CabinetOffice

Chapter 1 Introduction

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme

March 2012

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Chapter 1 (Introduction) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- This volume of guidance, together with the accompanying *Emergency Response and Recovery*, sets out the generic framework for civil protection. As such, it deals with pre-emergency elements of integrated emergency management - anticipation, assessment, prevention and preparation (*paragraphs 1.4 and 1.58*).

- There is a standard structure for most chapters of this volume of guidance. The structure is: details of what the legislation (the Act and the Regulations) requires; good practice guidance on how Category 1 and 2 responders should carry out their duties to comply with the legislation; and useful information that is not governed by the legislation (*paragraphs 1.9-1.10*).

- Some issues in common underpin the main chapters:

    - the definition of emergency;
    - the importance of Category 1 and 2 responders' functions;
    - the distinction between Category 1 and 2 responders; and
    - the links between the duties (*paragraphs 1.29-1.34*).

- This chapter also summarises the role of the Minister (*paragraphs 1.35-1.49*).

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1.1.   Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ("the Act") establishes a consistent level of civil protection activity across the UK. Consistency is sought too in the way the function is carried out between the local Category 1 and 2 responders as partners covered by the Act, and in different parts of the country.

1.2.   The Act provides a basic framework defining what tasks should be performed and how co-operation should be conducted.

1.3.   Local responders work to a common framework, and make their own decisions in the light of local circumstances and priorities about what planning arrangements are appropriate in their areas.

Purpose

1.4.   The purpose of *Emergency Preparedness* is to accompany Part 1 of the Act, and its supporting Regulations (The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2012) (the Regulations). Integrated emergency management (IEM) comprises six related activities: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. A volume of non-statutory guidance *Emergency Response and Recovery* http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/emergency-response-and-recovery, describes the multi-agency framework for responding to, and recovering from, civil emergencies in the UK. This non-statutory guidance is targeted at all personnel who may become involved in emergencies. It aims to develop a shared understanding of multi-agency response and recovery arrangements across responding agencies.

1.5.   *Emergency Preparedness* supports those individuals and organisations which have a role to play in the civil protection framework and, in particular, those organisations subject to duties under the Act.

1.6.   This guidance sets out how the civil protection duties should be carried out in England and Wales. Other available guidance is referenced within the *Further Reading Chapter* that accompanies the *Emergency Preparedness* guidance.

1.7.   This guidance also sets out how the civil protection duties should be carried out by certain bodies in Scotland, namely the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Health and Safety Executive and the British Transport Police. These bodies exercise functions which are largely reserved on a UK-wide basis and it is appropriate for them to be subject to guidance made by a Minister of the Crown. 'Minister of the Crown' or 'Minister' refers to the most appropriate minister in the given situation. The Scottish Ministers make separate regulations and guidance which apply to other Scottish Category 1 and 2 responders which fall within devolved competence. For more information, see Chapter 10: Scotland.

1.8.   This guidance also applies to certain bodies in Northern Ireland, namely the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and telecommunications operators. The guidance applies to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) only in relation to emergencies arising from war or terrorism threatening serious damage to the United Kingdom. The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may make appropriate guidance for the PSNI in respect of other emergencies to which the Act applies. Neither this guidance nor the Act applies to other bodies in Northern Ireland. Arrangements similar to those established under the Act, the Regulations, and this guidance have been set up in Northern Ireland on a non-statutory basis. For further information, please refer to Chapter 12: Northern Ireland.

1.9.   The guidance in this volume is divided into chapters. Each chapter deals with a specific aspect of preparedness within the civil protection framework. The main chapters (Chapters 2-8) describe the chief obligations imposed by the Act on Category 1 responders. Others (for example, Chapters 10-12, and 16) provide guidance which sets the work undertaken at the local level in the context of broader arrangements, including variations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is hoped that Category 1 and 2 responders will find these chapters helpful in understanding and delivering the wider civil protection framework.[1]

1.10.   Each chapter in this volume has a broadly similar format:

   o   summary;

   o   guidance on what the Act and the Regulations require of Category 1 and 2 responders;

   o   guidance on how to carry out the requirements of the legislation; and

   o   other information which may be helpful (much of which is contained in lined text boxes).

Supporting the chapters are: annexes, a glossary and a bibliography (collected at the end of this volume).

1.11.   This guidance includes a number of boxes setting out additional information. The type of box used indicates the type of information contained within it:

   o   lined text boxes - these unshaded boxes contain advice and information that may be useful to local responders, but are not directly supported by the Act.

   o   figures - these diagrams illustrate aspects of the good practice guidance.

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[1] Throughout the footnotes of this document the Regulations are referred to as regulation(s) with the appropriate number. Reference to the sections of the Civil Contingencies Act are referred to as e.g. s.2(1)(c).

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WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

1.12. While the civil protection duties are detailed on the face of the Act, the detail of what those duties mean, and how they should be performed, is delivered through the Regulations.[2] The Act and Regulations are supported too by this guidance document, which includes guidance to which the organisations covered by the Act must have regard.[3]

1.13. However, all the duties specified in Part 1 of the Act are contingent on the definition of "emergency".

The definition of "Emergency"

1.14. "Emergency" is defined in Part 1 of the Act as: an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.[4]

1.15. The definition of "emergency" is concerned with consequences, rather than with cause or source. Therefore, an emergency inside or outside the UK is covered by the definition, provided it has consequences inside the UK.[5]

1.16. An emergency is considered to have consequences inside the UK if the serious damage is within the territorial sea of the UK.[6] The territorial sea is the area of sea up to 12 nautical miles to seaward of the UK coast (or, more accurately, to seaward of the coastal baseline established by statute).

[2] s. 2(3). See also s. 4 and s. 6
[3] s. 3(3), s. 4(8) and 6(6)
[4] s. 1
[5] s. 1(5)
[6] s. 18(2)

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1.17.   A place in the UK may be anything from a small village to a town square to a large city. It may also include a part of a region or an entire region.

1.18.   Determination of when an emergency has occurred, or is likely to occur, is addressed in three ways. The Act provides:

> o   a specification of the kinds of event or situation which may cause "damage";[7] and
>
> o   two tests for determining whether an event or situation threatening such damage constitutes an emergency (one of which must be met).[8]
>
> o   The Regulations outline: The common procedures that Category 1 responders must follow in making the decision to activate a business continuity or emergency plan.[9]

Damage

1.19.   The Act sets out a list of events or situations which may be considered to pose a threat of damage to human welfare, the environment or security.[10]

Two tests as to whether a response is required

1.20.   A Category 1 responder must perform its duties under the Act only in relation to two situations, either of which poses a considerable test for that organisation's ability to perform its functions.[11]

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[7] s. 1(1)-(3)
[8] s. 2(2)(a)-(b)
[9] regulation 24
[10] s. 1(2)-(3)
[11] s. 2(2)

1.21.   The two tests are:

- o   where the emergency would be likely to seriously obstruct its ability to perform its functions;[12]

- o   where the Category 1 responder:

- o   would consider it necessary or desirable to act to prevent, reduce, control, or mitigate the emergency's effects, or otherwise take action; and

- o   would be unable to act without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional resources.[13]

One of these two tests must be met for the main duties of the Act to apply.

Procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred

1.22.   A procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred must be written into business continuity and emergency plans. The procedure should enable the person who will make the judgment to be identified, and state how they will be advised and whom they must inform.[14] The person will usually be a post-holder identified by their role or job title. More information on this can be found in Chapter 5 – *Emergency Planning*. It is particularly important that this is clearly stated in multi-agency plans.

The importance of Category 1 responder functions

1.23.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to take up their civil protection duties by reference to their functions. Functions are defined as "any power or duty whether conferred by virtue of an enactment or otherwise".[15] The reference covers statutory powers and duties, as well as common law powers.

[12] s. 2(2)(a)
[13] s. 2(2)(b)
[14] regulation 24
[15] s. 18(1)

1.24.   The functions of Category 1 responders are called into play when an emergency occurs or is likely to occur.

1.25.   Category 1 and Category 2 responders are referred to in the Act.[16] The term "responder" is not defined. However, a main purpose of the legislation is to ensure that Category 1 responders are able to perform their functions so far as necessary or desirable to respond to an emergency.[17]

The role of Category 1 and Category 2 responders

1.26.   Category 1 responders are listed in Schedule 1 to the Act.[18] They are the main organisations involved in most emergencies at the local level: for example, the emergency services.

1.27.   Category 2 responders are also listed in Schedule 1.[19] They are likely to be heavily involved in some emergencies: for example, utilities and transport companies.

1.28.   The Act brings both groups within its framework to ensure greater consistency and co-operation at the local level.

The links between the duties

1.29.   The main civil protection duties fall on the Category 1 responders as follows: [20]

> o   risk assessment;
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> o   business continuity management (BCM);
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> o   emergency planning; and
>
> o   maintaining public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public.

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[16] s. 3(4)-(5)
[17] s. 2(1)(d)
[18] Schedule 1, Part 1 (as amended). Part 2 of Schedule 1 sets out a list of Category 1 responders in Scotland who are subject to regulations and guidance made by Scottish Ministers.
[19] Schedule 1, Part 3 (as amended). Part 4 of Schedule 1 sets out a list of Category 2 responders in Scotland who are subject to regulations and guidance made by Scottish Ministers.
[20] s. 2(1)

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1.30.   A fifth duty applies to local authorities alone: [21]

   o   provision of advice and assistance to the commercial sector and
        voluntary organisations.

1.31.   Two further duties are prescribed in the Regulations: [22]

   o   co-operation;

   o   and information sharing.

1.32.   Risk assessment, supported by a collective process, provides the fundamental
         grounding for delivering the substantive elements of the Act.

1.33.   Emergency planning is supported by BCM, and is underpinned by the risk
         assessment. Its purpose is to ensure that Category 1 responders can perform their
         functions effectively in an emergency. It supports public awareness work and also
         shapes arrangements for warning and informing the public. Category 1 and 2
         responders must co-operate and share information in fulfilling these duties.

[21] s. 4
[22] s. 2(5)(h)-(i), Parts 2 and 8 of the Regulations.

Figure 1.1: How the seven civil protection duties under the Act and the Regulations fit together

1.34.   Provision of advice and assistance to the local business community and voluntary organisations by the local authority is likely to be linked to emergency plans and to draw on risk assessments. (See Chapter 6 paragraphs 6.14 - 6.16 for further information). It will also be supported by co-operation and information sharing with partners.

THE ROLE OF THE MINISTER

1.35.   In the event that any areas of civil protection arrangements do not address particular hazards or threats to the satisfaction of the Government, the Act permits the appropriate Minister of the Crown to issue new regulations or to make an order or issue a direction.[23] These powers are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

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23 See CCA S 14(1) for Scotland, S 16(1)-(2) for Wales and S 29 for all Devolved Areas

1.36. Chapter 13: Support and challenge describes the systems in place which will help the Government to identify whether there are areas where government action needs to be taken. The role of the Minister of the Crown in relation to performance development is also explained within this chapter. [24]

What the Act permits

1.37. A Minister of the Crown has certain functions available to him/her by virtue of the Act, which may be exercised, subject in certain cases, to Parliament's approval.

1.38. These are not likely to be used frequently, but may include:

- require a responder to perform a function and, derived from that, the power to direct in an urgent situation;
- amending the list of Category 1 and Category 2 responders; and
- monitor performance.

1.39. Ministers have a range of powers under Part 1 of the Act. Most of these powers relate to the issuing of guidance and Regulations to support the delivery of the main duties under the Act, and are dealt with elsewhere in this guidance.

1.40. This section does not deal with the emergency powers framework under Part 2 of the Act. The extent and exercise of emergency powers is addressed in *Emergency Response and Recovery*.

1.41. A Minister may amend the Regulations or guidance issued under Part 1 of the Act. The powers to amend the Regulations are broad; the Minister may make any provision about the extent of the duties under sections 2 and 4 and the

24 See CCA S 14(1) for Scotland, S 16(1)-(2) for Wales and S 29 for all Devolved Areas

manner in which they are to be performed. Section 2(5) of the act lists a range of provisions which can be included in regulations, – but this is not exhaustive.

1.42. A Minister may also require a person or body to perform a function in relation to an emergency.[25] For example, the Minister could require responders to purchase a particular range of interoperable equipment (subject to appropriate funding being in place).

1.43. Finally, a Minister may legislate so as to amend the list of Category 1 and/or 2 responders.[26] This power is only exercisable if both Houses of Parliament have approved the order. The Minister may remove a responder from the list, upgrade the status of a Category 2 responder into a Category 1 responder (and vice versa) and add new responders.

Urgent powers of direction

1.44. There are circumstances during emergencies, or when they appear imminent, when consistent, decisive action is necessary. The response required might fall outside existing planning frameworks; Category 1 and 2 responders might lack the information or advice to deal with it effectively; or it may not be apparent to these responders how best to deal with the situation.

1.45. Section 7 of the Act is designed to enable action to be taken by a Minister of the Crown in cases of urgency where there is insufficient time to make legislation. It is an exceptional power designed to ensure that in cases of real urgency the Government can arrange for coherent, effective action to be taken at the local level.

25 S 5
26 S 13

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1.46.   The Act enables[27]a Minister to issue a direction containing any provision that could be made by secondary legislation under sections 5 and 6 of the Act, to responders or a class of responders.

1.47.   An urgent direction must be in writing, though it could of course arrive by fax or e-mail. The Minister must revoke his direction as soon as is reasonably practicable (which will be, at the latest, as soon as it is possible to legislate). Even if not revoked, a direction will lapse 21 days after it has been made.

Monitoring powers

1.48.   A Minister has a range of powers to assist him/her in monitoring and overseeing the new civil protection regime. He/she may ask any Category 1 or 2 responder to provide him/her with information about the action taken under the Act.[28] The Minister may require a Category 1 or 2 responder to explain why it has not taken action under the Act. If the Minister considers that a Category 1 or 2 responder has failed to comply with its obligations under the Act, he/she may take proceedings against that responder in the High Court.[29]

1.49.   These powers are not intended to be used to establish direct monitoring by the Government as a standard procedure. They will be used in exceptional circumstances. Details of mechanisms and tools to develop responder performance and compliance with the act can be found in Chapter 13.

[27] s. 7
[28] s. 9
[29] s. 10

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Other statutory regimes in the field of civil protection

1.50.   A particular set of risks is excluded from consideration under the legislation.[30] These risks are subject to the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999, the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 or the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 and their Northern Ireland counterparts. Category 1 responders are not required to exercise their duties under the Act and Regulations in relation to emergencies which are covered by these provisions.

1.51.   However, Category 1 responders may use the Act regime to support or supplement these separate regimes where they consider this appropriate. For example, if Category 1 responders wish to include COMAH risks in the Community Risk Register, this is acceptable. They can also make information requests under the Regulations to support the COMAH duties, if they wish.

1.52.   One disadvantage of a separation between the two regimes, the one supported by the Act, the other by the Health and Safety Executive, is addressed by the inclusion of the Health and Safety Executive in Schedule 1 as a Category 2 responder. Further guidance on this can be found in Chapter 19, The CCA and the fit with other legislation, which looks at how key duties under the CCA link with those contained in other site specific legislation.

How the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

1.53.   Chapters 10, 11 and 12 detail how the Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In addition, each of the chapters dealing with how the duties under the Act are to be performed contains information about how

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[30] regulation 12

that particular duty is to be performed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Note that the Regulations and this guidance do not apply to those responders in Scotland who are within devolved competence.[31]

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

Integrated emergency management and the Act

Integrated emergency management	Emergency Preparedness	Emergency Response and Recovery
Anticipation	√	
Assessment	√	
Prevention	√	
Preparation	√	
Response		√
Recovery management		√

1.54.   Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between Category 1 and 2 responders. They should also be conducted according to a practical doctrine beginning with anticipation and assessment of risk and concluding with effective response and recovery arrangements.

1.55.   The Act focuses on emergency preparedness but its requirements should be seen in the context of integrated emergency management (IEM).

[31] The Regulations and this guidance apply to those responders listed in Parts 1 and 3 of Schedule 1 to the Act. These responders are referred to in the Regulations as "General responders" but for ease of reference they are referred to in this guidance as "Category 1 and Category 2 responders". Parts 2 and 4 of Schedule 1 to the Act list the responders that exercise functions which fall within the competence of the Scottish Ministers. These responders are referred to in the Regulations as "Scottish Category 1 responders" and "Scottish Category 2 responders"

1.56. The following six activities are fundamental to an integrated approach:

- anticipation;
- assessment;
- prevention;
- preparation;
- response; and
- recovery management.

1.57. The Act focuses on two of these - assessment and preparation - and they are covered extensively in this volume of guidance on preparing for emergencies. The other volume of guidance, *Emergency Response and Recovery*, covers the final two - response and recovery management.

1.58. Anticipation is sometimes called horizon-scanning. Category 1 responders, with the support of Category 2 responders where appropriate, should aim to be aware of new hazards and threats which might affect their locality and be ready to revise their risk assessments and plans accordingly. They may also wish to consider a mechanism to inform the public of what to do according to any new hazards and threats.

1.59. Prevention is an important component of integrated emergency management. The Act does not deal with it to any great extent because it is largely a matter for other legislation, for example fire safety and industrial safety, building regulations, flood defence, maritime safety or health protection. More information can be found in Chapter 19 (The CCA and the fit with other legislation). Prevention under the Act is limited to actions that help prevent an emergency which may be about to occur. For example, activating an emergency plan in advance of a major public event.

1.60. Response and recovery management are addressed in *Emergency Response and Recovery* because they are not covered directly in the Act. They are concerned with managing the consequences of an emergency, rather than preparing to deal with one.

1.61. Although the Act focuses on preparedness for response to emergencies, it should be seen in the wider context of safety, risk and threat management. Also, although the discussion of preparedness under the Act concentrates on the maintenance of planning arrangements, effective management is the aim. Planning is a process of preparing a Category 1 responder, its managers and personnel for the act of managing an emergency.

1.62. The wide concept of IEM within and across Category 1 responders is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. If the response is to be truly effective in meeting the needs of everyone affected by an emergency, then all leaders of the community, industry and commerce should be aware of the contributions of local responders and other organisations. It may also be beneficial to educate the general community about how they can support themselves in disruptive challenges.

1.63. In an extended emergency, the amount of work may be overwhelming, while provision of everyday services will also need to continue. Category 1 responders should explore all options for maintaining critical services, not only during the response but also throughout the recovery and aftermath proceedings, which may be lengthy.

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Chapter 2 Co-operation

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

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Chapter 2 (Co-operation) of Emergency Preparedness Revised Version

- **Summary**

  Category 1 and Category 2 responders in a local resilience area are required to co-operate with each other to help Category 1 responders deliver their responsibilities under the Act (*paragraphs 2.3 – 2.6*).

- Organisations, such as the voluntary sector or the military, which do not have a duty to co-operate under the Act, should also be fully involved, as appropriate, in a supportive role (*paragraphs 2.7, 2.18-2.19, 2.21, 2.41, 2.59, 2.81and 2.155-2.158*).

- Table 1 and Annex A show how the co-operation and information sharing duties support Category 1 responders in fulfilling their duties, and the likely impact of providing that support on local responders, particularly on Category 2 responders (*paragraphs 2.14, 2.17, and Annex A*).

- Although information sharing is a separate duty under the Act, it is considered here as an aspect of co-operation (*paragraphs 2.3 – 2.4, 2.14 and 2.80-2.91*).

- Co-operation takes place within a local resilience area between all local responders. The regulations also permit "managed co-operation" to reduce the burden of "all-with-all" co-operation (*paragraphs 2.8-2.38*).

- The local resilience area is based on police force boundaries (*paragraph 2.40*).

- One form of co-operation required by the Act is the Local Resilience Forum (LRF). The LRF is the principal form of multi-agency co-operation in a local resilience area. Even so, the statutory duties fall on the individual local responders. The LRF is not a legal entity and it does not direct its members. The role of the LRF in co-operation is examined in Table 2 (*paragraphs 2.39-2.69*).

- The purpose of the LRF is defined (*paragraphs 2.45-2.50*) and its structure suggested (*paragraphs 2.51-2.59*)

- Responders may satisfy their responsibilities to attend the Forum by nominating representatives (*paragraphs 2.66-2.69*).

- The LRF has an important place in the local resilience chain in England and Wales (*paragraphs 2.92-2.96*).

- Most Category 2 responders are not organised to deliver their normal business in local resilience areas. The expectations which Category 1 responders place on Category 2 responders should be reasonable. Protocols are proposed which may vary the way in which Category 2 arrangements can meet Category 1 requirements (*paragraphs 2.60-2.65, 2.70-2.91*).

- The likely participation in the LRF of the different classes of local responder organisation (within both Categories 1 and 2) is described (*paragraphs 2.108 – 2.158*).

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The scope of co-operation

2.1.   The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 prescribes, in the first instance, a consistent set of four duties across all the Category 1 responders, which include the emergency services, local authorities, health services and other organisations likely to be involved in most emergencies. Four elements of the emergency planning cycle – risk assessment, emergency planning, business continuity planning, and warning and informing – must each be delivered in the same way. This standard framework provides a sound basis for local co-operation.

2.2.   A fifth element – promotion of business continuity management – is required of local authorities.

2.3.   Drawing on this common set of procedures, the Act then adds two more duties for the Category 1 responders. They are required specifically to co-operate and share information in delivering the other five duties.[1] There are thus seven duties in all.

2.4.   These requirements to co-operate and share information are given extra importance by their imposition on a larger number of responder organisations, such as the utilities and transport providers. This second grouping, the Category 2 responders, have fewer overall obligations under the CCA, partly because they are less likely to be involved in most emergencies[2] and also because the underpinning sector-specific legislation and regulations, which define what they do, include duties to deliver their service during an emergency. Under the Act, the Category 2 responders are required to co-operate and share information[3] with Category 1 responders.[4] They are also required to co-operate and share information with each other insofar as this supports Category 1 responders.

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[1] See *Fig 1.1*, *Emergency Preparedness*; *Chapter 1*: Introduction, p.9
[2] Even so, the impact of flooding in 2007 and other severe weather events on some of the Category 2 responders shows how important their role is.
[3] Information sharing, as a separate duty, is the subject of a separate guidance chapter (*Chapter 3*) in *Emergency Preparedness*, and of additional non-statutory guidance, *Data Protection and Sharing: Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders*, 2007. Information sharing remains an important aspect of day-to-day co-operation between local responders and, as such, is considered in this chapter too.
[4] For a useful example from one Category 2 sector stressing the importance of information sharing with Category 1 responders, see *Effective Information Sharing with Category 2 Telecommunications Providers*, CCS, May 2009 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/250370/local_resilience_forums_telecoms.pdf

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2.5.   Co-operation for the Category 2 responders includes looking at how delivery of the emergency duties under their own legislation, such as risk assessment, emergency planning and exercising, can most easily match with the similar CCA duties of the Category 1 responders.[5]   Category 2 responders need to be fully integrated into multi-agency planning at all levels levels, including co-operation with each other where it helps local level preparedness by the Category 1 responders.

2.6.   One form of co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders, which is required by the regulations, is the Local Resilience Forum (LRF).

2.7.   A third grouping of local responders includes the voluntary sector to which Category 1 responders "must have regard" when carrying out their duties under the Act (see Chapter 14). There are other organisations outside the framework of the Act which are also brought into co-operation with the duty-holders in certain circumstances, such as, for example, the military (see Chapter 15).

Aspects of local-level co-operation

2.8.   There are three essential ways of addressing co-operation:

- o   Within your own organisation;
- o   Directly with other organisations; and
- o   Through managed arrangements with other organisations, which may take a number of forms.

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[5] regulation 4(2), 4(3), 4(4)

2.9.   Co-operation starts with the ability of each responder organisation to get the different parts of its own structure to work together. The Act obliges each responder organisation to ensure that all those divisions with functions that may require to be employed in an emergency are fully prepared. Effective preparation ensures that they are ready to co-operate with each other within the internal structures of the organisation, as well as with others outside the organisation. In particular cases, internal multi-directorate groups should be established to develop plans and training. The practice of civil protection under the CCA should be systematically "embedded" within each organisation.

2.10.   The next level of co-operation is outward facing and involves responder organisations working directly with each other (both Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders, together with the voluntary sector and other organisations) across the five main CCA duties.[6] Meetings, visits, phone calls, correspondence, e-mails and exercises are organised to strengthen each Category 1 organisation's risk assessment, plan-making, business continuity arrangements and warning and informing procedures. Much of this is one-on-one liaison work which takes place all the time on a day-to-day basis. Many local responders have set up multi-agency groups (below the level of the LRF) to help them prepare their own multi-agency plans and support local preparedness and awareness.

2.11.   However, if the Act required simply the direct interrelationship of the duty-holders with each other – "all with all" – it would not work efficiently and effectively. For this reason, the CCA also provides for managed arrangements between the Category 1 and Category 2 responders. It cuts back on the impact of the duties by permitting various measures to help structure the relationship between responders and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Managed arrangements also permit the duty-holders to "speak with one voice", when appropriate, and to co-ordinate actions across a local resilience area, or part of the area.

[6] regulation 4(1)-(4)

2.12.   In this regard, the Act and its regulations support a third form of co-operation with partner organisations through formal multi-agency structures and facilities. These managed arrangements include agreements to work together through:

- o   protocols between responders, which may also involve those not covered by the Act; appointing a lead responder; and setting up arrangements to jointly discharge or delegate functions;
- o   forums and support bodies at various levels, such as: the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) and multi-LRF groups, the offices of a Lead Government Department, or other central government forums[7]; and
- o   nominating a representative organisation to act on your behalf in attending meetings.

In addition, co-operation can also be facilitated through outward-facing, structured communications methods, such as, for example:

- o   Websites – set up locally and nationally; and
- o   Secure national communications media, such as the National Resilience Extranet.[8]

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[7] In Wales, the equivalent structures are the Wales Resilience Forum and the Welsh Government.
[8] Further details on the National Resilience Extranet (NRE) can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/emergency-response-resilience/communications

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WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

A Category 1 or 2 responder "shall comply with regulations" made by a Minister of the Crown about "the extent of a duty" and "the manner in which... it is to be performed" (s2(3) and s3(3)(a)).

Category 1 responders which have functions exercisable in a particular local resilience area "must co-operate with each other" and "with general Category 2 responders" in connection with the performance of their duties (reg 4(1)).

Category 2 responders which have functions exercisable in a particular local resilience area "must co-operate with each... Category 1 responder" which has functions exercisable in that area and "with each other" in connection with the performance by the Category 1 of its duties (regs 4(2), 4(3))

Co-operation across the five main CCA duties

2.13.   In looking more closely at co-operation as required in the Act and regulations, it is useful to define more clearly the circumstances in which Category 1 responders seek support from their Category 1 and 2 partners. Category 1 responders must co-operate with each other and with Category 2s.[9] Category 2 responders must support Category 1s in delivering their Category 1 duties and co-operate with other Category 2s in support of the Category 1s.[10]

9 Regulation 4(1).
10 Regulations 4(2), 4(3)

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2.14. Table 1 lists occasions[11] on which the Category 1s are likely to require co-operation in fulfilling their duties under the Act. The table includes information sharing, which is simultaneously a separate duty and a key aspect of co-operation.[12]

Table 1: The duties to co-operate and share information: as carried out by Category 1 and 2 responders[13] across the five main CCA duties

		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE	B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION
Five main Category 1 DUTIES		Is co-operation required?	Is information-sharing required?
1. Risk Assessment	a)	Direct discussions with partners to support compilation of individual risk assessment for each Category 1 organisation. For further information please refer to *Chapter 4* (*Local responder risk assessment duty*).	Information required directly from partners to support each Category 1 responder's individual risk assessment. For further information please refer to *Chapter 4* (*Local responder risk assessment duty*).
	b)	Discussion with partners within the LRF to compile Community Risk Register (CRR).	Information required for Community Risk Register.
	c)	Discussion with partners within the LRF regarding publication of the CRR – which can be done as part of warning and informing arrangements.	Consistent approach to providing risk and warning information required across the partners.

[11] Each cell (and each bullet point) indicates an act of co-operation and/or information sharing.
[12] Regulation 4(4)(a)
[13] The impact on Category 2 responders of the co-operation and information sharing requirements identified in Table 1 is discussed in *paragraph 2.17* below and examined in more detail in *Annex A*. It should be noted that the emergency plans of some Category 2 responders will not be specific to a particular local resilience or local authority area. Procedures should be designed to match or dovetail across different planning frameworks.

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Five main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE Is co-operation required?	B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION Is information-sharing required?
	d)	Discussion with partners regarding: • central government assessment of risk under capabilities programme; and • reports back to central government about risk registers.	Information required to assist with interpreting the local impact of central government risk assessment.
	e)	Discussion with partners about hazards and risks to support development by Category 1 responders of: • specific emergency plans; and • exercise scenarios.	Information required to help define the nature and possible quantification of consequences addressed: • by Category 1 plans; and • in exercise scenarios.
	f)	Risk meetings or discussions with infrastructure operators about business continuity plans	Information from infrastructure operators and main suppliers about business continuity risks
2. Emergency Planning	a)	Direct discussion for Category 1 responders with partners to prepare • specific emergency plans; • multi-agency plans; and • LRF multi-agency plans.	Details of partner contacts, roles, responsibilities, procedures, capabilities and resources.
	b)	Discussion for Category 1 responders with partners about: • specific emergency plans; • information required under the national capabilities survey.	Details of partner contacts, roles, responsibilities, procedures, capabilities and resources.

Five main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE Is co-operation required?	B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION Is information-sharing required?
2. Emergency Planning	c)	Discussion for Category 1 responders with partners about design and delivery of training and of exercises for: • specific emergency plans; • multi-agency plans; and • LRF multi-agency plans.	For scenario development.
	d)	Discussion with partners about the design and delivery of training and of exercises for plan required by central government.	For scenario development
	e)	Updating of plans	Details of partner contacts, roles, responsibilities, procedures, capabilities and resources.
3. Business Continuity Plans	a)	Discussions with key infrastructure operators and main suppliers about procedures.	Information from key infrastructure operators and suppliers about procedures.
	b)	-	Updated Business Continuity Plans
4. Warning and Informing	a)	Meetings for Category 1 responders with partners about the nature of hazard and risk, and type of messages to make public.	Category 2 responders are likely to have responsibilities to provide information to the public under their own legislation ("functions"). Updated messages and procedures.
	b)	Meetings for Category 1 responders with partners and other co-operating organisations, such as the media and voluntary sector, about multi-agency media plans and arrangements for warning dissemination.	Category 2 responders are likely to have responsibilities to provide information to the public under their own legislation ("functions"). Updated messages and procedures.[Operationally – at the response phase, partners should inform each other when warnings and other messages are issued.]

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Five main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE Is co-operation required?	B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION Is information-sharing required?
4. Warning and Informing	c)	Joint publicity and events by Category 1s and their partners to raise public awareness of plans and procedures.	Each organisation to contribute relevant messages.
5. Promotion of Business Continuity Management	a)	LA clarifies with partners who is doing what to promote business continuity management.	Information about promotion efforts undertaken and promotional opportunities.
	b)	-	Requests from business community for information about potential business continuity risks.

2.15.   Across the five duties, apart from the specific duty to co-operate through the local resilience forum, co-operation "shall take such form as may be agreed between the relevant responders".[14]   Most of these agreements for working together are informal and routine. Practical areas for co-operation and/or information sharing are dealt with directly between responders through day-to-day liaison. Other agreements are based on more formal structures of co-operation, such as the Local Resilience Forum or procedures supported by protocols.[15]

2.16.   As a statutory requirement, the LRF has an important role in facilitating co-operation between the partners. Annex A takes the areas of co-operation and information-sharing identified in Table 1 and helps define the role of the LRF. It identifies the key areas – from risk assessment to warning and informing – where the LRF is likely to play a part in co-operation and further areas where it may be involved in information sharing.

[14] regulation 4(4)
[15] regulations 4(4)(a), 4(4)(b), 7

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2.17.   Annex A also looks at the areas of co-operation and information-sharing from the perspective of Category 2 responders. It identifies the areas where requests for co-operation from Category 1 responders are likely to have a major impact on Category 2 responders, though most of these are intermittent only. There are also areas where information requests can have a major impact.

Co-operation with the voluntary sector

2.18.   There are local responders not captured in the schedule to the Act who may also be brought in to local planning arrangements, depending on the circumstances. One group – the voluntary sector - is identified in the Act.[16] Category 1 responders are required to "have regard to" the activities of the voluntary sector in maintaining their emergency and business continuity plans.

2.19.   "Regard" must be given to those local voluntary organisations whose activities are carried on in the local resilience area and are relevant in an emergency.[17] Those voluntary organisations whose role is to play a significant part in emergency response, such as search and rescue organisations, should expect Category 1s to integrate them fully into multi-agency co-operation across the five main duties. Other voluntary organisations may also expect to be involved in multi-agency co-operation where their activities are relevant to emergency planning and response. Voluntary organisations are not obliged by statute to carry out their role. In reaching an agreement to co-operate at a local level, the capability of the voluntary organisation to fulfil its role locally is a key factor. It is reasonable, when looking at collaborative arrangements as part of a local agreement with Category 1s, for a voluntary organisation to provide a locally-determined capacity and capability assessment.

[16] s2(5)(k)... "bodies (other than public or local authorities) whose activities are not carried on for profit".
[17] regulation 23(1)

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Managed co-operation

Protocols

2.20.   Responders have tended to rely on custom and practice and minuted agreements to support well-established collaborative arrangements and to provide a basis for new initiatives. However, the regulations permit Category 1 responders between themselves and Category 1 with Category 2 responders to go further in the performance of their duties by developing protocols which consolidate co-operative working on a firmer basis.[18]

2.21.   A protocol is a formal agreement between Category 1 responders, or Category 1 and Category 2 responders - or between them and local responders not covered in the Schedule, such as the voluntary sector or the armed forces – detailing how they will undertake or allocate responsibilities to deliver a task. Protocols may cover matters of broad agreement or detailed procedures for working together, including how to hand over tasks, provide a service or obtain additional resources. As far as possible, they should be simple, straightforward and concise. Protocols may or may not be legally binding depending on the nature of the agreement reached between the parties. Most often partners are unlikely to seek a legally-binding protocol.

2.22.   Protocols between local responders may be developed by the LRF or its sub-groups, or by industry groups on behalf of local responders (such as Category 2s) in a particular class or sector. Some protocols aim to insert local detail and circumstances into how co-operation is carried out. They are likely to be particularly relevant in relation to:

    o   information sharing agreements and co-operation generally between Category 1 and Category 2 responders, including multi-LRF based arrangements;[19]

[18] regulation 7(1)
[19] regulations 7(4), 7(5)
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- o multi-agency emergency planning arrangements, including humanitarian support;
- o arrangements for co-operation with voluntary or third sector, armed forces and other responder organisations not listed in the Schedule to the Act; and
- o communications planning generally:
  - for managing the response to an emergency; and
  - communicating with the public.

2.23. Particular attention should be paid when developing protocols in one local resilience area to their development in neighbouring resilience areas and more widely. Organisations whose remit covers several resilience areas may find it difficult to engage with protocols from different areas which contain conflicting requirements. Recognition should also be given to national protocols.

2.24. Protocols may be used to strengthen the structure of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), for example, to determine governance arrangements for the working of the Forum.

