/3 54/5 58/12 62/5 67/19 67/25 86/5 87/12 87/15 102/4 102/6 102/25 103/5 104/13 109/25 111/10 111/24 115/22 116/20 117/18 118/7 120/14 125/16 125/17 132/4 135/2 135/19 143/16 150/3 152/22 162/5 178/1 179/18 191/7 197/23 200/22 214/19 214/23 232/10 235/23 239/11</p> <p><b>asked [16]</b> 21/8 42/14 49/13 62/21 86/4 93/2 95/15 105/8 117/22 130/9 155/15 202/1 210/7 228/12 228/13 241/20</p> <p><b>asking [10]</b> 11/19 65/4 82/1 83/8 149/4 156/21 159/11 161/5 166/15 200/24</p> <p><b>aspect [2]</b> 46/2 89/14</p> <p><b>aspects [2]</b> 98/14</p>	<p>157/18</p> <p><b>assert [1]</b> 64/7</p> <p><b>assertion [1]</b> 64/5</p> <p><b>assess [4]</b> 42/15 42/16 127/6 207/8</p> <p><b>assessing [2]</b> 59/21 195/15</p> <p><b>assessment [15]</b> 34/13 70/19 83/7 172/16 172/21 172/21 172/23 172/23 172/24 173/4 173/8 174/1 174/6 190/4 191/22</p> <p><b>assessments [2]</b> 167/14 174/3</p> <p><b>assist [2]</b> 46/4 99/20</p> <p><b>assisting [2]</b> 50/8 198/5</p> <p><b>assume [4]</b> 69/18 74/20 76/1 76/10</p> <p><b>assumed [2]</b> 20/10 68/20</p> <p><b>assumption [5]</b> 8/6 14/15 16/1 16/3 104/16</p> <p><b>assured [2]</b> 149/6 149/7</p> <p><b>astorishingly [1]</b> 124/13</p> <p><b>asymptomatic [40]</b> 12/18 14/4 67/25 68/4 68/20 69/11 70/1 70/17 70/20 70/22 71/1 71/6 71/15 71/23 71/24 72/6 72/12 72/21 73/24 74/3 74/11 75/11 75/17 76/3 76/7 77/22 78/3 79/4 79/13 79/24 79/25 80/1 80/5 80/13 80/18 80/22 81/6 81/21 98/9 175/15</p> <p><b>asymptomatically [1]</b> 68/10</p> <p><b>at [286]</b></p> <p><b>at 11.15 [1]</b> 67/9</p> <p><b>Atherton [1]</b> 103/17</p> <p><b>Atlanta [1]</b> 155/4</p> <p><b>Atlético [1]</b> 86/8</p> <p><b>attached [1]</b> 1/16</p> <p><b>attaching [2]</b> 1/12 165/13</p> <p><b>attacks [1]</b> 152/12</p> <p><b>attempt [3]</b> 47/18 128/3 141/8</p> <p><b>attempted [1]</b> 12/23</p> <p><b>attempts [1]</b> 14/8</p> <p><b>attend [1]</b> 161/16</p> <p><b>attendance [2]</b> 99/14 158/5</p> <p><b>attendant [1]</b> 8/13</p> <p><b>attended [12]</b> 30/15 68/5 69/22 99/22 159/7 160/5 161/17</p>	<p>172/11 215/3 233/1 235/17 235/18</p> <p><b>attendee [1]</b> 91/8</p> <p><b>attending [3]</b> 150/7 156/8 195/20</p> <p><b>attention [2]</b> 94/5 163/16</p> <p><b>attractively [1]</b> 157/15</p> <p><b>audience [1]</b> 171/15</p> <p><b>August [3]</b> 142/5 211/5 212/20</p> <p><b>August 2020 [1]</b> 142/5</p> <p><b>authored [1]</b> 240/13</p> <p><b>authorities [1]</b> 208/9</p> <p><b>authority [1]</b> 117/24</p> <p><b>authors [1]</b> 242/3</p> <p><b>autumn [4]</b> 3/17 63/13 64/10 207/16</p> <p><b>available [8]</b> 46/18 90/19 102/5 102/9 105/4 117/25 158/9 172/25</p> <p><b>avian [1]</b> 177/7</p> <p><b>avoid [7]</b> 2/9 38/8 52/11 68/13 68/16 76/5 212/11</p> <p><b>avoided [4]</b> 66/16 134/8 135/3 190/11</p> <p><b>aware [26]</b> 1/22 1/25 7/13 24/2 42/18 77/20 88/9 91/22 92/4 108/11 116/22 116/25 117/4 117/10 119/17 134/10 135/21 135/24 143/25 203/20 203/21 206/10 221/15 223/23 227/9 240/6</p> <p><b>awareness [1]</b> 219/8</p> <p><b>away [5]</b> 25/20 35/14 38/3 66/10 190/3</p> <p><b>awful [4]</b> 86/16 191/3 243/1 243/5</p> <hr/> <p><b>B</b></p> <p><b>back [42]</b> 5/13 8/2 13/10 13/19 18/18 19/24 23/13 31/11 46/24 46/24 55/9 55/10 60/19 80/11 86/1 90/3 92/25 93/4 118/12 118/21 119/13 120/3 120/20 134/20 166/1 168/15 168/24 174/3 174/9 174/23 175/18 178/6 179/16 186/9 186/9 188/16 201/19 205/14 207/22 238/1 239/19 241/23</p> <p><b>back-model [1]</b> 168/24</p> <p><b>back-transferring [1]</b> 168/15</p>
---	---	---	--	---

<b>B</b>	64/8 66/3 66/10 67/3 69/5 71/10 72/2 72/6 74/17 75/9 75/20 77/18 82/15 82/22 86/10 88/19 88/23 89/20 92/23 98/14 100/8 100/23 103/9 104/16 108/23 110/17 113/25 118/19 119/17 119/18 119/19 124/12 130/10 131/7 135/5 135/7 135/8 136/10 136/18 139/11 140/16 140/22 141/12 144/5 144/17 146/3 148/21 155/8 157/16 158/16 158/24 163/7 163/11 163/13 168/15 169/14 170/16 171/2 173/16 173/19 174/24 176/8 178/22 182/13 184/12 184/15 186/1 186/9 187/14 188/13 191/10 192/11 192/17 192/22 193/1 194/14 195/17 195/25 200/12 202/16 205/14 205/16 205/21 206/13 207/9 208/20 208/23 208/25 211/22 212/5 213/17 229/6 232/5 234/8 236/17 241/8	49/8 49/13 52/11 54/7 55/16 56/3 61/12 62/6 62/21 63/17 63/25 65/11 65/17 65/18 65/21 65/23 66/7 66/16 66/21 68/9 68/19 73/8 79/14 80/16 82/23 86/4 87/1 87/6 88/9 93/8 95/14 100/11 102/9 102/21 104/19 104/22 104/25 105/7 107/9 113/13 115/2 117/6 117/10 120/11 120/11 120/23 120/24 121/21 121/24 122/14 124/5 125/23 126/15 130/19 132/14 133/11 134/8 135/3 136/12 142/17 142/19 143/12 143/14 143/23 143/25 146/1 149/2 149/8 150/8 150/23 151/14 152/7 152/11 153/7 153/15 156/17 156/21 157/15 158/14 159/1 159/20 163/22 164/17 167/24 168/1 168/9 168/17 168/17 173/12 175/8 178/21 178/22 180/23 182/12 182/23 184/11 184/19 186/17 186/20 186/22 187/4 188/14 189/8 189/12 189/18 190/5 190/19 191/3 194/4 195/24 196/4 198/2 198/6 199/20 202/17 205/19 210/12 210/14 210/15 210/23 214/4 217/21 218/18 222/10 223/16 223/24 224/10 224/13 226/4 226/25 227/21 228/19 231/3 232/8 233/25 240/3 242/14	157/13 161/17 162/20 174/13 182/21 207/5 222/24 223/2 223/23 224/13 <b>behalf [11]</b> 67/20 87/13 123/5 125/17 135/20 144/25 147/7 153/25 163/15 196/17 214/19 <b>behaviour [1]</b> 243/1 <b>behavioural [5]</b> 23/18 25/13 25/14 26/14 27/6 <b>behaviours [2]</b> 185/20 214/2 <b>behind [10]</b> 67/23 122/23 127/10 184/16 186/6 186/9 186/9 192/16 205/6 208/24 <b>Beijing [1]</b> 70/4 <b>being [59]</b> 1/19 3/12 3/21 3/23 4/2 4/8 5/16 6/11 7/14 7/16 10/8 20/12 35/7 40/9 42/8 42/14 44/4 55/2 56/15 57/3 60/25 61/2 76/24 80/13 82/12 83/13 86/11 103/11 104/10 114/4 116/23 119/11 132/18 132/20 139/6 147/18 158/23 159/21 171/22 174/4 177/2 181/5 191/24 203/22 206/5 206/9 206/10 206/18 209/24 213/24 221/9 231/11 235/9 235/11 235/13 238/4 240/8 240/17 241/4 <b>belief [4]</b> 20/7 46/7 136/1 201/6 <b>believe [4]</b> 71/13 151/23 186/19 208/12 <b>believed [1]</b> 180/11 <b>below [30]</b> 21/11 21/17 31/14 32/4 38/13 45/9 45/17 45/20 46/6 46/12 47/16 49/4 49/20 49/24 50/8 50/11 50/15 50/20 50/24 51/6 51/9 51/12 51/13 51/19 52/19 54/10 59/14 61/15 62/9 194/17 <b>below 1 [4]</b> 50/11 50/15 51/12 52/19 <b>Ben [2]</b> 1/12 3/8 <b>Ben Warner [2]</b> 1/12 3/8 <b>bend [1]</b> 67/1 <b>beneath [1]</b> 126/20 <b>beneficial [1]</b> 196/4 <b>benefit [7]</b> 36/2 36/17 39/9 101/10 134/22	174/16 189/6 <b>benefits [5]</b> 91/16 110/9 110/10 118/20 121/7 <b>Bennee [1]</b> 100/20 <b>bereaved [10]</b> 67/20 67/21 87/13 98/25 99/1 111/15 214/20 214/21 214/24 232/18 <b>bespoke [1]</b> 102/6 <b>best [15]</b> 9/15 40/2 82/20 90/17 91/2 92/11 116/3 117/11 118/18 123/1 129/14 137/9 211/8 221/5 222/2 <b>better [15]</b> 34/20 81/19 100/1 106/24 106/25 116/13 117/20 124/1 130/19 173/3 189/8 192/10 192/21 209/11 232/1 <b>between [43]</b> 1/20 3/3 9/12 13/17 35/11 37/16 44/25 47/2 47/6 57/24 62/14 66/18 70/8 70/16 71/23 75/1 108/14 109/11 109/21 112/12 116/18 121/7 139/25 140/19 146/7 151/11 154/18 163/19 163/25 169/17 176/7 178/3 200/6 208/2 208/14 210/16 216/9 218/17 224/18 234/22 234/25 237/1 240/24 <b>beyond [5]</b> 5/5 58/18 142/21 172/9 240/3 <b>big [16]</b> 14/22 19/13 26/23 47/5 52/5 62/13 71/22 74/24 76/21 90/14 98/7 132/22 134/16 136/10 173/22 200/4 <b>biggest [3]</b> 58/6 58/25 59/1 <b>binary [1]</b> 72/18 <b>bio [4]</b> 82/2 160/10 161/8 208/15 <b>bio-mathematical [2]</b> 160/10 161/8 <b>bio-safety [1]</b> 82/2 <b>biosafety [2]</b> 223/3 223/9 <b>biosecurity [2]</b> 152/10 208/15 <b>bioterrorism [1]</b> 152/10 <b>bit [26]</b> 2/22 6/3 35/25 50/5 58/22 80/4 85/21 101/17 104/13 105/3 146/24 149/2 165/19 166/7 166/10 182/13 185/23 185/24
----------	--	--	--	--

<b>B</b>	<b>briefings [1]</b> 23/8	<b>call [11]</b> 10/21 13/11	121/15 130/25 131/22	16/8 19/10 21/14 56/8
<b>bit... [8]</b> 189/12	<b>briefly [6]</b> 64/8 64/8	41/5 53/21 91/4	139/21 140/6 140/20	65/25 73/10 77/24
189/18 192/7 207/16	140/2 145/4 169/13	110/18 148/2 149/25	140/22 156/13 156/14	94/9 124/5 140/15
207/16 209/1 224/25	211/7	155/19 164/22 233/20	158/10 176/24 178/5	170/3 170/5 170/12
239/1	<b>bring [11]</b> 19/24	<b>called [6]</b> 42/18	184/8 188/4 188/12	170/22 170/23 182/9
<b>black [2]</b> 123/10	29/17 49/20 51/9	60/24 66/9 115/20	196/18 197/1 202/10	191/18 192/1 192/6
123/21	51/12 51/13 51/19	165/14 213/6	212/14 212/24 213/14	195/3 197/12 201/12
<b>blind [1]</b> 140/17	61/15 94/4 101/18	<b>calling [2]</b> 173/6	214/5 220/18 220/19	203/14 211/11 216/15
<b>blue [1]</b> 226/5	144/14	218/21	224/1 228/5 230/10	227/2 233/23 243/8
<b>bluntly [2]</b> 4/22 44/11	<b>bringing [8]</b> 33/16	<b>came [13]</b> 37/17	230/25 231/4 231/6	<b>case-hospitalisation</b>
<b>blur [2]</b> 235/15	42/11 50/8 50/10	57/12 79/22 107/18	232/1 233/7 234/11	<b>[2]</b> 170/5 170/12
235/16	50/15 52/17 52/18	110/13 110/21 116/20	237/19 242/15	<b>cases [32]</b> 5/20
<b>board [5]</b> 16/21	163/16	122/9 131/19 155/8	<b>canard [1]</b> 20/11	27/12 27/19 55/16
39/11 58/7 124/22	<b>Britain [4]</b> 93/18 94/8	161/1 174/23 206/22	<b>cancel [1]</b> 199/21	55/18 55/19 69/9
175/13	94/15 95/10	<b>campaign [2]</b> 87/14	<b>cancellation [1]</b>	69/11 77/9 80/25
<b>bodies [3]</b> 83/6 90/11	<b>British [1]</b> 38/17	214/11	200/6	81/21 81/22 82/19
158/2	<b>broad [10]</b> 8/19	<b>can [140]</b> 5/4 5/17	<b>cancellations [1]</b>	93/9 93/15 125/2
<b>body [5]</b> 4/21 170/18	30/24 54/15 68/12	6/6 7/5 7/22 11/4	112/24	167/24 168/1 168/18
174/14 227/17 229/7	96/1 152/8 152/10	11/21 15/9 15/12 17/3	<b>candidness [1]</b>	170/4 170/21 170/24
<b>boils [1]</b> 175/10	155/10 185/6 187/1	18/17 19/24 22/21	125/17	171/4 175/21 186/10
<b>bollocks [1]</b> 136/2	<b>broadcasting [1]</b>	23/18 28/15 28/25	<b>cannot [4]</b> 60/3 76/7	195/6 218/22 219/1
<b>bonded [1]</b> 164/10	126/8	31/15 32/23 34/4	121/5 196/5	224/21 225/8 225/19
<b>border [8]</b> 84/9 85/16	<b>broader [3]</b> 123/13	34/17 37/5 40/2 44/22	<b>capability [1]</b> 193/3	231/17
88/17 94/7 108/1	203/6 237/4	45/6 46/4 47/12 47/18	<b>capable [3]</b> 40/5	<b>cat [2]</b> 163/7 163/8
108/24 175/5 187/9	<b>broadly [1]</b> 148/5	49/15 54/21 56/13	70/23 177/3	<b>catastrophic [1]</b>
<b>borders [2]</b> 164/4	<b>broke [2]</b> 118/10	58/1 58/12 58/19	<b>capacity [33]</b> 55/6	47/11
174/21	120/13	62/24 63/11 63/15	55/15 56/8 57/6 58/23	<b>catch [5]</b> 14/5 15/2
<b>Boris [2]</b> 63/7 112/13	<b>broken [2]</b> 193/12	69/18 73/2 76/4 77/2	59/6 59/7 104/21	15/11 83/2 144/18
<b>Boris Johnson [1]</b>	193/14	77/2 77/3 78/24 81/13	191/15 191/19 191/23	<b>category [1]</b> 132/15
63/7	<b>Broström [1]</b> 73/8	82/5 82/16 82/21	192/6 192/7 192/20	<b>cause [7]</b> 28/18 40/9
<b>boss [1]</b> 159/24	<b>brought [12]</b> 31/2	83/16 86/3 86/19 97/2	192/24 192/25 193/8	132/13 164/11 170/7
<b>both [21]</b> 61/1 62/15	31/23 32/13 33/9	99/19 102/25 103/8	193/8 193/19 201/11	176/16 178/9
62/16 69/23 84/1	51/16 62/9 111/17	108/9 109/20 109/25	220/11 220/20 221/4	<b>caused [2]</b> 9/2 108/1
89/10 91/16 92/21	115/8 116/10 194/17	109/25 110/1 111/24	221/5 221/6 221/17	<b>causes [1]</b> 40/8
100/22 103/11 104/23	210/17 230/3	113/7 113/24 116/11	221/25 222/2 222/3	<b>causing [3]</b> 40/5
116/1 116/18 117/12	<b>buckle [1]</b> 60/6	116/13 118/14 119/7	223/15 223/18 232/22	40/11 138/5
121/2 130/18 181/12	<b>building [3]</b> 6/23	122/1 123/13 123/14	237/18	<b>caution [1]</b> 104/11
181/15 181/22 187/7	124/10 157/6	124/7 124/20 124/23	<b>cards [1]</b> 30/9	<b>cautioned [1]</b> 10/3
235/3	<b>built [3]</b> 37/8 161/22	124/24 125/3 125/16	<b>care [29]</b> 15/4 40/10	<b>cautious [3]</b> 8/3
<b>bottom [4]</b> 55/22	208/13	126/13 128/2 128/7	55/6 56/15 58/6 61/1	14/13 57/20
56/13 97/5 229/20	<b>bunch [1]</b> 200/25	128/10 128/11 130/20	78/2 79/13 82/20	<b>caveat [8]</b> 8/5 19/13
<b>bought [1]</b> 18/22	<b>bunny [1]</b> 66/25	131/11 139/2 140/21	137/22 146/4 146/4	57/16 74/6 74/8 79/2
<b>boundaries [1]</b> 116/9	<b>burden [4]</b> 70/21	143/5 144/6 144/9	155/14 170/24 190/23	90/14 166/10
<b>boundary [1]</b> 209/9	76/16 132/21 201/12	144/14 144/18 144/19	191/2 192/13 192/18	<b>caveated [2]</b> 74/16
<b>brakes [2]</b> 67/2 240/1	<b>business [2]</b> 33/17	145/4 146/14 147/18	195/7 195/10 213/2	171/10
<b>breaching [2]</b> 113/18	154/22	149/6 158/12 160/20	240/14 240/17 241/4	<b>caveating [1]</b> 74/25
114/2	<b>businesses [1]</b>	168/4 170/10 170/19	241/7 241/8 242/4	<b>caveats [2]</b> 32/8
<b>break [13]</b> 60/1 60/6	194/10	173/24 174/10 175/14	242/18 242/19	72/11
61/12 61/16 62/21	<b>but [381]</b>	176/14 176/16 181/8	<b>care home [5]</b>	<b>CDC [5]</b> 155/4 164/23
62/23 67/11 67/14	<b>button [2]</b> 183/8	184/14 184/14 184/16	240/17 241/4 241/7	167/18 169/2 169/5
101/22 102/25 143/5	184/7	184/24 185/10 193/1	242/18 242/19	<b>CDL [1]</b> 234/16
198/20 198/24	<b>buttons [1]</b> 182/8	195/12 196/9 197/4	<b>care homes [8]</b> 78/2	<b>central [5]</b> 44/13
<b>breaker [2]</b> 65/17	<b>byproduct [1]</b> 7/15	200/21 200/22 201/22	79/13 146/4 146/4	132/3 155/16 155/18
209/21	<b>C</b>	202/11 205/9 208/4	213/2 240/14 241/8	187/25
<b>breakers [1]</b> 207/2	<b>Cab [2]</b> 205/16 206/9	213/16 214/5 217/6	242/4	<b>centre [6]</b> 5/11 63/20
<b>breaks [1]</b> 118/3	<b>Cabinet [7]</b> 46/19	217/15 218/3 220/8	<b>career [4]</b> 8/23	151/11 167/10 208/15
<b>breathless [1]</b> 186/3	137/25 156/2 188/17	220/10 221/6 222/2	150/17 150/20 151/1	219/16
<b>bridge [1]</b> 224/18	213/9 213/13 214/8	223/21 225/6 225/7	<b>careers [1]</b> 164/19	<b>centres [4]</b> 90/20
<b>brief [1]</b> 166/17	<b>Cabinet Office [5]</b>	226/25 231/22 233/2	<b>careful [2]</b> 2/23 109/1	218/23 218/24 219/2
<b>briefing [11]</b> 54/21	156/2 188/17 213/9	235/11 238/6 239/11	<b>carefully [5]</b> 65/3	<b>centric [1]</b> 106/1
68/5 68/6 68/11 68/15	213/13 214/8	241/8 243/2	94/21 96/3 166/7	<b>CEO [1]</b> 56/16
69/23 69/24 70/7	<b>calculated [1]</b> 46/22	<b>can't [43]</b> 37/10 53/4	206/3	<b>certain [10]</b> 32/6
75/15 139/4 237/12	<b>calculation [1]</b> 17/13	76/24 92/17 104/18	<b>carry [2]</b> 12/4 102/6	48/14 60/11 128/4
		112/7 119/4 120/22	<b>case [30]</b> 12/3 12/17	128/24 129/16 155/5

<b>C</b>	<b>chasing [1]</b> 182/1	207/2	<b>clinically [1]</b> 132/9	<b>coherent [1]</b> 236/19
<b>certain... [3]</b> 181/18	<b>chat [1]</b> 73/4	<b>circulating [2]</b>	<b>clinicians [1]</b> 161/12	<b>collaborating [1]</b>
198/18 230/10	<b>chatter [1]</b> 9/15	168/10 241/13	<b>close [17]</b> 32/20 38/5	167/10
<b>certainly [36]</b> 6/20	<b>check [3]</b> 131/16	<b>circulation [2]</b> 69/17	49/2 53/3 53/4 57/11	<b>collaboration [6]</b>
33/22 34/25 37/24	132/2 235/11	69/18	103/15 103/16 110/17	107/16 163/18 163/23
45/15 48/17 49/13	<b>chemical [1]</b> 168/17	<b>circumnavigate [1]</b>	163/18 164/9 176/5	163/24 164/14 167/7
49/17 53/1 68/25 77/7	<b>chief [27]</b> 55/13 56/2	209/9	203/1 210/18 213/7	<b>collapse [4]</b> 62/8
77/20 78/1 81/18 84/2	56/14 56/20 87/21	<b>circumstance [1]</b>	213/24 242/10	62/10 194/16 194/23
90/18 91/5 104/20	91/7 92/19 99/20	48/15	<b>close-contact [1]</b>	<b>collar [1]</b> 145/12
108/13 110/14 113/10	103/18 115/12 135/25	<b>circumstances [8]</b>	213/7	<b>colleague [5]</b> 73/21
125/14 128/12 140/15	138/14 152/3 153/6	12/19 33/15 38/8	<b>closed [3]</b> 213/6	91/13 100/14 165/11
160/3 162/20 162/21	153/10 153/19 153/25	55/20 57/19 98/15	213/21 213/23	238/8
185/5 188/15 189/8	154/3 154/6 154/15	153/18 176/18	<b>closely [3]</b> 92/1	<b>colleagues [25]</b>
190/17 192/19 198/20	154/23 156/11 157/4	<b>cite [1]</b> 234/24	155/23 180/25	25/13 27/6 51/21
205/8 237/1 237/9	160/2 163/19 165/7	<b>citizens [1]</b> 12/8	<b>closest [1]</b> 130/14	122/5 130/12 130/22
<b>certainty [4]</b> 28/19	184/6	<b>city [2]</b> 178/17	<b>closing [2]</b> 199/16	131/19 164/6 164/15
38/11 179/5 216/14	<b>children [5]</b> 38/6	192/16	202/10	165/7 166/8 167/1
<b>cetera [3]</b> 49/6	110/9 118/21 119/13	<b>civil [3]</b> 53/20 145/13	<b>closure [2]</b> 37/25	167/17 167/19 169/3
190/21 200/1	119/15	188/8	174/21	173/7 175/22 176/9
<b>chain [5]</b> 82/1 96/2	<b>chime [1]</b> 235/24	<b>Clara [1]</b> 53/21	<b>closures [2]</b> 187/9	181/21 183/23 199/7
143/22 153/17 182/10	<b>China [18]</b> 28/20	<b>Clara Swinson [1]</b>	239/20	203/18 204/7 205/13
<b>chairs [2]</b> 167/17	49/6 69/9 72/10 73/11	53/21	<b>cluster [3]</b> 165/21	243/10
176/6	84/16 85/5 85/6 85/7	<b>clarification [2]</b>	168/18 178/19	<b>collective [4]</b> 108/20
<b>chair [4]</b> 99/7 151/19	85/7 86/2 161/19	68/23 216/5	<b>CMO [25]</b> 10/1 63/3	109/9 110/21 110/25
151/20 159/24	165/20 167/24 168/2	<b>clarity [2]</b> 231/6	73/7 91/22 99/18	<b>collectively [2]</b> 21/24
<b>chaired [3]</b> 117/13	168/10 180/6 180/6	236/20	108/14 109/6 109/11	50/8
229/23 233/10	<b>Chinese [7]</b> 68/9	<b>classically [1]</b> 224/18	110/2 112/4 118/4	<b>College [1]</b> 1/13
<b>challenge [2]</b> 101/11	71/4 72/10 74/24 76/2	<b>classification [7]</b>	118/19 120/15 120/21	<b>Colleges [1]</b> 110/19
236/20	76/8 76/23	216/12 216/18 217/3	121/13 121/17 122/5	<b>combat [1]</b> 88/15
<b>challenges [3]</b>	<b>choice [1]</b> 65/15	221/19 222/1 225/17	148/2 155/7 163/22	<b>combination [4]</b>
106/14 123/9 127/5	<b>choices [1]</b> 66/5	231/11	180/22 183/7 183/15	31/14 60/23 64/17
<b>challenging [1]</b> 69/13	<b>choke [1]</b> 26/7	<b>classified [2]</b> 215/6	223/6 223/6	64/18
<b>chance [6]</b> 36/10	<b>choose [1]</b> 29/1	216/10	<b>CMOs [18]</b> 73/5	<b>combined [1]</b> 203/25
36/12 48/15 74/11	<b>chosen [1]</b> 139/22	<b>classrooms [1]</b>	74/23 92/1 106/16	<b>come [35]</b> 13/10
84/24 190/10	<b>CHRIS [38]</b> 1/3 18/17	121/5	107/17 108/6 108/10	13/10 13/19 16/25
<b>Chancellor [2]</b>	54/14 63/8 67/14	<b>clear [58]</b> 11/20	109/8 109/22 110/13	20/6 25/15 25/17
147/25 232/23	98/24 101/21 103/17	22/22 28/2 38/4 39/10	111/19 111/19 115/5	26/23 37/23 39/22
<b>chances [1]</b> 61/15	112/14 147/25 149/1	40/4 41/9 42/3 44/5	115/6 118/4 118/15	42/4 46/24 46/24
<b>change [14]</b> 36/25	153/11 154/24 158/9	45/7 45/11 48/5 51/20	119/2 230/8	47/10 47/12 58/6 59/3
78/12 83/21 90/10	158/11 159/24 165/12	52/2 57/2 57/11 61/8	<b>co [9]</b> 99/7 109/6	118/9 122/22 129/25
94/3 120/14 121/13	169/7 170/2 171/20	63/4 64/10 67/3 71/1	159/24 163/25 164/13	140/2 154/21 160/24
175/2 190/1 190/3	172/4 179/13 180/21	77/7 79/3 84/2 87/2	205/8 233/11 240/13	163/14 174/3 179/16
195/2 195/3 206/24	181/13 181/20 181/24	88/20 96/1 102/2	242/3	180/7 189/1 190/18
225/6	182/6 182/9 183/13	104/6 109/4 114/1	<b>co-authored [1]</b>	192/18 194/22 194/23
<b>changed [4]</b> 156/4	183/17 183/24 187/12	114/6 114/14 119/22	240/13	205/14 233/24 242/25
156/7 182/16 219/3	189/5 190/22 200/20	121/12 134/11 136/6	<b>co-authors [1]</b> 242/3	<b>comfortable [1]</b>
<b>changer [1]</b> 41/6	210/8 242/24 244/3	137/4 140/12 142/8	<b>co-chair [2]</b> 99/7	144/23
<b>changes [3]</b> 3/12	<b>Chris Whitty [5]</b>	142/20 143/22 146/3	159/24	<b>coming [17]</b> 60/19
197/10 229/25	112/14 165/12 169/7	146/7 148/3 165/22	<b>co-operate [1]</b> 205/8	63/21 64/16 85/4
<b>changing [2]</b> 182/17	170/2 180/21	170/20 172/4 177/18	<b>co-operation [2]</b>	86/10 87/19 93/21
225/1	<b>Chris Whitty's [1]</b>	177/19 183/24 196/1	163/25 164/13	103/12 161/19 165/20
<b>channel [1]</b> 154/15	181/13	202/15 207/15 207/17	<b>co-ordinate [1]</b>	185/15 188/8 201/4
<b>channels [2]</b> 126/6	<b>Chris's [1]</b> 200/8	212/6 212/12 220/6	233/11	202/21 203/8 221/22
143/20	<b>Christopher [4]</b>	<b>clearest [1]</b> 231/20	<b>coach [1]</b> 213/19	237/10
<b>chaos [2]</b> 148/2	130/5 134/2 135/19	<b>clearly [19]</b> 10/6	<b>COBR [22]</b> 30/25	<b>command [2]</b> 153/17
148/4	194/14	14/10 14/11 31/13	54/21 102/4 102/7	182/10
<b>chaotic [1]</b> 100/15	<b>Christopher's [1]</b>	35/9 42/1 48/25 53/6	103/4 103/6 103/23	<b>commended [1]</b>
<b>chapter [1]</b> 116/8	183/6	60/1 60/16 80/9 100/7	103/25 104/2 104/2	213/7
<b>characteristics [2]</b>	<b>chronological [1]</b> 1/8	116/12 133/13 151/25	104/5 104/6 108/3	<b>comment [3]</b> 93/5
184/13 196/6	<b>chronology [2]</b> 34/5	164/3 171/10 227/4	112/19 157/2 158/3	159/14 184/10
<b>chart [1]</b> 174/6	191/6	230/12	158/8 158/14 158/19	<b>commentators [3]</b>
<b>charts [1]</b> 54/14	<b>circuit [3]</b> 65/17	<b>click [1]</b> 165/18	182/13 182/20 186/18	20/8 22/25 82/24
<b>chases [1]</b> 181/24	207/2 209/21	<b>clinical [2]</b> 133/22	<b>COBRA [1]</b> 46/19	<b>comments [13]</b>
	<b>circuit breakers [1]</b>	219/8	<b>cocooned [1]</b> 12/25	92/10 97/21 100/14

<b>C</b>	<b>complete [8]</b> 13/17 29/1 29/23 67/13 92/7 140/23 198/22 226/21	202/25	55/1	144/9 160/19 203/6 240/14 241/3 241/4 242/5 243/2
<b>comments... [10]</b> 101/16 103/13 103/21 104/9 104/9 104/11 113/5 153/20 200/8 212/17	<b>completely [14]</b> 4/3 4/15 8/8 9/2 9/13 11/2 21/13 27/23 28/18 84/25 124/2 125/4 125/13 220/20	<b>conduct [1]</b> 243/9 <b>conduit [1]</b> 92/19 <b>conference [5]</b> 24/25 141/23 141/25 142/21 143/19 <b>conferences [8]</b> 24/2 25/5 141/18 142/1 142/7 143/8 156/16 156/20	<b>consideration [4]</b> 50/11 51/14 134/1 138/2 <b>considerations [4]</b> 41/3 64/25 65/5 191/4 <b>considered [12]</b> 16/5 16/10 38/5 73/19 76/11 96/8 149/10 149/10 150/12 214/9 225/17 226/13	<b>contexts [1]</b> 72/17 <b>contextual [1]</b> 107/10 <b>Contingencies [1]</b> 188/9 <b>contingent [1]</b> 172/23 <b>continual [1]</b> 92/17 <b>continuation [2]</b> 200/11 202/6 <b>continue [10]</b> 24/17 48/1 49/1 151/25 194/18 196/5 202/11 204/5 224/5 238/18
<b>commission [3]</b> 69/11 102/12 125/6	<b>completes [1]</b> 148/25	<b>confidence [9]</b> 34/18 35/3 35/18 45/21 80/5 113/7 113/19 114/15 171/12	<b>Considering [1]</b> 127/4 <b>consistency [1]</b> 88/15 <b>consistent [4]</b> 73/24 166/19 175/8 199/14	<b>continued [7]</b> 1/3 1/4 47/8 48/17 104/3 244/3 244/5 <b>continues [3]</b> 75/3 192/5 193/13 <b>continuing [1]</b> 205/7 <b>continuous [2]</b> 122/7 145/19 <b>continuously [1]</b> 92/2 <b>contribute [2]</b> 173/2 204/5 <b>contributed [3]</b> 75/11 125/19 203/13 <b>contributing [3]</b> 43/12 124/25 198/4 <b>contribution [2]</b> 9/18 91/15 <b>control [25]</b> 3/14 7/15 54/9 69/12 75/10 142/8 150/16 150/18 161/11 161/11 178/21 180/13 184/24 187/10 187/12 187/13 204/2 207/10 207/16 209/19 209/25 217/17 219/7 220/2 242/17
<b>commissioned [1]</b> 137/24	<b>complex [4]</b> 21/2 21/6 146/23 181/4	<b>confident [15]</b> 14/5 34/17 34/22 39/2 45/18 47/7 47/8 53/1 53/2 139/20 140/5 140/6 140/17 142/23 180/4	<b>consistently [2]</b> 64/13 67/6 <b>consolation [1]</b> 149/5 <b>constantly [1]</b> 64/13 <b>constitute [1]</b> 170/18 <b>constrained [3]</b> 28/10 78/22 156/19	<b>constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>constructive [2]</b> 212/17 235/4 <b>consultation [3]</b> 63/2 63/5 63/5 <b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12
<b>commitment [1]</b> 123/18	<b>complexity [3]</b> 88/2 106/4 107/5	<b>confined [1]</b> 106/1 <b>confirm [1]</b> 172/20 <b>confirmed [7]</b> 1/18 69/11 73/10 97/8 171/4 218/22 219/1	<b>constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>constructive [2]</b> 212/17 235/4 <b>consultation [3]</b> 63/2 63/5 63/5 <b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12	<b>contacting [1]</b> 97/7 <b>contacts [8]</b> 91/24 92/15 103/16 103/19 145/11 164/20 164/21 176/5 <b>contagious [1]</b> 129/3 <b>contain [1]</b> 89/15 <b>contained [1]</b> 225/11 <b>containment [2]</b> 198/2 198/6 <b>contemplate [2]</b> 52/3 243/6 <b>contemporaneous [2]</b> 43/20 61/22 <b>content [5]</b> 3/20 4/23 5/1 182/10 187/18 <b>contents [2]</b> 150/11 150/11 <b>contested [1]</b> 27/10 <b>context [15]</b> 10/5 77/3 78/11 91/19 97/19 97/21 123/8
<b>committee [7]</b> 151/16 151/22 152/1 155/22 221/20 226/13 226/19	<b>compliance [6]</b> 26/10 34/15 50/15 123/22 195/15 195/18	<b>confirms [1]</b> 218/20 <b>conflated [1]</b> 72/3 <b>confronted [1]</b> 181/5 <b>confused [5]</b> 9/3 9/17 17/24 18/14 23/17 <b>confusing [1]</b> 2/11 <b>confusingly [1]</b> 96/9 <b>confusion [3]</b> 9/3 10/9 88/1 <b>Congress [1]</b> 144/25 <b>conjunction [1]</b> 157/4 <b>connected [1]</b> 197/14 <b>conscious [1]</b> 88/10 <b>consciousness [1]</b> 177/1 <b>consensus [1]</b> 161/1 <b>consequence [9]</b> 29/14 82/6 82/13 82/25 162/8 215/4 216/4 216/10 228/3 <b>consequences [8]</b> 30/22 46/15 64/21 108/7 183/8 202/18 205/5 242/4 <b>consequent [1]</b> 93/16 <b>consider [12]</b> 27/22 29/8 36/22 65/1 85/14 102/7 108/7 122/11 148/18 149/7 162/15 163/24 <b>considerable [5]</b> 10/8 27/18 150/8 163/21 199/12 <b>considerably [1]</b>	<b>consolation [1]</b> 149/5 <b>constantly [1]</b> 64/13 <b>constitute [1]</b> 170/18 <b>constrained [3]</b> 28/10 78/22 156/19 <b>constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>constructive [2]</b> 212/17 235/4 <b>consultation [3]</b> 63/2 63/5 63/5 <b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12	<b>controlled [1]</b> 180/9 <b>controls [4]</b> 84/9 85/17 175/5 187/9 <b>convened [1]</b> 232/22 <b>convenient [1]</b> 198/19 <b>conversation [12]</b> 18/2 103/8 122/8 139/17 139/19 139/20 139/23 140/4 140/6 140/18 155/7 179/2 <b>conversations [5]</b> 121/17 121/24 122/1 122/4 165/6 <b>conveying [1]</b> 182/5 <b>convinced [2]</b> 135/22 138/11 <b>cooking [1]</b> 211/12 <b>coping [1]</b> 57/25 <b>copy [4]</b> 2/13 197/9
<b>common [6]</b> 94/11 94/16 98/13 164/11 166/5 206/19	<b>complicated [7]</b> 9/20 88/16 88/18 88/23 106/2 112/16 128/19	<b>confidentiality [1]</b> 114/2 <b>confined [1]</b> 106/1 <b>confirm [1]</b> 172/20 <b>confirmed [7]</b> 1/18 69/11 73/10 97/8 171/4 218/22 219/1	<b>consistently [2]</b> 64/13 67/6 <b>consolation [1]</b> 149/5 <b>constantly [1]</b> 64/13 <b>constitute [1]</b> 170/18 <b>constrained [3]</b> 28/10 78/22 156/19 <b>constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>constructive [2]</b> 212/17 235/4 <b>consultation [3]</b> 63/2 63/5 63/5 <b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12	<b>continues [3]</b> 75/3 192/5 193/13 <b>continuing [1]</b> 205/7 <b>continuous [2]</b> 122/7 145/19 <b>continuously [1]</b> 92/2 <b>contribute [2]</b> 173/2 204/5 <b>contributed [3]</b> 75/11 125/19 203/13 <b>contributing [3]</b> 43/12 124/25 198/4 <b>contribution [2]</b> 9/18 91/15 <b>control [25]</b> 3/14 7/15 54/9 69/12 75/10 142/8 150/16 150/18 161/11 161/11 178/21 180/13 184/24 187/10 187/12 187/13 204/2 207/10 207/16 209/19 209/25 217/17 219/7 220/2 242/17
<b>commonsensical [1]</b> 26/12	<b>complies [1]</b> 195/1	<b>confirms [1]</b> 218/20 <b>conflated [1]</b> 72/3 <b>confronted [1]</b> 181/5 <b>confused [5]</b> 9/3 9/17 17/24 18/14 23/17 <b>confusing [1]</b> 2/11 <b>confusingly [1]</b> 96/9 <b>confusion [3]</b> 9/3 10/9 88/1 <b>Congress [1]</b> 144/25 <b>conjunction [1]</b> 157/4 <b>connected [1]</b> 197/14 <b>conscious [1]</b> 88/10 <b>consciousness [1]</b> 177/1 <b>consensus [1]</b> 161/1 <b>consequence [9]</b> 29/14 82/6 82/13 82/25 162/8 215/4 216/4 216/10 228/3 <b>consequences [8]</b> 30/22 46/15 64/21 108/7 183/8 202/18 205/5 242/4 <b>consequent [1]</b> 93/16 <b>consider [12]</b> 27/22 29/8 36/22 65/1 85/14 102/7 108/7 122/11 148/18 149/7 162/15 163/24 <b>considerable [5]</b> 10/8 27/18 150/8 163/21 199/12 <b>considerably [1]</b>	<b>comprehensive [1]</b> 127/8 <b>comprised [2]</b> 41/2 155/11 <b>concentrate [1]</b> 69/6 <b>concentrated [1]</b> 90/23 <b>concept [8]</b> 25/24 101/25 211/20 213/15 214/3 237/13 239/20 240/7 <b>conceptualise [1]</b> 5/24 <b>concern [15]</b> 3/21 3/24 4/15 29/19 68/8 68/18 81/9 86/7 113/15 172/9 206/18 208/13 219/8 236/11 237/10 <b>concern/awareness [1]</b> 219/8 <b>concerned [21]</b> 4/15 4/22 18/16 29/15 32/24 33/2 81/10 99/23 119/20 135/5 152/4 152/24 157/19 168/5 168/6 177/13 180/5 187/16 188/11 205/15 205/21 <b>concerning [2]</b> 162/6 199/25 <b>concerns [11]</b> 2/6 4/20 17/1 43/18 64/14 108/1 112/15 172/5 205/17 205/19 235/21 <b>concisely [1]</b> 28/7 <b>concludes [1]</b> 242/21 <b>conclusion [2]</b> 172/19 180/10 <b>conclusions [3]</b> 91/23 92/4 92/9 <b>conclusive [1]</b> 74/2 <b>concrete [1]</b> 145/22 <b>conditions [1]</b>	<b>comprehensiveness [1]</b> 127/8 <b>comprised [2]</b> 41/2 155/11 <b>concentrate [1]</b> 69/6 <b>concentrated [1]</b> 90/23 <b>concept [8]</b> 25/24 101/25 211/20 213/15 214/3 237/13 239/20 240/7 <b>conceptualise [1]</b> 5/24 <b>concern [15]</b> 3/21 3/24 4/15 29/19 68/8 68/18 81/9 86/7 113/15 172/9 206/18 208/13 219/8 236/11 237/10 <b>concern/awareness [1]</b> 219/8 <b>concerned [21]</b> 4/15 4/22 18/16 29/15 32/24 33/2 81/10 99/23 119/20 135/5 152/4 152/24 157/19 168/5 168/6 177/13 180/5 187/16 188/11 205/15 205/21 <b>concerning [2]</b> 162/6 199/25 <b>concerns [11]</b> 2/6 4/20 17/1 43/18 64/14 108/1 112/15 172/5 205/17 205/19 235/21 <b>concisely [1]</b> 28/7 <b>concludes [1]</b> 242/21 <b>conclusion [2]</b> 172/19 180/10 <b>conclusions [3]</b> 91/23 92/4 92/9 <b>conclusive [1]</b> 74/2 <b>concrete [1]</b> 145/22 <b>conditions [1]</b>
<b>communal [1]</b> 121/4	<b>comprised [2]</b> 41/2 155/11	<b>confidentiality [1]</b> 114/2 <b>confined [1]</b> 106/1 <b>confirm [1]</b> 172/20 <b>confirmed [7]</b> 1/18 69/11 73/10 97/8 171/4 218/22 219/1	<b>constantly [1]</b> 64/13 <b>constitute [1]</b> 170/18 <b>constrained [3]</b> 28/10 78/22 156/19 <b>constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>constructive [2]</b> 212/17 235/4 <b>consultation [3]</b> 63/2 63/5 63/5 <b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12	<b>control [25]</b> 3/14 7/15 54/9 69/12 75/10 142/8 150/16 150/18 161/11 161/11 178/21 180/13 184/24 187/10 187/12 187/13 204/2 207/10 207/16 209/19 209/25 217/17 219/7 220/2 242/17
<b>communicable [2]</b> 150/15 178/20	<b>concentrate [1]</b> 69/6 <b>concentrated [1]</b> 90/23	<b>confirms [1]</b> 218/20 <b>conflated [1]</b> 72/3 <b>confronted [1]</b> 181/5 <b>confused [5]</b> 9/3 9/17 17/24 18/14 23/17 <b>confusing [1]</b> 2/11 <b>confusingly [1]</b> 96/9 <b>confusion [3]</b> 9/3 10/9 88/1 <b>Congress [1]</b> 144/25 <b>conjunction [1]</b> 157/4 <b>connected [1]</b> 197/14 <b>conscious [1]</b> 88/10 <b>consciousness [1]</b> 177/1 <b>consensus [1]</b> 161/1 <b>consequence [9]</b> 29/14 82/6 82/13 82/25 162/8 215/4 216/4 216/10 228/3 <b>consequences [8]</b> 30/22 46/15 64/21 108/7 183/8 202/18 205/5 242/4 <b>consequent [1]</b> 93/16 <b>consider [12]</b> 27/22 29/8 36/22 65/1 85/14 102/7 108/7 122/11 148/18 149/7 162/15 163/24 <b>considerable [5]</b> 10/8 27/18 150/8 163/21 199/12 <b>considerably [1]</b>	<b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12 <b>contacting [1]</b> 97/7 <b>contacts [8]</b> 91/24 92/15 103/16 103/19 145/11 164/20 164/21 176/5 <b>contagious [1]</b> 129/3 <b>contain [1]</b> 89/15 <b>contained [1]</b> 225/11 <b>containment [2]</b> 198/2 198/6 <b>contemplate [2]</b> 52/3 243/6 <b>contemporaneous [2]</b> 43/20 61/22 <b>content [5]</b> 3/20 4/23 5/1 182/10 187/18 <b>contents [2]</b> 150/11 150/11 <b>contested [1]</b> 27/10 <b>context [15]</b> 10/5 77/3 78/11 91/19 97/19 97/21 123/8	<b>controlled [1]</b> 180/9 <b>controls [4]</b> 84/9 85/17 175/5 187/9 <b>convened [1]</b> 232/22 <b>convenient [1]</b> 198/19 <b>conversation [12]</b> 18/2 103/8 122/8 139/17 139/19 139/20 139/23 140/4 140/6 140/18 155/7 179/2 <b>conversations [5]</b> 121/17 121/24 122/1 122/4 165/6 <b>conveying [1]</b> 182/5 <b>convinced [2]</b> 135/22 138/11 <b>cooking [1]</b> 211/12 <b>coping [1]</b> 57/25 <b>copy [4]</b> 2/13 197/9
<b>communicate [2]</b> 4/3 4/19	<b>concept [8]</b> 25/24 101/25 211/20 213/15 214/3 237/13 239/20 240/7	<b>confirms [1]</b> 218/20 <b>conflated [1]</b> 72/3 <b>confronted [1]</b> 181/5 <b>confused [5]</b> 9/3 9/17 17/24 18/14 23/17 <b>confusing [1]</b> 2/11 <b>confusingly [1]</b> 96/9 <b>confusion [3]</b> 9/3 10/9 88/1 <b>Congress [1]</b> 144/25 <b>conjunction [1]</b> 157/4 <b>connected [1]</b> 197/14 <b>conscious [1]</b> 88/10 <b>consciousness [1]</b> 177/1 <b>consensus [1]</b> 161/1 <b>consequence [9]</b> 29/14 82/6 82/13 82/25 162/8 215/4 216/4 216/10 228/3 <b>consequences [8]</b> 30/22 46/15 64/21 108/7 183/8 202/18 205/5 242/4 <b>consequent [1]</b> 93/16 <b>consider [12]</b> 27/22 29/8 36/22 65/1 85/14 102/7 108/7 122/11 148/18 149/7 162/15 163/24 <b>considerable [5]</b> 10/8 27/18 150/8 163/21 199/12 <b>considerably [1]</b>	<b>constantly [1]</b> 64/13 <b>constitute [1]</b> 170/18 <b>constrained [3]</b> 28/10 78/22 156/19 <b>constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>constructive [2]</b> 212/17 235/4 <b>consultation [3]</b> 63/2 63/5 63/5 <b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12 <b>contacting [1]</b> 97/7 <b>contacts [8]</b> 91/24 92/15 103/16 103/19 145/11 164/20 164/21 176/5 <b>contagious [1]</b> 129/3 <b>contain [1]</b> 89/15 <b>contained [1]</b> 225/11 <b>containment [2]</b> 198/2 198/6 <b>contemplate [2]</b> 52/3 243/6 <b>contemporaneous [2]</b> 43/20 61/22 <b>content [5]</b> 3/20 4/23 5/1 182/10 187/18 <b>contents [2]</b> 150/11 150/11 <b>contested [1]</b> 27/10 <b>context [15]</b> 10/5 77/3 78/11 91/19 97/19 97/21 123/8	<b>control [25]</b> 3/14 7/15 54/9 69/12 75/10 142/8 150/16 150/18 161/11 161/11 178/21 180/13 184/24 187/10 187/12 187/13 204/2 207/10 207/16 209/19 209/25 217/17 219/7 220/2 242/17
<b>communicated [2]</b> 3/23 174/2	<b>conceptualise [1]</b> 5/24	<b>confirms [1]</b> 218/20 <b>conflated [1]</b> 72/3 <b>confronted [1]</b> 181/5 <b>confused [5]</b> 9/3 9/17 17/24 18/14 23/17 <b>confusing [1]</b> 2/11 <b>confusingly [1]</b> 96/9 <b>confusion [3]</b> 9/3 10/9 88/1 <b>Congress [1]</b> 144/25 <b>conjunction [1]</b> 157/4 <b>connected [1]</b> 197/14 <b>conscious [1]</b> 88/10 <b>consciousness [1]</b> 177/1 <b>consensus [1]</b> 161/1 <b>consequence [9]</b> 29/14 82/6 82/13 82/25 162/8 215/4 216/4 216/10 228/3 <b>consequences [8]</b> 30/22 46/15 64/21 108/7 183/8 202/18 205/5 242/4 <b>consequent [1]</b> 93/16 <b>consider [12]</b> 27/22 29/8 36/22 65/1 85/14 102/7 108/7 122/11 148/18 149/7 162/15 163/24 <b>considerable [5]</b> 10/8 27/18 150/8 163/21 199/12 <b>considerably [1]</b>	<b>consulted [9]</b> 63/25 64/1 110/18 110/19 210/6 210/12 210/14 210/15 223/8 <b>consuming [1]</b> 210/19 <b>contact [13]</b> 1/23 71/11 81/2 97/11 97/14 156/1 156/7 156/18 203/1 210/18 213/7 213/24 230/12 <b>contacting [1]</b> 97/7 <b>contacts [8]</b> 91/24 92/15 103/16 103/19 145/11 164/20 164/21 176/5 <b>contagious [1]</b> 129/3 <b>contain [1]</b> 89/15 <b>contained [1]</b> 225/11 <b>containment [2]</b> 198/2 198/6 <b>contemplate [2]</b> 52/3 243/6 <b>contemporaneous [2]</b> 43/20 61/22 <b>content [5]</b> 3/20 4/23 5/1 182/10 187/18 <b>contents [2]</b> 150/11 150/11 <b>contested [1]</b> 27/10 <b>context [15]</b> 10/5 77/3 78/11 91/19 97/19 97/21 123/8	<b>controlled [1]</b> 180/9 <b>controls [4]</b> 84/9 85/17 175/5 187/9 <b>convened [1]</b> 232/22 <b>convenient [1]</b> 198/19 <b>conversation [12]</b> 18/2 103/8 122/8 139/17 139/19 139/20 139/23 140/4 140/6 140/18 155/7 179/2 <b>conversations [5]</b> 121/17 121/24 122/1 122/4 165/6 <b>conveying [1]</b> 182/5 <b>convinced [2]</b> 135/22 138/11 <b>cooking [1]</b> 211/12 <b>coping [1]</b> 57/25 <b>copy [4]</b> 2/13 197/9
<b>communicating [1]</b> 92/20	<b>concerned [21]</b> 4/15 4/22 18/16 29/15 32/24 33/2 81/10 99/23			