2.25. Protocols are permitted on a cross-boundary basis between local resilience areas, as well as on a cross-border basis between Category 1 and Category 2 responders in England and Scotland.[20]

2.26. As defined in regulations, protocols are likely to specify three aspects of the co-operation required:

- o its timing;
- o its form; and
- o contact details for the individuals involved.[21]

[20] Protocols may of course be set up between England and Wales, but these are not addressed in regulations because the Act covers both England and Wales.
[21] regulation 7(3)

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Other matters can be included as local responders wish.

An example of a standard model protocol will be made available on the National Resilience Extranet (NRE).

Also available on the NRE are examples of best practice case studies. These can be found at *https://www.resilience-extranet.gse.gov.uk/AtlasApps/Pages/Collaborate/ DocumentStore/DocumentStore.aspx?folderid=113699*. They detail the areas where protocols have been introduced and the benefits derived from them.

The lead responder principle

2.27.   The main duties fall equally on all those Category 1 responders "whose functions" (defined as their powers and duties) are likely to be seriously obstructed by an emergency or who would consider it necessary or desirable to take action to deal with the emergency through a special deployment of resources.[22] There is a risk that Category 1 responders may duplicate each other's work when, for example, carrying out their duty of risk assessment or providing warnings when an emergency occurs.

2.28.   The problem is particularly acute in relation to communicating with the public. It would not be sensible for a number of Category 1 responders each to be arranging to publish the same, similar or, indeed, conflicting messages about risks and planning arrangements to the same members of the public. It would be confusing, too, if several organisations were maintaining arrangements, simultaneously to issue uncoordinated public warnings about an emergency. Gaps in the arrangements could also arise because no one organisation had taken an overview. To address these difficulties, the regulations enable one local responder to take on the lead responsibility.[23]

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[22] s. 2(2)
[23] regulations 32-34. These Regulations are described in more detail in *Chapter 7* of *Emergency Preparedness, Communicating with the Public*. That guidance also includes, at *Annex 7C*, a checklist of suggested protocols for warning, informing and advising the public.

2.29.   There is a further risk of duplication where, for example, several Category 1 responders in the same LRF area each decide they are obliged to assess the same risk or the impact of that risk (for example, severe weather). Again, more than one Category 1 responder could believe it necessary to develop an emergency mortuary plan or a coastal pollution plan. Regulations address these potential problems by permitting all those Category 1 responders whose functions are exercised in relation to a particular duty (other than the duties to communicate with the public, see _Chapter 7_) to identify one of their number as lead responder. The lead responder is the Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for performing a given duty in relation to a given emergency, or an emergency of a particular kind, in that local resilience area.[24]

2.30.   The other Category 1 responders who are party to the decision are referred to as non-lead Category 1 responders.[25]

2.31.   Many of these issues of duplication are, of course, addressed through the activities of the Local Resilience Forum. The LRF can help the Category 1 local responders determine how the lead responder principle is applied. It ensures proper co-ordination of risk assessment and multi-agency planning and, under the separate regulations, communication with the public.

2.32.   Regulations outline the duties on a lead Category 1 responder.[26] They must:

    o   take the lead responsibility for that particular task in
        that local resilience area; [27]

    o   consult the non-lead Category 1 responders in performance
        of the duty;

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[24] regulation 9
[25] regulation 9(4)
[26] regulation 10
[27] There are likely to be different lead responders appointed for different tasks within a particular local resilience area.

> o keep the non-lead Category 1 responders informed about how they are fulfilling the duty; and
>
> o co-operate with non-lead Category 1 responders and, in particular, as far as reasonably practicable, obtain approval from the non-lead Category 1 responders for the way they are performing the duty.

2.33. Regulations also specify the role of the non-lead Category 1 responders.[28] They must:

> o co-operate with the lead Category 1 responder in performance of the duty;
>
> o provide information to the lead Category 1 responder which will assist in performance of the duty; and
>
> o assist the lead responder in any exercises or training in connection with the duty.

The non-lead Category 1 responders do not themselves need to perform the duty to an extent that would unnecessarily duplicate what the lead Category 1 responder is doing.[29] However, if the non-lead responder is not satisfied with the way the lead responder is performing the duty, then (after exhausting other remedies) it should determine for itself how it will carry out the duty.

2.34. The requirement on a Category 1 responder to co-operate with another Category 1 responder in the performance of its duty (for example, by taking part in a joint exercise) applies where the former is the lead responder and the latter is a non-lead responder.[30] Category 2 responders are also required to assist the lead Category 1 responder when it is carrying out duties on behalf

[28] regulation 11
[29] regulation 11(2)(d)
[30] regulation 11(2)(c)

of a number of responders to the same extent that they would be required to assist the individual Category 1 Responders.

2.35.   A decision by the relevant local Category 1 responders not to co-operate with identifying a lead responder in relation to a particular duty leaves them potentially all equally responsible for the performance of that duty.

2.36.   In practice, local responders have tended to operate in accordance with the above lead responder principle on an informal or customary basis.

Joint discharge and delegation of functions

2.37.   In some instances, Category 1 responders will wish to go beyond direct or bilateral co-operation and enter into joint arrangements with other Category 1 responders. This is permitted by the regulations and can take two forms:

   o   exercising responsibilities jointly. In this case, two or more Category 1 responders would agree that an aspect of the duties was best performed by working together. For example, a number of local authorities may decide to form a single civil preparedness unit, and staff and fund it jointly to deliver their responsibilities under the Act; [31] and

   o   delegating responsibility entirely. For example, a local authority might decide to delegate some or all of its responsibilities to the local fire and rescue service.[32]

[31] regulation 8(a)
[32] regulation 8(b)

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2.38.   In both these instances, all Category 1 responders covered by the decision have to agree that joint arrangements are appropriate and make associated agreements in terms of transfer and other resources. Of course, they each retain ultimate ownership of their own functions and are ultimately responsible for the performance of their duties; they must therefore be satisfied that they are being delivered correctly.

Local Resilience Forum

2.39.   Under the regulations, Category 1 responders must form a Local Resilience Forum (LRF) as part of their obligation to co-operate with each other.[33] Category 2 responders whose functions are exercisable within a local resilience area co-operate with other responders by attending meetings of the LRF or being represented at it.[34] (In circumstances where all the Category 1 responders in a local resilience area agree, this requirement on a Category 2 may be varied).[35] Often in practice, as permitted by the Act, several responder organisations in a particular class will nominate a representative to attend on their behalf.

2.40.   The LRF is the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation and co-ordination under the Act, based on each police force area. It is a process by which the duty-holders co-operate with each other. The LRF helps the duty-holders decide how they will interpret and meet their responsibilities under the CCA. It has no separate legal personality and does not have powers to direct its members. As a forum for responder organisations, it is not a local responder itself and has no specific duties under the Act.

[33] regulation 4(4)(b)
[34] regulation 4(7)(c)
[35] regulation 7(5)

2.41.   Organisations not specifically captured by the Schedule to the Act, such as the military and voluntary organisations,[36] the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) Team and Welsh Government will generally be invited to attend the LRF, contribute to its work and be involved in its working groups and sub-groups where relevant.

2.42.   The chief officer group of the LRF must make arrangements to meet at least once every six months. The aim should be to space these meetings evenly and to develop a regular cycle. Meetings can be held more frequently if LRF members agree that is necessary. The chief officer group should be supported by a general working group and sub groups. The frequency of these meetings is set by the LRF.[37]

2.43.   The LRF is not an operational body because it has no functional responsibilities to deliver during an emergency and no resources. However, generally, during an emergency, a particular set of those who make up the LRF are likely to come together as a multi-agency team to deliver their functional responsibilities.

2.44.   Table 2 compares the role of the LRF with the role of the Category 1 and 2 duty holders.   It shows how the LRF, acting through the powers of its duty-holders and on their behalf, undertakes certain key tasks – such as preparing and maintaining the Community Risk Register and preparing LRF multi-agency plans. Equally, it shows how the main responsibilities are delivered by the duty holders themselves.

[36] regulation 23
[37] regulations 4(4)(b), 4(5) - 4(7)

Table 2: The role of the LRF and the role of the duty holder

(Category 1 and 2 responders)

	ROLE OF THE LRF	ROLE OF THE DUTY HOLDER	
		Category 1 Responders	Category 2 Responders
1.	Help develop policy by agreement across the partners.	Implement agreed policy. Inform partners of relevant policy changes within their sector. [38]	Implement agreed policy in support of Category 1 responders. Inform partners of relevant policy changes within their sector or company.
2.	Facilitate co-operation.	Be ready to co-operate with partners. [39]	Be ready to co-operate with partners.
3.	Keep all Category 1 and 2 responders in its local resilience area informed of all LRF business.	Receive and take note of all materials circulated by LRF and take action as appropriate.	Receive and take note of all relevant materials circulated by LRF and take action as appropriate.
4.	Facilitate and, where necessary, promote development of protocols, including with the voluntary sector and the military.	Set up agreements and protocols with partners, including, where appropriate, locally-determined capacity and capability assessments.	Support Category 1 responders by setting up or agreeing protocols.
5.	Information and education – share latest thinking and experience.	Enable staff to keep up-to-date with relevant civil protection issues.	Enable staff to keep up-to-date with relevant civil protection issues.
6.	Prepare and maintain Community Risk Register.	Prepare and maintain Individual Risk Register.	Support development of Community Risk Register.
7.	Receive and, where appropriate, respond to government requests about risk assessments and capabilities.	Assess impact of government requests in their functional areas of responsibility and respond as necessary.	Assess impact of government requests in sectoral areas of responsibility and respond as necessary.

[38] A relevant policy change could be any matter which affects emergency response arrangements and preparations for response.
[39] Readiness involves both awareness and capability and relates to whether civil protection is embedded in the organisation or not (see paragraph 2.9 above.)

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	ROLE OF THE LRF	ROLE OF THE DUTY HOLDER	
		Category 1 Responders	Category 2 Responders
8.	Be aware of individual members' planning arrangements.	Prepare and maintain individual plans.	Prepare plans under sectoral responsibilities.
9.	Be aware of the planning arrangements of voluntary sector organisations and other organisations not named in the schedule to the Act.	In preparing plans, have regard to the capacity and capabilities of voluntary sector organisations and other responders not named in the schedule to the Act	In preparing plans under sectoral responsibilities consider the capacity and capabilities of responders not named in the schedule to the Act
10.	Facilitate identification of lead responder where appropriate.	Act as lead responder or support lead responder.	Act as lead responder under its sectoral responsibilities or support lead responder.
11.	Be aware of multi-agency plans of members.	With relevant partners, develop and maintain its own multi-agency plans as appropriate.	Under sectoral responsibilities, develop and maintain relevant multi-agency plans.
12.	Prepare and review LRF multi-agency plans[40] as appropriate.	Contribute to LRF multi-agency plans.	Under sectoral responsibilities, contribute to LRF multi-agency plans.
13.	Receive and, as appropriate, respond to government requests for specific plans under the capabilities programme.	Develop multi-agency plans[41] in line with the government's capabilities programme.	Under sectoral responsibilities and government's capabilities programme, develop multi-agency plans.
14.	Support its members' exercises, including maintaining a list of exercises.	Exercise its individual and multi-agency plans.	Support Category 1 responder exercises under CCA and sectoral responsibilities.

[40] Increasingly, LRFs are developing multi-agency plans – though these are likely to be "owned" and managed by one of the Category 1 local responders on behalf of the LRF members.
[41] As required by the Act, Category 1 responders are likely to develop multi-agency emergency plans and these may not cover the whole LRF area. They are not necessarily treated as LRF plans.

	ROLE OF THE LRF	ROLE OF THE DUTY HOLDER	
		Category 1 Responders	Category 2 Responders
15.	Organise exercises of LRF multi-agency plans.	Take part in LRF multi-agency exercises as appropriate.	Take part in LRF multi-agency exercises as appropriate.
16.	Awareness and support for business continuity management (BCM).	Prepare and maintain business continuity plans. Support partners in preparing their business continuity plans.	Under sectoral responsibilities, prepare and maintain business continuity plans. Support Category 1 responders in developing their BC plans.
17.	Facilitate its members in agreeing lead responder role and other measures for warning and informing arrangements.	Set up and maintain warning and informing arrangements and plans.	Under sectoral responsibilities and in support of Category 1 responders, set up and maintain warning arrangements.
18.	Facilitate co-operation across partners in promotion of business continuity management.	(LA) Promote BCM. (Other Category 1 responders) Assist LAs with BC information as appropriate.	Assist LAs with BC information as appropriate.
19.	Play supportive role during an emergency	Respond to emergencies. Implement recovery plans.	Respond to emergencies. Implement recovery plans.
20.	Attend multi-LRF meetings or Wales Resilience Forum (WRF), as appropriate	Take note of multi-LRF / WRF discussions.	Attend multi-LRF meetings / WRF or take note of its discussions.

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Purpose of the LRF

2.45.   The purpose of the Local Resilience Forum is as follows:

- o   to provide a local forum for local issues;
- o   to help co-ordinate risk assessment through production of the Community Risk Register;
- o   to facilitate Category 1 and 2 responders in the delivery of their CCA duties;
- o   to help deliver government policy by co-ordinating responses to government initiatives; and
- o   to help determine a procedure for the formation of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) by the relevant local responders at the time of an emergency.

2.46.   The fundamental role and first purpose of the LRF in England and Wales is as a co-ordinating group for local responders engaged in preparedness for emergencies at the police force area level.[42] It should enable any of the members to bring issues forward for discussion and agreement on combined initiatives. All responders build up over time an understanding of the challenges and pressures faced by their partners and an experience of working together.

2.47.   A second purpose of the LRF reflects a strategic approach to preparing for emergencies. The importance of the LRF preparing the Community Risk Register (CRR)[43] is that its members develop a consistent understanding of the hazards and threats across the LRF area. The risk register also provides a sound basis for joint working. An agreed risk assessment across all the local partners helps determine the priority issues they must be ready to deal with.

[42] regulation 4(4)(b), 4(5)-(7)
[43] regulation 15

2.48.   Another strategic purpose of the LRF is to support the duty-holders so that they perform their legal responsibilities better than they would if they were acting on their own.[44] The five main duties of the Act, plus the co-operation and information sharing duties, provide a substantial agenda which changes and evolves. Many emergency situations demand multi-agency working across all the partners, including the development of multi-agency LRF plans and the exercising of those plans. Support may also be needed with protocols for information sharing and other matters and with agreements about which of the partners will act as a lead responder. The LRF is also likely to be involved with supporting the development of performance management procedures and with encouraging good practice.

2.49.   A fourth purpose reflects the position of the LRF in the resilience chain (see paragraph 2.92 below), namely the importance to the government of a group which will:

- o   take forward at the local level initiatives which need to be developed within a national framework; and

- o   facilitate discussion between local responders as requested by government and report back.

Expectations from central government for delivery within a national framework are placed on LRFs – or, strictly, on the Category 1 responders, supported by the Category 2 responders, who make up the LRF – for example, as part of the government's national capabilities programme. These expectations require formal responses and considerable engagement under the LRF's work programme. The relationship between central government and the Category 1 and 2 responders, as mediated by the LRFs, is discussed further below (see paragraphs 2.92-2.94).

[44] s. 2 (5)(h)

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2.50.   Finally, as stated, the LRF does not have an operational role. It facilitates preparedness at the local level. Nevertheless, when an emergency occurs, at least one of the local Category 1 responders will normally[45] declare a major incident and call together a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) (usually, though not always, led by the police). Some, or many, of the responder organisations which have met at the LRF are likely to be part of the SCG.[46] The SCG's task is to co-ordinate the response to the emergency and it is also likely to take a role in the initial stages of the recovery (after which, if required, it is replaced by a dedicated Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG)). LRFs must help plan how the formation of the SCG takes place so as to ensure that it happens smoothly and without misunderstandings. It is reported widely that organisations which have worked together in the LRF are more likely to respond coherently and with confidence to an emergency. The formation of the SCG is not simply a transition from the LRF. On occasions, the LRF will continue to meet while an SCG is operating.

LRF – structure

2.51.   The Local Resilience Forum comprises all chief officer groups, working groups, task and finish groups and sub-groups.[47] The structure of the LRF reflects its status as a forum bringing together the duty-holders.

2.52   Because of its importance, the LRF chief officer group should attract a sufficiently senior level of representation. For example, local authority representatives should be at chief executive or deputy chief executive level, and police representatives should be chief constables or their deputies. Because the discussions are strategic, the LRF chief officer group should meet relatively infrequently, though at the minimum every six months, and the meetings should be thoroughly prepared so that the time of senior officers is used well.[48]

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[45] Plans are maintained by Category 1 responders and will normally be activated by a member of that organisation, the regulations do not limit the decisions to Category 1 responders. Please refer to Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.20 for more information.
[46] At the time of an emergency, those organisations whose functions are affected by the emergency come together to deliver the response and to lead the recovery.
[47] regulation 4(7)
[48] regulation 4(7)(a)

2.53.   The role of the general working group is to bring issues before the chief officer group and ensure its decisions are implemented. Preparation for the LRF chief officer meetings is likely to be the responsibility of the LRF general working group. It is likely that senior civil protection professionals will attend, who can help determine the most useful agenda for the chief officer group. Chief Officers may of course nominate appropriate senior managers to attend if they wish. These working group meetings should be held regularly and they are likely to be convened more frequently to prepare the business of the LRF before chief officer group meetings and to act on its decisions afterwards and between meetings.

2.54.   Arrangements for the LRF – including the frequency of meetings of its groups and sub-groups – should be agreed between the Category 1 responders within a local resilience area and in consultation with the Category 2 responders which exercise functions within the LRF area.[49]

2.55.   Regardless of the way in which organisations are represented in the LRF process, all papers for discussion at the chief officer group meetings should be copied to all Category 1 and 2 responders in the LRF area and any standing members which are not Category 1 or 2 responders, such as voluntary sector and military representatives. All local responders should also be invited to submit agenda items to chief officer group meetings. These procedures will allow Category 1 and 2 responders not regularly attending the meeting to know what the issues are and to submit their contribution through their representatives if they wish. They may also request to attend the meeting, or part of the meeting, because of particular concerns they have. Where appropriate, LRFs should consider publishing papers into the public domain to inform their local communities of discussions held within meetings and upcoming agenda items.

[49] regulation 4(5)- 4(7), 4(10)

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The general working group, sub groups and task and finish groups

2.56.   A typical structure for a Local Resilience Forum is shown in Figure 2:

Figure 2: Structure for a Local Resilience Forum

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│    LRF Chief Officer group (strategic)   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│    LRF General Working Group (business)  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
         │                          │
┌──────────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ LRF Sub-groups        │   │ LRF Task and Finish Groups│
│ (for example)         │   │                          │
│  • Risk               │   └──────────────────────────┘
│  • Capabilities       │
│  • Area               │
│  • Sector             │
│  • Specialist         │
└──────────────────────┘
```

2.57.   The general working group is likely to be a permanent group. In the first instance, it should be made up of officers from the organisations represented on the LRF chief officer group – though these may be augmented from other responder organisations. In some areas, the chairs of sub-groups are members of the general working group. The group takes forward business such as LRF multi-agency plans and training and exercise programmes.

2.58.   Supporting the general working group will be various sub-groups. Some of these may be permanent groups, such as the risk group which co-ordinates the production of the Community Risk Register. Task and finish Groups should also be considered with a finite life to deliver a defined outcome. One role of the sub-groups and task and finish groups is to provide an opportunity for organisations which do not attend the main LRF meetings (but which are represented there) to make their contribution. These groups also provide an opportunity for responder organisations which are not involved in the whole range of civil protection work, such as Category 2 responders and the voluntary sector, to be engaged. However, they should not be used as an opportunity to remove Category 2 responders from core LRF business. (Category 2 responders are specifically entitled to attend the main LRF meetings.[50]) Membership of all sub-groups, and their role in the light of evolving LRF priorities, should be reviewed regularly.

2.59.   Determination of which groups should be permanent sub-groups and which task and finish groups is a matter for LRFs themselves. Possible groups are suggested as follows:

- o   Risk – delivering the Community Risk Register; identifying priorities for the work programme;

- o   Capabilities – matching the government's capabilities programme, including, for example, Telecommunications sub-groups (TSGs);

- o   Area groups – based on administrative areas smaller than the whole LRF area;

- o   Sector groups, including the voluntary sector – see discussion of representation at paragraphs 2.66-2.69 below;

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o   Specialist groups – these are cross-organisational groupings working on particular issues, such as chemical hazards, flooding, utilities emergencies, events, welfare support for people affected by emergencies, animal health, media relations, or training and exercising; and

o   Standing groups – these tend to pre-exist the CCA or to exist outside its statutory framework – such as airport committees, COMAH groups, coastal groups, event planning and sports stadium groups, town and city centre groups, local search and rescue committees, or flood defence boards. (Essentially, a "friendly" relationship should be established with them to ensure that they are familiar with the work of the LRF and reporting arrangements set up in both directions. Some may usefully be brought under the LRF umbrella as formal sub-groups. It is suggested that standing coastal groups be set up in all coastal areas.)

Sub-groups and task and finish groups should only be established with the approval of the LRF chief officer group and should tie into the priorities set out in the Community Risk Register. Increasingly, LRFs are adopting governance arrangements which define the role and relationship of the various groups within the structure and ensure that the programme is carried forward in accordance with sound business management principles.

The impact of the pattern of local resilience areas on all Category 1 and 2 responders

2.60. The establishment of local resilience areas and LRFs on police service boundaries [51] can pose particular problems.

2.61. Because the administrative arrangements of local government in England and Wales vary considerably between metropolitan, shire and unitary areas, co-operation across a police boundary local resilience area is more easily applied in some areas than others. Also, the pattern of local resilience areas across England and Wales exerts particular pressures on national-level Category 1 responders such as, the Environment Agency and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency whose organisational footprints are different. Again, some of the Category 2 responders, such as, the utilities or transport companies, are organised nationally or regionally, on different boundaries. The LRF needs to take a flexible approach in recognition of these organisational differences.

2.62. Also, one consequence of the local nature of arrangements under the CCA is that the way LRFs work is frequently different from one local resilience area to another. Differing procedures can pose particular problems for local responders (Categories 1 and 2) operating across a number of LRF areas. These responders are likely to have adopted a standard approach across all the LRF areas they cover. They should be prepared to show flexibility too.

[51] regulation 3.

2.63.   The justification for basing local resilience planning on a police boundary structure is that emergencies generally have their initial impact at the local level. Response is first organised locally – usually co-ordinated by the police. It follows that, irrespective of the partners' particular administrative arrangements and their procedures, they must have the capability to respond effectively at the local level. In this respect, it means both Category 1 and Category 2 responders must prepare at the local level with their civil protection partners. [52]

2.64.   Nevertheless, some concessions should be made to acknowledge the difficulties which some responders, not only Category 2 responders but also some Category 1 responders, have in fulfilling expectations at the planning stage at the local level.

2.65.   One useful action which LRFs should take is to publish a detailed map showing their local resilience area and the local responders operating within it. It is also useful to provide clear information, possibly in a members' handbook, about the membership of the LRF, its structures, procedures and activities.

LRF – "effective representation"

2.66.   There are difficulties for some responders (both Category 1 and Category 2 responders) whose administrative areas cover a number of LRF areas of getting senior staff to all LRF meetings. There are also problems for the efficient functioning of the LRF where, for example, a number of organisations in the same class or sector – for example, shire district councils in England – all wish to attend the same LRF meeting. For these reasons, the regulations permit responders in a particular class, because they are operating in the same sector, to nominate a representative from that class who will act for them at the LRF meeting. This qualification of the obligation on all Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders to attend the LRF in their local resilience area, aims to ensure that meetings can be run efficiently and organisations are not over-stretched. The main requirement is that local responders must be "effectively represented". [53]

[52] regulation 4
[53] regulation 4(8), 4(9)

2.67.   Where Category 1 responders do not feel they are or can be effectively represented by another member of their class – for example, metropolitan districts and unitary authorities may consider they need to be fully engaged in the LRF – then the primary duty to attend the LRF applies. Similarly, where Category 2 responders – for example, in the telecoms or the energy sectors – consider that a single organisation from their sector cannot represent them all (because, for instance, the class covers a range of different types of business), they should identify a second, suitable representative organisation, or recognise that the primary duty falls on them to be involved directly.

2.68.   Concerns remain that those responder organisations not attending the LRF are not engaged in its business and can fall outside the active civil protection community at the local level. Representation in some instances has tended to be determined in an ad hoc way, without regular review and renewal. In order to achieve effective representation, a more consistent procedure will be useful. Those Category 1 and 2 responders in each class in a local resilience area[54] who wish to utilise the representation procedure should have an annual meeting to nominate an organisation (or possibly more than one) from their class to represent them for the year, unless other sound mechanisms exist.[55] Over the course of the year, the representative is expected to provide an effective two-way flow of information for those in its group or sector. The mandate of the representative organisation should also be clearly stated. One Category 2 utility attempting to represent all Category 2 utilities across several sectors is not likely to be effective representation.

[54] See *Civil Contingencies Act 2004*, Schedule 1, Part 1 and 3, for classes of local responder in England and Wales.
[55] In Wales, a memorandum of understanding and information handbook has been produced by the Wales Utilities Group. The document provides a framework for the companies concerned to work with Category 1 responders and other Category 2 responders to meet the requirements of the Act. It sets out how utility companies engage with responder organisations and LRFs through an engagement protocol.

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2.69. A Category 1 or 2 responder which acts as an effective representative for others:

- o has the authorisation of other local members of its class to take part in the LRF on their behalf;

- o is aware of the proceedings of the LRF chief officer group, its general working group, sub-groups and task and finish groups and is ready to take forward to the LRF issues raised by local members inside and outside these groups; [56]

- o is able to explain current structures, policies, priorities and events in the area of civil protection affecting its sector; and

- o ensures that the other local members of its class which it represents are kept fully informed of issues discussed at the LRF and are invited to submit their comments or attend particular LRF meetings as appropriate.

Role of Category 2 responders in co-operation

2.70. Category 2 organisations are brought under the Act because local resilience can only be achieved if their emergency and business continuity plans under their own legislation reflect an understanding of, and integrate with, the plans of Category 1 responders. Category 2 planning may be regional or even national in its scope - these plans nonetheless must still acknowledge the interface with local responders in local level response arrangements and cater to their needs. Category 2 organisations also must co-operate with each other where that will help a Category 1 responder fulfil its duties. [57]

[56] regulation 4(10)
[57] regulation 4(3)

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2.71.　Category 2 responders are expected to help Category 1 responders in all aspects of the duty[58], but not to the extent that the demands of the Category 1 responder effectively place a Category 1 responsibility on them "by the back door". Accordingly, Category 1 responders are expected to manage their requests for co-operation addressed to Category 2 responders – when, for example, requesting attendance at meetings of the LRF or seeking information for business continuity plans – in ways which are realistic and fair. At the same time, the Category 1 responders should not be expected to compromise their objectives.

2.72.　In order to address the various problems identified for Category 2 responders of meeting the demands made on them, a combination of measures should be implemented in each local resilience area:

- o to set the expectations of Category 1 responders at a level which is realistic and fair;
- o to manage Category 1 expectations and requests in the most efficient way; and
- o to address the obligations on Category 2 responders in ways which recognise the reasonable needs of Category 1 responders under the Act.

2.73.　Annex A aims to identify the reasonable expectations which Category 1 responders will have of Category 2 responders. The major areas where co-operation, including information sharing,[59] is likely to be sought are identified as follows:

- o compilation of the **community risk register** (meetings and information sharing);

[58] regulation 4(2), 4(3)
[59] regulation 4(4). Co-operation can take many forms. In this list, two only (meetings and information sharing) are identified because they are considered to be the most time-consuming for Category 2 responders. For a fuller description of co-operation, see paragraph 10 above.

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- o   identifying hazards and risks as the basis for **specific emergency plans and exercise scenarios** (meetings);

- o   identifying business risks as part of **BC planning** (information sharing);

- o   discussions with partners when developing procedures **for specific plans, for multi-agency plans, and for LRF multi-agency plans** (meetings);

- o   discussions with partners when developing and planning **exercises** (meetings); and

- o   discussions with partners about co-ordinating and formulating **warning and informing** messages (meetings).

2.74.   Some of these areas require direct contact for the Category 1 responder with a specific Category 2 partner and are unlikely to be addressed by a representative, or by other means. Therefore, the processes of attempting to manage the burden on Category 2 responders outlined below (see "The Right Issue, At the Right Time, At the Right Level", _paragraphs 2.83 - 2.87_) will not meet all cases, and Category 2 responders should expect to continue to address some direct requests from Category 1 responders.

2.75.

Category 2 responders should expect to deal directly with the following expectations from Category 1 responders:

- o   to meet with them occasionally to help them deliver their statutory tasks;

- o   to take part in relevant exercises; and

- o   to assist with information to help them complete their statutory tasks.

The Category 2 role is not a passive one. Category 2 responders should be engaged actively with Category 1 responders in making the relationship work.

2.76.   The expectation that Category 2 responders will take part in relevant local exercises is particularly important and needs to be managed carefully. Category 2 responders are subject to requests to take part in civil protection exercise programmes organised nationally or across multi-LRF boundaries. It is reasonable, nevertheless, for Category 1 responders to expect Category 2 responder involvement in local exercises where a clear need is demonstrated.

2.77.   In terms of the obligation under the Act to attend the LRF chief officer group, the requirements on Category 2 representatives are moderated in two ways:

   o   They must *consider* attendance at all meetings; [60]

   o   They must attend meetings where all Category 1 responders in that local resilience area have invited them.[61]

In practice, Category 2 responders or their representatives should give careful consideration to attending those meetings where items of relevance to them are on the agenda. If all Category 1 responders in the area request their attendance at a particular meeting, then the Category 2 responder or its representative must do so. However, this power to require attendance should only be used by the Category 1 responders where the item for discussion is relevant to the Category 2 responder.

[60] regulation 4(9)(b)
[61] regulation 4(9)(a)

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2.78.   Whether a matter is of relevance or not will be determined by the Category 2 responder or its representative organisation in conversation with the LRF secretary. In cases of dispute – where the LRF chair can demonstrate that he or she has the agreement for this course of action of all the Category 1 responders in the local resilience area[62] – the LRF chair can require the Category 2 responder or its representative to attend.

2.79.   Category 2 responders are, of course, entitled to attend any of these meetings of the LRF, its working group, sub-groups and task and finish groups if they wish to do so.[63] Membership of these groups is determined by the LRF chief officer group and Category 2 responders should be encouraged to attend them when relevant issues are tabled.

Category 1 and 2 responders and information sharing

2.80.   A particular aspect of co-operation examined in *Annex A* is the impact on Category 2 responders of requests for information from Category 1 responders.[64] (Such requests can be directed at fellow Category 1 responders too, who may also benefit from a managed approach.) *Annex A* identifies two areas of major impact:

   o   information required for the Community Risk Register;[65] and

   o   information from infrastructure operators and main suppliers about business continuity risks.[66]

A number of other areas are identified where the impact is intermittent or minor, but they should be recognised and addressed.

[62] regulation 4(10)(b)(i)
[63] regulation 4(10)(b)(ii)
[64] regulation 47
[65] regulation 15,
[66] regulation 18, 19,

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2.81.   Requests for information – between Category 1s and Category 1s, Category 1s and Category 2s, Category 2s and Category 2s, and Category 1s and the voluntary sector – are suitable for a managed approach because:

- o   the demands of a number of responder organisations are similar;
- o   the volume of demands is great and can usefully be spread out or, alternatively, concentrated, or reduced; and
- o   the capacity of partners to meet demand is limited.

It is essential that civil protection partners seeking information from Category 2 responders (and other Category 1 responders and the voluntary sector) respect the difficulties that may be caused for the organisation receiving the request and refrain from an "all with all" approach[67] as far as possible (see also Chapter 3 on Information Sharing). Protocols relating to information sharing have been developed in some local resilience areas to ease the difficulties. A proposal for a more comprehensive protocol governing all aspects of co-operation is made in the next section.

2.82.   Even so, occasions remain when direct contact between local responders, one-on-one, to seek and provide information remains appropriate, as the Act requires.

Category 1s, Category 2s and the voluntary sector, LRFs and multi-LRFs: "The Right Issue, at the Right Time, at the Right Level"

2.83.   Attendance at LRF meetings and sub-groups can create difficulties for Category 2 responders (and some Category 1 responders and the voluntary sector), particularly those which operate regionally or nationally. Category 2 responders must be invited to all LRF meetings, but the circumstances where Category 1 responders require a Category 2 to attend a meeting:

[67] See paragraphs 2.9 – 2.10 above.

  o should be limited to those where matters of relevance will be discussed (see *paragraphs 2.77- 2.78* above); and

  o may be modified by putting in place arrangements at the multi-LRF level which, in defined circumstances, will satisfy the requirement to meet with Category 1 local responder partners.

2.84. A principle of Category 2 engagement should be that it takes place on "the right issue, at the right time, at the right level". The key considerations are pragmatic and need to ensure that representatives of Category 2 responders attend those meetings of the LRF chief officer group, the working group, the sub-groups and task and finish groups where they need to be present and not those where they don't.

2.85. However, a further consideration is that co-operation, including information sharing, between Category 2 responders and Category 1 responders may be mediated effectively through structures at a multi-LRF level or above. Thus procedures should be agreed (and may be cemented in protocols) which identify a role for the DCLG RED team or a group of multiple LRFs – or Welsh Resilience Forum in Wales (WRF) – to facilitate co-operation between the Category 2 responders and the Category 1 responders.[68] Examples are already in place where the formal arrangements between Category 2 responders and Category 1 responders have been agreed across multi-LRF areas. Protocols have been designed where the duty holders themselves are the main parties to the agreement, together with the LRF(s) and organisations representing Category 2 responders from, for example, a particular utility sector.

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[68] regulation 7.

2.86.   The effect of the two moderating principles in paragraph 2.83 above is that the LRF, representing the Category 1 and 2 responders in its area, will need to determine which areas of work with particular Category 2 responders should continue to be dealt with through its structures and which can safely be delegated and formally assigned to a multi-LRF level committee on which Category 1 representatives will sit. (This task may be assisted by reference, for example, to Table 2 above which examines the tasks of the LRF, and also *Annex A*).

2.87.   Consideration should be given to how to allocate the different types of information request across the various forms of managed co-operation proposed:

> o   through LRFs;
>
> o   through groups of LRFs (and the Welsh Resilience Forum);
>
> o   through LGD websites;
>
> o   through Category 1 and 2 responder websites;
>
> o   through secure national communications media; and
>
> o   through the use of protocols between all the parties to agree the appropriate use of all the above.

Support from lead government departments

2.88.   Working with the organisations they sponsor, lead government departments (LGDs) can act as a clearing house for answering certain generic types of request from Category 1 responders. This can be done through a variety of means including through the use of a web site with, for example, a Frequently Asked Questions page (as, for example, the CCS website on Category 2 responders[69]).

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69 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/civil-contingencies-act-category-2-responders-overview-sectors-and-emergency-planni

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2.89.   LGDs can also assist LRFs by ensuring that requests for action in a local resilience area are made to the duty-holders, rather than added to the expectations placed on the LRF.

Other forms of co-operation to improve information sharing

2.90.   Category 2 responders themselves and their national associations can assist Category 1 responders by providing generic information on their websites tailored to the specific needs of local responders.

2.91.   Other means of making information available to local responders are through secure national communications media, such as the National Resilience Extranet.

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

A Category 1 or 2 responder "shall have regard to guidance" issued by a Minister of the Crown about "the matters specified" in regulations (s2(3) and (5) and s3(3)(b)).

The Local Resilience Forum

2.92. The LRF has essentially two roles as illustrated in Figure 1 below: [70]

    o   To link up organisations at the local level; and

    o   To serve as one tier in a chain of resilience organisations at the local, multi-LRF and national levels.

Figure 1: Resilience across the tiers of government

[70] Please note that Diagram 1 should not be taken as demonstrating a hierarchical relationship. It is also generic and schematic. It does not, for example, describe the particular arrangements in Wales – including the Wales Resilience Forum and the links to the Welsh Government as lead government department in some areas.

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2.93.   Supporting the LRF and facilitating its work in the resilience chain is the Department of Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division Team in England, and in Wales, the emergencies branch of the Welsh Government (WG). In addition, there are Lead Government Departments (LGDs) which relate to each of the Category 1 and 2 responders and represent them at a UK level as well as issuing guidance in relation to their functions. WG has devolved responsibility in a number of areas, such as environment and animal health, and acts as an LGD for those areas in Wales. Finally, there is the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) within the Cabinet Office which relates directly to the Category 1 and 2 responders and to the LRFs and is responsible for the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and local resilience policy. It also co-ordinates the resilience work of LGDs. The CCS and LGDs report to a Cabinet sub-committee on Threats, Hazards and Resilience and Contingencies (NSC (THRC)), which itself reports to a Cabinet committee, the National Security Council (NSC).

2.94.   The LRF should not be expected to act in the same way as an arm of government, funded and resourced to deliver policy objectives. It is a forum required under the CCA regulations, but it may not have paid staff and its essential role is to help the duty-holders determine what to do in accordance with local circumstances. Government's formal relationship is with the duty-holders, the Category 1 and 2 responders, who have the principal responsibility for delivery.

2.95.   The LRF is also not an entity which represents its local responder members in a legal sense. In this respect, the LRF cannot "deliver" its members. However, the duty-holders can agree to bind the LRF to a certain course of action if they wish.

2.96.   As suggested above[71] the aim of delivering a more robust LRF which can act more decisively can be achieved through agreement on governance arrangements which can be supported by a protocol between all the Category 1 and 2 partners. It can also be assisted by agreements for joint discharge of functions between key responders.

Leadership and management

2.97.   There are several aspects of leading the LRF and ensuring that it works well, such as chairing the forum, the role of the secretary, the development of governance arrangements and sound business management practice and the possible appointment of an LRF manager.

2.98.   Traditionally in many areas, the role of chair has fallen to the police. The matching of the LRF boundary to the police boundaries reflects the police's key co-ordinating role in many types of emergency. Generally, it makes them well placed to co-ordinate the multi-agency partnership of responder organisations, many of which are likely to operate within only part of – or, alternatively, over a wider geographical area than – the local resilience area. Even so, the choice of chair remains a matter for local determination.

2.99.   Various factors should determine the choice. The chair should be able to:

  o   take on the job on a long term basis;

  o   speak with authority about the forum area;

  o   speak with authority about strategic civil protection issues; and

  o   commit sufficient time to prepare for forum meetings.

[71] See paragraph 2.24

2.100. The chair may also represent the LRF at meetings with other tiers, including devolved and central government, or nominate another member of the LRF or its sub-groups to do so, at the appropriate senior level. Usually those nominated to attend on behalf of the LRF will be familiar with, and actively engaged in, the functional subject areas under discussion and may be the chair of the relevant subgroup

2.101. The secretariat support role is crucial in ensuring the LRF performs effectively. This clearly involves the appointment of an efficient secretary but it may also require a co-ordinator or manager to assist the chief officer and general working groups and ensure that the business of the forum across all its sub-groups and task and finish groups is dealt with satisfactorily. The two roles can fall to any of the member organisations and there are several instances where, for convenience, the role is performed by the chair's organisation, or the roles are co-located. However, it should generally be a different organisation from that providing the chair, possibly a local authority, so as to get the widest knowledge at the centre of the LRF of the range of functions engaged in preparations for emergency.

2.102. In relation to the LRF chief officer group, the working group, various sub-groups and task and finish groups, and other activities, the support role to the chair has a number of key tasks, as follows:

- o fix the date of chief-officer level LRF meetings;
- o agree the agenda and attendance with the LRF members;
- o organise the production of papers and presentations;
- o circulate papers to all Category 1 and 2 responders in the LRF area;
- o brief the chair;
- o take the minutes and follow up the matters arising and action points;
- o disseminate the minutes to all Category 1 and 2 responders in the LRF area and other LRF members;

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o   ensure that meetings of the working group, sub-groups and task and finish groups are effectively organised and recorded; and

o   ensure that relevant issues from these groups are brought to the attention of the chief officer group.

Where a co-ordinator or manager has been appointed, the following additional tasks may be undertaken (though without a manager, these are undertaken by the LRF chief officer group and the working group):

o   track progress in carrying out the forum's decisions, including competent delivery of its programme, which may include the Community Risk Register, developing multi-agency plans and running multi-agency exercises;

o   prepare and deliver from time to time a strategic assessment on the capability and readiness of local responders, acting together, to respond; and

o   act when necessary as a focal point for the dissemination of documents containing policy initiatives and requests from other levels of government.

2.103.   All of these tasks, but particularly the last three, illustrate the burden of work falling to LRFs, which has encouraged them to find ways of appointing managers where they can. The LRF is not a fully-staffed, corporate body, supported by a secure funding stream. As a result, the expectations placed on it can sometimes strain its limited infrastructure. The LRF relies on voluntary contributions in kind or through subscription from its members. Accordingly, central government will endeavour to reduce the demands placed directly on LRFs by circulating communications and expectations for action in the first instance to the specific Category 1 and 2 duty-holders whose contributions are required. LRF chairs and secretariats will be fully informed of all these communications and be invited to co-ordinate initiatives.

2.104.   The LRF is likely to rely on its member organisations – in addition to those providing the chair and the secretariat – taking initiative and progressing work through the general working group, the sub-groups, the task and finish groups and other projects.

2.105.   Various factors should determine the choice of who provides the secretariat. Those taking up the task should:

- o   take on the job on a long term basis;

- o   be competent to support the chair at strategic level meetings;

- o   have the back up of an administration team within their own organisation; and

- o   be competent to organise, or to support officers from their own or other organisations, in administering the work of the working group, sub-groups, task and finish groups and other projects.

LRF funding

2.106.   Dedicated funding can achieve greater consistency of performance in LRFs. In most cases, providing a secretariat - or a co-ordinator or manager-relies on a subscription scheme. Subscription from LRF members has achieved good results in a number of areas and should be considered as a practical way of standing the forum on a firmer footing.

2.107.   Establishing LRFs on a firmer basis with greater resources to support the chair and secretariat will require full consent from the members, who will wish to ensure that sound governance arrangements and an effective work programme are in place. Some support for the work of sub-groups, as well as the main LRF, may be appropriate in some instances.

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Participation in the LRF

2.108.   This section looks at how participation in the LRF process is likely to be organised in practice for different classes of organisation. The descriptions below are guides rather than definitive structures, and will need to be tailored to reflect local circumstances. But they do represent what Category 1 and 2 responders have indicated as reasonable expectations at the local level.

Category 1 responders

2.109.   **Local authorities** play a critical role in civil protection. They have a wide range of functions likely to be called upon in support of the emergency services during an emergency, including key statutory responsibilities such as environmental health, housing, social services and highways. As the response phase comes to an end, the impact on the community becomes a key issue. At this stage, the recovery phase, the local authority is likely to take the lead co-ordination role as part of its wider community leadership responsibility.

2.110.   Each local authority retains the right to attend the LRF. But it may not be practical for every local authority in any given LRF area to be a member of the full LRF. Despite their legal autonomy and individual approaches to civil protection, in many instances, it will make sense for local authorities to nominate one or more of their number to act as effective representatives on the LRF.

2.111.   **Police forces** co-ordinate the response to most emergencies on land. Their key role in co-ordinating the response is based not only on the need to protect the scene for emergency workers and vehicles and preserve evidence of a potential crime; the police are also often expected to co-ordinate information to the public about the emergency, including dealing with the media. This strong presence in co-ordinating the response has meant that the police are often called upon to co-ordinate multi-agency policy work at the strategic level as well.

2.112.   As the LRFs have been based by definition on police areas, there will be a single local police force member for each LRF. Each police force will have a single representative, though it may have a second if it has taken on the role as chair.

2.113.   The **British Transport Police** (BTP) plays a role akin to local police forces, albeit in a more specialist and limited environment. It takes responsibility for the management of incidents on the rail network and at train stations.

2.114.   In most LRFs, the local police force will represent the BTP. The exceptions to this are likely to be those meetings where particular consideration is given to rail transport issues, including risk assessments and plans.

2.115.   The **Fire and Rescue Service** is a key Category 1 responder. It has a pivotal role to play in the risk assessment and response to a wide range of emergencies, both fire and non-fire related. Its co-ordination role of the fire and rescue service in a multi-agency incident is normally focused on operations inside the inner cordon. Fire and Rescue Services' expertise and equipment for dealing with chemical emergencies, including decontamination on behalf of the health service, and their search and rescue capabilities, give them a key role in multi-agency planning.

2.116.   In many cases, outside Wales, the boundaries of the local fire and rescue authority will be coterminous with or very similar to the LRF area. It will generally be appropriate for the fire and rescue authorities to have a single representative. Any other fire and rescue authorities which also fall within the same LRF area will be most efficiently represented by the lead authority, with that authority taking responsibility for keeping its colleagues informed of LRF deliberations.

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2.117. Although a part of the NHS, the **Ambulance Service** has a distinct place within the multi-agency civil protection effort. As one of the emergency services, they are at the vanguard of emergency response.

2.118. If a number of ambulance trusts operate within the same LRF area, it will probably be appropriate to agree a lead trust (reflecting both the geographical coverage within the LRF area and commitments with other LRFs). In Wales, there is a single ambulance trust covering all four police areas.

2.119. The **National Health Service**[72] (NHS) is a patient-led service across primary, secondary and tertiary care. Health sector organisations covered by the Act include Strategic Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts, Local Health Boards, the Public Health Wales NHS Trust, Trusts (Foundation and Non-Foundation) that provide hospital accommodation and services in relation to accidents and emergencies, and also Ambulance Trusts. The above NHS organisations are all subject to duties under the Act as Category 1 responders, with the exception of Strategic Health Authorities, which are Category 2 responders (and are described below at *paragraphs 2.151-2.152*).

2.120. Particular care needs to be taken in establishing co-operation with the various parts of the health structure at LRF level. In addressing the responsibilities of a large organisation, it is challenging for single NHS representation to portray accurately the position of the entire local health economy on the LRF. Some LRFs have a health sub-group on which all the various health organisations are represented. In England, the local NHS is normally represented at the LRF by the lead Primary Care Trust (apart from the ambulance service which is separately represented in its own right) or, in exceptional circumstances, the Strategic Health Authority. In Wales, Health Boards, the Public Health Wales NHS Trust and the Welsh Ambulance Services Trust will normally each be represented.

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[72] References to NHS structures will be amended as appropriate following restructuring

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2.121.   Notwithstanding its close links with the NHS, the **Health Protection Agency** (HPA) should be represented separately.

2.122.   **Port health authorities** are concerned with the prospect of human, animal and crop diseases being imported into the UK at seaports and airports.

2.123.   Port health authorities are unlikely to be directly represented on the LRF. Generally, they will be represented by the local authority or (in some circumstances) the HPA. Like the BTP, they will be expected to attend the LRF meetings when issues relating to their functions are discussed.

2.124.   The **Environment Agency** aims to protect and improve the environment, and to promote sustainable development. It plays an important supporting role in planning for and responding to emergencies: in particular, it has key roles in relation to flood risk management and environmental regulation.

2.125.   The Environment Agency has seven regions and 19 operational areas across England and Wales and will be directly represented by the Environment Agency area in which the LRF area is located. Where the LRF falls across an Environment Agency area boundary, the Environment Agency has agreed to nominate a lead area and thus a single representative.

2.126.   The Environment Agency will be represented by the area manager or nominated deputy from the lead area and will provide advice and information on all aspects of the environment for which it has a statutory responsibility.

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2.127. The **Maritime and Coastguard Agency** (MCA) is responsible for the initiation and co-ordination of civil maritime search and rescue within the UK Search and Rescue Region, and as such is an emergency service. It carries out this function through HM Coastguard. This role is described in the *Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*.

2.128. The MCA also leads the response to maritime pollution incidents in the UK Pollution Control Zone. It manages a multi-level plan, the *National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations*, for co-ordinating responder organisations dealing with pollution at sea or on the coast.

2.129. The MCA is structured around three "regions" (Eastern; Wales and West England; and Scotland and Northern Ireland). Within each region, there are three HM Coastguard operational areas. These regional and area boundaries do not coincide with coastal police force areas.

2.130. The MCA will be required to take part in the LRF process only in coastal LRF areas. It will be represented at the LRF by an HM Coastguard manager from the Coastguard "region" where the LRF is situated. In most cases, this will be the manager from the relevant area. These managers will be able to provide advice and information on all maritime emergency response matters. In addition, the MCA has a central resilience unit and each "region" has a senior MCA/ HM Coastguard officer dedicated to resilience matters.

Category 2 responders

2.131.   **Electricity distributors and transmitters** are covered by the Act. During an emergency affecting electricity supplies, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.132.   Electricity companies operating within a given LRF area may be expected to attend the LRF meetings when relevant agenda items are tabled. They are likely to be represented by one or more of their number, who will report back to them.

2.133.   **Gas distributors and transmitters** are covered by the Act. During an emergency affecting gas supplies, the companies retain control of the operation and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.134.   Planning in relation to oil and gas pipelines is covered by the Pipelines Safety Regulations. These arrangements, including exercises, are likely to be reported to the LRF.

2.135.   The main gas distribution company in an area may attend the main LRF group on the basis of 'right to attend, right to invite'. It may act as a representative for other gas distributors, and report back to them.

2.136.   **Water and sewerage undertakers.** During an emergency affecting water or sewerage, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their legal obligations. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.137. In many cases, there will be one water company operating within an LRF area. It will attend the main LRF group on the basis of 'right to attend, right to invite'. Where there is more than one company, they may be represented by one of their number, which could report back to them.

2.138. **Telephone service providers, fixed and mobile.** There are many providers of landline services. There are five mobile telephone operators, each organised on a national basis. During an emergency affecting fixed or mobile telephone supplies, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that their planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.139. Fixed-line and mobile companies operating within a given LRF area may be expected to attend the LRF meetings when relevant agenda items are tabled. They are likely to be represented by one of their number, which will report back to them.

2.140. **Railway operators.** Responsibility for operation and maintenance of the railway track rests currently principally with Network Rail. There are a number of train operating companies, organised on a national and regional basis and dealing with passengers and freight. During an emergency affecting the railways, the companies retain control of their operations and have to meet their obligations as prescribed by the regulator. Network Rail and some train operating companies are also responsible for operating mainline stations. It is crucial that these planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.141.   Freight train operators will in most cases be represented by Network Rail. In some instances it may be appropriate for passenger train operating companies to be represented by Network Rail also.

2.142.   **Airport operators.** Not every LRF area will have an airport within it. And not every airport will be subject to the obligations. Only "relevant airport operators" are covered by the Act. "Relevant airport operators" are defined as those with an annual throughput of at least 50,000 passengers or 10,000 tonnes of freight.

2.143.   During an emergency affecting an airport, the airport retains control of its operations and has to meet its obligations as prescribed by the regulator. It is crucial that its planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.144.   Each airport is likely to represent itself directly in the LRF process, either at the main group or at a relevant sub-group.

2.145.   **Ports.** Not every LRF area will have a port within it. And not every port will be subject to the obligations. "Relevant harbour authorities" are defined as those with an annual throughput of at least 200,000 passengers or 1.5 million tonnes of freight. During an emergency affecting a port, the harbour authority retains control of its operations and has to meet its obligations as prescribed by the Secretary of State. It is crucial that its planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them.

2.146.   If more than one relevant harbour authority operates within an LRF area, they are likely to nominate a lead operator to attend either the main LRF group or a relevant subgroup. This role may be taken on by a representative of the British Ports Association.

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2.147.   The **Highways Agency** is an executive agency of the Department for Transport (DfT), responsible for managing the English Strategic Road Network, comprising motorways and A-roads (primary routes). The Highways Agency does not operate in Wales, where WG has responsibility for trunk roads. Divided into a number of operational regions and areas, the work of the Highways Agency includes maintenance and development of roads, structures and equipment on the Network. Since 2004, with the introduction of the Traffic Officer Service, operational management of traffic on those roads has also become an important part of the Agency's remit, with the National Traffic Control Centre providing traffic and travel information through a variety of media across the Network. The Agency also has a keen interest in multi-agency working and partnerships with all key stakeholders, in particular the Police, helping to respond effectively to incidents.

2.148.   It is crucial that these planning arrangements be understood by the Category 1 responders, and vice versa, and that there be a free flow of information between them. Highways Agency emergency planning teams exist within each region and will attend LRF meetings and sub-groups on the basis of "right to attend, right to invite".

2.149.   The **Health and Safety Executive** (HSE) has a crucial role to play in certain aspects of the LRF process. In particular, the HSE has a significant input to make in the assessment of risk, and the development of the Community Risk Register. The HSE also has a role in relation to offshore oil and gas installations.

2.150.   The HSE may be expected to attend LRF meetings and sub-groups when relevant items are tabled.

2.151.   **Strategic Health Authorities**[73](SHAs) in England act as the regional headquarters for the NHS. They do not deliver services but provide leadership, co-ordination and support across a defined geographical area, managing the performance of PCTs and NHS Trusts.

[73] References to NHS structures will be amended as appropriate following restructuring.

2.152.   Arrangements vary, but SHAs are likely to represent the NHS at multi-LRF Forums. Co-ordination between the SHA and the lead PCTs in each LRF area ensures sound representation.

Other co-operating bodies

2.153.   **The DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division** (DCLG RED) and the **Welsh Government** (WG) are responsible for ensuring that there is good two-way communication between Category 1 and Category 2 responders and central government, that planning is co-ordinated where necessary, and that Category 1 responders have the support they need. DCLG and WG need a full understanding of the work of LRFs, not least because of the requirement to develop plans for emergencies beyond the local level.

2.154.   DCLG and WG can be expected to be standing members of the LRFs in their area. They will generally attend only as observers, though they will be able to add value in a number of ways, including offering advice on the wider picture, and encouraging cross-boundary working and the sharing of good practice.

2.155.   The **armed forces** have a small permanent role in local civil protection through the provision of unique and guaranteed military "niche" capabilities, such as explosive ordnance disposal or search and rescue. As part of the wider government response, Defence can also make a significant contribution in support of Category 1 responders at times of serious emergencies through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). The armed forces remain prepared to respond to a range of emergencies in the UK, especially where Defence can make a strategic impact. There are no standing forces allocated to UK resilience, however, and assets are drawn from across Defence to meet specific demands. Since the Armed Forces are a centralised organisation under direct control of central government, requests for assistance are considered at national level.

2.156.   It is important that Category 1 responders establish close links with the armed forces in their area. Through the medium of LRFs (and multi-LRF groups/ Wales Resilience Forum), Category 1 responders will develop a greater understanding of how the armed forces might support a response to an emergency. It is therefore important that the Regional Brigade, via the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO), is represented at the appropriate level on LRFs since he or she is best placed to provide appropriate guidance on seeking military assistance. Clear guidance on Defence's role is contained in MoD's, *The Defence Contribution to UK Resilience – A Guide for Civil Responders, 2009*.[74]

2.157.   The **Met Office** provides services that can help Category 1 and 2 responders prepare for and respond to emergencies that are caused or influenced by the weather. These can include severe weather warnings, plume predictions and storm tide alerts. Linked to these services is advice on the interpretation and impact of the weather during an emergency.

2.158.   The **voluntary sector** is organised nationally and locally and can provide a wide range of skills and services. It has a key support role to offer to the emergency services and other responding organisations in emergency planning and response and, in certain circumstances, such as rescue at sea, an operational role. At the national level, the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum ensures communication and co-operation between organisations in the voluntary sector themselves. Further detail on the voluntary sector's work is set out in Chapter 14.

[74] http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/849928EC-0918-41E6-8C84-11FD23D58119/0/JDP022EdAddendumWeb.pdf

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Annex A

CO-OPERATION AND INFORMATION-SHARING: EXPECTATIONS AND IMPACT AND THE ROLE OF THE LRF

[This table repeats Table 1 and highlights the impact of the CCA duties on the Category 2s and the LRF. It does not deal with expectations regarding attendance at LRFs.]

Five Main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE			B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION		
		Is co-operation required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	IS LRF involved?	Is information sharing required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	Is LRF involved?
1. Risk Assessment	a)	Direct discussions with partners to support compilation of individual risk assessment for each Category 1 organisation.	Intermittent – impact varies	No	Information required directly from partners to support each Category 1 responder's individual risk assessment.	Intermittent – impact varies	No – but Category 1s use CRR to develop their own risk assessments
	b)	Discussion with partners within LRF to compile Community Risk Register.	**Major and ongoing**	Yes	Information required for Community Risk Register.	**Major and ongoing**	Yes
	c)	Discussion with partners within the LRF re publication of the CRR – which can be done as part of warning and informing.	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes	Consistent approach to providing risk and warning information required across partners.	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes

Five Main Category 1 DUTIES		**A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE**			**B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION**		