<b>C</b>	214/10 215/22 217/9 217/11 217/14 217/20 219/2 223/10 224/3 225/16 225/21 231/9 236/22 238/12 238/17 <b>couldn't [18]</b> 36/6 47/19 49/10 52/18 53/8 59/19 62/11 65/10 103/5 118/25 135/5 162/3 184/10 185/11 201/11 207/19 212/13 212/17 <b>COUNSEL [7]</b> 1/4 149/24 241/20 242/1 244/4 244/15 244/19 <b>count [1]</b> 158/25 <b>countenance [1]</b> 35/20 <b>counteract [1]</b> 38/11 <b>counterintuitively [1]</b> 39/4 <b>countermeasure [2]</b> 37/12 45/2 <b>countermeasures</b> <b>[25]</b> 7/15 26/9 26/13 29/16 30/6 30/18 31/1 31/5 31/6 34/23 37/5 44/2 44/25 50/6 50/7 51/8 51/17 51/22 52/16 59/20 130/15 187/8 188/10 188/25 189/14 <b>counterparts [1]</b> 163/20 <b>counterpoint [2]</b> 87/21 92/13 <b>countries [9]</b> 27/16 28/20 29/4 93/16 161/20 165/1 167/5 200/4 200/6 <b>country [13]</b> 7/17 57/12 66/12 73/11 82/17 109/12 127/20 161/3 171/16 201/1 201/5 201/10 243/11 <b>couple [8]</b> 28/5 127/2 127/2 165/24 190/24 200/3 237/6 237/7 <b>course [59]</b> 1/17 5/21 7/3 7/17 10/17 16/20 29/14 31/1 31/3 39/21 41/2 41/11 41/19 44/11 49/10 49/16 51/6 62/5 64/23 66/11 71/21 89/23 98/13 99/3 104/10 106/19 112/25 136/18 139/5 143/17 150/2 150/12 153/10 154/11 156/4 157/7 158/16 159/22 164/15 167/23 167/24 168/8 169/18 174/1 174/24 178/14 180/21 182/16 189/1 189/16	191/8 205/12 205/20 205/22 206/22 212/25 228/15 234/2 241/10 <b>court [1]</b> 19/22 <b>CoV [6]</b> 7/21 156/5 185/5 186/1 186/2 242/11 <b>covered [2]</b> 145/20 152/9 <b>coverings [2]</b> 118/3 120/24 <b>Covid [92]</b> 7/17 7/20 8/7 14/21 15/12 16/11 16/16 24/21 27/16 28/18 30/2 30/9 44/15 47/9 55/10 67/20 68/10 70/1 75/17 81/20 82/3 87/13 88/15 89/2 89/17 98/24 99/23 100/16 111/15 116/12 127/12 129/5 129/13 130/16 132/5 133/24 135/20 135/22 136/1 136/11 136/13 136/17 136/18 137/11 137/20 138/1 138/5 138/5 138/17 138/24 138/25 139/4 139/9 140/1 140/10 140/11 140/13 140/25 141/9 141/13 141/20 141/23 141/25 142/3 142/4 142/11 142/17 143/7 143/21 143/25 144/7 144/7 144/11 145/18 146/5 158/4 158/4 158/22 158/22 158/23 158/25 191/1 211/11 214/20 215/1 215/4 215/15 225/19 226/9 226/12 231/11 232/18 <b>Covid's [1]</b> 127/19 <b>Covid-19 [9]</b> 28/18 55/10 81/20 130/16 132/5 138/5 141/20 142/3 232/18 <b>Covid-O [3]</b> 158/4 158/22 158/25 <b>Covid-S [3]</b> 158/4 158/22 158/23 <b>CP [1]</b> 62/20 <b>crack [1]</b> 154/12 <b>credible [1]</b> 169/21 <b>criminal [1]</b> 243/14 <b>crisis [13]</b> 123/16 152/13 154/18 156/5 156/24 162/24 163/12 172/7 173/22 196/25 225/19 226/10 231/11 <b>criteria [3]</b> 100/22 218/25 219/10 <b>critical [4]</b> 55/6 55/17 56/5 76/16	<b>criticised [1]</b> 184/7 <b>criticism [5]</b> 94/24 102/17 105/20 105/23 122/1 <b>criticisms [1]</b> 235/5 <b>cross [1]</b> 176/14 <b>crossed [1]</b> 32/18 <b>crowded [2]</b> 213/6 213/22 <b>crucial [2]</b> 123/15 123/21 <b>crystallise [1]</b> 206/10 <b>Cs [3]</b> 213/6 213/15 213/20 <b>CSA [1]</b> 10/1 <b>cultural [1]</b> 130/13 <b>culturally [1]</b> 126/15 <b>culture [2]</b> 49/6 199/6 <b>cumbersome [1]</b> 221/19 <b>Cummings [2]</b> 5/10 6/20 <b>current [5]</b> 56/5 172/15 173/9 191/20 192/5 <b>curve [9]</b> 47/1 52/1 184/16 186/7 191/18 192/8 192/16 193/13 208/24 <b>curves [1]</b> 61/22 <b>cusps [1]</b> 166/3 <b>cut [3]</b> 82/21 103/8 163/2 <b>Cymru [2]</b> 98/25 232/19	117/13 125/8 125/10 146/2 146/2 161/19 168/24 172/25 179/11 181/10 181/17 182/14 182/17 182/25 185/4 185/15 185/18 185/19 185/22 185/24 186/10 187/19 187/22 189/24 191/17 193/11 194/15 195/21 207/22 207/25 208/25 208/25 <b>dataset [1]</b> 115/20 <b>datasets [1]</b> 116/4 <b>date [20]</b> 61/13 105/2 120/4 120/4 120/17 120/18 120/18 120/19 139/21 169/23 177/18 191/8 193/11 194/23 195/2 195/3 223/19 224/1 227/8 229/21 <b>dated [3]</b> 130/18 140/16 150/10 <b>dates [2]</b> 160/4 231/1 <b>David [1]</b> 146/25 <b>David Halpern [1]</b> 146/25 <b>dawning [1]</b> 30/20 <b>day [26]</b> 3/5 33/25 55/17 69/2 72/21 72/22 81/22 107/24 118/5 118/9 152/20 159/2 162/21 166/1 189/6 189/11 192/18 196/20 198/10 204/7 204/7 205/20 205/20 211/17 211/19 211/22 <b>days [39]</b> 4/8 33/10 33/11 34/10 41/18 45/11 45/14 93/23 99/10 101/24 102/19 152/21 156/25 162/21 163/5 165/24 166/14 168/19 175/17 182/17 182/18 182/19 185/6 185/20 185/22 186/1 186/4 189/8 190/9 191/20 194/3 195/4 195/7 195/11 196/1 211/18 211/18 212/10 215/6 <b>days' [2]</b> 56/9 56/10 <b>DCMO [17]</b> 63/3 151/25 152/8 152/17 152/23 152/24 153/1 153/1 153/18 154/20 158/19 159/23 163/23 180/22 183/15 205/12 214/13 <b>DCMO's [1]</b> 155/21 <b>DCMS [1]</b> 199/8 <b>deadly [1]</b> 184/22 <b>deal [9]</b> 30/16 56/22 59/2 86/25 146/22 155/12 158/3 178/23
----------	---	--	---	--

<b>D</b>	154/5	<b>Denmark [2]</b> 84/12 84/14	<b>devastating [1]</b> 242/3	234/22 236/4 236/14
<b>deal... [1]</b> 234/7	<b>decision-makers [2]</b> 148/7 234/23	<b>denominator [1]</b> 171/13	<b>develop [2]</b> 142/25 143/1	237/2 237/3 237/15 242/2 242/6
<b>dealing [13]</b> 8/23 47/23 53/12 54/14 56/14 60/20 89/16 100/16 184/22 207/22 207/25 223/3 226/9	<b>decision-making [6]</b> 40/25 42/16 44/10 156/10 229/7 233/16	<b>department [4]</b> 68/22 155/13 199/5 204/11	<b>developed [4]</b> 89/12 97/15 101/3 137/16	<b>didn't [54]</b> 2/6 2/13 4/23 6/13 8/14 16/2 23/16 38/4 38/10 41/17 46/16 47/16 59/18 66/4 70/8 70/12 78/5 78/15 78/16 90/5 91/21 93/7 99/15 109/1 109/5 113/18 114/10 123/25 126/10 135/25 138/4 140/17 142/1 146/21 147/3 163/6 163/7 163/9 166/1 180/18 182/8 183/20 187/25 198/7 204/16 206/4 206/24 210/24 211/21 216/15 224/18 234/12 240/16 241/6
<b>dealt [2]</b> 110/16 242/15	<b>decisions [19]</b> 27/23 36/21 41/16 47/13 60/17 61/7 65/11 66/7 89/7 108/20 119/11 119/13 137/5 138/18 142/23 206/8 207/25 236/23 237/11	<b>departments [6]</b> 90/24 100/25 156/3 199/10 203/20 206/16	<b>development [3]</b> 18/23 89/13 157/20	
<b>dear [1]</b> 181/21	<b>declaration [5]</b> 13/22 15/15 15/24 18/18 18/22	<b>depend [3]</b> 80/17 154/8 184/25	<b>developments [1]</b> 180/25	
<b>death [11]</b> 11/10 13/1 40/14 40/21 41/5 43/18 44/11 44/24 46/8 132/13 153/19	<b>declassification [1]</b> 226/20	<b>depended [1]</b> 117/6	<b>deviate [1]</b> 36/1	
<b>deaths [15]</b> 5/21 27/12 40/7 40/7 40/11 40/19 42/19 44/7 44/10 44/15 44/15 44/19 44/25 45/4 46/21	<b>decreases [1]</b> 9/10	<b>dependency [1]</b> 221/2	<b>devolved [14]</b> 99/3 99/8 102/10 105/13 111/19 163/25 164/6 233/12 233/15 234/7 234/23 236/24 237/10 237/16	
<b>debate [43]</b> 7/12 10/4 12/16 14/10 17/19 18/15 19/23 20/13 23/16 24/12 25/3 25/25 28/24 29/18 29/22 30/17 33/24 34/7 34/8 43/15 43/25 46/4 46/5 46/6 50/3 51/1 51/2 52/6 58/9 65/4 82/22 90/16 122/12 122/13 146/9 147/2 147/4 188/9 194/20 196/19 205/23 206/25 239/2	<b>deep [3]</b> 50/21 50/22 184/17	<b>depending [2]</b> 71/11 142/13	<b>DHSC [6]</b> 155/14 155/14 174/12 175/22 199/7 223/15	
<b>debated [5]</b> 31/2 79/7 111/5 121/5 145/8	<b>deeper [2]</b> 50/22 51/7	<b>depends [6]</b> 4/25 71/17 77/1 153/9 201/3 201/6	<b>diagnose [1]</b> 81/25	
<b>debates [5]</b> 20/17 23/22 24/18 109/18 120/23	<b>deeply [1]</b> 162/18	<b>deprivation [2]</b> 128/18 145/18	<b>diagnostics [1]</b> 180/16	
<b>debating [3]</b> 18/12 35/1 36/3	<b>define [2]</b> 4/25 57/25	<b>Deputy [3]</b> 99/18 115/6 152/3	<b>Diamond [2]</b> 79/21 79/22	
<b>debilitating [1]</b> 143/11	<b>defined [1]</b> 172/10	<b>Deputy CMO [1]</b> 99/18	<b>Diamond Princess [2]</b> 79/21 79/22	
<b>decades [1]</b> 177/8	<b>definite [1]</b> 74/4	<b>Deputy CMOs [1]</b> 115/6	<b>diary [1]</b> 159/5	
<b>December [2]</b> 97/3 208/8	<b>definitely [8]</b> 22/11 25/17 37/23 38/13 49/3 85/25 112/23 235/13	<b>derived [1]</b> 142/8	<b>dice [1]</b> 34/20	
<b>December 2022 [1]</b> 97/3	<b>definition [5]</b> 21/13 21/19 216/2 218/25 229/22	<b>descended [2]</b> 148/2 148/4	<b>dichotomy [1]</b> 196/25	
<b>decide [1]</b> 64/23	<b>definition/criteria [1]</b> 218/25	<b>describe [6]</b> 12/25 25/22 55/20 146/9 162/8 181/7	<b>did [114]</b> 2/7 3/1 4/3 4/24 5/6 5/11 6/9 6/12 6/23 7/3 8/14 10/9 10/10 16/22 16/22 16/25 17/2 20/6 20/24 22/1 22/2 22/23 25/11 25/17 27/13 29/4 45/2 46/5 46/6 46/8 47/21 47/21 48/11 49/11 49/16 58/6 58/13 59/25 60/11 66/2 69/20 70/6 78/16 80/17 80/18 85/18 101/6 105/24 107/3 109/9 110/15 114/8 114/9 116/12 120/15 120/16 121/13 124/13 124/14 124/17 125/5 125/5 125/8 125/10 130/21 131/6 131/9 131/18 136/12 138/14 138/24 138/24 139/8 139/20 146/12 152/3 152/16 152/18 154/21 159/18 160/13 161/16 162/13 163/1 163/2 169/13 174/8 176/3 178/1 178/2 179/25 184/3 188/23 188/25 190/25 193/25 197/7 209/3 210/6 213/12 213/18 214/11 216/14 224/11 232/10 232/10	
<b>decided [2]</b> 93/20 112/22	<b>definitions [1]</b> 230/11	<b>described [6]</b> 7/7 11/3 94/21 105/17 209/22 242/25		
<b>decision [30]</b> 38/4 38/5 40/22 40/25 41/2 42/16 43/2 43/5 44/10 44/12 45/24 84/20 110/8 122/10 138/7 148/7 154/5 156/10 182/1 208/2 209/20 209/21 226/23 226/25 229/3 229/7 230/6 232/4 233/16 234/23	<b>degree [16]</b> 3/6 3/20 15/16 31/8 46/17 46/17 54/9 59/7 132/24 163/24 171/5 171/24 173/19 179/4 179/5 234/14	<b>describes [1]</b> 23/23		
<b>decision's [1]</b> 231/2	<b>degrees [1]</b> 151/5	<b>describing [3]</b> 112/17 144/4 193/5		
<b>decision-maker [1]</b>	<b>delay [6]</b> 25/10 37/8 85/9 134/7 135/3 208/13	<b>description [4]</b> 40/20 61/12 114/16 198/17		
	<b>delaying [1]</b> 50/11	<b>descriptions [1]</b> 169/22		
	<b>delays [1]</b> 207/20	<b>designated [2]</b> 132/15 158/24		
	<b>delegated [2]</b> 154/1 158/10	<b>designation [3]</b> 83/8 83/22 83/23		
	<b>deliberate [1]</b> 20/4	<b>designed [1]</b> 209/15		
	<b>deliberately [2]</b> 20/14 218/24	<b>desire [2]</b> 35/18 181/14		
	<b>deluging [1]</b> 55/3	<b>desired [1]</b> 196/13		
	<b>delve [1]</b> 123/12	<b>despite [3]</b> 61/10 96/9 118/4		
	<b>demands [4]</b> 55/5 162/7 162/13 164/2	<b>detail [5]</b> 28/5 84/11 101/18 112/2 128/10		
	<b>demonstrate [1]</b> 116/12	<b>detailed [3]</b> 55/14 56/19 89/23		
	<b>demonstrated [3]</b> 16/5 38/25 127/17	<b>details [3]</b> 100/2 117/10 242/16		
	<b>demonstration [1]</b> 4/4	<b>detain [2]</b> 123/8 241/18		
		<b>detect [2]</b> 199/4 211/11		
		<b>detecting [1]</b> 12/19		



<b>D</b>	<b>disagreement [3]</b> 109/21 119/18 120/9	<b>distillation [1]</b> 42/9	<b>doctorates [1]</b> 151/6	122/23 126/22 136/25
<b>differentiate... [1]</b> 70/15	<b>disbenefits [1]</b> 118/21	<b>distinct [1]</b> 93/19	<b>document [31]</b> 2/6	137/19 138/9 138/12
<b>differently [4]</b> 29/20 86/2 101/13 103/14	<b>disciplinary [1]</b> 91/17	<b>distinction [3]</b> 75/1 210/16 222/17	41/20 54/13 75/19	139/24 142/15 146/20
<b>difficult [25]</b> 6/22 37/3 48/22 48/23 71/7	<b>discipline [1]</b> 92/6	<b>distinguish [1]</b> 83/20	75/21 94/18 94/20	158/16 158/23 160/4
86/22 95/11 95/17	<b>disciplines [1]</b> 161/10	<b>distinguished [3]</b> 19/2 95/3 96/13	94/22 94/22 94/23	165/4 170/16 170/21
110/17 111/2 116/5	<b>disclosed [1]</b> 3/10	<b>diverged [1]</b> 107/19	95/2 95/5 96/2 98/2	172/7 172/7 177/1
121/1 121/18 122/15	<b>disconnected [1]</b> 103/25	<b>divergence [1]</b> 108/8	117/24 118/13 118/17	183/13 183/22 184/9
161/23 172/10 173/16	<b>discourage [1]</b> 21/7	<b>divergences [1]</b> 108/5	119/3 119/21 120/4	184/9 190/18 192/4
173/23 180/13 181/4	<b>discovered [1]</b> 213/14	<b>diversity [3]</b> 90/8	134/15 136/4 139/16	192/9 192/17 192/23
195/13 201/20 209/11	<b>discuss [3]</b> 21/2 76/18 93/6	90/12 105/10	198/5 215/9 216/23	195/5 195/6 196/3
238/19 242/17	<b>discussed [17]</b> 26/21 63/8 64/6 64/7 77/18	<b>divide [1]</b> 183/12	223/22 226/16 229/18	196/8 196/17 196/22
<b>difficulties [6]</b> 6/10 27/18 89/16 115/23	80/14 87/1 101/6	<b>divided [1]</b> 121/4	229/19 230/1	200/21 204/21 206/13
116/8 175/6	108/6 108/10 114/12	<b>do [156]</b> 2/8 2/15	<b>documentary [1]</b> 147/16	209/12 218/18 222/4
<b>difficulty [5]</b> 23/20 115/24 117/5 148/6	122/12 139/12 200/3	2/17 7/24 15/5 17/8	<b>documents [10]</b> 3/9	223/22 227/2 227/7
209/6	226/19 234/15 234/17	17/8 17/9 18/7 18/13	67/5 68/14 100/5	227/12 237/14 237/14
<b>Digest [1]</b> 165/14	<b>discussing [5]</b> 24/23 24/24 24/24 63/18	19/10 20/16 20/19	102/23 104/8 105/4	237/19 237/24 237/25
<b>dim [1]</b> 236/6	125/11	23/25 27/14 28/5 29/2	118/18 118/19 198/9	238/25 242/23 243/4
<b>dimensions [1]</b> 88/18	<b>discussion [17]</b> 5/14 9/22 25/25 73/8 83/6	29/6 30/1 30/3 30/7	118/18 118/19 198/9	243/7
<b>diplomas [1]</b> 151/5	104/21 108/13 108/14	33/21 33/24 35/16	140/14 166/20 173/10	<b>done [33]</b> 29/10
<b>diplomatic [1]</b> 69/4	109/11 114/16 137/7	37/20 37/21 39/1 39/3	176/2 184/25 192/23	31/23 35/21 36/7 42/8
<b>diptel [2]</b> 70/3 70/8	141/3 153/23 153/24	39/6 39/14 42/6 42/13	215/22 222/13 228/23	53/23 54/20 63/12
<b>direct [10]</b> 1/23 40/6 40/17 44/1 44/14 46/2	156/21 216/8 217/3	42/15 42/15 43/7 43/8	229/19 231/1	64/4 66/15 80/12 86/1
46/16 60/23 125/21	<b>discussions [21]</b> 26/25 27/1 43/5 72/5	45/5 47/25 48/8 49/1	176/2 184/25 192/23	92/14 100/18 101/13
146/7	92/9 92/18 103/20	49/15 50/6 50/16	215/22 222/13 228/23	103/22 109/12 120/11
<b>directed [2]</b> 2/25 238/8	108/11 108/19 122/3	52/11 53/20 60/2	229/19 231/1	120/12 123/24 124/1
<b>direction [3]</b> 6/22 10/3 108/22	130/11 130/22 130/24	60/15 61/5 63/1 63/10	<b>doesn't [23]</b> 7/16	126/24 130/19 144/11
<b>directions [1]</b> 121/2	131/2 131/6 131/8	65/1 66/17 68/10	13/2 13/21 29/10 64/6	148/1 148/24 164/22
<b>directly [11]</b> 2/2 4/19 40/19 43/15 44/7 46/7	131/19 136/2 138/3	68/12 77/14 80/11	71/2 86/20 103/15	173/12 203/22 211/17
47/9 96/15 113/1	188/16 232/3	82/16 83/16 84/11	120/8 134/16 164/4	211/17 227/25 243/5
131/19 136/13	<b>disease [20]</b> 15/1 15/2 15/3 15/6 15/10	87/3 87/6 87/18 89/14	164/4 168/8 169/20	<b>door [1]</b> 61/1
<b>director [3]</b> 69/10 71/4 73/9	81/10 82/13 82/25	89/20 90/1 90/13	170/16 171/7 173/13	<b>doors [1]</b> 72/4
<b>directors [1]</b> 110/20	150/16 154/25 170/4	90/14 92/3 92/10 93/7	178/18 179/10 218/19	<b>double [1]</b> 27/3
<b>disabilities [5]</b> 12/8 131/3 131/13 132/1	176/16 178/21 209/19	93/12 94/12 95/17	229/20 237/13 238/1	<b>doubling [23]</b> 6/3
133/1	215/5 216/4 216/11	100/17 103/6 103/14	<b>dog [1]</b> 3/18	35/11 35/13 45/10
<b>disability [1]</b> 143/16	218/22 219/9 219/24	104/5 105/2 105/23	<b>doing [19]</b> 4/6 25/21	45/13 45/16 47/2 47/4
<b>disabled [5]</b> 130/5 130/23 131/20 131/24	<b>diseases [5]</b> 82/6 152/9 224/6 224/9	105/25 110/12 111/23	38/3 38/21 41/13	48/20 52/4 52/25 56/4
132/4	225/7	112/17 113/5 113/20	41/14 52/20 76/5	56/5 57/22 57/22
<b>disabuse [2]</b> 135/25 138/10	<b>disorders [1]</b> 132/13	113/23 114/12 115/23	101/13 103/14 107/20	184/25 185/1 185/3
<b>disadvantage [4]</b> 127/7 127/14 132/23	<b>disparate [3]</b> 147/10 148/12 197/4	116/14 119/9 119/25	108/23 117/21 126/23	185/3 185/7 185/9
147/9	<b>disparities [1]</b> 40/13	119/25 123/1 123/23	129/6 134/10 144/15	195/10 195/14
<b>disadvantaged [1]</b> 128/14	<b>dispute [4]</b> 30/11 95/19 160/4 234/25	123/25 124/16 125/7	168/13 183/14	<b>doubling up [3]</b> 45/10 45/13 48/20
<b>disadvantages [4]</b> 40/12 82/11 121/8	<b>disrupted [1]</b> 55/2	126/3 128/22 133/12	<b>domain [3]</b> 62/6 73/17 79/23	<b>doubt [8]</b> 17/4 17/22
133/14	<b>disruption [1]</b> 174/18	133/12 136/17 136/18	<b>domains [2]</b> 117/1 117/9	22/10 59/3 92/11 96/4
<b>disagree [3]</b> 19/3 20/6 36/23	<b>disruptive [1]</b> 31/14	137/2 137/3 137/9	<b>domestic [1]</b> 175/19	146/16 192/9
<b>disagreeing [1]</b> 79/10	<b>distance [1]</b> 89/1	137/13 138/24 138/24	<b>dominance [1]</b> 106/20	<b>doubts [1]</b> 15/23
	<b>distances [1]</b> 154/10	139/18 140/3 142/18	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	<b>down [33]</b> 3/15 7/17
	<b>distancing [3]</b> 61/5 88/6 239/24	143/8 143/11 144/7	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	29/4 30/5 41/2 50/14
	<b>distant [1]</b> 236/6	144/23 147/11 148/10	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	50/23 52/18 52/19
	<b>distill [1]</b> 141/8	148/18 149/6 153/15	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	52/23 55/22 77/3
		153/17 163/24 171/7	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	82/14 89/22 101/22
		173/23 176/1 183/14	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	102/25 114/19 122/14
		185/11 188/7 189/22	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	129/5 129/12 129/19
		192/2 192/3 192/12	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	175/10 194/22 194/23
		192/13 196/9 196/20	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	198/14 206/1 209/5
		197/13 197/14 197/17	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	219/23 219/24 223/9
		197/22 200/13 202/5	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	226/4 226/8 239/7
		207/8 209/22 211/11	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	<b>Down's [6]</b> 132/6
		212/20 218/25 222/2	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	132/14 133/8 133/25
		227/8 235/4 235/11	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	134/4 134/25
		236/9 237/6 238/12	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	<b>Down's Syndrome</b>
		238/18 243/8	<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	<b>[4]</b> 132/6 132/14
			<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	134/4 134/25
			<b>dominant [3]</b> 150/23 157/8 231/22	<b>downgrading [1]</b>



<b>D</b>	<b>drove [1]</b> 127/12	147/9 208/2 240/7	83/12 83/17 87/20	<b>energy [1]</b> 198/12
<b>downgrading... [1]</b> 82/2	<b>Dublin [1]</b> 94/2	<b>economy [2]</b> 33/14	162/10 165/13 165/23	<b>engage [1]</b> 81/12
<b>Downing [10]</b> 2/12 2/24 3/24 4/14 5/6 126/8 156/9 156/14 156/15 239/5	<b>Duchy [1]</b> 232/23	33/15	166/25 167/9 167/13	<b>engaged [5]</b> 73/4 147/2 150/17 165/1 187/23
<b>Downing Street [9]</b> 2/12 3/24 4/14 5/6 126/8 156/9 156/14 156/15 239/5	<b>due [5]</b> 45/12 60/25 136/18 189/1 228/15	<b>ed [1]</b> 107/19	167/16 167/17 167/21	<b>engaging [1]</b> 126/12
<b>downplayed [1]</b> 231/12	<b>during [16]</b> 30/14 31/3 73/3 73/24 122/15 122/17 123/11	<b>edge [1]</b> 53/4	169/3 169/23 170/1	<b>England [21]</b> 69/23 102/3 102/10 105/17 105/25 106/1 106/9 106/18 106/22 107/2 107/23 107/25 113/16 114/8 117/2 137/21 155/3 218/7 225/25 230/21 231/23
<b>downsides [4]</b> 26/23 132/20 133/19 135/10	136/20 141/18 151/16	<b>editor [1]</b> 151/2	170/2 176/10 197/11	<b>English [2]</b> 120/2 120/6
<b>downward [1]</b> 98/7	154/17 160/21 213/9	<b>Edmunds [3]</b> 3/4 160/23 201/24	204/7 218/17 218/19 224/11	<b>enhanced [3]</b> 102/3 103/3 220/2
<b>Dr [10]</b> 5/10 87/20 88/12 99/21 100/19 103/17 103/17 142/3 167/12 174/6	214/25 216/8 240/1	<b>education [3]</b> 37/25 38/5 118/15	<b>email's [1]</b> 5/19	<b>enhancing [1]</b> 123/18
<b>Dr Chris Jones [1]</b> 103/17	<b>dwarfed [1]</b> 203/4	<b>educational [4]</b> 120/1 120/5 120/6 121/9	<b>emailed [1]</b> 1/11	<b>enormous [2]</b> 42/20 42/20
<b>Dr Dabrera [2]</b> 167/12 174/6	<b>dying [2]</b> 15/4 40/6	<b>effect [19]</b> 16/23 31/3 37/6 49/18 50/7 51/16	<b>emails [11]</b> 3/2 3/3 3/7 3/10 3/19 4/5	<b>enormously [2]</b> 238/19 243/10
<b>Dr Frank Atherton [1]</b> 103/17	<b>dynamic [1]</b> 174/4	52/10 52/17 122/18	16/20 26/4 165/5	<b>enough [16]</b> 7/10 31/6 32/25 36/7 36/9 41/20 52/2 60/13 80/11 126/11 181/18 191/2 203/24 205/15 232/5 238/20
<b>Dr McBride [1]</b> 88/12	<b>dynamics [1]</b> 119/10	130/19 135/9 184/12	167/2 201/22	<b>ensconced [1]</b> 175/18
<b>Dr Michael McBride [1]</b> 87/20	<b>E</b>	186/22 199/15 199/22	<b>emerge [4]</b> 166/4 167/22 168/12 168/14	<b>ensure [8]</b> 5/10 35/23 91/2 109/8 124/14 127/8 138/15 209/25
<b>Dr Orford [1]</b> 100/19	<b>each [17]</b> 5/25 54/23 98/4 100/3 106/25	200/6 201/24 203/25 210/20	<b>emerged [3]</b> 102/20 133/13 168/25	<b>ensuring [1]</b> 123/22
<b>Dr Rob Orford [1]</b> 99/21	107/1 108/12 110/13	<b>effective [7]</b> 9/10 29/12 53/8 92/23	<b>emergence [1]</b> 168/4	<b>entangled [1]</b> 109/1
<b>Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus [1]</b> 142/3	110/15 183/23 187/19	92/24 123/14 234/22	<b>emergencies [1]</b> 152/12	<b>enter [4]</b> 65/4 175/21 205/3 234/12
<b>Dr Warner [1]</b> 5/10	210/18 212/10 213/24	<b>effectively [14]</b> 83/14 83/18 85/8 122/18	<b>emergency [8]</b> 6/15 40/8 60/25 104/1 104/3 122/15 122/19 243/13	<b>entered [1]</b> 25/23
<b>draconian [1]</b> 50/12	235/23 240/2 242/10	123/25 127/7 147/11	<b>emerges [1]</b> 84/16	<b>entering [1]</b> 218/2
<b>draft [1]</b> 198/4	<b>eager [1]</b> 203/20	148/11 159/19 167/6	<b>emerging [6]</b> 165/4 165/8 167/22 168/16 173/17 229/23	<b>entire [4]</b> 84/21 116/7 129/5 133/17
<b>drafted [1]</b> 70/4	<b>earlier [30]</b> 19/24 33/10 33/10 33/11	226/23 228/24 229/3 229/7	<b>emphasised [1]</b> 177/23	<b>entirely [9]</b> 20/22 26/2 26/19 36/2 151/22 182/5 182/6 196/8 224/3
<b>drafting [3]</b> 197/7 198/5 198/9	34/9 34/10 36/10 50/6	<b>effectiveness [1]</b> 235/7	<b>employed [3]</b> 145/14 152/21 239/8	<b>entities [2]</b> 94/8 94/15
<b>Drakeford [9]</b> 101/17 104/10 104/23 235/1 235/6 235/12 235/14 235/22 236/13	65/11 65/16 65/18	<b>effects [1]</b> 201/21	<b>employers [1]</b> 238/16	<b>entitled [3]</b> 1/13 95/4 140/1
<b>Drakeford's [1]</b> 101/20	91/11 103/22 125/5	<b>efficacy [1]</b> 174/16	<b>employment [2]</b> 145/12 145/20	<b>entry [7]</b> 117/23 117/23 147/21 174/10 174/11 174/15 175/8
<b>drawing [4]</b> 75/1 97/17 101/2 222/18	136/15 137/18 142/11	<b>efficiency [1]</b> 154/13	<b>empted [1]</b> 124/3	<b>environment [3]</b> 145/14 225/2 225/4
<b>drawn [1]</b> 139/6	142/19 161/21 176/10	<b>efficiently [2]</b> 207/18 207/19	<b>empty [1]</b> 220/21	<b>environmets [1]</b> 213/1
<b>drew [1]</b> 105/12	184/3 189/9 189/18	<b>effort [1]</b> 174/17	<b>enable [1]</b> 208/3	<b>envisaged [1]</b> 224/19
<b>drink [1]</b> 203/8	190/5 190/9 195/16	<b>eight [3]</b> 55/7 57/3 182/19	<b>enact [1]</b> 194/25	<b>epidemic [12]</b> 3/17 35/6 40/1 41/18 41/19 77/5 120/25 160/16 169/16 180/2 191/18 224/5
<b>drive [2]</b> 7/16 43/1	200/24 226/15 238/13 242/25	<b>eight days [1]</b> 182/19	<b>enacted [2]</b> 182/19 182/20	<b>epidemics [1]</b> 30/11
<b>driven [3]</b> 95/21 95/23 120/4	<b>early [29]</b> 34/7 36/7 36/9 53/14 64/16 72/4 73/20 79/24 89/15 89/16 99/10 100/10 101/23 102/19 111/24 125/4 125/15 126/5 126/11 128/6 142/5 146/18 156/24 156/25 157/7 169/15 199/8 201/10 215/2	<b>eight-fold [2]</b> 55/7 57/3	<b>encounter [1]</b> 11/6	
<b>driver [5]</b> 40/22 44/11 44/13 49/23 77/5	<b>earn [1]</b> 238/22	<b>either [8]</b> 80/16 81/7 82/8 94/14 121/10 201/17 215/18 236/7	<b>encounters [1]</b> 176/14	
<b>driving [2]</b> 60/17 93/11	<b>ease [1]</b> 204/14	<b>elaborate [1]</b> 6/6	<b>encourage [3]</b> 21/1 21/22 119/20	
<b>droplet [4]</b> 154/10 215/18 231/21 231/24	<b>easier [1]</b> 145/9	<b>elderly [1]</b> 138/3	<b>encouraging [1]</b> 210/22	
<b>droplets [1]</b> 215/23	<b>easily [2]</b> 94/21 219/2	<b>elective [1]</b> 40/10	<b>end [24]</b> 8/15 16/15 25/8 27/17 30/2 30/3 42/4 42/5 42/7 48/21 59/15 62/16 64/19 70/22 79/21 93/20 129/25 134/3 140/13 149/2 164/8 185/4 220/4 230/1	

<b>E</b>	130/12 143/16 <b>ethnicity [1]</b> 128/17 <b>Europe [2]</b> 57/12 180/7 <b>European [1]</b> 73/21 <b>evaluate [1]</b> 147/8 <b>Evans [3]</b> 81/15 83/21 226/18 <b>Eve [1]</b> 115/20 <b>even [31]</b> 2/14 8/3 8/9 8/20 10/14 11/22 11/24 15/1 23/8 44/16 47/3 47/10 48/20 50/22 51/7 52/2 70/11 76/14 79/3 80/8 88/8 90/24 106/9 106/22 138/10 147/14 186/4 192/2 200/2 211/18 243/4 <b>evening [1]</b> 163/4 <b>event [4]</b> 57/14 203/7 203/10 210/17 <b>events [7]</b> 199/16 200/4 200/7 202/7 202/11 202/16 209/14 <b>eventualities [1]</b> 53/23 <b>eventually [2]</b> 14/5 59/22 <b>ever [11]</b> 7/14 11/4 11/4 11/15 33/8 156/13 212/18 234/15 234/17 239/21 240/3 <b>every [15]</b> 45/10 45/14 57/11 98/3 116/9 116/15 116/16 122/8 122/13 126/3 129/4 159/2 162/3 174/5 211/11 <b>everybody [13]</b> 6/23 38/7 39/6 39/8 39/14 77/13 91/18 111/10 129/13 129/14 129/19 149/6 195/1 <b>everyone [4]</b> 4/9 93/21 110/15 212/12 <b>everything [4]</b> 66/10 116/15 129/6 149/10 <b>everything's [1]</b> 173/21 <b>evidence [40]</b> 1/10 1/17 56/20 56/21 67/13 70/1 75/17 99/12 105/9 105/14 105/22 107/16 114/18 117/19 130/18 133/24 137/11 146/7 147/16 148/25 149/9 154/4 154/17 157/16 158/3 159/7 163/21 165/14 166/18 167/23 174/14 184/11 186/22 198/22 202/2 208/7 229/13 233/6 238/13 242/21	<b>evident [1]</b> 179/22 <b>evolutionary [1]</b> 176/21 <b>EWRS [1]</b> 73/19 <b>exact [7]</b> 21/21 47/14 57/20 59/12 77/2 139/10 148/8 <b>exactly [25]</b> 13/4 14/21 17/17 18/13 27/24 48/14 53/24 85/18 100/2 100/3 103/20 108/24 112/8 114/24 120/22 121/6 121/18 127/22 130/25 131/22 139/21 140/7 142/12 142/23 210/22 <b>example [37]</b> 8/7 16/11 18/23 27/10 35/8 37/9 85/19 86/3 86/15 91/15 100/25 102/13 108/9 110/1 110/22 120/1 126/7 135/1 141/20 144/5 144/8 145/22 145/22 146/2 147/18 152/14 154/5 154/8 155/4 155/21 156/8 188/8 200/2 209/3 226/1 234/24 239/8 <b>examples [6]</b> 107/21 108/5 110/5 111/3 130/17 233/24 <b>exceed [5]</b> 191/19 191/22 192/2 192/6 192/25 <b>exceeded [1]</b> 223/16 <b>exceeding [1]</b> 193/8 <b>excellent [1]</b> 125/24 <b>except [3]</b> 38/5 93/21 109/9 <b>exchange [6]</b> 81/12 218/17 218/19 233/11 233/19 233/21 <b>excited [2]</b> 166/9 182/13 <b>excluding [2]</b> 77/7 77/8 <b>exclusively [3]</b> 152/17 205/21 225/2 <b>executive [3]</b> 56/14 56/21 81/16 <b>exegesis [1]</b> 77/3 <b>exercise [5]</b> 17/20 54/24 59/13 211/7 239/22 <b>exercised [1]</b> 54/9 <b>exercises [2]</b> 239/19 240/4 <b>exhausted [2]</b> 26/8 26/12 <b>exhibit [1]</b> 195/9 <b>exhibits [1]</b> 130/17 <b>exist [1]</b> 82/25 <b>existed [3]</b> 96/10	135/22 142/20 <b>existence [1]</b> 213/15 <b>existing [6]</b> 44/25 53/9 62/11 141/4 195/17 195/24 <b>exit [2]</b> 29/2 29/5 <b>expand [3]</b> 58/17 101/7 221/5 <b>expanded [2]</b> 58/17 58/17 <b>expanding [1]</b> 58/22 <b>expansion [1]</b> 58/10 <b>expect [4]</b> 70/3 163/1 163/3 183/21 <b>expectation [2]</b> 194/22 224/11 <b>expected [3]</b> 154/24 162/24 224/3 <b>experience [10]</b> 28/21 91/16 130/14 139/12 153/13 164/8 177/24 178/20 180/18 182/7 <b>experienced [1]</b> 173/14 <b>experiences [2]</b> 105/12 174/15 <b>expert [5]</b> 141/10 157/17 168/22 184/18 190/10 <b>expertise [4]</b> 90/20 91/14 92/6 239/15 <b>experts [5]</b> 18/20 159/18 161/11 161/12 201/23 <b>explain [5]</b> 10/20 10/22 17/25 22/7 208/6 <b>explained [5]</b> 25/19 85/25 168/19 194/14 217/1 <b>explanation [2]</b> 107/11 233/13 <b>explicitly [2]</b> 100/13 131/24 <b>explode [1]</b> 184/14 <b>exploding [1]</b> 48/2 <b>explored [2]</b> 179/13 214/10 <b>exploring [2]</b> 123/19 228/20 <b>explosive [4]</b> 49/21 53/12 242/4 242/17 <b>exponential [14]</b> 5/24 6/16 7/1 47/1 47/24 47/25 59/8 59/9 59/19 59/22 61/21 62/10 194/18 225/19 <b>exponentially [2]</b> 53/12 231/17 <b>exponentially-growin g [1]</b> 53/12 <b>exposed [1]</b> 212/3 <b>exposition [1]</b> 57/2	<b>exposure [3]</b> 176/18 212/11 225/5 <b>exposures [6]</b> 176/17 185/25 186/11 195/2 207/23 214/2 <b>express [2]</b> 153/4 161/5 <b>expressed [8]</b> 3/6 3/21 17/1 68/8 92/8 112/4 188/20 188/22 <b>expressing [3]</b> 68/18 68/19 205/20 <b>expression [1]</b> 193/17 <b>expressions [1]</b> 190/20 <b>expressly [2]</b> 4/20 95/15 <b>extant [1]</b> 172/25 <b>extending [1]</b> 45/14 <b>extends [1]</b> 171/23 <b>extensive [5]</b> 7/12 7/22 163/23 164/13 164/23 <b>extent [21]</b> 4/5 16/24 31/4 42/15 43/24 50/3 59/20 94/6 99/8 107/3 107/8 153/10 157/15 164/5 166/22 170/15 184/17 188/22 199/12 209/18 239/21 <b>external [1]</b> 110/24 <b>externally [1]</b> 4/21 <b>extra [1]</b> 200/22 <b>extract [1]</b> 118/1 <b>extraordinarily [6]</b> 10/13 52/4 58/8 119/14 122/15 243/1 <b>extreme [5]</b> 8/6 55/2 70/22 82/18 85/12 <b>extremely [19]</b> 1/15 6/2 12/15 14/12 16/3 18/14 32/9 82/7 93/8 110/7 132/9 145/7 162/9 173/5 176/12 181/4 184/14 228/10 242/13 <b>eye [3]</b> 179/7 179/10 231/16
			<b>F</b>	
			<b>face [10]</b> 5/15 118/3 118/16 119/1 119/5 120/24 121/8 164/1 214/13 231/25 <b>face masks [1]</b> 119/5 <b>face-masks [2]</b> 119/1 121/8 <b>faced [1]</b> 123/9 <b>facilitate [1]</b> 86/21 <b>facilities [2]</b> 82/3 82/18 <b>facing [2]</b> 85/4 87/16 <b>fact [62]</b> 3/7 4/18 5/2	