		Is co-operation required?	*Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders*	*IS LRF involved?*	*Is information sharing required?*	*Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders*	*Is LRF involved?*
1. Risk Assessment	d)	Discussion with partners about • Central government assessment of risk under capabilities programme • Reports back to central government about multi-LRF and national risk registers	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes	Information required to help assist with interpreting the local impact of central government risk assessment.	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes
	e)	Discussion with partners to support development of: • specific emergency plans • exercise scenarios.	**Intermittent - major**	No	Information required to help define the nature and possible quantification of consequences addressed • by Category 1 plans • in exercise scenarios.	Intermittent – impact varies	No
	f)	Risk meetings or discussions with infrastructure operators about Business Continuity plans.	Intermittent – impact varies	Probably not	Information from infrastructure operators and main suppliers re business continuity risks.	**Intermittent - major**	Probably not

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Five Main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE			B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION		
		Is co-operation required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	IS LRF involved?	Is information sharing required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	Is LRF involved?
2. Emergency Planning	a)	Direct discussion for Category 1 responders with partners to prepare • specific emergency plans; • multi-agency plans; and • LRF multi-agency plans.	Intermittent - major	• Probably not • Sometimes • Yes	Details of partner contacts, roles, responsibilities, procedures, capabilities and resources.	Intermittent - major	• Probably not • No • Yes
	b)	Discussion for Category 1 responders with partners about • Plans required by central government • Information required under national capabilities survey.	Intermittent - major	Yes	Details of partner contacts, roles, responsibilities, procedures, capabilities and resources.	Yes	Yes
	c)	Discussion for Category 1 responders with partners about design and delivery of training and of exercises for: • specific emergency plans.	Intermittent - major	• Probably not • Sometimes • Yes	For scenario development.	Intermittent – impact varies	• Probably not • Sometimes • Yes

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Five Main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE			B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION		
		Is co-operation required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	IS LRF involved?	Is information sharing required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	Is LRF involved?
2. Emergency Planning		• multi-agency plans; and • LRF multi-agency plans.					
	d)	Discussion with partners about design and delivery of training and exercises for plan required by central government.	**Intermittent – major**	Yes	For scenario development.	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes
	e)	Updating plans	Regular - minor	Sometimes	Details of partner contacts, roles, responsibilities, procedures, capabilities and resources.	Regular – minor	Sometimes
3. Business Continuity Plans	a)	Discussions with key infrastructure operators and main suppliers re procedures.	Intermittent – impact varies	No	Information from key infrastructure operators and suppliers re procedures.	Intermittent – impact varies	No
	b)	-	-	No	Updated business continuity plans.	Regular – minor	No

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Five Main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE			B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION		
		Is co-operation required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	IS LRF involved?	Is information sharing required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	Is LRF involved?
4. Warning and Informing	a)	Meetings for Category 1 responders with partners about the nature of hazard and risk and type of messages to make public.	Intermittent - major	Yes	Category 2 responders are likely to have responsibilities to provide information to the public under their own legislation. Updated messages and procedures.	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes
	b)	Meetings for Category 1 responders with partners and other co-operating organisations such as the media and voluntary sector about multi-agency media plans and arrangements for warning dissemination.	Intermittent - major	Yes	Category 2 responders likely to have responsibilities to provide information to the public under their own legislation. Updated messages and procedures. [Operationally - at the response phase - partners should inform each other when warnings and other messages are issued.]	Intermittent – impact varies	Yes

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Five Main Category 1 DUTIES		A. DUTY TO CO-OPERATE			B. DUTY TO SHARE INFORMATION		
		Is co-operation required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	IS LRF involved?	Is information sharing required?	Impact on Category 2 responders and other Category 1 responders	Is LRF involved?
	c)	Joint publicity and events by Category 1s and their partners to raise public awareness of plans and procedures.	Intermittent – impact varies	Sometimes	Each organisation to contribute relevant messages.	Intermittent - minor	Yes
5. Promotion of BCM	a)	LA clarifies with partners who is doing what to promote business continuity management.	Intermittent - minor	No	Information about promotion efforts undertaken and promotional opportunities.	Intermittent – minor	Sometimes
	b)	-	-	-	Requests from business community for information about potential business continuity risks.	Intermittent - minor	No

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CabinetOffice

Formal Information Sharing Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

**Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*,
Chapter 3 (Information Sharing)**

Chapter 3 (Formal Information Sharing) of *Emergency Preparedness* Revised Version

Summary

- Information sharing is a crucial element of civil protection work, underpinning all forms of co-operation. Category 1 and 2 responders should share information formally and as part of a culture of co-operation (*Chapter 2*).

- Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) and the Contingency Planning Regulations[1] , Category 1 and 2 responders have a duty to share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. This is required for those responders to fulfil their duties under the CCA. Information sharing is also encouraged as being good practice.

- The initial presumption is that all information should be shared, but the release of some information, and of information to some audiences, may need to be controlled. Category 1 and 2 responders need to understand what should be controlled (*paragraphs 3.8–3.12*).

- Category 1 responders need to know how to categorise types of information; how the different types of information can be used; how to obtain consent; and the limits on disclosure (*paragraphs 3.25–3.40*).

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[1] Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations referred to in this Guidance as the Contingency Planning Regulations.

- Category 1 and 2 responders need to know about the impact of other legislation, such as the Freedom of Information and Data Protection Acts (DPA), on their information sharing (*paragraphs 3.60–3.72*).

- Category 1 and 2 responders need to understand the importance of training and exercising information sharing elements of emergency plans to ensure they are effective (*paragraphs 3.57-3.59*).

- Further guidance on information sharing and data protection is available (*paragraphs 3.73-3.74*).

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

The duties quoted below outline formal legal requirements. However, most information sharing will be undertaken voluntarily within the context of broader co-operation between responders.

A Category 1 or 2 responder "shall comply with regulations" made by a Minister of the Crown about "the extent of a duty" and "the manner in which… it is to be performed" (s2(3) and s3(3)(a))

Regulations under the Act "may permit or require a person or body listed in Part 1 or 3 of Schedule 1 to provide information, either on request or in other specified circumstances, to a person or body listed in Part 1 of the Schedule in connection with the performance of a duty under subsection (1)". This is subject to Part 8 of the Regulations.

Purpose and Scope

3.1.   Information is shared between Category 1 and 2 responders as they work together to perform their duties under the Act. Information sharing is a crucial element of civil protection work, underpinning all forms of co-operation. It may involve simple liaison between bodies keeping each other up to date on their current arrangements and future plans. Such activities may be carried out through LRFs and multi LRF groups, and more informally.

3.2.   Information sharing may also involve direct contacts, formal or informal, between Category 1 and 2 responders seeking knowledge of hazards, risk assessments or planning arrangements (including warning procedures) and other matters, where the information is in the possession of one, and the other believes it needs the information to fulfil its civil protection duties.

3.3.   The process of sharing information is crucial to other duties under the Act as represented in *Annex A* of *Chapter 2* (Co-operation) [2]. These are:

   o   sound risk assessment relies on obtaining accurate information about the nature of the hazard, the probability of a hazardous event occurring, and the potential effects and impact on the community if it does. Each of these elements may involve some specialist knowledge and calculation and the information required may be privileged or sensitive and not generally in the public domain.

   o   business continuity management largely involves knowledge of the vulnerabilities of one's own organisation – but it also examines linkages to and dependencies on suppliers and contractors, where information may be harder to obtain.

   o   emergency planning relies essentially on knowledge of how each of the partners in response has planned to perform – what their aims and contribution will be, how they will organise and co-ordinate their efforts with those of other bodies, and how contacts will be managed before and during the event. All these details are constantly changing as plans are revised, organisations are restructured or their roles redefined, and individuals and teams are replaced.

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[2] This refers to a table in the 2012 revision of *Chapter 2* (Co-operation) of *Emergency Preparedness*.

3.4.   Information sharing is necessary so that Category 1 and 2 responders are able to make the right judgements. If Category 1 and 2 responders have access to all the information they need, they can make the right decisions about how to plan and what to plan for. If they do not have access to all the information, their planning will be weakened. They will be less well placed to make judgements around cost-benefit analysis – what to plan for and what not to plan for.

3.5.   But the picture is complicated because each individual Category 1 or 2 responder needs to get its planning right and this has to be balanced against the needs of others. For example, sharing a piece of information which helps the planning of one Category 1 or 2 responder, might, in some circumstances, harm the interests of another Category 1 or 2 responder. Also, the perspective of an individual organisation on a single piece of information can be affected by its own position, so an organisation can interpret information in a way that seems correct but is actually wrong. For example, a Category 1 or 2 responder might interpret something to be a risk, but another Category 1 or 2 responder with greater expertise might be less concerned. And in some circumstances, Category 1 or 2 responders will not be able to appreciate the bigger picture into which the information fits. For example, a seemingly innocuous piece of information might have implications for national security.

3.6.   These two competing factors point towards a framework in which the initial presumption is that information should be shared, but that some information should be controlled if its release would be counterproductive or damaging in some other way.

Devolved Administrations

3.7.   The way in which the information sharing duty under the CCA and the Contingency Planning Regulations apply to Category 1 and 2 responders in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is much the same as in England. The key points in relation to the information sharing duty are:

   o   in Scotland, Part 1 of the CCA and the Regulations (which includes the disclosure of information provision under which the Regulations were made) apply to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish Ministers; [3]

   o   in Wales, arrangements under Part 1 of the CCA and the Regulations apply; and

   o   in Northern Ireland, arrangements under Part 1 of the CCA and the Regulations apply only to a limited number of organisations: PSNI, MCA and telecoms providers.

Where relevant, LRFs should be aware of the different structures in place and consider cross boundary information sharing requirements.

When information should not be formally requested

3.8.   In most instances, information will pass freely between Category 1 and 2 responders, as part of a more general process of dialogue and co-operation. This is the means by which the overwhelming majority of information sharing should happen and has happened. _Annex A_ of _Chapter 2_ sets out the areas in which responders will expect to share information.

[3] Part 8 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 (SI2005/ 494).

3.9.   The Regulations require Category 1 and 2 responders to consider alternative routes before pursuing a formal information request.[4] But there are still some instances in which the supply of information will be more controlled. Under the Regulations, any Category 1 or 2 responder can request information from another Category 1 or 2 responder, so long as it is for the purpose of fulfilling responsibilities under the Act, or the performance of another function which relates to an emergency.[5] This should be seen very much as a fallback option and every effort should be made to maintain relationships between Category 1 and 2 responders that allow information to be shared without recourse to formal requests. But should formal requests be necessary, there are a number of procedures that need to be followed in order to make the system work. This ensures that Category 1 and 2 responders make proper efforts to use existing and informal routes to gather information. The aim of this provision is to avoid over-bureaucratisation of the information-sharing process, and reinforce the message that the information-sharing mechanisms under the Act should be regarded as a fallback rather than as the first option.

3.10.   Where it is necessary to resort to the formal request process, one or more Category 1 or 2 responders will request the information and one or more will receive the request. They are known respectively as "the requesting Category 1 or 2 responder"[6] and "the receiving Category 1 or 2 responder." Where the information is required by a number of Category 1 responders, the request may be co-ordinated through the LRF or LRF members may agree on a lead responder co-ordinating such a request. In addition, any multi-Local Resilience Forum groups may facilitate the co-ordination of such requests from across more than one LRF area.

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In Wales, this role is undertaken by the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF). This co-ordinated approach to information sharing should reduce the burden on those agencies from whom information is requested. Before making a request, first, the Category 1 or 2 responder must be satisfied that it does not already hold the information, either by virtue of a previous request or because of informal information exchange. Category 1 and 2 responders should, as a consequence, marshal the information they hold in such a way as to ensure they can make a judgement on this point.

3.11. Secondly, the Category 1 or 2 responder must satisfy itself that the information is not reasonably accessible to the public – that is to say, is not published by the Category 1 or 2 responder as part of its wider information policy. Examples of this would include material made available in annual reports or accounts, or material on websites (both those of individual Category 1 or 2 responders and general websites with generic information).

3.12. Thirdly, the Category 1 or 2 responder must satisfy itself that the information cannot be obtained by other means. This includes all forms of informal dialogue and information sharing, and obliges Category 1 and 2 responders to work together in the first instance to agree information flows that meet the need of those organisations involved. To assist the process LRFs are strongly advised to develop information sharing protocols. These should recognise any pre-existing organisational relationships and will include many of the informal information sharing agreements that exist at the local level. Category 1 and 2 responders also have or may have pre-existing requirements on them under other legislation (including, for example, their licence conditions from a regulator,

or by direction of a minister) to assess risk and to prepare planning arrangements for emergencies. This may mean that relationships and information-sharing routes are already established. Where possible, these should be built on and complemented, rather than duplicated.

Formal procedures for requesting information

3.13. In any instance of information sharing, one or more Category 1 or 2 responders will request the information and one or more will receive the request. They are known respectively as "the requesting responder" and "the receiving responder".[7]

3.14. An information request should be made in writing. It must specify either the information required or a description of the information requested. The request should be sufficiently precise that the nature of the information sought is clear. The request must include reasons as to why the responder needs the information.[8]

3.15. The request may specify a time limit, and the place at which the information should be provided. The request may also specify the form in which the information is to be supplied (eg in paper form, on disk). In each case, the time allowed and the place and form specified, must be reasonable. For example, a requesting responder seeking details from an established plan might allow a week for the receiving responder to reply. But if the information being sought is, for example, not presently collated in an easy-to-share way, or can only be released with the permission of a third party, a month might be more applicable. Wherever possible, the mechanics of the request should be discussed in advance between responders.

3.16. A template for requesting information can be found at *Annex 3*.

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[7] regulation 47
[8] regulation 48

Procedure for dealing with a request

3.17.   A valid request for information in possession of the Category 1 and 2 responder receiving the request, must be complied with unless one of the exceptions applies (see *paragraph 3.23*). This is the case even where the information has been originally supplied in confidence – though the responder which receives the information is also likely to become subject to that duty of confidence. Where the responder is subject to restrictions on the disclosure of information in another enactment or a contract, the other enactment or contract will have to be considered in light of the Regulations. Which provision applies will depend on the particular terms of the other enactment or contract.

3.18.   In considering whether the request is valid, a responder should consider if the procedural requirements have been satisfied and whether the reasons given by the requesting responder indicate the information does appear to be reasonably required in connection with the requesting responder's functions.

3.19.   The information must be provided within the time limit specified in the request. If no time limit is specified, the information must be provided in a reasonable period. The information must be supplied in the form and at the place specified by the request.

3.20.   The request relates to information, not documents. A responder which receives a request is not required to disclose all the documents which contain the information which has been requested. However, this will often be the easiest way to deal with an information request. In other cases, a new document which contains the information being requested may be prepared.

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3.21.   A template for responding to a request for information can be found at _Annex 3_.

3.22.   Templates for making and replying to information requests can be found at _Annex 3_.

Storing information

3.23.   Category 1 and 2 responders should also be aware of the differences required in handling personal data, when compared to handling sensitive security-related or commercial information (see _paragraph 3.26_).

3.24.   It is essential that Category 1 and 2 responders who request information formally or informally have appropriate methods of secure storage when the requested information is received. Each agency should have a locally defined protocol for handling, accessing, and storing information, especially that which relates to sensitive information.

Exception to the duty to provide information: sensitive information

3.25.   Not all information can be shared, and Category 1 and 2 responders can claim exceptions in certain circumstances (and thus not supply information as requested). Exceptions under this Act and the Regulations relate to sensitive information only.

Where the exceptions apply, a Category 1 or 2 responder must not disclose the information:

- o **exception where disclosure would prejudice sensitive information:** a Category 1 or 2 responder must refuse to comply with an information request if the information is sensitive and if it has reasonable grounds to believe that complying with the request would compromise that information. If a Category 1 or 2 responder refuses to disclose information on this basis, it must give reasons for so doing, unless the information is sensitive by virtue of its impact on national security.[9] It should be noted, however, that this exception is only rarely likely to be available, as generally there will be no robust reason to expect that information would be passed on.

3.26.   There are four different kinds of sensitive information as defined by the Regulations:[10]

- o **information prejudicial to national security** – information, where disclosure to the public would adversely affect national security.
- o **information prejudicial to public safety** – information, where disclosure to the public would adversely affect public safety.
- o **commercially sensitive information** – information which relates to the business or other affairs of a person or organisation, where disclosure to the public would prejudice the legitimate business interests of the person or organisation to whom the information relates.
- o **personal data** – information which is personal data within the meaning of the DPA, where disclosure to the public would breach any of the data protection principles or section 10 of the DPA.

[9] regulation 45(1)
[10] regulation 45(1)

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3.27. It will be for individual Category 1 or 2 responders to reach a decision about whether the information they hold is sensitive. But there are a number of general points that should affect the decision:

- o all Category 1 and 2 responders should work on the presumption that information requested should be disclosed. Non-disclosure should only occur in exceptional cases, such as where there are clear national security or commercial implications.

- o where the Category 1 or 2 responder knows that the information has originated from the intelligence services and that disclosure to the public would threaten national security, then the information must not be disclosed unless consent is obtained from the originating services. Where the Category 1 or 2 responder suspects that the information has originated from the intelligence services, or that it may be sensitive for reasons of national security, it should consult with the originator of the information.

- o in considering national security implications, note that the test is whether disclosure to the public would threaten national security, not whether disclosure to the requesting Category 1 or 2 responder would threaten national security. A similar test applies in the other categories of sensitive information.

- o in the case of information that is sensitive by virtue of its national security implications, a Minister of the Crown may issue a certificate certifying that disclosure of that information to the public would be contrary to the interests of national security. This certificate is conclusive. The Minister can issue a certificate in relation to a class of information or a specific piece of information. Note, however, that absence of a

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certificate does not mean that the information cannot be sensitive on national security grounds.[11]

o   where a request relates to information, part of which is sensitive and part of which is not, the exception only applies to the sensitive information. (In other words, the application of an exception does not necessarily enable a Category 1 or 2 responder to refuse an information request in its entirety).

Using non-sensitive information within the planning process

3.28.   The Act and Regulations do not impose any limits on the use of information obtained under the Act which is not sensitive. However, use of non-sensitive information may be limited by duties of confidence, by other enactment or by contract.

3.29.   There are unlikely to be any restrictions on the use to which a Category 1 or 2 responder can put any non-sensitive information which it creates in the course of carrying on its duties under the Act; for example an emergency plan – though an emergency plan may contain information that has been supplied by another Category 1 or 2 responder, and the use to which this information may be put may be subject to limits. It is also important to be mindful that information is sensitive within different environments, and whilst some information may be suitable for sharing among Category 1 or 2 responders, it might not be suitable for the wider public.

[11] regulation 46

Disclosure of non-sensitive information

3.30.   Neither the Act nor the Regulations place any restriction on the disclosure of non-sensitive information that is obtained under the Act. Nor do the Act or Regulations create any restriction on disclosure of non-sensitive information that is created by a Category 1 or 2 responder in the course of carrying out its functions under the Act. However, non-sensitive information which is received from other Category 1 or 2 responders or third parties may be subject to a duty of confidence or contractual restrictions on disclosure. Category 1 or 2 responders may also be subject to other statutory restrictions on disclosure.

3.31.   Just because there is no restriction on disclosure, this does not necessarily mean that the Category 1 or 2 responder will be obliged to disclose the information. But some Category 1 or 2 responders may be under a legal obligation to disclose certain information – in particular, under the Act (see, for example, the duty to arrange to publish in part the plans and risk assessments),[12] the *Freedom of Information Act 2000* (FOIA) and the *Environmental Information Regulations 2004* (EIR).[13]

Using sensitive information within the planning process

3.32.   If a Category 1 responder asks for sensitive information for the purpose of performing a particular function under its regulatory regime, that information may only be used for that purpose.[14] The effect of this will be to limit the circulation of information within Category 1 responder organisations. For example, information about the robustness of mobile phone coverage in the event of an emergency, legitimately obtained by one part of an organisation for use in emergency plans, should not be shared with another part of the organisation responsible for the organisation's contractual relationship with its mobile phone provider.

[12] s. 2(1)(f)
[13] S.I.2004/3391
[14] regulation 52(1)

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3.33. If a Category 1 or 2 responder wishes to use sensitive information it has received by virtue of an information request under the Act for a different purpose, it must obtain the consent of the relevant person or organisation.[15] The relevant person or organisation for different types of sensitive information is set out in *Figure 3.1.*

3.34. The use of sensitive information may be further restricted by duties of confidence, by other enactment or by contract.

3.35. Restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information which is created by a Category 1 or 2 responder in the course of carrying out its duties under the Act are dealt with below. This is likely to limit the way in which sensitive information created by a Category 1 or 2 responder is used.

Disclosure of sensitive information

3.36. The Regulations prohibit any Category 1 and 2 responder from publishing or otherwise disclosing any sensitive information which it has received by virtue of the Act.[16] The Regulations also prohibit disclosure of any sensitive information which the Category 1 or 2 responder has created in the course of discharging its duties under the Act.[17] For example, a risk assessment might identify that a local authority's planning to evacuate a city centre was deficient, and would exacerbate the effects of a terrorist attack. Putting the information into the public domain could expose a weakness that might encourage an attack. If this information was obtained by virtue of an information request made under the Act, or created in the course of a Category 1or 2 responder discharging its duties under the Act, the sensitive information must not be disclosed, even if it would otherwise fall within the Category 1 responder's duty to publish a risk assessment/plan or its duty to warn, inform and advise the public.

[15] regulation 52(2)
[16] regulation 51(1)
[17] regulation 51(5)

3.37. There are two exceptions in the Regulations to the prohibition on disclosure. Where the exceptions apply, the Category 1 or 2 responder may disclose. But unless the Category 1 or 2 responder is subject to an obligation under the Act to disclose the information (eg as part of the obligation to publish risk assessments), it is not obliged to do so:

- o **consent for the publication or disclosure is obtained.** Consent should be obtained from the person identified in _Figure 3.1._ Note that the consent may be given subject to conditions.[18]

- o **the information is commercially sensitive or personal data, but the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests of the person or organisation concerned.** This exception does not apply if the information is sensitive by virtue of its national security or public safety implications. When relying on this exception, the Category 1 or 2 responder must inform the person or organisation to whom the information relates of its intention to disclose the information and provide reasons why it is satisfied that the public interest in disclosure outweighs their interests.[19]

3.38. The prohibition on disclosure applies when the Category 1 or 2 responder is discharging its duties under the Act or any other function that it has in relation to an emergency. The prohibition does not apply where a Category 1 or 2 responder is dealing with an information request under the Regulations or contributing to the Community Risk Register (CRR).

[18] regulation 51(2)
[19] regulation 51(6)

3.39.   The prohibition will not apply where the Category 1 or 2 responder receives an information request under the FOIA or the EIR. In such circumstances, Category 1 or 2 responders must consider the relevant enactment to determine whether or not the information should be released (bearing in mind that the presumption under FOIA is that all information will be disclosed). The right to information under each of those enactments is subject to exemptions on disclosure. In many cases, these will apply to sensitive information; but Category 1 or 2 responders should consider each case on its merits.

3.40.   The Regulations[20] deal with the sharing of risk assessments to form the CRR. Where the risk assessment contains sensitive information, the Category 1 or 2 responder need not provide that information to the CRR where it considers that to do so would impair the confidentiality of that information or compromise the information. Note that there is no obligation under the Regulations to publish the CRR in its entirety. It is possible for a Category 1 or 2 responder to contribute a risk assessment to the CRR on condition that its risk assessment is not published.

[20] regulation 15(3)

Figure 3.1: Relevant Persons or Organisations for Different Types of Security Information

Type of sensitive information	Person or organisation whose consent is needed
Relates to **national security** and supplied indirectly or directly by one of the intelligence services.	The intelligence service which supplied the information or a Minister of the Crown.
Relates to **national security** but not supplied indirectly or directly by one of the intelligence services.	(a) if the information is contained in a document which has been created by a public authority, that authority; (b) in other cases, the organisation which supplied the information or (if different) a Minister of the Crown.
Relates to **public safety** and supplied indirectly or directly by one of the intelligence services.	The intelligence service which supplied the information or a Minister of the Crown.
Relates to **public safety** but not supplied indirectly or directly by one of the intelligence services.	a) if the information is contained in a document which has been created by a public authority, that authority; (b) in other cases, the organisation which supplied the information or (if different) a Minister of the Crown.
Relates to the **business or other affairs** of a person or organisation where disclosure would harm the legitimate business interests of that person or organisation.	The person or organisation to whom the information relates.
Relates to personal data and disclosure to a member of the public would contravene any of the data protection principles or s 10 DPA.	The person to whom the personal data relates.

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

3.41.   This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance.[21]

Types of Information

3.42.   It may be helpful for Category 1 and 2 responders to think about their use of information in the round, and consider how streams of information interact.

[21] s. 3(3)(b)

3.43. There are various types of information. Information may be suitable for some audiences, but not others. And the circulation of information can be limited to certain classes of organisation or individual.

3.44. It is important not to think of information as being either public or private. The picture is much more nuanced, with a spectrum which runs from limited-access information (even within organisations) through to information intended to be absorbed and understood by the public.

3.45. However, there are certainly controls on the free flow of information. Access is limited in a range of ways including physical access, restrictive markings, circulation lists, the 'need-to-know' principle and targeting particular audiences.

Protective marking

There are 6 key points for protectively marking material. These are:

- o Not Protectively Marked;
- o Protect;
- o Restricted;
- o Confidential;
- o Secret; and
- o Top Secret.

The large range of information that can be covered by PROTECT means that a descriptor should be used e.g. "PROTECT - FOR LOCAL RESILIENCE FORUM USE ONLY". Material which contains sensitive personal data should be marked "PROTECT – PERSONAL DATA". The non-statutory guidance document, Security Vetting and Protective Markings: A guide for Emergency Responders, describes

the classification for each heading. It is however unlikely that responders will have a frequent need to work with highly classified material, but nevertheless, should understand the classification for each heading.

Security vetting

There are three types of personnel security controls (vetting levels) that affect access to protectively marked information. These are:

- o **Baseline Standard (BS)** – previously known as Basic Check (BC) and also known as Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS). This standard may enable those who are cleared to have access up to CONFIDENTIAL and occasional controlled access to SECRET material.

- o **Security Check (SC)** - This standard may enable those who have been cleared to have long term, frequent and uncontrolled access to SECRET information or assets; and occasional controlled access to TOP SECRET.

- o **Developed Vetting (DV)** – This standard may enable those who are cleared to have long term, frequent and uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET information or assets.

Incidents of a sensitive nature

In the rare case of an extremely sensitive incident, such as a nuclear or terrorist attack, it is important that Category 1 and 2 responders assess the appropriateness of clearances for staff and volunteers. This judgment *must* be based on how frequently staff are likely to come into contact with any sensitive information arising from the incident. Category 1 and 2 responders should be willing to challenge organisations which demand unwarranted levels of clearance.

Category 2 responders

3.46.   As with co-operation obligations, it is important for Category 1 responders to be realistic about what information is requested from Category 2 responders. Information sharing has the potential to be very burdensome if it is not handled responsibly.

3.47.   Category 2 responders often put information about their activities into the public domain. Information about the overall regulatory regime for Category 2 responders such as the utility and transport sectors is also widely available. In the first instance, Category 1 responders should seek information about the civil protection arrangements of Category 2 responders from these open sources. To facilitate this, the Government will work with Category 2 responders to put as much information as practical about their industry's civil protection arrangements into the public domain.

3.48.   Whilst Category 2 responders do not have the same planning duties as Category 1 responders, Category 2 responders do have a duty to provide information when requested by another responder [22] if the responder requires it:

    o   to perform its duties under the CCA; or

    o   in connection with the performance of another of its functions which relates to an emergency.

[22] regulation 44A, 47 (1), 49 (1), 50

If a request is made, the Category 2 responder must, unless the information is sensitive, comply with the request. In addition to the exceptions discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the regulations prevent a Category 2 responder providing information if they consider that:

- o the information requested is personal data and disclosure would contravene a data protection principle; or
- o disclosure would be likely to adversely affect the confidentiality of the information.

In relation to information on vulnerable people, disclosure should not contravene a data protection principle. Provided that the requesting agency gives an assurance that the confidentiality of the information will not be breached, the Category 2 responder would be expected to provide the information as a general duty under the regulations.

3.49. Beyond these generic arrangements, Category 1 responders can generally expect to be making information requests in a limited number of areas:

- o information about local configuration of national arrangements;
- o information about specific local facilities; and
- o contact details of key staff.

3.50. Of course, this list is not exclusive. If a Category 1 responder wants information in order to discharge its duties under the Act, it should approach the Category 2 responder in question and begin a dialogue about access. If that is not possible, or is unsuccessful, and the Category 1 responder believes the request to be

reasonable and appropriate, it should make the request in accordance with the procedures set out above.

3.51.   Where possible, Category 1 responders should seek to channel requests through as small a number of routes as possible to avoid duplication of effort. There are several ways in which Category 1 responders can request access to information to make the process more efficient:

- o   where the information is required by a number of Category 1 responders, the request may be co-ordinated through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), with the information shared between LRF members if appropriate. This is particularly relevant if the questions relate to local arrangements.

- o   across more than one LRF area, the request could be co-ordinated through any multi-agency or multi-LRF groups.

- o   where a type of information request comes up repeatedly, a Category 1 responder should consider raising this with its national representative body, or the sponsoring government department, or through the national representative body for the Category 2 sector in question. This will allow the sector to consider whether adjustment might be made to the scope of publicly available information to remove the need for future requests.

3.52.   In terms of sensitive information, most Category 2 responders are particularly likely to rely on exceptions that relate to commercial confidentiality. This reflects the fact that many of the Category 2 responders are private sector bodies, who may be in competition with other Category 2 responders within the same area. It is important that these needs are respected. For example, two mobile

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phone operators in the same LRF area might not want to expose details of their network coverage to each other, or to the public.

3.53.   This would obviously be less true of those Category 2 responders from the public sector.

3.54.   Category 1 responders should also bear in mind that information may be available to their organisation by virtue of existing commercial relationships with a Category 2 responder, or that information might be shared under the Act which would affect a commercial relationship. For example, an electricity supplier might have a contract to supply a local authority, but civil protection work might reveal problems with the resilience of that supply.

3.55.   It is important that Category 1 responders respect the circumstances under which such information is obtained, and abide carefully by any restrictions on its use. Should Category 1 responders not handle information properly, the sanctions set out in the Act [23] might be available to the Category 2 responder in question. In addition, if information is disclosed in breach of any duty of confidence, action may be taken against the responder in breach.

3.56.   In return for responsible use of these powers to request information, Category 2 responders should ensure that they can deal with reasonable requests made by Category 1 responders.

Exercising (validation, training and testing)

3.57.   The regulations clarify the requirements in regard to the arrangements for exercises not only to ensure that emergency plans are effective, but also that

[23] s. 10

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training for Category 1 personnel and other persons whom the responder considers necessary should also be provided. In addition, whilst not all elements of the plan can be tested, crucial elements of the plan can. One of these elements is information management.

3.58.   It is vital that all Category 1 and 2 responders have an awareness of their roles and are reasonably comfortable with them *before* an incident occurs. Category 1 and 2 responders should receive awareness training in understanding and interpreting the legislation relating to information sharing i.e. under the CCA, DPA, FOIA and EIR. In addition, lessons and experience from previous incidents should also be included in any training and exercising of plans. Reference should be made to the use of national reports and recommendations from major incidents.

3.59.   Category 1 and 2 responders should regularly review their training and exercising programme to validate, exercise and test the information sharing and also interoperability of communications elements of an emergency plan. In undertaking such a review, it is essential that responders understand their role and can fulfil its purpose *before* an incident occurs.

Other legislative requirements

3.60.   Although there are many pieces of legislation which affect the use of information within individual sectors, there are three which have a wider-ranging impact and of which, as a consequence, Category 1 and 2 responders should be aware. It is for each Category 1 or 2 responder to make the final judgements about the detailed implications of each of these pieces of legislation and how they interface with the Act.

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Freedom of Information Act 2000

3.61.   FOIA provides a mechanism by which members of the public can access information held by public sector bodies.

3.62.   The FOIA aims to increase the transparency of public bodies and the way in which such bodies carry out their work, and to increase accountability. For Category 1 and 2 responders which are public authorities as defined by the FOIA – broadly speaking that is a UK-wide public authority or a public sector body in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (similar legislation exists in Scotland) – the FOIA imposes certain duties to communicate information which is requested by any person (subject to procedural requirements and exemptions). These duties are not affected by the Act.

3.63.   Although as a matter of law the FOIA could be used by one public authority to extract information from another, the FOIA is not primarily intended to be used for that purpose. Public authorities have an implicit duty of co-operation in the discharge of public functions which should facilitate information flow. As such, public authorities which are Category 1 or 2 responders should not regard the FOIA as the principal basis for making requests from each other about civil protection matters. Category 2 responders which are not public authorities should also not rely on the provisions of the FOIA as the principal basis to acquire information for civil protection purposes.

3.64.   Instead, Category 1 and 2 responders should follow the two-stage process set out in earlier paragraphs. In the first instance, they should consider whether it is possible to get the information they seek through other means.

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3.65.   It is only if the information is not publicly or informally available that Category 1 or 2 responders should seek to use the formal mechanisms set out above. But this remains a last resort.

3.66.   In most respects, the information sharing provisions in the Act and Regulations are broader than those in the FOIA. The FOIA recognises that the information will enter the public domain. The Act recognises that the information stays within the civil protection community. As a result, the Act allows certain types of sensitive information to be shared which would be unlikely to be disclosed under FOIA.

3.67.   It is important however that WRF, LRFs and any multi LRF group agree protocols for dealing with individual FOIA requests. This will ensure that multi-LRF, WRF or LRF responders who receive the same individual FOIA request from the public or media can produce a co-ordinated response to the request. The process may mean identifying a lead responder to deal with specific FOIA requests on behalf of the multi LRF/WRF or LRF responders bearing in mind what can and cannot be disclosed under the CCA.

3.68.   Detailed guidance on the FOIA can be found on the Ministry of Justice website at www.justice.gov.uk

Environmental Information Regulations 2004

3.69.   The EIR provide for the freedom of access to information on the environment, subject to certain conditions.

3.70.   Further information is available through the website of the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, at www.defra.gov.uk

Data Protection Act 1998

3.71. The DPA provides certain rights to individuals to request information from public bodies about personal data held by them which relates to that individual. It also provides limits on the use or processing of such data by public authorities. The Data Protection Act must be considered in relation to the duties imposed under the Act and Regulations.

3.72. Guidance on the Data Protection Act can be found in *Data Protection and Information Sharing - Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders*, which is available through the Cabinet Office website at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience and on the Information Commissioner's website at: www.ico.gov.uk

Other Related Guidance

3.73. Guidance on multi agency interoperability is available from www.npia.police.uk

3.74. *Data Protection and Information Sharing - Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders* is available through the Cabinet Office website at www.cabinetoffice. gov.uk/ukresilience and *Security Vetting and Protective Markings: A guide for Emergency Responders* is available on a restricted basis from DCLG RED or from the Welsh Government or via the National Resilience Extranet at www.resilience-extranet.gov.uk or www.resilience-extranet.gse.gov.uk.

Annex 3

INFORMATION REQUEST PROFORMAS

Information Request Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

Requesting organisation(s)	
Information holding organisation(s)	
Information requested	
Reason why the information is required in connection with the Act or other civil protection duties (and how the information is likely to be used)	
Date of request	
Date by which information is required	
Form in which information is required	
Place to which information should be sent	
Contact details	

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Response to Information Request Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

Requesting organisation(s)	
Information holding organisation(s)	
Date of request	
Information requested	
Request accepted?	Yes/No
If no, please set out the exceptions on which you are relying	
If yes, please set out any sensitivities or further background information which might be necessary to ensure the information is properly understood and properly protected	
Date information was supplied	
Contact details	

CabinetOffice

Chapter 4 Local responder risk assessment duty

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 4 (Local responder risk assessment duty) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

- **Summary**

  Risk assessment is the first step in the emergency planning and business continuity (BC) planning processes. It ensures that Category 1 responders make plans that are sound and proportionate to risks (*paragraphs 4.1-4.5*).

- The Act places a duty on all Category 1 responders to carry out risk assessment. Multi-agency co-operation in maintaining a Community Risk Register is also a statutory duty (*paragraphs 4.9-4.10*).

- There is a six-step process for risk assessment that reflects widely accepted good practice. It involves a cycle of identifying potential hazards within the local context, assessing the risks, and considering how those risks should be managed. Responders can use these steps to assist their own planning (*paragraphs 4.29-4.56 and Box 4.6*).

- Local risk assessments should inform multi-LRF and national assessments, and vice versa. Category 1 responders will be able to draw on generic risk assessments and other sources of information (*Box 4.5*) that are provided by central government, while local risk assessments will be shared with Government via the Department for Communities and Local Government (Resilience and Emergencies Division DCLG RED). These may then be used to inform multi-LRF and national risk assessments (*Boxes 4.2 and 4.3*).

- Category 1 responders have a statutory duty to publish their risk assessments, to the extent necessary to reduce the impact of an emergency on the community (*paragraphs 4.14 and 4.56*).

Box 4.1: Further advice and information

> Further advice and information about risk assessment that is not supported directly by the Act, but which responders may find useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act are found in text boxes like this one.

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

Scope of the duty

4.1. The Act places a risk assessment duty on all Category 1 responders. The purpose of the duty is to:

   o ensure that Category 1 responders have an accurate and shared understanding of the risks that they face so that planning has a sound foundation and is proportionate to the risks;

   o provide a rational basis for the prioritisation of objectives and work programmes and the allocation of resources;