<b>F</b>	79/3 110/1 116/13 118/14 135/4 137/16 143/1 145/9 170/3 213/1 222/23 <b>farms [1]</b> 84/18 <b>Farrar [1]</b> 3/4 <b>fast [11]</b> 35/11 50/25 81/17 157/14 184/14 184/25 185/8 204/18 204/23 224/5 227/19 <b>fastidious [1]</b> 228/10 <b>fatal [1]</b> 134/2 <b>fatality [2]</b> 170/3 216/15 <b>fatigue [4]</b> 23/18 24/21 24/25 25/14 <b>fatigued [4]</b> 24/4 24/5 24/15 26/9 <b>fault [2]</b> 25/23 26/6 <b>favour [1]</b> 38/23 <b>FCO [1]</b> 69/3 <b>fear [1]</b> 48/10 <b>features [1]</b> 236/25 <b>February [18]</b> 21/12 25/6 79/21 101/7 139/3 139/9 140/4 140/19 175/1 186/19 187/1 187/3 187/16 188/9 188/10 188/23 197/24 199/6 <b>February 2021 [3]</b> 139/3 139/9 140/4 <b>fed [1]</b> 111/20 <b>Federation [1]</b> 123/6 <b>feeding [1]</b> 187/25 <b>feel [12]</b> 7/22 118/18 144/23 146/20 153/9 153/11 176/2 178/18 180/19 182/20 210/24 212/25 <b>feeling [1]</b> 184/2 <b>FEHMO [1]</b> 147/7 <b>fellowships [2]</b> 151/6 151/6 <b>felt [20]</b> 2/2 5/3 63/23 108/12 108/13 108/21 111/18 111/22 113/15 114/1 160/17 164/6 164/10 169/7 179/11 203/24 206/14 213/17 213/25 231/23 <b>Fenton [1]</b> 125/7 <b>Fenton's [2]</b> 125/22 127/15 <b>Ferguson [12]</b> 1/11 1/23 1/25 2/1 2/4 2/10 2/19 3/4 4/18 160/22 201/23 202/1 <b>Ferguson's [1]</b> 3/7 <b>few [20]</b> 19/4 19/20 34/9 35/9 41/18 75/6 99/5 110/5 135/19 144/24 147/7 161/19 163/5 165/4 166/14	168/18 194/3 210/24 215/6 235/5 <b>few weeks [1]</b> 165/4 <b>FFP3 [3]</b> 218/1 226/4 232/5 <b>FFP3s [1]</b> 222/14 <b>field [2]</b> 181/4 184/21 <b>fighting [1]</b> 197/14 <b>figure [4]</b> 8/19 194/13 194/17 194/22 <b>figures [6]</b> 44/24 44/24 46/18 55/14 60/4 212/25 <b>final [22]</b> 40/22 40/25 44/3 44/12 45/1 45/5 48/1 50/12 54/4 56/24 62/22 89/6 97/2 109/14 128/24 148/10 163/17 198/4 225/12 229/18 231/8 231/10 <b>finally [12]</b> 39/17 74/19 79/20 84/8 86/3 102/22 161/16 162/23 211/1 213/4 226/16 237/15 <b>financial [7]</b> 145/2 145/5 147/12 208/10 238/9 238/14 239/12 <b>financially [1]</b> 148/13 <b>find [5]</b> 37/21 107/6 118/25 165/19 184/16 <b>finding [1]</b> 77/25 <b>fine [6]</b> 18/9 215/11 215/24 221/10 231/21 239/10 <b>finish [2]</b> 143/24 230/5 <b>finished [1]</b> 227/7 <b>finite [1]</b> 193/21 <b>firebreak [1]</b> 107/24 <b>firm [1]</b> 73/14 <b>firmly [5]</b> 23/15 25/9 28/1 38/20 63/16 <b>first [76]</b> 8/15 8/25 11/11 11/21 11/25 13/15 15/11 24/12 26/1 27/11 27/13 27/23 27/24 28/4 37/18 41/12 46/11 54/19 57/9 57/14 57/16 58/6 61/3 67/16 73/10 87/15 95/6 95/13 97/16 99/4 99/14 99/21 99/24 101/16 101/20 103/1 103/6 105/23 106/13 109/17 115/11 115/17 115/22 116/2 118/8 123/13 125/21 131/4 131/11 131/14 132/12 141/3 141/24 144/6 154/5 165/3 166/1 170/1 176/13 177/13 181/25 182/19 190/23	210/9 211/5 213/14 216/24 217/14 217/14 226/21 230/4 235/1 235/11 236/2 237/7 237/12 <b>First Minister [1]</b> 235/1 <b>firstly [15]</b> 14/25 19/1 20/21 31/18 47/8 48/13 99/7 116/21 134/9 145/4 152/22 166/18 178/1 191/22 217/23 <b>fits [1]</b> 129/16 <b>five [5]</b> 48/21 185/6 186/4 195/4 232/19 <b>five days [1]</b> 185/6 <b>five minutes [1]</b> 232/19 <b>fix [1]</b> 81/19 <b>fixed [1]</b> 59/4 <b>flagged [1]</b> 224/15 <b>flagging [2]</b> 166/12 219/21 <b>flavour [2]</b> 54/25 173/13 <b>flawed [2]</b> 15/25 18/19 <b>flexible [1]</b> 221/25 <b>flight [2]</b> 175/10 175/14 <b>flights [1]</b> 86/11 <b>Fliss [1]</b> 100/19 <b>flood [1]</b> 58/21 <b>flow [2]</b> 102/8 212/22 <b>flowed [1]</b> 103/12 <b>flows [4]</b> 2/23 106/9 106/13 109/14 <b>flu [3]</b> 151/17 160/21 184/4 <b>fluid [1]</b> 192/7 <b>fly [1]</b> 94/1 <b>flying [1]</b> 201/1 <b>focus [11]</b> 42/13 46/5 99/4 99/10 105/24 115/10 123/13 157/13 170/11 191/16 208/4 <b>focused [6]</b> 15/16 58/13 105/16 197/13 198/11 209/14 <b>focusing [5]</b> 99/7 99/19 105/2 165/3 198/14 <b>fold [2]</b> 55/7 57/3 <b>follow [9]</b> 15/22 83/13 83/23 88/8 96/6 98/16 121/19 141/5 216/24 <b>follow-up [1]</b> 98/16 <b>followed [2]</b> 133/8 139/24 <b>following [4]</b> 3/5 39/22 69/2 162/2 <b>follows [2]</b> 105/5	130/9 <b>foolish [1]</b> 21/23 <b>foolishly [1]</b> 25/4 <b>footage [1]</b> 178/17 <b>football [3]</b> 86/7 166/10 200/25 <b>football's [1]</b> 200/13 <b>foothills [1]</b> 74/18 <b>footing [1]</b> 99/9 <b>footprint [3]</b> 58/11 58/16 60/3 <b>force [8]</b> 8/10 9/10 32/2 32/7 51/21 51/24 74/6 75/2 <b>forcefully [1]</b> 43/9 <b>foreseeable [1]</b> 239/13 <b>forever [2]</b> 42/6 198/9 <b>forget [1]</b> 173/25 <b>forgotten [1]</b> 193/25 <b>form [3]</b> 7/18 44/18 66/22 <b>formal [4]</b> 91/24 141/6 205/16 236/3 <b>formally [1]</b> 215/6 <b>forming [1]</b> 9/22 <b>formulated [1]</b> 115/14 <b>forth [5]</b> 41/4 56/17 193/9 201/5 204/8 <b>fortnight [1]</b> 191/16 <b>fortunate [1]</b> 238/20 <b>fortunately [1]</b> 29/5 <b>forum [1]</b> 235/10 <b>forward [8]</b> 31/23 56/11 80/4 112/7 144/23 166/7 184/20 184/20 <b>forwarded [5]</b> 165/11 165/13 165/17 165/23 167/16 <b>forwards [2]</b> 55/8 160/5 <b>found [4]</b> 27/17 50/19 51/5 150/24 <b>foundations [1]</b> 26/13 <b>four [28]</b> 4/8 33/25 48/20 58/2 98/3 98/13 102/2 106/16 106/23 107/1 107/25 108/12 109/7 110/13 116/14 130/5 152/21 158/4 195/11 229/22 230/2 230/3 230/8 230/8 232/22 232/24 236/19 236/21 <b>four days [3]</b> 4/8 152/21 195/11 <b>four nations [11]</b> 98/3 106/23 108/12 109/7 158/4 229/22 230/3 230/8 230/8
----------	---	---	---	--

<b>F</b>	<b>Féin [1]</b> 88/24	57/9 57/17 60/12 72/3 79/15 79/15 84/25 85/12 85/21 89/22 90/3 91/16 103/4 106/8 109/1 116/10 116/13 118/4 119/3 119/16 119/18 120/9 126/13 129/5 129/19 130/13 136/23 144/7 145/24 147/3 162/1 166/8 173/11 175/16 176/15 181/16 181/17 183/18 184/15 184/24 186/2 196/21 202/18 202/25 203/2 203/4 205/2 210/23 212/6 212/11 220/6 241/8	<b>GMO [1]</b> 115/12 <b>go [65]</b> 8/2 12/1 18/8 18/18 18/21 19/14 23/13 29/1 29/21 30/7 31/11 32/8 35/20 53/13 53/14 53/14 55/9 55/9 55/22 67/4 67/18 77/3 80/3 81/17 84/10 86/1 86/15 102/11 103/4 106/4 109/16 111/3 112/1 123/23 134/20 137/10 137/17 137/19 141/3 143/4 158/7 158/10 158/11 159/4 165/4 170/19 174/9 176/24 192/17 199/12 202/21 204/18 204/23 205/2 206/20 207/1 207/22 208/16 212/15 217/20 218/2 223/13 232/12 233/7 239/18 <b>go-to [1]</b> 199/12 <b>goal [10]</b> 7/14 10/6 10/12 15/20 22/4 22/7 22/21 23/2 23/7 23/12 <b>goes [11]</b> 5/13 36/11 36/12 36/13 46/24 69/15 75/9 75/19 75/22 216/23 236/18 <b>going [138]</b> 4/13 6/18 7/2 7/17 12/17 13/18 14/10 14/11 17/10 21/5 21/19 23/9 24/15 30/8 30/19 30/22 31/1 31/25 37/20 38/1 38/14 39/1 39/3 39/6 39/11 39/13 39/20 42/6 42/10 42/20 43/8 44/21 45/13 45/20 46/24 48/1 48/21 51/11 51/22 52/1 52/2 52/22 52/24 53/2 54/5 54/23 57/9 57/14 57/17 59/1 59/9 59/11 59/11 62/22 63/14 64/19 67/4 67/16 67/19 67/25 68/13 68/16 71/22 75/16 78/25 81/4 84/10 86/4 87/12 88/24 90/16 91/4 93/4 96/2 98/21 103/23 106/3 106/19 111/9 112/19 112/21 113/5 113/10 114/3 118/21 119/11 119/13 120/19 122/22 123/12 125/24 127/1 128/1 130/1 130/4 130/6 131/16 133/21 134/21 136/10 137/10 138/22 139/14 143/1 143/17 144/10 149/25 156/15 158/11 166/13 166/13	168/19 170/9 175/17 178/9 179/18 183/17 188/1 189/23 190/18 196/21 197/16 197/17 201/9 201/14 201/16 201/17 201/18 205/23 207/1 209/8 214/23 220/6 229/17 231/17 232/12 238/25 241/9 <b>gone [8]</b> 29/4 45/15 50/18 79/23 128/9 191/5 191/5 226/8 <b>good [32]</b> 1/6 1/7 20/22 23/6 26/20 33/18 49/2 51/11 51/18 51/18 89/8 91/12 98/24 106/22 112/20 118/5 121/21 122/12 123/4 124/13 125/20 144/21 167/6 168/12 169/10 169/19 173/1 221/23 232/16 232/17 238/16 241/12 <b>Google [1]</b> 24/21 <b>got [58]</b> 6/8 12/7 16/11 16/16 17/7 18/14 19/9 19/11 32/6 39/16 43/15 50/17 50/20 53/15 58/3 65/8 65/13 66/6 67/5 67/24 68/1 69/18 71/6 73/6 82/7 90/12 90/14 90/15 90/19 98/11 99/5 102/15 102/19 103/9 103/25 106/6 106/24 110/8 125/17 137/3 137/17 143/4 156/16 162/23 170/17 171/3 173/21 184/1 185/9 196/5 200/9 209/6 211/16 220/4 223/8 226/22 226/23 230/4 <b>Gove [6]</b> 232/22 233/10 233/14 234/24 235/12 237/1 <b>Gove's [1]</b> 234/5 <b>government [99]</b> 1/21 4/16 4/22 5/1 7/14 10/19 16/23 20/1 20/4 20/11 20/14 21/9 21/24 22/15 22/22 23/22 26/4 32/18 34/18 37/4 42/18 42/21 44/6 45/2 47/19 48/9 49/25 54/6 56/2 56/18 60/1 60/15 64/23 65/2 66/15 68/9 72/10 74/24 75/20 76/2 76/9 76/23 84/20 93/20 100/8 100/25 102/4 102/5 102/14 102/19 103/4 104/12 107/19 108/15 114/9
<b>four nations... [2]</b> 236/19 236/21 <b>fraction [1]</b> 175/20 <b>fragmentation [1]</b> 206/7 <b>frame [1]</b> 206/11 <b>framed [1]</b> 46/4 <b>framework [1]</b> 31/16 <b>framing [2]</b> 58/19 127/24 <b>France [1]</b> 190/16 <b>frank [4]</b> 103/17 108/15 110/14 153/23 <b>frankly [4]</b> 9/13 22/9 24/8 61/25 <b>free [1]</b> 212/22 <b>freeloaders [1]</b> 39/12 <b>frequently [1]</b> 143/18 <b>Friedman [5]</b> 130/1 130/3 135/15 241/20 244/11 <b>friend [1]</b> 105/8 <b>friends [3]</b> 164/7 164/22 181/20 <b>front [3]</b> 61/1 62/7 156/5 <b>fruity [1]</b> 185/24 <b>frustration [1]</b> 237/5 <b>full [19]</b> 16/1 32/5 35/21 37/17 63/2 91/8 91/9 91/19 91/21 97/11 128/11 150/4 150/11 152/19 153/23 170/15 192/9 218/3 225/8 <b>fully [10]</b> 7/3 72/11 82/23 109/11 124/15 128/16 138/12 176/24 202/23 212/21 <b>function [5]</b> 33/16 57/10 57/18 109/6 220/19 <b>functionally [1]</b> 153/2 <b>functions [1]</b> 6/10 <b>further [32]</b> 3/8 5/5 9/7 10/20 30/21 30/25 31/19 31/20 34/23 40/11 44/2 51/14 51/25 55/10 55/23 99/16 115/1 123/23 184/20 184/20 191/23 191/24 192/16 196/23 199/9 199/9 204/25 208/6 212/11 228/5 242/1 244/19 <b>future [14]</b> 112/17 115/5 115/11 125/2 125/2 148/11 148/12 163/12 172/23 173/2 173/11 173/15 193/15 194/23	<b>G</b> <b>galvanised [1]</b> 190/1 <b>game [2]</b> 41/6 202/22 <b>game-changer [1]</b> 41/6 <b>games [1]</b> 202/19 <b>gap [2]</b> 139/25 224/17 <b>garner [1]</b> 159/17 <b>gather [2]</b> 168/22 233/15 <b>gathering [3]</b> 86/6 202/25 203/5 <b>gatherings [15]</b> 86/4 86/5 87/2 111/25 112/1 112/5 112/22 113/16 114/19 199/2 199/16 199/20 200/11 200/20 201/25 <b>gatherings -- and [1]</b> 112/22 <b>gauge [1]</b> 92/25 <b>gave [15]</b> 22/15 28/1 55/14 94/18 96/15 107/15 114/18 117/19 122/10 153/11 153/12 153/13 155/12 209/1 236/22 <b>Gavin [1]</b> 167/13 <b>general [25]</b> 4/2 18/12 21/24 24/24 25/1 38/21 45/3 58/23 73/9 78/13 82/7 86/16 89/18 101/11 113/21 118/15 120/24 146/5 148/9 180/18 203/18 207/8 209/16 219/8 225/3 <b>generally [2]</b> 83/9 207/10 <b>generates [1]</b> 203/7 <b>generically [1]</b> 11/5 <b>genomic [2]</b> 168/1 168/21 <b>genuinely [3]</b> 18/8 170/23 181/21 <b>geographical [6]</b> 90/8 90/12 91/16 105/10 172/1 209/9 <b>geographically [1]</b> 78/22 <b>Germany [1]</b> 73/10 <b>get [87]</b> 4/23 4/25 7/10 7/19 7/22 8/8 8/9 8/14 11/3 11/24 15/9 21/17 24/1 24/22 31/13 31/25 32/3 32/4 32/9 35/12 38/3 38/10 38/13 45/9 45/16 45/17 46/6 47/4 47/16 49/3 49/23 51/25 53/15 53/24 54/25	79/15 79/15 84/25 85/12 85/21 89/22 90/3 91/16 103/4 106/8 109/1 116/10 116/13 118/4 119/3 119/16 119/18 120/9 126/13 129/5 129/19 130/13 136/23 144/7 145/24 147/3 162/1 166/8 173/11 175/16 176/15 181/16 181/17 183/18 184/15 184/24 186/2 196/21 202/18 202/25 203/2 203/4 205/2 210/23 212/6 212/11 220/6 241/8 <b>gets [2]</b> 107/5 242/8 <b>getting [27]</b> 3/16 6/4 6/11 7/1 15/3 45/20 46/12 51/6 71/23 81/5 91/3 106/13 112/15 115/18 115/23 115/24 116/4 116/4 116/8 126/7 134/23 148/6 157/5 157/13 182/13 187/19 206/15 <b>Ghebreyesus [1]</b> 142/3 <b>give [28]</b> 28/7 81/13 85/21 106/3 107/20 108/9 108/24 109/25 119/10 125/20 130/17 147/23 149/9 150/3 155/10 164/9 173/13 177/1 196/9 196/11 196/18 211/8 214/5 215/13 231/6 231/6 232/1 242/15 <b>given [43]</b> 1/10 2/2 51/14 51/16 51/17 53/21 61/13 61/23 64/6 65/9 81/23 90/20 96/25 102/22 105/9 108/5 108/8 108/17 113/19 117/2 117/17 121/24 123/18 125/16 126/21 126/21 130/18 134/1 138/16 138/23 145/17 146/9 146/24 153/7 182/6 184/21 193/18 196/6 199/15 202/24 235/22 239/4 240/17 <b>gives [2]</b> 164/25 170/10 <b>giving [10]</b> 95/15 104/4 107/10 127/22 131/21 139/16 154/12 194/20 204/6 205/12 <b>glean [1]</b> 113/24 <b>global [1]</b> 155/25 <b>globally [1]</b> 185/14 <b>glossy [1]</b> 197/15		

<p><b>G</b></p> <p><b>government... [44]</b>  115/11 115/12 145/8  147/19 152/2 152/19  153/2 153/9 153/22  154/13 155/16 155/18  156/2 157/2 157/4  157/9 158/18 159/17  182/7 183/9 183/18  186/17 187/5 187/17  187/25 194/15 195/22  197/17 198/7 198/9  199/10 203/19 203/20  204/5 204/11 204/11  205/13 206/15 209/20  233/16 236/22 237/11  239/3 239/20</p> <p><b>governmental [1]</b>  209/16</p> <p><b>governments [1]</b>  236/24</p> <p><b>grade [1]</b> 239/9</p> <p><b>gradual [2]</b> 17/9  72/23</p> <p><b>gradually [3]</b> 9/9 9/10  72/19</p> <p><b>granted [1]</b> 117/24</p> <p><b>grappling [1]</b> 194/15</p> <p><b>grateful [5]</b> 144/16  162/18 232/9 243/10  243/15</p> <p><b>gravitated [1]</b> 150/21</p> <p><b>great [15]</b> 13/22  15/14 15/23 18/18  30/16 38/25 56/22  93/18 95/10 141/19  155/12 158/3 164/5  174/8 181/20</p> <p><b>Great Britain [2]</b>  93/18 95/10</p> <p><b>greater [10]</b> 16/24  47/10 51/23 66/13  93/10 106/20 110/10  113/15 132/24 183/7</p> <p><b>greatest [1]</b> 127/21</p> <p><b>Gregor [3]</b> 73/7  114/12 120/21</p> <p><b>Gregor Smith [1]</b>  73/7</p> <p><b>Gregor's [1]</b> 121/11</p> <p><b>groan [1]</b> 199/4</p> <p><b>ground [1]</b> 206/19</p> <p><b>group [25]</b> 10/1  16/10 19/2 55/11  56/12 67/21 90/15  92/1 101/5 103/10  103/18 116/24 117/14  129/4 132/1 164/10  211/3 215/3 216/9  229/23 230/2 230/6  230/8 230/11 240/17</p> <p><b>groups [26]</b> 45/20  103/9 104/17 123/21</p>	<p>125/9 127/13 128/4  128/6 128/14 129/1  129/16 130/13 130/23  130/24 130/25 131/11  131/12 131/20 131/22  131/24 131/24 132/9  134/24 135/20 160/25  161/2</p> <p><b>growing [2]</b> 53/12  224/5</p> <p><b>growth [15]</b> 5/24  6/16 7/1 47/1 47/24  47/25 54/9 59/8 59/9  59/19 59/22 62/10  64/19 192/5 194/18</p> <p><b>guarantee [1]</b> 175/14</p> <p><b>guess [3]</b> 150/20  167/8 242/6</p> <p><b>guidance [15]</b> 102/3  103/3 122/10 137/21  217/4 217/7 217/17  218/7 219/1 222/10  222/19 222/19 225/24  226/3 231/23</p> <p><b>gut [1]</b> 212/25</p> <p><b>H</b></p> <p><b>H5N1 [2]</b> 176/3 177/7</p> <p><b>had [209]</b> 1/16 1/19  1/23 2/19 5/14 6/19  6/21 8/10 8/12 8/17  8/20 9/15 10/14 11/22  12/15 12/23 15/23  16/15 18/5 18/24 19/7  19/17 19/19 21/4  25/15 25/16 25/19  27/8 27/15 28/24  29/25 30/1 30/18  31/20 31/22 31/23  32/2 32/7 32/15 33/13  34/12 34/20 35/5 35/5  35/22 36/9 37/22 39/9  41/10 41/11 42/16  42/21 45/16 45/22  47/16 47/24 49/1 49/4  49/5 49/8 49/14 49/17  49/25 52/17 52/20  53/22 53/24 54/7  55/16 56/3 59/1 63/25  64/10 65/2 65/8 65/16  65/17 65/18 66/1 66/7  66/13 66/15 68/9  68/19 69/17 70/11  76/23 76/23 77/24  79/23 84/17 84/20  85/2 85/7 87/3 87/6  87/22 89/5 90/15 91/9  91/24 93/8 97/6 97/8  98/4 98/22 100/21  100/22 102/4 102/11  102/16 102/21 103/4  103/16 104/15 104/20  106/12 106/14 107/16  107/22 107/23 107/24</p>	<p>108/17 108/25 109/9  110/14 114/3 114/6  121/2 121/17 121/24  122/13 122/17 126/16  130/14 130/24 131/21  132/22 134/14 137/21  137/23 137/25 138/15  138/19 139/3 139/15  140/5 140/9 140/10  140/25 141/13 142/3  143/25 144/5 144/17  146/5 147/14 157/2  158/9 160/17 160/24  161/24 164/7 164/21  164/24 165/7 165/13  165/16 165/23 167/24  168/1 169/5 177/6  179/2 180/23 185/4  186/20 187/3 188/13  189/24 190/8 190/19  190/24 194/3 194/4  195/24 196/4 197/14  198/2 198/11 208/16  208/20 209/24 210/12  210/14 210/15 211/10  212/21 214/4 217/20  223/16 226/17 226/18  227/25 228/12 238/21  239/7 240/3 240/9</p> <p><b>hadn't [7]</b> 20/23  32/20 37/23 49/12  50/20 149/3 168/9</p> <p><b>half [8]</b> 9/15 17/3  21/4 47/4 146/14  166/11 186/19 187/1  187/1</p> <p><b>half term [2]</b> 186/19  187/1</p> <p><b>Halpern [1]</b> 146/25</p> <p><b>halving [2]</b> 45/17  52/24</p> <p><b>Hancock [4]</b> 112/13  112/13 113/2 113/11</p> <p><b>hand [3]</b> 186/8 187/9  197/7</p> <p><b>handed [1]</b> 239/7</p> <p><b>handful [1]</b> 123/7</p> <p><b>handling [4]</b> 221/15  221/18 224/19 232/25</p> <p><b>handwritten [1]</b>  136/4</p> <p><b>hang [1]</b> 120/18</p> <p><b>happen [19]</b> 17/2  17/6 17/11 17/25 22/8  23/10 53/2 56/10 57/8  57/14 81/23 124/14  153/24 158/17 160/16  177/11 207/10 208/3  236/22</p> <p><b>happened [20]</b> 14/21  31/17 35/9 37/18 38/2  48/14 50/7 79/18  85/19 91/11 104/24  107/12 121/18 125/19  162/24 163/7 185/21</p>	<p>220/3 229/16 236/4</p> <p><b>happening [12]</b>  24/18 43/10 74/20  76/1 76/9 76/10 81/23  204/10 204/10 223/24  231/18 233/21</p> <p><b>happenings [1]</b>  154/25</p> <p><b>happens [5]</b> 34/21  45/10 167/5 231/16  238/7</p> <p><b>happy [5]</b> 3/11 68/14  106/4 111/22 215/9</p> <p><b>hard [11]</b> 19/22 53/14  118/4 119/9 120/7  120/8 120/11 157/13  193/10 193/11 193/17</p> <p><b>harder [4]</b> 51/25  51/25 53/15 104/25</p> <p><b>Harding [1]</b> 146/17</p> <p><b>harm [3]</b> 133/11  133/11 203/22</p> <p><b>harms [2]</b> 110/9  110/11</p> <p><b>Harries [1]</b> 241/25</p> <p><b>harsh [2]</b> 129/24  130/1</p> <p><b>has [61]</b> 1/10 7/12  10/4 16/19 17/15  25/23 37/7 37/13  53/21 62/6 73/9 73/11  82/23 88/20 89/24  91/5 91/13 92/20  93/20 98/10 101/23  105/14 107/9 112/22  115/2 135/2 144/17  149/8 150/23 152/1  152/7 162/10 163/22  168/1 173/4 174/16  175/8 177/9 178/22  183/24 184/11 186/22  187/12 192/7 192/15  192/19 193/2 193/14  194/14 198/6 199/19  202/20 222/5 224/13  226/25 231/2 235/6  235/22 241/20 241/22  242/14</p> <p><b>hateful [2]</b> 162/9  162/14</p> <p><b>have [386]</b></p> <p><b>haven't [1]</b> 78/1</p> <p><b>having [41]</b> 18/4  19/14 23/16 33/17  43/5 46/7 50/14 52/10  53/10 53/11 57/25  73/19 78/18 80/1  101/9 109/6 114/12  118/4 118/11 120/11  120/11 122/4 135/10  139/12 139/12 147/23  153/15 163/2 164/16  167/10 169/1 186/17  186/18 187/4 188/20</p>	<p>188/21 196/13 226/8  227/16 234/7 238/1</p> <p><b>HCID [28]</b> 81/9 83/8  83/13 215/5 216/18  218/22 218/23 218/24  218/25 219/2 219/5  219/16 219/21 220/10  220/14 220/23 221/16  221/25 222/13 222/18  225/8 225/17 226/12  226/18 226/20 229/22  229/25 230/11</p> <p><b>HCIDs [5]</b> 68/2  218/14 221/20 223/16  224/19</p> <p><b>HDR [1]</b> 117/12</p> <p><b>HDR UK [1]</b> 117/12</p> <p><b>he [57]</b> 1/14 1/16  1/17 1/18 1/19 2/6  2/13 2/15 2/16 3/1  16/8 16/10 16/11  23/23 23/23 37/1  63/25 64/6 64/6 64/7  87/22 87/23 90/10  91/8 91/12 91/20  99/21 101/22 101/24  102/14 102/17 102/21  103/1 112/16 112/19  112/21 113/12 117/14  117/19 117/20 118/13  138/15 139/14 139/14  140/9 140/10 140/11  147/24 158/12 172/8  174/8 182/3 182/8  183/14 187/12 234/8  238/1</p> <p><b>he'd [2]</b> 36/23 140/24</p> <p><b>he's [4]</b> 91/23 200/9  238/3 241/19</p> <p><b>head [6]</b> 6/18 84/7  117/12 137/23 151/10  229/23</p> <p><b>headed [2]</b> 71/13  225/13</p> <p><b>heading [1]</b> 6/22</p> <p><b>health [72]</b> 31/12  40/15 40/17 40/21  41/4 44/12 46/1 52/14  57/12 64/11 64/22  65/1 65/5 65/6 65/6  66/20 69/11 69/23  81/15 82/14 83/2  93/19 94/9 94/10  99/21 110/20 113/3  123/16 123/19 124/4  127/8 127/18 127/21  133/20 137/21 137/22  138/13 138/21 142/22  146/17 148/18 148/21  150/15 150/23 151/10  152/4 152/25 153/1  154/20 155/3 155/3  155/13 155/24 155/25  161/11 161/12 166/7</p>
---	---	--	--	--

<b>H</b>	105/15 107/10	140/13 141/1 174/7	<b>hospitality [4]</b> 33/12	<b>I</b>
<b>health...</b> [15] 167/18	<b>her [1]</b> 105/18	234/9 235/25 238/1	35/3 36/6 86/12	<b>I absolutely [1]</b> 179/7
173/7 178/13 202/6	<b>herd [33]</b> 7/5 7/11	238/4	<b>hospitals [4]</b> 58/23	<b>I accept [1]</b> 129/15
203/22 214/13 218/7	7/13 8/4 8/21 8/23	<b>himself [5]</b> 136/8	78/3 79/13 213/2	<b>I act [1]</b> 123/5
230/18 230/21 230/21	8/24 9/1 9/3 9/5 10/4	137/5 138/7 138/19	<b>host [2]</b> 176/22	<b>I actually [4]</b> 19/2
230/22 230/22 231/23	10/17 10/22 11/1	140/8	176/23	58/19 118/17 238/12
240/6 242/16	11/15 11/16 11/24	<b>hindsight [6]</b> 36/2	<b>hotspot [2]</b> 86/21	<b>I again [1]</b> 44/22
<b>Health Secretary [1]</b>	14/16 15/5 15/19	36/17 80/11 128/2	201/2	<b>I agree [2]</b> 92/10
113/3	16/20 16/24 17/8	189/7 202/7	<b>hotspots [2]</b> 86/14	127/11
<b>healthcare [11]</b>	17/14 17/16 19/12	<b>his [22]</b> 1/16 1/19	201/2	<b>I also [2]</b> 25/20 37/16
123/6 128/5 130/11	20/5 20/9 20/15 21/14	36/25 63/6 64/5 88/14	<b>hour [2]</b> 21/4 126/21	<b>I always [1]</b> 13/11
130/22 171/25 214/24	21/20 22/4 22/24	90/12 91/14 112/9	<b>hour's [1]</b> 126/21	<b>I am [6]</b> 117/21 130/2
214/25 225/2 231/13	<b>herd immunity [31]</b>	117/23 120/7 136/1	<b>hours [1]</b> 162/20	166/13 166/13 166/14
231/17 232/4	7/5 7/11 7/13 8/4 8/21	137/6 172/5 180/23	<b>house [1]</b> 238/23	230/10
<b>hear [7]</b> 111/20	8/23 8/24 9/1 9/3 9/5	182/7 183/7 183/14	<b>household [2]</b> 194/7	<b>I and [1]</b> 146/16
214/11 236/4 236/15	10/4 10/17 10/22 11/1	232/22 239/4 239/4	194/9	<b>I appear [1]</b> 111/14
237/2 237/3 237/15	11/15 11/16 11/24	241/22	<b>households [3]</b>	<b>I appreciate [2]</b>
<b>heard [23]</b> 81/7 91/5	14/16 15/5 16/20	<b>historical [1]</b> 186/11	33/16 33/18 210/17	112/25 232/8
99/13 105/9 105/14	16/24 17/8 17/14	<b>historically [1]</b> 241/5	<b>how [70]</b> 2/16 2/23	<b>I are [1]</b> 181/20
111/25 115/16 115/16	17/16 19/12 20/5 20/9	<b>hit [1]</b> 27/3	4/13 4/25 5/24 7/22	<b>I ask [11]</b> 34/17
118/11 146/24 158/3	21/14 21/20 22/4	<b>HIV [1]</b> 35/7	16/24 17/2 17/17 20/6	58/12 62/5 111/24
163/22 165/14 165/24	22/24	<b>hoc [1]</b> 236/3	21/5 21/5 23/23 25/21	116/20 135/2 135/19
200/8 210/9 211/6	<b>here [26]</b> 14/23 51/2	<b>hold [5]</b> 16/22 16/23	32/20 33/20 34/7	150/3 191/7 197/23
223/1 235/9 235/25	59/17 71/14 74/22	20/7 107/13 151/5	34/13 34/17 40/4	214/19
236/16 237/4 242/23	77/13 83/20 86/9	<b>holding [1]</b> 116/16	40/17 40/20 44/5 46/4	<b>I asked [1]</b> 117/22
<b>hearing [2]</b> 68/8	86/10 115/10 120/17	<b>hole [1]</b> 196/22	53/8 54/25 55/17	<b>I assisting [1]</b> 198/5
243/22	131/23 144/5 149/9	<b>home [20]</b> 4/9 31/7	55/20 56/15 62/19	<b>I assume [1]</b> 69/18
<b>hearts [1]</b> 190/1	201/7 203/6 205/10	32/14 35/22 44/3 44/8	64/23 66/9 89/11 90/2	<b>I attended [2]</b> 160/5
<b>heat [1]</b> 172/7	221/9 222/20 223/14	45/5 107/22 112/18	92/11 92/14 104/5	161/17
<b>heated [2]</b> 146/9	224/12 230/2 230/6	165/25 179/2 191/9	104/21 116/20 119/4	<b>I became [1]</b> 151/24
239/2	230/9 231/13 241/8	192/3 194/11 238/19	131/2 134/6 135/2	<b>I been [1]</b> 210/15
<b>heatedly [1]</b> 145/8	<b>hermetically [1]</b> 13/7	240/17 241/4 241/7	137/9 143/23 146/19	<b>I believe [2]</b> 151/23
<b>Heathrow [1]</b> 175/16	<b>herself [1]</b> 136/9	242/18 242/19	151/20 154/21 163/22	208/12
<b>Heaven [9]</b> 98/22	<b>hide [1]</b> 9/21	<b>homes [9]</b> 78/2 79/13	164/9 164/9 167/6	<b>I bring [1]</b> 19/24
98/22 98/23 111/9	<b>high [35]</b> 3/6 9/8	146/4 146/4 213/2	170/16 180/13 183/8	<b>I call [1]</b> 164/22
232/14 232/15 237/22	10/13 11/3 47/2 48/15	240/14 241/8 241/9	183/25 185/10 185/16	<b>I called [1]</b> 60/24
244/8 244/17	60/13 81/9 82/6 82/7	242/4	190/14 194/16 195/12	<b>I can [29]</b> 5/17 17/3
<b>heavily [2]</b> 6/19	82/13 82/25 83/1	<b>honest [1]</b> 2/5	196/20 197/16 197/17	28/15 40/2 47/18
146/3	84/24 90/5 93/16 94/2	<b>honestly [3]</b> 112/7	197/23 214/10 216/15	63/11 63/15 76/4 77/2
<b>heavy [2]</b> 28/20	98/11 133/24 165/9	120/22 140/20	229/16 232/24 235/16	102/25 109/20 113/7
60/17	170/5 170/11 190/23	<b>Hong [2]</b> 175/11	<b>however [11]</b> 12/25	118/14 140/21 146/14
<b>heeded [2]</b> 207/11	205/3 206/21 215/4	175/13	112/21 136/15 159/22	158/12 160/20 175/14
209/18	216/4 216/10 219/22	<b>Hong Kong [2]</b>	172/9 175/2 203/3	196/9 200/21 201/22
<b>heightened [1]</b> 172/9	219/22 220/11 221/2	175/11 175/13	203/4 204/15 229/5	205/9 213/16 217/6
<b>held [5]</b> 8/18 36/6	223/17 236/14 240/22	<b>honorary [1]</b> 151/6	235/4	220/10 223/21 231/22
63/23 151/9 236/12	<b>high-consequence</b>	<b>hope [5]</b> 35/1 74/16	<b>HSE [3]</b> 81/15 83/21	233/2 238/6
<b>help [15]</b> 23/16 63/1	<b>[2]</b> 82/6 82/25	122/5 194/22 196/6	223/8	<b>I can't [30]</b> 92/17
126/13 140/8 142/22	<b>higher [12]</b> 5/22	<b>hopefully [2]</b> 33/8	<b>hubristic [1]</b> 41/14	119/4 120/22 121/15
144/6 144/7 144/10	10/23 12/7 39/2 74/15	144/10	<b>huge [4]</b> 12/17 32/17	130/25 131/22 139/21
149/12 201/14 201/15	128/4 132/15 145/19	<b>hoping [1]</b> 38/2	57/12 132/19	140/6 140/22 156/13
210/4 210/16 225/24	208/10 208/17 215/16	<b>hopping [1]</b> 66/25	<b>hugely [2]</b> 66/13	156/14 158/10 178/5
226/25	215/20	<b>horrendous [1]</b>	157/19	184/8 188/4 188/12
<b>helped [2]</b> 18/15 97/3	<b>highest [2]</b> 145/17	162/19	<b>human [8]</b> 23/24	196/18 197/1 212/14
<b>helpful [11]</b> 18/2	231/18	<b>hospital [8]</b> 58/11	69/12 69/12 85/4 94/9	212/24 213/14 214/5
22/13 72/4 114/21	<b>highlight [1]</b> 71/22	116/15 118/11 170/7	177/19 177/19 185/19	224/1 230/10 231/4
126/16 142/19 188/6	<b>highlighted [1]</b>	170/24 186/2 191/2	<b>humans [3]</b> 176/7	232/1 233/7 234/11
235/4 236/13 236/21	146/18	195/7	176/14 176/16	237/19 242/15
240/9	<b>highlighting [4]</b> 64/2	<b>hospitalisation [4]</b>	<b>hundreds [3]</b> 24/23	<b>I cannot [1]</b> 121/5
<b>helpfully [2]</b> 217/1	71/4 72/2 74/24	11/9 13/1 170/5	81/22 186/23	<b>I certainly [3]</b> 108/13
217/20	<b>highly [5]</b> 74/16	170/12	<b>hurry [2]</b> 41/21	113/10 188/15
<b>helping [2]</b> 9/23	90/22 115/21 121/5	<b>hospitalisations [3]</b>	185/10	<b>I check [1]</b> 235/11
124/14	129/3	171/3 185/23 186/10	<b>hyperbolic [1]</b> 4/1	<b>I clearly [1]</b> 151/25
<b>Henderson [2]</b>	<b>him [11]</b> 138/4	<b>hospitalised [3]</b>		<b>I come [1]</b> 47/12
	139/16 139/17 140/3	170/14 171/5 224/6		

<b>I</b>	213/25	<b>I maintain [1]</b> 67/6	<b>I say [2]</b> 36/22 138/6	160/25 165/24 178/7
<b>I commissioned [1]</b> 137/24	<b>I finally [1]</b> 86/3	<b>I make [2]</b> 6/25 161/4	<b>I see [3]</b> 114/17	182/5 182/9 182/10
<b>I completely [4]</b> 4/15 124/2 125/4 125/13	<b>I first [1]</b> 213/14	<b>I may [17]</b> 10/21	166/5 228/2	182/13 183/21 188/12
<b>I consider [3]</b> 29/8 36/22 102/7	<b>I forwarded [1]</b> 165/23	99/11 117/6 117/10	<b>I sent [1]</b> 140/15	188/12 197/13 197/16
<b>I considered [3]</b> 16/5 38/5 76/11	<b>I found [1]</b> 150/24	155/18 156/16 158/14	<b>I shall [2]</b> 67/8	198/11 198/14 198/16
<b>I could [3]</b> 14/2 117/1 125/21	<b>I fully [3]</b> 72/11	162/16 163/15 166/17	198/21	205/15 212/13 219/21
<b>I couldn't [3]</b> 65/10 162/3 212/17	109/11 124/15	182/3 182/23 187/2	<b>I slightly [1]</b> 36/1	221/14 233/22 237/18
<b>I deeply [1]</b> 162/18	<b>I gather [1]</b> 168/22	217/5 226/11 232/20	<b>I spent [1]</b> 8/22	<b>I wasn't [6]</b> 134/9
<b>I definitely [2]</b> 22/11 235/13	<b>I gave [1]</b> 28/1	234/1	<b>I spoke [1]</b> 112/14	161/5 161/14 162/2
<b>I delve [1]</b> 123/12	<b>I genuinely [1]</b> 181/21	<b>I mean [24]</b> 11/11	<b>I started [1]</b> 150/20	216/5 232/12
<b>I detain [1]</b> 241/18	<b>I go [3]</b> 123/23	17/4 23/4 24/7 37/15	<b>I stated [1]</b> 21/8	<b>I went [3]</b> 118/12
<b>I detect [1]</b> 199/4	158/10 207/22	41/8 41/9 49/12 51/20	<b>I stayed [1]</b> 114/6	156/17 212/16
<b>I did [13]</b> 2/7 10/10 69/20 125/5 125/5	<b>I got [1]</b> 137/3	62/13 64/5 80/3 92/17	<b>I still [2]</b> 114/24	<b>I were [2]</b> 142/6
131/9 136/12 138/24	<b>I guess [3]</b> 150/20	121/15 141/2 143/15	138/9	147/25
152/18 163/1 163/2 179/25 237/3	167/8 242/6	146/14 148/8 165/17	<b>I stopped [1]</b> 25/20	<b>I will [8]</b> 69/5 114/10
<b>I didn't [11]</b> 2/6 113/18 114/10 140/17	<b>I had [17]</b> 25/19	199/19 212/24 227/4	<b>I subsequently [1]</b> 1/25	117/17 123/1 188/14
147/3 180/18 182/8	103/16 108/17 114/3	230/9 232/2	<b>I suppose [1]</b> 207/12	197/1 232/19 239/1
183/20 187/25 204/16 234/12	114/6 121/17 130/24	<b>I meant [1]</b> 160/14	<b>I take [3]</b> 31/10 139/2	<b>I wish [1]</b> 40/2
<b>I directed [1]</b> 238/8	131/21 160/24 164/21	<b>I meet [1]</b> 162/17	220/8	<b>I won't [4]</b> 101/18
<b>I do [18]</b> 7/24 18/7 42/13 66/17 68/12	165/23 169/5 179/2	<b>I might [4]</b> 159/20	<b>I talked [1]</b> 31/12	123/7 218/2 229/24
90/14 92/10 123/23	188/13 197/14 227/25	162/23 162/24 188/14	<b>I thank you [1]</b> 124/20	<b>I wonder [2]</b> 112/11
124/16 137/13 148/18	240/9	<b>I misread [1]</b> 227/3	<b>I then [1]</b> 139/23	121/19
153/15 153/17 183/14	<b>I have [18]</b> 67/24	<b>I moved [2]</b> 157/3	<b>I think [281]</b>	<b>I would [39]</b> 27/23
189/22 235/4 236/9 237/6	104/11 127/1 128/9	227/18	<b>I thinking [1]</b> 178/6	29/20 29/21 33/4
<b>I don't [56]</b> 2/15 6/23 17/21 18/6 18/14 22/5	146/20 150/20 152/11	<b>I must [2]</b> 42/13	<b>I thought [23]</b> 9/21	33/11 57/20 62/15
23/8 23/9 30/10 33/22	153/7 158/25 159/1	113/14	10/7 12/15 15/25 16/1	66/4 96/3 103/24
33/23 36/4 36/16 41/8	178/20 188/5 200/8	<b>I need [3]</b> 63/6 81/13	16/3 17/24 19/20	107/13 112/3 113/9
52/6 62/13 62/19	200/8 200/16 215/9	88/4	19/21 21/2 21/22	115/10 116/1 118/8
66/14 66/14 66/15	217/9 239/14	<b>I needed [2]</b> 140/18	41/15 47/14 66/5 83/5	119/20 126/20 126/21
81/3 81/12 87/5 95/7	<b>I heard [2]</b> 210/9	160/6	114/3 114/5 118/13	127/15 131/23 134/13
95/18 96/22 106/20	237/4	<b>I never [3]</b> 22/5	136/7 137/8 138/6	134/20 138/8 139/22
111/17 112/1 115/7	<b>I honestly [2]</b> 112/7	211/16 211/19	139/22 160/17	142/10 142/12 142/14
138/12 139/24 146/20	140/20	<b>I not [1]</b> 25/11	<b>I to [2]</b> 78/12 86/1	142/24 147/14 154/11
158/23 160/4 165/4	<b>I hope [1]</b> 122/5	<b>I now [3]</b> 7/5 39/22	<b>I touched [1]</b> 9/14	157/9 160/3 160/5
172/7 177/1 183/13	<b>I imagine [1]</b> 91/23	197/4	<b>I tried [5]</b> 20/16 20/19	160/6 179/16 210/21
184/9 190/18 192/4	<b>I interpreted [1]</b> 192/4	<b>I only [1]</b> 163/11	21/1 21/7 212/16	219/5 228/13
192/9 192/23 196/8	<b>I just [31]</b> 1/22 14/8	<b>I personally [1]</b> 242/14	<b>I understand [1]</b> 196/8	<b>I wouldn't [7]</b> 8/17
196/17 200/21 206/13	18/18 19/19 28/5 28/6	<b>I point [1]</b> 128/10	<b>I understood [2]</b> 182/4 211/16	43/11 48/16 96/11
218/18 222/4 223/22	32/23 40/1 73/5 82/21	<b>I pointed [1]</b> 166/9	<b>I undoubtedly [1]</b> 197/9	97/24 110/5 210/15
227/2 227/7 237/14	95/18 109/25 125/16	<b>I posed [1]</b> 117/20	<b>I want [16]</b> 1/8 3/19	<b>I writing [1]</b> 198/4
237/19 242/23	126/22 127/2 141/16	<b>I probably [1]</b> 168/14	25/16 26/6 61/8 78/15	<b>I wrote [1]</b> 178/5
<b>I entirely [1]</b> 224/3	166/6 170/10 178/1	<b>I promise [2]</b> 67/14	87/15 99/10 101/15	<b>I'd [14]</b> 7/24 25/14
<b>I ever [1]</b> 156/13	180/13 181/2 184/9	198/22	105/10 117/18 120/14	25/19 95/6 95/7 99/4
<b>I explained [1]</b> 85/25	197/20 200/22 206/16	<b>I put [3]</b> 82/5 107/11	126/23 162/5 187/7	112/7 115/22 118/7
<b>I feel [3]</b> 118/18	209/12 212/13 228/5	143/24	235/22	132/2 143/21 144/16
153/11 182/20	232/19 239/11 243/7	<b>I quote [1]</b> 97/10	<b>I wanted [8]</b> 9/21	152/22 164/22
<b>I felt [9]</b> 63/23 111/22	<b>I kind [3]</b> 31/10	<b>I raised [1]</b> 117/19	12/14 20/19 25/16	<b>I'd explained [1]</b> 25/19
113/15 114/1 160/17	156/23 224/15	<b>I read [1]</b> 96/3	41/19 139/17 139/17	<b>I'll [20]</b> 53/21 81/13
164/6 179/11 213/17	<b>I knew [5]</b> 114/7	<b>I really [3]</b> 94/4	205/10	100/13 101/21 106/11
	180/14 180/15 187/23	156/20 237/14	<b>I was [50]</b> 5/8 14/12	107/20 124/3 140/23
	187/24	<b>I recall [2]</b> 175/7	18/2 21/12 25/12	142/25 149/7 159/11
	<b>I know [8]</b> 62/20	236/7	43/19 53/1 62/22	190/18 197/17 211/8
	96/13 96/14 111/10	<b>I received [1]</b> 182/11	63/20 88/13 92/17	215/13 217/4 217/11
	143/6 156/21 200/3	<b>I recognise [1]</b> 148/9	92/25 116/25 117/9	225/12 233/7 233/24
	243/2	<b>I refer [1]</b> 201/22	122/4 129/8 130/11	<b>I'm [129]</b> 2/22 4/6 5/1
	<b>I launched [1]</b> 136/19	<b>I reflect [1]</b> 189/7	131/9 134/10 135/24	8/3 11/19 18/17 24/15
	<b>I left [1]</b> 148/1	<b>I represent [4]</b> 98/24	136/5 142/19 152/19	27/5 33/21 36/20
	<b>I literally [1]</b> 161/24	124/21 125/18 232/18	156/25 157/10 157/12	41/13 43/12 46/24
	<b>I live [1]</b> 192/22	<b>I respect [1]</b> 182/9	159/22 159/23 160/3	54/5 54/23 58/12 59/4
	<b>I made [5]</b> 63/15 87/2	<b>I said [6]</b> 8/21 24/8		63/13 65/3 67/4 67/19
	114/1 117/8 147/23	114/24 161/21 194/1		67/22 67/25 68/13
		242/23		68/14 68/16 71/13
		<b>I saw [1]</b> 109/8		71/22 76/5 76/18