   o enable Category 1 responders to assess the adequacy of their plans and capabilities, highlight existing measures that are appropriate, and allow gaps to be identified;

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o   facilitate joined-up local planning, based on consistent

planning assumptions;

o   enable Category 1 responders to provide an accessible overview of

the emergency planning and business continuity planning context for

the public and officials and

o   inform and reflect national risk assessments that support

emergency planning and capability development at those levels.

Assess the risk of an emergency

4.2.   There is a duty on Category 1 responders to assess the risk of an emergency

within, or affecting, a geographical area for which each Category 1 responder is

responsible.[1] The source of risk includes both hazards and threats. Hazards are

defined as non-malicious events including natural events, industrial accidents and

industrial action. Threats are defined as malicious attacks. Emergency, as defined

in the Act, is an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human

welfare in a place in the United Kingdom, an event or situation which threatens

serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or war, or

terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.[2]

It must also meet either of the following criteria:

o   The threat or hazard is of a sufficient scale and nature that it is likely

to seriously obstruct a Category 1 responder in the performance of

its functions.

o   The threat or hazard requires the Category 1 responder to exercise

its functions and undertake a special mobilisation.[3]

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1   s.2 (1)(a)-(b), regulation 13
2   s.1
3   s. 2(2)

4.3.   Challenges which do not constitute an emergency as defined under the Act lie outside the scope of the risk assessment duty. As part of business continuity management (BCM), Category 1 responders will need to risk-assess their emergency planning arrangements and their ability to deliver their critical functions during those emergencies for which the risks are assessed to be significant. Henceforth, in this chapter, 'hazards' and 'threats' are events which may result in an emergency, as defined above.

Modification of plans

4.4.   Category 1 responders are required to consider whether plans should be modified in light of the risk assessment.[4]

Plan for response to an emergency

4.5.   Category 1 responders need only perform a risk assessment in relation to emergencies which would or might affect the geographical area for which they are responsible.[5] This includes risk sources both within and outside an LRF border including critical national infrastructure (CNI).

Minister of the Crown

4.6.   The Regulations enable a Minister of the Crown to issue Category 1 responders with guidance on the risk of a particular emergency. This guidance will usually take the form of likelihood and impact assessments. The Minister may provide that Category 1 responders must adopt that assessment as their own. In general, this is the approach that will be used for the assessment of risks associated with threats; central government will provide statements of the likelihood and impacts of broad threat

[4] s. 2(1)(e)
[5] regulation 13

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categories within the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)[6] and the National Risk Register (NRR)[7] Planning figures for the generic consequences of these threats categories are provided in the National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPAs).[8] In these cases, a responder must not assess the likelihood of that emergency occurring itself; it must rely on the Ministerial assessment.

4.7. Alternatively, the Minister may provide that Category 1 responders must "have regard" to the Ministerial assessment. In such cases, responders must conduct a subsequent risk assessment of their own. They must take the Ministerial assessment into account, but if there are particular reasons to depart from that assessment (e.g. because there are peculiar local features which have not been taken into account in the Ministerial assessment), a responder may do so. This is how generic local likelihood assessments of hazards - in the form of the LRAG - will be provided to Category 1 responders in the Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) by the government departments and agencies that are best placed to make those assessments (e.g. the Environment Agency for coastal flooding, and the Health and Safety Executive for industrial accidents).

Frequency

4.8. The Act also states that the risk assessment should be updated "from time to time".[9] This must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the risk assessment duty and the duty on responders to perform their duties under the Act in a "reasonable fashion". Thus, Category 1 responders should assess risk as often as is necessary, taking into account the annually updated Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG), to ensure that they are in a reasonable position to maintain and

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6 The LRAG is issued by the Cabinet Office and is designed to inform LRF risk assessments. It contains information on the likelihood and impact of generic threats and hazards and is updated annually See *Box 4.4*.
7 The NRR is the public version of the NRA. It contains a high level overview of the risks to the UK as well as giving advice on how businesses, communities and individuals can better prepare for emergencies. It is issued approximately every two years. It can be found at *http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register*. See *Box 4.4*.
8 National Resilience Planning Assumptions provide information and planning figures for the generic consequences of risks. It is based upon the NRA and is published annually to reflect changes in the risk assessment.
9 s. 2(1)(a)-(b)

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update their emergency plans and to perform the civil protection duties under the Act, including the duty to maintain Business Continuity plans. However, the risk assessment should respond quickly to changes in the risk environment so that plans can be updated[10] accordingly. This means that the process should be iterative and contain risk monitoring and updating mechanisms (see paragraph 4.55).

Co-operation

4.9.   As part of the LRF process, Category 1 responders must co-operate with each other in maintaining the Community Risk Register (CRR).[11] The CRR provides an agreed position on the risks affecting a local area and on the planning and resourcing priorities required to prepare for those risks. Its purpose is to enable each Category 1 responder to:

   o   be fully informed of the risks of emergency in its area;

   o   benefit from the range of views on risk of its partners on the LRF;

   o   identify collectively the main local emergency plans and capabilities which appear to be needed across all the Category 1 responders;

   o   decide which of the plans and capabilities should properly fall to it;[12] and

   o   know which of its partners in the LRF acknowledges responsibility for developing plans and capabilities against the various risks.

4.10.   According to the Regulations, the CRR should be shared with LRFs with whom a boundary is shared.[13] A copy of the CRR should also be provided to the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division for distribution to others as necessary. This may include Cabinet Office and other government departments, as well as other LRFs who do not necessarily share

[10] s. 2(1)(e)
[11] regulation 15
[12] s. 2(1)(b)
[13] regulation 16

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geographical boundaries with the CRR area. Indeed, Category 1 responders should consider whether there are any specific risks which should be communicated to any LRFs in any other local areas.[14]

4.11.   While the Act imposes a duty on each Category 1 responder to assess risk, it is recognised that requiring each Category 1 responder to perform this duty in isolation would lead to a wasteful duplication of resources. It is more efficient for individual Category 1 responders to fulfil their risk assessment duties by participating in a collaborative exercise that results in a single, collective risk assessment. This ensures that each local risk is assessed once only and allows the workload to be shared between Category 1 responders. It also helps to streamline the relationship between Category 1 responders and the government departments and agencies that are able to support the risk assessments.

4.12.   In light of this, the Regulations enable the risk assessment duty to be exercised in different ways.[15] The Act provides that Category 1 responders may fulfil the duty to assess risk jointly. For example, a number of Category 1 responders in the form of a subgroup of the LRF might collectively assess the risk of a particular emergency occurring. Alternatively, the Act enables one Category 1 responder to be identified with lead responsibility.[16] This is the mechanism that may be used by LRF members to share the risk assessment activity between them, with each member taking lead responsibility for a number of the risks. However, as outlined below, it will be for each Category 1 responder to assess whether a given risk poses a challenge for that particular responder.

4.13.   In addition, a Category 1 responder may engage a third party (e.g. an external consultant) to provide it with advice that relates to the risk of a particular emergency occurring. The Category 1 responder may then rely on this advice in making its own risk assessment. However, Category 1 responders should remember the benefits of conducting this process themselves: increased stakeholder engagement, a deeper understanding of the risk assessment, and enhanced credibility when communicating and explaining the assessment.

Publication of risk assessments

4.14.   The Act requires each Category 1 responder to arrange to publish all or part of its risk assessments.[17] It can do this (by agreement with its LRF partners) by publishing all or part of the CRR. It may also fulfil the duty by publishing all or part of a plan, where the part published includes a summary of the risk assessment on which the plan is based. When deciding what may be published, the security classification of information and any restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information should be taken into consideration (see paragraph 4.57)

How the Act and the Regulations Apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

4.15.   The extent of the risk assessment duty under the Act and the application of this guidance differ between the devolved administrations.

Scotland

4.16.   Category 1 responders in Scotland have a duty to undertake risk assessment. The Resilience Division and sector policy areas of the Scottish Government work closely with Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (LRF equivalents) and national agencies to

[17] s. 2(1)(f)

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4.16.   deliver resilience activities in Scotland. The guidance *Preparing Scotland* has been centrally produced by the Scottish Government in partnership with Category 1 responders to support them to undertake these statutory duties.

4.17.   Information on hazard and threat assessments for the UK is provided to the Scottish Government in the form of the LRAG, the National Risk Register and National Resilience Planning Assumptions. These are circulated to Strategic Co-ordinating Groups via the Scottish Government's Resilience Division. This material will be issued direct by a Minister to Category 1 responders which fall outside devolved competence.

Wales

4.18.   The Act, Regulations and guidance extend to Wales. To assist Category 1 responders to fulfil their risk assessment duty, the Welsh Government will be provided with information on hazard and threat assessments in the form of the LRAG, the National Risk Register and National Resilience Planning Assumptions, to cascade to Category 1 responders in Wales. The Welsh Government may issue its own risk assessments to responders in Wales, with the consent of the Minister of the Crown. In certain circumstances, a Minister of the Crown may also provide guidance direct to Category 1 responders in Wales. From time to time, the CRR should also be shared with LRFs with whom a boundary is shared, and a copy provided to the Welsh Government.[18]

Northern Ireland

4.19.   In Northern Ireland, only a limited number of organisations have duties under Part 1 of the Act. (For further details see Chapter 12.)

[18] regulation 16

4.20.   To assist those Category 1 responders who do have a duty to undertake risk assessment, information on hazard and threat assessments will be provided to them direct. They will also be provided to the Civil Contingencies Policy Branch (CCPB) and the Department of Justice for information purposes.

4.21.   Because these organisations do not represent the full spectrum of responders, not all the duties placed on organisations elsewhere will be appropriate in Northern Ireland. In particular, the provisions in the Regulations relating to the LRF and its activities, including the production of a CRR, do not apply to responders in Northern Ireland.

4.22.   However, the Category 1 responders are expected to carry out individual risk assessments in relation to their own functions, and in doing so, they should co-operate, as appropriate, with each other. The Category 2 responders should also co-operate with the Category 1 responders as required.[19] In carrying out their risk assessment, Category 1 responders must have regard to any assessment of which they are aware by one of the specified Northern Ireland public service bodies and may adopt or rely on that work.[20]

4.23.   Organisations in Northern Ireland which deliver relevant devolved functions (with the exception of the Police Service of Northern Ireland) are not subject to the duties in Part 1 of the Act, but carry out their civil contingencies activities in line with the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework. Powers under the Civil Contingencies Act to give directions and guidance to the PSNI in relation to its devolved functions lie with the Department of Justice, as set out in Chapter 12.

[19] regulation 6
[20] Part 10 of the Regulations

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4.24. The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework requires organisations to carry out individual risk assessments in relation to their functions. The methodology specified in the Framework is similar to that used by Category 1 responders. The Framework encourages organisations to co-operate in producing risk assessments and to share information at local level. Further information can be found on the CCPB website http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/making-government-work/civil-contingencies.html

## HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

Figure 4.1: Risk as a product of likelihood and impact

Terminology

4.26.   Key terms applying to the process are defined in the Glossary. Risk terminology is notoriously varied. However, this chapter aims to be consistent with the main standards relating to risk management.

Figure 4.2: The general risk management process

4.27.   It should be noted that, in the Act, risk itself is defined solely as the probability of an emergency [21] (see *paragraph 4.2*). The definition of risk used in this chapter is aligned with a more common definition in use but is, to all intents and purposes, consistent. Here, risk is defined as a product of the likelihood and impact of a given hazard or threat.

[21] s. 2(1)(a)

4.28.   Generally, higher risks are associated with hazards or threats that have a higher impact and medium to high likelihood. Conversely, low risks will reflect hazards and threats where the impact is low and the likelihood is low to medium. The more difficult cases are those hazards and threats where the likelihood is low and the impact very high, or vice versa. These risks defy simple categorisation. They require a more sophisticated means of measurement involving judgements about the overall risk associated with certain combinations of likelihood and impact. Typically, these judgements are presented in a risk matrix, as seen in Annex 4F.

The risk assessment process

4.29.   Here, risk assessment is one component of the general risk management process as set out in Figure 4.2. The dashed line represents transitions from one phase to another: the first phase is 'contextualisation', the second 'risk evaluation' and the third 'risk treatment'. It should be noted that there is no statutory requirement for Category 1 responders to perform the risk treatment step. However, it is described below for completeness and because, in practice, Category 1 responders are likely to use this step as a bridge to the emergency planning duty.

4.30.   The risk assessment phases can be described as follows:

o   **Contextualisation** involves defining the nature and scope of the risk and agreeing how the risk management process will be undertaken

o   **Risk evaluation** covers the identification of those threats and hazards that present significant risks, analysis of their likelihood and impacts, and the combination of these values to produce overall risk scores.

o **Risk treatment** involves deciding which risks are unacceptably high, developing plans and strategies to mitigate these risks, and then testing the plans and any associated capabilities. The National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPAs) set national and regional figures for the common consequences of risk which should be planned for. Together with the Local Planning Assumptions Guidance, the NRPAs can be tailored to inform local plans and strategies. It is important to note that the Act does not require Category 1 responders to take action to reduce the likelihood of threats and hazards. Category 1 responders may decide to do this as part of their treatment of assessed risks but the Act only requires that emergency plans be developed: prevention and pre-emption lie outside its scope.

4.31.   All three phases should be cyclical and interactive, involving the full range of stakeholders and allowing for review and updating. Moreover, the entire risk management process must be cyclical if it is to retain currency. Risks vary with changes in the context, changes in the hazards and threats, and changes in available emergency plans and capabilities. Thus, periodic reviews are required to ensure that these changes are captured, and then reflected in the risk assessment and emergency planning processes (see step 6, Annex 4A).

Box 4.2: Consistency with UK and multi-LRF risk assessments

> Risk assessment processes are not only found at the local level of government. Similar processes are implemented at UK level, at pan-Wales level in Wales, and some areas may also undertake the process on a multi-LRF basis in England. The linkages between these are very important. Coherent emergency planning across the levels must in turn be based on coherent risk assessment processes. Indeed, given the fact that risks will often be assessed at one level and communicated to

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another, it is important that the risk assessment activities are, to a large extent, complementary and synchronised.

There are considerable benefits in having a standardised risk assessment approach. By applying an approach at the local level that is consistent both across Category 1 responders and with different tiers, there will be an unprecedented opportunity to:

- o compare the exposure of Category 1 responders, and local areas, to different types of risk;
- o facilitate multi-LRF aggregation of local risk assessments in support of regional and UK planning; and
- o ensure that plans and capabilities - provided on a UK basis and/or locally - are commensurate with the risks.

As the aim is to facilitate local risk assessment, the process described in this guidance is not precisely the same as the risk assessment methods used at different levels. However, it has many features in common with them and is generally consistent. As such, this guidance will facilitate the sharing of information about risks between local, multi-LRF and national levels and will support the further development of these linkages in the future.

Supporting the planning process

4.32.   As Figure 4.3 illustrates, risk assessment should drive a standard emergency planning process, informing emergency plans (and BC plans) which are then tested through audit and validation exercises. Regular updating of the risk assessment[22] in turn leads to the revision of plans and further testing. A fundamental principle of emergency planning and business continuity planning is to address common consequences rather than different causes. As far as possible, flexible, generic plans may be developed to deliver the response capabilities for managing these consequences, whatever causes them. However, to ensure that these generic plans are commensurate with the risks, it is important that planning is underpinned by a risk assessment [22] that evaluates and prioritises those hazards and threats according to their associated risks.

Figure 4.3: The location of risk assessment in the emergency planning process

Organisation and accountability

4.33. It is likely that the LRF would wish to set up a Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG), composed of a representative group of emergency planning officers from Category 1 responders, to undertake this work under a chair appointed by the LRF. As with the LRF, this working group is simply a forum for co-operation on risk assessment. Accordingly, the CRR is not owned by the LRF but by Category 1 responders in the LRF collectively.

Rigour and proportionality

4.34. The risk assessment process should be based on a sound methodology using the best available evidence and judgment. Category 1 responders should be supported in their assessment by Category 2 responders, local bodies, DCLG RED and national organisations sharing information and co-operating as appropriate. However, as far as possible, the amount of effort given to any risk should be proportionate to its potential severity.

The six-step process
(See also Annex 4A)

Step 1: Contextualisation

4.35. In an initial discussion at the RAWG, Category 1 responders should begin by defining the scope of the risk management activity in the context of the Act and supporting guidance. They should review the process that they will adopt and identify the project's stakeholders. Key stakeholder groups must include the Category 1 responders who share the risk assessment duty, and may include Category 2

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organisations with a contribution to the risk assessment process, as well as groups in the community with relevant knowledge and a particular interest in the results of the work (see 4.56). It is important that Category 1 responders understand, at the outset, the risk evaluation criteria and principles with which risks will be evaluated and prioritised (see Annexes 4D and 4F). This should prepare them for later stages of the process, in which they will need to decide which risks are acceptable and those which must be tolerated, including those which require planning.

4.36.   An important part of step 1 is for Category 1 responders to describe the characteristics of the local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community. This is to understand the context better, as well as to establish the vulnerability and resilience of the area to emergencies. To do this Category 1 responders should reflect on a number of aspects of their area, including:

- o   **Social:** What is the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition of the community? Are there any particularly vulnerable groups in the community? How are the various communities geographically distributed within the local area? How prepared and experienced is the community at coping with different types of emergencies?

- o   **Environment:** Are there any particular local vulnerabilities (e.g. poor coastal defences against flooding)? Is the area urbanised, rural or mixed? Are there any Sites of Special Scientific Interest?

- o   **Infrastructure:** How is the infrastructure configured in the area (transport, utilities, business, etc)? What are the critical supply networks in the area? Are there any sites in the area that are particularly critical for local and national essential services (e.g. telecommunications hubs, health, finance, legal, etc)? What type of

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economy does it have? How prepared and experienced are the businesses in the area at coping with different types of emergency?

o **Hazardous sites:** What potentially hazardous sites exist in the area? Where are they in relation to communities or sensitive environmental sites?

Step 2: Hazard review and allocation for assessment

Hazards

4.37. Taking into account centrally provided guidance, in the form of the LRAG (see *Box 4.4*), each Category 1 responder should consider the local context as described during step 1 and identify those non-malicious hazards that, in their view, present significant risks (i.e. could give rise to an emergency) in their areas over the next five years. These hazards will be identified on the basis of experience, research or other information (including from the community itself) and they are likely to present consequences to which a special mobilisation by the Category 1 responder is required.

4.38. The RAWG should share and discuss these hazards at a meeting of the LRF with a view to agreeing a list of hazards to be assessed. The LRF should endorse the list of hazards, and determine which Category 1 responder will lead the assessment of each hazard on behalf of the group. The LRF will also need to decide how any additional hazards proposed by the RAWG should be assessed, whether by the appointment of a lead, delegation or otherwise.

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Box 4.3: longer term considerations

Category 1 responders should consider these aspects in the context of the current situation, but with regards to emerging trends and future events. They are also encouraged to take into account the longer-term risk context. Climate change, although not a risk considered in the time frames of the local risk assessment cycle, is a major driver of many of the risks that LRFs do consider Consideration of this longer term risk will allow responders to identify capability gaps and risk reduction measures that may need to be tackled over a longer term period. For example, will present coastal defences be sufficient over a longer term horizon. A suggested timeframe for longer term risk contextualisation is 20 years. The National Security Risk Assessment, first published in 2010, evaluates risk over the same timescale and can be drawn upon to inform longer term contextualisation. Other factors that may define the time frame of longer term contextualization include the expected service lifetime of buildings, plants and equipment. This consideration of longer term risk drivers, is not a statutory part of the risk assessment process and should be included at the discretion of the LRF.

4.39. When overall risk scores are calculated at a later stage, events that are low in likelihood but high in impact will not score highly, implying a need for planning cannot be justified (e.g. asteroids hitting the earth). This is not to say that all low likelihood, high impact events should be excluded, but a careful judgment is needed about the likelihood below which events will be excluded from the assessment. It would be good practice to maintain a register of excluded risks as an appendix to the CRR; this would allow Category 1 responders to demonstrate that certain risks were considered at the outset but were then discounted for specified reasons (e.g. an assumption that the likelihood was so small that the hazard did not warrant further attention).

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4.40.   The responsibilities of the lead assessors would be to:

- o   assess the likelihood and impact of each hazard, based on the knowledge of RAWG members, the generic likelihood assessment (where available) and any other relevant information;

- o   liaise with the relevant government departments or agencies, as required;

- o   document assessments using the individual risk assessment example (Annex 4C), which will support the CRR, containing more detailed information on the assessment;

- o   present the likelihood assessment to the LRF and make changes as necessary;

- o   capture the results of the LRF risk assessment in the CRR; and

- o   ensure that the assessment is adequately described in the CRR.

Box 4.4: Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)

Central government departments, or their agencies, are often best placed to provide generic likelihood assessments for local hazards and threats. Members of the RAWG are well positioned to adapt these generic assessments of likelihood and, using their local knowledge of sites and conditions, to combine them with their assessments of the impacts of hazards. Through the involvement of the Department for Communities and Local Government, Resilience and Emergencies Division, the more specific local risk assessments will feed up into the UK picture. Consequently, the top-down and bottom-up risk assessment processes within the UK should become increasingly integrated.

Category 1 responders will receive Local Risk Assessment Guidance containing information on the likelihood and impact of generic threats and hazards. This guidance will be agreed each year in a process co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and involving representatives from the departments and agencies responsible for providing the assessments, as well as representatives of the local emergency planners, including first responders. It will be made available by the Cabinet Office in England, and the Welsh Government in Wales. (For further detail on arrangements in the devolved administrations, see *paragraphs 4.15-4.24.*)

The framework is continually updated; Category 1 and 2 responders and other relevant parties are encouraged to put forward suggestions for improvements to the guidance. These will be fed back to the originating departments who will, where possible, reflect these suggestions in future versions of the guidance.

Step 3: Risk analysis

Threats

Assessing the likelihood of threats

4.41. Category 1 responders should adopt the central government assessment, set out in the LRAG, of the likelihood of threats as categorised in the National Risk Register (NRR) (See *Box 4.5*). Guidance on publication of the threat assessment within the community risk register is detailed in *section 4.57*

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Assessing the impact of threats

4.42. For some categories of threat, LRFs may also weight the impact of a successful attack against local targets within their area. Information from the LRAG, the National Risk Register, National Resilience Planning Assumptions, Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSAs[23]) (Box 4.5) and local crowded places protection programmes can be used to inform the impact assessment.[24]

Assessing the likelihood of hazards

4.43. The RAWG lead assessors should consider the likelihood of the hazards occurring within the next five years (the same timescale adopted by the UK assessment). The LRAG from central government should provide a basis for this work but the local knowledge available in the RAWG and other local organisations (including Category 2 responders) should allow the RAWG to elaborate the assessment, and even to change it, if necessary.

4.44. When assessing the likelihood of a hazard, it is necessary to refer to the description of an outcome of an incident. Without defining the outcome, it is more difficult to assess likelihood. For example, it is difficult to assess the likelihood of flooding in the next five years without defining the size of the flood incident to be assessed (small scale floods are more likely than larger scale floods). The outcome can be defined in various ways. For flooding, it may be appropriate to talk in terms of the area flooded. For many incidents, it may be necessary to use numbers of fatalities. Although both measures - area flooded and fatalities - are consequences of the hazards, they are immediate or primary consequences that can be used as proxy measures to describe the outcome of the hazard.

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[23] CTSAs provide counter terrorism security advice to support LRFs and businesses.
[24] https://vsat.nactso.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/AreasOfRisk/working-together-crowded-places.pdf

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Box 4.5: Other sources of information to aid local risk assessment

The National Risk Register (NRR)

The National Risk Register (NRR) was first published in 2008 as part of the National Security Strategy which promised a publicly available assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of the range of threats and hazards the UK could face. Although intended to encourage public debate on security and help organisations, communities and individuals to prepare better for emergencies, the document is also important to LRFs in informing the local assessment of risks, particularly threat related risks. Indeed, the LRAG makes explicit reference to the NRR as an important tool in the risk assessment process.

The National Risk Assessment (NRA)

The National Risk Assessment (NRA) is the classified and detailed cross-government assessment of the risks facing the UK and is the basis of the public National Risk Register (NRR). It uses historical and scientific data and the professional judgments of experts to identify risks, assess the likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact if they do. The NRA is shared with all UK police forces. As well as informing police work, this will also give LRFs, the majority of which are chaired by the police, more direct access to the full assessment.

The National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPAs) and Local Planning Assumption Guidance

The National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPAs) provide information on the generic consequences of risks without disclosing the sensitive information on the causes of these consequences. Although the document

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gives only national and sometimes multi-LRF planning figures, it is issued in tandem with the Local Planning Assumption Guidance which explains how the NRPAs should be interpreted and tailored to inform local planning assumptions. The guidance also explains how the Community Risk Register (CRR) rating matrix can be used to identify and define generic planning assumptions, providing a mechanism by which LRFs can use the output from the local risk assessment process better, to inform local planning.

Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs)

CTSAs are embedded in all UK police forces. Their core role is to identify and assess local critical sites within their force area that might be vulnerable to terrorist or extremist attack; then devise and develop appropriate protective security plans to minimise impact on that site and the surrounding community. Additionally, the CTSA will promote awareness of the terrorist threat and develop positive ongoing relationships by appropriate discussion of changes in the prevailing terrorist threat and commensurate responses.

4.45. The outcome of a hazard is not the same as its (wider) impact, which is considered later in the process, although there will usually be a close relationship between the two. For example, in the case of flooding, two flood events could have the same outcome (e.g. 100 square miles flooded) but very different impacts, depending on the precise location of the flooding.

4.46.   Where there is a considerable range in the foreseeable outcomes of a potential hazard, it may be necessary to assess the likelihood (and subsequently impact) of the hazard at multiple outcomes. Consequently, the individual risk assessment example at Annex 4C allows the lead assessors to record multiple outcomes for each hazard. Although a variety of outcomes may be considered for a particular type of risk, the LRF may decide that only a small number need to be captured in the CRR.

4.47.   Each assessment should be carried out by a group of professionals with a pragmatic mix of evidence and judgment, which should be documented as far as possible. Where appropriate, the assessments of likelihood will be informed by studies on the vulnerability (i.e. susceptibility to damage or harm) and resilience (ability to withstand damage or harm) of the relevant sites, systems and communities. The assessments of likelihood and of impact should adopt the scales provided at Annex 4D.

4.48.   It is possible that the generic local assessments of likelihood provided by central government in the LRAG will refer to outcomes of hazards that were not identified by the Category 1 responders. Category 1 responders can adopt different outcomes if they feel that this is necessary, but should document their reasons for doing so. It will not be possible for central government to re-issue the generic assessments with the revised outcomes, but it should be possible to take account of the new outcomes when agreeing the national risk assessment framework in subsequent years.

Assessing the impact of hazards

4.49.   The next stage is to assess the impacts of the hazards. At Annex 4B, a generic framework is provided for assessing the local impacts of events in a consistent way. Using the impact scales provided, the lead assessors should assess the impact of hazards in their local areas.

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4.50.   Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations engaged in response should not share risk assessments (either through the LRF or otherwise) if the information in the assessment is sensitive (e.g. commercially sensitive or relating to national security) and the responder has reason to believe that to do so would compromise the information. Chapter 3 provides further guidance.

4.51   The lead assessors should capture the agreed likelihood and impact assessments in the individual risk assessment forms for consideration by the RAWG.

Step 4: Risk evaluation

4.52.   Once the RAWG has agreed the individual risk assessment forms, the results should be collated and incorporated in the CRR, unless sensitive. The level of risk can then be determined by plotting likelihood and impact scores for each hazard on a risk matrix (see Annex 4F). The production of a risk matrix is an essential part of the risk assessment process. Not only does it enable the risk analysis to be interpreted against pre-defined criteria, but it greatly facilitates the communication of the risk assessment. Annex 4F provides descriptions of the four risk ratings ('Very high', 'High', 'Medium' and 'Low') and addresses their relative significance for directing emergency planning.

4.53.   Note that in this risk matrix, the impact score is given a slightly greater weighting than the likelihood score. For example, an 'Unlikely' (2) but 'Catastrophic' (5) risk scores 'Very high', whereas a 'Probable' (5) but 'Minor impact' (2) risk scores 'Medium'. The formula used to combine likelihood and impact scores varies from one risk assessment approach to another. The guidance presented here is consistent with a number of the major standards, and consistency in the application of this risk matrix is essential if the results of the local risk assessments are to be easily compared.

4.54.   As regards threat information within the public community risk register, LRFs must refer directly to the NRR and include the related NRR threat statement provided by central government in the threat section of the LRAG. See Box 4.4.

Box 4.6: National Resilience Extranet (NRE):

The National Resilience Extranet (NRE) provides the UK resilience community with a common system that enables timely, efficient and secure communication and exchange of information. It allows users to work together in routine planning, sharing best practice plans and documentation where appropriate and, in the event of an emergency, allows the fast dissemination of documents such as minutes, situation reports and press lines to the relevant teams and individuals. Information classified up to and including RESTRICTED can be shared across the range of emergency responders. It is accessible via all GSI services and can also be accessed via the internet with the use of a digital certificate. A number of key documents, including the LRAG, the National Resilience Planning Assumptions and the Local Planning Assumptions Guidance are disseminated via the NRE.

Step 5: Risk treatment

(See Box 4.7)

Step 6: Monitoring and reviewing

4.55.   Risks should be reviewed regularly. Although there is no statutory requirement, it is recommended LRFs review risks in line with the annually updated Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG). Risks should be monitored continuously and, where information suggests a potential change in the risks, a risk assessment should be

performed and the CRR updated accordingly. This may require special meetings of the LRF, although risk assessment should be a standing item on the agendas of the LRFs. The CRR will also need to be updated periodically to reflect changes in the response capability (i.e. resilience). Consequently, the CRR should be seen as a living document and the work of the LRF as a rolling project.

Sharing Risk Assessments

4.56. Regulations require CRRs to be shared with LRFs in neighbouring local areas with whom a boundary is shared, and to the DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division. In addition, Category 1 responders should consider whether there are any specific risks which should be communicated to any LRFs in any other local areas.

Box 4.7: Risk treatment

Risk treatment may involve risk mitigation activity, i.e. reducing the likelihood of the risk, rather than having plans and measures in place to deal with a risk once it has happened. In some circumstances this could place a significant burden on responders. Risk treatment is therefore recommended only as good practice. Although not a statutory duty under the Act, risk treatment is the next step in the risk management process and Category 1 responders are encouraged to adopt the recommended practice.

Step 5:
CRRs are not an end in themselves, but serve as a means for ensuring a common starting point for responders in their approach to integrated emergency management - the adoption of coherent strategies and systems for the harmonisation of contingency plans and procedures.

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In this stage of the risk assessment process, the LRF should prioritise risk reduction measures in accordance with the size of the risks and the gaps in the capabilities required to respond to those risks. This should take into account risks both in context of the current situation and consideration of the longer term risk context.

This will allow responders to identify capability gaps and risk reduction measures that may need to be tackled over a longer term period. They should set the risk priorities and, having evaluated the treatment options, agree a risk treatment plan. All such judgements should be recorded in the CRR.

The process has a number of stages that are described below. The results of each stage should be recorded in the CRR:

- o   Assess the type and extent of the capabilities required to manage and respond to the hazards. The National Resilience Planning Assumptions together with Local Planning Assumptions Guidance can be used to inform local planning figures and will determine the level of capability required.
- o   Identify the capabilities that are already in place
- o   Considering the gap and the extent of the risk, rate the risk priority.
- o   Identify the additional treatments required to close the capability gap and manage the risk more effectively.

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Publishing Risk Assessments

4.57. A number of hazards a community may face, including pandemic influenza and wide-spread flooding, would be beyond the capacity of the emergency services, without the co-operation of the communities affected. The Community Risk Register, which Category 1 responders have a duty to publish, is an effective mechanism for making communities and businesses more aware and better able to prepare to play their part in emergency scenarios. LRFs are encouraged to increase awareness and engagement of the local community with the CRR by taking into account the principles of effective risk communication as documented on the UK resilience website http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/communicating-risk-guidance. The webpage also gives examples of good practice that some LRFs have used in the production of their CRR. Category 1 responders are able to fulfil their statutory duty to publish all or part of their risk assessments by publishing all or part of the CRR or publishing all or part of a plan, where the part published includes a summary of the risk assessment [25] on which the plan is based. They should do so where such information is presented in such a way that informs and encourages members of the public to mitigate the consequences of risks in their area. They should also consider the security classification of the information and the restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information (information disclosure of which would be damaging to national security or public safety or information which would be harmful to individuals or the commercial interests of any business entity.).

[25] s. 2(1)(f)

Box 4.8: Access under the Freedom of Information Act

Members of the public may make requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to see the LRAG, CRR or any of the individual risk assessments. Category 1 responders who are presented with such requests will need to consider what must be released using available guidance (including guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice). The exemptions relating to national security, commercial sensitivity and policy formulation may be particularly relevant to these deliberations (subject, where appropriate, to the public interest balancing test). Given the relatively short timeframe in which information must be provided, it would be helpful for Category 1 responders to consider in advance how such requests would be handled. However, as each request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 must be considered on a case-by-case basis, it may not be possible to form a firm view on how to handle a request in advance of a request being received.

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Annex 4 A: Summary of the six-step local risk assessment process

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Step No	Name of step	Forum level	Agencies involved	Actions	Inputs
1	Contextualisation	Risk assessment working group (RAWG)	Category 1 responders	o Define scope of project (relate to definition of emergency in the Act) and process to be followed o Identify stakeholders o Set out risk evaluation criteria and principles o Review or describe social, economic, cultural, infrastructural and environmental issues within local context o Review risk within the context of the current situation, but with regard for the longer-term risk context	o Prior internal discussions within all Category 1 responders o Views of Category 2 responders received
2	Hazard review and allocation for assessment	RAWG	Category 1 responders	o Taking into account centrally provided guidance and drawing on information provided by Category 2 responders, Category 1 responders provisionally identify and describe hazards which might give rise to an emergency in the next five years and those which will not	o Category 1 responders bring own research on hazards o Views of Category 2 responders received o Government to provide Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)

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Step No	Name of step	Forum level	Agencies involved	Actions	Inputs
		Local Resilience Forum (LRF) Risk Assessment working group (RAWG)		o Category 1 responders provisionally agree allocation of lead assessors o LRF endorses hazards to be assessed and determines lead assessor responsibility o RAWG convenes and reviews hazards identified at LRF for confirmation or possible Community Risk Register (CRR) amendment o RAWG confirms appropriateness of lead allocation and identifies any other agencies with key roles o RAWG agrees a project plan with deadlines for assessing individual or group hazards	
3	Risk analysis	Lead assessors	All Category 1 responders	o Lead assessors consider the likelihood of hazards occurring over five-year period, drawing on generic assessments from central government, other research and knowledge of Category 1 responders	o Local Risk Assessment Guidance o Lead assessors' impact and likelihood assessments

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Step No	Name of step	Forum level	Agencies involved	Actions	Inputs
				o Lead assessor adopts the likelihood assessment of threats from central government. o Lead assessor suggests the range of potential impacts arising from the hazards as well as any vulnerabilities surrounding these, and discusses with RAWG o For some categories of threat, the lead assessor may weight the impact of a successful attack against local targets within their area. o Lead assessor captures assessment details for each hazard and related reasoning within the individual risk assessment form. This generates a provisional risk statement with likelihood, impact(s) and an overall risk assessment for evaluation by RAWG	o Input from other Category 1 and 2 responders, and community where relevant.

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Step No	Name of step	Forum level	Agencies involved	Actions	Inputs
4	Risk evaluation	RAWG LRF	All Category 1 responders	o RAWG considers the individual risk assessment forms, compares the results to the risk criteria, and confirms or modifies these assessments as appropriate o Agreed assessments are collated and incorporated into CRR o Risk matrix is plotted for hazards o RAWG incorporates into CRR threat statement provided by central government within the LRAG. o RAWG highlights existing capabilities and migration plans for the hazards and threats and: • considers the acceptability of risks • identifies and recommends options for risk treatment for the LRF • makes recommendations to the LRF on risk priorities for hazards and threats	o Lead assessors bring examples of individual risk assessments back to RAWG o Agreed risk evaluation criteria

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Step No	Name of step	Forum level	Agencies involved	Actions	Inputs
				o LRF reviews the CRR and risk matrix in light of the evaluation criteria, and amends as appropriate o LRF determines the acceptability of the risks before considering treatment	o Updated CRR, risk matrix and recommendation from RAWG
5	Risk treatment	LRF	LRF	o Review the capability challenges posed by the risks against existing capabilities, mitigation plans or known gaps o Set risk priorities o Evaluate proposed options for additional treatment of risks and agree risk treatment plan o Identify officer or organisation to be responsible for implementation of actions o Actions communicated to appropriate working groups	o Updated CRR, risk matrix and recommendation from RAWG
6	Monitoring and reviewing	LRF	All Category 1 responders Category 2 responders (as appropriate)	o Review of all risks as and when appropriate, taking into account the annually updated LRAG	o Ongoing review of changes to context and hazards within responding organisations o Ongoing and regular reviews of risks by LRF between responders

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Annex 4 B: Illustration of Local Risk Assessment Guidance

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

4B.1. The following table is illustrative of the structure and type of content that is included in the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG). It identifies the types of hazard that Category 1 responders may wish to add to their Community Risk Registers, and an assessment of the likelihood of these risks occurring in a five-year timeframe in a typical Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area. It also sets out the assumptions which underpin the likelihood assessment and guidance on how this might vary through the country. It also provides information on generic threats for Category 1 responders.

4B.2. Category 1 responders are collectively responsible for maintaining a Community Risk Register (CRR). The LRAG is a guide which should assist Category 1 responders in compiling and assessing their CRRs. It provides a consistent basis for emergency planning across the LRF area.

4B.3. For each risk, the following descriptors are provided:

- o **Risk identifier:** Risks prefixed with 'H' are hazards which will require a national as well as a local response. Risks marked 'HL' would not ordinarily prompt a national response, and would usually be dealt with locally. Risks marked 'T' are threats which will require a national as well as a local response.

- o **Risk category:** This indicates the type of threat or hazard in question (e.g. terrorist attack, industrial accident, severe weather, public protests). Risk categories should be read in conjunction with outcome descriptions in order to understand the magnitude of the event.