<b>I</b>	<b>identify [5]</b> 16/7 16/12 128/12 129/8 130/15	192/2 192/5 192/9 193/12 193/18 194/16 194/25 195/1 196/1 196/3 196/12 196/22 197/10 199/21 199/22 200/24 205/1 205/11 207/10 213/18 214/2 217/5 217/6 217/9 219/6 219/22 220/10 220/14 220/15 220/24 224/11 225/6 225/16 225/21 226/3 226/11 228/12 231/9 232/20 233/2 233/25 235/23 235/24 236/22 238/25 239/18 242/23 243/4	<b>imperial [1]</b> 40/20 <b>Imperial [1]</b> 1/13 <b>Imperial College [1]</b> 1/13 <b>implementation [1]</b> 108/7 <b>implemented [2]</b> 29/16 97/12 <b>implementing [1]</b> 207/20 <b>implication [3]</b> 88/20 127/10 138/23 <b>implications [8]</b> 20/25 41/23 52/12 153/22 163/14 192/15 192/19 193/2 <b>implied [3]</b> 25/15 38/13 100/13 <b>importance [7]</b> 79/9 145/5 148/6 208/24 230/2 238/14 239/12 <b>important [58]</b> 24/14 26/21 33/14 34/4 35/15 37/19 37/23 38/7 45/8 46/25 65/13 69/5 70/15 72/7 72/17 72/25 78/11 79/16 82/6 82/22 90/6 97/23 110/7 110/7 111/20 119/14 124/12 124/19 126/9 126/22 127/6 129/4 132/18 132/25 134/25 138/4 138/14 145/7 147/3 147/8 148/16 148/19 148/21 155/11 157/23 159/25 160/17 160/19 165/12 166/19 172/14 174/1 176/8 185/14 203/24 213/1 214/23 236/17 <b>importantly [2]</b> 11/25 128/21 <b>imported [1]</b> 81/1 <b>importing [1]</b> 93/15 <b>impose [6]</b> 37/10 45/5 65/3 84/13 192/2 209/21 <b>imposed [15]</b> 3/13 30/18 31/8 34/6 34/8 34/9 44/4 44/8 57/8 149/3 189/1 190/9 191/9 191/24 194/4 <b>imposing [1]</b> 47/22 <b>imposition [2]</b> 48/9 132/19 <b>impossible [3]</b> 85/8 190/11 190/13 <b>impracticable [1]</b> 220/20 <b>impractical [2]</b> 13/12 14/7 <b>impression [3]</b> 22/15 63/24 64/6 <b>impropriety [1]</b> 3/1	<b>improve [1]</b> 123/20 <b>improved [4]</b> 124/5 143/13 143/15 143/20 <b>improvement [1]</b> 131/13 <b>improving [1]</b> 187/22 <b>inappropriately [1]</b> 83/4 <b>incentives [1]</b> 147/23 <b>inception [2]</b> 151/19 151/23 <b>incidence [2]</b> 145/17 195/3 <b>include [2]</b> 98/8 99/15 <b>included [2]</b> 100/9 161/3 <b>includes [2]</b> 215/23 215/24 <b>including [9]</b> 63/8 71/11 77/24 117/1 128/4 128/16 152/14 215/1 237/16 <b>incoherent [1]</b> 114/21 <b>income [3]</b> 145/25 146/11 241/10 <b>incomes [1]</b> 145/15 <b>incompatible [1]</b> 21/13 <b>inconceivable [1]</b> 10/11 <b>incontrovertible [1]</b> 206/2 <b>incorrect [1]</b> 16/4 <b>increase [6]</b> 40/14 48/11 52/23 60/4 61/15 185/18 <b>increased [3]</b> 52/13 133/7 133/15 <b>increasing [1]</b> 9/9 <b>incredibly [4]</b> 13/20 29/12 37/3 38/19 <b>incremental [1]</b> 203/25 <b>incubating [1]</b> 212/5 <b>incubation [2]</b> 73/25 175/12 <b>incursions [1]</b> 176/15 <b>indeed [40]</b> 3/2 4/10 4/17 10/9 14/21 16/4 29/3 29/9 30/23 50/13 57/15 63/2 72/25 104/13 111/24 117/3 120/2 145/10 148/20 149/1 149/11 161/25 163/9 169/6 172/4 174/23 179/15 180/20 182/16 186/13 186/23 198/7 200/18 203/11 213/3 216/23 220/22 235/7 235/25 242/22 <b>independent [14]</b>
<b>I'm... [99]</b> 77/12 77/16 79/10 81/25 83/8 83/19 84/10 86/4 87/12 88/23 89/10 90/16 96/4 97/19 98/21 99/15 100/1 100/3 100/9 101/1 101/2 101/25 106/3 106/3 111/9 111/9 113/21 118/16 121/20 121/23 122/20 123/12 124/20 124/23 125/14 125/23 126/23 127/1 128/1 129/23 130/1 130/6 131/7 131/16 131/21 133/21 137/1 137/10 138/11 139/20 140/5 140/6 140/16 140/20 141/7 142/15 142/23 143/2 144/12 144/20 149/1 149/25 152/20 153/16 158/11 163/11 168/15 168/22 171/15 171/17 173/5 176/19 179/1 179/18 181/23 188/4 189/4 192/21 198/16 201/13 206/10 214/23 215/9 215/10 221/22 222/17 222/23 223/13 225/12 227/9 228/10 228/20 232/9 235/13 236/9 238/3 240/6 240/11 243/18	<b>identifying [3]</b> 101/4 113/14 133/23 <b>idiot [1]</b> 243/14 <b>ie [1]</b> 114/22 <b>if [231]</b> 2/15 3/14 5/17 10/14 10/14 10/21 11/4 11/6 12/1 12/17 15/15 15/19 18/5 19/6 19/7 23/13 24/20 27/9 27/20 28/15 28/25 29/1 29/21 31/8 31/11 33/7 35/11 35/21 36/22 38/1 38/20 39/6 40/1 41/6 44/7 45/4 45/5 45/24 46/8 46/16 47/3 47/8 47/18 47/21 48/11 48/20 48/24 49/12 49/19 50/7 50/19 51/5 51/15 51/23 52/11 53/2 53/5 53/25 54/22 55/8 55/9 55/9 55/22 57/1 57/8 57/22 60/2 60/9 60/10 60/15 62/23 63/15 64/16 64/17 68/14 70/14 74/3 76/4 76/14 77/2 77/22 78/7 78/20 79/3 81/13 82/13 82/25 83/4 85/18 90/14 90/15 90/17 92/5 94/20 94/23 98/9 99/5 99/11 99/19 100/17 101/12 102/25 103/14 104/16 105/20 105/25 106/4 107/11 108/8 112/11 112/18 113/12 114/6 116/6 116/14 117/20 118/16 119/6 120/15 121/14 121/19 126/3 126/3 132/2 132/21 135/2 135/10 136/7 138/6 138/18 140/3 140/25 141/6 142/6 143/25 144/14 144/18 145/4 145/10 145/11 145/13 147/19 148/4 149/1 149/3 149/5 150/3 154/9 154/13 155/5 155/18 162/24 163/12 163/15 165/10 165/18 166/5 166/17 168/24 170/23 171/2 171/11 172/14 173/15 174/9 175/12 175/17 176/14 179/8 179/16 180/6 180/8 182/3 182/21 182/23 185/18 185/22 187/2 187/3 188/12 190/8 190/18 190/24	<b>ignore [1]</b> 243/13 <b>ill [5]</b> 112/18 171/25 175/17 175/17 202/7 <b>ill-advised [1]</b> 202/7 <b>illness [3]</b> 141/20 143/11 153/19 <b>illusions [2]</b> 114/4 187/13 <b>illustration [1]</b> 167/9 <b>imagine [1]</b> 91/23 <b>immediacy [1]</b> 6/15 <b>immediate [1]</b> 43/2 <b>immediately [4]</b> 50/9 73/3 73/13 213/16 <b>immune [3]</b> 10/25 14/18 15/3 <b>Immunisation [1]</b> 155/23 <b>immunity [45]</b> 7/5 7/9 7/11 7/13 8/4 8/8 8/21 8/23 8/24 9/1 9/3 9/5 9/9 10/4 10/17 10/22 11/1 11/1 11/15 11/16 11/24 14/16 14/16 15/5 15/8 15/19 16/1 16/20 16/24 17/8 17/10 17/14 17/16 19/12 20/5 20/9 20/15 21/3 21/5 21/14 21/20 22/4 22/24 29/25 85/23 <b>immunosuppression</b> <b>[1]</b> 12/9 <b>impact [31]</b> 11/10 12/10 26/10 42/15 42/24 42/25 44/9 46/3 52/20 53/10 53/11 54/15 54/22 56/22 56/25 80/2 85/22 98/11 120/25 127/12 193/6 194/13 195/5 195/6 195/23 196/1 196/2 196/4 196/13 201/17 243/2 <b>impacting [1]</b> 179/23 <b>impacts [5]</b> 98/6 128/17 142/2 147/10 148/12	<b>imperial [1]</b> 40/20 <b>Imperial [1]</b> 1/13 <b>Imperial College [1]</b> 1/13 <b>implementation [1]</b> 108/7 <b>implemented [2]</b> 29/16 97/12 <b>implementing [1]</b> 207/20 <b>implication [3]</b> 88/20 127/10 138/23 <b>implications [8]</b> 20/25 41/23 52/12 153/22 163/14 192/15 192/19 193/2 <b>implied [3]</b> 25/15 38/13 100/13 <b>importance [7]</b> 79/9 145/5 148/6 208/24 230/2 238/14 239/12 <b>important [58]</b> 24/14 26/21 33/14 34/4 35/15 37/19 37/23 38/7 45/8 46/25 65/13 69/5 70/15 72/7 72/17 72/25 78/11 79/16 82/6 82/22 90/6 97/23 110/7 110/7 111/20 119/14 124/12 124/19 126/9 126/22 127/6 129/4 132/18 132/25 134/25 138/4 138/14 145/7 147/3 147/8 148/16 148/19 148/21 155/11 157/23 159/25 160/17 160/19 165/12 166/19 172/14 174/1 176/8 185/14 203/24 213/1 214/23 236/17 <b>importantly [2]</b> 11/25 128/21 <b>imported [1]</b> 81/1 <b>importing [1]</b> 93/15 <b>impose [6]</b> 37/10 45/5 65/3 84/13 192/2 209/21 <b>imposed [15]</b> 3/13 30/18 31/8 34/6 34/8 34/9 44/4 44/8 57/8 149/3 189/1 190/9 191/9 191/24 194/4 <b>imposing [1]</b> 47/22 <b>imposition [2]</b> 48/9 132/19 <b>impossible [3]</b> 85/8 190/11 190/13 <b>impracticable [1]</b> 220/20 <b>impractical [2]</b> 13/12 14/7 <b>impression [3]</b> 22/15 63/24 64/6 <b>impropriety [1]</b> 3/1	



<b>I</b>	219/7 220/2 224/24 225/1 242/5	229/18	180/10	128/9 130/13 131/8 133/4 133/12 144/24 146/13 148/2 148/4 148/19 159/1 170/9 173/6 173/11 173/22 176/15 187/25 189/22 192/11 192/18 193/20 195/8 195/8 199/22 202/18 203/4 207/1 208/13 208/16 209/6 210/18 213/23 214/11 227/14 242/8
<b>independent...</b> [14] 83/7 93/14 94/19 95/3 95/19 96/7 96/9 96/17 152/1 153/2 153/8 159/18 159/25 227/17	<b>infections</b> [12] 7/23 8/23 15/12 35/6 74/9 150/18 150/22 151/11 173/18 185/19 229/23 231/24	<b>INQ000129072</b> [2] 191/9 191/12	<b>instincts</b> [5] 178/8 178/14 179/1 182/5 183/19	<b>intolerable</b> [3] 204/1 204/17 204/21
<b>Independent SAGE</b> [4] 93/14 94/19 95/3 95/19	<b>infectious</b> [15] 81/10 82/6 82/13 82/25 152/9 154/24 190/15 215/5 216/4 216/11 219/24 224/6 224/9 225/7 242/8	<b>INQ000129230</b> [1] 112/12	<b>institute</b> [2] 137/22 169/2	<b>introduce</b> [1] 37/5 <b>introduced</b> [7] 36/10 50/1 51/10 51/11 51/18 65/18 93/17
<b>independently</b> [2] 153/14 161/3	<b>infectivity</b> [1] 74/4	<b>INQ000130955</b> [1] 97/4	<b>instructed</b> [1] 111/14	<b>introducing</b> [1] 88/15
<b>indeterminate</b> [1] 193/15	<b>infelicity</b> [1] 23/20	<b>INQ000151286</b> [1] 165/10	<b>instruction</b> [2] 227/16 230/12	<b>introduction</b> [5] 36/5 51/8 88/7 151/3 207/2
<b>INDEX</b> [1] 243/24	<b>inflating</b> [1] 173/22	<b>INQ000151293</b> [1] 169/1	<b>insulate</b> [1] 234/5	<b>invest</b> [1] 127/21
<b>indicate</b> [1] 174/15	<b>influence</b> [1] 161/10	<b>INQ000151316</b> [1] 175/24	<b>integrated</b> [1] 214/11	<b>invite</b> [2] 28/6 96/4
<b>indicated</b> [1] 168/1	<b>influenced</b> [2] 160/10 161/8	<b>INQ000151342</b> [1] 218/16	<b>intellectual</b> [2] 17/20 32/17	<b>invited</b> [1] 102/14
<b>indicates</b> [3] 100/7 171/2 210/11	<b>influenza</b> [11] 150/22 151/3 151/10 164/17 167/11 177/7 239/18 239/19 240/13 242/11 242/18	<b>INQ000184034</b> [2] 217/6 217/12	<b>intense</b> [1] 162/22	<b>involved</b> [15] 6/19 83/11 103/20 109/2 109/12 114/5 130/11 147/3 157/1 157/10 162/11 184/3 210/8 230/8 232/2
<b>indication</b> [1] 167/6	<b>info</b> [1] 73/12	<b>INQ000203933</b> [1] 115/9	<b>intensity</b> [1] 190/23	<b>involvement</b> [2] 101/24 239/5
<b>indications</b> [1] 141/9	<b>inform</b> [2] 143/9 233/16	<b>INQ000212195</b> [1] 225/14	<b>intensive</b> [8] 15/4 55/18 56/15 58/6 61/1 192/13 192/18 195/10	<b>involves</b> [1] 200/25
<b>indicative</b> [1] 148/5	<b>informal</b> [4] 91/24 92/14 92/22 166/23	<b>INQ000223410</b> [1] 81/14	<b>interactions</b> [1] 99/2	<b>involving</b> [2] 97/7 108/9
<b>indirect</b> [9] 40/7 40/8 40/17 44/1 44/19 46/2 46/16 60/21 60/24	<b>informally</b> [1] 73/14	<b>INQ000236466</b> [1] 169/25	<b>intercepted</b> [1] 70/4	<b>IPC</b> [2] 219/7 221/10
<b>indirect/direct</b> [1] 44/1	<b>information</b> [28] 2/23 5/2 35/13 56/19 85/22 102/8 114/7 116/13 126/8 138/22 141/5 160/14 165/12 165/15 166/2 166/20 167/22 169/2 169/15 174/7 178/11 178/13 181/6 181/14 186/12 195/17 233/11 233/22	<b>INQ000251645</b> [1] 130/8	<b>interested</b> [1] 100/9	<b>Ireland</b> [30] 73/17 87/13 87/17 87/21 88/3 88/11 88/16 88/20 88/21 89/1 89/24 91/7 91/9 91/22 92/13 93/19 93/22 94/8 94/10 94/15 94/16 95/9 95/10 97/6 97/14 100/14 108/16 120/3 163/21 230/23
<b>indirectly</b> [3] 40/11 40/19 44/7	<b>informing</b> [1] 176/9	<b>INQ000273901</b> [1] 117/23	<b>interesting</b> [1] 19/23	<b>Irish</b> [1] 94/6
<b>indiscriminate</b> [2] 138/16 143/10	<b>infrequent</b> [1] 158/6	<b>INQ000274026</b> [2] 54/12 54/16	<b>interestingly</b> [1] 38/24	<b>irrelevant</b> [1] 26/25
<b>individual</b> [11] 6/24 15/6 77/8 82/9 82/12 83/4 130/25 142/9 194/8 204/13 206/11	<b>initial</b> [4] 31/5 133/6 154/17 154/20	<b>INQ000282774</b> [1] 73/2	<b>interests</b> [5] 68/16 133/5 134/22 134/23 154/12	<b>irrespective</b> [1] 78/24
<b>individuals</b> [2] 22/23 133/19	<b>initially</b> [5] 20/22 97/6 101/5 104/4 133/11	<b>INQ000282777</b> [1] 87/18	<b>interim</b> [3] 176/25 177/2 185/22	<b>is</b> [560]
<b>industries</b> [1] 203/21	<b>inputs</b> [4] 90/11 96/12 96/18 96/19	<b>inquiry</b> [27] 1/4 1/10 1/17 16/19 75/21 91/5 99/13 101/16 105/14 105/16 112/11 114/18 122/17 130/7 136/6 149/24 173/2 185/14 186/22 233/14 235/3 235/6 235/22 242/1 244/4 244/15 244/20	<b>internal</b> [3] 3/7 5/19 26/3	<b>is 80</b> [1] 12/3
<b>ineffectively</b> [1] 147/13	<b>input</b> [2] 100/19 101/9	<b>INQ000282777</b> [1] 87/18	<b>internally</b> [2] 4/20 109/24	<b>island</b> [2] 88/11 93/18
<b>inefficacy</b> [1] 176/7	<b>inputs</b> [2] 100/19 101/9	<b>INQ000282777</b> [1] 87/18	<b>international</b> [4] 164/4 164/14 164/21 167/7	<b>islands</b> [3] 94/8 94/15 95/25
<b>inefficient</b> [3] 175/9 177/3 177/6	<b>INQ00021307</b> [1] 172/13	<b>inquiry</b> [27] 1/4 1/10 1/17 16/19 75/21 91/5 99/13 101/16 105/14 105/16 112/11 114/18 122/17 130/7 136/6 149/24 173/2 185/14 186/22 233/14 235/3 235/6 235/22 242/1 244/4 244/15 244/20	<b>internationally</b> [1] 90/18	<b>isn't</b> [14] 70/6 71/16 76/10 77/19 80/2 96/1 142/16 166/2 201/16 201/17 207/18 218/11 220/24 234/25
<b>inequalities</b> [1] 127/23	<b>INQ000051925</b> [1] 76/6	<b>INQ000282777</b> [1] 87/18	<b>interpretable</b> [1] 177/10	<b>isolate</b> [8] 93/23 97/25 98/15 145/10 145/10 146/11 238/17
<b>inevitability</b> [4] 29/3 31/9 36/4 64/12	<b>INQ000064689</b> [1] 69/7	<b>inquiry's</b> [1] 163/16	<b>interpretation</b> [2] 113/11 185/15	
<b>inevitable</b> [3] 32/15 66/5 66/7	<b>INQ000069418</b> [1] 203/16	<b>insecure</b> [2] 240/20 240/25	<b>interpreted</b> [3] 4/13 17/18 192/4	
<b>inevitably</b> [4] 4/12 57/13 193/14 194/19	<b>INQ000109142</b> [1] 28/12	<b>insights</b> [3] 91/13 101/12 130/13	<b>interrupt</b> [4] 18/17 32/23 82/21 200/16	
<b>infected</b> [11] 7/10 7/20 8/12 8/17 14/16 14/17 17/7 21/18 171/4 171/25 175/13	<b>INQ000119453</b> [1] 215/14	<b>insignificant</b> [2] 170/25 202/16	<b>intersected</b> [1] 31/18 145/24	
<b>infection</b> [35] 7/8 8/7 8/8 8/9 10/23 11/8 11/10 11/24 12/4 13/5 13/8 15/17 18/1 19/13 21/22 36/8 71/23 71/24 75/2 75/10 79/4 94/2 129/3 136/18 161/11 201/2 201/2 204/25 216/14 217/16	<b>INQ000119498</b> [1]	<b>insistent</b> [1] 2/4	<b>intersection</b> [1] 145/24	

<b>I</b>	119/21 119/22 124/12 124/19 127/6 132/2 132/18 134/4 135/8 138/10 138/12 138/20 140/16 142/11 146/22 149/2 149/8 152/9 152/11 154/22 160/19 161/6 165/22 166/5 166/10 166/15 166/23 166/24 167/8 169/18 170/13 172/10 172/24 173/12 173/24 173/25 175/9 178/12 178/19 178/25 184/1 186/8 188/6 189/17 190/13 194/14 200/18 200/23 201/14 201/15 201/19 201/20 202/15 205/15 206/19 213/20 214/23 215/8 215/14 216/22 217/6 217/7 217/11 217/16 218/12 218/16 218/18 218/19 219/14 220/15 221/24 222/18 223/22 225/11 225/14 226/22 232/14 235/2 235/8 235/15 235/16 243/5 <b>Italy [1]</b> 190/16 <b>item [1]</b> 162/4 <b>its [19]</b> 10/5 26/13 33/17 40/20 60/15 70/23 88/16 98/6 107/24 116/16 122/17 137/18 151/19 151/23 176/22 176/23 197/7 197/8 236/23 <b>itself [8]</b> 42/9 45/3 73/3 92/21 96/8 141/22 155/15 207/13 <b>ITU [2]</b> 55/21 56/8	174/7 174/8 183/14 183/15 197/13 197/18 <b>jobs [5]</b> 163/13 197/14 238/16 238/21 238/21 <b>jog [1]</b> 233/25 <b>Johnson [6]</b> 16/8 23/23 63/7 112/13 113/2 234/6 <b>joins [1]</b> 73/15 <b>joint [8]</b> 118/14 118/18 118/25 120/10 155/22 203/13 208/14 208/15 <b>Jonathan [6]</b> 149/22 149/23 150/1 150/5 241/22 244/14 <b>Jonathan Van-Tam [1]</b> 241/22 <b>Jones [1]</b> 103/17 <b>journalists [1]</b> 142/9 <b>judge [1]</b> 97/24 <b>judgement [4]</b> 91/4 97/17 114/11 173/6 <b>June [10]</b> 7/21 7/24 8/15 133/23 134/8 135/3 140/14 145/23 213/9 213/13 <b>June 20 [1]</b> 7/24 <b>June 2020 [3]</b> 7/21 134/8 145/23 <b>junior [2]</b> 155/14 158/18 <b>jurisdictions [1]</b> 110/20 <b>just [220]</b> 1/22 2/20 2/22 4/22 6/13 7/21 8/19 10/20 11/11 11/18 11/20 13/2 14/8 15/13 16/5 16/7 18/18 19/5 19/7 19/19 20/15 21/3 22/21 27/9 28/5 28/6 30/1 32/23 36/9 36/20 37/10 37/24 38/3 40/1 41/18 42/4 45/6 45/21 46/21 50/5 50/23 50/23 54/10 54/23 57/15 57/24 58/10 59/14 60/6 62/18 62/22 63/15 64/2 65/5 68/15 69/5 71/1 71/22 72/2 73/5 73/8 75/15 76/24 78/16 79/8 80/3 82/21 85/15 86/3 89/6 90/25 95/18 96/25 97/19 98/17 98/21 99/19 101/2 102/2 102/10 102/25 104/18 105/2 107/20 109/15 109/25 111/17 116/7 116/8 116/21 120/8 120/19 121/23 122/11 122/24 123/8 124/3 124/15	125/14 125/16 125/17 126/22 127/1 127/2 130/6 130/9 130/18 131/16 133/3 133/21 134/5 134/11 135/2 135/19 136/22 137/1 137/2 139/16 140/5 140/20 140/23 141/16 142/15 142/16 142/25 143/24 145/4 146/24 147/2 147/7 147/18 148/22 148/22 149/9 154/11 157/19 161/23 162/1 162/17 165/8 165/17 166/6 166/12 166/15 168/4 169/19 170/10 172/20 173/25 174/3 175/10 175/13 176/24 178/1 178/4 178/16 179/19 180/13 180/17 181/2 183/21 184/9 185/10 190/14 190/16 190/18 194/16 195/9 196/5 197/4 197/20 200/22 201/13 201/16 202/8 202/13 204/5 205/7 206/16 207/12 207/20 208/1 208/4 208/6 209/12 212/13 213/19 217/1 220/19 222/10 222/20 223/24 224/10 224/25 225/18 226/21 227/12 228/5 229/17 229/21 230/5 231/6 232/3 232/19 232/21 234/3 235/4 235/15 235/16 235/16 235/23 238/12 239/9 239/11 240/2 241/18 241/23 243/5 243/7 243/8 <b>justice [7]</b> 67/21 87/14 98/25 126/23 144/15 214/20 232/19 <b>Justice Campaign [1]</b> 87/14 <b>Justice Cymru [2]</b> 98/25 232/19 <b>Justice UK [1]</b> 67/21 <b>justified [3]</b> 132/22 133/14 135/11 <b>justify [2]</b> 48/24 204/13 <b>JVT [2]</b> 225/23 225/24	<b>keep [5]</b> 114/7 122/25 174/8 212/10 238/2 <b>keeps [1]</b> 173/18 <b>Keith [5]</b> 1/5 62/20 86/1 149/20 199/1 <b>Keith's [1]</b> 79/20 <b>Kent [1]</b> 66/9 <b>Kevin [1]</b> 125/7 <b>key [19]</b> 5/15 8/13 32/4 38/6 45/9 45/17 46/11 47/13 47/13 59/16 71/19 74/22 75/3 75/4 76/3 78/6 148/7 231/12 231/12 <b>key workers [1]</b> 38/6 <b>kind [124]</b> 2/8 13/22 16/11 31/10 31/16 37/25 43/6 53/3 53/22 53/23 66/25 72/18 89/1 89/24 93/9 95/15 104/1 112/8 116/23 117/7 124/21 151/21 151/22 154/11 155/20 156/23 157/1 157/1 158/19 160/1 161/1 161/18 161/18 161/21 161/24 162/20 162/25 164/8 164/11 166/2 166/8 168/15 168/21 168/24 170/22 172/5 173/13 173/15 173/21 176/21 176/25 177/1 177/2 178/16 178/22 182/12 182/20 182/21 183/16 184/23 185/6 185/23 188/16 188/18 189/5 189/8 189/11 190/1 192/13 193/1 193/17 193/19 195/8 195/13 196/9 197/9 197/11 198/11 199/23 199/25 200/5 200/6 201/4 201/10 204/12 204/14 205/1 205/2 205/6 205/15 206/7 206/13 207/24 209/4 209/5 209/9 210/20 211/12 211/19 212/6 212/11 212/25 214/2 216/22 221/16 224/15 224/18 226/5 228/1 228/17 230/15 233/18 233/20 234/12 238/18 238/21 238/21 239/9 239/23 239/23 240/1 240/4 241/11 243/1 <b>kindly [1]</b> 94/18 <b>King's [1]</b> 241/20 <b>King's Counsel [1]</b> 241/20 <b>Kingdom [14]</b> 168/6 177/15 177/24 179/22 179/24 180/7 180/8
----------	---	--	---	--

<b>K</b>	192/23 193/18 195/25 196/3 197/16 197/19 197/20 198/10 199/24 200/3 200/3 200/12 200/12 200/18 201/11 201/22 203/6 203/9 204/14 206/13 206/14 207/12 207/15 207/24 207/24 209/7 210/20 211/18 212/16 213/16 213/20 214/6 216/15 216/19 218/18 221/14 225/6 228/7 234/8 236/8 238/15 239/22 239/23 239/25 240/2 240/7 241/11 241/11 242/23 243/2	12/20 15/8 19/19 20/3 24/19 24/22 30/6 32/1 48/19 48/20 54/25 61/4 61/6 81/20 98/12 126/19 135/9 135/23 136/16 153/10 171/3 171/3 187/14 195/20 215/23	<b>led</b> [6] 10/8 10/13 23/2 92/9 162/10 209/2 <b>left</b> [5] 127/2 148/1 156/11 180/6 200/13 <b>legal</b> [2] 86/24 86/24 <b>Legionella</b> [1] 168/18 <b>legitimate</b> [3] 29/22 30/7 63/22 <b>legitimately</b> [1] 109/3 <b>Leicester</b> [1] 145/23 <b>length</b> [4] 74/10 112/14 175/10 176/5 <b>lengthy</b> [1] 39/19 <b>lens</b> [1] 128/2 <b>Leslie</b> [1] 123/5 <b>Leslie Thomas</b> [1] 123/5 <b>less</b> [13] 8/16 15/10 24/16 24/17 66/1 78/4 97/14 98/9 98/11 101/3 139/16 173/14 205/4 <b>lessen</b> [1] 148/11 <b>lessened</b> [1] 40/18 <b>lesser</b> [1] 16/24 <b>let</b> [20] 8/2 8/6 51/4 52/19 89/6 96/11 96/18 124/9 124/23 127/25 132/4 148/5 158/7 178/4 197/22 205/1 205/2 211/22 224/25 232/3 <b>let's</b> [15] 13/16 19/23 24/11 31/16 45/22 50/13 51/1 52/7 63/17 79/14 79/15 79/15 105/7 110/6 191/14 <b>lethal</b> [2] 216/15 216/19 <b>lethality</b> [1] 216/20 <b>letter</b> [8] 203/13 204/4 205/7 205/7 205/9 205/16 205/24 209/17 <b>letters</b> [1] 64/14 <b>level</b> [21] 3/24 11/4 34/18 44/1 65/18 82/14 90/5 94/1 98/5 107/5 138/15 163/22 163/23 170/22 171/23 188/2 205/4 206/20 206/24 209/10 236/14 <b>levels</b> [6] 9/9 15/25 107/5 195/18 208/10 219/8 <b>liaisons</b> [1] 155/2 <b>lies</b> [1] 221/20 <b>life</b> [8] 10/14 12/20 14/1 14/12 37/1 71/7 200/13 236/9 <b>lifelong</b> [2] 8/7 16/2 <b>liftings</b> [1] 206/11 <b>light</b> [4] 16/25 30/19	44/2 228/5 <b>like</b> [39] 15/15 15/19 41/6 48/16 49/19 51/16 68/25 71/11 90/10 90/11 93/8 99/4 107/11 112/3 113/10 115/10 115/22 118/7 118/8 124/11 126/2 150/19 152/22 164/3 166/10 173/15 176/3 178/18 179/16 180/18 181/9 182/21 190/15 195/4 205/14 213/22 215/15 219/22 237/13 <b>likelihood</b> [2] 64/11 196/12 <b>likely</b> [25] 17/11 44/1 44/10 46/15 53/10 54/15 54/22 56/22 56/25 57/7 70/6 70/18 74/4 84/7 85/7 98/9 139/16 139/22 148/17 169/8 194/12 203/2 227/16 227/18 227/21 <b>limitation</b> [1] 58/25 <b>limitations</b> [1] 187/11 <b>limited</b> [8] 85/14 115/14 161/19 175/4 176/4 176/12 183/1 199/21 <b>limits</b> [1] 23/24 <b>line</b> [5] 36/7 74/19 154/6 199/14 218/25 <b>linguistic</b> [2] 125/1 126/2 <b>link</b> [3] 146/7 165/18 240/24 <b>linked</b> [2] 27/22 227/25 <b>linking</b> [1] 26/1 <b>links</b> [3] 119/5 130/14 164/24 <b>list</b> [14] 67/4 69/18 104/18 104/19 117/2 132/8 132/10 132/19 134/6 134/7 134/10 134/21 164/25 229/23 <b>listening</b> [1] 144/18 <b>literally</b> [4] 159/4 161/24 213/21 233/21 <b>literature</b> [4] 24/20 137/20 242/7 242/10 <b>little</b> [9] 101/17 123/8 159/14 165/19 166/6 189/9 192/7 211/6 224/25 <b>live</b> [4] 164/5 192/22 192/23 242/9 <b>Liverpool</b> [5] 86/7 86/8 86/12 209/3 209/8 <b>lives</b> [1] 54/2 <b>living</b> [7] 127/17 131/3 131/12 131/25
<b>Kingdom... [7]</b> 180/11 186/21 186/24 212/21 214/20 214/22 243/12 <b>knew</b> [13] 5/21 47/22 61/20 80/1 114/7 141/13 180/14 180/15 182/8 187/23 187/24 204/24 204/25 <b>knock</b> [1] 19/21 <b>know</b> [210] 4/5 6/20 8/2 10/9 10/14 11/13 11/21 14/8 14/9 18/8 18/10 19/7 21/10 22/9 23/13 24/23 26/20 27/9 27/20 30/15 32/11 33/7 33/19 33/19 33/20 33/22 35/5 36/12 36/16 47/3 47/19 47/20 52/18 52/25 53/5 53/8 53/9 53/19 58/5 58/20 59/18 59/19 61/25 62/19 62/20 69/2 70/13 71/21 75/19 75/21 78/12 80/8 89/21 89/24 91/6 92/23 93/4 95/18 96/13 96/14 99/15 101/12 107/18 107/23 110/6 110/8 111/10 112/3 114/8 114/9 119/6 126/3 126/20 126/20 127/16 128/5 129/11 133/2 134/2 136/10 136/12 139/5 139/24 140/21 143/6 144/6 148/5 153/7 153/9 153/21 154/11 156/5 156/21 158/16 159/3 159/19 160/1 161/22 162/22 162/25 163/6 163/9 164/5 164/16 165/25 166/2 166/10 166/11 166/12 167/9 169/16 170/13 170/21 171/11 171/14 171/15 171/16 173/17 173/18 173/21 175/7 175/18 177/6 177/10 178/6 178/16 178/20 180/13 181/20 181/21 181/23 182/4 182/8 182/11 183/21 183/22 183/24 183/25 184/23 185/1 185/10 185/23 186/1 186/3 187/22 188/14 188/17 189/5 189/12 189/21 189/25 190/16 190/17 190/18 191/3 192/3 192/4 192/11 192/17 192/21	261/9 261/10 261/11 261/12 261/13 261/14 261/15 261/16 261/17 261/18 261/19 261/20 261/21 261/22 261/23 261/24 261/25 261/26 261/27 261/28 261/29 261/30 261/31 261/32 261/33 261/34 261/35 261/36 261/37 261/38 261/39 261/40 261/41 261/42 261/43 261/44 261/45 261/46 261/47 261/48 261/49 261/50 261/51 261/52 261/53 261/54 261/55 261/56 261/57 261/58 261/59 261/60 261/61 261/62 261/63 261/64 261/65 261/66 261/67 261/68 261/69 261/70 261/71 261/72 261/73 261/74 261/75 261/76 261/77 261/78 261/79 261/80 261/81 261/82 261/83 261/84 261/85 261/86 261/87 261/88 261/89 261/90 261/91 261/92 261/93 261/94 261/95 261/96 261/97 261/98 261/99 261/100	261/101 261/102 261/103 261/104 261/105 261/106 261/107 261/108 261/109 261/110 261/111 261/112 261/113 261/114 261/115 261/116 261/117 261/118 261/119 261/120 261/121 261/122 261/123 261/124 261/125 261/126 261/127 261/128 261/129 261/130 261/131 261/132 261/133 261/134 261/135 261/136 261/137 261/138 261/139 261/140 261/141 261/142 261/143 261/144 261/145 261/146 261/147 261/148 261/149 261/150 261/151 261/152 261/153 261/154 261/155 261/156 261/157 261/158 261/159 261/160 261/161 261/162 261/163 261/164 261/165 261/166 261/167 261/168 261/169 261/170 261/171 261/172 261/173 261/174 261/175 261/176 261/177 261/178 261/179 261/180 261/181 261/182 261/183 261/184 261/185 261/186 261/187 261/188 261/189 261/190 261/191 261/192 261/193 261/194 261/195 261/196 261/197 261/198 261/199 261/200	<b>lab</b> [2] 82/2 82/3 <b>label</b> [1] 219/5 <b>laboratories</b> [5] 68/2 81/11 82/16 83/16 83/24 <b>laboratory</b> [2] 83/12 84/2 <b>labs</b> [1] 223/4 <b>lack</b> [8] 6/17 38/18 61/22 103/2 161/10 179/5 236/2 236/3 <b>ladder</b> [1] 31/11 <b>Lady</b> [28] 67/7 67/15 98/21 107/6 111/8 115/8 117/23 121/19 121/23 122/20 123/1 130/4 135/2 135/18 143/3 144/13 144/20 148/23 149/13 149/15 149/21 198/19 202/20 237/24 238/25 241/16 241/18 243/19 <b>Lady's</b> [2] 101/19 111/17 <b>lag</b> [1] 186/12 <b>laid</b> [7] 10/10 12/12 41/21 118/19 118/24 129/9 143/22 <b>Lancaster</b> [1] 232/23 <b>land</b> [5] 71/14 88/16 148/3 148/7 186/15 <b>lands</b> [1] 229/5 <b>landscape</b> [1] 123/13 <b>language</b> [4] 4/2 26/19 54/25 126/4 <b>large</b> [27] 6/1 9/14	

<b>L</b>	<b>long-term [3]</b> 18/25 142/2 143/10	<b>Ma Xiaowei [1]</b> 69/10	71/7 94/7 102/17	198/3 198/8 199/8
<b>living... [3]</b> 133/7 136/17 143/21	<b>longer [6]</b> 45/15 57/10 57/18 65/19 128/20 189/9	<b>machine [3]</b> 155/18 186/17 187/5	104/23 157/16 173/2 241/10	199/10 199/11 222/24 223/2 223/13 223/21 223/23 224/13 225/13 225/16 229/19 229/20
<b>local [2]</b> 126/13 208/9	<b>look [32]</b> 5/17 23/18 27/9 28/4 38/4 38/20 44/21 54/3 54/19 77/2 88/4 92/25 93/3 99/5 116/6 128/1 137/7 147/18 155/25 163/5 172/14 178/18 180/19 181/24 184/1 185/23 187/19 189/24 191/7 197/11 213/19 231/4	<b>machinery [2]</b> 5/7 157/2	<b>making [26]</b> 39/10 40/25 41/10 42/16 44/10 59/5 69/12 74/15 79/10 79/11 89/10 98/2 113/21 125/13 129/11 135/13 142/24 153/20 156/10 161/9 161/14 161/15 229/7 230/5 233/16 237/11	<b>March 2000 [1]</b> 111/24
<b>lock [1]</b> 41/2	<b>looked [10]</b> 32/8 93/1 109/15 118/13 134/18 134/19 189/25 209/11 227/18 242/6	<b>made [41]</b> 4/2 16/1 22/11 37/2 37/12 52/7 63/15 72/16 73/16 80/24 81/1 87/2 91/22 93/14 94/13 102/1 102/9 104/9 105/18 109/10 114/1 117/8 118/15 120/15 121/12 122/1 122/14 128/19 138/18 142/11 143/22 147/23 150/8 176/3 183/9 183/9 183/24 189/23 210/15 221/15 241/19	<b>managed [2]</b> 209/4 218/23	<b>March 2020 [5]</b> 91/5 91/9 114/22 132/9 132/16
<b>lockdown [31]</b> 26/1 26/24 28/4 31/7 32/5 35/22 37/17 39/5 40/22 42/6 44/12 44/20 47/22 48/10 51/13 57/8 65/3 65/9 65/20 66/2 66/8 107/25 136/3 189/16 189/22 190/9 190/11 191/23 207/5 213/10 239/24	<b>looking [14]</b> 6/19 17/5 34/3 51/3 80/11 125/7 125/8 144/23 155/1 155/24 178/16 187/23 190/14 227/14	<b>made/observed [1]</b> 93/14	<b>Management [1]</b> 218/23	<b>March 2021 [1]</b> 130/18
<b>lockdowns [3]</b> 27/10 29/24 66/22	<b>loophole [1]</b> 93/25	<b>Madrid [2]</b> 86/8 86/14	<b>manage [3]</b> 214/1 221/6 224/5	<b>March 2022 [1]</b> 152/16
<b>logic [7]</b> 42/8 96/2 141/6 143/22 146/1 146/10 146/12	<b>loose [1]</b> 193/1	<b>Madrid-Liverpool [1]</b> 86/8	<b>manageable [1]</b> 2/17	<b>margin [1]</b> 58/4
<b>logically [1]</b> 114/20	<b>Lord [1]</b> 56/21	<b>magnificent [1]</b> 61/23	<b>managed [2]</b> 209/4 218/23	<b>marginal [1]</b> 33/3
<b>logistical [1]</b> 105/1	<b>Lord Stevens [1]</b> 56/21	<b>magnitude [1]</b> 156/4	<b>Manchester [2]</b> 209/6 209/8	<b>margins [1]</b> 59/15
<b>London [14]</b> 1/13 55/19 55/21 56/9 56/16 94/3 191/16 191/17 191/19 192/8 192/9 192/10 192/15 192/23	<b>lose [1]</b> 159/3	<b>mailbox [1]</b> 102/16	<b>manager [1]</b> 159/5	<b>mark [5]</b> 101/17 162/21 185/21 205/10 205/11
<b>long [63]</b> 13/20 13/24 16/15 18/25 22/13 29/24 33/10 38/1 40/13 42/25 65/23 67/4 90/15 104/3 104/18 117/2 121/15 122/12 123/8 131/6 131/8 135/20 135/22 136/1 136/11 136/13 136/17 136/18 137/11 137/17 137/20 138/1 138/5 138/16 138/24 138/25 139/4 139/9 140/1 140/10 140/11 140/13 140/25 141/9 141/13 141/23 141/25 142/2 142/4 142/11 142/17 143/7 143/10 143/21 143/25 144/7 144/11 150/24 151/14 151/20 219/9 232/11 242/14	<b>losing [2]</b> 207/15 243/18	<b>main [5]</b> 44/11 60/19 91/22 94/7 94/14	<b>managing [2]</b> 93/15 123/15	<b>mashed [1]</b> 23/10
<b>Long Covid [30]</b> 135/20 135/22 136/1 136/11 136/13 136/17 136/18 137/11 137/20 138/1 138/5 138/24 138/25 139/4 139/9 140/1 140/10 140/13 140/25 141/9 141/13 141/23 141/25 142/11 142/17 143/7 143/21 143/25 144/7 144/11	<b>loss [4]</b> 10/13 12/20 14/11 209/25	<b>mainly [2]</b> 150/15 233/19	<b>mandatory [11]</b> 31/7 32/5 35/22 39/5 44/3 44/8 45/5 190/9 190/11 191/8 192/2	<b>mask [1]</b> 231/25
	<b>lost [6]</b> 158/25 198/2 198/6 198/7 207/10 209/19	<b>mainstream [1]</b> 126/9	<b>manner [1]</b> 6/12	<b>masks [7]</b> 118/16 119/1 119/5 121/8 226/5 231/15 232/11
	<b>lot [38]</b> 2/1 6/25 9/4 10/7 23/15 23/17 24/12 31/19 31/21 31/21 39/1 41/15 47/9 59/2 86/16 112/1 115/16 118/22 121/1 126/24 131/25 138/24 138/25 139/12 142/8 142/21 158/17 164/18 164/20 164/21 166/23 171/1 178/14 178/15 182/14 200/19 205/2 213/22	<b>maintain [3]</b> 67/6 219/5 219/6	<b>many [56]</b> 6/21 8/13 8/16 15/12 27/12 27/12 30/15 33/23 41/10 43/5 43/19 54/21 55/17 58/1 62/20 63/21 64/24 65/10 66/5 74/9 82/24 91/13 96/13 100/15 100/25 106/18 113/7 117/2 121/17 122/9 126/7 126/12 127/14 131/4 132/25 133/16 134/24 141/2 142/6 145/14 146/16 156/9 157/10 158/23 165/2 165/5 165/6 170/9 170/16 186/23 203/3 203/4 207/20 214/21 226/6 235/16	<b>mass [19]</b> 86/4 86/5 86/6 87/2 111/25 112/1 112/5 112/22 113/16 114/19 199/2 199/15 199/20 200/11 200/19 201/24 202/7 211/14 211/15
	<b>lots [5]</b> 41/25 42/10 166/11 190/20 201/3	<b>maintained [3]</b> 27/16 221/10 223/10	<b>March [63]</b> 1/9 1/12 3/4 3/12 3/13 5/18 9/19 12/13 28/11 30/14 30/19 32/24 33/9 34/6 34/19 39/24 45/1 45/2 49/25 54/8 55/9 55/11 56/11 56/12 56/24 59/25 61/8 81/10 87/22 91/5 91/9 99/17 99/22 111/24 114/22 130/18 132/9 132/16 152/16 154/19 159/11 175/1 189/3 189/3 189/3 191/8 194/3 197/5	<b>massive [4]</b> 47/3 71/15 76/19 173/11
	<b>low [10]</b> 145/24 146/11 173/25 174/16 185/2 185/3 203/1 206/22 240/17 241/5	<b>major [11]</b> 40/22 44/19 71/3 72/12 77/5 80/9 80/9 80/10 119/17 126/3 148/18	<b>Manchester [2]</b> 209/6 209/8	<b>massively [2]</b> 75/10 104/14
	<b>lower [7]</b> 15/18 32/3 74/4 145/15 146/5 221/17 221/19	<b>majority [4]</b> 38/25 141/19 162/17 243/9	<b>mandatory [11]</b> 31/7 32/5 35/22 39/5 44/3 44/8 45/5 190/9 190/11 191/8 192/2	<b>match [5]</b> 86/8 86/8 86/11 86/12 200/25
	<b>ludicrous [1]</b> 54/24	<b>make [45]</b> 2/17 6/9 6/25 8/6 11/20 19/9 20/13 20/23 37/7 39/7 42/2 49/2 83/6 86/16 90/11 95/6 95/7 97/22 102/4 104/16 104/17 110/25 112/19 114/14 122/24 136/10 140/24 142/22 153/25 155/2 159/14 161/4 163/6 163/11 168/4 169/13 179/4 181/3 181/25 197/9 199/17 207/25 209/11 211/21 214/3	<b>managing [2]</b> 93/15 123/15	<b>material [12]</b> 1/16 1/19 23/21 56/22 136/12 137/4 138/8 138/12 149/8 167/16 193/4 202/15
	<b>lunch [2]</b> 67/14 143/5	<b>maker [1]</b> 154/5	<b>manager [1]</b> 159/5	<b>materially [1]</b> 225/11
<b>M</b>		<b>makers [2]</b> 148/7 234/23	<b>Manchester [2]</b> 209/6 209/8	<b>mathematical [2]</b> 160/10 161/8
<b>Ma [1]</b> 69/10		<b>makes [9]</b> 39/7 63/4	<b>managing [2]</b> 93/15 123/15	<b>Matt [3]</b> 112/13 112/13 113/2

<b>M</b>	29/10 30/8 37/15 41/8 41/9 43/19 49/12 51/20 62/13 64/5 71/2 76/21 78/4 79/17 80/3 82/16 92/17 103/15 106/20 109/5 121/15 134/16 136/25 137/19 141/2 143/15 146/14 148/8 160/13 165/17 168/9 169/21 172/7 173/10 178/1 178/2 179/10 181/22 199/19 202/5 212/24 215/17 215/22 227/4 230/9 232/2 241/24	28/11 55/11 56/12 68/17 69/22 69/22 69/25 73/3 73/4 75/22 75/24 75/25 99/23 100/3 104/2 148/8 156/15 156/18 159/5 159/10 161/25 172/11 172/14 174/5 187/20 191/7 193/10 211/5 212/14 212/15 215/13 225/17 227/7 228/1	244/12 <b>Michael</b> [3] 73/15 87/20 92/18 <b>Michael McBride</b> [1] 73/15 <b>microphone</b> [4] 122/25 131/8 144/24 238/3 <b>microphone's</b> [1] 67/18 <b>mid</b> [5] 187/16 188/23 197/24 213/9 213/13 <b>mid-February</b> [3] 187/16 188/23 197/24 <b>mid-June</b> [2] 213/9 213/13 <b>middle</b> [7] 42/7 163/4 163/4 170/1 187/3 199/10 208/21 <b>might</b> [48] 6/7 29/16 30/5 31/6 32/3 34/15 35/23 36/10 37/20 40/14 60/11 61/12 65/20 65/23 78/12 83/2 89/8 93/2 93/4 105/19 107/8 107/11 111/4 113/12 127/23 133/3 133/7 136/17 137/4 144/11 146/10 147/5 159/20 161/8 162/23 162/24 168/25 174/22 175/21 176/19 178/2 187/10 188/14 207/10 214/10 228/19 236/11 236/17 <b>mild</b> [2] 141/20 170/17 <b>Milieu</b> [1] 25/2 <b>milling</b> [1] 86/12 <b>million</b> [2] 141/13 211/19 <b>millions</b> [1] 203/5 <b>mind</b> [10] 43/24 114/14 132/12 159/18 164/11 207/18 237/24 238/25 239/14 240/9 <b>mind's</b> [2] 179/7 179/10 <b>minds</b> [1] 190/2 <b>mine</b> [2] 100/1 204/17 <b>minimally</b> [2] 81/21 85/9 <b>minimise</b> [6] 48/24 49/22 53/6 60/9 60/15 65/10 <b>minister</b> [32] 1/15 2/3 4/8 16/8 30/24 32/13 36/24 46/19 62/1 63/16 63/24 101/17 113/3 135/21 136/1 136/8 136/9 136/14 136/21 136/25	137/5 138/7 138/19 139/4 139/8 139/13 140/8 140/18 155/17 234/6 234/6 235/1 <b>ministerial</b> [3] 55/11 56/12 236/14 <b>ministers</b> [20] 10/19 20/2 20/8 22/23 26/5 45/24 48/24 53/7 60/8 60/18 61/6 62/7 65/9 90/2 111/20 112/6 155/14 155/17 158/25 233/20 <b>ministries</b> [1] 63/21 <b>mink</b> [1] 84/18 <b>minoritised</b> [1] 128/6 <b>minority</b> [11] 123/6 123/10 123/21 125/1 125/9 127/13 128/5 128/17 130/12 143/16 176/17 <b>minute</b> [6] 75/24 76/6 198/20 215/13 215/14 233/24 <b>minutes</b> [25] 5/4 16/21 28/2 43/21 54/21 69/3 69/24 75/6 76/22 78/12 89/15 89/18 94/23 106/6 127/2 133/22 143/4 144/15 172/12 187/20 227/4 227/5 227/8 229/13 232/19 <b>misread</b> [1] 227/3 <b>missing</b> [1] 119/1 <b>mistake</b> [1] 121/10 <b>misunderstand</b> [1] 96/21 <b>misunderstanding</b> [2] 23/5 135/8 <b>misunderstood</b> [1] 82/23 <b>Mitchell</b> [5] 111/12 111/13 121/21 122/21 244/9 <b>mixed</b> [1] 88/1 <b>mixing</b> [1] 38/12 <b>model</b> [4] 13/22 13/23 33/17 168/24 <b>modellers</b> [10] 9/8 17/5 17/20 106/7 106/9 160/11 161/8 161/13 196/10 196/17 <b>modelling</b> [12] 23/11 32/7 38/12 43/8 45/20 51/21 88/3 104/14 133/24 160/25 161/2 161/6 <b>models</b> [2] 17/6 46/23 <b>modest</b> [1] 157/15 <b>modified</b> [1] 66/16 <b>module</b> [4] 58/10 130/7 148/25 242/24
<b>may...</b> [88] 4/17 10/21 11/5 13/8 13/10 14/17 14/18 20/5 20/5 20/9 23/18 28/15 32/23 32/25 63/23 64/9 66/21 71/14 74/9 74/12 74/20 76/1 81/17 81/23 97/12 98/16 99/11 107/22 113/22 113/24 116/20 117/6 117/6 117/10 119/1 126/2 140/8 140/11 140/13 140/19 140/25 141/21 146/1 146/11 155/18 156/16 156/17 157/15 158/14 159/14 162/16 163/15 166/17 170/14 173/5 176/22 178/1 178/2 180/24 181/12 182/3 182/22 182/23 187/2 191/10 191/11 197/21 197/23 202/17 202/21 203/13 209/17 211/8 212/7 217/5 226/11 229/15 229/17 230/15 232/20 233/5 233/25 233/25 234/1 241/14 241/18 241/24 243/5	<b>meaning</b> [6] 9/5 9/9 12/6 12/7 31/21 103/3 <b>means</b> [10] 15/11 15/12 17/16 83/15 134/17 169/21 200/11 219/12 221/5 221/17 <b>meant</b> [7] 29/23 40/3 40/13 102/3 160/14 172/21 179/23 <b>measure</b> [4] 35/19 51/13 84/24 93/24 <b>measures</b> [52] 3/13 3/14 28/17 28/21 31/15 32/1 32/12 32/25 33/10 33/12 34/6 34/13 34/19 34/19 35/19 36/5 38/14 38/19 43/16 44/20 45/18 50/1 50/14 53/9 61/24 62/12 65/16 85/3 85/12 88/15 127/8 129/1 145/21 187/12 187/13 189/3 189/7 190/8 191/24 191/25 194/4 194/13 194/21 194/25 195/2 195/13 195/17 195/24 196/12 196/21 196/23 239/24	<b>meetings</b> [38] 30/16 30/16 64/15 99/14 100/10 103/12 107/18 156/10 158/4 158/5 158/23 159/1 161/16 161/17 165/6 186/18 187/20 188/14 204/7 205/21 232/22 233/2 233/8 233/15 234/5 234/9 234/12 234/19 234/24 235/3 235/8 235/12 236/3 236/13 236/14 237/14 237/17 239/5 <b>meets</b> [1] 219/9 <b>member</b> [5] 151/15 151/15 151/16 235/25 237/16 <b>members</b> [10] 3/21 3/22 10/18 20/2 95/3 95/19 96/15 124/12 126/16 128/10 <b>memory</b> [9] 4/6 8/16 25/6 120/22 134/15 212/24 233/25 235/5 236/6 <b>mental</b> [3] 40/15 133/20 198/11 <b>mention</b> [5] 75/25 76/1 133/21 142/11 241/6 <b>mentioned</b> [3] 115/4 141/24 143/7 <b>menu</b> [1] 210/21 <b>mere</b> [1] 97/13 <b>merely</b> [1] 166/15 <b>merge</b> [1] 116/11 <b>merits</b> [1] 213/7 <b>MERS</b> [1] 169/6 <b>message</b> [7] 6/11 88/12 113/25 126/14 174/2 202/6 202/8 <b>messaged</b> [1] 223/15 <b>messages</b> [4] 88/1 88/6 162/9 162/14 <b>messaging</b> [6] 123/20 124/4 143/12 143/14 214/9 236/20 <b>met</b> [5] 104/22 164/18 199/8 219/3 225/13 <b>Metzer</b> [5] 135/16 135/17 143/2 144/12		

<b>M</b>	221/19 225/3 236/21 236/23	214/17 214/18 232/8 232/22 233/10 233/14 234/5 234/6 234/24 235/1 235/6 235/12 235/12 235/14 235/22 236/13 237/1 237/23 237/25 238/5 241/17 241/20 244/6 244/7 244/11 244/12 244/13 244/16 244/18	94/7 94/21 98/9 98/10 98/16 98/20 100/18 101/3 104/20 111/7 125/12 126/15 137/17 142/7 149/1 149/11 150/6 153/11 156/6 156/20 164/7 166/1 181/20 182/7 185/10 189/24 199/17 200/13 214/16 233/18 237/20 242/6 242/22	129/21 130/4 130/21 131/17 134/13 134/20 135/2 135/18 136/15 136/21 138/9 138/10 138/20 139/11 140/17 141/7 142/8 143/3 143/18 144/6 144/13 144/20 145/2 145/9 148/23 149/13 149/15 149/21 150/5 150/20 150/25 153/12 156/18 157/8 157/9 158/8 159/18 159/22 159/24 160/5 161/4 161/21 162/25 163/1 163/9 164/7 164/25 166/1 166/7 167/9 167/11 170/5 173/7 177/20 178/8 178/12 178/14 178/22 178/25 179/1 179/7 179/10 179/12 179/19 180/18 182/5 183/15 189/5 190/17 190/19 190/21 197/16 198/19 199/19 202/20 205/9 207/17 209/14 211/8 212/25 221/12 230/12 236/6 237/21 237/24 238/7 238/25 239/9 241/16 241/18 243/18 243/19
<b>Module 1 [1]</b> 242/24	<b>moreover [1]</b> 50/22	<b>Mr Cummings [2]</b> 5/10 6/20	<b>muddle [1]</b> 9/12	<b>my Lady [22]</b> 67/7 67/15 107/6 115/8 117/23 121/19 121/23 122/20 123/1 135/2 135/18 144/13 148/23 149/13 149/15 149/21 198/19 202/20 238/25 241/16 241/18 243/19
<b>Module 2 [1]</b> 130/7	<b>morning [13]</b> 1/6 1/7 69/3 69/21 70/8 70/9 87/11 98/24 99/2 144/17 149/3 223/1 238/9	<b>Mr Drakeford [8]</b> 104/10 104/23 235/1 235/6 235/12 235/14 235/22 236/13	<b>muddled [1]</b> 12/15	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>modules [2]</b> 59/3 98/18	<b>Morris [1]</b> 117/12	<b>Mr Drakeford's [1]</b> 101/20	<b>muddling [1]</b> 27/1	<b>myself [5]</b> 114/7 160/23 163/15 178/5 232/21
<b>moment [18]</b> 33/24 44/21 72/15 101/21 105/8 137/10 139/22 140/2 144/16 173/1 173/9 176/8 179/18 186/2 208/4 208/14 227/5 241/18	<b>mortality [27]</b> 12/10 12/10 40/6 40/6 40/8 40/17 42/17 44/1 45/25 46/2 46/16 47/21 48/11 48/25 49/23 52/13 53/6 60/10 60/15 60/19 60/24 60/24 60/25 62/1 65/10 81/19 242/7	<b>Mr Friedman [3]</b> 130/1 135/15 241/20	<b>multifaceted [1]</b> 127/4	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>moments [1]</b> 147/7	<b>most [24]</b> 14/24 17/15 24/9 24/20 37/19 37/22 38/18 39/14 45/19 55/8 65/24 76/14 92/21 95/11 116/17 129/4 139/23 150/16 161/16 161/17 164/3 169/8 169/14 240/4	<b>Mr Gove [6]</b> 232/22 233/10 233/14 234/24 235/12 237/1	<b>multiple [23]</b> 13/12 15/25 16/19 35/13 58/14 60/22 64/14 79/19 104/17 106/10 111/3 117/1 117/9 126/17 129/10 130/12 130/24 136/19 143/19 161/2 196/16 204/20 239/25	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>momentum [3]</b> 157/6 161/21 205/2	<b>move [39]</b> 35/6 45/22 55/8 58/3 59/14 62/24 75/14 78/15 80/3 98/21 101/15 105/7 105/10 112/23 117/17 119/7 124/9 124/23 127/1 127/25 131/16 132/4 140/23 152/18 157/3 163/3 163/5 163/7 183/18 184/14 189/22 193/19 218/15 221/2 223/13 225/12 225/21 226/3 234/3	<b>Mr Gove's [1]</b> 234/5	<b>must [8]</b> 42/13 43/7 60/5 62/8 88/8 88/8 113/14 198/2	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Monday [13]</b> 31/2 41/6 41/7 43/13 43/25 46/19 50/3 90/9 112/18 117/22 159/11 211/22 212/5	<b>Mr Hancock [1]</b> 113/11	<b>Mr Hancock [1]</b> 113/11	<b>must [8]</b> 42/13 43/7 60/5 62/8 88/8 88/8 113/14 198/2	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>money [1]</b> 238/22	<b>Mr Jacobs [4]</b> 148/24 237/23 237/25 241/17	<b>Mr Johnson [4]</b> 16/8 23/23 113/2 234/6	<b>muted [1]</b> 160/6	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>monitor [1]</b> 180/25	<b>Mr Keith [5]</b> 1/5 62/20 86/1 149/20 199/1	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>my [205]</b> 2/11 2/18 2/25 8/21 8/22 9/4 9/17 9/18 10/6 10/10 10/11 11/12 13/18 14/12 17/14 18/1 18/12 18/15 19/24 22/10 22/12 24/7 24/9 24/9 24/10 24/24 25/13 25/23 26/19 27/1 27/5 27/6 27/8 32/12 32/15 32/17 35/4 37/1 38/17 42/10 42/25 43/2 43/20 44/13 44/18 58/11 60/17 63/4 66/3 66/24 66/24 67/7 67/7 67/15 67/22 73/21 79/17 84/1 84/6 85/11 86/7 87/7 92/3 93/5 95/5 95/14 95/21 96/2 98/21 99/2 99/24 100/5 101/6 101/19 103/13 103/21 105/5 105/8 106/17 107/6 107/13 108/4 109/8 111/7 111/8 111/17 113/8 113/12 113/20 113/20 114/1 115/8 117/23 119/2 120/23 121/10 121/12 121/19 121/23 122/4 122/9 122/19 122/20 123/1 123/1 123/4 123/23 124/3 128/10 128/11 128/15 129/9 129/19	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>monkeypox [1]</b> 152/13	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>month [3]</b> 139/5 195/1 195/9	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>months [5]</b> 19/9 106/13 201/11 206/22 210/24	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Moonshot [7]</b> 211/1 211/3 211/6 211/7 211/9 212/14 212/15	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>more [100]</b> 3/9 3/14 4/1 10/23 11/25 24/14 24/14 25/12 27/10 27/12 27/12 29/24 34/23 37/20 37/21 42/2 42/25 43/16 44/16 46/6 46/8 50/5 51/16 51/21 54/6 62/19 69/13 70/18 71/7 76/13 78/4 78/25 82/20 89/23 90/1 94/7 94/13 94/21 98/17 99/6 100/13 100/18 101/17 102/21 103/24 104/11 104/20 106/18 107/10 117/15 124/17 126/15 126/24 127/2 128/19 128/21 133/13 138/21 141/6 143/18 147/14 148/11 148/13 151/4 151/22 155/5 160/1 161/22 161/23 165/19 166/7 174/20 176/23 178/15 181/9 181/9 181/12 181/14 181/25 182/7 182/23 183/16 186/23 188/4 189/12 194/20 196/23 197/13 199/24 205/5 206/16 209/6 213/1 214/11 219/6 220/16	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>moreover [1]</b> 50/22	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>morning [13]</b> 1/6 1/7 69/3 69/21 70/8 70/9 87/11 98/24 99/2 144/17 149/3 223/1 238/9	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Morris [1]</b> 117/12	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>mortality [27]</b> 12/10 12/10 40/6 40/6 40/8 40/17 42/17 44/1 45/25 46/2 46/16 47/21 48/11 48/25 49/23 52/13 53/6 60/10 60/15 60/19 60/24 60/24 60/25 62/1 65/10 81/19 242/7	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>most [24]</b> 14/24 17/15 24/9 24/20 37/19 37/22 38/18 39/14 45/19 55/8 65/24 76/14 92/21 95/11 116/17 129/4 139/23 150/16 161/16 161/17 164/3 169/8 169/14 240/4	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>move [39]</b> 35/6 45/22 55/8 58/3 59/14 62/24 75/14 78/15 80/3 98/21 101/15 105/7 105/10 112/23 117/17 119/7 124/9 124/23 127/1 127/25 131/16 132/4 140/23 152/18 157/3 163/3 163/5 163/7 183/18 184/14 189/22 193/19 218/15 221/2 223/13 225/12 225/21 226/3 234/3	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>moved [7]</b> 27/15 70/11 82/17 98/22 139/15 157/3 227/18	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>movement [5]</b> 94/6 200/5 201/8 221/18 223/17	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>moving [10]</b> 35/6 36/14 56/11 107/15 115/1 117/18 134/5 163/17 185/8 186/16	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3	<b>myriad [1]</b> 41/3
<b>Mr [69]</b> 1/5 5/10 6/20 16/8 23/23 62/20 67/16 67/17 67/22 79/20 86/1 87/9 87/9 87/10 93/2 98/20 101/20 104/10 104/23 113/2 113/11 122/22 129/23 130/1 130/3 135/15 135/16 135/17 139/3 140/4 140/9 143/2 144/12 144/14 144/22 147/7 148/24 149/20 199/1 200/23	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20	<b>Mr Keith's [1]</b> 79/20		

N				November 2020 [2]
<p><b>nations...</b> [15] 109/13 116/14 116/18 116/19 117/3 126/10 158/4 229/22 230/2 230/3 230/8 230/8 232/24 236/19 236/21 <b>natural</b> [1] 11/24 <b>naturally</b> [1] 7/9 <b>nature</b> [8] 47/25 61/21 80/21 117/4 127/4 169/16 183/3 184/21 <b>near</b> [1] 28/19 <b>necessarily</b> [8] 3/15 18/24 37/8 66/6 71/2 84/6 87/6 180/16 <b>necessary</b> [14] 4/18 37/14 50/13 65/21 80/16 83/24 100/23 180/9 204/4 205/11 209/24 223/22 224/12 224/13 <b>necessity</b> [1] 207/1 <b>need</b> [49] 3/8 3/14 4/6 7/24 8/9 11/3 28/5 28/9 34/22 37/13 37/20 38/13 46/6 51/22 58/21 63/6 66/21 68/14 77/18 77/20 80/18 81/13 81/13 85/13 88/4 91/1 109/16 111/17 112/1 112/7 115/8 115/13 127/21 129/20 132/2 133/12 135/5 135/7 136/3 136/8 137/19 143/22 148/12 181/2 196/10 220/14 222/12 225/14 243/8 <b>needed</b> [21] 5/3 8/20 26/22 42/7 49/9 60/5 88/7 109/3 119/25 135/11 136/16 137/3 138/7 140/18 142/4 160/6 180/24 205/24 205/25 206/2 225/24 <b>needn't</b> [1] 241/24 <b>needs</b> [6] 10/24 40/17 134/18 138/23 148/1 148/19 <b>negative</b> [8] 122/6 122/18 137/1 175/15 201/17 212/4 212/17 217/24 <b>negotiate</b> [1] 208/10 <b>negotiation</b> [3] 4/12 208/2 208/20 <b>neither</b> [2] 63/11 80/18 <b>NERVTAG</b> [31] 69/22 69/24 74/3 75/16 133/22 134/15 151/19</p>	<p>151/21 152/1 155/23 161/16 161/17 161/18 161/25 162/2 167/12 167/14 172/11 172/19 173/17 174/3 174/5 174/14 174/23 175/3 186/18 187/22 225/13 227/7 227/17 228/12 <b>net</b> [2] 206/11 210/20 <b>net result</b> [1] 206/11 <b>network</b> [3] 92/20 224/7 224/9 <b>networks</b> [1] 167/10 <b>neutral</b> [1] 217/25 <b>never</b> [13] 8/9 8/24 13/18 21/9 22/5 22/20 30/8 35/23 47/19 53/9 173/12 211/16 211/19 <b>nevertheless</b> [10] 2/21 10/17 16/19 70/9 75/3 79/12 177/12 193/21 195/15 203/24 <b>new</b> [20] 19/12 42/11 55/16 66/3 66/19 93/9 94/2 151/22 166/3 173/17 176/22 176/23 195/6 209/25 209/25 216/22 219/9 222/7 222/9 226/3 <b>New Year</b> [2] 66/19 166/3 <b>New York</b> [1] 94/2 <b>news</b> [2] 126/10 178/16 <b>newspaper</b> [1] 126/10 <b>newspapers</b> [1] 126/9 <b>next</b> [26] 35/23 41/18 58/24 72/22 74/19 77/14 93/14 115/6 119/8 124/3 124/23 158/21 159/6 166/14 176/19 176/21 191/15 191/20 192/18 195/8 205/3 226/24 228/25 229/1 236/11 241/25 <b>next week</b> [1] 241/25 <b>Nguyen</b> [1] 150/5 <b>Nguyen-Van-Tam</b> [1] 150/5 <b>NHS</b> [47] 40/8 44/16 44/21 46/3 47/10 47/12 52/12 54/4 54/10 54/15 54/22 55/1 55/3 56/14 56/19 56/19 56/21 56/23 57/1 57/8 58/8 58/23 59/23 59/25 60/1 60/6 60/12 61/12 61/16 62/7 136/20 190/20 191/15 191/19 191/22 192/6 192/6 192/11 192/25 193/3 193/6</p>	<p>193/12 193/20 194/16 194/24 213/10 225/25 <b>nicely</b> [2] 175/18 241/21 <b>Nicola</b> [2] 112/22 235/2 <b>Nicola Sturgeon</b> [1] 235/2 <b>night</b> [5] 41/7 42/5 50/4 96/3 163/4 <b>night/Monday</b> [1] 41/7 <b>nightclubs</b> [1] 209/8 <b>Nightingale</b> [1] 58/23 <b>nine</b> [1] 56/9 <b>nine days'</b> [1] 56/9 <b>no</b> [105] 8/19 8/19 9/11 11/22 17/4 22/10 24/18 28/9 28/9 28/9 29/20 29/25 30/2 32/12 33/1 34/22 35/3 35/17 41/8 48/13 49/10 51/4 57/1 57/10 57/18 58/4 59/3 60/10 61/20 61/21 63/4 63/5 69/25 72/4 73/1 75/17 75/25 76/1 78/7 80/20 82/22 89/15 92/11 96/25 97/19 97/19 99/16 102/1 108/18 109/20 114/3 114/3 119/7 122/1 129/25 129/25 129/25 131/21 141/2 144/16 146/16 169/10 169/20 169/21 170/17 183/20 184/9 187/13 187/14 188/6 190/17 191/6 191/23 191/24 193/10 194/1 194/1 195/24 196/18 201/13 211/10 212/25 213/11 213/11 214/12 215/11 216/3 216/7 218/21 220/2 223/20 224/15 224/15 225/8 227/2 227/10 228/6 231/13 233/18 234/11 234/13 234/18 234/20 236/6 236/14 <b>no one</b> [5] 48/13 49/10 51/4 61/20 195/24 <b>nobody</b> [3] 50/17 61/9 195/23 <b>noise</b> [1] 166/23 <b>non</b> [7] 1/14 40/10 48/17 169/6 169/6 194/10 212/17 <b>non-essential</b> [1] 194/10 <b>non-negative</b> [1] 212/17 <b>non-pharmaceutical</b> [1] 1/14</p>	<p><b>non-trivial</b> [1] 48/17 <b>non-urgent</b> [1] 40/10 <b>none</b> [3] 33/8 136/20 169/21 <b>nor</b> [1] 63/11 <b>norm</b> [1] 134/18 <b>normal</b> [5] 55/20 57/11 57/18 153/23 156/6 <b>normality</b> [1] 114/23 <b>normally</b> [2] 8/24 58/16 <b>North</b> [2] 87/25 88/5 <b>North/South</b> [2] 87/25 88/5 <b>Northern</b> [18] 87/13 87/17 87/21 88/16 88/21 89/24 91/7 91/9 91/21 92/13 95/9 97/6 97/14 100/14 108/16 120/3 163/21 230/23 <b>Northern Ireland</b> [17] 87/13 87/17 87/21 88/16 88/21 89/24 91/7 91/9 92/13 95/9 97/6 97/14 100/14 108/16 120/3 163/21 230/23 <b>not</b> [309] <b>not weeks</b> [1] 196/1 <b>notable</b> [1] 154/14 <b>notably</b> [3] 2/13 150/22 170/3 <b>note</b> [15] 70/5 75/24 101/19 109/17 136/4 139/24 140/1 140/11 140/16 140/17 141/7 141/8 141/11 141/14 228/1 <b>notebooks</b> [1] 118/1 <b>noted</b> [3] 97/5 174/14 225/24 <b>notes</b> [3] 64/15 111/18 117/23 <b>Nothing</b> [1] 236/16 <b>notice</b> [3] 122/7 183/10 236/23 <b>notification</b> [2] 73/23 112/8 <b>notion</b> [3] 14/14 24/5 26/11 <b>notoriously</b> [1] 180/13 <b>Nottingham</b> [3] 152/21 159/21 167/11 <b>notwithstanding</b> [1] 88/2 <b>novel</b> [6] 168/8 169/6 177/18 180/2 180/15 217/16 <b>November</b> [8] 1/1 84/12 132/10 134/5 134/8 135/3 207/6 243/23</p>	<p>132/10 134/5 <b>Novichok</b> [1] 152/12 <b>now</b> [82] 3/15 3/19 6/21 7/5 15/14 23/18 30/5 30/14 32/2 33/19 33/20 34/3 39/22 43/8 43/24 54/3 58/8 62/18 64/21 68/4 68/24 69/21 72/9 73/3 73/10 74/20 76/1 76/8 79/25 80/8 81/18 82/11 84/8 85/15 91/19 92/11 94/23 106/24 107/15 107/18 109/14 111/25 112/25 114/18 115/15 116/12 117/21 118/7 121/15 123/8 123/12 130/19 132/8 139/2 151/14 152/20 160/19 165/3 165/22 174/9 176/1 177/8 178/11 180/24 186/17 186/21 192/6 196/22 197/4 205/14 211/16 215/2 219/17 223/18 225/12 226/21 231/13 231/19 232/14 235/11 235/15 236/25 <b>nuance</b> [1] 36/2 <b>nuanced</b> [1] 173/23 <b>nub</b> [10] 23/3 29/18 47/18 48/4 48/5 53/18 53/19 53/24 62/12 193/15 <b>number</b> [61] 1/11 1/24 2/21 4/19 8/18 12/13 19/19 20/1 20/21 21/18 21/25 30/16 30/17 32/1 35/17 40/19 42/19 44/7 44/10 45/4 45/11 45/13 55/19 59/4 61/4 63/16 63/23 69/9 78/23 82/16 83/15 102/4 102/5 115/9 122/4 126/19 130/7 156/2 156/8 156/13 156/18 156/19 158/25 159/8 170/13 171/3 172/17 176/17 188/17 191/1 193/5 193/21 193/22 195/14 199/9 203/14 204/2 212/3 220/16 220/23 242/17 <b>Number 10</b> [15] 1/11 1/24 2/21 4/19 12/13 20/1 30/17 63/16 63/23 156/2 156/8 156/13 156/19 188/17 203/14 <b>number one</b> [1] 102/4 <b>numbers</b> [31] 5/15</p>

<b>N</b>	199/17 237/7	112/10 122/24 123/13	228/22 228/25 229/1	<b>opposite [2]</b> 21/20
<b>numbers... [30]</b> 5/25	<b>occur [4]</b> 29/12 35/24	124/3 128/2 178/4	229/18 231/12 232/21	21/21
6/1 6/2 24/22 30/6	45/21 84/4	194/2 204/9 204/14	235/23 236/2 236/11	<b>optically [1]</b> 234/8
33/20 44/25 47/2 47/3	<b>occurred [7]</b> 12/21	215/9 218/15 219/19	236/17 241/18	<b>optics [3]</b> 200/10
47/14 48/19 48/20	27/11 32/19 66/23	220/5 220/8 221/8	<b>one day [3]</b> 72/21	201/21 202/5
49/3 51/2 57/21 59/12	131/3 185/20 185/25	221/9 222/8 222/21	152/20 211/17	<b>optimistic [1]</b> 144/20
81/20 98/12 98/13	<b>occurring [7]</b> 4/11	224/23 225/10 225/12	<b>one page [1]</b> 55/9	<b>option [4]</b> 60/10 65/2
106/17 106/21 136/16	41/25 52/25 71/2	225/20 227/13 227/24	<b>onerous [2]</b> 66/1	65/2 65/7
170/21 171/11 191/19	76/15 77/9 177/20	228/4 228/18 230/24	122/8	<b>options [1]</b> 65/10
192/1 192/6 195/20	<b>OCMO [3]</b> 63/3	231/5 233/4 234/2	<b>ones [15]</b> 23/15 82/7	<b>or [227]</b> 2/13 3/20
209/5 212/23	163/23 199/15	235/20 237/20	104/19 104/24 125/25	3/21 3/24 4/7 7/11
<b>numerically [3]</b> 27/9	<b>October [14]</b> 25/1	<b>old [1]</b> 209/1	126/1 126/2 126/6	7/13 7/14 7/15 7/18
106/17 106/19	107/24 108/3 136/2	<b>older [1]</b> 12/8	126/19 131/14 146/5	11/1 11/9 12/25 12/25
<b>numerous [1]</b> 186/18	137/12 137/25 139/2	<b>Omicron [1]</b> 85/19	146/20 158/24 199/21	13/22 13/23 14/14
<b>nursed [1]</b> 82/19	141/24 152/3 207/3	<b>on [448]</b>	239/25	14/17 15/4 15/17
<b>nursing [1]</b> 242/18	208/7 208/8 209/14	<b>once [15]</b> 28/21 32/6	<b>ongoing [2]</b> 167/14	15/24 16/7 16/22
	209/21	46/25 48/19 59/7	211/12	16/24 17/1 20/5 20/7
	<b>October 2017 [1]</b>	65/13 89/22 98/11	<b>online [2]</b> 102/23	22/6 22/20 23/20
	152/3	128/24 137/3 157/1	105/3	24/22 26/14 29/18
	<b>October 2020 [3]</b>	161/21 161/23 184/15	<b>only [37]</b> 9/18 11/16	30/17 34/21 35/16
	25/1 136/2 137/12	219/13	12/16 25/11 46/1	35/19 36/13 37/20
	<b>off [8]</b> 25/12 77/23	<b>one [145]</b> 5/25 6/9	53/13 61/5 76/3 78/20	40/7 42/15 42/19 44/5
	78/2 78/10 175/16	6/20 10/7 11/12 13/16	82/15 82/25 85/13	44/7 45/5 45/6 46/2
	177/8 220/23 239/1	15/13 19/4 19/20	87/22 89/18 91/8 97/6	46/6 46/17 46/21
	<b>offence [1]</b> 238/2	20/16 21/21 23/15	102/19 102/22 117/8	47/20 47/21 49/19
	<b>offer [2]</b> 146/21	24/6 24/7 24/12 26/2	121/23 138/3 138/18	50/4 50/4 50/11 50/12
	212/16	26/20 26/25 27/11	141/16 141/22 143/7	52/19 52/19 59/10
	<b>office [16]</b> 137/6	27/13 29/1 37/22 38/7	154/14 158/9 160/20	59/20 59/25 60/20
	151/10 153/8 154/1	38/16 42/1 45/8 47/6	161/7 163/11 175/20	61/11 61/11 61/11
	154/23 156/2 160/2	48/13 49/10 49/19	182/18 182/19 194/3	61/14 63/2 63/3 63/3
	163/19 165/7 178/22	51/4 54/11 54/19	205/9 231/22 236/22	64/12 64/17 65/23
	183/22 188/17 213/9	54/24 55/9 55/10	<b>onset [1]</b> 239/13	66/16 70/1 74/13
	213/13 214/8 223/6	58/10 61/20 63/11	<b>onwards [1]</b> 25/11	75/17 76/2 76/9 78/2
	<b>officer [17]</b> 55/13	66/2 66/3 66/5 68/1	<b>Ooh [1]</b> 166/6	82/8 83/21 83/21 85/7
	56/14 87/21 135/25	68/2 70/16 72/21	<b>open [8]</b> 11/8 13/5	86/19 89/19 90/24
	138/15 152/4 153/7	76/13 78/14 86/3	13/8 14/24 20/12	92/14 93/9 93/22
	153/10 153/20 153/25	86/23 88/18 88/19	183/22 188/25 220/25	94/10 94/15 95/10
	154/3 154/16 156/12	90/9 90/21 92/3 92/14	<b>open-ended [1]</b>	95/14 96/18 96/19
	160/2 163/20 165/8	92/23 93/2 95/11	188/25	96/19 96/23 105/21
	184/6	96/23 98/3 100/22	<b>opened [1]</b> 68/17	107/1 107/4 109/12
	<b>Officer's [2]</b> 154/7	102/4 104/24 104/25	<b>openly [1]</b> 22/23	110/2 110/3 113/20
	154/23	105/19 109/22 110/6	<b>opens [1]</b> 222/1	114/2 114/8 114/15
	<b>officers [1]</b> 103/18	110/17 110/24 111/4	<b>operate [3]</b> 111/1	115/12 117/6 121/11
	<b>official [8]</b> 69/25 72/9	116/17 117/8 118/12	117/9 205/8	122/10 124/17 125/25
	75/17 156/1 188/18	118/18 118/18 119/22	<b>operation [2]</b> 163/25	126/8 128/5 131/21
	218/17 219/13 223/15	120/2 120/3 120/23	164/13	133/20 136/8 136/17
	<b>officially [1]</b> 157/7	121/18 121/20 125/5	<b>operational [3]</b> 41/23	136/22 137/2 143/21
	<b>officials [8]</b> 10/19	125/22 126/1 127/24	97/11 98/5	147/21 153/19 153/21
	20/2 30/25 68/7	129/15 131/23 133/11	<b>operations [1]</b> 90/2	154/14 155/6 156/10
	155/18 155/24 199/8	136/5 136/22 137/2	<b>opine [2]</b> 46/1 108/17	156/17 158/5 158/9
	206/15	139/15 142/10 142/25	<b>opining [1]</b> 175/3	158/15 159/2 160/9
	<b>often [16]</b> 13/25	145/8 145/22 145/22	<b>opinion [9]</b> 4/21	161/6 161/6 161/11
	38/16 90/4 90/22	147/12 147/18 148/9	18/19 27/5 33/6 88/14	161/12 161/25 165/6
	103/16 105/17 109/22	152/8 152/20 156/17	92/8 113/22 160/2	169/16 169/17 169/22
	115/13 122/7 124/17	157/3 158/8 158/12	190/10	170/9 170/14 170/17
	127/17 133/19 158/17	158/15 158/21 159/2	<b>opinions [5]</b> 33/5	171/22 172/22 173/7
	173/18 178/21 203/8	159/5 164/16 167/5	105/9 159/17 181/16	174/22 176/17 178/2
	<b>Oh [7]</b> 33/1 52/22	168/12 169/14 173/3	181/17	178/2 178/18 179/4
	72/1 173/10 173/25	176/25 178/21 181/13	<b>opportunities [1]</b>	179/5 179/5 179/12
	225/15 240/11	181/24 181/24 186/8	225/5	180/4 180/16 180/19
	<b>okay [44]</b> 25/8 62/25	193/19 195/24 196/12	<b>opportunity [2]</b>	184/8 184/20 186/4
	68/13 75/13 77/6	196/21 200/22 202/20	153/12 153/13	186/4 187/8 187/9
	77/12 78/1 81/9 83/8	203/3 208/8 208/8	<b>opposed [4]</b> 7/14	187/9 187/9 187/17
	83/10 87/7 107/14	209/4 211/17 227/16	143/19 161/12 204/4	188/1 188/9 188/12



<b>O</b>				
<p><b>or...</b> [53] 188/13 188/17 188/24 190/4 190/11 191/11 191/13 191/23 192/1 193/13 194/16 194/22 195/16 195/16 195/24 197/7 197/17 197/17 198/11 199/16 199/16 201/2 202/19 202/19 206/21 207/23 211/7 211/12 211/17 212/7 212/20 212/22 215/18 216/1 216/14 217/25 219/24 220/3 221/4 222/19 223/10 230/7 235/21 235/23 235/25 236/7 236/18 238/15 239/4 240/7 241/7 241/21 242/18</p>	<p>107/2 108/22 108/25 109/8 110/2 110/3 111/19 113/8 115/2 117/3 125/6 126/9 126/10 127/16 127/18 130/12 134/24 136/22 137/2 138/23 139/13 142/10 143/17 143/19 146/16 152/12 152/13 152/21 153/18 155/17 156/2 156/15 156/21 156/23 157/3 157/11 161/10 161/20 167/2 167/4 167/17 167/19 180/4 183/23 184/11 188/13 192/11 193/20 201/4 201/5 201/23 201/23 206/15 209/2 210/16 210/18 212/11 213/1 213/24 221/14 225/4 241/15 242/10</p>	<p>191/6 192/16 192/18 193/1 193/19 193/20 193/20 196/21 201/20 202/6 204/2 204/7 206/14 206/23 210/4 210/4 210/16 210/16 218/1 222/12 238/22 240/2</p>	<p>61/11 129/20 190/21 193/6</p>	<p>181/6 184/22 196/7 205/22 214/14 215/1 232/25 239/13 239/18 239/19 240/1 241/2</p>
<p><b>oral</b> [2] 69/24 206/4 <b>orally</b> [1] 149/9 <b>order</b> [14] 10/24 13/8 31/7 31/24 35/23 37/12 44/3 44/8 45/5 95/13 148/10 191/9 192/3 218/22 <b>ordered</b> [2] 68/22 208/19 <b>orders</b> [1] 32/14 <b>ordinarily</b> [3] 8/5 156/11 205/20 <b>ordinary</b> [4] 10/16 33/15 145/20 168/20 <b>ordinate</b> [1] 233/11 <b>ordinating</b> [1] 109/6 <b>Orford</b> [2] 99/21 100/19</p>	<p><b>others</b> [29] 5/9 5/10 6/21 9/25 17/5 17/18 38/22 41/10 43/19 48/5 53/22 57/22 88/24 91/14 96/4 100/20 103/17 118/23 127/14 131/25 133/1 145/13 146/17 146/18 164/3 165/12 174/24 197/22 225/1</p>	<p><b>outbreak</b> [7] 64/20 69/13 85/7 170/15 170/15 183/4 184/13 <b>outbreaks</b> [7] 84/18 145/23 145/24 178/23 186/6 242/4 242/18 <b>outcome</b> [1] 47/6 <b>outcomes</b> [3] 40/15 134/3 138/13 <b>outdoor</b> [3] 199/20 202/15 202/17 <b>outer</b> [1] 158/14 <b>outlets</b> [1] 126/10 <b>outputs</b> [2] 160/24 187/24 <b>outset</b> [2] 85/6 241/1 <b>outside</b> [2] 86/15 218/23 <b>outward</b> [1] 223/17 <b>outwards</b> [1] 223/18 <b>outweigh</b> [1] 174/17 <b>over</b> [37] 17/6 17/25 22/8 24/13 27/7 27/20 28/15 31/4 31/17 33/25 38/11 38/22 40/13 41/19 42/2 48/20 50/9 54/9 55/25 63/3 65/19 72/19 86/11 101/4 112/15 118/3 121/11 133/16 156/7 160/23 166/14 191/15 195/20 200/13 212/9 225/1 242/15</p>	<p><b>own</b> [12] 22/10 58/11 70/23 91/14 107/3 114/14 116/16 154/7 201/10 214/1 214/2 239/14</p>	<p><b>pandemics</b> [1] 186/5 <b>panflu</b> [1] 170/8 <b>paper</b> [3] 1/12 12/12 40/20 <b>papers</b> [9] 23/11 24/22 24/23 73/16 102/18 105/18 137/19 151/5 199/9 <b>par</b> [1] 170/8 <b>paragraph</b> [20] 76/6 109/17 111/16 119/22 130/8 131/18 165/19 169/9 170/2 171/18 174/10 175/25 191/13 207/9 217/7 217/20 225/22 226/24 228/22 233/9 <b>paragraph 11.12</b> [1] 130/8 <b>paragraph 19</b> [1] 76/6 <b>paragraph 2.5</b> [1] 225/22 <b>paragraph 277</b> [1] 111/16 <b>paragraph 4.3</b> [1] 217/7 <b>paragraph 5.12</b> [1] 233/9 <b>paragraph 5.193</b> [1] 109/17 <b>paragraph 5.8</b> [1] 174/10 <b>paragraph 7</b> [1] 191/13 <b>paragraph shows</b> [1] 207/9 <b>paragraphs</b> [1] 101/19 <b>paragraphs 30</b> [1] 101/19 <b>parallel</b> [2] 43/10 101/2 <b>parents</b> [3] 118/19 118/23 119/14 <b>parity</b> [1] 106/16 <b>parks</b> [1] 195/20 <b>parlance</b> [1] 25/23 <b>part</b> [36] 3/22 11/7 12/24 19/18 25/4 35/16 58/15 60/1 61/6 70/20 71/3 73/5 76/15 76/17 89/16 90/21 100/23 106/12 115/22 120/5 135/23 138/9 138/10 144/3 148/17 152/20 157/8 172/14 173/12 174/1 188/13 216/1 218/24 225/12 236/6 238/23</p>
<p><b>organisation</b> [4] 100/24 105/20 167/18 178/13 <b>organisations</b> [2] 123/6 130/6 <b>organism</b> [2] 212/5 216/22 <b>orientate</b> [2] 217/15 229/21 <b>originally</b> [1] 66/9 <b>ostensibly</b> [1] 229/24 <b>other</b> [110] 12/13 12/19 18/20 19/3 25/20 25/21 26/4 26/19 28/6 32/1 35/25 39/3 43/5 44/19 44/20 55/2 59/3 63/21 64/24 65/11 66/20 68/6 68/7 72/5 72/17 73/4 74/9 77/17 80/24 84/5 85/9 89/2 93/15 94/5 97/15 98/1 98/18 98/25 103/18 103/24 104/4 104/13 104/17 104/19 104/25 106/21 107/1</p>	<p><b>otherwise</b> [8] 15/2 15/17 40/23 71/10 83/16 87/25 119/6 144/11 <b>our</b> [21] 21/17 21/21 23/14 31/11 51/20 59/10 60/3 70/18 74/18 81/2 84/23 110/20 120/22 134/6 137/16 148/20 153/25 171/18 199/19 199/19 238/20 <b>ourselves</b> [1] 225/18 <b>out</b> [84] 2/23 10/10 12/12 17/6 17/11 17/12 19/22 20/17 20/19 24/11 25/18 33/20 36/21 37/21 40/4 40/16 41/21 50/19 51/5 53/21 56/3 63/1 63/1 76/7 76/24 77/14 79/22 84/9 89/8 90/7 93/24 101/7 102/6 103/8 118/19 118/24 119/23 128/21 129/9 131/10 134/18 141/6 143/22 152/18 156/25 160/16 161/19 162/1 163/3 163/5 163/7 165/16 166/9 167/1 167/4 171/11 171/12 174/9 178/22 184/24 188/8 190/23</p>	<p><b>overall</b> [5] 12/7 40/19 41/17 83/3 235/7 <b>overarching</b> [2] 89/21 90/4 <b>overdone</b> [1] 67/3 <b>overflow</b> [1] 192/10 <b>overlay</b> [1] 181/19 <b>overly</b> [1] 105/25 <b>overnight</b> [1] 37/11 <b>overreacted</b> [1] 48/9 <b>overriding</b> [1] 136/8 <b>overseas</b> [1] 164/22 <b>overtopped</b> [2] 57/17 59/10 <b>overtopping</b> [3] 61/11 190/21 193/6 <b>overwhelm</b> [2] 55/6 190/20 <b>overwhelmed</b> [9] 40/9 54/11 56/9 57/4 59/23 60/25 61/2 104/14 159/4 <b>overwhelming</b> [4]</p>	<p><b>P</b> <b>pace</b> [2] 3/11 215/12 <b>package</b> [2] 238/24 239/7 <b>packages</b> [2] 208/3 208/11 <b>page</b> [23] 28/15 55/9 55/10 55/22 55/25 56/13 73/2 73/6 73/6 81/14 87/19 97/4 97/5 109/17 130/8 147/20 172/15 174/9 175/24 217/14 217/21 225/21 244/2 <b>page 1</b> [1] 175/24 <b>page 170</b> [1] 147/20 <b>page 2</b> [3] 73/2 73/6 73/6 <b>page 204</b> [1] 130/8 <b>page 218</b> [1] 97/4 <b>page 3</b> [2] 28/15 87/19 <b>page 4</b> [1] 225/21 <b>page 5</b> [1] 81/14 <b>page 6</b> [1] 172/15 <b>page 73</b> [1] 109/17 <b>page 8</b> [1] 174/9 <b>page up</b> [1] 217/14 <b>pages</b> [3] 28/13 150/13 169/25 <b>pages 2</b> [2] 28/13 169/25 <b>paid</b> [3] 119/25 183/7 238/16 <b>pamphlet</b> [1] 197/15 <b>pandemic</b> [69] 11/13 22/12 24/13 24/21 24/25 27/7 27/21 38/1 45/10 46/12 47/23 61/3 80/23 85/4 87/17 88/11 89/22 94/14 99/10 100/10 103/24 106/24 107/19 115/6 115/19 123/11 124/18 126/17 127/5 128/6 133/17 147/10 148/11 148/12 151/3 151/10 151/17 154/21 156/14 160/16 160/21 163/19 164/2 164/15 165/4 165/8 169/16 173/20 177/9 177/21 177/24 178/10 179/21 179/23 179/23 180/2 180/10</p>	<p><b>paper</b> [3] 1/12 12/12 40/20 <b>papers</b> [9] 23/11 24/22 24/23 73/16 102/18 105/18 137/19 151/5 199/9 <b>par</b> [1] 170/8 <b>paragraph</b> [20] 76/6 109/17 111/16 119/22 130/8 131/18 165/19 169/9 170/2 171/18 174/10 175/25 191/13 207/9 217/7 217/20 225/22 226/24 228/22 233/9 <b>paragraph 11.12</b> [1] 130/8 <b>paragraph 19</b> [1] 76/6 <b>paragraph 2.5</b> [1] 225/22 <b>paragraph 277</b> [1] 111/16 <b>paragraph 4.3</b> [1] 217/7 <b>paragraph 5.12</b> [1] 233/9 <b>paragraph 5.193</b> [1] 109/17 <b>paragraph 5.8</b> [1] 174/10 <b>paragraph 7</b> [1] 191/13 <b>paragraph shows</b> [1] 207/9 <b>paragraphs</b> [1] 101/19 <b>paragraphs 30</b> [1] 101/19 <b>parallel</b> [2] 43/10 101/2 <b>parents</b> [3] 118/19 118/23 119/14 <b>parity</b> [1] 106/16 <b>parks</b> [1] 195/20 <b>parlance</b> [1] 25/23 <b>part</b> [36] 3/22 11/7 12/24 19/18 25/4 35/16 58/15 60/1 61/6 70/20 71/3 73/5 76/15 76/17 89/16 90/21 100/23 106/12 115/22 120/5 135/23 138/9 138/10 144/3 148/17 152/20 157/8 172/14 173/12 174/1 188/13 216/1 218/24 225/12 236/6 238/23</p>