o **Outcome description:** This describes the immediate consequences or significance of the event. Outcome descriptions will often be expressed in terms of the facilities that have been destroyed, the numbers of fatalities and casualties, or extent of contamination. It is this information which enables the subsequent local impact assessment.

o **Variation and further information:** This column focuses on the specific assumptions or causal events that drive the outcome description. Details are also given on the historical precedent and justification for the specific assumptions made.

o **Likelihood score and lead department:** This column in the table gives the likelihood score of the risk arising, and the department or agency which has made this assessment. There is an important distinction in the treatment of likelihood assessments for threats and for hazards. In the case of hazards, the table provides an assessment of the likelihood of relevant risks occurring in a five-year timeframe in a typical LRF area. Likelihood assessments for hazards are presented on a 1-5 scale.

o In the case of threats, the assessment of likelihoods is treated differently. The table does not show likelihood scorings for each threat event because doing so would be analytically misleading.

o **Likelihood rationale:** This column in the table provides additional descriptive or statistical guidance on how the generic likelihood assessment was calculated. Each local area will wish to identify which of those threats and hazards listed could not occur in their area because it lacks particular sites or characteristics; and ultimately each LRF will need to decide on its own likelihood assessments. This will lead to a reduced set of assessed risks for most, if not all, local areas. The central government likelihood scores given are based upon the assessment of the risk outcome description occurring at any location across the UK. The figure provided is what policy experts assess to be the highest of all

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possible local level likelihoods for that specific scenario. While ratings at a local level will vary as each area is different, no local score should be greater than the national one. Clearly, where a local version of the hazard is being assessed at the LRF's discretion and with potentially lesser impacts, the likelihood of that new, local risk, might well be greater.

4B.4.   The Local Risk Assessment Guidance will be issued annually. Feedback from Category 1 responders about how this guidance could be improved is welcomed and should be directed to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.

Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Industrial accidents and environmental pollution				
e.g. **H1**	Fire or explosion at a gas terminal as well as LPG, LNG and other has onshore feedstock pipeline and flammable gas storage sites	e.g. Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and 1,500 hospitalisations. Gas terminal event likely to be of short duration once feed lines are isolated; event at a storage site could last for days if explosion damaged control equipment	**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Fire and Rescue Service (F&R)/Health and Safety Executive (HSE) **Assumptions:**		
e.g. **H2**	Fire or explosion at an onshore ethylene gas pipeline	e.g. Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and 1,500 hospitalisations and serious downstream impact on oil and chemical production	**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** HSE **Assumptions:**		
e.g. **HL1**	Fire or explosion at a gas terminal, or involving a gas pipeline	e.g. Up to 3km around site causing up to 10 fatalities and 100 hospitalisations	**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** HSE **Assumptions:**		
	Fire or explosion at an oil refinery		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** HSE **Assumptions:**		

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Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site and tank storage of flammable or toxic liquids		Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		
	Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline		Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		
	Fire or explosion at an offshore oil/gas platform		Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		
	Explosions at a natural gas pipeline		Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		
	Toxic chemical release		Likelihood rating: Lead: Environment Agency/HSE Assumptions:		
e.g. HL2	Industrial accident involving toxic release, e.g. from a site storing large quantities of chlorine	e.g. Up to 3km from site causing up to 30 fatalities and up to 250 hospitalisations	Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		
e.g. HL3	Industrial accident involving toxic release	e.g. Up to 1km from site causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 100 hospitalisations	Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		
	Radioactive substantive release from a nuclear reactor accident		Likelihood rating: Lead: HSE Assumptions:		

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Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Accidental or unplanned importation or release of radioactive material from incorrectly handled or disposed of sources		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)		
	Biological substance release from control measure failure (e.g. pathogen release from containment laboratory)		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** HSE **Assumptions:**		
	Widespread contamination of the food supply chain, arising from: 1. Industrial accident (chemical, microbiological nuclear) affecting food production areas e.g. Chernobyl, Sea Empress oil spill, foot and mouth disease (FMD) 2. Contamination of animal feed, e.g. dioxins, FMD		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Food Standards Agency (FSA)		
	Maritime pollution		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** EA **Variation:**		
	Land contamination		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** EA **Variation:**		
	Air quality incident		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** EA **Variation:**		

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Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Transport Accidents				
	Rapid accidental sinking of a passenger vessel in, or close to, UK waters		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Department for Transport (DfT) **Assumptions:**		
	Severe weather				
	Storms and gales		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Meteorological Office (Met Office) (on behalf of EA) **Assumptions:**		
	Low temperatures and heavy snow		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Met Office (on behalf of EA) **Assumptions:**		
	Flooding: Major coastal/tidal		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** EA **Variation:**		
	Flooding: Major fluvial		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** EA **Variation:**		

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Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Structural hazards				
	Land movement (tremors and landslides)		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Fire		
	Building collapse		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Fire/HSE		
	Human health				
	Influenza-type disease (epidemic)		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Department of Health (DH)		
	Influenza-type disease (pandemic)		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** DH		
	SARS-type disease		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** DH		
	Animal health				
	Non-zoonotic notifiable animal disease (e.g. FMD, Classical Swine Fever, Blue Tongue and Newcastle disease of birds)		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Defra		
	Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (e.g. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), rabies and West Nile Virus)		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Defra		

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Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Public protest				
	Large scale public protest		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)		
	Targeted disruptive protest, i.e. fuel protest		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Cabinet Office CCS		
	Industrial technical failure				
	Technical failure of upstream (offshore) oil/gas network leading to a disruption in upstream oil and gas production		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** DTI		
	Accidental failure at water treatment works		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Defra		
	No notice failure of a public telephony provider		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Cabinet Office Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (CSIA)		
	Technical failure of electricity network		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** DH		
	Telecommunication infrastructure – human error		**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Cabinet Office CSIA		

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Type of risk	Risk categories (and sub-categories)	Outcome description	Likelihood assessment, lead department and assumptions	Variation and further information	Likelihood rationale
	Terrorist bombs - infrastructure				
E.g. **T1**	Conventional attack on main government buildings	e.g. Up to 400 fatalities and partial and temporary closure of the building	**Likelihood rating:** **Lead:** Home Office	Regions and local areas that include significant main government buildings are at greater risk.	

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Annex 4 C: Example of an individual risk assessment

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Individual risk assessment

Hazard/threat category:	Sub-category:
Severe weather	Flooding (main river)

Hazard and threat description, including scale:	Risk reference no.
River W – flooding over an area of 10 square miles and 50 square miles	SW1

Date of revision:	Next review date:
July 2011	September 2011

4C.1 Overview of hazard or threat

Flooding:

- o Most commonly caused by intense bursts of rain causing flash floods, or prolonged rainfall on saturated ground in river catchments, which result in rivers or other watercourses overflowing their banks.

- o May lead to a minor inundation of properties and road closures, or result in widespread loss of life and devastation of property necessitating the implementation of a co-ordinated recovery plan.

4C.2 Key historical evidence

2007

October/November - United Kingdom - prolonged severe rainfall led to the flooding of 12,000 homes nationwide. The River Ouse at York flooded hundreds of properties with estimated £400 million damages. The Aire flooded over 300 properties in Selby and Barlby and 300 at Stockbridge near Keighley.

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2006

March - North Yorkshire - River Derwent burst its banks and inundated Malton and Norton forcing 200 families to abandon their homes (recurred in November 2007).

2005

April - Midlands - extensive flooding killed 5 and damaged 4,500 homes in Northamptonshire, Warwickshire and Oxfordshire.

4C.3   Likelihood

Hazard	Outcome description	Likelihood
Flooding (main river)	10 square miles	Probable (5)
Flooding (main river)	50 square miles	Negligible (1)

Igleby appears to be experiencing more instances of all forms of flooding in recent times, in particular as building continues on several floodplains.

4C.4   Impact

Summary

Hazard	Outcome description	Impact
Flooding (main river)	10 square miles	Significant (4)
Flooding (main river)	50 square miles	Catastrophic (5)

Details

Impacts associated with floods:

4C.5

- o Primary:
  - Drowning of people, pets and livestock
  - Major damage to property and surrounding
  - Closure, or washing away, of roads, bridges, railway lines

4C.6
  - Loss of (and possible damage to) telephone, electricity, gas and water supplies. Pollution/health risks from sewerage systems, chemical stores, fuel storage tanks. Evacuation and temporary/long-term accommodation needs

- o Secondary:
  - Need for recovery strategy in aftermath of major flood
  - Disruption of economic life and major costs of rebuilding infrastructure
  - Public need for information, advice, benefits/ emergency payments
  - Insurance implications, including help for the uninsured
  - Safety assessments/possible demolition of damaged buildings and structures
  - Shortage/overstretch of key resources (equipment and personnel) and agencies. Overstretch of normal communication links, including mobile phones

4C.5   **Vulnerability and resilience**

Areas across Igleby with a high potential for flooding based on topography and historical incidents include Hotton, Nimby and Coneywood Bridge.

4C.6   Overall assessment

Category:	Sub-category:
Severe weather	Flooding (main river)

Outcome description	Impact	Likelihood	Risk
10 square miles	Significant	Probable	VERY HIGH
50 square miles	Catastrophic	Negligible	MEDIUM

Controls in place:

Council: Major Emergency Plan; Generic Flooding Plan; Major Flood Incident Plan for River Aire.

Other organisations:

- o   Environment Agency:, Local Flood Warning Plan for Igleby Area.
- o   Police: Flood Warning and Flood Response; Flood Plan for River Wandle

Additional risk treatment required:

- o   Assist Environment Agency in take-up of automated voice messaging for use in warning local residents and encourage better flood preparedness in communities.
- o   Work with Land Drainage on the mapping and identification of 'flooding hotspots' on becks and other watercourses.

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Annex 4 D: Likelihood and impact scoring scales

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Level	Descriptor	Categories of impact	Description of impact
1	Insignificant	Health	• Insignificant number of injuries or impact on health
		Social	• Insignificant number of persons displaced and personal support required • Insignificant disruption to community services, including transport services and infrastructure
		Economic	• Insignificant impact on local economy
		Environment	• Insignificant impact on environment
2	Minor	Health	• Small number of people affected, no fatalities, and small number of minor injuries with first aid treatment
		Social	• Minor damage to properties • Minor displacement of a small number of people for < 24 hours and minor personal support required • Minor localised disruption to community services or infrastructure < 24 hours
		Economic	• Negligible impact on local economy and cost easily absorbed
		Environment	• Minor impact on environment with no lasting effects
3	Moderate	Health	• Moderate number of fatalities with some casualties requiring hospitalisation and medical treatment and activation of MAJAX, the automated intelligent alert • notification system, procedures in one or more hospitals
		Social	• Damage that is confined to a specific location, or to a number of locations, but requires additional resources • Localised displacement of >100 people for 1-3 days • Localised disruption to infrastructure and community services
		Economic	• Limited impact on local economy with some short-term loss of production, with possible additional clean-up costs
		Environment	• Limited impact on environment with short-term or long-term effects

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Level	Descriptor	Categories of impact	Description of impact
4	Significant	Health	• Significant number of people in affected area impacted with multiple fatalities, multiple serious or extensive injuries, significant hospitalisation and activation of MAJAX procedures across a number of hospitals
		Social	• Significant damage that requires support for local responders with external resources • 100 to 500 people in danger and displaced for longer than 1 week. Local responders require external resources to deliver personal support • Significant impact on, and possible breakdown of, delivery of some local community services
		Economic	• Significant impact on local economy with medium-term loss of production • Significant extra clean-up and recovery costs
		Environment	• Significant impact on environment with medium-to long-term effects
5	Catastrophic	Health	• Very large numbers of people in affected area(s) impacted with significant numbers of fatalities, large number of people requiring hospitalisation with serious injuries with longer-term effects
		Social	• Extensive damage to properties and built up environment in affected area requiring major demolition • General and widespread displacement of more than 500 people for prolonged duration and extensive personal support required • Serious damage to infrastructure causing significant disruption to, or loss of, key services for prolonged period. Community unable to function without significant support
		Economic	• Serious impact on local and regional economy with some long-term, potentially permanent, loss of production with some structural change • Extensive cleanup and recovery costs.
		Environment	• Serious long term impact on environment and/or permanent damage

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Category	Explanation
Health	Encompassing direct health impacts (numbers of people affected, fatalities, injuries, human illness or injury, health damage) and indirect health impacts that arose because of strain on the health service
Social	Encompassing the social consequences of an event, including availability of social welfare provision; disruption of facilities for transport; damage to property; disruption of a supply money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of an electronic or other system of communication; homelessness, evacuation and avoidance behaviour; and public disorder due to anger, fear, and/or lack of trust in the authorities
Economic	Encompassing the net economic cost, including both direct (e.g. loss of goods, buildings, infrastructure) and indirect (e.g. loss of business, increased demand for public services) costs
Environment	Encompassing contamination or pollution of land, water, or air, with harmful biological/chemical/radioactive matter or oil, flooding, or disruption or destruction of plant or animal life

Note

Strictly, levels 1 and 2 of the impact scale are likely to fall below threshold for an emergency. Consequently, there may be no statutory requirement to plan for events that score 1 or 2 on the impact scale. This scale recognises that, to demonstrate a thorough analysis, Category 1 responders will wish to include in the risk assessment certain risks with impacts at these levels.

Likelihood scoring Scale

Level	Descriptor	Likelihood over 5 years	Likelihood over 5 years
1	Negligible	>0.005%	> 1 in 20,000 chance
2	Rare	>0.05%	> 1 in 2,000 chance
3	Unlikely	>0.5%	> 1 in 200 chance
4	Possible	>5%	> 1 in 20 chance
5	Probable	>50%	> 1 in 2 chance

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Annex 4 E: Example of a classified Community Risk Register

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Date of revision: July 2011								Next review date: September 2011				
Risk ref	Hazard or threat category	Hazard or threat sub-category	Outcome description	Likelihood	Impact	Risk rating	Capability required	Controls currently in place	Additional risk treatment required (with timescale)	Risk priority	Lead responsibility	Review date
SW1	Severe weather	Flooding (main river)	River W – flooding 10 square miles	Probable	Significant	Very high	Flood Incident Plans Strategic stocks of sand bags Flood warden scheme	Major Emergency Plan Major Flood Incident Plan	Major flood exercise every 2 years	2	TBD	July 2012
	Transport accident	Accident on motorway or major trunk road	Accident on M6. Up to 10 fatalities and 20 hospitalisations. Closure of lanes for up to 1 week	Possible	Significant	Very high	Motorway Incident Plans Heavy lifting and earth-moving equipment	Major Incident Plans Highway Agency Plans	Multi-agency co-ordination exercises every 2 years	3	Fire Service/ DfT	July 2012
	Industrial accident and environ-mental pollution	Toxic chemical release	Accident at AA chemical plant. Release up to 3km from site. Up to 30 fatalities and 250 hospitalisations	Unlikely	Significant	High	Toxic Incident and Environ-mental Pollution Plans Chemical containment. Detoxification and decontamination equipment	Major Incident Plans Emergency Services Major Incident Plans HSE safety inspection	Exercise safety every 5 years	3	Fire Service	July 2012
	Terrorist attack (information provided by central government)	Conventional/ explosive	Explosion in a crowded place killing up to 100 people				Inherent hospital surge capacity	Emergency Services Major Incident Plans	Identification of temporary mortuary sites	2	Police	July 2012

As regards to **public information for community risk registers** for both non-malicious hazards and malicious threats, LRFs should consider the security classification of the information and the restrictions on disclosure (see para 4.57). For malicious threats, LRFs are recommended to refer directly to the NRR, perhaps by including a link or reproducing the enclosed risks as assessed in the NRR matrix, using a modified form of the language previously recommended, along the following lines:

"The NRR is a national picture, derived from the National Risk Assessment, of the risks of emergencies. The Matrix [here] gives an indication of the relative likelihood and impact of the high consequence risks that are outlined in the National Risk Register. It includes the risk of a number of kinds of terrorist attacks, shown here as attacks on crowded places, transport systems, and critical infrastructure, and attacks using non-conventional (or in other words chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) materials. In planning for emergencies [we] take into account the impact that such attacks would have in the local area as much as we do the impacts of other hazards of a more local nature"

Last updated:March 2012

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Annex 4 F: Risk rating matrix

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Definitions of risk ratings

Very high (VH) risk - these are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate attention. They may have a high or medium likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency. Consideration should be given to planning being specific to the risk rather than generic.

High (H) risk - these risks are classed as significant. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate consideration after those risks classed as 'very

high'. Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also mitigation in the form of, at least (multi-agency) generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency.

Medium (M) risk - these risks are less significant, but may cause upset and inconvenience in the short term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are being appropriately managed and consideration given to their being managed under generic emergency planning arrangements.

Low (L) risk - these risks are both unlikely to occur and not significant in their impact. They should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category.

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Chapter 5 (Emergency Planning)

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 5 (Emergency Planning) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- Emergency planning is at the heart of the civil protection duty on Category 1 responders. The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans for preventing emergencies; reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies in both the response and recovery phases; and taking other action in the event of emergencies (*paragraphs 5.1-5.14*).

- The Regulations require plans to contain a procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred; provision for training key staff; and provision for exercising the plan to ensure it is effective. Procedures should also be put in place to ensure that the plan is reviewed periodically and kept up to date (*paragraphs 5.15-5.20*, *5.34-5.36* and *5.41-5.44*).

- Category 1 responders must have regard to risk assessments when deciding which plans are required and when developing and reviewing the contents of them (*paragraph 5.21*).

- Emergency plans may take the form of generic plans - which set out the core of a Category 1 responder's response to, and recovery from, any emergency - or specific plans dealing with particular hazards or sites. Category 1 responders will probably adopt a combination of the two (*paragraphs 5.23-5.25*).

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- Multi-agency plans can consolidate partnership working. Multi-agency plans are permitted, and Category 1 responders are required to consider whether it would be appropriate to develop multi-agency plans (*paragraphs 5.26-5.28*).

- Category 1 responders should involve Category 2 responders - and organisations which are not subject to the Act's requirements - as appropriate throughout the planning process. Category 1 responders are specifically required to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations when developing plans and may also wish to have regard to the work of communities (*paragraphs 5.32* and *5.58-5.61*).

- Senior personnel should be involved in planning and testing and exercising plans. They should also support the assimilation of lessons learned (*paragraphs 5.35-5.137*, *5.166-5.167* and *5.172*)

- This chapter outlines a cycle for developing, exercising and reviewing plans. It also sets out good practice in presenting plans (*paragraphs 5.111-5.175*)

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

5.1.   The chief requirement of the Act in regard to emergency planning is to maintain plans to ensure that, if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur, each Category 1 responder body can deliver its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing the emergency, reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects, or taking other action in connection with it.[1]

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[1] s. 2(1)(d)

5.2. Three aspects of performing the organisation's functions in an emergency are identified:

- o maintaining plans for preventing the emergency;
- o maintaining plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects; and
- o maintaining plans for taking other action in connection with the emergency.

Maintain plans for preventing an emergency

5.3. The first part of the duty to maintain plans deals with the short time before an emergency occurs, when it might be avoided by prompt or decisive action. Plans should be maintained for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency is likely to occur, the organisation can perform its functions to prevent the emergency.[2]

5.4. Prevention, in this context, means carrying out the functions of the organisation in such a way as to prevent an emergency which is imminent, or which might be predicted, from occurring at all. Emergencies under this aspect of the Act should be 'nipped in the bud' in the way that fire-fighters stop a fire from spreading. Preventative actions may be identified from dynamic risk assessments at the time of an emergency.

5.5. Other examples of prevention include actions such as those taken by the ambulance service and other emergency services when they mobilize proactively on New Year's Eve, so as to be ready to deal with potential incidents. Public health organisations taking action proactively to immunise against the spread of influenza in the winter months would be a further example in this context of prevention.

[2] s. 2(1)(a)(i)

5.6.   What the Act does not do is impose a duty on Category 1 responders to prevent all emergencies, nor does it require these organisations to undertake remedial works which might prevent a possible emergency at some future date. Such actions may be desirable and they may be a logical outcome of the risk assessment process at the risk treatment stage, but they are not required by the Act.

Maintain plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency

5.7.   The central part of the main planning duty under the Act is to ensure that the organisation can perform its functions so as to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of an emergency.[3]

5.8.   Plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency begin by addressing the disruption caused by the event. The event may have a sudden impact or a slow build-up. The effects of the emergency will be reduced by the remedial actions taken by the Category 1 responders. These will include actions to stem the effects of the emergency at source, such as fighting fires, or combating the release of toxic chemicals, the spread of disease or the extent of floods. Plans may specify the use of local teams with specialist equipment to perform these tasks.

5.9.   The plan aims to bring order to the response and recovery operation. It is concerned with providing a framework for management, co-ordination and control within which teams of local specialists can go about their work. It identifies:

     o   the roles and responsibilities of teams at strategic (gold), tactical (silver) and operational (bronze), and in a multi-agency response, through Strategic Co-ordinating Groups and Tactical Co-ordinating Groups;

[3] s. 2(1)(d)(ii)

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o   how their activities are co-ordinated;

o   the communications plan and contact details;

o   the alerting and mobilising procedures;

o   the facilities and equipment available, and their locations;

o   how additional resources may be obtained, if required;

o   how to support and protect staff; and

o   a crisis management strategy from response through to recovery.[4]

5.10.   Plans that ensure the effects of an emergency are mitigated lead to interventions which, for example, protect or remove people from the full impact of the emergency. For instance, by rescuing people from the scene, or evacuating them and treating their injuries, or providing them with shelter and comfort, or arranging for an orderly return to the scene when it is safe. Again, plans may need to specify specialist teams and procedures to achieve this.

5.11.   Recovery plans also mitigate the effects of an emergency. They are invoked and begin to operate at the same time as response plans. An outline of recovery planning is contained in the government publication, *Emergency Response and Recovery*.[5] This can be found at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/emergency-response-and-recovery: it complements this guidance and should be read alongside it. Emergency response planning and recovery planning should not take place in isolation. Emergency planning should understand and factor in the needs of the recovery stage, thinking through the longer-term impact of the planned response from the outset.

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[4] A similar list is provided in Cabinet Office, *The Lead Government Department and Its Role: Guidance and Best Practice* (2004). Chapter 6 describes roles and responsibilities for lead government departments.
[5] Cabinet Office, *Emergency Response and Recovery* (2010).

Last updated:October 2011

Maintain plans for taking other action in connection with an emergency

5.12.   The distinction between mitigating the effects of an emergency and dealing with its secondary impacts is not clear-cut. Also, some subordinate arrangements and procedures in support of emergency plans might not be captured by the earlier two requirements. What the Act achieves by including a third duty to maintain plans for taking other action in connection with an emergency, is that it ensures there can be no doubt that these types of secondary plan and supportive procedure are required by statute.

5.13.   For example, not all actions to be taken in preparing for an emergency are directly concerned with controlling, reducing or mitigating its effects. Emergency planning has to concern itself not only with the immediate response to, and extended recovery from, an emergency, but also with its secondary impacts. The wave of reaction can be quite overwhelming in terms of, for example, media attention and public response. Handling public interest can be almost as demanding for the responders as the emergency itself. Most of these issues are dealt with in Chapter 7.

5.14.   The procedures required under this provision of the Act in support of plans may also include subordinate or incidental arrangements necessary to the development of effective response plans. For example, procedures may be needed variously to:

> o   develop emergency control centres;
>
> o   develop reliable internal communications or information management systems for effective response;
>
> o   bind private contractors into the emergency plans;
>
> o   assess health and safety concerns;

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o ensure the welfare of staff engaged in response; and

o ensure that sufficient resources (e.g. human, material, and financial) are available when needed.

Plan maintenance procedures

5.15. The maintenance of plans involves more than their preparation. Once a plan has been prepared, it must be maintained for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs, or is likely to occur, the Category 1 responder is able to perform its functions to deal with it.[6]

5.16. Plan maintenance procedures must be developed and published to ensure that responsibilities are clear and plans are kept up to date.

Procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred to which a Category 1 responder should respond

5.17. The definition of emergency in section 1 of the Act is concerned with the scale of consequences in terms of serious damage to human welfare, the environment and security.[7] An exercise of judgment is required to determine whether or not an event or situation falls within the definition.

5.18. Accordingly, as described in Chapter 1, the Act imposes a duty to maintain an emergency plan only if it is likely, in the face of the emergency, that the Category 1 responder:

o would consider it necessary or desirable to respond; and

o would be unable to do so without redeploying or obtaining additional resources.[8]

[6] s. 2(1)(d)
[7] s. 1(1)
[8] s. 2(2)(b)

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5.19.   Any emergency plan maintained by a Category 1 responder must include a procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred that makes it necessary or desirable for it to perform its functions for the purpose of dealing with an emergency.[9]

5.20.   Although plans are maintained by Category 1 responders and will normally be activated by a member of that organisation, the regulations do not limit the decision to Category 1 responders. It may, in certain circumstances, be appropriate for a Category 2 responder or a non-responder to make the decision that an emergency has occurred. The procedure for the activation of any multi-agency response procedures must also be set out in emergency plans. The procedure required is spelt out in the Regulations.[10] It must:

- o   enable the identification of the person who should determine whether an emergency has occurred - this will be for local determination and will usually be a person qualified by position or training and identified as a post-holder by title or role;
- o   specify the procedure which that person should adopt in taking that decision;
- o   specify any persons who should be consulted about the decision;
- o   specify the persons who should be informed about the decision; and
- o   although not contained in the Regulations, it is advisable to ensure that, where relevant, appropriate local authorities are informed about the decision.

[9] regulation 24(2)
[10] regulation 24(3)

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Have regard to risk assessment

5.21.   The Act requires Category 1 responders, from time to time, to assess whether the risk of an emergency might make it necessary or expedient for them to perform any of their functions.[11] Further information on risk assessment can be found in Chapter 4. Plans must be maintained to ensure that responders are able to perform those functions when necessary or desirable for the purpose of dealing with an emergency, if one occurs or is likely to occur.[12] The Regulations explicitly link the two duties. They require a Category 1 responder to have regard to any relevant assessment of risk when performing its duty to maintain its emergency plans[13] (and also its business continuity plans - see Chapter 6).

Have regard to arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public

5.22.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public at the time of an emergency. In developing and maintaining their emergency plans, Category 1 responders must have regard to their relevant warning arrangements and provisions for informing and advising the public.[14]

Generic and specific plans

5.23.   Chapter 4, Annex 4B contains a classification of hazards and threats. It identifies a small number of generic hazards or threats and a much larger number of examples of each. It would not be sensible to require Category 1 responders to prepare a specific plan for each of these possible events. Therefore, the Regulations distinguish between a single plan which relates to any emergency[15] and plans which relate to a particular emergency or a particular kind of emergency.[16]

[11] s. 2(1)(b)
[12] s. 2(1)(d)
[13] regulation 19
[14] regulation 20
[15] regulation 21(b)
[16] regulation 21(a)

5.24.   Generic plans are the core plans which enable a Category 1 responder to perform its functions in relation to a wide range of possible scenarios.

5.25.   A plan which relates to a particular emergency or a particular kind of emergency is usually known as a specific plan. Specific plans are a detailed set of arrangements designed to go beyond the generic arrangements when the latter are likely to prove insufficient in a particular case. A specific plan usually relies on a generic plan. Category 1 responders should use assessments of the nature of the risk to decide whether specific plans are necessary or desirable.

Multi-agency plans

5.26.   A multi-agency plan is a plan maintained by more than one Category 1 responder acting jointly.[17] Multi-agency plans are developed in a situation where the partners agree that, for a successful combined response, they need a formal set of procedures governing them all.

5.27.   These plans may be generic, as when they describe the control and co-ordination procedures for combined response to an emergency, including, for example, the procedures for setting up joint strategic or tactical co-ordination centres. They may also be specific. Thus, evacuation by the police of a central area may be unworkable without the carefully pre-planned co-operation of various other Category 1 responders, such as fire and ambulance services and the highways department of the local authority, and the involvement too of some Category 2 responders, including transport organisations, such as train and bus companies, under their own regulations.

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[17] regulation 22

5.28.   Category 1 responders within an LRF whose functions are engaged by a particular emergency must consider whether the appropriate way to perform their duty to maintain an emergency plan is by way of a multi-agency plan.[18]

Joint discharge of functions and other forms of collaborative working

5.29.   The duty to maintain plans for preventing, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of, or taking other action in connection with, an emergency falls on all Category 1 responders. But the Regulations permit them to collaborate with others in delivering the duty.

5.30.   There are several options for Category 1 responders in deciding how best to discharge their responsibility.[19] They may decide to undertake the task:

- o   on their own;

- o   collaboratively, by agreeing with partners to act under the leadership of a lead responder; [20]

- o   jointly, by making arrangements with another Category 1 or Category 2 responder; [21]

- o   by delegating the task to another Category 1 or Category 2 responder. [22]

5.31.   They may also support collaborative arrangements with the use of protocols.[23]

[18] regulation 22
[19] regulation 23
[20] regulations 9-11
[21] regulation 8(a)
[22] regulation 8(b)
[23] regulation 7

Have regard to voluntary organisations

5.32. Category 1 responders are required to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations when developing plans. They should ensure that the capabilities of voluntary organisations are considered early on in the plan formulation process. These should be reflected in emergency plans and training and exercising regimes where appropriate. Volunteers may live in the communities they serve and involving them can therefore serve a dual purpose. This is an important part of utilising and helping to develop community resilience.

5.33. Further guidance on how to involve the voluntary sector in planning frameworks can be found in Chapter 14.

Plan revision

5.34. The Act requires Category 1 responders to consider whether a new risk assessment carried out from time to time makes it necessary or expedient to add to or modify their emergency plans.[24] This is a specific route, which the Act identifies, requiring the revision of plans, in addition to the general requirement to maintain plans. You may also wish to note that, plans can be enhanced by recognising the contribution communities can bring to the response and recovery process.

5.35. Regulation 14 addresses the situation where a Minister of the Crown or a devolved administration issues guidance or an assessment in regard to the risk of an emergency. Category 1 responders must then consider whether that makes it necessary or expedient for them to revise their plans.[25]

5.36. An example of the kind of issue involved might be guidance or an assessment about a terrorist threat.

[24] s. 2(1)(e)
[25] regulation 26

Arrange for the publication of all or part of the plans

5.37.   Category 1 responders are required to arrange for the publication of all or part of the plans maintained under the Act, in so far as publication is necessary or desirable for the purpose of dealing with an emergency.[26] Any unpublished parts of the plan may be subject to Freedom of Information requests.

5.38.   Category 1 responders may choose to publish the whole of an emergency plan, or only part of that plan, in so far as publication in either case will help in, for example, mitigating an emergency. Effectively, this means that the decision to publish may be focused on those parts of the plan which it is useful for the public to know. Publishing these parts of the plan can, for example, help community groups to identify possible activities they could undertake in support of the plan. Where the plan contains a summary of the risk assessment on which it is based, publication of this summary also may satisfy the requirement to publish a part of the risk assessment. These matters are discussed further in Chapter 7. It is possible that information on unpublished parts of plans may be requested under Freedom of Information. Such requests will need to be considered on an individual basis in light of the contents of the plan and requirements of Freedom of Information legislation.

Existing emergency planning duties

5.39.   While responders will need to have regard to any planning requirements imposed by other sector-specific planning regimes and legislation, the Regulations identify only three pieces of legislation pre-dating this Act, which were introduced separately in Britain and Northern Ireland under sector-specific legislation operated by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and HSE Northern Ireland. These relate to major accident hazards at industrial establishments (Control of Major Accident Hazards

Regulations (COMAH)), to hazardous pipelines (Pipelines Safety Regulations) and to radiation hazards (Radiation (Emergency Preparation and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR)).

5.40. These sector-specific Regulations have established multi-agency emergency planning regimes in co-operation with the operators, which are specific, well defined and in some respects more prescriptive than the emergency planning requirements contained in this Act. To avoid duplication, the Regulations provide that the duty to maintain plans under the Act does not apply to emergencies which are dealt with by these pieces of legislation.[27]

Training and exercises

5.41. The Regulations require a plan to include provision for the carrying out of exercises[28] and for the training of staff or other persons.[29] This means that relevant planning documents must contain a statement about the nature of the training and exercising to be provided and its frequency.

5.42. The Regulations clarify the requirement in regard to arrangements for exercises. Exercises should ensure that the emergency plans are effective.[30]

5.43. The Regulations also clarify the requirement in regard to arrangements for training. Training[31] should be provided for:

o   an appropriate number of suitable personnel of the Category 1 responder; and

[27] regulation 12. For more information on the links between the CCA and the above legislative frameworks, see Fit with Other Legislation chapter.
[28] regulation 25(a)
[29] regulation 25(b)
[30] regulation 25(a)
[31] regulation 25(b)

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      o   other persons whom the responder considers necessary. This could include contractors with a role in the plans and also civil protection partners, both statutory and non-statutory, who have a role in the plans.

5.44.   The same or similar requirements for exercising and training also apply to business continuity plans (as discussed in Chapter 6) and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public (as discussed in Chapter 7).

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

5.45.   This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance.[32]

Box 5.1: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter is further advice about emergency planning and information that is not supported directly by the Act, but responders may find it useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

The cycle of emergency planning

5.46.   Emergency planning is a systematic and ongoing process, preparing organisations for the response to, and recovery from, emergencies. It evolves as lessons are identified and addressed and circumstances change.

5.47.   It is usual to view emergency planning as part of a cycle of activities beginning with establishing a risk profile to help determine what should be the priorities for developing plans and ending with review and revision, which then re-starts the whole cycle. Figure 5.1 has been adapted from earlier versions of the same diagram.[33] The lower circle outlines the plan preparation process and the upper circle the life of the plan once it is issued and circulated. Embedding the plans within the management culture of the organisation is vital to ensuring effective response on the day of an emergency. Equally vital is to maintain the plans as circumstances change, and to ensure that awareness of the plans is renewed as they are revised.

Figure 5.1: The cycle of emergency planning

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[33] See, for example, Cabinet Office, *The Lead Government Department and Its Role* (2010) which contains a full description of the cycle.

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5.48.   Both circles of the 'figure of eight' in *Figure 5.1* can stand independently of each other. In other words, the plan preparation cycle in the lower circle is continuous and repeated until the plan is ready for dissemination. The life cycle of the plan after circulation continues several times round the upper circle until a review indicates the need to prepare a new version. The occurrence of an emergency provides, of course, the true test of a plan, including how far managers and operational personnel are guided by it. It is possible that greater attention to detail and time invested on the second and third activities, will reduce the need for extensive reworking and remedial action after stage 7.

5.49.   All the various elements of this cycle are explored in the following guidance and in the previous chapter on risk assessment. Broadly, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and on the basis of initial hazard analysis and risk assessment, and their experience of local emergencies, the Category 1 responders' senior management define the purpose of the plan. This may be with the input of the community. It determines whether a plan is needed and what priority should be given to it. More detailed risk assessment is part of the information gathering process, which also includes liaison and co-operation with partner organisations to clarify their respective roles and the availability of resources. Consultation within the organisation and with partners takes place throughout the plan preparation process. It continues around the lower circle of the 'figure of eight' until the plan is agreed and is ready to be issued.

5.50.   The next paragraphs discuss the purpose of plans and the implications of deriving them more firmly from risk assessment. There is then an extensive discussion of the different types of plan and in what ways they are useful. The lower circle of *Figure 5.1* is then completed by some suggestions on how to prepare a plan.

Defining the purpose of a plan

5.51.   The purpose of an emergency plan is to serve organisations engaged in response and recovery, within the locality at the time of an emergency. Its aim is to increase multi-agency and community resilience by ensuring that all those charged with tackling the emergency on behalf of the community:

- o   know their role;
- o   are competent to carry out the tasks assigned to them;
- o   have access to available resources and facilities; and
- o   have confidence that their partners in response are similarly prepared.

Involving the community in the production of emergency plans whenever possible and practical, and supporting communities to develop their own emergency plans, will enable community members to play an active role in supporting responders in the response to, and recovery from, emergencies and ensure they also meet the requirements set out above. This should encompass relevant voluntary, business and community organisations operating in the area covered by the plan.

5.52.   There is an obligation on the management of Category 1 responders when identifying the need for an emergency plan, or the modification of an existing one, to assess the extent to which the emergency will place particular demands on their resources and capacity. It will require flexible use of what they have and arrangements to mobilise assistance from wherever it is available.

5.53.   In deciding whether to prepare a new emergency plan - or to revise or maintain an existing one - the Category 1 responder should examine its existing generic and specific emergency planning arrangements and see to what extent these meet the circumstances or the scenario under discussion.

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5.54. Where plans are developed in partnership across Category 1 responders, co-ordination and co-operation at management level are essential.

5.55. Once the decision to prepare or modify an emergency plan has been made, the following considerations may be helpful. A written plan and associated support material can assist internal management of emergency arrangements by serving as:

- o a concise description of how a special mobilisation of Category 1 responders, divisions, departments, teams and officers will be carried out;

- o a record of key decisions agreed with and between the main parties to the plan, which will evolve and change over a number of years; [34]

- o a guide for briefing, training or exercising personnel so that they are prepared for an emergency and know what has been agreed;

- o a series of checklists, references or aides memoires for senior officers to use at the time of an emergency, if they need it; and

- o a measure or standard against which the performance of a Category 1 responder and its partners can be assessed.

Planning for a combined response

5.56. Each Category 1 responder's plans are its own responsibility. But it is vital that their various plans to deliver particular capabilities fit together and complement each other.

5.57. Planning for a genuinely combined response across local organisational and cultural boundaries is not an easy task. But the legal framework of the Act and the practical co-operation which it encourages through multi-agency plans (including multi-LRF plans) and the LRF are both designed to improve consistency.

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[34] The plan should be supported in files by records of decisions agreed at meetings over the years.

The planning role of Category 2 responders

5.58.   Category 2 responders, such as utilities and transport companies, are governed by their own legislation and regulations in regard to emergency planning.

Box 5.2: Emergency planning, resources and capabilities

The planning process may throw up some areas where existing capabilities to deal with an emergency are deemed insufficient and additional resources appear to be needed to provide the level of capability desired.

A tension may be revealed between what Category 1 responders consider to be desirable as a result of the risk assessment and plan preparation process, and what the Act actually requires.