<b>P</b>	195/10 219/15 220/16 221/16 224/6 226/9 <b>Patrick [25]</b> 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 28/1 33/5 36/1 41/9 56/1 57/21 63/9 63/11 64/10 90/9 115/21 117/19 117/22 118/1 119/16 137/15 137/25 147/20 147/21 157/5 210/7 <b>Patrick Vallance [4]</b> 28/1 115/21 137/25 147/20 <b>Patrick's [3]</b> 36/19 92/10 118/11 <b>pause [6]</b> 34/4 36/9 54/17 85/21 181/10 217/13 <b>pay [5]</b> 146/4 146/6 239/9 240/18 241/5 <b>PCR [2]</b> 175/15 212/22 <b>peacetime [1]</b> 155/21 <b>peak [3]</b> 28/19 28/21 55/5 <b>peculiar [1]</b> 165/21 <b>peer [1]</b> 151/4 <b>peers [1]</b> 164/14 <b>penultimate [1]</b> 169/9 <b>people [145]</b> 5/2 5/11 5/23 6/19 6/25 7/10 8/14 8/16 9/4 9/4 9/15 9/19 12/4 12/7 12/8 12/8 12/13 13/18 13/20 13/24 14/3 14/15 14/24 15/1 16/6 16/7 16/16 17/6 17/23 18/3 18/4 18/7 20/21 21/1 21/18 22/7 22/17 23/17 24/3 24/5 24/14 24/16 24/17 25/20 25/21 26/8 33/23 34/25 35/17 38/17 38/25 39/2 39/3 39/10 40/6 41/20 47/9 58/1 61/24 65/24 68/7 76/14 78/20 78/21 86/21 91/2 92/23 97/8 98/10 100/21 100/22 101/5 106/18 108/22 112/17 113/8 116/5 119/19 119/20 121/1 121/6 126/7 127/12 127/17 128/13 130/24 131/3 131/25 132/5 132/5 132/14 132/19 132/25 133/5 133/7 133/12 133/16 136/11 138/1 141/5 141/13 142/22 143/21 144/4 144/7 144/10 145/11 145/14 145/19 146/11	146/16 160/20 163/12 164/18 164/21 169/17 170/14 170/17 171/4 181/8 181/9 185/16 191/1 192/17 194/10 195/20 200/19 201/1 201/4 202/21 202/25 203/7 205/14 209/7 211/19 212/3 212/10 213/23 213/25 226/9 231/22 238/1 238/16 238/20 239/7 <b>people's [7]</b> 17/15 27/14 38/18 45/12 54/1 130/6 141/4 <b>percentage [2]</b> 7/19 48/16 <b>perfect [1]</b> 211/9 <b>perfectly [17]</b> 5/9 14/9 17/7 17/19 41/16 63/22 68/25 95/4 109/3 113/12 113/17 114/11 168/23 182/10 197/18 201/15 223/6 <b>perform [1]</b> 209/23 <b>perhaps [25]</b> 26/10 35/23 47/20 50/9 50/13 56/11 63/2 64/12 65/17 65/17 66/20 119/7 161/10 181/9 181/13 183/6 186/23 189/12 191/14 198/17 202/19 202/21 202/23 231/12 237/11 <b>period [17]</b> 6/2 6/4 18/10 24/13 27/17 31/17 33/25 37/8 38/1 65/19 73/25 78/6 85/1 93/23 133/17 160/23 175/12 <b>periods [5]</b> 13/21 13/24 16/15 29/24 104/3 <b>peripheral [1]</b> 157/12 <b>permanent [2]</b> 145/12 203/14 <b>permissions [1]</b> 153/8 <b>persistent [1]</b> 224/24 <b>person [31]</b> 16/12 70/12 74/11 74/11 83/1 117/11 134/9 169/10 169/10 169/13 169/13 169/20 169/20 169/22 169/22 170/6 170/6 175/23 175/23 176/1 176/1 176/4 176/4 176/11 176/11 177/3 177/3 177/7 177/7 199/13 218/20 <b>personal [3]</b> 22/2 200/17 222/16 <b>personalities [3]</b> 181/19 181/22 181/23	<b>personally [9]</b> 2/7 27/15 33/11 62/13 165/22 213/17 219/5 221/12 242/14 <b>personnel [1]</b> 58/25 <b>persons [1]</b> 218/2 <b>perspective [3]</b> 106/1 200/15 232/24 <b>pertain [1]</b> 186/11 <b>pharmaceutical [2]</b> 1/14 152/14 <b>phase [4]</b> 154/20 196/12 196/21 225/19 <b>PHE [16]</b> 68/7 69/25 70/5 70/12 75/15 81/15 83/21 167/12 172/15 172/25 173/7 215/3 216/9 218/17 219/13 223/8 <b>philosophy [3]</b> 36/23 36/24 37/1 <b>phrase [3]</b> 6/8 10/17 113/10 <b>phrased [1]</b> 25/14 <b>phraseology [1]</b> 113/5 <b>phrases [1]</b> 23/1 <b>physical [2]</b> 40/14 133/20 <b>physically [1]</b> 162/3 <b>physician [1]</b> 150/14 <b>pick [5]</b> 1/8 56/12 98/9 126/11 165/9 <b>picked [4]</b> 126/4 168/11 169/5 178/22 <b>picking [1]</b> 85/15 <b>picks [1]</b> 175/20 <b>picture [1]</b> 226/21 <b>piece [4]</b> 43/10 122/10 154/4 178/11 <b>piecemeal [2]</b> 116/15 204/11 <b>pieces [4]</b> 102/12 125/24 152/14 169/14 <b>pillars [1]</b> 41/22 <b>pilot [2]</b> 97/7 97/13 <b>place [16]</b> 37/9 37/13 37/17 42/1 48/22 62/16 81/5 85/3 133/17 156/10 179/12 186/19 196/19 211/5 222/19 231/2 <b>placed [3]</b> 41/1 162/7 162/13 <b>places [5]</b> 82/17 161/23 190/15 192/15 213/6 <b>placing [1]</b> 55/4 <b>plain [6]</b> 16/25 20/13 26/7 157/17 168/4 179/4 <b>plainly [7]</b> 6/10 23/21 37/4 54/7 94/11 154/17 166/25	<b>plan [3]</b> 81/18 197/5 224/14 <b>plane [1]</b> 175/16 <b>planes [1]</b> 94/3 <b>planned [3]</b> 152/18 198/15 240/3 <b>planning [1]</b> 239/18 <b>plans [6]</b> 37/9 187/8 187/8 187/8 188/8 224/17 <b>play [1]</b> 197/16 <b>played [2]</b> 98/6 160/16 <b>plays [2]</b> 33/20 123/15 <b>please [36]</b> 1/8 6/6 7/5 9/20 10/20 19/25 34/17 42/13 51/4 54/12 55/9 58/12 69/7 73/2 73/6 87/18 103/7 107/15 108/9 111/24 118/16 119/6 141/17 149/6 150/4 152/22 155/10 159/15 207/14 223/14 225/21 226/3 226/16 233/3 236/11 243/13 <b>pleased [1]</b> 119/4 <b>pledged [1]</b> 197/1 <b>plenty [1]</b> 147/16 <b>plethora [1]</b> 151/5 <b>plus [2]</b> 36/5 164/17 <b>pm [10]</b> 10/1 147/24 149/17 149/19 156/16 198/23 198/25 236/7 236/7 243/21 <b>pneumonias [1]</b> 165/21 <b>pneumonitis [1]</b> 168/17 <b>point [184]</b> 2/17 5/15 5/16 5/20 6/25 7/9 8/13 8/25 9/1 9/5 9/6 9/11 9/19 11/25 12/14 15/4 19/23 24/14 25/11 26/7 26/12 27/3 28/16 32/6 32/20 40/11 45/16 47/4 47/7 47/15 49/1 51/1 51/2 51/4 51/7 52/14 57/10 57/17 59/4 60/8 60/12 61/16 61/17 61/19 62/11 65/14 66/14 68/19 69/8 70/13 70/18 71/19 71/21 72/9 72/16 72/25 74/15 74/17 76/14 76/18 77/4 77/16 78/5 79/3 79/20 80/6 80/23 80/25 80/25 81/3 83/17 83/19 85/14 85/15 86/13 89/10 94/4 95/6 95/7 95/8 98/1 100/16 100/24
----------	--	--	--	--

<b>P</b>	155/25 166/8	<b>possible [28]</b> 7/8 13/6 28/7 32/3 38/3 50/25 52/12 53/20 58/1 68/20 93/18 93/25 108/10 128/3 128/8 128/9 128/12 130/15 157/14 168/23 169/15 170/13 171/1 171/5 182/12 190/21 190/24 242/8	217/17	103/13 103/21 105/5 107/13 113/14 134/13 134/20 174/15 191/25 194/4
<b>point...</b> [101] 103/23 107/7 107/18 108/14 112/9 113/17 113/21 113/21 114/2 117/8 118/22 119/5 120/7 121/6 121/11 122/24 124/2 124/12 124/24 125/13 127/15 128/10 129/11 134/20 134/21 135/2 135/11 135/12 135/13 136/12 136/15 137/3 137/6 139/10 140/23 147/23 148/17 148/22 148/22 151/25 156/3 156/24 159/2 161/4 161/15 163/11 166/9 168/21 170/19 172/22 172/24 172/25 173/22 176/20 178/4 179/11 179/12 180/17 181/3 182/6 182/15 182/18 182/21 185/8 185/11 185/13 186/11 186/15 187/24 191/4 192/19 193/11 193/15 194/18 195/11 198/19 200/9 200/18 201/19 202/2 205/1 205/16 207/13 207/22 208/19 208/23 209/4 211/10 211/16 212/12 216/13 216/13 218/14 219/14 221/24 226/10 231/10 231/11 231/13 241/6 241/24	<b>policymakers [2]</b> 29/21 42/3	<b>possibly [9]</b> 2/14 27/15 149/5 171/15 173/12 189/9 192/25 206/9 229/12	<b>preference [1]</b> 147/14	<b>previously [6]</b> 58/18 70/4 119/6 123/24 128/18 189/24
<b>policymaking [1]</b> 9/23	<b>political [18]</b> 88/25 89/2 89/6 94/11 95/13 95/22 105/15 108/22 109/2 114/5 114/6 114/8 114/15 138/11 139/1 188/18 200/10 202/4	<b>post [3]</b> 80/2 152/11 228/1	<b>preliminary [1]</b> 163/17	<b>primarily [2]</b> 152/24 216/13
<b>politically [3]</b> 27/15 88/23 95/11	<b>politicians [1]</b> 95/16	<b>post-meeting [1]</b> 228/1	<b>premise [3]</b> 20/5 20/6 198/6	<b>primary [6]</b> 6/10 49/19 49/20 49/22 159/16 202/10
<b>politics [4]</b> 88/2 89/8 95/12 109/2	<b>polling [2]</b> 38/22 38/24	<b>poster [3]</b> 213/5 213/8 213/12	<b>prepared [2]</b> 39/24 40/23	<b>Prime [29]</b> 1/15 2/3 4/8 16/8 30/24 32/13 36/24 46/19 63/16 63/24 113/3 135/21 136/1 136/8 136/9 136/14 136/21 136/24 137/5 138/7 138/19 139/4 139/8 139/13 140/8 140/18 155/17 234/6 234/6
<b>poor [2]</b> 24/8 40/14	<b>poorly [1]</b> 25/19	<b>postponement [1]</b> 40/9	<b>presence [4]</b> 158/8 158/24 234/15 234/17	<b>Prime Minister [26]</b> 1/15 2/3 4/8 16/8 30/24 32/13 36/24 46/19 63/16 63/24 113/3 135/21 136/1 136/8 136/9 136/14 136/21 137/5 138/7 139/4 139/8 139/13 140/8 140/18 155/17 234/6
<b>population [25]</b> 7/8 7/9 7/11 7/20 8/11 8/17 10/24 10/25 11/1 11/8 11/23 12/3 12/24 13/7 14/15 15/18 17/9 23/25 27/18 38/12 38/23 83/3 211/15 242/9 243/9	<b>populations [2]</b> 242/13 242/13	<b>potential [5]</b> 110/11 118/21 121/8 173/20 191/4	<b>present [8]</b> 75/23 156/9 159/10 186/20 188/15 191/10 235/13 235/14	<b>press [16]</b> 20/2 24/2 25/5 141/18 141/23 141/25 142/1 142/7 142/20 143/7 143/19 156/16 156/20 182/8 195/19 237/12
<b>ported [4]</b> 174/10 174/11 174/15 175/8	<b>portfolio [1]</b> 152/7	<b>potentially [20]</b> 2/11 15/4 35/8 42/19 47/11 52/4 66/1 67/1 71/16 77/24 81/2 81/22 82/15 84/22 84/22 90/18 163/6 177/14 199/24 242/3	<b>presented [3]</b> 148/1 172/16 206/18	<b>pressing [2]</b> 183/8 184/7
<b>posed [3]</b> 117/20 127/5 177/14	<b>posited [1]</b> 19/7	<b>powerful [1]</b> 116/18	<b>preserve [1]</b> 239/4	<b>presidents [1]</b> 110/18
<b>position [43]</b> 35/4 37/4 39/16 44/21 47/18 53/8 54/4 64/22 64/22 64/24 67/6 69/1 70/11 72/9 76/2 84/15 85/11 95/4 95/20 95/21 108/17 110/15 110/16 111/5 112/20 114/18 117/15 139/15 139/15 152/16 155/11 162/15 182/16 183/6 183/7 190/25 193/9 195/14 195/22 199/19 199/19 229/25 230/1	<b>positions [4]</b> 62/14 110/23 151/9 181/12	<b>Powis [1]</b> 141/22	<b>pressured [1]</b> 44/16 44/18 47/11 47/11 55/3 57/4 57/5 57/5 58/6 61/10 98/7 217/24 217/25 225/25	<b>Princess [2]</b> 79/21 79/22
<b>positive [3]</b> 97/8 107/15 122/6	<b>possession [1]</b> 105/21	<b>PPE [6]</b> 75/9 77/17 79/16 80/19 218/3 226/8	<b>pressures [2]</b> 57/13 170/8	<b>principal [7]</b> 33/16 49/23 52/11 62/1 65/9 92/19 131/1
<b>possibilities [3]</b> 70/16 160/15 173/15	<b>possibility [13]</b> 8/4 8/21 36/15 49/8 65/20 70/19 70/21 77/8 77/20 79/23 134/14 171/24 173/21	<b>practical [9]</b> 9/6 14/1 37/6 37/7 37/11 175/6 187/11 209/10 221/5 <b>practically [2]</b> 35/21 212/19	<b>pressurised [1]</b> 149/2	<b>principally [3]</b> 95/22 96/12 134/9
<b>possibility [13]</b> 8/4 8/21 36/15 49/8 65/20 70/19 70/21 77/8 77/20 79/23 134/14 171/24 173/21		<b>practice [6]</b> 13/6 36/14 36/19 153/23 184/22 192/14	<b>presumably [10]</b> 51/18 52/17 52/20 70/7 70/12 93/1 114/12 152/7 155/12 155/15	<b>principles [1]</b> 120/24
		<b>pre [1]</b> 124/3	<b>presume [1]</b> 32/23	<b>prior [5]</b> 33/22 45/18 102/7 239/13 239/17
		<b>pre-empted [1]</b> 124/3	<b>presumptomatic [1]</b> 14/4	<b>priority [2]</b> 129/7 129/12
		<b>precautionary [1]</b> 102/15	<b>pretty [15]</b> 76/15 76/16 101/8 157/11 161/19 166/1 171/13 175/9 189/4 191/3 213/20 218/12 230/10 235/14 239/20	<b>private [3]</b> 137/6 155/1 161/24
		<b>precautions [5]</b> 83/13 218/10 218/12 219/7 221/11	<b>prevalence [4]</b> 7/22 206/21 206/23 240/25	<b>private office [1]</b> 137/6
		<b>precisely [1]</b> 47/20	<b>prevent [1]</b> 44/20	<b>privy [3]</b> 3/19 136/5 188/7
		<b>predicated [1]</b> 80/22	<b>prevented [2]</b> 65/12 143/21	<b>proactive [1]</b> 128/25
		<b>predict [3]</b> 128/3 128/9 128/23	<b>prevention [3]</b> 150/18 217/17 219/7	<b>probabilities [2]</b> 178/8 190/14
		<b>predictable [1]</b> 128/16	<b>previous [14]</b> 52/17 55/17 59/20 66/7	<b>probability [2]</b> 60/13 79/25
		<b>predicted [1]</b> 128/25		<b>probable [1]</b> 74/2
		<b>predominant [2]</b> 132/13 231/24		<b>probably [27]</b> 10/15 20/17 22/10 24/9 24/11 35/12 58/9 64/1 66/4 70/7 76/12 77/5 84/1 107/6 117/11
		<b>predominantly [1]</b> 46/5		
		<b>preferential [1]</b>		

<b>P</b>	160/22 160/23 162/5 165/11 169/7 177/12 179/4 180/21 181/13 182/22 183/19 191/7 197/7 198/21 199/2 200/16 200/23 201/23 201/24 202/1 206/19 209/14 210/6 214/19 223/1 226/18 229/6 230/6 232/16 237/25 238/6 238/8 238/13 238/25 239/2 241/14 241/22 241/25 242/2 242/22 244/3 244/10 244/14	<b>Professor Edmunds [2]</b> 160/23 201/24 <b>Professor Evans [2]</b> 83/21 226/18 <b>Professor Fenton's [2]</b> 125/22 127/15 <b>Professor Ferguson [11]</b> 1/11 1/23 1/25 2/1 2/4 2/10 2/19 4/18 160/22 201/23 202/1 <b>Professor Ferguson's [1]</b> 3/7 <b>Professor Jenny Harries [1]</b> 241/25 <b>Professor Kevin Fenton [1]</b> 125/7 <b>Professor Sir [4]</b> 165/11 180/21 181/13 241/22 <b>Professor Tom [1]</b> 81/15 <b>Professor Van-Tam [1]</b> 242/22 <b>Professor Van-Tam's [1]</b> 183/19 <b>Professor Whitty [7]</b> 67/19 111/14 112/25 123/4 223/1 238/8 239/2 <b>Professor Whitty's [1]</b> 238/13 <b>Professor Woolhouse [1]</b> 13/23 <b>Professor Young [2]</b> 91/6 91/20 <b>Professors [1]</b> 3/3 <b>profile [1]</b> 89/25 <b>profound [2]</b> 35/7 182/7 <b>progress [2]</b> 179/9 187/17 <b>progressed [1]</b> 106/24 <b>progression [1]</b> 39/16 <b>project [2]</b> 97/7 97/13 <b>projection [1]</b> 56/10	<b>projections [1]</b> 56/6 <b>ProMED [6]</b> 165/14 165/15 165/15 165/23 166/2 166/18 <b>ProMED's [1]</b> 166/22 <b>prominent [1]</b> 24/9 <b>promise [2]</b> 67/14 198/22 <b>promote [3]</b> 22/3 22/3 61/14 <b>promoted [1]</b> 18/22 <b>prompting [1]</b> 73/22 <b>promulgation [1]</b> 197/8 <b>proof [1]</b> 132/21 <b>proper [6]</b> 6/12 10/5 17/19 18/16 139/4 226/5 <b>properly [8]</b> 1/20 3/23 16/6 63/8 64/5 74/25 128/20 187/23 <b>proportion [4]</b> 10/24 39/2 80/5 171/4 <b>proposed [5]</b> 3/12 13/23 29/16 108/4 226/4 <b>proposition [2]</b> 15/15 16/17 <b>prospect [3]</b> 50/10 61/14 196/20 <b>prospective [1]</b> 172/22 <b>protect [5]</b> 39/14 61/2 129/1 129/4 129/14 <b>protected [2]</b> 14/24 14/25 <b>protection [15]</b> 15/6 15/16 151/11 152/5 152/25 153/2 154/20 155/3 155/24 166/8 173/7 214/13 222/17 230/21 232/4 <b>protections [1]</b> 129/2 <b>protocol [2]</b> 102/1 103/2 <b>prove [1]</b> 179/12 <b>proved [2]</b> 16/4 116/5 <b>provide [4]</b> 14/6 84/3 90/4 138/21 <b>provided [13]</b> 8/7 54/18 56/19 69/23 75/21 101/11 113/18 114/14 115/7 146/5 149/8 199/7 199/9 <b>providing [1]</b> 160/14 <b>province [1]</b> 178/17 <b>proving [1]</b> 190/15 <b>provision [2]</b> 150/9 220/3 <b>provisions [2]</b> 82/2 83/22 <b>prudent [1]</b> 63/17 <b>précis [1]</b> 125/24	<b>public [69]</b> 10/4 10/10 12/15 18/12 20/3 22/14 23/16 26/1 31/12 38/21 40/16 40/21 41/3 44/11 46/1 52/14 62/6 64/11 64/22 65/1 65/5 65/6 65/6 66/20 69/22 73/17 79/23 82/14 83/2 110/20 114/21 118/20 123/15 123/18 124/4 127/8 127/18 127/21 137/20 138/13 138/21 141/19 141/23 142/2 142/19 142/22 143/9 143/25 148/18 148/21 150/15 150/23 155/2 155/25 161/12 162/10 162/17 200/12 202/6 202/19 213/19 218/7 230/18 230/21 230/22 230/22 231/23 242/16 243/11 <b>publication [1]</b> 227/8 <b>publications [1]</b> 198/18 <b>publicly [3]</b> 10/18 16/21 142/4 <b>published [5]</b> 70/1 75/17 136/5 137/21 151/4 <b>PubMed [1]</b> 24/22 <b>pubs [2]</b> 199/25 203/5 <b>pull [4]</b> 50/23 129/12 160/4 164/20 <b>pulled [1]</b> 152/11 <b>pulling [1]</b> 41/24 <b>pure [1]</b> 90/5 <b>purportedly [1]</b> 113/4 <b>purpose [9]</b> 96/10 159/16 213/23 233/8 233/10 233/17 234/3 234/4 234/19 <b>purposes [4]</b> 9/7 94/9 210/18 214/22 <b>pursue [1]</b> 11/7 <b>pursued [2]</b> 13/9 20/12 <b>pursuing [5]</b> 16/23 20/4 20/14 22/16 22/16 <b>push [2]</b> 184/19 184/20 <b>put [47]</b> 10/5 16/10 24/21 25/16 29/20 37/9 37/13 47/14 48/16 51/4 54/23 57/15 57/15 62/22 63/6 63/17 68/15 69/5 76/4 81/13 82/5 85/8 91/19 96/11 97/19 97/20 98/2 107/11 124/4 133/4 133/12	134/5 143/24 165/16 178/5 178/11 181/2 181/11 195/9 204/15 215/9 217/21 220/10 220/15 232/3 240/1 241/24 <b>putting [10]</b> 11/1 44/5 59/12 61/9 68/13 74/6 77/16 180/4 213/22 217/5
			<b>Q</b>		
			<b>qualified [1]</b> 181/25 <b>qualify [1]</b> 169/19 <b>qualitative [1]</b> 125/10 <b>quality [1]</b> 185/4 <b>quandary [1]</b> 195/22 <b>quantitative [1]</b> 125/8 <b>quarantine [1]</b> 174/22 <b>quarter [1]</b> 146/15 <b>quarters [1]</b> 242/10 <b>question [60]</b> 2/25 11/2 11/21 17/13 19/24 42/14 44/22 45/3 46/2 49/13 52/23 55/17 65/13 92/3 95/9 97/2 108/4 109/14 111/25 112/8 113/14 116/21 117/15 117/20 118/11 119/8 120/14 121/12 121/20 124/3 125/17 126/22 128/24 130/21 131/17 132/3 132/12 132/17 134/6 135/4 138/20 143/16 143/24 146/14 146/15 148/10 173/6 176/10 179/19 185/21 188/4 196/8 200/22 209/15 210/7 223/2 230/10 232/10 233/23 234/11 <b>questions [59]</b> 1/4 62/20 67/7 67/17 67/20 67/25 87/7 87/10 87/12 93/2 98/17 98/23 99/2 99/24 104/15 106/15 111/8 111/13 122/22 123/3 123/7 127/3 129/22 130/3 130/9 135/17 135/19 144/15 144/22 144/25 145/2 149/5 149/24 152/22 159/12 170/10 214/18 214/19 214/22 232/15 237/21 238/5 238/7 238/8 242/1 244/4 244/6 244/7 244/8 244/9 244/10 244/11 244/12 244/13 244/15 244/16 244/17 244/18 244/19		

<b>Q</b>	129/19 145/19 146/5 <b>rather [23]</b> 17/24 19/22 32/16 43/1 46/14 52/24 73/11 86/2 96/9 96/10 98/18 100/15 110/6 120/5 122/6 150/1 160/1 191/13 197/13 205/7 217/5 228/20 242/11 <b>rational [2]</b> 11/17 142/22 <b>ratios [1]</b> 56/15 <b>re [2]</b> 100/17 142/7 <b>re-do [1]</b> 100/17 <b>re-run [1]</b> 142/7 <b>reach [1]</b> 188/24 <b>reached [9]</b> 167/4 180/8 187/4 188/20 188/21 190/25 194/19 194/24 197/24 <b>reaches [2]</b> 172/19 219/14 <b>reaching [1]</b> 167/1 <b>react [1]</b> 186/14 <b>reaction [4]</b> 184/15 187/18 189/6 195/16 <b>read [15]</b> 41/21 73/5 94/20 96/3 96/4 97/20 101/21 116/6 119/21 130/7 139/11 141/7 162/1 173/24 217/5 <b>read-out [1]</b> 162/1 <b>reader [1]</b> 173/14 <b>readily [2]</b> 102/9 146/4 <b>reading [1]</b> 125/23 <b>ready [2]</b> 148/13 157/5 <b>real [7]</b> 44/23 80/1 146/1 175/2 178/9 209/1 226/8 <b>realisation [6]</b> 30/20 31/18 31/24 37/19 37/24 65/14 <b>realise [2]</b> 20/24 72/17 <b>realised [3]</b> 6/21 32/20 51/24 <b>realising [1]</b> 60/9 <b>realistic [1]</b> 65/2 <b>reality [7]</b> 10/15 58/24 80/13 81/6 90/25 145/9 209/18 <b>really [87]</b> 5/23 6/1 7/1 9/18 16/21 19/21 22/14 24/8 26/2 26/25 27/8 31/25 33/23 37/2 38/6 39/15 41/8 41/17 43/7 43/21 50/24 51/20 52/6 52/8 58/4 61/4 65/15 71/19 74/17 77/4 77/18 83/17 92/25 93/11 94/4 104/7 105/3	112/16 116/12 119/16 119/19 125/22 152/9 155/20 156/18 156/20 156/25 157/8 157/13 158/8 159/2 160/17 160/18 164/23 164/24 166/3 168/12 171/7 173/16 175/20 176/5 185/13 187/25 188/4 189/4 190/1 193/17 196/18 198/10 198/11 200/7 201/5 201/8 207/12 209/3 209/12 211/19 216/13 227/25 233/18 233/19 233/22 235/8 237/14 239/4 241/1 242/17 <b>reason [16]</b> 17/21 25/10 41/13 41/14 41/24 42/14 57/20 57/21 61/6 89/20 98/2 106/12 131/21 153/3 216/12 229/5 <b>reasonable [7]</b> 68/25 78/14 104/24 113/23 114/11 160/15 181/15 <b>reasonably [7]</b> 5/9 20/10 22/17 28/2 51/3 128/23 146/6 <b>reasoning [1]</b> 205/6 <b>reasons [12]</b> 13/12 14/1 14/7 26/20 59/13 75/6 94/5 96/25 105/1 108/24 127/22 193/18 <b>reassured [1]</b> 160/25 <b>rebuild [1]</b> 205/2 <b>recall [35]</b> 3/13 50/25 63/11 68/10 85/18 92/17 109/20 112/7 115/23 120/22 121/5 121/15 131/22 139/10 139/21 140/3 140/6 140/22 148/4 156/13 156/15 158/23 175/7 184/9 184/9 188/12 191/11 195/19 201/22 212/20 235/13 236/7 237/6 237/14 237/19 <b>recalling [1]</b> 236/10 <b>receipt [1]</b> 5/1 <b>receive [3]</b> 185/18 185/22 243/4 <b>received [14]</b> 6/11 73/12 88/12 102/18 140/10 162/9 165/6 165/13 169/1 182/11 184/11 186/22 197/9 227/16 <b>receiving [3]</b> 185/19 185/24 186/10 <b>recent [1]</b> 45/19 <b>recipients [1]</b> 243/3 <b>reclassification [1]</b> 226/12	<b>recognise [2]</b> 123/9 148/9 <b>recognised [5]</b> 125/4 215/15 215/17 220/15 221/24 <b>recognising [1]</b> 175/4 <b>recognition [3]</b> 44/14 87/16 142/4 <b>recollection [2]</b> 68/24 99/25 <b>recommendation [3]</b> 226/11 226/22 228/24 <b>recommendations</b> <b>[1]</b> 96/7 <b>recommended [1]</b> 232/11 <b>recommending [1]</b> 21/11 <b>reconsidered [1]</b> 226/23 <b>record [17]</b> 22/6 22/20 25/16 43/20 43/22 68/15 69/25 76/4 92/13 122/11 122/12 124/4 132/8 205/15 214/23 215/14 217/7 <b>recorded [6]</b> 68/18 92/16 119/9 122/3 122/11 216/8 <b>Recording [2]</b> 122/7 122/13 <b>recordings [1]</b> 144/18 <b>records [3]</b> 180/23 197/11 215/15 <b>rectify [1]</b> 125/2 <b>redacted [1]</b> 218/18 <b>reduce [8]</b> 21/17 40/18 40/21 45/25 58/20 62/1 131/2 232/4 <b>reduced [2]</b> 41/5 54/10 <b>reduces [1]</b> 203/9 <b>reducing [3]</b> 21/11 42/17 50/15 <b>reduction [1]</b> 38/12 <b>refer [9]</b> 134/13 160/8 167/5 179/22 201/22 213/5 222/14 240/12 241/23 <b>reference [20]</b> 9/24 28/23 54/18 55/23 56/13 65/16 66/8 66/9 76/3 76/25 81/14 89/15 115/8 169/13 171/18 171/19 174/10 187/7 189/14 215/13 <b>referenced [1]</b> 107/17 <b>references [6]</b> 16/19 24/3 54/22 55/1 55/4	143/9 <b>referred [9]</b> 15/14 75/15 94/20 167/12 202/4 215/24 226/24 239/2 240/16 <b>referring [4]</b> 91/24 94/19 118/13 226/15 <b>refers [5]</b> 69/8 163/18 177/5 225/22 229/1 <b>reflect [7]</b> 39/13 113/6 114/17 120/8 189/7 206/7 207/23 <b>reflected [1]</b> 1/20 <b>reflection [2]</b> 115/11 143/12 <b>reflections [1]</b> 113/8 <b>reflective [2]</b> 39/20 183/6 <b>reflects [2]</b> 120/8 120/9 <b>reformatted [1]</b> 151/23 <b>refute [1]</b> 228/7 <b>regard [3]</b> 115/7 119/25 152/23 <b>region [4]</b> 116/16 193/1 212/1 212/2 <b>regional [1]</b> 89/19 <b>regions [3]</b> 192/8 192/20 192/22 <b>register [1]</b> 166/15 <b>registrar [1]</b> 242/16 <b>regular [1]</b> 234/9 <b>regularly [4]</b> 155/12 156/8 158/5 236/25 <b>regulate [1]</b> 214/1 <b>rehearsal [1]</b> 240/7 <b>rehearsed [2]</b> 239/21 239/22 <b>reinfected [1]</b> 14/19 <b>reiterate [1]</b> 133/18 <b>relate [1]</b> 99/2 <b>related [3]</b> 94/6 156/19 240/5 <b>relates [2]</b> 173/9 178/12 <b>relation [14]</b> 14/14 63/13 112/5 138/2 157/12 167/21 179/19 188/22 199/25 200/2 201/9 201/18 232/21 242/24 <b>relationship [1]</b> 147/10 <b>relative [9]</b> 19/12 49/17 110/9 121/7 125/9 145/18 147/1 161/10 217/24 <b>relatively [11]</b> 6/17 19/12 70/18 101/7 156/3 158/18 160/6 204/13 206/21 206/24 238/15
----------	---	---	--	---

<b>R</b>	41/24 42/9 42/16 42/17 42/18 42/25 43/3 43/6 43/21 54/6 68/9 96/8 97/2 97/16 115/4 115/4 115/7 116/6 125/7 137/23 148/20 165/20 168/25 177/4 178/25	<b>respirators [3]</b> 226/5 231/14 232/5 <b>respiratory [14]</b> 132/13 150/18 150/22 150/24 154/10 168/16 173/18 175/12 175/15 178/24 180/14 184/24 185/2 241/12 <b>respond [5]</b> 103/6 148/10 155/15 181/8 183/9 <b>responded [2]</b> 38/18 58/8 <b>responding [7]</b> 56/2 87/17 88/10 94/13 107/19 169/15 187/6 <b>response [21]</b> 11/17 21/19 34/16 61/24 73/20 103/1 148/17 154/21 175/2 180/23 181/15 182/11 182/25 184/4 184/16 184/18 188/18 195/16 209/16 215/3 240/6 <b>responses [1]</b> 240/6 <b>responsibilities [1]</b> 108/18 <b>responsibility [1]</b> 162/25 <b>responsible [1]</b> 206/17 <b>rest [5]</b> 149/6 149/7 157/9 191/18 243/14 <b>restart [1]</b> 203/21 <b>restaurants [1]</b> 200/1 <b>restore [1]</b> 211/10 <b>restrict [1]</b> 64/18 <b>restricted [1]</b> 180/6 <b>restriction [2]</b> 174/23 204/9 <b>restrictions [19]</b> 68/3 84/8 84/10 84/13 85/9 85/16 86/9 86/15 86/23 87/5 139/6 174/21 203/11 203/23 204/10 204/15 205/23 206/23 207/21 <b>result [9]</b> 16/14 25/9 29/12 80/12 98/5 151/2 162/13 206/11 212/6 <b>results [1]</b> 195/12 <b>retro [1]</b> 228/17 <b>retro-constructed [1]</b> 228/17 <b>return [2]</b> 67/8 198/21 <b>reversed [1]</b> 62/10 <b>review [4]</b> 105/18 137/20 229/25 231/2 <b>reviewed [1]</b> 151/4 <b>revisited [1]</b> 174/25 <b>revolving [1]</b> 171/22 <b>rewrite [1]</b> 78/12	<b>ridiculous [1]</b> 10/6 <b>right [91]</b> 12/22 13/14 16/6 16/7 18/13 18/20 19/1 19/6 24/1 27/4 30/13 34/2 39/18 43/4 43/23 45/23 46/13 48/7 59/25 62/17 67/16 77/19 82/4 87/7 90/12 91/3 102/11 103/20 110/8 116/5 119/16 119/19 120/10 121/21 124/9 127/25 128/25 133/21 134/24 140/14 146/18 146/21 147/4 151/8 153/16 153/18 154/14 158/1 158/20 161/15 165/17 168/11 168/20 171/9 172/6 178/25 179/17 180/20 181/16 182/3 182/6 183/13 184/23 185/12 187/2 188/3 189/20 193/22 196/13 197/3 198/13 202/13 204/22 208/23 210/3 210/25 213/18 214/8 214/16 215/7 215/8 215/19 217/9 217/14 221/7 222/23 223/2 228/20 231/10 232/14 240/24 <b>rightly [6]</b> 17/4 21/18 23/17 25/3 25/12 156/24 <b>rights [1]</b> 95/19 <b>rigorous [1]</b> 174/4 <b>ring [1]</b> 63/23 <b>rise [3]</b> 170/10 209/1 225/19 <b>risk [64]</b> 11/9 13/1 14/18 15/18 50/18 51/5 53/4 54/1 55/5 59/21 60/16 60/20 61/25 62/3 62/8 82/7 84/21 88/1 93/16 108/2 127/6 128/4 132/5 132/15 132/22 133/3 133/7 133/13 133/15 133/22 133/24 138/5 138/16 142/2 143/10 143/25 147/9 147/12 167/14 172/15 172/15 172/21 172/22 172/24 173/4 173/8 174/1 174/3 174/5 196/3 196/22 201/14 202/22 204/1 204/16 204/17 204/19 204/23 204/24 205/1 214/1 225/8 231/18 240/22 <b>risks [9]</b> 8/13 12/4 12/8 12/9 83/3 83/3 93/15 125/9 131/2 <b>river [2]</b> 58/21 58/22	<b>road [1]</b> 206/14 <b>roadmap [1]</b> 139/6 <b>Rob [1]</b> 99/21 <b>robust [1]</b> 148/13 <b>role [18]</b> 85/16 86/9 90/6 96/21 99/7 109/5 109/8 123/15 126/17 152/23 153/1 153/1 154/19 155/21 157/16 160/5 183/16 197/16 <b>roles [2]</b> 157/12 163/13 <b>roll [1]</b> 34/20 <b>room [12]</b> 14/24 34/7 34/8 34/14 105/22 158/14 160/1 205/18 217/23 217/25 218/2 233/22 <b>roughly [3]</b> 8/1 8/2 185/20 <b>round [1]</b> 180/5 <b>route [5]</b> 2/8 29/4 131/1 215/23 231/24 <b>routes [1]</b> 104/4 <b>routine [4]</b> 155/6 155/8 192/13 201/4 <b>Royal [3]</b> 96/19 96/23 110/19 <b>Royal Society [1]</b> 96/23 <b>Rubicon [1]</b> 32/17 <b>rude [1]</b> 238/4 <b>rule [2]</b> 62/24 241/19 <b>Rule 10 [1]</b> 241/19 <b>ruled [2]</b> 76/7 76/24 <b>rules [1]</b> 221/17 <b>rumours [1]</b> 166/11 <b>run [10]</b> 33/7 66/15 83/2 122/18 142/7 167/10 190/23 196/3 204/2 206/14 <b>run-up [1]</b> 66/15 <b>runaway [1]</b> 242/5 <b>running [2]</b> 108/21 150/13
		<b>S</b>		
		<b>sacrifice [2]</b> 39/7 39/7 <b>safe [4]</b> 38/4 52/11 84/3 184/1 <b>safely [1]</b> 19/12 <b>safety [4]</b> 81/16 82/2 83/12 216/24 <b>SAGE [120]</b> 1/20 2/3 3/21 3/22 4/21 5/2 5/3 5/4 16/21 21/10 25/3 25/9 27/25 28/2 28/11 28/13 28/14 28/17 28/19 29/6 29/15 30/25 43/21 54/21 64/10 75/19 75/22 75/24 75/25 76/6 76/22 77/13 79/7		

<p><b>S</b></p> <p><b>SAGE...</b> [87] 87/16 89/15 89/18 89/21 90/1 90/4 90/9 90/11 91/10 91/20 92/4 92/12 93/14 94/19 94/23 95/3 95/5 95/14 95/19 96/8 96/8 96/9 96/10 96/15 96/17 96/24 99/4 99/7 99/9 99/14 99/17 99/23 100/9 101/4 101/24 101/25 102/2 102/3 102/4 102/6 102/12 102/15 102/16 102/18 102/23 103/3 103/4 103/5 103/12 103/25 104/1 104/3 105/10 105/12 105/16 105/20 105/24 105/25 121/1 151/16 157/2 159/10 159/14 159/16 159/20 159/22 159/24 160/3 160/8 160/10 160/21 160/22 161/7 182/12 182/18 186/18 187/19 187/20 187/23 187/24 188/10 188/13 188/13 191/7 191/10 193/10 196/20</p> <p><b>SAGE 18 [1]</b> 159/10</p> <p><b>SAGEs [2]</b> 159/8 188/12</p> <p><b>said [64]</b> 2/16 4/9 6/8 8/21 10/8 11/4 11/13 15/23 16/5 22/20 24/8 25/21 25/22 27/25 29/3 38/25 39/2 51/1 52/7 54/3 55/16 55/24 56/3 62/6 87/22 91/20 92/12 96/6 98/17 105/17 106/11 107/9 111/18 113/4 113/9 114/24 117/20 118/10 120/13 121/14 130/20 131/18 137/6 140/5 140/8 140/10 142/12 142/14 142/16 147/24 153/15 158/11 161/21 175/24 180/20 187/12 194/1 206/1 210/22 214/6 221/9 233/25 241/22 242/23</p> <p><b>sake [7]</b> 8/11 11/6 12/2 24/15 57/23 66/19 175/11</p> <p><b>same [19]</b> 43/6 51/12 58/2 62/16 69/21 74/10 75/14 75/19 75/21 85/18 103/21 108/15 139/5 164/11 190/22 199/7 210/7 211/13 238/7</p>	<p><b>sample [1]</b> 97/8</p> <p><b>samples [2]</b> 82/9 223/3</p> <p><b>sand [2]</b> 205/10 205/11</p> <p><b>SARS [8]</b> 7/21 156/5 169/6 185/5 186/1 186/2 215/15 242/11</p> <p><b>SARS-CoV-2 [6]</b> 7/21 156/5 185/5 186/1 186/2 242/11</p> <p><b>satisfied [1]</b> 1/19</p> <p><b>satisfying [1]</b> 154/6</p> <p><b>save [3]</b> 101/18 130/6 213/10</p> <p><b>saw [11]</b> 22/5 22/20 38/7 42/4 47/19 53/13 58/5 96/22 109/8 109/11 145/6</p> <p><b>say [111]</b> 4/5 9/19 11/11 13/16 18/3 18/23 19/2 19/22 22/23 25/11 29/21 32/20 32/23 35/16 36/22 44/3 45/21 48/8 49/15 50/13 52/9 53/24 58/10 60/1 64/6 64/15 65/24 66/4 74/1 78/24 81/14 84/11 93/20 94/5 95/18 96/18 97/13 101/23 103/25 104/18 109/19 109/23 113/7 120/16 126/24 129/15 130/4 130/10 133/3 133/9 138/6 140/21 144/6 144/10 148/20 153/3 154/3 156/23 157/9 160/3 160/5 160/6 160/7 163/3 168/9 169/2 169/9 170/1 172/10 173/10 173/20 175/11 177/17 178/6 179/6 179/20 181/23 182/3 182/23 183/22 184/1 184/3 186/16 187/2 190/12 190/13 190/19 192/1 193/25 194/25 195/4 195/23 195/25 200/9 201/15 202/4 203/19 204/19 206/2 207/18 210/13 211/22 213/17 214/5 216/23 229/19 233/8 234/21 235/2 235/17 236/12</p> <p><b>saying [40]</b> 2/22 12/1 19/4 21/25 23/9 28/25 30/8 33/23 36/20 43/7 43/15 61/9 62/7 69/25 76/9 76/9 78/9 83/12 83/18 83/20 83/22 84/5 85/15 96/4 101/2 123/24 125/14 135/6</p>	<p>142/15 147/2 147/2 162/2 169/4 171/17 172/8 178/7 193/11 219/1 235/25 236/1 <b>says [11]</b> 28/13 39/6 63/7 75/16 76/6 101/24 102/14 102/21 118/2 147/21 228/22</p> <p><b>scale [4]</b> 7/19 71/17 78/17 79/15</p> <p><b>scaled [3]</b> 97/24 187/14 212/21</p> <p><b>scaled-up [3]</b> 97/24 187/14 212/21</p> <p><b>scaling [1]</b> 80/16</p> <p><b>scenario [2]</b> 56/8 170/23</p> <p><b>schedule [1]</b> 147/20</p> <p><b>scheme [4]</b> 63/3 97/14 210/6 220/10</p> <p><b>schemes [1]</b> 63/22</p> <p><b>Scholar [1]</b> 24/22</p> <p><b>school [5]</b> 26/24 118/21 119/13 187/9 239/20</p> <p><b>schools [4]</b> 118/4 120/19 121/3 202/10</p> <p><b>science [20]</b> 18/12 23/5 25/13 26/14 27/6 72/18 88/3 89/4 89/21 94/22 95/5 95/21 95/23 102/20 105/15 108/10 108/19 175/7 181/17 205/6</p> <p><b>Sciences [1]</b> 96/20</p> <p><b>scientific [29]</b> 56/2 90/5 90/11 90/25 91/7 91/13 92/8 92/19 93/10 96/12 96/17 97/21 98/8 99/21 102/17 109/9 109/21 110/3 111/6 115/12 115/13 117/14 151/4 157/5 159/17 159/23 159/25 174/14 211/3</p> <p><b>scientifically [4]</b> 15/22 109/10 150/17 199/13</p> <p><b>scientist [1]</b> 201/13</p> <p><b>scientists [8]</b> 2/1 2/10 3/22 72/5 90/17 96/13 101/10 184/11</p> <p><b>Scotland [17]</b> 73/7 99/18 108/16 113/15 115/17 115/18 115/25 116/3 116/23 117/1 118/3 118/10 120/13 120/20 163/20 230/21 237/7</p> <p><b>Scots [1]</b> 112/21</p> <p><b>Scottish [8]</b> 105/21 111/15 112/4 117/14 120/1 120/5 120/15 121/13</p>	<p><b>scratched [1]</b> 21/3</p> <p><b>screen [7]</b> 54/12 87/19 97/3 101/18 178/12 178/12 217/5 <b>screening [6]</b> 174/11 174/11 174/16 174/20 174/22 175/8</p> <p><b>script [1]</b> 239/1</p> <p><b>scroll [2]</b> 54/23 174/9</p> <p><b>seal [1]</b> 13/7</p> <p><b>Sec [2]</b> 205/16 206/9</p> <p><b>second [33]</b> 9/1 15/10 19/6 28/19 28/21 31/24 38/9 44/18 46/10 64/12 64/15 64/20 65/3 65/8 65/20 66/2 66/22 69/9 70/19 79/2 81/9 95/7 101/4 104/11 115/19 120/18 134/6 136/3 141/16 143/14 171/18 179/19 210/1</p> <p><b>secondary [2]</b> 51/15 185/13</p> <p><b>secondly [9]</b> 13/6 21/1 25/18 47/10 88/23 116/3 166/25 194/3 202/13</p> <p><b>Secretariat [1]</b> 188/9</p> <p><b>secretary [13]</b> 9/25 26/4 68/6 68/8 68/17 68/22 74/23 113/3 155/1 155/13 161/25 199/5 203/14</p> <p><b>sector [2]</b> 206/11 241/5</p> <p><b>sectors [1]</b> 206/8</p> <p><b>secure [1]</b> 87/24</p> <p><b>security [1]</b> 219/23</p> <p><b>see [43]</b> 1/15 5/4 14/2 32/11 34/21 35/9 36/12 37/2 39/12 42/7 45/22 50/12 50/14 55/11 55/23 56/13 62/13 65/10 69/19 94/21 96/11 105/19 109/5 114/17 119/4 122/5 128/11 130/20 131/11 147/20 166/5 174/10 176/3 181/14 195/5 195/6 195/12 197/12 197/20 212/13 212/17 218/3 228/2</p> <p><b>seeded [1]</b> 201/7</p> <p><b>seedings [1]</b> 186/24</p> <p><b>seeing [2]</b> 178/16 181/18</p> <p><b>seek [3]</b> 11/6 68/22 87/24</p> <p><b>seeking [2]</b> 28/17 229/12</p> <p><b>seem [3]</b> 86/20 231/1 233/13</p> <p><b>seemed [5]</b> 33/13</p>	<p>137/6 139/18 145/15 208/1</p> <p><b>seemingly [1]</b> 203/25</p> <p><b>seems [4]</b> 57/2 78/14 103/1 221/8</p> <p><b>seen [18]</b> 3/3 3/9 9/17 16/19 19/8 20/18 22/3 23/22 49/5 49/12 54/13 66/24 70/8 140/1 145/23 147/17 157/17 202/2</p> <p><b>segment [2]</b> 33/14 33/14</p> <p><b>segmentation [1]</b> 15/16</p> <p><b>segmented [1]</b> 12/25</p> <p><b>segments [1]</b> 13/7</p> <p><b>seized [1]</b> 5/7</p> <p><b>selection [1]</b> 2/9</p> <p><b>self [20]</b> 93/23 94/20 145/3 145/6 145/10 145/10 145/14 146/11 147/24 148/14 148/15 148/16 152/21 179/22 214/1 238/10 238/14 238/17 239/8 239/8</p> <p><b>self-employed [2]</b> 152/21 239/8</p> <p><b>self-evident [1]</b> 179/22</p> <p><b>self-isolate [6]</b> 93/23 145/10 145/10 146/11 238/17 239/8</p> <p><b>self-isolation [8]</b> 145/3 145/6 147/24 148/14 148/15 148/16 238/10 238/14</p> <p><b>self-referred [1]</b> 94/20</p> <p><b>self-regulate [1]</b> 214/1</p> <p><b>semantics [1]</b> 77/12</p> <p><b>send [4]</b> 140/17 161/24 161/24 213/12</p> <p><b>sending [1]</b> 2/10</p> <p><b>sends [1]</b> 159/6</p> <p><b>senior [4]</b> 42/3 95/16 138/10 151/2</p> <p><b>sense [70]</b> 4/4 5/8 6/13 8/3 9/8 10/16 13/16 14/22 15/7 17/14 19/16 21/21 21/24 25/24 27/2 27/14 31/10 31/17 37/7 43/9 43/17 43/20 44/23 45/3 46/10 47/15 49/14 51/18 51/23 52/6 52/7 52/13 53/3 54/15 57/11 58/15 58/18 62/15 79/17 80/15 84/1 88/18 89/5 90/3 94/7 94/13 95/23 100/12 100/21 103/9 106/21</p>
---	---	---	--	--



<b>S</b>	186/4 189/8 195/4 195/7	<b>should [45]</b> 1/15 2/2 4/9 10/12 22/14 25/10 27/22 34/9 64/4 66/21 74/20 75/25 76/10 79/14 79/18 81/7 81/18 83/13 84/5 91/11 93/17 93/22 100/11 101/6 102/8 102/11 103/21 104/24 108/8 108/13 108/17 114/22 124/5 130/19 132/14 143/12 146/19 183/25 184/17 218/16 219/1 219/15 219/15 221/10 227/21	14/19 17/12 29/10 37/10 39/12 42/9 42/11 60/13 69/8 85/1 94/24 97/17 114/16 232/5	<b>Sir Patrick [12]</b> 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 33/5 36/1 41/9 57/21 64/10 119/16 147/21 157/5
<b>sense...</b> [19] 109/1 109/10 110/25 113/13 116/1 126/1 127/10 133/10 136/25 137/1 138/20 140/24 146/7 154/2 164/9 187/2 211/21 222/4 240/24	<b>seven days [6]</b> 162/21 185/20 185/22 189/8 195/4 195/7	<b>shouldn't [5]</b> 29/10 30/7 32/11 124/14 168/14	<b>simultaneous [1]</b> 97/18	<b>Sir Patrick Vallance [5]</b> 56/1 90/9 117/19 117/22 210/7
<b>sensible [21]</b> 2/6 2/8 16/17 19/21 22/6 22/21 26/11 41/16 50/4 83/5 83/24 84/1 84/12 85/2 86/17 86/20 110/11 141/2 210/24 218/10 218/12	<b>several [16]</b> 2/5 10/10 33/10 33/11 77/23 125/6 125/20 125/23 131/12 153/5 159/1 175/17 177/7 177/23 186/21 212/10	<b>show [2]</b> 100/5 167/2 <b>showed [1]</b> 195/19 <b>shows [8]</b> 23/21 154/17 159/7 166/25 167/16 185/18 207/9 208/25	<b>simultaneously [1]</b> 212/23	<b>Sir Patrick Vallance's [1]</b> 118/1
<b>sensibly [1]</b> 223/6	<b>severe [17]</b> 12/11 15/1 15/6 16/11 29/24 30/23 55/4 57/4 57/5 57/5 170/4 170/8 176/16 177/24 179/21 191/2 204/19	<b>shrunk [2]</b> 46/14 50/24	<b>since [3]</b> 177/8 191/5 194/4	<b>Sir Patrick's [3]</b> 36/19 92/10 118/11
<b>sensitive [3]</b> 126/15 162/5 192/22	<b>severely [2]</b> 15/10 55/2	<b>shrink [2]</b> 46/14 50/24	<b>Singapore [1]</b> 164/24	<b>Sir Stephen Powis [1]</b> 141/22
<b>sent [13]</b> 1/18 2/6 9/24 87/22 140/15 165/5 169/3 202/8 209/17 212/13 212/14 213/8 214/8	<b>severity [2]</b> 171/1 171/8	<b>shunted [1]</b> 36/18	<b>single [12]</b> 41/20 116/15 116/16 122/8 122/13 129/4 129/7 142/16 162/3 211/11 217/25 241/24	<b>Sir Stephen Powis [1]</b> 141/22
<b>sentence [3]</b> 69/9 170/10 179/20	<b>Shafi [3]</b> 139/3 140/4 140/9	<b>show [2]</b> 100/5 167/2 <b>showed [1]</b> 195/19 <b>shows [8]</b> 23/21 154/17 159/7 166/25 167/16 185/18 207/9 208/25	<b>Sinn [1]</b> 88/24	<b>sit [3]</b> 126/19 161/25 183/9
<b>sentiment [1]</b> 237/4	<b>shall [6]</b> 25/21 67/8 175/10 195/4 198/21 198/21	<b>shrunk [2]</b> 46/14 50/24	<b>Sinn Féin [1]</b> 88/24	<b>sitrep [1]</b> 56/20
<b>sentinel [1]</b> 183/16	<b>shape [2]</b> 7/18 227/17	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>sits [1]</b> 67/23
<b>separate [13]</b> 24/11 24/11 31/17 36/21 37/18 65/12 90/7 94/8 94/15 103/9 108/20 197/4 201/20	<b>shared [3]</b> 88/16 102/18 120/25	<b>shunted [1]</b> 36/18	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>situation [19]</b> 11/12 11/17 11/23 12/16 12/20 14/2 35/10 37/3 39/4 53/3 58/3 80/24 86/2 86/18 143/20 180/24 187/21 213/19 222/9
<b>September [5]</b> 65/17 147/21 150/10 206/25 209/20	<b>sharing [3]</b> 116/17 116/17 116/23	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>situations [2]</b> 70/24 89/25
<b>sequencing [2]</b> 168/22 168/24	<b>she [6]</b> 105/15 105/17 105/18 112/23 120/16 144/18	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>six [4]</b> 19/9 48/21 182/17 182/18
<b>sequential [1]</b> 227/4	<b>shepherd [1]</b> 162/3	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>six days [2]</b> 182/17 182/18
<b>series [2]</b> 50/1 118/24	<b>shield [2]</b> 16/6 16/14	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>six months [1]</b> 19/9
<b>serious [6]</b> 51/1 64/20 93/25 139/18 153/19 170/7	<b>shielded [1]</b> 12/25	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>six weeks [1]</b> 48/21
<b>seriously [4]</b> 18/4 177/13 183/10 206/5	<b>shielding [17]</b> 13/11 15/17 37/10 37/10 131/5 131/11 132/18 132/20 133/4 133/9 133/12 133/14 133/16 134/21 135/10 135/10 138/3	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>size [2]</b> 129/15 135/8
<b>servants [2]</b> 53/21 145/13	<b>shift [2]</b> 241/8 241/8	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>skilled [1]</b> 58/25
<b>serve [1]</b> 88/4	<b>ship [1]</b> 193/20	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>skillsets [1]</b> 160/18
<b>served [3]</b> 160/20 209/13 243/11	<b>shone [1]</b> 127/19	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>Sky [1]</b> 203/6
<b>service [4]</b> 57/12 84/3 97/11 240/6	<b>shorn [1]</b> 4/1	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>Sky TV [1]</b> 203/6
<b>services [1]</b> 40/9	<b>short [30]</b> 6/2 8/20 12/1 18/10 31/23 32/5 41/20 59/16 67/11 68/1 73/5 85/1 96/25 97/7 103/8 122/7 140/1 141/8 141/20 145/1 149/18 165/19 176/6 190/8 193/19 198/24 211/15 238/6 239/1 239/22	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>slam [1]</b> 67/2
<b>set [5]</b> 40/4 40/16 84/9 104/11 218/1	<b>short-cut [1]</b> 103/8	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>sleep [2]</b> 193/1 193/20
<b>sets [1]</b> 222/12	<b>shortage [1]</b> 152/15	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>slight [2]</b> 33/4 33/5
<b>setting [8]</b> 11/11 49/5 121/9 175/19 204/12 204/12 204/12 204/13	<b>shortly [2]</b> 32/21 120/13	<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 190/22 194/14 200/8 210/7 210/8 241/22 242/24 244/3 244/14	<b>slightly [20]</b> 29/20 36/1 39/4 59/12 74/8 76/13 78/13 81/3 105/11 107/2 107/10 110/13 110/23 119/8 134/17 165/21 191/5 192/25 237/4 240/10
<b>settings [3]</b> 213/7 242/18 242/19		<b>shut [1]</b> 114/19	<b>SIR [65]</b> 1/3 2/13 2/18 5/8 10/18 18/17 33/5 36/1 36/19 41/9 54/14 56/1 57/21 64/10 67/14 90/9 92/10 92/18 98/24 101/21 108/15 110/14 114/12 117/19 117/22 118/1 118/11 119/16 120/21 121/11 130/5 134/2 135/19 141/22 147/21 149/1 149/22 149/23 150/1 153/11 154/24 157/5 158/9 159/24 165/11 169/7 171/20 179/13 180/21 181/13 182/6 183/6 183/13 183/17 187/12 189/5 1	



<b>S</b>	24/17 42/21 43/7 46/21 49/2 52/21 55/23 60/14 82/12 83/1 93/9 93/9 100/18 101/12 114/15 115/15 119/1 123/25 133/18 134/17 154/9 154/14 155/5 156/11 165/24 166/5 166/13 166/14 168/19 171/2 171/5 178/3 178/18 179/13 180/2 181/2 182/13 192/7 193/25 195/4 198/10 200/23 224/21 239/3 239/12 240/10 241/1 241/21	121/13 153/14 163/15 187/21 196/17 205/9 <b>speakers [6]</b> 58/14 60/22 79/19 97/18 196/16 204/20 <b>speaking [4]</b> 122/25 131/7 144/24 185/20 <b>speaks [1]</b> 207/13 <b>specialising [1]</b> 150/15 <b>specialist [1]</b> 178/23 <b>species [2]</b> 176/13 176/14 <b>specific [13]</b> 84/17 102/12 104/15 117/4 121/3 123/20 132/5 147/15 172/8 197/14 218/23 233/24 240/14 <b>specifically [11]</b> 69/17 87/5 95/12 99/4 118/16 119/1 158/10 202/2 218/1 222/13 222/14 <b>specifics [1]</b> 123/12 <b>specimen [1]</b> 221/15 <b>specimens [1]</b> 221/18 <b>spectrum [2]</b> 181/7 181/15 <b>speculate [1]</b> 121/10 <b>speculative [1]</b> 47/15 <b>speed [9]</b> 36/14 61/22 154/13 184/15 187/5 187/16 187/17 221/18 223/14 <b>speedily [2]</b> 52/19 167/6 <b>spent [2]</b> 8/22 150/16 <b>sphere [2]</b> 25/1 139/1 <b>spheres [1]</b> 139/1 <b>SPI [4]</b> 96/18 96/18 151/16 151/21 <b>SPI-B [1]</b> 96/18 <b>SPI-M [1]</b> 96/18 <b>splitting [1]</b> 67/22 <b>spoke [4]</b> 112/14 115/21 171/20 180/21 <b>spoken [2]</b> 126/4 226/17 <b>Sport [1]</b> 199/6 <b>sporting [8]</b> 199/16 199/16 200/4 202/7 202/11 202/15 203/7 203/9 <b>spotlight [1]</b> 127/19 <b>spread [9]</b> 1/8 7/18 15/17 28/18 108/2 172/1 181/6 219/13 228/5 <b>spring [2]</b> 28/24 139/5 <b>spurious [1]</b> 59/13 <b>stadium [1]</b> 203/4 <b>staff [2]</b> 193/21	222/17 <b>staffing [1]</b> 56/17 <b>Stafford [1]</b> 150/5 <b>stage [33]</b> 14/19 27/11 27/13 32/10 32/18 33/25 36/7 36/9 38/22 45/11 48/18 52/6 52/10 52/15 53/7 53/25 58/24 61/23 62/2 65/8 70/16 84/6 97/15 120/21 125/4 126/5 142/19 155/5 180/14 184/7 217/4 226/10 231/20 <b>staged [1]</b> 233/2 <b>stages [6]</b> 13/25 31/11 100/10 137/18 169/15 220/8 <b>staging [1]</b> 80/2 <b>stand [1]</b> 176/20 <b>standard [1]</b> 218/12 <b>standing [3]</b> 220/11 220/20 223/15 <b>staring [1]</b> 37/3 <b>stark [1]</b> 51/3 <b>start [13]</b> 26/22 46/14 48/19 49/3 90/19 110/22 111/4 115/19 153/20 155/6 191/14 216/22 238/12 <b>started [9]</b> 104/5 107/25 150/20 156/14 157/2 157/7 166/4 167/17 233/5 <b>starting [7]</b> 98/10 100/16 110/14 178/17 188/19 225/3 225/5 <b>starts [1]</b> 220/23 <b>state [14]</b> 9/25 16/2 26/4 39/13 68/6 68/8 68/17 68/22 74/23 84/25 100/13 113/17 155/13 199/5 <b>state's [1]</b> 148/17 <b>stated [4]</b> 21/8 48/25 91/20 219/10 <b>statement [63]</b> 7/7 8/22 10/11 10/22 23/23 24/9 25/9 29/8 29/11 30/11 30/12 36/20 53/22 63/4 63/6 84/10 91/6 94/24 96/22 101/20 109/16 109/17 111/16 114/1 116/2 118/5 118/14 118/25 119/2 120/10 123/23 128/10 128/11 129/9 130/7 150/10 150/11 150/13 154/4 160/9 160/9 161/4 162/6 163/18 164/25 172/12 176/2 177/12 177/22 179/6 180/20 180/22 181/3 181/11	186/16 213/4 226/18 233/1 233/9 234/21 235/17 240/12 241/23 <b>statements [3]</b> 74/16 76/12 77/11 <b>states [3]</b> 112/13 169/3 177/12 <b>stating [1]</b> 137/1 <b>statistical [1]</b> 134/18 <b>status [1]</b> 104/8 <b>stay [18]</b> 4/9 20/19 31/7 32/14 35/22 44/3 44/8 45/5 88/25 89/3 107/22 107/23 109/4 112/18 191/9 192/3 194/11 223/14 <b>stay-at-home [8]</b> 31/7 32/14 35/22 44/3 44/8 45/5 191/9 192/3 <b>stayed [3]</b> 114/6 150/25 164/18 <b>steer [1]</b> 109/4 <b>steered [1]</b> 25/20 <b>stenographer [1]</b> 144/17 <b>step [20]</b> 8/2 35/23 38/7 44/3 47/24 48/1 50/12 57/1 60/2 60/5 61/14 72/24 83/25 176/21 176/25 176/25 177/2 219/23 219/23 226/8 <b>Stephen [1]</b> 141/22 <b>stepped [1]</b> 223/9 <b>stepping [1]</b> 226/4 <b>steps [8]</b> 42/20 64/18 66/20 107/18 128/25 129/10 180/9 209/19 <b>Stevens [1]</b> 56/21 <b>stick [2]</b> 111/10 232/9 <b>still [30]</b> 5/25 11/9 15/11 15/11 16/16 21/5 30/3 30/4 35/7 37/2 45/16 47/5 48/21 74/17 76/13 77/4 80/4 92/23 101/8 114/24 121/23 126/24 137/17 138/9 158/18 159/23 178/12 193/2 206/23 219/9 <b>stimulating [1]</b> 150/25 <b>stood [1]</b> 58/17 <b>stop [10]</b> 15/3 20/11 20/13 59/8 84/20 86/19 193/11 193/17 194/10 218/21 <b>stopped [2]</b> 25/20 104/2 <b>stopping [1]</b> 33/12 <b>stops [1]</b> 7/11 <b>storm [1]</b> 231/16 <b>story [1]</b> 215/2
----------	--	---	---	--

<b>S</b>	1/25 4/16 5/21 7/3 14/4 60/18 101/1 101/3 128/15 131/4 133/8 133/10 167/23 <b>substantial</b> [4] 77/22 132/21 150/13 174/17 <b>substantially</b> [2] 44/17 82/15 <b>substitute</b> [1] 236/14 <b>subtlety</b> [1] 93/10 <b>succeed</b> [1] 50/10 <b>successful</b> [1] 214/4 <b>successor</b> [1] 151/21 <b>such</b> [34] 2/10 7/9 11/7 13/9 15/24 15/24 17/2 28/20 36/14 61/10 72/6 94/2 99/6 105/20 108/5 115/24 123/20 126/16 130/22 134/6 144/17 149/3 152/12 161/7 166/21 170/6 182/25 195/13 213/2 215/6 220/16 224/14 224/21 243/9 <b>suddenly</b> [1] 189/24 <b>suffering</b> [2] 138/1 141/19 <b>suffice</b> [1] 62/12 <b>sufficient</b> [6] 45/21 64/18 78/23 143/9 187/11 220/24 <b>sufficiently</b> [4] 36/13 110/10 135/9 206/5 <b>suggest</b> [4] 161/8 166/18 191/17 206/6 <b>suggested</b> [3] 80/15 147/8 236/18 <b>suggesting</b> [12] 19/16 19/16 19/17 86/18 140/12 176/6 181/6 216/6 228/19 228/20 233/14 237/9 <b>suggestion</b> [3] 48/8 202/14 228/7 <b>suggestions</b> [1] 197/10 <b>suggests</b> [3] 49/10 206/4 226/24 <b>suite</b> [1] 35/19 <b>sum</b> [1] 204/5 <b>summaries</b> [1] 102/20 <b>summarise</b> [4] 40/2 47/18 88/24 145/4 <b>summarised</b> [1] 200/20 <b>summary</b> [6] 39/25 155/19 159/12 165/15 199/13 219/12 <b>summer</b> [4] 63/13 64/9 66/18 206/22 <b>Sunday</b> [5] 41/6 43/13 43/25 50/3 212/4	<b>supplementary</b> [1] 229/13 <b>supply</b> [1] 56/4 <b>support</b> [10] 24/17 145/2 145/5 146/12 147/12 238/9 238/14 239/7 239/12 240/8 <b>supporter</b> [1] 101/25 <b>supporting</b> [2] 148/14 226/20 <b>supportive</b> [1] 162/18 <b>suppose</b> [2] 207/12 227/7 <b>suppress</b> [2] 28/18 210/23 <b>suppression</b> [3] 28/20 29/1 29/23 <b>sure</b> [23] 6/9 20/24 27/6 33/21 46/11 59/18 62/11 72/8 90/11 99/15 100/1 101/14 112/19 122/24 124/20 124/23 141/7 179/1 192/5 195/23 195/25 224/4 235/14 <b>surely</b> [1] 207/9 <b>surface</b> [2] 21/3 201/9 <b>surge</b> [10] 55/6 57/5 57/6 59/6 59/7 60/3 170/7 193/8 219/3 222/1 <b>surgical</b> [3] 226/5 231/15 231/25 <b>surging</b> [1] 191/15 <b>surmise</b> [1] 231/22 <b>surprise</b> [2] 38/18 189/4 <b>surprising</b> [2] 24/6 95/14 <b>surround</b> [1] 157/23 <b>surrounding</b> [1] 217/24 <b>surveillance</b> [1] 185/16 <b>suspect</b> [1] 149/3 <b>sustainable</b> [1] 169/18 <b>sustained</b> [2] 188/22 198/1 <b>swamp</b> [1] 57/3 <b>swamping</b> [1] 55/3 <b>swathe</b> [1] 211/24 <b>swathes</b> [1] 20/3 <b>sweeps</b> [1] 190/3 <b>swept</b> [2] 66/10 66/11 <b>swine</b> [3] 151/17 160/21 184/4 <b>swine flu</b> [3] 151/17 160/21 184/4 <b>Swinson</b> [1] 53/21 <b>sworn</b> [2] 149/23	244/14 <b>symbolic</b> [1] 200/19 <b>symptomatic</b> [5] 74/5 74/10 74/12 81/20 81/21 <b>symptoms</b> [11] 71/12 71/24 78/8 78/21 78/22 78/24 98/10 144/1 170/17 170/17 212/8 <b>Syndrome</b> [6] 132/6 132/14 133/8 133/25 134/4 134/25 <b>synthesising</b> [1] 161/18 <b>system</b> [35] 6/7 6/12 7/15 7/16 13/11 15/3 37/11 55/4 57/16 58/7 60/25 61/1 65/18 73/9 73/20 73/21 101/2 104/13 104/15 120/2 167/7 173/4 182/20 184/19 185/16 187/15 207/3 207/17 208/1 208/7 208/14 209/2 209/13 209/22 212/21 <b>systems</b> [2] 97/25 98/15 <b>Søren</b> [1] 73/8	106/8 114/10 119/12 129/1 148/19 149/4 186/18 188/16 206/3 206/5 209/19 210/11 210/14 222/20 226/25 231/2 231/3 241/15 <b>takes</b> [3] 85/1 195/8 198/9 <b>taking</b> [5] 27/18 85/12 89/21 100/4 196/19 <b>talk</b> [6] 3/10 9/20 22/9 109/18 183/23 202/10 <b>talked</b> [4] 18/25 31/12 35/2 157/11 <b>talking</b> [14] 5/15 5/18 9/6 20/9 21/12 25/4 47/5 48/19 52/8 56/22 74/22 76/20 143/18 171/15 <b>talks</b> [1] 56/16 <b>Tam</b> [6] 149/22 149/23 150/5 241/22 242/22 244/14 <b>Tam's</b> [1] 183/19 <b>tardy</b> [1] 183/14 <b>targeted</b> [3] 85/17 86/17 86/25 <b>task</b> [1] 6/8 <b>Taskforce</b> [1] 157/6 <b>teach</b> [1] 213/25 <b>teachers</b> [3] 118/20 118/23 119/15 <b>team</b> [1] 156/1 <b>technical</b> [19] 15/8 26/14 40/16 64/11 79/9 93/6 93/7 97/2 97/16 98/14 115/4 115/7 148/20 154/9 157/18 196/9 233/23 237/18 240/5 <b>technically</b> [3] 7/7 35/1 114/20 <b>Tedros</b> [1] 142/3 <b>telegram</b> [1] 69/4 <b>television</b> [1] 195/19 <b>tell</b> [9] 45/6 118/14 118/16 170/16 171/7 181/18 207/14 230/25 233/7 <b>telling</b> [3] 178/8 179/1 237/12 <b>tells</b> [2] 171/1 171/8 <b>temporary</b> [1] 84/23 <b>ten</b> [5] 78/21 143/4 144/15 185/6 186/4 <b>ten days</b> [1] 186/4 <b>ten minutes</b> [2] 143/4 144/15 <b>tenor</b> [1] 148/9 <b>tens</b> [1] 203/3 <b>term</b> [14] 9/2 9/13 12/1 17/14 18/25 26/6
		<b>T</b>		
		<b>table</b> [5] 77/23 78/2 78/10 91/2 161/1 <b>tactical</b> [4] 39/25 41/16 41/22 49/23 <b>tail</b> [1] 3/18 <b>take</b> [63] 16/7 16/22 16/22 21/23 23/18 29/6 31/10 31/10 31/16 34/16 35/12 37/13 41/17 43/16 47/25 50/18 51/5 53/4 53/25 60/2 60/5 60/11 61/14 62/2 62/21 62/23 64/17 83/25 84/12 86/17 89/6 95/20 100/5 110/6 110/24 113/20 113/21 119/21 124/21 133/21 137/5 138/8 138/19 139/2 141/16 147/24 148/13 176/25 177/2 181/12 183/10 188/7 195/25 198/20 199/22 220/8 223/21 229/17 229/24 232/10 232/20 233/2 238/1 <b>take-up</b> [1] 34/16 <b>takeaway</b> [1] 74/22 <b>taken</b> [34] 10/4 25/10 36/21 42/21 47/24 54/20 57/1 61/5 62/14 65/11 66/21 77/23 78/2 78/10 84/20 87/4		

<b>T</b>	155/5 156/15 160/1 168/25 173/3 178/15 184/20 188/4 189/9 189/9 189/24 197/15 205/7 209/12 217/5 220/16 228/20 242/11	140/15 140/16 144/12 148/16 149/5 150/3 151/7 157/25 159/13 161/4 161/15 165/17 168/12 169/2 172/9 173/11 173/16 177/4 179/13 179/16 181/10 181/16 183/12 183/25 185/6 189/19 189/21 191/6 192/1 192/12 192/12 193/22 193/23 196/12 196/25 196/25 202/20 210/2 212/19 212/24 215/11 216/8 217/9 218/6 222/17 222/18 222/19 225/13 225/16 226/4 227/2 233/5 238/3 240/9 241/11	75/14 75/19 78/22 78/25 79/2 83/6 83/16 86/11 89/6 89/23 91/7 93/19 94/3 94/4 99/5 100/6 101/4 101/15 101/22 102/25 105/22 107/15 108/14 110/16 110/21 110/25 111/5 119/7 120/12 121/2 121/4 124/9 126/13 128/15 131/13 133/8 133/13 133/14 134/19 134/19 139/8 139/23 140/23 141/5 141/8 146/19 151/16 152/3 152/16 152/17 153/7 153/24 154/11 155/4 155/6 157/3 161/16 161/19 169/9 170/24 171/18 172/16 173/10 176/15 181/19 185/19 185/24 189/15 189/16 192/10 194/7 194/8 194/9 195/1 195/5 196/18 202/13 203/14 205/3 206/25 207/2 207/5 208/23 217/4 217/11 217/25 218/2 218/15 219/4 220/18 220/24 220/24 223/2 223/8 223/13 223/14 224/21 225/23 226/1 226/3 226/4 226/11 226/16 226/23 229/17 229/25 234/6 237/15 239/11 239/25	57/24 60/5 62/8 64/13 78/7 84/21 85/8 88/8 92/10 100/6 106/19 113/13 128/21 132/21 145/16 145/20 156/9 170/18 188/7 191/25 195/3 195/22 196/2 202/22 205/4 205/4 206/8 221/25 223/16 226/22 230/23 231/25 240/4
<b>term... [8]</b> 40/13 42/25 49/17 142/2 143/10 186/19 187/1 193/1	<b>thank [59]</b> 28/16 67/8 67/15 87/8 87/9 89/13 93/13 98/16 98/20 101/15 105/6 111/7 111/9 117/17 119/7 121/16 122/21 123/2 124/20 127/1 129/21 129/23 130/4 135/14 135/15 135/18 137/14 141/15 144/13 148/23 149/1 149/11 149/13 149/15 150/6 150/7 150/9 163/15 168/13 186/15 210/3 214/16 215/25 216/5 217/15 217/21 225/15 232/7 232/12 232/13 237/20 237/22 241/14 241/16 241/17 242/20 242/22 243/16 243/19	<b>their [45]</b> 2/2 2/10 3/6 4/15 13/25 15/3 17/5 19/18 27/17 48/25 50/6 89/6 95/4 96/15 96/21 100/8 101/24 107/3 111/10 120/25 121/3 121/7 124/17 126/7 130/13 134/22 134/23 144/1 147/9 153/22 157/12 160/14 161/6 163/2 164/19 164/19 188/18 196/11 203/21 209/5 214/1 214/2 238/1 238/18 240/17	75/14 75/19 78/22 78/25 79/2 83/6 83/16 86/11 89/6 89/23 91/7 93/19 94/3 94/4 99/5 100/6 101/4 101/15 101/22 102/25 105/22 107/15 108/14 110/16 110/21 110/25 111/5 119/7 120/12 121/2 121/4 124/9 126/13 128/15 131/13 133/8 133/13 133/14 134/19 134/19 139/8 139/23 140/23 141/5 141/8 146/19 151/16 152/3 152/16 152/17 153/7 153/24 154/11 155/4 155/6 157/3 161/16 161/19 169/9 170/24 171/18 172/16 173/10 176/15 181/19 185/19 185/24 189/15 189/16 192/10 194/7 194/8 194/9 195/1 195/5 196/18 202/13 203/14 205/3 206/25 207/2 207/5 208/23 217/4 217/11 217/25 218/2 218/15 219/4 220/18 220/24 220/24 223/2 223/8 223/13 223/14 224/21 225/23 226/1 226/3 226/4 226/11 226/16 226/23 229/17 229/25 234/6 237/15 239/11 239/25	<b>these [59]</b> 3/22 4/20 13/19 19/14 30/15 36/18 41/9 50/14 53/23 74/16 79/7 79/8 84/18 89/4 89/15 92/21 99/24 108/6 109/18 113/1 113/1 114/13 122/2 125/8 125/12 127/17 129/9 131/2 136/21 136/24 141/3 146/8 158/16 160/9 162/14 163/13 163/13 170/20 170/21 170/23 174/4 189/7 191/13 200/7 200/19 206/20 212/23 227/8 232/2 233/1 233/8 233/15 235/7 235/9 235/21 236/7 236/13 237/17 242/12
<b>terms [60]</b> 11/10 23/14 30/24 37/7 40/4 40/21 44/12 46/20 46/20 52/4 56/3 64/11 65/1 65/13 66/11 66/20 68/12 78/1 78/2 78/15 79/12 80/13 85/4 89/11 89/13 90/8 90/10 92/11 96/1 98/6 99/20 104/1 105/3 106/20 106/20 109/6 126/5 151/9 153/22 158/2 160/14 175/4 185/14 185/15 187/22 192/8 194/13 195/14 200/5 202/5 203/7 203/18 206/12 206/14 207/8 222/13 229/21 230/4 233/8 236/9	<b>thank you [44]</b> 28/16 67/15 87/8 87/9 89/13 93/13 101/15 105/6 117/17 121/16 122/21 123/2 127/1 129/21 135/14 135/15 135/18 137/14 141/15 144/13 148/23 149/13 149/15 150/7 150/9 163/15 168/13 186/15 210/3 215/25 216/5 217/15 217/21 225/15 232/7 232/12 232/13 237/22 241/14 241/16 241/17 242/20 243/16 243/19	<b>them [50]</b> 2/3 7/25 12/14 14/10 14/13 15/3 15/13 25/15 25/17 27/19 32/4 43/22 52/18 58/10 62/15 63/18 78/14 78/17 78/21 79/17 81/25 102/21 104/24 110/4 110/6 114/10 121/8 124/15 128/16 134/7 144/15 162/17 163/14 166/8 166/15 170/24 173/19 199/21 199/23 199/24 213/24 214/24 214/25 231/14 231/15 234/9 235/23 235/24 237/12 238/17	57/24 60/5 62/8 64/13 78/7 84/21 85/8 88/8 92/10 100/6 106/19 113/13 128/21 132/21 145/16 145/20 156/9 170/18 188/7 191/25 195/3 195/22 196/2 202/22 205/4 205/4 206/8 221/25 223/16 226/22 230/23 231/25 240/4	
<b>terrible [2]</b> 35/20 61/9	<b>thank you [44]</b> 28/16 67/15 87/8 87/9 89/13 93/13 101/15 105/6 117/17 121/16 122/21 123/2 127/1 129/21 135/14 135/15 135/18 137/14 141/15 144/13 148/23 149/13 149/15 150/7 150/9 163/15 168/13 186/15 210/3 215/25 216/5 217/15 217/21 225/15 232/7 232/12 232/13 237/22 241/14 241/16 241/17 242/20 243/16 243/19	<b>theological [1]</b> 104/1 <b>theoretical [3]</b> 11/23 13/16 49/7	<b>they [143]</b> 3/3 3/10 4/14 5/21 6/9 7/3 13/3 13/8 14/10 14/11 14/18 14/25 15/7 16/2 17/13 18/5 18/6 19/5 19/15 19/16 19/17 20/6 20/23 20/24 20/25 22/14 22/24 24/1 25/18 26/12 27/11 27/13 29/17 31/2 31/2 34/7 34/9 34/19 35/1 35/3 35/18 36/10 36/10 36/13 37/5 37/6 37/6 39/1 39/2 42/4 43/10 45/24 46/8 46/16 50/10 51/9 51/11 52/18 52/20 52/20 52/22 52/24 53/10 53/10 56/15 59/21 60/9 60/10 61/7 62/15 66/23 72/3 83/2 85/2 85/11 86/16 89/5 89/10 90/22 93/23 94/5 94/19 94/25 95/16 95/20 96/21 96/22 98/13 100/11 101/11 102/10 102/15 102/16 102/19 102/22 103/5 103/5 106/11 107/3 108/8 110/11 111/22 112/5 124/17 126/1 128/11 130/14 132/8 132/10 132/14	
<b>terrific [2]</b> 35/20 61/9	<b>thank you [44]</b> 28/16 67/15 87/8 87/9 89/13 93/13 101/15 105/6 117/17 121/16 122/21 123/2 127/1 129/21 135/14 135/15 135/18 137/14 141/15 144/13 148/23 149/13 149/15 150/7 150/9 163/15 168/13 186/15 210/3 215/25 216/5 217/15 217/21 225/15 232/7 232/12 232/13 237/22 241/14 241/16 241/17 242/20 243/16 243/19	<b>theological [1]</b> 104/1 <b>theoretical [3]</b> 11/23 13/16 49/7	<b>theory [5]</b> 32/2 32/6 33/9 36/6 36/21	
<b>terribly [3]</b> 166/9 168/20 236/8	<b>thank you [44]</b> 28/16 67/15 87/8 87/9 89/13 93/13 101/15 105/6 117/17 121/16 122/21 123/2 127/1 129/21 135/14 135/15 135/18 137/14 141/15 144/13 148/23 149/13 149/15 150/7 150/9 163/15 168/13 186/15 210/3 215/25 216/5 217/15 217/21 225/15 232/7 232/12 232/13 237/22 241/14 241/16 241/17 242/20 243/16 243/19	<b>therapeutics [1]</b> 157/21	<b>there [324]</b>	
<b>territories [2]</b> 93/19 164/19	<b>that [1411]</b>	<b>therapeutics [1]</b> 157/21	<b>there's [34]</b> 9/11 17/4 17/21 24/18 24/19 28/9 71/22 75/25 79/2 103/10 106/2 106/16 116/7 117/8 158/17 163/12 165/19 166/10 166/11 166/23 171/18 172/17 185/8 185/13 200/13 203/6 220/11 220/14 220/16 225/8 226/11 231/13 241/6 241/12	
<b>test [13]</b> 57/2 79/15 79/15 97/8 97/25 98/14 111/4 141/5 187/14 201/11 211/14 212/4 212/24	<b>that's [119]</b> 7/11 8/5 8/13 8/25 13/21 15/5 15/5 15/7 17/7 21/19 23/19 24/13 26/2 27/24 29/2 29/3 29/18 32/4 32/21 33/17 33/20 39/3 44/18 59/4 61/1 61/18 62/12 63/22 65/24 68/25 68/25 71/13 72/4 74/8 76/8 76/20 76/25 77/19 78/6 79/12 79/18 81/3 83/19 90/24 91/15 97/4 100/5 100/9 101/14 104/8 105/11 110/22 111/6 113/16 123/17 127/24 129/21 130/7 132/2 135/8 135/12 138/20 138/22 140/5	<b>thereafter [2]</b> 14/18 64/18	<b>thereby [1]</b> 174/2 <b>therefore [41]</b> 13/2 20/9 21/17 27/25 29/6 34/17 43/13 49/9	
<b>tested [3]</b> 109/22 110/24 212/23	<b>that's [119]</b> 7/11 8/5 8/13 8/25 13/21 15/5 15/5 15/7 17/7 21/19 23/19 24/13 26/2 27/24 29/2 29/3 29/18 32/4 32/21 33/17 33/20 39/3 44/18 59/4 61/1 61/18 62/12 63/22 65/24 68/25 68/25 71/13 72/4 74/8 76/8 76/20 76/25 77/19 78/6 79/12 79/18 81/3 83/19 90/24 91/15 97/4 100/5 100/9 101/14 104/8 105/11 110/22 111/6 113/16 123/17 127/24 129/21 130/7 132/2 135/8 135/12 138/20 138/22 140/5	<b>therefore [41]</b> 13/2 20/9 21/17 27/25 29/6 34/17 43/13 49/9		
<b>testing [12]</b> 75/9 77/17 78/1 80/17 81/24 82/14 110/1 211/15 211/22 213/1 223/9 223/10	<b>that's [119]</b> 7/11 8/5 8/13 8/25 13/21 15/5 15/5 15/7 17/7 21/19 23/19 24/13 26/2 27/24 29/2 29/3 29/18 32/4 32/21 33/17 33/20 39/3 44/18 59/4 61/1 61/18 62/12 63/22 65/24 68/25 68/25 71/13 72/4 74/8 76/8 76/20 76/25 77/19 78/6 79/12 79/18 81/3 83/19 90/24 91/15 97/4 100/5 100/9 101/14 104/8 105/11 110/22 111/6 113/16 123/17 127/24 129/21 130/7 132/2 135/8 135/12 138/20 138/22 140/5			
<b>tests [15]</b> 71/8 78/4 78/5 78/7 78/16 78/16 78/18 78/20 78/23 78/25 79/4 81/11 82/3 83/16 212/22	<b>that's [119]</b> 7/11 8/5 8/13 8/25 13/21 15/5 15/5 15/7 17/7 21/19 23/19 24/13 26/2 27/24 29/2 29/3 29/18 32/4 32/21 33/17 33/20 39/3 44/18 59/4 61/1 61/18 62/12 63/22 65/24 68/25 68/25 71/13 72/4 74/8 76/8 76/20 76/25 77/19 78/6 79/12 79/18 81/3 83/19 90/24 91/15 97/4 100/5 100/9 101/14 104/8 105/11 110/22 111/6 113/16 123/17 127/24 129/21 130/7 132/2 135/8 135/12 138/20 138/22 140/5			
<b>text [3]</b> 112/12 113/25 166/3	<b>that's [119]</b> 7/11 8/5 8/13 8/25 13/21 15/5 15/5 15/7 17/7 21/19 23/19 24/13 26/2 27/24 29/2 29/3 29/18 32/4 32/21 33/17 33/20 39/3 44/18 59/4 61/1 61/18 62/12 63/22 65/24 68/25 68/25 71/13 72/4 74/8 76/8 76/20 76/25 77/19 78/6 79/12 79/18 81/3 83/19 90/24 91/15 97/4 100/5 100/9 101/14 104/8 105/11 110/22 111/6 113/16 123/17 127/24 129/21 130/7 132/2 135/8 135/12 138/20 138/22 140/5			
<b>textbook [1]</b> 151/3 <b>than [59]</b> 5/22 8/16 15/10 19/22 27/11 27/13 29/24 30/21 31/20 32/1 32/16 43/1 44/16 52/1 52/24 66/2 73/11 74/4 83/16 85/9 94/22 97/15 98/1 98/18 100/1 101/3 103/24 106/18 106/21 107/2 110/10 113/16 116/14 120/5 122/6 123/23 145/13 146/5 150/1 151/4 153/18	<b>that's [119]</b> 7/11 8/5 8/13 8/25 13/21 15/5 15/5 15/7 17/7 21/19 23/19 24/13 26/2 27/24 29/2 29/3 29/18 32/4 32/21 33/17 33/20 39/3 44/18 59/4 61/1 61/18 62/12 63/22 65/24 68/25 68/25 71/13 72/4 74/8 76/8 76/20 76/25 77/19 78/6 79/12 79/18 81/3 83/19 90/24 91/15 97/4 100/5 100/9 101/14 104/8 105/11 110/22 111/6 113/16 123/17 127/24 129/21 130/7 132/2 135/8 135/12 138/20 138/22 140/5			