Planning should be realistic, proportionate to the risk and based on what the responder can actually provide from the totality of its existing resources, including contractors and dormant contracts, and from mutual aid agreements and other assistance from partner organisations. The Act does not require the Category 1 responders to find from within its own resources whatever level of capability the risk assessment and planning process may suggest is needed.

From a legal perspective, a plan which cannot be implemented will not discharge the legal duty to maintain plans. There is an implied duty to maintain a plan which is effective. It follows that it is better to have a less ambitious plan which works, than a fully comprehensive plan which cannot be implemented for lack of resources.

Please see further discussion of this topic in:

- _Box 5.4_: Risk assessment and local responder capabilities;
- _Box 5.6_: Generic capabilities and procedures; and
- _Box 5.9_: UK Capabilities Programme.

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5.59. However, the requirements of the Act are that they should co-operate with Category 1 responders in the performance of the Category 1 responders' duties and provide information to them in connection with those duties.[35] In consequence, Category 2 responders may be expected to assist the Category 1 responders in all aspects of plan preparation and maintenance. Category 2 responders can be invited to play a part in multi-agency plans and to take part in multi-agency exercises.[36] Requests should seek to minimise the burdens on Category 2 responders who, in turn, should consider them carefully and in a positive manner. See Chapter 2 for further detail on Category 2 responders' duties.

The role of other organisations engaged in response not named in the Act

5.60. The lists in Schedule 1 of the Act[37] of the organisations on which the statutory duties fall is by no means exhaustive of all the organisations that may be called upon in an emergency to assist with response.

Box 5.3: Place of Category 1 responders in the plans and exercises of Category 2 responders

Category 2 responders may also seek co-operation from their Category 1 partners in developing their own plans under their own legislation. Co-operation from Category 1 responders is likely to include provision of information and participation in exercises.

5.61. An organisation engaged in response that is not named in Schedule 1 is not subject to the requirements of the Act. But this does not mean that it should be discouraged or excluded from co-operation with the Category 1 and 2 responders in developing planning arrangements. On the contrary, where appropriate, it

should be included in Category 1 responders' development of plans. (See also Chapters 14 and 15.) The community's ability to provide support to elements of the response should not be overlooked either, and community resilience should be factored into the development of plans where practical. Further information on the Government's Community Resilience Programme can be found at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/community-resilience.

Risk assessment and planning

5.62.   Risk assessment under the Act is about the likelihood of an emergency (which threatens serious damage) occurring.[38] The only risks with which the Act is concerned and for which plans must be maintained are those which threaten serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security. The aim is to provide each Category 1 responder with the best possible basis from which to fulfill its duty to prepare emergency plans.

5.63.   The various types of emergency, the scale of their effects and their likelihood of occurrence are addressed in chapter 4, Annex 4B. Category 1 responders should identify the capabilities required to deal with the different types of emergency and allocate these between generic and specific plans.

5.64.   Thus, for example, treating the casualties from a prolonged cold weather emergency might require a rapid surge in the health service capacity for providing intensive care. But a rapid expansion in the provision of intensive care is a generic capability that may be required across a number of different types of emergency, including, for example, train crashes or a major industrial accident.

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[38] What the Act actually says is that Category 1 responders "shall from time to time assess the risk of an emergency occurring" (s. 2(1)(a)). In legal terms, this means the likelihood of an event or situation which threatens serious damage (s. 1(1)).

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5.65.   As a result of the risk assessment process, Category 1 responders should review their existing emergency plans.[39] The review is likely to:

> o   highlight weaknesses in some of their existing plans or procedures;
>
> o   suggest areas where further work is needed in order to match the type and level of risks identified; and
>
> o   reveal the need for new plans, procedures or supporting capabilities in areas where preparations do not currently exist or are clearly inadequate.

The process recurs continually and should be repeated as risk assessments change.

5.66.   Emergency planning tends to be concerned more with consequences than with causes. Emergencies can be grouped according to the type of response their different sets of consequences require, as shown in the table below. Response arrangements will be determined by whether resources tend to be concentrated at a single main location or series of locations, or dispersed over a wide area. A further consideration is whether the emergency has a sudden impact or a slow onset.

5.67.   By grouping possible emergencies in this way, responders can use the table as a framework for assessing whether their existing planning arrangements are sound or need improvement. Where a range of emergencies stemming from different causes requires a similar type of plan, this is likely to be a generic plan. Where the emergency requires its own individual plan, this will be a specific plan. The duration of an emergency is a further factor for consideration.

5.68.   A full review of plans will, of course, require reference to the complete taxonomy of emergencies contained in Annex 4B on risk assessment.

[39] s. 2(1)(c)

Emergencies classified by location and extent of consequences

Type of emergency - example

A. Single location

Fixed site	Industrial plant; school; airport; train station; sports stadium; town or city centre.
Corridor	Railway; motorway; air corridor; fuel pipeline.
Unpredictable	Bomb; chemical tanker; random shooting.

B. Multiple locations

Multiple locations	Linked, possibly simultaneous, explosions at different sites.

C. Wide area

Large area	Toxic cloud; loss of electricity, gas, water, telephone supply; river or coastal flooding; dam or reservoir failure.
Whole area	Severe weather; health emergencies, including influenza pandemic; foot-and-mouth.

D. Outside area

External emergency	Residents local to your area involved in an emergency elsewhere, e.g. coach or plane crash; passenger ship sinking; incident at football stadium. Evacuees into your area from another UK area. Refugees from an emergency overseas.

Types of plan

5.69.   The following section describes:

- o   generic plans;

- o   specific plans; and

- o   single-agency, multi-agency and multi-level plans.

5.70.   Most Category 1 responders have a mixture of generic and specific plans. The two work together, with specific plans supported by the generic plan. They may also have community plans, designed around the risks of a particular community.

5.71.   A danger of relying too much on a generic plan built round generic capabilities is that detailed understanding and preparations in relation to particular hazards and threats could be neglected. Lessons learned from dealing with particular emergencies may not be recorded and built subsequently into revised planning arrangements.

5.72.   A danger of relying too much on specific plans and the capabilities which deliver them is that of inconsistency and duplication, including inefficient use of resources. With specific plans, there can be a further danger of not establishing a clear set of central, corporate capabilities and procedures, transferable across emergencies and easily understood internally and by partner agencies.

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5.73.   The table at *Annex 5A* identifies generic and specific plans, as follows, and gives a few examples:

- o   generic - the core plan for mobilising staff and resources in response to an emergency;

- o   generic capability or procedure - a wide range of capabilities, procedures and teams which may need to be developed in support of the core generic plan;[40]

- o   specific hazard or contingency - plans for particular types of event or situation, identified through the risk assessment, which may occur widely across the local area; and

- o   specific site or location - plans for particular sites or locations in the local area, also identified through the risk assessment.

Generic plans

5.74.   Generic plans are core plans which enable a Category 1 responder to perform its functions in relation to a wide range of possible scenarios. General in nature, generic plans are, in the first instance, single-agency plans and are seen as the most important plans for that organisation. But each organisation's generic plan should fit with the generic plans of its partner agencies and may contain references to them. In some local areas, multi-agency generic plans have been developed as part of core planning for a combined response.

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[40] Some of these generic capabilities, such as the provision of rest centres or an emergency mortuary, are often considered to be specific plans. They are included here as part of the generic plan because they support the generic plan.

Box 5.4: Risk assessment and local responder capabilities

For many years, Category 1 responders have tended to deliver a capability in emergencies that is determined by their normal functions. When an emergency occurs, this function-based capability is redeployed to deal with the problems posed. If that capability is insufficient, the organisation will seek assistance from neighbouring responder organisations.

What the risk assessment process suggests is that responders should determine the capability required to deal with an emergency, not only on the basis of their existing functional capability, but also on the level of risk. This risk-based capability for dealing with emergencies is determined by the risk assessment and is delivered through the emergency plans.

However, as the discussion in _Box 5.2_ above suggests, the Act does not specifically require Category 1 responders to obtain the resources that will deliver the new level of capability.

Capability requirements necessarily change as risk assessments and planning assumptions change. Category 1 responders should consider how their plans and capabilities need to be improved to meet the assessed level of risk.

5.75.   For a Category 1 responder, generic plans deliver four key practical benefits:

- o   a recognised corporate basis of response for the organisation to any type,or most types, of emergency;

- o   key supporting elements (that is, capabilities and management procedures) which can be selected from and combined as necessary, depending on the nature of the emergency - and which can be drawn on, too, in support of specific plans;

- o   a recognised corporate management framework for:

  - awareness-raising throughout the organisation;

  - developing training and exercising throughout the organisation;

  - building ownership of civil protection throughout the organisation; and

  - mainstreaming civil protection within the organisation; and

- o   a recognised corporate management framework for participating with other local partner organisations in the combined response.

  - a checklist of the minimum number of elements that one would normally expect to see covered in the core generic plan is contained in _Annex 5B_.

5.76.   Similar benefits from a consistent and standard approach can, of course, be realised across a number of organisations where they combine in developing a multi-agency generic plan.

5.77.   Most Category 1 responders will carry out their main emergency planning responsibility under the Act by preparing a generic plan.

5.78.   All Category 1 responders should ensure that their response plans not only meet

their own requirements but also complement the multi-agency integrated major incident response systems, especially command and control, within each Local Resilience Area.

Specific plans

5.79. Specific plans enable a Category 1 responder to move from the general to the particular.

5.80. The development of a specific plan is a matter for decision by the Category 1 responder [41] (but see also 5.35 above and Chapter 4). Where the local risk assessment indicates clearly that it is desirable for a particular risk to be addressed in a plan, the Category 1 responder should consider whether a generic plan and supporting capabilities are adequate or should be improved. When changes are needed and a generic plan is not the right place to include them, then a specific plan may be appropriate.

5.81. Many specific plans, such as for flooding, oil pollution or a stadium incident, are likely to be multi-agency plans. This gives them a particular importance, supported as they are by the core generic plans. It is important that specific plans dovetail and are compatible with those of partner agencies. A checklist for verification purposes of the minimum number of elements which one would expect to see contained in a specific plan is contained at Annex 5C.

5.82. Specific emergency plans deliver four key practical benefits:

o a more detailed set of procedures designed to go beyond the standard generic procedures, when these are likely to prove inadequate in a particular case;

o a basis for integrated emergency response to a particular situation or

> scenario across a number of partner organisations;

o a framework for specific emergency-planning training and exercising addressed to particular situations or scenarios; and

o a reference of information setting out detailed specific information, e.g. health hazards and effects of chemical types (COMAH plans) on the public.

Plans for specific hazards or contingencies

5.83. Certain types of emergency require additional knowledge or procedures, which it would be inappropriate to include in a generic plan.

5.84. For example, an influenza pandemic requires major specialist interventions within the health service, but also draws on a range of Category 1 responders and others. As a result, local multi-agency contingency plans have been promoted by the Department of Health. Again, chemical hazards on the roads, including spillages, may require specialist fire service and chemical industry expertise and equipment, or treatment by private specialist waste firms.

Box 5.5: Emergencies and major incidents

The main planning responsibility required under the Act relates to emergencies which seriously obstruct the normal functions of the responder or demand that action be taken and require a special deployment of resources. Each Category 1 responder must have a plan capable of dealing with an event of this scale, and it must have procedures for activating the plan on a 24-hour basis. This generic plan is supported by a range of generic capabilities.

Hitherto, such events have been known in the UK context as major incidents. When incidents are of such a nature that they severely test the response arrangements of

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the emergency services and require a special mobilisation of their resources, most are likely to declare a major incident. Partner organisations are immediately informed – and they often (though not always) will declare a major incident too, as part of a combined response.

The Act, the Regulations and this guidance consistently use the term emergency, but there is nothing in the legislation that prevents a responder from continuing to use the term "major incident" in its planning arrangements for response.

The well-established principles which define a major incident have been replicated by various provisions in the Act. The concept of a major incident is captured, in particular, by the test for deciding when the duty to prepare an emergency plan applies. The Act defines an emergency in such a way as effectively to require a major incident response from one or more of the Category 1 responders. The definition of an emergency provides a defined threshold for emergency planning similar to the major incident concept. It does not require plans for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of events or situations below this threshold.

5.85.   Wide-area emergencies, such as major storms, generalised flooding or widespread contamination, build on the standard, generic approach, but can benefit from specific contingency planning. So, too, can slow-building wide-area emergencies, such as severe and prolonged cold weather, drought, or a foot-and-mouth emergency.

Box 5.6: Generic capabilities and procedures

Capability is the ability to do what is required in an emergency situation. Generic capabilities and procedures in support of local responders' generic plans deserve particular attention, to ensure that what the generic plan

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promises can address successfully a wide range of emergencies. For example, in the context of an emergency, it may be necessary to evacuate a single block of flats (usually, a minor evacuation) or to evacuate a whole neighbourhood (a major evacuation). Generic capabilities may be needed to be able to deal with both types of demand.

Capability is originally a military term: it covers the people mobilised by a plan, their equipment and training, and also the planning, doctrinal and control frameworks for their actions.

The UK Capabilities Programme has been developed by central government to address the most serious disruptive challenges requiring support from central government. It leads to some capabilities being developed at the local level in support of UK-wide resilience planning, but these are a matter of current government policy and are not a specific requirement of the Act.

See also: Box 5.9 on the UK Capabilities Programme.

Plans for specific sites or locations

5.86.   A second type of specific plan can be appropriate for specific sites or locations, where the consequences and impact at the known location are more easily predictable. It is possible to develop detailed plans which, as a result of exercises, can be constantly tested and improved, and changed as physical and organisational arrangements change.

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5.87.   The best known examples of site-specific plans are not covered by the duty under the Act to maintain plans because they are covered by sector-specific legislation operated by the HSE.[42]

COMAH, REPPIR and the Pipeline Regulations

These statutory planning arrangements are for major industrial hazard sites, nuclear power stations (including MoD nuclear installations subject to Defence Major Accident Control Regulations) and oil and gas pipeline installations.

The Act places no requirement on Category 1 responders to prepare plans for these events, because the essential relevant organisations already have this statutory responsibility under the HSE legislation. In the event of a COMAH, REPPIR or pipeline event with consequences beyond those that, under HSE legislation, must be prepared for, there is no requirement under the Act for Category 1 responders to prepare plans for this emergency.

However, it is considered that, in practice, Category 1 responders will want voluntarily to integrate planning arrangements under the different statutory regimes at the LRF.

For more information please see para 5.39-5.40 and chapter 19, Fit with Other Legislation.

5.88.   There are other types of specific site, permanent or temporary, where emergency plans may be needed. For example, airports, sports grounds, hospitals, public events or areas where flooding is likely. Particular locations may also need specific plans, such as town or city centres, or coastal areas most vulnerable to pollution from major oil spills.

[42] regulation 12

Multi-agency plans and the role of a lead Category 1 responder

5.89.   The Act places duties on individual Category 1 responders to prepare emergency plans. However, planning for emergencies is rarely an autonomous activity. There are occasions when Category 1 responders will want to cement integrated emergency management by developing multi-agency plans.

5.90.   The Regulations:

o   require Category 1 responders who have a duty in relation to the same emergency to consider whether a multi-agency plan should be developed;[43] and

o   permit Category 1 responders to co-operate for the purpose of identifying which of them will take lead responsibility where more than one of them have functions that are exercisable in relation to the same emergency or the same type of emergency.[44]

Box 5.7: Multi-level plans and the role of the lead government department

A multi-level plan is a plan covering more than one level of government; for example, a national or multi-LRF plan. National plans have been or are being developed, for foot-and-mouth, anthrax, rabies, influenza pandemic, marine and coastal pollution and fuel shortages. There is also a national plan for Wales. Multi-LRF plans could relate to flooding, severe weather or a crisis affecting a utility.

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[43] regulation 22
[44] regulations 9-11

Ownership of their part of these plans is the responsibility of each of the relevant Category 1 responders, but co-ordination or leadership in the development and execution of these plans is likely to be taken by a national or regional organisation, perhaps relying on one of the local partners (e.g. the police) to co-ordinate.

The lead government departments will take steps as a matter of policy to publicise these plans, as necessary, to their local partners and ensure that arrangements dovetail. _Annex 5A_ indicates in a number of places the involvement of different levels in the development of plans. Some of these relate to specific sectoral concerns, such as foot-and-mouth; others to generic capabilities which are required to support national plans for coping with catastrophic incidents.

See also: _Box 5.9_ on the UK Capabilities Programme.

5.91.   Generally, it will be appropriate for a lead responder to be appointed to develop a multi-agency plan. However, such plans can also be developed by joint working[45] or by delegation.[46]

5.92.   Where they are unable to agree that a multi-agency plan is needed, or which organisation should take the lead responsibility, each has a duty to maintain its own plan.[47]

[45] regulation 8(a)
[46] regulation 8(b)
[47] s. 2(1)(d)

> **Box 5.8: Day-to-day incident procedures**
>
> It is generally accepted as good practice that procedures which relate to events that fall short of an emergency should be removed from the core generic plan for emergencies, because they do not require a special mobilisation.
>
> Day-to-day incident procedures are not covered by the Act. Nonetheless, they deserve particular attention, so as to give greater coherence to response arrangements. It is sometimes difficult for the emergency services, such as the police, when they arrive at the scene of an incident, to know who are the responsible individuals representing partner organisations with whom they should co-ordinate. When an organisation has several functions called into play by an incident, a number of officers representing key disciplines may be called to the scene. Integrated incident management with partner organisations is improved if procedures are in place for co-ordinating staff at the scene of a day-to-day incident by, for example, appointing a Lead Incident Officer or a Liaison Officer.
>
> Sound procedures developed and practiced at the day-to-day incident level ensure there will be greater confidence when the event to be dealt with is an emergency. Emergency planners and the relevant managers need to examine day-to-day procedures, and, where necessary, revise them or bring them into a corporate framework. Day-to-day procedures need to link seamlessly into the emergency planning procedures.

5.93.   A multi-agency plan may be developed by:

       o   one or more of the Category 1 members of the LRF on behalf of all or some of its members across the whole LRF area. For example, a plan for an emergency mortuary;

> - o one or more of the Category 1 members of the LRF across the boundaries between two or more LRFs, particularly where there is a hazard that affects communities on both sides of a boundary, such as an airport; or
>
> - o one or more of the Category 1 responders directly on their own behalf, without relying on the LRF as such and not covering the whole LRF area. For example, a plan for a local shopping centre or entertainment complex or for a sports stadium.

5.94. A multi-level plan is a further example of a multi-agency plan, involving different levels of government, such as the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution (see also *Box 5.7*).

5.95. Where the boundaries of the LRF coincide with those of the organisation(s) initiating a multi-agency plan, it is not the LRF which is responsible for the plan. Each of the participating organisations takes direct responsibility for the plan.

Plan content

5.96. The definition of emergency in Section 1 of the Act covers a wide range of events or situations threatening serious damage in the areas of human welfare, the environment and security.[48] These situations are listed in detail in Annex 4B which provides a classification of hazards and threats. But the number of generic capabilities and specific emergency plans which a responder body may choose to develop is not specified in the Act.

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[48] s. 1(1)

5.97.   Even so, the Government considers that plans should have regard to two groupings of people, the vulnerable and survivors, in a wide range of situations. A further grouping, emergency responder personnel, is also indicated in this guidance as deserving special consideration. In all three cases, the longer-term needs of these groups during the recovery phase should be an important consideration in planning for the response phase.

The vulnerable

5.98.   Vulnerable people are one set of people to whom all emergency plans must have regard. The particular needs of the vulnerable are also considered in Chapter 7.

5.99.   Having regard to the vulnerable means that people who are less able to help themselves in the circumstances of an emergency must be given special consideration in plans. Frequently, a distinction is made between the self-reliant and the vulnerable. It is assumed generally that self-reliant people will be able to respond to the requirements of an emergency promptly, while the vulnerable are likely to require special assistance in taking appropriate actions.

5.100.   Sometimes the planning required of the Category 1 responder may be as simple as making arrangements to encourage community resilience by emphasising to the public that they should adopt a good-neighbourly attitude, keep an eye on vulnerable neighbours and offer help where needed.

5.101.   However, making direct contact is relatively easy when such people live or are present at vulnerable establishments, such as nursing homes, day centres or schools. It is harder when they live or are present in the community as individuals. In these cases, the local authority and the health authority are likely to have relevant lists

- such as of people on dialysis machines in their homes. Subject to the provisions in the Data Protection Act, arrangements can be made in the plans of relevant Category 1 responders for access to these lists at the time of an emergency. This may be achieved with the help of an information sharing protocol. Plans should refer to these information sources. Utility companies also hold similar but more limited lists on their 'help registers'.[49]

5.102.   Special provision also needs to be made in plans for people with disabilities. This provision may include special transport, such as local authority social services or voluntary sector vehicles, or taxis, to help in the evacuation of people with mobility problems. Other provision may include plans for the availability of electric wheelchairs in town and shopping centres to facilitate evacuation when needed.

5.103.   It is not easy to define in advance and for planning purposes who are the vulnerable people to whom special consideration should be given in plans. Those who are vulnerable will vary depending on the nature of the emergency, for example people with breathing difficulties may be vulnerable in the face of toxic fumes. For planning purposes there are broadly three categories which should be considered:

    o   those who, for whatever reason, have mobility difficulties, including people with physical disabilities or a medical condition and even pregnant women;

    o   those with mental health difficulties; and

    o   others who are dependent, such as children. Further consideration of how best to communicate with those who are especially vulnerable in emergencies is contained in Chapter 7.[50]

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[49] While each situation must be assessed on its own facts, there are particular provisions in the Data Protection Act which will be relevant in this kind of situation, for example Schedule 2 which contains a list of conditions that must be satisfied before information is disclosed and deals with situations where disclosure of the information is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.

[50] For more information on identifying vulnerable people, see Cabinet Office, *Identifying People who are Vulnerable in a Crisis: Guidance for Emergency Planning and Response* (2008).

Those affected by the emergency

5.104.   A second group of people to be given a place in plans are survivors and others affected by an emergency. These include not only those directly affected by the emergency, but also those who, as family and friends, suffer bereavement or the anxiety of not knowing what has happened. There is a full discussion of the particular information needs of these groups in Chapter 7.

5.105.   Planned procedures at the scene of an emergency - and at secondary centres like hospitals and the emergency mortuary - should pay particular attention to the needs of this group. Information planning should be designed to meet their needs. Plans should contain commitments to respond sensitively to the needs of survivor groups - for example, to hold a review meeting within a short time to assess the need for longer-term initiatives - and, if necessary, to develop medium and long-term support programmes.

5.106.   Category 1 responders should consider developing a specific multi-agency plan for offering social and psychological support to survivors, the bereaved and the wider community following an emergency. Such a plan for a multi-agency crisis support team would be likely to include local social services for adults and children, health authorities, police family liaison officers and voluntary organisations. As recommended by the inquiry into the Marchioness disaster,[51] a lead responder may be needed to co-ordinate the planning, which would generally be the local authority.

[51] Lord Justice Clark's Inquiry into the Marchioness Disaster, 2001.

Responder personnel

5.107.   Sometimes plans prepared for emergencies place unrealistic expectations on management and personnel. The emergency services have health and safety procedures which determine shift patterns and check for levels of stress. They also have rules about exposing personnel to danger. It is important that all Category 1 responders should build proper consideration for the welfare of this third group, their own personnel, into all their plans. For more information, see The Fit with Other Legislation chapter.

Box 5.9: UK Capabilities Programme

The UK Capabilities Programme is a government programme. Its purpose is to deliver a number of generic capabilities to provide government with the assurance that effective response can be made at a national, devolved administration, multi-LRF or local level to a number of the most serious disruptive challenges.

The programme relies on the framework of the Act to provide a basic structure for civil protection and resilience at the local level. However, the expectations of the UK Capabilities Programme are a matter of government policy and not a requirement of the Act.

The UK Capabilities Programme lists workstreams concerned with the maintenance of essential services, for example:

- health;
- environment - water, food, sewerage, flood defence;
- transport;
- utilities; and
- financial services.

Other functional work streams address potential consequences of a major disruptive challenge, for example:

- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents;
- human infectious diseases;
- animal and plant infectious diseases;
- mass casualties;
- mass fatalities;
- mass evacuation;
- site clearance; and
- warning and Informing the public.

Plan presentation and plan making

5.108. Greater consistency in planning documents will ensure improved co-operation between responders at the local level. It will also lead to improved understanding at all levels and among the public.

5.109. Some Category 1 responders will focus more on training and developing an effective management culture, with the emphasis on inculcating an awareness of management's role in responding effectively to emergencies, than on the production of written plans. All will rely on written plans, however, to a greater or lesser extent. Some "plans" will come in different formats, for example, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), action cards or aides memoires may be suitable for a single organisation's specific response plans.

5.110. An important consideration in writing an emergency plan is that it should introduce the reader to the topic by logical steps. It should also be as concise

as possible. Undertaking a regular plan rationalisation or review exercise can be useful in highlighting inconsistencies or duplication. The table below *para 5.116* provides an example of a standard format which may be followed. Other formats begin with "activation" because plans are response documents and activation is the most important element.

The process of preparing plans

5.111.   It is important that planning should be seen as a collective process, involving at all stages, those who will be responsible for delivering the plan's objectives on the day of an emergency.

5.112.   The cycle of emergency planning shown in *Figure 5.1* identifies (in the lower circle of the 'figure of eight') four phases in developing and maintaining plans. This section looks at the process of preparing plans in more detail. It suggests, in addition, that a specific project plan should be developed as part of the planning process, to ensure that the emergency plan is delivered on schedule and with all the necessary elements complete.

Step 1: Risk profile

5.113.   The first step carries the treatment of risks, that is, the final stage of the risk assessment process, over into the emergency planning process. Under the terms of the Act, risk treatment focuses on emergency planning only, and does not directly address other aspects. The aim is to define the situations or scenarios for which response and recovery capabilities are needed, in accordance with the responder's functions. It is important to imagine and select from the risk profile all the possible circumstances. For example:

- o   what is most likely to happen?

- o   who might be affected by the impact of the emergency? or

- o   what are the different things that might go wrong with the response?

5.114.   As a result of this stage, an overview is achieved of the scenarios which the plan is designed to address.

Step 2: Objectives including capabilities

5.115.   The basic scenarios delivered by the risk assessment then need to be translated into a series of objectives - including a first assessment of the capabilities needed to meet them. This is the most important stage of the entire plan-making process. Key operational officers at middle-management level need to be asked how they would expect to deal with relevant scenarios. They should be talked to individually, to try to get them to think honestly and creatively about emergencies that are likely to test, to the limits, their professional experience and the competence of their organisation. They should be encouraged to take their time to think about all the issues:

- o   how would they go about it?

- o   what capabilities and resources have they got?

- o   how would they fill any gaps in capabilities or resources?

- o   what numbers of casualties should the plan be able to deal with?

- o   what are the priorities?

- o   what are the likely problems to be overcome? and

- o   what standard of response is required?

5.116.   At a certain point, the key professionals from various disciplines should be brought together to agree these objectives between themselves, and to confirm that all are

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thinking along the same lines in terms of an agreed set of planning assumptions and capabilities. As the questions are answered, so the objectives for the plan are clarified and if possible quantified.[52]

Presentation of an emergency plan

SECTION	CONTENT	SUMMARY
General Information	A short, overall description of the plan and its purpose. Some reference to the risk assessment on which the plan is based (with more detail as necessary in an annex)	Why the plan is needed.
Management, Control and Co-ordination	Control arrangements. The main elements of the plan in a hierarchy of importance. The main emergency teams, their roles and responsibilities. The key concepts, doctrine and terminology. The main facilities, locations and communications.	How the plan works Who has a role in the plan.
Activation, including alert and standby	The procedures for alerting, placing on standby and then activating the key teams named in the Control and Co-ordination section. This includes the procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred.	When the plan is activated.
Action	Specific actions to be undertaken, as their contribution to the overall response, by the key organisations, divisions, departments and officers in the hierarchy. Key officer checklists can be abstracted from here.	What the plan says will be done and by whom.
Annexes	Call-out lists (related to the key teams). Resource lists. Further information, including: • more on the risk assessment, as necessary; and • a policy statement on carrying out training and exercises.	Who has a role in the plan – contact details.

[52] For more information on planning assumptions, see Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies (2010).

Figure 5.2: The five steps for preparing an emergency plan

5.117.   Once the objectives are agreed in terms of the need to develop capabilities, the scope and ambition of the plan are determined. The remaining steps are systematic to achieve a final scheme. Even so, as difficulties are encountered or new considerations emerge, the objectives themselves may have to be refined or changed as part of the cycle of emergency planning.

5.118.   The next three steps are placed in the order in which the plan is thought through (not how they will appear in the written document).

Step 3: Tasks and resources

5.119.   The logistics of the plan follow directly from determining its objectives. The function-based capabilities of the organisation should be determined, as should the risk-based capability that appears to be required (see also _Box 5.4_). The basic questions are:

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- o   what are we going to have to do?

- o   how are we going to do it?

- o   do we have the right teams, the right numbers, the right skills, the right training?

- o   are the management and communication structures in place to do it?

- o   who might be called upon to reinforce the local capability?

- o   are our resources of facilities, materials, vehicles, premises and equipment sufficient? If not, where do we get them from?

5.120.   These questions should be pursued with the key staff in each functional area. As a result of this stage in the process, a detailed list is created of all the many activities which will need to be undertaken successfully during an emergency.

Starting the project plan - two sets of planning objectives

At Step 3 of the process, what becomes absolutely vital is a project plan, a structured process for managing all the work that needs to be done to deliver a completed emergency plan, including a work programme and time line.

Two separate sets of planning objectives should be distinguished at this point:

- the objectives of the emergency plan itself - already established at Step 2; and

- the objectives of the project plan - namely, the actions that need to be finished, and the capabilities that need to be in place, before the emergency plan itself is completed.

Those organisations that wish to apply project management techniques across a wider range of their civil protection duties should look at the Major Projects Authority section of the Cabinet Office website www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/best-practice-and-methodology-projects-programmes-and-portfolios

Step 4: Organisation

5.121.   The large number of emergency tasks identified at Step 3 needs to be pulled into a proper management framework for dealing with the response and recovery phase. No useful purpose is served by reinventing satisfactory control and co-ordination arrangements which already exist. However, the following questions may be asked to ensure that the organisational framework is fit for purpose:

   o   what is the hierarchy of control needed to avoid duplication and ensure that everyone knows what to do?

   o   can existing management structures within the organisation be utilised in an emergency setting effectively or do new management structures need to be created specifically to deliver the capability required for an emergency?

   o   how will the different teams and groups identified above be organised so that they share a common understanding as to how they will operate?

   o   does a joint structure need to be created across a number of responders to enable all the tasks to be properly managed in a coherent way - or does such a structure for emergencies already exist in a form that can be drawn upon in the face of the scenarios defined and the objectives of the plan?

   o   where does the authorisation lie for prompt expenditure decisions?

   o   is there a need for cross-boundary support if resources of the responding agency are limited/overwhelmed?

Step 5: Responsibilities

5.122.   Finally, as the organisational framework of the plan is addressed, so the allocation of responsibilities across teams and responders can be firmed up. A detailed spelling out of who does what becomes possible. Responsibilities can be clearly assigned, with emergency objectives and tasks spelled out and an organisational framework agreed for pulling all the capabilities together.

5.123.   As these questions are answered, so the plan takes shape. Task lists can be prepared, allocated by responsibility. All the actions needed to meet all the plan's objectives will be allocated securely.

5.124.   The whole process is ongoing and should be reviewed as the plan develops and as circumstances change. For example, if there are insufficient resources available to deliver the plan's objectives - and it is not possible to obtain more - then the objectives must be revisited. Here again, close attention should be paid to the requirement to perform the responder's functions 'so far as necessary and desirable' in an emergency. [53]

5.125.   The key to an effective planning process is to be clear about its objectives. There should be buy-in to those objectives from all the responders and the key staff affected by the plan. This is one of the main reasons why simply writing the plan, getting it approved and issuing it to staff is not sufficient. A sound process for developing the plan is likely to involve regular consultation with key representatives of all the teams to be mobilised by it, until the plan is finished. This ensures a degree of preliminary verification.

[53] See s. 2(1)(d) and Box 5.4

5.126.   However, it should be made absolutely clear that this suggested process for developing a plan is not the same as the way in which the plan is presented.[54]

5.127.   Once the final draft of the plan has been agreed and approved between all the parties, the relevant senior officers should sign off the plan. If it is a multi-agency plan, it may be signed off through the LRF.

Maintaining and embedding the plans

5.128.   So far, the guidance has considered the lower circle in *Figure 5.1*, the cycle of emergency planning. The next sections move the process into the top half of the 'figure of eight' and examine how a completed plan is validated, maintained and quality-assured as a living document. In the real world, it will be exposed to emergencies. Managers will assess how far the principles and procedures contained help them in a real event. Partner organisations will also form their own views on the effectiveness of each organisation's plan, or its contribution to a multi-agency plan.

Plan publication (internal)

5.129.   The publication and dissemination of an emergency plan for internal purposes, that is, for the organisations, teams and officers covered by the plan, is an important part of plan verification. A plan is not valid if it only exists in draft form.

5.130.   For a plan to be valid, it must be accepted as the stated policy of the organisation or Category 1 responders on whose behalf it has been produced. For this to happen, the key decision makers in an organisation must have an awareness of the plan and, through sign-off and other initiatives, have accepted part ownership of it.

[54] *See paragraphs 5.108-5.110*

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5.131.   Persons responsible for carrying out roles in the plan must be aware of those roles. Internal publication of the plan is often accompanied by awareness-raising events designed to promote the plan to those 'who need to know'.

5.132.   There should also be a general level of awareness throughout the Category 1 responder that the plan exists and that the Category 1 responder has a commitment to carry out its agreed responsibilities under the plan.

Plan training

5.133.   The Regulations require provisions for the training of staff or other persons to be included in plans.[55] It means that the plans themselves should include a schedule for training. This training should extend beyond those employed by the responder and include contractors, and the staff and senior personnel of voluntary organisations, and the community (where necessary) who might be used in support of the plan. Involving senior personnel, in particular, from all interested organisations should reinforce and support organisational commitment and collaboration.

5.134.   Training, as distinct from exercise, is broadly about raising participants' awareness about the potential emergency that they may face and giving them confidence in the procedures and their ability to carry them out successfully. It is particularly important that participants in training understand the objectives of the plan and their part in delivering them.

5.135.   It is also important that people taking part in exercises should be trained beforehand, so that they know what is expected of them. It is especially important that senior personnel in the organisation attend training so that they are able to effectively lead the organisation in the event of an emergency.

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Completion of the project plan

The completion of the project plan ensures that all the objectives of the emergency plan are supported by firm arrangements, adequate resources and facilities, an agreed allocation of responsibilities, and so on.

Of course, the plan still needs to be validated.

General raising of awareness

5.136. There are also many ways in which an organisation can raise awareness internally of the existence of an emergency plan and its contents. These include:

- o ensuring that emergency planning arrangements are part of induction training for all relevant staff;
- o putting the plans on the intranet;
- o producing information leaflets for personnel;
- o publishing an informal newsletter;
- o holding an awareness-raising seminar;
- o introducing online training packages; and
- o publishing an EPO handbook reference document.

Senior managers can play an important role in embedding a culture of emergency preparedness into an organisation. Case study evidence has shown that where senior management are pro-active in the promotion of business continuity management and preparedness within their particular organisation, the culture permeates through all levels ensuring a greater ability for that organisation to withstand any adverse event.

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The purpose of exercises

5.137. Generally, participants in exercises should have an awareness of their roles and be reasonably comfortable with them, before they are subject to the stresses of an exercise. Exercising is not to catch people out. It tests procedures, not people. If staff are underprepared, they may blame the plan, when they should blame their lack of preparation and training. An important aim of an exercise should be to make people feel more comfortable in their roles and to build morale. It is especially important that senior personnel are involved in exercising. They will need to be practiced in their role and up to date with changes in procedures in order to effectively lead the organisation in an emergency.

5.138. Exercises have three main purposes:

  o to validate plans (verification);

  o to develop staff competences and give them practice in carrying out their roles in the plans (training); and

  o to test well-established procedures (validation).

Most exercises will have some elements of all three.

Plan exercising

5.139. Regulations require that plans include provisions for carrying out exercises.[56] It means that the plan itself must include reference to an exercise programme, which will maintain its currency and validity. Appropriate emphasis should be placed on multi-agency exercising, co-ordinated through the LRF when relevant. This gives responders a chance to test information sharing and can identify important lessons that can be missed in single agency exercises.

[56] regulation 25(a)

5.140. Cost-effectiveness is obviously of importance in designing an exercise programme. Multi-agency exercises can be designed to test some aspects of single-agency plans. Responders may also consider pooling some of their exercise budgets across the LRF. Responders could then draw up an exercise programme to test all appropriate aspects of the responders' multi-agency and single-agency plans.

5.141. When developing an exercise programme across a number of plans and over a period of time it may be helpful to focus on:

- o all aspects of the main generic plan;
- o plans which address the most probable risks and are most likely to be used;
- o those divisions, departments or teams which are weakest;
- o those plans or parts of plans where the least training and exercising has been done; and
- o co-ordination with the exercise programmes of other key partners.

5.142. Although there is no national standard, people writing and delivering exercises and training should be suitably experienced or knowledgeable.

5.143. In many local areas, it is accepted that the combined response is strengthened if responders are aware of each other's exercises and are invited, where appropriate, to play a part in them. Multi-agency exercise and training programmes can be publicised through the LRF. They can also be publicised through the National Resilience Extranet (NRE) or, for wider-area exercises, the Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) *Resilience Gateway*.

The role of Category 2 responders in exercises

5.144.   The requirements of the Regulations in regard to exercising apply to Category 1 responders, but Category 2 responders are obliged to co-operate with them in the delivery of their civil protection duties. In seeking co-operation from Category 2 responders in their exercise programmes, Category 1 responders should ensure that their requests are reasonable and do not overburden them. Opportunities should also be sought for local plans to be exercised as part of the wider programme of exercises many Category 2 responders are required to hold through other legislative frameworks/by other LGDs.

Plan testing

5.145.   Not all aspects of an emergency plan can be tested, but some crucial elements can, such as:

  o   the contact list;
  o   the activation process;
  o   communications equipment;
  o   the premises selected for the activity;
  o   the setting-up procedures; and
  o   information management.

5.146.   Ringing the relevant numbers on a regular basis can test the contact details of each person named in the plan. Some responders do this every three months.

5.147.   The activation process can be examined by running a short test, in which the staff responsible for triggering a plan activation are asked to do so. This should be done at least annually.

5.148.   Communications equipment needs to be tested for reliability, capacity and reach, that is, the conditions where it is effective and where it begins to fail. Personnel who are not involved habitually, for example, with a particular radio system or channel, also need to be tested regularly.