<b>T</b>	112/21	197/20 234/8	33/17 33/22 36/4	25/12 47/22 73/9 90/9
<b>they... [33]</b> 133/9	<b>third [7]</b> 38/16 40/9	<b>thoughtful [1]</b> 182/1	36/18 37/1 37/21	91/25 92/15 98/22
133/13 133/25 134/5	66/3 66/8 66/22 70/21	<b>thousands [6]</b> 81/22	41/12 42/2 47/4 50/5	105/16 140/9 141/18
134/19 138/11 144/1	175/24	86/10 86/21 200/25	50/9 50/17 51/17	180/18 197/23 212/15
144/1 158/5 160/17	<b>thirdly [2]</b> 21/8	203/3 220/21	51/24 52/4 55/8 56/9	214/9
173/19 184/14 185/23	167/21	<b>threat [4]</b> 148/18	56/10 57/23 58/20	<b>Tom [1]</b> 81/15
189/9 189/18 189/24	<b>this [534]</b>	150/23 177/14 225/1	59/16 65/8 65/18	<b>tomorrow [2]</b> 112/15
192/18 195/7 205/19	<b>Thomas [6]</b> 122/22	<b>threatened [1]</b> 163/2	65/19 66/6 68/16	243/20
212/5 219/15 220/19	123/3 123/5 129/23	<b>threats [3]</b> 152/10	72/19 74/10 80/6	<b>too [15]</b> 64/16 64/16
229/6 230/25 232/24	147/7 244/10	242/25 243/4	85/14 88/11 99/5	91/3 130/2 183/17
233/5 233/10 235/2	<b>those [115]</b> 3/10 3/19	<b>three [28]</b> 20/16	101/4 101/18 107/7	184/7 184/8 189/6
236/4 236/8 236/10	3/21 4/7 5/25 7/24 9/3	20/19 24/11 35/12	111/10 112/9 113/6	196/23 204/18 204/23
241/8 243/4	9/12 11/14 12/4 13/18	37/18 45/14 52/3 52/8	113/9 114/22 119/11	207/20 209/3 235/14
<b>they'll [3]</b> 82/17	14/7 14/15 16/13	52/9 67/24 70/24 93/9	119/21 121/6 121/15	243/5
82/19 90/21	18/10 18/21 19/4	106/13 107/1 125/25	121/23 130/6 137/12	<b>took [14]</b> 60/8 60/18
<b>they're [14]</b> 3/11 13/2	20/17 23/1 23/8 24/18	143/7 143/8 160/20	137/23 139/18 140/9	61/6 61/7 89/18 98/3
92/22 92/23 95/3	26/25 27/1 27/16 31/5	166/17 171/19 195/11	140/12 141/24 145/1	107/2 128/20 129/10
98/14 98/17 130/17	32/24 33/12 34/6	211/18 211/18 213/6	146/24 149/11 150/9	145/16 154/19 156/10
158/23 178/15 199/21	34/13 34/19 43/9	213/15 213/20 241/7	150/24 151/14 151/24	179/5 211/5
202/17 204/17 227/4	43/21 44/18 45/1	241/9	152/11 152/19 152/20	<b>tool [2]</b> 87/6 144/5
<b>they've [1]</b> 164/18	47/13 47/13 47/15	<b>three days [3]</b> 45/14	155/11 156/7 157/9	<b>tools [2]</b> 77/24 78/10
<b>thing [41]</b> 11/11 17/7	50/5 50/7 51/17 61/2	211/18 211/18	159/20 160/22 162/4	<b>top [14]</b> 31/25 32/4
18/13 19/6 25/22 27/5	64/17 67/7 70/24	<b>three weeks [2]</b>	162/15 163/8 165/25	51/25 53/15 53/25
27/21 29/17 33/6	75/10 76/11 77/11	35/12 52/3	168/2 168/10 178/6	79/9 84/25 85/12
35/20 38/9 44/19	78/12 79/18 80/21	<b>threshold [6]</b> 9/5	179/3 182/19 184/25	171/16 174/8 181/19
46/11 52/11 57/9	81/5 81/19 82/8 87/7	11/25 12/2 17/8 17/16	185/1 185/3 185/4	207/21 210/23 229/19
57/16 59/1 60/14	89/11 92/9 92/22	57/2	185/9 186/12 193/4	<b>topic [10]</b> 54/4 81/9
72/17 80/22 83/5 92/4	93/21 94/13 97/19	<b>throats [1]</b> 163/2	194/20 194/21 195/10	87/15 93/14 99/24
93/2 97/16 110/11	108/18 109/4 111/7	<b>through [51]</b> 3/23 6/4	197/19 199/7 202/23	109/14 109/14 141/16
110/18 113/17 113/23	111/20 113/20 123/10	7/8 10/25 14/15 14/16	209/17 211/13 211/16	232/21 238/7
114/11 115/17 119/24	124/21 124/21 125/18	15/18 18/1 18/5 18/6	212/20 213/10 218/14	<b>topics [5]</b> 67/22 68/1
122/6 122/6 129/4	126/20 127/16 128/23	18/9 19/14 21/12	223/23 225/1 231/2	87/13 99/6 135/20
141/2 142/16 142/18	129/1 129/2 130/16	22/11 54/23 61/3 67/4	232/9 234/4 234/10	<b>total [4]</b> 170/22
144/6 144/9 156/23	131/10 133/5 133/19	76/17 77/2 91/22 96/2	236/8 240/2 243/12	171/13 221/17 240/1
191/6	133/25 136/17 137/24	96/15 98/6 102/22	<b>timeline [1]</b> 165/3	<b>totality [5]</b> 193/2
<b>things [61]</b> 20/16	139/25 141/19 143/8	103/6 103/23 104/6	<b>timeliness [1]</b> 188/24	200/5 201/18 206/17
20/18 20/20 21/10	143/14 156/19 156/25	111/3 128/2 131/5	<b>timely [2]</b> 123/14	206/18
24/11 31/18 37/18	157/23 158/5 158/7	135/6 135/7 137/19	189/13	<b>totally [1]</b> 237/13
37/23 42/10 43/22	159/25 171/4 172/3	139/14 141/4 146/13	<b>times [13]</b> 10/10	<b>totemic [2]</b> 112/23
67/3 67/5 71/10 71/11	175/3 179/19 188/10	151/24 154/15 158/7	35/13 47/2 55/1 55/2	113/6
77/17 79/8 80/14	188/15 188/16 189/15	165/5 171/17 175/9	56/4 56/5 57/22 58/2	<b>touch [3]</b> 89/3 229/6
80/15 81/5 84/5 86/2	194/13 195/6 195/13	197/20 201/4 207/16	143/7 156/6 185/7	230/7
87/3 90/10 92/22 98/8	195/16 196/12 201/10	218/2 223/25 224/10	239/25	<b>touched [2]</b> 9/14
100/15 103/10 103/10	204/15 205/17 206/11	226/8 229/24 239/22	<b>timetable [1]</b> 149/4	115/2
108/11 114/8 114/13	207/21 219/22 220/4	<b>throughout [9]</b> 64/9	<b>timetables [2]</b> 120/5	<b>touching [1]</b> 89/1
114/22 115/17 116/18	237/14 237/21 238/21	124/1 126/17 163/18	120/6	<b>tough [1]</b> 144/17
125/5 125/6 126/2	240/4	164/15 164/19 174/25	<b>timing [7]</b> 1/13 24/1	<b>tourism [1]</b> 201/4
129/8 131/4 136/16	<b>though [8]</b> 4/17 27/5	187/1 206/22	27/24 87/25 88/6	<b>towards [5]</b> 40/22
136/24 137/3 138/11	52/16 69/13 70/12	<b>thrust [1]</b> 107/9	88/14 237/5	52/19 131/7 149/2
139/12 141/3 142/6	88/8 92/3 170/4	<b>Thursday [2]</b> 212/7	<b>tiny [6]</b> 175/20	183/7
142/10 142/14 143/17	<b>thought [47]</b> 2/5 4/17	243/23	176/16 176/17 176/17	<b>towards 1 [1]</b> 52/19
152/13 157/3 157/10	4/18 9/21 10/7 12/15	<b>tied [1]</b> 186/9	176/17 239/1	<b>trace [2]</b> 98/15
158/16 173/3 178/14	13/11 14/8 15/25 16/1	<b>tier [9]</b> 65/18 207/3	<b>tired [1]</b> 159/3	187/15
179/8 184/23 189/23	16/3 17/24 18/5 18/6	207/17 208/1 208/7	<b>titled [1]</b> 39/24	<b>tracing [4]</b> 71/11
206/20 216/18 216/19	18/7 18/20 19/19	208/17 209/2 209/13	<b>today [6]</b> 74/25 98/19	81/2 97/11 97/14
<b>think [379]</b>	19/20 19/21 20/22	209/22	150/7 198/22 238/13	<b>track [3]</b> 154/24
<b>thinking [14]</b> 18/4	20/25 21/2 21/22	<b>tiered [1]</b> 207/21	242/21	159/3 197/10
18/8 31/21 34/24	26/13 31/20 31/22	<b>tiering [1]</b> 208/10	<b>together [14]</b> 33/16	<b>tracking [1]</b> 173/17
39/20 43/1 77/4	41/15 47/14 52/1	<b>tiers [1]</b> 209/10	33/18 36/19 41/25	<b>tracks [1]</b> 167/13
109/22 110/2 121/20	52/22 63/18 66/5 83/5	<b>tight [1]</b> 149/3	42/12 92/1 116/10	<b>traction [1]</b> 206/15
169/6 178/6 222/7	97/22 114/3 114/5	<b>time [116]</b> 6/2 6/3	119/3 202/21 202/25	<b>trade [1]</b> 84/21
235/16	118/13 135/11 136/7	13/21 15/10 15/11	203/8 204/16 230/3	<b>Trades [1]</b> 144/25
<b>thinks [2]</b> 112/16	137/8 138/6 139/22	17/6 17/25 18/23 22/8	241/9	<b>Trades Union [1]</b>
	146/10 148/21 160/17	28/10 32/15 33/10	<b>told [16]</b> 23/24 24/1	144/25

<b>T</b>	<b>travelling [1]</b> 93/21 <b>Treasury [1]</b> 63/21 <b>treat [3]</b> 94/7 94/14 183/10 <b>treated [2]</b> 82/12 215/4 <b>treating [3]</b> 82/8 93/18 221/16 <b>treatment [4]</b> 55/18 139/1 218/24 219/2 <b>treatments [1]</b> 40/10 <b>tricky [1]</b> 98/1 <b>tried [10]</b> 10/5 20/16 20/19 20/23 21/1 21/7 22/7 35/22 111/1 212/16 <b>trigger [2]</b> 219/3 222/1 <b>triggered [1]</b> 25/4 <b>triggering [1]</b> 1/13 <b>triggers [6]</b> 171/19 171/19 171/22 172/3 172/5 172/8 <b>trivial [3]</b> 48/17 119/24 155/6 <b>trouble [7]</b> 50/21 50/22 50/22 51/7 106/13 178/9 184/17 <b>true [3]</b> 21/9 123/17 219/20 <b>truly [1]</b> 135/22 <b>trust [1]</b> 160/24 <b>truth [1]</b> 161/5 <b>truthful [2]</b> 197/1 197/18 <b>truths [1]</b> 166/12 <b>try [26]</b> 2/8 5/10 13/12 20/13 21/1 28/6 34/21 35/18 38/7 40/2 43/1 49/9 51/9 51/12 51/19 68/13 68/16 99/5 121/10 129/10 131/10 138/21 140/21 173/1 173/10 211/10 <b>trying [36]</b> 17/24 18/2 21/14 21/22 23/6 40/18 41/13 50/23 50/24 76/5 76/17 76/18 77/1 77/13 83/19 89/3 92/25 93/6 93/12 95/17 97/19 97/20 116/10 116/14 117/9 121/17 122/18 125/11 131/1 140/20 142/22 207/25 210/23 215/10 223/13 232/9 <b>Tuesday [1]</b> 212/6 <b>turn [7]</b> 5/24 7/5 85/13 86/3 152/17 209/5 238/1 <b>turning [1]</b> 28/4 <b>TV [2]</b> 203/6 210/10 <b>twice [1]</b> 57/25 <b>two [46]</b> 9/1 9/12	13/15 13/15 24/18 26/18 31/17 33/3 43/21 47/2 52/3 52/8 58/1 58/9 61/2 61/3 62/14 62/22 68/1 70/16 77/11 80/15 88/18 94/7 94/14 95/25 99/14 100/22 102/6 103/9 107/20 115/16 119/22 125/25 135/19 155/20 156/17 157/23 158/15 161/23 163/17 207/23 211/1 230/4 231/1 241/7 <b>two weeks [2]</b> 58/1 207/23 <b>two years [1]</b> 61/3 <b>type [3]</b> 37/12 214/9 218/10 <b>types [1]</b> 146/25 <b>typical [1]</b> 175/12	79/19 97/18 196/16 204/20 <b>uncoiled [1]</b> 28/24 <b>unconscionable [1]</b> 196/3 <b>under [19]</b> 13/8 33/15 38/8 44/16 44/17 47/10 48/14 55/2 57/12 57/18 63/24 98/15 100/21 142/8 144/15 153/18 187/13 201/9 221/16 <b>underestimate [1]</b> 202/17 <b>underestimated [1]</b> 38/17 <b>underlined [1]</b> 81/6 <b>underlying [1]</b> 127/13 <b>underplayed [1]</b> 76/22 <b>understand [39]</b> 1/16 5/11 6/9 7/3 8/14 11/14 12/14 20/7 20/24 21/25 34/5 58/13 59/16 60/10 72/11 78/11 85/22 99/12 99/16 99/17 99/20 99/22 108/23 125/11 128/21 129/10 138/12 160/24 171/17 185/9 188/17 196/8 201/12 216/14 229/14 232/25 233/5 235/8 240/9 <b>understandably [2]</b> 24/4 39/19 <b>understanding [32]</b> 6/18 16/22 17/16 18/16 23/2 23/10 26/15 28/23 30/20 40/24 44/9 44/23 56/25 57/7 60/8 74/18 80/17 92/7 119/10 123/22 124/24 137/16 167/11 172/20 187/11 194/12 211/8 211/9 220/3 231/20 234/4 234/10 <b>understandings [1]</b> 141/4 <b>understands [2]</b> 30/11 153/16 <b>understatement [1]</b> 71/14 <b>understood [24]</b> 8/5 8/24 9/16 20/3 20/23 22/24 30/22 30/25 54/7 54/7 95/16 126/14 131/17 134/12 144/1 179/7 182/4 186/19 193/10 211/16 211/20 241/1 241/3 242/7	<b>undertaken [1]</b> 239/19 <b>undertaking [1]</b> 17/21 <b>underway [1]</b> 28/21 <b>undiagnosed [1]</b> 165/21 <b>undoubtedly [4]</b> 18/3 53/11 101/10 197/9 <b>unexpected [1]</b> 224/14 <b>unfairly [1]</b> 88/24 <b>unfolded [1]</b> 156/5 <b>unfortunate [1]</b> 173/24 <b>unfortunately [4]</b> 27/12 102/1 139/21 173/9 <b>unfounded [1]</b> 48/10 <b>unhelpful [5]</b> 26/2 27/2 202/9 202/9 202/12 <b>unhelpfully [1]</b> 22/9 <b>uninformed [1]</b> 9/22 <b>Union [1]</b> 144/25 <b>unions [2]</b> 118/23 119/15 <b>unique [4]</b> 69/13 87/16 88/10 160/18 <b>unit [5]</b> 55/18 195/10 220/23 221/2 225/7 <b>United [15]</b> 168/6 169/3 177/15 177/24 179/22 179/24 180/7 180/8 180/11 186/21 186/24 212/21 214/20 214/22 243/12 <b>United Kingdom [14]</b> 168/6 177/15 177/24 179/22 179/24 180/7 180/8 180/11 186/21 186/24 212/21 214/20 214/22 243/12 <b>United States [1]</b> 169/3 <b>units [3]</b> 192/13 222/12 222/13 <b>universities [1]</b> 90/24 <b>University [2]</b> 152/20 159/21 <b>unjoined [1]</b> 41/16 <b>unless [8]</b> 42/20 47/25 54/8 61/14 62/9 93/7 95/15 103/5 <b>unlike [1]</b> 97/20 <b>unlikely [5]</b> 9/7 32/9 68/21 174/17 199/17 <b>unminuted [1]</b> 92/22 <b>unnamed [1]</b> 22/23 <b>unnecessarily [1]</b> 67/2 <b>unprecedented [3]</b> 162/7 162/13 164/2 <b>unravel [1]</b> 128/20
	<b>U</b>			
	<b>UK [52]</b> 24/20 49/9 55/6 67/21 73/5 78/7 85/10 86/19 87/24 88/3 89/19 90/18 90/19 90/21 93/21 94/10 94/14 94/16 95/11 97/15 97/25 98/3 105/18 106/14 106/16 107/4 107/19 108/10 109/21 110/19 111/20 112/6 113/23 114/9 116/3 117/12 117/13 126/4 126/9 157/14 164/5 173/3 175/19 191/18 201/7 201/12 211/10 211/12 214/3 233/16 236/22 237/11 <b>UK CMOs [1]</b> 73/5 <b>UK Government [2]</b> 107/19 233/16 <b>UK's [1]</b> 89/3 <b>UK-wide [1]</b> 117/13 <b>ultimate [4]</b> 40/25 42/16 48/1 51/13 <b>ultimately [5]</b> 56/24 60/7 62/3 189/16 207/5 <b>unable [1]</b> 12/24 <b>unanimity [1]</b> 236/21 <b>unanimous [5]</b> 28/14 28/17 29/6 29/14 226/19 <b>unavailable [1]</b> 158/13 <b>uncertain [3]</b> 38/10 38/10 137/12 <b>uncertainty [2]</b> 173/11 216/20 <b>unclear [8]</b> 16/3 58/14 60/22 77/25			

<b>U</b>	197/23 207/14 209/13 211/22 217/2 226/6 226/25 229/21 243/14 <b>use [21]</b> 6/7 17/15 22/25 23/1 24/15 26/19 54/11 78/25 105/11 121/3 127/23 142/1 160/9 161/7 172/6 177/23 202/19 217/25 218/1 219/22 221/4 <b>used [19]</b> 9/1 10/18 26/6 34/12 58/20 61/12 83/4 113/10 115/5 116/4 122/23 134/15 144/8 167/21 168/14 216/18 216/19 237/25 238/3 <b>useful [14]</b> 27/5 82/20 91/1 91/18 100/19 101/11 102/21 108/23 122/16 139/23 142/18 144/9 198/17 232/24 <b>usefulness [2]</b> 234/21 235/7 <b>uses [3]</b> 9/13 61/10 193/4 <b>using [6]</b> 9/8 17/13 44/20 121/8 202/19 233/14 <b>usual [1]</b> 154/22 <b>usually [1]</b> 180/3 <b>utility [1]</b> 122/17 <b>utterly [1]</b> 19/3	<b>Van [7]</b> 149/22 149/23 150/5 183/19 241/22 242/22 244/14 <b>Van-Tam [3]</b> 149/22 149/23 244/14 <b>variant [6]</b> 15/19 53/14 66/4 66/10 84/23 85/19 <b>varied [1]</b> 54/25 <b>variety [4]</b> 59/13 65/25 108/25 142/9 <b>various [18]</b> 12/13 14/8 20/18 22/1 22/2 46/23 63/22 68/7 110/21 121/24 121/25 123/9 124/18 127/15 143/17 145/13 152/13 200/4 <b>vast [4]</b> 162/16 162/16 162/16 243/8 <b>ventilated [1]</b> 235/6 <b>ventilation [2]</b> 203/1 213/22 <b>ventilators [2]</b> 56/16 59/2 <b>versa [1]</b> 88/21 <b>version [1]</b> 131/14 <b>versus [1]</b> 175/11 <b>very [248]</b> <b>via [4]</b> 2/8 93/7 104/4 215/22 <b>vice [1]</b> 88/21 <b>vice versa [1]</b> 88/21 <b>victims [1]</b> 243/3 <b>victims' [1]</b> 243/3 <b>view [93]</b> 2/2 2/11 2/18 6/7 9/4 10/6 10/11 11/12 11/14 13/18 14/12 15/19 17/14 18/1 18/12 18/15 22/12 23/19 24/10 27/2 27/3 27/8 27/20 29/7 29/14 32/12 32/15 32/17 37/1 42/11 42/25 43/2 44/13 51/10 52/14 59/10 60/17 63/17 64/10 66/3 68/19 76/14 76/24 79/17 84/1 84/6 84/13 84/23 85/6 85/11 86/16 95/5 95/14 95/21 96/2 101/6 106/17 109/9 110/21 110/25 113/12 119/2 120/23 120/25 121/11 121/11 122/9 122/19 127/9 128/15 129/19 136/16 136/21 136/22 139/11 140/17 145/9 146/21 170/6 177/20 179/6 187/3 188/20 188/21 188/24 190/17 190/19 190/21 197/24 200/17 210/11	210/14 221/12 <b>views [28]</b> 1/19 2/11 2/19 24/24 34/14 43/20 84/9 92/7 95/2 95/15 96/12 96/15 110/24 111/18 112/4 112/9 113/6 113/8 113/20 121/2 136/24 153/4 154/7 161/5 196/11 233/15 233/19 233/21 <b>vigorous [1]</b> 147/14 <b>violent [1]</b> 243/13 <b>viral [8]</b> 47/23 181/6 184/13 184/22 186/5 186/6 196/7 242/5 <b>virologist [2]</b> 176/19 176/20 <b>virtually [1]</b> 32/14 <b>virtue [4]</b> 4/17 154/19 159/20 203/23 <b>virus [43]</b> 7/10 13/17 40/7 40/7 53/12 54/10 69/14 78/25 84/16 85/10 150/18 150/22 157/18 164/3 167/22 168/16 168/25 170/8 171/2 172/16 173/18 175/12 176/12 176/21 177/9 177/14 180/5 185/25 186/20 188/23 190/15 197/15 201/6 203/1 207/16 212/3 215/16 216/15 218/10 219/14 225/5 241/12 242/8 <b>viruses [11]</b> 150/24 154/10 167/13 175/16 178/24 180/14 184/13 184/24 185/1 185/2 185/3 <b>visibility [1]</b> 188/1 <b>vital [3]</b> 93/17 169/14 186/5 <b>voice [2]</b> 238/2 243/18 <b>voices [1]</b> 159/25 <b>voluntary [3]</b> 38/14 38/19 61/24 <b>vulnerabilities [1]</b> 129/17 <b>vulnerable [8]</b> 13/25 15/2 38/6 39/15 132/9 242/9 242/12 242/13	182/12 <b>Wales [23]</b> 99/4 100/20 101/10 101/12 101/17 102/9 102/11 103/10 103/19 104/16 104/16 104/18 106/18 107/21 107/22 107/24 108/2 108/9 108/15 163/20 230/22 235/1 237/16 <b>Wales' [1]</b> 99/20 <b>walking [1]</b> 131/7 <b>want [51]</b> 1/8 3/15 3/19 8/18 13/10 25/16 26/6 28/5 39/22 43/11 47/14 61/8 73/5 76/5 78/4 78/15 79/8 87/15 94/4 95/18 99/10 101/15 103/6 105/10 106/4 112/17 117/18 120/14 124/16 126/22 126/23 133/4 138/24 141/16 153/3 156/23 162/5 163/8 163/12 166/6 176/20 177/1 187/7 192/9 192/21 217/6 219/5 232/10 235/4 235/22 243/7 <b>wanted [21]</b> 2/15 9/21 11/20 12/14 20/19 25/16 29/21 41/19 45/25 50/18 51/5 97/22 119/16 119/18 120/9 133/25 139/17 139/17 186/15 205/10 206/2 <b>wanting [2]</b> 27/14 62/2 <b>wants [2]</b> 112/23 113/12 <b>wards [1]</b> 215/1 <b>warn [2]</b> 203/24 242/3 <b>warned [1]</b> 141/22 <b>Warner [3]</b> 1/12 3/8 5/10 <b>warning [6]</b> 29/17 73/20 184/7 205/4 207/8 209/18 <b>warrant [1]</b> 191/2 <b>Warwick [1]</b> 161/3 <b>was [877]</b> <b>washing [1]</b> 187/9 <b>wasn't [50]</b> 2/25 12/17 18/1 19/15 22/19 26/8 30/1 35/10 42/11 49/7 50/23 57/13 59/4 62/5 62/6 63/2 65/14 66/6 90/1 95/20 95/23 97/17 103/19 104/7 108/16 108/21 114/2 119/17 134/9 135/7 135/21 138/9 151/22 156/20	
			<b>V</b> <b>vaccinating [1]</b> 110/9 <b>vaccination [8]</b> 111/16 14/25 17/17 18/24 29/5 144/4 144/8 155/22 <b>vaccine [11]</b> 19/7 19/10 19/13 19/13 19/17 19/18 29/13 84/22 85/22 155/24 157/6 <b>Vaccine Taskforce [1]</b> 157/6 <b>vaccine-escaping [1]</b> 84/22 <b>vaccines [7]</b> 11/2 11/12 19/8 157/13 157/20 161/22 240/5 <b>valid [1]</b> 200/9 <b>validity [2]</b> 17/2 161/6 <b>Vallance [9]</b> 28/1 56/1 90/9 115/21 117/19 117/22 137/25 147/20 210/7 <b>Vallance's [1]</b> 118/1 <b>valuable [3]</b> 166/19 166/20 166/24		

<b>W</b>	202/2 210/7 211/6 222/10 223/24 224/10	143/14 144/3 146/1 146/14 148/24 151/15	60/8 60/24 77/1 77/3 77/14 80/5 81/23 82/1	93/1 98/12 100/10 100/16 107/18 111/18				
<b>wasn't... [16]</b> 161/5 161/14 162/1 162/2 172/5 184/6 188/15 196/15 197/19 198/10 202/23 209/25 216/5 224/14 231/20 232/12	<b>weaknesses [2]</b> 98/5 119/23 <b>Weatherby [10]</b> 67/16 67/17 87/9 93/2 200/23 214/17 214/18 232/8 244/6 244/16	157/18 161/17 164/1 164/12 164/16 164/20 167/18 173/25 180/24 181/16 184/23 188/14 194/25 197/20 198/17 200/16 200/21 204/19 204/22 206/19 209/4 209/13 212/7 213/14 215/9 220/15 226/21 227/4 228/20 229/15 230/15 232/2 234/15 238/16 239/21 241/15	85/3 90/4 91/20 92/12 92/25 93/10 95/16 96/4 96/6 98/17 100/5 101/22 104/5 107/4 107/9 107/20 108/8 108/11 108/17 108/22 112/3 112/8 112/17 113/4 113/9 113/24 114/24 115/10 115/22 116/12 117/6 118/8 118/9 118/13 119/10 120/12 120/16 120/22 121/10 121/14 125/18 125/19 125/24 126/22 127/11 127/16 128/22 128/25 129/15 130/20 131/10 131/17 135/6 139/21 140/5 141/8 142/12 142/23 144/1 144/6 146/9 146/21 147/4 148/1 151/15 153/3 155/10 160/6 160/13 160/15 161/1 162/2 162/8 165/13 165/20 169/7 170/21 171/17 172/20 173/10 173/14 177/4 178/1 178/6 181/10 181/18 183/22 184/17 185/15 185/21 187/3 188/1 188/18 192/12 192/12 192/23 194/12 194/12 194/20 195/23 196/1 196/3 196/8 196/11 200/10 200/19 200/24 201/9 201/18 203/7 207/9 207/10 208/25 210/11 210/14 210/22 211/6 214/6 216/8 217/1 217/15 217/23 218/6 219/12 219/21 220/3 221/9 221/10 223/24 224/10 224/18 230/9 233/20 233/24 237/9 242/23	116/13 117/19 120/14 122/9 133/17 134/5 136/2 139/3 140/7 140/15 140/16 142/3 151/24 156/17 158/9 158/11 160/5 161/18 162/17 173/10 175/16 175/18 176/13 178/5 178/7 179/8 179/20 181/5 181/17 182/8 185/4 185/16 186/3 188/15 190/25 194/16 195/13 198/3 200/12 201/11 202/4 204/15 213/14 219/3 220/3 231/17 236/4 241/12 242/8				
<b>watch [5]</b> 166/6 166/13 166/14 166/15 203/5	<b>website [1]</b> 75/20 <b>Wednesday [2]</b> 1/1 212/7 <b>Wednesdays [2]</b> 236/7 236/10	<b>well known [1]</b> 86/13 <b>Welsh [15]</b> 99/1 99/15 99/19 100/7 102/3 102/5 102/14 102/19 103/3 104/12 105/21 108/15 110/2 110/2 120/2 <b>Welsh Government [4]</b> 102/5 102/19 104/12 108/15	113/4 113/9 113/24 114/24 115/10 115/22 116/12 117/6 118/8 118/9 118/13 119/10 120/12 120/16 120/22 121/10 121/14 125/18 125/19 125/24 126/22 127/11 127/16 128/22 128/25 129/15 130/20 131/10 131/17 135/6 139/21 140/5 141/8 142/12 142/23 144/1 144/6 146/9 146/21 147/4 148/1 151/15 153/3 155/10 160/6 160/13 160/15 161/1 162/2 162/8 165/13 165/20 169/7 170/21 171/17 172/20 173/10 173/14 177/4 178/1 178/6 181/10 181/18 183/22 184/17 185/15 185/21 187/3 188/1 188/18 192/12 192/12 192/23 194/12 194/12 194/20 195/23 196/1 196/3 196/8 196/11 200/10 200/19 200/24 201/9 201/18 203/7 207/9 207/10 208/25 210/11 210/14 210/22 211/6 214/6 216/8 217/1 217/15 217/23 218/6 219/12 219/21 220/3 221/9 221/10 223/24 224/10 224/18 230/9 233/20 233/24 237/9 242/23	166/13 166/14 166/15 203/5 <b>wave [14]</b> 8/15 27/24 29/2 29/5 30/4 30/5 46/14 50/24 57/14 64/12 64/15 64/20 205/3 210/1 <b>waves [6]</b> 9/7 9/11 17/25 57/15 160/16 204/25 <b>way [61]</b> 2/11 4/19 17/24 18/20 19/11 20/12 21/12 21/20 22/13 23/14 25/13 44/5 46/9 48/9 51/12 53/1 53/13 61/3 63/18 80/16 81/7 82/19 84/7 86/25 91/3 95/18 96/11 96/18 104/21 110/16 111/1 112/16 119/25 126/15 129/14 136/22 137/2 137/11 137/17 144/3 146/15 164/9 165/13 173/2 175/9 175/21 180/4 192/4 193/13 195/8 195/15 202/20 209/20 213/18 216/22 220/10 238/18 239/9 240/2 240/3 243/11 <b>ways [9]</b> 9/2 22/1 22/3 24/19 65/25 123/20 167/4 181/7 193/5 <b>wayside [1]</b> 129/6 <b>we [396]</b> <b>we'd [7]</b> 21/5 31/22 67/3 100/18 101/13 206/13 206/14 <b>we'll [8]</b> 13/10 13/19 22/9 54/18 58/9 99/5 101/22 140/2 <b>we're [14]</b> 5/15 5/18 11/1 28/9 43/8 44/21 52/8 64/21 81/25 112/19 181/23 206/25 225/18 238/4 <b>we've [30]</b> 19/8 19/9 21/3 23/22 54/20 54/20 75/15 75/20 77/18 80/14 93/1 99/5 99/12 105/9 109/15 111/25 115/16 115/16 137/17 143/4 158/3 165/1 165/14 177/6	<b>Wednesday [2]</b> 1/1 212/7 <b>Wednesdays [2]</b> 236/7 236/10 <b>week [26]</b> 31/3 31/6 39/21 50/13 50/19 51/8 51/9 51/17 52/16 52/17 57/23 57/23 75/14 75/22 76/22 107/25 149/4 152/20 162/21 192/1 194/5 194/21 196/4 207/23 241/10 241/25 <b>weekend [8]</b> 30/14 31/4 39/22 39/23 50/17 189/23 195/18 195/21 <b>weeks [17]</b> 22/1 35/9 35/12 48/21 52/3 52/8 52/9 54/8 58/1 81/23 154/18 165/4 186/21 190/24 191/17 196/1 207/23 <b>weigh [2]</b> 64/23 196/20 <b>weight [3]</b> 40/24 92/8 183/7 <b>welcome [1]</b> 197/19 <b>welcomed [1]</b> 93/24 <b>welfare [1]</b> 203/23 <b>well [122]</b> 2/20 7/13 7/24 8/2 8/20 8/20 10/6 11/11 14/7 17/3 18/8 19/1 19/1 22/5 24/2 26/16 26/18 31/10 31/19 35/4 36/12 37/20 46/10 46/23 48/13 48/13 49/12 49/15 49/17 51/10 52/7 57/9 58/15 58/18 59/15 63/23 68/13 70/7 71/17 74/9 77/1 79/17 80/15 81/17 81/24 83/15 84/1 85/11 86/13 88/4 89/18 94/12 97/16 101/3 101/11 101/15 103/19 104/17 106/2 111/7 113/13 114/1 114/6 116/1 122/4 124/20 125/20 127/10 128/8 133/3 134/9 134/10 134/24 136/4 138/6 140/5 140/8 140/15 142/20 142/25	143/14 144/3 146/1 146/14 148/24 151/15 157/18 161/17 164/1 164/12 164/16 164/20 167/18 173/25 180/24 181/16 184/23 188/14 194/25 197/20 198/17 200/16 200/21 204/19 204/22 206/19 209/4 209/13 212/7 213/14 215/9 220/15 226/21 227/4 228/20 229/15 230/15 232/2 234/15 238/16 239/21 241/15 <b>well known [1]</b> 86/13 <b>Welsh [15]</b> 99/1 99/15 99/19 100/7 102/3 102/5 102/14 102/19 103/3 104/12 105/21 108/15 110/2 110/2 120/2 <b>Welsh Government [4]</b> 102/5 102/19 104/12 108/15 <b>went [14]</b> 18/1 51/24 93/20 103/5 118/12 120/3 129/8 142/9 156/13 156/17 162/4 202/6 212/16 237/7 <b>were [389]</b> <b>weren't [17]</b> 3/19 19/17 39/2 39/11 50/20 51/6 51/10 69/17 92/15 103/15 136/24 182/14 188/7 188/11 192/19 232/5 236/8 <b>West [1]</b> 88/4 <b>Western [1]</b> 180/7 <b>Western Europe [1]</b> 180/7 <b>what [226]</b> 2/16 3/1 5/23 7/1 7/19 8/20 10/8 10/20 10/21 11/5 12/1 15/22 16/25 17/6 17/11 17/25 18/2 19/3 19/15 20/11 20/25 21/2 21/25 22/8 22/14 27/25 28/25 30/7 31/4 31/8 31/13 31/16 33/19 33/21 34/15 34/15 34/16 34/18 34/21 34/23 35/9 36/3 38/24 40/2 40/24 41/22 42/6 42/15 42/15 42/19 42/24 43/24 44/1 44/9 44/23 45/7 45/7 46/15 46/17 46/17 46/17 46/18 46/20 47/7 47/20 48/8 48/14 50/2 52/16 53/10 54/20 56/24 57/2 57/7 57/7 58/5 58/13 58/18 59/20	60/8 60/24 77/1 77/3 77/14 80/5 81/23 82/1 83/11 83/15 83/17 85/3 90/4 91/20 92/12 92/25 93/10 95/16 96/4 96/6 98/17 100/5 101/22 104/5 107/4 107/9 107/20 108/8 108/11 108/17 108/22 112/3 112/8 112/17 113/4 113/9 113/24 114/24 115/10 115/22 116/12 117/6 118/8 118/9 118/13 119/10 120/12 120/16 120/22 121/10 121/14 125/18 125/19 125/24 126/22 127/11 127/16 128/22 128/25 129/15 130/20 131/10 131/17 135/6 139/21 140/5 141/8 142/12 142/23 144/1 144/6 146/9 146/21 147/4 148/1 151/15 153/3 155/10 160/6 160/13 160/15 161/1 162/2 162/8 165/13 165/20 169/7 170/21 171/17 172/20 173/10 173/14 177/4 178/1 178/6 181/10 181/18 183/22 184/17 185/15 185/21 187/3 188/1 188/18 192/12 192/12 192/23 194/12 194/12 194/20 195/23 196/1 196/3 196/8 196/11 200/10 200/19 200/24 201/9 201/18 203/7 207/9 207/10 208/25 210/11 210/14 210/22 211/6 214/6 216/8 217/1 217/15 217/23 218/6 219/12 219/21 220/3 221/9 221/10 223/24 224/10 224/18 230/9 233/20 233/24 237/9 242/23 <b>what's [5]</b> 120/17 127/8 210/21 213/21 229/3 <b>whatever [9]</b> 13/24 29/15 42/8 61/11 66/14 95/20 174/22 187/10 221/4 <b>WhatsApp [5]</b> 73/4 93/1 93/5 93/7 93/11 <b>WhatsApps [2]</b> 9/24 16/20 <b>when [74]</b> 25/21 30/5 32/16 32/19 33/17 34/6 37/17 47/2 47/23 61/20 71/7 78/6 79/21 84/16 85/18 89/19	93/1 98/12 100/10 100/16 107/18 111/18 114/14 114/15 114/16 116/13 117/19 120/14 122/9 133/17 134/5 136/2 139/3 140/7 140/15 140/16 142/3 151/24 156/17 158/9 158/11 160/5 161/18 162/17 173/10 175/16 175/18 176/13 178/5 178/7 179/8 179/20 181/5 181/17 182/8 185/4 185/16 186/3 188/15 190/25 194/16 195/13 198/3 200/12 201/11 202/4 204/15 213/14 219/3 220/3 231/17 236/4 241/12 242/8 <b>whenever [3]</b> 17/10 21/8 202/25 <b>where [104]</b> 6/4 6/18 8/7 9/11 10/3 12/16 12/20 14/2 18/13 19/21 22/12 23/15 24/7 26/7 27/8 28/20 33/3 34/3 35/14 35/25 36/23 39/16 45/16 49/1 57/10 57/17 58/3 67/1 68/7 71/13 77/17 80/25 81/4 82/7 82/18 84/24 86/15 90/19 91/1 91/16 94/1 94/25 108/4 108/20 109/10 109/20 110/22 111/1 111/4 111/22 114/1 114/2 114/5 116/15 121/6 126/12 126/16 127/18 127/20 131/12 133/3 136/24 137/3 137/6 138/8 138/12 138/22 139/10 139/13 139/14 140/19 141/3 142/7 142/9 142/13 145/18 145/24 146/2 146/4 146/6 147/12 148/3 148/15 158/8 158/12 162/22 164/5 173/4 176/3 176/5 190/25 201/1 211/10 211/16 212/12 215/3 216/20 224/25 225/12 225/17 225/18 226/17 230/3 238/21 <b>Whereas [1]</b> 225/6 <b>wherever [3]</b> 106/8 108/10 159/5 <b>whether [35]</b> 3/11 7/13 11/22 13/21 24/13 30/17 32/16 34/9 36/13 38/11 50/4 50/12 50/14 52/18 59/19 65/11 79/3 79/4



W				
<p><b>whether... [17]</b>  105/12 127/6 147/8  169/17 171/22 182/1  192/20 201/3 201/6  201/7 211/17 212/20  222/18 230/11 235/8  236/18 241/21</p> <p><b>which [213]</b> 1/16  2/14 4/20 6/6 6/12  8/13 8/16 8/23 9/4 9/6  9/7 10/15 11/8 12/2  12/14 12/24 14/3  15/15 15/17 16/2 16/3  16/16 17/17 18/2  19/25 21/11 21/11  21/14 21/22 22/14  22/16 23/11 23/19  23/23 24/3 24/20 25/5  25/14 25/15 25/19  26/19 27/7 27/10 28/4  29/4 29/7 29/17 29/23  30/18 31/18 36/22  37/25 38/7 38/16  39/14 39/16 39/20  40/13 41/2 41/9 41/16  42/14 42/14 42/18  43/6 43/22 44/17  45/17 48/25 49/2 52/3  53/6 54/13 54/14  55/19 58/16 59/2  64/15 66/23 67/21  70/17 71/21 73/20  75/9 75/16 75/20  75/23 79/2 79/14  80/23 81/3 84/13  84/17 85/9 86/6 87/22  92/9 92/15 93/10  94/18 98/8 99/8 99/15  100/22 102/1 103/10  103/13 104/12 105/17  107/3 108/2 110/8  113/23 115/1 115/15  115/20 116/2 117/13  117/18 119/3 119/8  120/20 121/1 121/18  125/20 125/21 125/22  126/2 127/11 128/23  130/25 131/1 131/6  131/9 131/14 131/22  132/24 133/25 134/13  135/4 135/12 136/19  137/22 138/11 139/25  141/7 144/3 145/11  145/14 148/9 150/23  151/23 152/1 156/10  158/3 159/11 159/18  162/6 162/10 164/8  165/1 167/4 171/11  171/20 172/19 176/10  176/18 179/5 180/9  181/3 181/8 183/15  183/15 184/21 187/5</p>	<p>188/11 188/12 189/23  193/11 196/10 198/5  199/4 202/21 202/23  203/8 206/25 207/8  208/9 208/14 208/19  209/12 209/17 209/24  211/5 211/8 213/7  213/18 215/23 216/9  216/18 216/19 217/1  219/24 222/1 222/20  226/15 226/24 229/18  229/18 241/19 241/24  243/4 243/11</p> <p><b>whichever [1]</b> 155/1  <b>while [9]</b> 37/8 87/19  100/2 104/6 152/7  163/5 240/22 240/25  242/14</p> <p><b>whilst [12]</b> 35/7  90/25 107/22 107/24  114/19 122/16 157/10  160/3 160/8 173/5  202/15 236/13</p> <p><b>whisper [1]</b> 169/5  <b>white [1]</b> 145/12</p> <p><b>WHITTY [18]</b> 1/3  67/19 111/14 112/14  112/25 123/4 165/12  169/7 170/2 171/20  180/21 187/12 210/8  223/1 238/8 239/2  242/24 244/3</p> <p><b>Whitty's [2]</b> 181/13  238/13</p> <p><b>who [97]</b> 3/22 4/22  6/19 8/14 9/3 9/15  11/14 12/7 13/25 14/3  14/15 15/1 16/9 16/12  17/23 18/4 18/7 18/20  18/21 20/3 20/21  22/23 24/25 30/10  34/25 35/17 39/11  53/21 67/22 74/12  78/20 81/19 82/8 83/1  83/6 87/20 91/6 95/16  96/4 97/8 97/20 100/3  100/9 101/1 117/12  119/20 124/13 126/13  128/14 131/19 132/19  133/3 133/12 133/16  134/9 134/21 136/17  144/11 145/19 153/16  159/19 160/20 162/17  164/22 167/10 170/14  170/14 178/22 181/8  181/9 181/24 181/24  192/16 192/17 206/17  208/9 212/3 212/4  212/5 212/7 212/14  218/18 226/9 226/18  227/17 230/5 230/25  231/22 233/20 238/17  238/17 238/20 238/21  239/7 239/8 241/7</p>	<p>242/9</p> <p><b>who's [2]</b> 117/11  158/18</p> <p><b>whoever [1]</b> 70/6  <b>whole [15]</b> 27/7  27/21 36/25 41/18  51/7 58/7 118/24  129/13 187/5 200/25  211/24 212/1 212/2  221/16 243/12</p> <p><b>wholly [2]</b> 13/12 14/7  <b>whom [3]</b> 96/13  96/14 96/14</p> <p><b>whose [2]</b> 33/15 62/1  <b>why [36]</b> 14/12 19/10  26/21 51/14 76/20  76/22 76/24 82/5  107/11 119/8 119/20  135/25 138/3 142/1  146/12 148/4 154/3  161/4 173/12 175/20  180/4 180/5 186/5  186/8 198/4 198/4  204/4 205/7 205/11  205/25 209/12 213/12  231/16 231/18 232/10  238/3</p> <p><b>wide [8]</b> 69/17 87/24  107/4 117/13 138/21  153/21 171/13 239/23</p> <p><b>wide-ranging [1]</b>  153/21</p> <p><b>widely [6]</b> 51/21 54/6  79/1 124/18 240/8  241/13</p> <p><b>wider [8]</b> 116/4  118/20 119/14 148/22  155/3 173/7 178/15  225/9</p> <p><b>widespread [7]</b> 6/17  11/14 123/22 209/7  219/6 224/12 224/24</p> <p><b>Wilcock [5]</b> 67/22  87/9 87/10 98/20  244/7</p> <p><b>will [74]</b> 8/8 9/17  12/16 15/3 18/8 18/9  18/9 20/17 28/18  28/21 29/2 30/8 33/8  34/21 34/22 34/22  36/12 39/14 42/5 42/5  45/3 54/24 55/5 55/11  55/22 57/25 59/3 60/1  60/4 60/6 61/12 61/15  61/16 62/8 62/10  66/24 67/13 69/5  81/24 82/14 84/25  91/6 94/21 106/21  114/10 115/13 116/6  117/17 123/1 124/21  139/10 143/3 147/20  148/3 149/9 149/10  150/11 163/3 163/5  163/12 171/16 171/17</p>	<p>176/25 177/2 178/2  188/14 193/12 193/14  196/6 196/23 197/1  203/4 232/19 239/1</p> <p><b>willingness [1]</b> 23/25  <b>win [1]</b> 146/12  <b>window [2]</b> 189/11  211/15</p> <p><b>winter [1]</b> 3/17  <b>wisdom [2]</b> 15/24  17/1</p> <p><b>wise [1]</b> 2/14  <b>wish [6]</b> 40/2 77/2  95/20 132/22 165/4  196/17</p> <p><b>wished [1]</b> 60/9  <b>wishes [1]</b> 39/13  <b>withdrew [2]</b> 149/14  243/17</p> <p><b>within [30]</b> 4/13 4/21  23/22 30/17 59/25  73/11 81/23 89/19  92/6 92/8 94/12 99/9  106/9 109/12 116/9  116/19 121/4 121/23  153/3 154/23 165/7  168/18 181/15 190/24  191/19 196/19 219/15  221/6 224/9 239/2</p> <p><b>without [14]</b> 18/4  19/14 38/3 42/5 57/5  71/24 102/7 129/5  146/12 148/8 153/22  154/5 170/9 237/12</p> <p><b>witness [15]</b> 8/22  23/22 53/22 63/6  101/20 111/16 149/14  149/21 150/9 188/15  233/1 233/9 234/21  234/22 243/17</p> <p><b>witnesses [5]</b> 106/10  156/22 157/11 200/5  241/15</p> <p><b>woken [1]</b> 186/17  <b>won't [9]</b> 60/6 101/18  123/7 176/23 189/4  201/15 218/2 223/18  229/24</p> <p><b>wonder [2]</b> 112/11  121/19</p> <p><b>wondered [1]</b> 198/3  <b>Woolhouse [1]</b> 13/23  <b>word [18]</b> 24/15 32/4  34/12 35/14 54/11  100/4 100/5 127/23  134/14 167/21 168/11  168/14 172/6 178/5  192/10 192/21 196/13  204/21</p> <p><b>words [23]</b> 4/8 4/25  22/25 23/1 61/10  78/13 90/12 98/25  113/1 113/1 113/2  113/20 113/20 124/21</p>	<p>160/9 161/7 172/6  177/23 179/19 191/13  198/15 204/16 225/4</p> <p><b>work [53]</b> 11/4 11/5  13/2 14/10 14/20 17/6  19/8 34/19 34/22 35/2  35/3 35/18 49/10  49/11 49/12 49/16  49/17 50/6 51/11  59/20 59/21 65/19  77/14 102/12 120/7  120/8 120/11 120/11  124/16 125/25 126/24  128/21 131/10 134/10  139/16 145/25 155/23  157/8 161/6 161/22  164/23 166/1 166/20  166/22 182/21 196/6  196/21 209/11 214/3  215/12 238/18 240/20  240/25</p> <p><b>workable [1]</b> 37/6  <b>worked [13]</b> 20/17  36/11 36/13 49/14  56/3 102/2 118/4  119/3 119/9 164/1  164/12 171/11 207/19</p> <p><b>worker [1]</b> 241/7  <b>workers [11]</b> 38/6  93/22 128/5 171/25  214/24 214/25 231/13  231/18 232/4 240/17  241/4</p> <p><b>working [10]</b> 17/11  17/12 67/18 161/2  186/8 207/18 212/13  212/18 240/22 240/25</p> <p><b>workload [4]</b> 159/4  162/7 162/19 163/1</p> <p><b>works [3]</b> 137/24  167/7 241/7</p> <p><b>world [10]</b> 152/17  154/25 159/20 164/17  166/21 167/2 167/18  167/19 178/13 180/17</p> <p><b>worldwide [1]</b> 180/2  <b>worried [2]</b> 59/2  163/11</p> <p><b>worry [5]</b> 66/24  118/22 122/23 198/12  237/25</p> <p><b>worse [3]</b> 53/17  187/19 189/24</p> <p><b>worst [3]</b> 52/12 56/8  170/23</p> <p><b>worst-case [1]</b>  170/23</p> <p><b>worth [6]</b> 64/2 125/22  161/6 182/1 227/14  229/12</p> <p><b>would [324]</b>  <b>wouldn't [18]</b> 1/18  3/2 8/17 14/20 16/13  37/21 40/23 43/11</p>