5.149.   The setting-up procedures for control centres and other key facilities should be tested at least annually. This includes provision of necessary premises, emergency supplies and equipment (for example, any IT equipment, stationery, message forms, log books, whiteboards, financial record forms, etc) and ensuring that they can be located quickly and placed in the right positions where they are needed. This can be done as one starting point for a larger exercise.

5.150.   There are considerable overlaps between plan testing of this sort and exercising for business continuity planning (see Chapter 6).

Exercise design

5.151.   The design of an exercise should be driven by its objectives. These will be:

   o   overall objectives for the exercise set by the exercise directing staff;

   o   specific objectives for each of the main players including senior personnel (who may, for example, want to examine their ability to contact officers and mobilise resources in real time); and

   o   potentially, in a multi-agency exercise, several sets of objectives. There will be a core overall set, and each organisation may have its own. Any conflicts in objectives should be ironed out early in the design process.

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5.152.   Once the objectives are meshed into a single design, everything in the exercise should be determined by them. The scenario is simply a means of setting up situations which test the exercise objectives. It is important that the scenario should be realistic, so that people do not think their time is being wasted, and it should have enough in it to provide a challenge. However, the details of the scenario can sometimes take up too much time in exercise preparation.

Exercise types

5.153.   There are three main types of exercise:

- o   discussion-based;
- o   table top; and
- o   live.

The choice of which one to adopt depends on what the purpose of the exercise is. It is also a question of lead-in time and available resources. Further guidance can be found at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/exercise-planners-guide.

5.154.   A discussion-based exercise is cheapest to run and easiest to prepare. It can be used at the policy formulation stage as a 'talk-through' of how to finalise the plan. More often, it is based on a completed plan and is used to develop awareness about the plan through discussion. In this respect, it is often used for training purposes.

5.155.   A table top exercise is based on simulation, not necessarily literally around a table top. Usually, it involves a realistic scenario and a time line, which may be real time or may speed time up. The players are expected to know the plan and they are invited to test how the plan works as the scenario unfolds. This type of exercise is

particularly useful for verification purposes, particularly for exploring weaknesses in procedures. Table top exercises are relatively cheap to run, except in the use of staff time. They demand careful preparation.

5.156. A live exercise is a live rehearsal for validating and implementing the plan. Such exercises are particularly useful for testing logistics, communications and physical capabilities. They also make excellent training events from the point of view of experiential learning, helping participants develop confidence in their skills and providing experience of what it would be like to use the plan's procedures in a real event. Where the latter purposes are, in fact, the main objective of the exercise, then it is essentially a training exercise or practice drill. Live exercises are expensive to set up and demand the most extensive preparation. The cost of live exercises can be spread if undertaken by a number of organisations and co-ordinated through the LRF.

5.157. The three types of exercise can be used for single- or multi-agency plans and multi-level plans.

Preparations for an exercise

5.158. During the planning stage for an exercise, it is important to bring in any necessary expertise to the working group. Members of this group should not be players in the exercise and must keep all information confidential. The membership of the planning group will become the exercise-directing team and numbers should be kept relatively small. Wider planning meetings, with attendees from all organisations taking part, can also be used as part of the exercise planning process.

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5.159.   Initial planning meetings should include discussion of the following:

- objective-setting and agreement - these may change in the light of later decisions;
- scope of exercise - will it cover the first few hours or weeks; will it cover all responders or only some; will it cover the recovery phase as determined by the objectives?
- the scenario - get an expert (in-house, if possible) to help on this;
- identify the teams and organisations that will be playing;
- determine who or how many will play from each organisation;
- what type and structure of exercise is suitable again depending on the objectives;
- what accommodation or locations are needed;
- what funding is available; and
- whether players will bring their communications equipment; or be provided with phones; or whether paper and runners are sufficient.

Exercise documentation

5.160.   A large amount of documentation is likely to be needed by the exercise directing team. Most of this will be confidential and may include:

- aims and objectives of the exercise;
- storyline: an overview of everything that will happen in the exercise (similar to the stage director's notes alongside the text of a theatrical play);
- structure and methodology;

      o   text of the initial briefings (for players, observers, umpires);

      o   basic scenario (to be given to players at the start);

      o   overall scenario as it develops over time (for the exercise directing team)

      o   checklist of key points (for the exercise directing team to enable them to note during the play whether the exercise objectives have been met);

      o   scene setting information (for the players, to be sent out in advance);

      o   specific injects or feeds (issued to the players as the scenario unfolds collectively); and

      o   evaluation forms (to be given to the players at the end of the exercise).

5.161.   Generally, the exercise should be ended by the directing staff when they consider that the bulk of the exercise objectives (whether they are for plan verification, training or testing) have been met.

Debrief and evaluation

5.162.   Frequently, the players - who as far as possible should be the individuals and teams likely to be mobilised in the event of a real emergency - are the best judges of whether the procedures 'work' or not. In a plan validation exercise, the main purpose is, therefore, to provide players with the opportunity to carry out the procedures and to offer their comments on whether they are sound or might be improved.

5.163.   The conduct by the exercise director of the 'hot' debrief immediately after the event - and obtaining written assessments later from the key players taking part - deserves pre-planning as much as the exercise itself, so as to get the maximum benefit from what is a time-consuming and costly event. Comments may also be sought from expert observers.

5.164.   Written assessments are useful for the formal debrief some time after the exercise when considered judgments about the lessons identified or learned are offered - and also as source material for the post-exercise report.

5.165.   Frequently, in the debrief, exercise players find it difficult to distinguish between:

o   problems they have encountered with the realism and design of the exercise itself (**exercise mechanics**); and

o   what the exercise has told them about the effectiveness of the plan in delivering its objectives (**plan verification**) or taught them in terms of improved awareness, confidence and competences (**training**).

The exercise director, when running a hot debrief afterwards, should always provide a short, separate slot for players to comment on the exercise mechanics. However, the two evaluations should be kept separate, so as to avoid confusion and time wasting during the crucial plan verification discussion.

Lessons identified and lesson learning

5.166.   A post exercise report should include recommendations for improvement in the plan in question. Preparation of the exercise report draws on the debrief and on written comments from the key players. This should be copied to appropriate senior personnel for their comment at the earliest possible stage.

5.167.   In both multi and single-agency exercises, within 12 months of the exercise, an implementation report should be produced, indicating which of the exercise report's recommendations have been carried out in the form of revisions to procedures in the plans. However, if there is an urgent need to amend plans e.g. after an incident/debrief, this should take place as soon as possible and in consultation with

all stakeholders. This should also be copied to the appropriate senior personnel. A covering letter should highlight where recommendations have not yet been implemented. This is especially important when a failure to implement is the result of cost or resourcing constraints beyond the emergency planner's control. The relative importance of implementing these recommendations should also be highlighted in order to aid any senior personnel decision making processes.

5.168. In single agency exercises, responsibility for monitoring and implementing recommendations rests within the agency. Recommendations from multi-agency exercises should be publicised through the LRF. In London, this can, if appropriate, be delegated to the multi-borough tier or the Borough Resilience Forum. When an implementation report has been produced following a multi-agency exercise, the LRF should, when appropriate, monitor the implementation of those recommendations. If the recommendations have wider relevance, consideration should be given to sharing post-exercise reports, or the relevant extracts of these reports. This can be done through the NRE.

5.169. It is a good idea to publicise good practice in exercising, especially when this has been undertaken in a cost-effective way. This can also be done through the NRE.

Generation of further exercises

5.170. Where an exercise of whatever type indicates that there are problems with the procedures or their execution, further simulations may be held. Perhaps the call-out procedures or the message-recording system need testing further. It is not then necessary to hold a comprehensive exercise. The particular procedure causing difficulties may be isolated and tested, or practiced until it is right.

Plan maintenance procedures and revision

5.171. Plans should be revised if a new risk assessment indicates that the plan is out of date, or a new risk is identified.[57]

5.172. Other factors which may require the revision of plans include:

- o lessons identified (and learned) from experience of emergencies: These might effectively draw attention to new risks not previously identified, or they may demonstrate that better procedures are needed, or that organisations not previously involved need to be brought into the plans. These will need to be brought to the attention of appropriate senior personnel as soon as possible.

- o lessons learned from exercises: The lessons learned from exercises are likely to be similar to those from real events; the difference is that exercises are controlled events, specifically designed to test procedures and they can be repeated again and again until sound arrangements are in place.

- o restructuring and other changes in organisations, their procedures and technical systems identified in the plans. Plans must be adjusted regularly to reflect organisational changes, including restructurings, changed methods of delivery of functions, redefinitions of an organisation's mission and of its role in emergencies, new policies and protocols, and changes in technology and facilities, such as communications equipment or control centres.

- o changes in key personnel: plans - or their supporting annexes [58] - must continually reflect changes in the details of key personnel, including names, job titles and contact arrangements.

[57] s. 2(1)(e)
[58] Many plan writers exclude contact details as far as possible from the planning document and include them in a separate annex for ease of revision.

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5.173.   It is good practice to follow a standard cycle for the revision and reissue of those plans which are in hard copy, as follows:

- o   issuing of corrections to contact details in plans every three months;[59]

- o   review of all plans periodically;

- o   issuing of revised or new plans as soon as practicable; and

- o   where all plans are contained within a single volume or handbook, its comprehensive reissue in a new edition (perhaps once every one to two years).

5.174.   Where plans are maintained and circulated electronically or through the NRE, corrections and changes can, of course, be made as they occur. But the same regular cycle of plan maintenance activities (as outlined above) should be sustained as part of a comprehensive emergency plan review programme. Major revisions should be advertised by a 'publication' announcement to the key personnel, divisions and departments affected. Up-to-date versions of electronic plans should also be kept in hard copy in case of IT failure.

5.175.   Plan maintenance requires systematic procedures for:

- o   recording and amending details of personnel, job titles or ranks, departmental or divisional names, headquarters and contact points of organisations, and so on;

- o   ensuring version control, so that the dates of all amendments of whatever size and extent are clearly identified on each page;

- o   reviewing plan objectives and standards, roles, policies, frameworks;

- o   holding training events, recording who has been trained and how often;

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[59] This procedure does not, of course, require a reissue of the plan itself. Corrections can be inserted directly into web-based versions of the plan or circulated by letter for insertion by the plan copy-holder in hard copy. To make this regular updating task manageable, the onus should lie on key staff and departments named in the plans to inform the plan manager of corrections and other changes to contact details.

- o holding exercises to validate plans, recording lessons learned, and ensuring that lessons learned are acted upon in terms of amendments to plans;

- o maintaining a cycle of exercises to validate plans and ensure preparedness of staff;

- o recording who has attended exercises;

- o noting lessons identified from emergencies and other incidents, and taking action on them;

- o publishing and circulating plans, ensuring that they reach the people who should have them, maintaining records of those who hold them, testing that those who hold them have read them and know what they mean for their role;

- o delivering regular awareness sessions for senior officers, key partners, elected members and so on;

- o liaising with all partners continually and consistently to maintain awareness and ensure the continued relevance of the plans as organisations change; and

- o keeping track of developments nationally and locally.

5.176. For an example of a plan maintenance matrix, see *Annex 5D*.

Powers of direction

5.177. There are circumstances during emergencies, or when they appear imminent, when consistent, decisive action is necessary. The response required might fall outside existing planning frameworks; Category 1 and 2 responders might lack the information or advice to deal with it effectively; or it may not be apparent to these responders how best to deal with the situation.

5.178. Section 7, of the Act is designed to enable action to be taken by a Minister of the Crown in cases of urgency where there is insufficient time to make legislation. It is an exceptional power designed to ensure that in cases of real urgency the Government can arrange for coherent, effective action to be taken at the local level.

5.179. The Act enables [60] a Minister to issue a direction containing any provision that could be made by secondary legislation under sections 5 and 6 of the Act, to responders or a class of responders.

Box 5.10: Urgent directions in practice

Emergencies are by their nature often unpredictable. But the breadth of the existing obligations under the Act is such that effective generic planning should be in place to deal with most emergencies.

If a threat or risk did arise which appeared to fall outside existing planning work, it might nevertheless be necessary to take rapid remedial action to fill a gap in capability.

For example, a very large-scale emergency in another part of the world might generate large flows of refugees, some of whom might end up in the UK. The arrivals would not be immediate – perhaps weeks away – but Category 1 responders might need to be instructed rapidly to acquire new equipment or take action to meet specific requirements. The direction power would allow the Government to ensure coherence of action and ensure a rapid step change in capability.

In practice, the Government would be unlikely to exercise urgent direction powers in a unilateral way. The Government maintains close links with those organisations

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> which represent local responders, and that close working would strengthen if a new and difficult situation arose. The Government would be likely to develop the directions rapidly, working with representative bodies to produce workable proposals. It would not be in the Government's interest to adopt a non-consultative approach, not least because of the need to ensure directions made a rapid, practical difference to preparedness.

5.180.   An urgent direction must be in writing, though it could of course arrive by fax or e-mail. The Minister must revoke his direction as soon as is reasonably practicable (which will be, at the latest, as soon as it is possible to legislate). Even if not revoked, a direction will lapse 21 days after it has been made.

5.181.   A Minister may also require a person to perform a function in relation to an emergency.[61] For example, the Minister could require responders to purchase a particular range of interoperable equipment (subject to appropriate funding being in place). This power is only exercisable if both Houses of Parliament have approved the order.

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Annex 5A:

Examples of generic and specific plans

Plan category	Type of plan or planning procedure	Multilevel
Generic	Emergency or major incident	
Generic capability or procedure	Access to resources	
	Control centre operating procedures	
	Determination of an emergency	
	Disaster appeal fund	
	Emergency interpretation service	
	Emergency press and media team	
	Emergency radio and mobile communications	
	Evacuation: minor, major, mass	√
	Expenditure procedures during an emergency	
	External disasters (outside Local Resilience Forum boundary	
	Mass fatalities	√
	Recovery	
	Rest centres	
	Secondary control centre	
	Site clearance	
	Emergency mortuary and body holding areas	
	Use of voluntary organisations by different Category 1 responders	
	Warning, informing and advising the public, including public information team	√
	Crisis support team	
Specific hazard or contingency	Aircraft accident	
	Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear	
	Chemical hazards	
	Coastal pollution	√
	Dam or reservoir failure	√
	Downstream oil	√
	Environmental health emergencies	
	Failure of major utilities: electricity, gas, telephone, water	
	Foot-and-mouth disease	√
	Influenza pandemic	√
	Prolonged freezing weather	
	Rabies	√
	Rail crash	
	Refugees	√
	River and coastal flooding (general)	√

Plan category	Type of plan or planning procedure	Multilevel
	Schools emergencies	
	Severe weather	
	Smallpox	√
Specific site or location	Airport	
	City or town centre evacuation	
	City or town centre severe weather disruption	
	Methane migration	
	Multi-storey block	
	Non-COMAH industrial sites	
	Nuclear power station	
	Public event temporary venue	
	Road tunnel	
	Shopping centre	
	Specific flooding sites	
	Sports ground	

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Annex 5B:

Generic plan: emergency or major incident

The minimum level of information to be contained in a generic plan

Tick [√]	Generic plan[1]
	Aim of the plan, including links with plans of other responders
	Trigger for activation of the plan, including alert and standby procedures
	Activation procedures [2]
	Identification and generic roles of emergency management team
	Identification and generic roles of emergency support staff
	Location of emergency control centre from which emergency will be managed
	Generic roles of all parts of the organisation in relation to responding to emergencies
	Complementary generic arrangements of other responders
	Stand-down procedures
	Annex: contact details of key personnel
	Annex: reference to Community Risk Register and other relevant information
	Plan maintenance procedures
	Plan validation (exercises) schedule [3]
	Training schedule [4]

[1] regulation 21(b)
[2] regulation 24
[3] regulation 25(a)
[4] regulation 25(b)

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Annex 5C:
Specific Plan

The minimum level of information to be contained in a specific plan

Tick [√]	Specific plan[1]
	Aim of the plan, including links with the plans of other responders
	Information about the specific hazard or contingency or site for which the plan has been prepared
	Trigger for activation of the plan, including alert and standby procedures
	Activation procedures [2]
	Identification and roles of multi-agency strategic (gold) and tactical (silver) teams
	Identification of lead responsibilities of different responder organisations at different stages of the response
	Identification of roles of each responder organisation
	Location of joint operations centre from which emergency will be managed
	Stand-down procedures
	Annex: contact details of key personnel and partner agencies
	Plan maintenance procedures
	Plan validation (exercises) schedule [3]
	Training schedule [4]

[1] regulation 21(a)
[2] regulation 24
[3] regulation 25(a)
[4] regulation 25(b)

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Annex 5D:

Example of a plan maintenance matrix for a local authority

Cycle of actions to maintain emergency plans

	1. Update and issue call-out lists (quarterly)	2. Visit key officers in departments	3. Check resource lists for departments	4. Integrate all plans with those of emergency services	5. Visit all external bodies listed in plans	6. Brief key officers within council and outside	7. Hold exercises to test plans and improve them	8. Review all plans and revise as necessary
Generic emergency plan	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Generic capabilities								
Emergency management team	√			√		√	√	√
Central control team	√	√	√	√		√	√	√
Forward communications team	√	√	√	√		√	√	√
Public information team	√	√	√	√		√	√	√
Facilities set-up team	√		√			√	√	√
Access to resources		√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Crisis support team	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Hospitals support	√	√		√	√	√	√	√
Emergency mortuary	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Major evacuation	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Rest centre	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Disaster appeal fund	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Specific plans								
Cold weather	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Environmental health	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
River flooding	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Severe weather	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√

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Cabinet Office

Chapter 6 Business Continuity Management

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 6 (Business Continuity Management) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency so far as is reasonably practicable. The duty relates to all functions, not just their emergency response functions (*paragraphs 6.1 – 6.13*).

- Category 1 responders must have regard to assessments of both internal and external risks when developing and reviewing business continuity plans (BCPs) (*paragraphs 6.14 - 6.16*).

- Business continuity plans may take the form of generic plans - which set out the core of a Category 1 responder's response to any BCM event - or specific plans dealing with particular risks, sites or services (*paragraphs 6.17 - 6.19*).

- There must be a clear procedure for invoking the business continuity plan (*paragraphs 6.20*).

- BCPs must include arrangements for exercises for the purpose of ensuring the plan is effective, and arrangements for the provision of training to those involved in implementing the plan. Plans must be reviewed and kept up to date (*paragraphs 6.21 - 6.28*).

- Category 1 responders are required to publish aspects of their BCPs insofar as making this information available is necessary or desirable for the purposes of dealing with emergencies (*paragraph 6.29 - 6.31*).

- The British Standard for Business Continuity (BS25999) is widely acknowledged as industry best practice. It provides a generic framework that is applicable across the public, private and voluntary sectors. (*paragraphs 6.43 - 6.107*).

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

Scope of the duty

6.1. The Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to perform their functions in the event of an emergency, so far as is reasonably practicable.[1]

6.2. The duty to maintain plans relates to all the functions of a Category 1 responder, not just its civil protection functions. For Category 1 responders to help others in the event of an emergency, they first need to be able to keep their own crisis response capabilities going. However, Category 1 responders also need to be able to continue to deliver critical aspects of their day-to-day functions (e.g. law enforcement, looking after vulnerable people, attending minor fires) in the event of an emergency, if the impact on the community is to be kept to a minimum.

[1] s.2(1)(c)

6.3.   It may, therefore, be helpful to think of the business continuity management (BCM) duty in the Act as being separated into two strands. In practice, the Act requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can:

- o   continue to exercise their civil protection functions: The legislation requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to deal with emergencies (see Chapter 5) and put in place arrangements to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency (see Chapter 7). The BCM duty requires Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can deliver these capabilities when they are required.

- o   continue to perform their ordinary functions: Category 1 responders perform a range of functions that are important to the human welfare and security of the community and its environment (e.g. provision of health care, detection of crime, fighting fires). This is particularly true in an emergency situation, where operational demands often increase and the operating environment can become more challenging. The legislation requires Category 1 responders to make provision for ensuring that their ordinary functions can be continued to the extent required.

6.4.   Organisations should not only look at the resilience of internal structures and processes, but also those of organisations they rely on, or deliver services through.

6.5.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to put in place plans to ensure that they can continue their functions in the event of an emergency.[2] This requires them to ensure that those organisations delivering services on their behalf (e.g. contracted-out services) or capabilities which underpin service provision (e.g. information technology and telecommunications providers) can deliver to the extent required in the event of an emergency. This is because services remain part

[2] s.2(1)(c)

of an organisation's functions even if they do not directly provide them.

Limits of the duty

Definition of emergency

6.6.   BCM is a flexible framework designed to help organisations to continue operating in the face of a wide range of different types of disruptions right the way along the spectrum of severity. BCM does not however embrace all dimensions of an organisation's resilience, and one important distinction is between BCM and crisis management. The Publicly Available Specification on Crisis Management (PAS200) identifies crisis management as wider ranging and inherently strategic in nature. BCM in turn is a more operationally-focused activity to ensure that service disruptions are managed, potentially cascading impacts are mitigated and services are maintained. For further details and for guidance on developing a crisis management capability see http://epcollege.com/epc/news/pas200-crisis-management---new-guidance-for-crisis/ (including link to the BSI website).

6.7.   The BCM duty, however, is determined by the definition of emergency in the Act. The Act therefore imposes a duty on Category 1 responders to put in place plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of a much narrower range of disruptive challenges.[3]

6.8.   The duty applies only to those events or situations defined as an emergency in section 1 of the Act - events or situations that threaten serious damage to the human welfare, environment or security of a place in the United Kingdom. This should be read in conjunction with section 2(2) of the Act, which provides that an event or situation is only an emergency when it overwhelms existing response arrangements, and cannot be dealt with within existing resources or procedures (see Chapter 1 for an in-depth description of the definition of "emergency" underpinning Part 1 of the Act).

[3] s.2(1)(c) and s.2(2)

6.9.   While the duty focuses on the most challenging situations, it is likely that plans put in place to fulfil their duty under the Act will help Category 1 responders to prepare for a much wider range of day-to-day (i.e. non-emergency) interruptions. By putting in place plans to keep themselves going in the event of an emergency, Category 1 responders will build resilience to a wider range of less serious events.

Practicability

6.10.   Ideally, Category 1 responders would be able to continue all of their functions at ordinary service levels in the event of an emergency. In practice, this may not prove possible, and therefore the duty is qualified.

6.11.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to put in place arrangements to ensure that they continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency so far as is reasonably practicable.[4]

6.12.   The qualification "so far as is reasonably practicable" has three elements to it:

> o   **Criticality:** Category 1 responders should focus on ensuring that they can deliver critical functions. Which of its functions are critical is a matter that can be determined only by the organisation itself, and may depend on the nature of the emergency in question. Category 1 responders should not lose sight of the common supporting infrastructure underpinning these functions. The following guiding principles should be used when deciding whether or not a service or activity is critical. It is not intended to be a definitive list, but rather a series of useful indicators:

[4] s.2(1)(c)

- **Emergency management/civil protection:** Functions that underpin the Category 1 responder's capability to respond to the emergency itself, and take effective action to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the emergency.

- **Impact on human welfare, the environment and security:** The significance of services to the effective functioning of the community in the event of an emergency, or an adverse effect on the environment.

- **Legal implications:** Statutory requirements on Category 1 responders and the threat of litigation if a service is not delivered, or is delivered inadequately.

- **Financial implications:** Loss of revenue and payment of compensation.

- **Reputation:** Functions that impact on the credibility and public perception of a Category 1 responder.

o **Service levels:** The Act does not require Category 1 responders to continue to deliver their functions at ordinary levels in the event of an emergency. Some critical functions may need to be scaled up, while others (which are non-critical) may need to be scaled down or suspended. Acceptable levels of service in the event of an emergency are a matter for the Category 1 responder itself to determine in the light of its capabilities, constraints and the needs of the community.

o **Balance of investments:** No organisation will be in a position to commit unlimited resources to BCM. It is the role of the Category 1 responder itself to decide the level of protection sought.

6.13.   Category 1 responders must therefore put in place a process for effectively managing the prioritisation of services - and getting high-level endorsement for these decisions - prior to an emergency occurring. The business impact analysis (BIA) process described later in this chapter gives a methodology for undertaking this work.

Risk assessment

6.14.   It is important that Category 1 responders identify the significant risks threatening the performance of critical functions in the event of an emergency or disruption, as this will enable them to focus resources in the right areas, and develop appropriate continuity strategies.[5]

6.15.   In this context, there are two strands to risk assessment, relating to external threats (i.e. risk of an emergency occurring) and internal risks (i.e. business risks) that could cause loss or disruption of critical services required to control, reduce or mitigate the effects of an emergency or disruption.

6.16.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to identify and assess significant risks of an emergency occurring in their area[6] - in accordance with their particular functions - as a basis for performing their other civil protection duties (see Chapter 4). The Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to assessments of risk maintained pursuant to the Act when developing BCPs.[7] The Act requires Category 1 responders to consider whether a risk assessment makes it necessary or desirable to review a BCP.[8] It is good practice, in any instance, to review BCPs in conjunction with risk registers and vice versa.

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5 regulation 21
6 s.2(1)(a)
7 regulation 19
8 s.2(1)(e)

Generic and specific plans

6.17.   As with emergency plans, the Regulations provide that Category 1 responders may use generic plans, specific plans, or a combination of the two in business continuity planning. A generic plan is a core plan which enables a Category 1 responder to respond to a wide range of possible impacts, setting out the common elements of the response to these (e.g. invocation procedure, command and control, access to financial resources).

6.18.   Specific plans may be required in relation to specific risks, sites or services. Specific plans provide a detailed set of arrangements designed to go beyond the generic arrangements when these are unlikely to prove sufficient.

6.19.   Specific plans will usually operate within the framework established by the generic plan. It is a matter for Category 1 responders themselves to decide - in the light of assessments of risk - what, if any, specific plans are required.

Plan invocation

6.20.   The Regulations specifically require Category 1 responders to establish a procedure for determining when an emergency has occurred which affects its ability to continue to perform its functions.[9] In other words, there must be a clear procedure for invoking the plan. Where continuity of critical functions is threatened in the event of an emergency, there should be a clearly laid out escalation procedure. This should be identified, agreed and documented within the plan. The Regulations specifically require this procedure to:

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[9] regulation 24

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- o identify the person who should determine whether such an emergency has occurred;

- o specify the procedure that person should adopt in taking that decision;

- o specify the persons who should be consulted before such a decision is taken; and

- o specify the persons who should be informed once a decision has been taken.

Exercising BCPs

6.21.   Exercises provide demonstrable evidence of a business continuity and incident management competence and capability. A BCP cannot be considered reliable until it is exercised and has proved to be workable. As part of the BC process there is a continual need to prove plans and strategies by testing. No matter how well designed and thought-out a BCM strategy or BCP appears to be, a series of robust and realistic exercises will identify areas that require amendment.

6.22.   The Regulations require Category 1 responders to put in place arrangements for exercising BCPs in order to ensure that they are effective.[10] These arrangements should encompass the three principal purposes of exercising:

- o **validating plans** - to verify that the plan works;

- o **rehearsing key staff** - to familiarise key staff with what is expected of them in a crisis and preparing them for crisis conditions; and

- o **testing systems** - to ensure that systems relied upon to deliver resilience (e.g. uninterrupted power supply) function correctly and offer the degree of protection expected.

[10] regulation 25(a)

6.23.   As a simple rule, if it has not been tested it does not work. Exercising must be maintained to hold credibility and encourage ownership across the organisation. Tests should build on the organisation's past experience. The exercising programme should be flexible, and the focus and frequency of exercises should be responsive to:

- o   **the rate of change** - where the pace of change (e.g. to the organisation or risk profile) is particularly rapid, exercises may need to be more frequent; and

- o   **outcomes of previous exercises** - the identification of particular weaknesses and subsequent changes to plans may necessitate further exercising.

Training key staff

6.24.   It is important to ensure that relevant people across the Category 1 responder - and in other organisations where appropriate - are confident and competent concerning the plan. It is particularly important that staff receive appropriate training prior to exercising. This will ensure that they are adequately prepared for what can be a challenging experience.

6.25.   The Regulations require Category 1 responders to put in place a training programme for those directly involved in the execution of the BCP should it be invoked.[11] This should be reflected in plans. This should cover:

- o   **the contents of the plan** - how is the plan invoked? What are the key decision-making processes? Who else needs to be involved?

[11] regulation 25(b)

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    o   **their role in implementing the plan** - what is expected of them? How do they fit into the wider picture?

    o   **key skills and knowledge required in crisis response.**

Reviewing and maintaining BCPs

6.26.   The Act specifically requires Category 1 responders to maintain business continuity plans to ensure that they can continue to deliver key services in the event of an emergency.[12] This means that Category 1 responders must not only put plans in place, but ensure that they are reviewed and kept up to date.

6.27.   Category 1 responders exist in a dynamic environment - organisations themselves and the environment they operate in are subject to change. BCPs need to be reviewed and updated to ensure that they remain valid. The following aspects of plans should be reviewed:

    o   **personnel** - staff turnover means that contact details will need constant updating;

    o   **the responsibilities of the Category 1 responder** - where a Category 1 responder takes on new functions or delivers new services, this should be reflected;

    o   **organisational structures** - where responders have experienced restructuring this may need to be reflected in plans;

    o   **suppliers or contractors** - ensuring that the details of suppliers and contractors are kept up to date;

    o   **risk assessments** - the Act requires Category 1 responders to review plans in the light of changes to risk assessments;[13] and

    o   **business objectives/processes.**

[12] s.2(1)(c)
[13] s.2(1)(e)

6.28. The frequency of plan review will depend on the rate of change within the organisation and the environment it operates within. Plan maintenance should take place on an ongoing basis, but all business continuity plans should be comprehensively reviewed at appropriate intervals.

Publication of BCPs

6.29. Communication with customers or service users - who may need information about service continuity in the event of an emergency - is important to community resilience. Emergencies cause serious disruption to people's lives and increase reliance on public sector bodies - provision of information about what they can and cannot expect from Category 1 responders in the event of an emergency, may help to minimise this disruption.

6.30. The Act requires the publication of aspects of BCM plans in so far as this is necessary or desirable for the purposes of preventing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency or otherwise responding to the emergency.[14]

6.31. Category 1 responders need only publish information where there is a positive benefit in doing so. For example, a Category 1 responder need not publish internal management information which would be of little relevance or interest to the public. Furthermore, the Regulations prohibit the publication of sensitive information (e.g. commercially confidential information, personal data) where consent has not been received from the originator of the information, or where the public interest in disclosure fails to outweigh the interests of the organisation or individual concerned.

[14] s.2(1)(f)

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Box 6.0: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter is further advice about BCM and information that is not supported directly by the Act, but responders may find it useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

How the Act and Regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

6.32.   The Act and the Regulations apply in Scotland to bodies outside devolved competence in the same way as they apply in England.

6.33.   The Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers make provision as to how Category 1 responders in Scotland that fall within devolved competence, should exercise their duty under the Act to maintain business continuity plans.

Wales

6.34.   The Act and the Regulations apply in Wales in the same way as they apply in England.

Northern Ireland

6.35.   The Act and the Regulations apply to Category 1 responders exercising functions in Northern Ireland in the same way as they apply in England, but see information in Chapter 12 in relation to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

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HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

6.36. This section provides practical guidance on taking forward a BCM programme within a Category 1 responder organisation. It describes the discipline of BCM and outlines a methodology for implementing it. Category 1 responders must have regard to this material and may find it useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. While the Government considers this to be a sound approach, Category 1 responders may use other models to deliver statutory requirements where there are compelling reasons for doing so.

6.37. The Government is keen to give Category 1 responders the flexibility to make the best use of the resources and expertise available to them. The Regulations permit Category 1 responders to enter into collaborative arrangements in order to fulfil the BCM duty.[15] Category 1 responders may:

- o deliver the duty separately;
- o deliver the duty jointly (e.g. by forming a joint BCM unit or resource);
- o agree that one Category 1 responder will facilitate the delivery of a BCM programme on behalf of a number of other Category 1 responders; or
- o enter into collaborative arrangements in which one or more Category 1 responder gives assistance to others in fulfilling their BCM duties (e.g. managing the overarching programme, developing framework plans).

[15] regulations 8 and 9

6.38. However, BCM must be owned and driven within the organisation itself - and engage the expertise and resources of its staff - in order to be effective. While collaborative arrangements can be used to make use of BCM expertise or resources in other Category 1 responders, responsibility for the robustness of BCM arrangements must remain within the organisation.

What is business continuity and business continuity management?

6.39. Business continuity[16] is the strategic and tactical capability of the organisation to plan for and respond to incidents and business disruptions in order to continue business operations at an acceptable predefined level.

6.40. Business continuity management provides the strategic framework for improving an organisation's resilience to interruption. Its purpose is to facilitate the recovery of key business systems and processes within agreed time frames, while maintaining the delivery of the Category 1 responder's identified critical functions. It assists organisations to anticipate, prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disruptions, whatever their source and whatever aspect of the business they affect.

6.41. BCM is a holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realised, might cause. It also provides a framework for building organisational resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and core business activities. Business continuity management involves managing the recovery or continuation of activities in the event of a disruption, and management of the overall programme through training, exercises and reviews, to ensure business continuity plans stay current and up-to-date.

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[16] BS25999 definition of business continuity

6.42.   BCM is valid across the public, private and voluntary sectors. It is about maintaining the essential business deliverables of an organisation in an emergency. The primary 'business' of private sector organisations is the generation of profit, a process that BCM seeks to protect. Category 1 responders provide services to the public, and it is equally important that these are protected and resilient.

BCM methodology

6.43.   The British Standard for business continuity (BS25999) works on a six-stage process widely acknowledged as best practice. This model provides a generic framework that is applicable across the public, private and voluntary sectors. This standard, or its equivalent in the water industry, the Security and Emergency Measures Direction (SEMD), provide a good basis for BCM.

6.44.   Figure 6.1 illustrates this approach. The rest of the chapter describes this process, and supports Category 1 responders in using this framework to fulfil their duties under the Act.

Figure 6.1: The business continuity management lifecycle

BS 25999-1:2006 BRITISH STANDARD business continuity management Part 1: Code of Practice [17]

[17] Permission to reproduce extracts from BS25999 is granted by BSI. British Standards can be obtained in PDF or hard copy formats from the BSI online shop: www.bsigroup.com/Shop or by contacting BSI Customer Services for hardcopies only: Tel: +44 (0)20 8996 9001, Email: cservices@bsigroup.com.

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6.45.   As Figure 6.1 shows, the six stages of the process are:

- o   **Stage 1: BCM programme management:** Programme management is at the heart of the process. It requires the participation of senior management and establishes the organisation's approach to business continuity.

- o   **Stage 2: Understanding the organisation:** This element assists in the understanding of the organisation through the identification of its key products and services and the critical activities and resources that support them. This element ensures that the BCM programme is aligned to the organisation's objectives, obligations and statutory duties.

- o   **Stage 3:** Determining business continuity strategy: This element allows the organisation to select its strategies in order to meet its objectives.

- o   **Stage 4:** Developing and implementing a BCM response: This stage looks at the need for Category 1 responders to develop and implement plans and arrangements to ensure continuity of critical activities, and the management of an incident.

- o   **Stage 5:** Exercising, maintaining and reviewing BCM arrangements: An organisation's arrangements cannot be considered reliable until exercised. This element ensures that an organisation's BCM arrangements are validated by exercise and review and that they are kept up-to-date.

- o   **Stage 6:** Embedding BCM in the organisation's culture: Business continuity must become part of the way an organisation is managed to be effective. This stage provides the overarching element that ensures that opportunities are used at the various stages of the BCM process.

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Delivering BCM arrangements

Stage 1: BCM programme management

6.46.   In order to be successful, BCM must be regarded as an integral part of a Category 1 responder's normal management processes.

6.47.   Achieving top-level buy-in is vital to developing robust BCM arrangements. Engaging senior officers is crucial to the success of any major programme because of the influence they have over resource allocation and the culture of an organisation. However, the commitment of the top level is particularly important in relation to BCM because:

- o   it requires the leverage they exert across the organisation in order to be effective;
- o   it requires decisions about attitudes to risk and service prioritisation that can only be taken at the top level; and
- o   the top team is responsible for ensuring that effective governance arrangements are in place.

Leadership

6.48.   Experience has shown that there is merit in giving a member of the executive management board overall responsibility for the BCM process by being appointed as the champion within the organisation. This will ensure that the profile of BCM issues is increased and decisions are made at the appropriate level.

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6.49.   BCM is an ongoing process and it is important to gain the support and endorsement of the board at the end of each stage of the cycle. Critically, it should be the responsibility of senior management to provide the assurance that BCM arrangements are robust and meet the requirements of the Act.

BCM co-ordinator

6.50.   Governance is about accountability, responsibility and control. A person with the appropriate seniority and authority should be identified as accountable for BCM policy, implementation and operation.

6.51.   Implementation planning should include arranging appropriate training for staff and exercising the capability; this stage is best carried out using a project management method to ensure that the implementation is effectively managed.

6.52.   Ongoing management of your BCM arrangements will contribute to business continuity becoming embedded within the organisation. Regular review, exercise and updating plans will ensure this happens. A review must take place of arrangements after change in the organisation; such as operating procedures, environment personnel, technology, and after an incident or exercise. If the change is significant to the organisation then a review of the Business Impact Analysis is also advised.

Stage 2: Understanding the organisation

6.53.   An accurate assessment of the Category 1 responder's organisation and its business is critical, as it will provide the basis upon which all subsequent BCM policies and processes are based.

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6.54.   An understanding of the organisation comes from:

- o   the organisation's objectives, obligations, statutory duties and operating environment;
- o   the activities, assets and resources that support the delivery of key products and services;
- o   assessing the impact and consequences of failure of these activities; and
- o   identifying and evaluating the threats that could disrupt these.

6.55.   Category 1 responders should carry out a business impact analysis that assesses over time the impacts if the activity was disrupted; and establish the maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPD) of each. MTPDs can be worked out by looking at the:

- o   time period after disruption that the activity must be resumed;
- o   minimum level needed upon resumption; and
- o   time period for achieving normal levels of operation.

Key to this is identifying interdependencies (assets, infrastructure, and resources) to be maintained.

6.56.   Category 1 responders should consider the following when assessing impacts:

- o   the impact on staff or public wellbeing;
- o   the impact of damage to, or loss of, premises, technology or information;
- o   the impact of breaches of statutory duties or regulatory requirements;

- o   reputation damage;

- o   damage to financial viability;

- o   deterioration of product or service quality; environmental damage; and

- o   external services and suppliers.

Category 1 responders should document this process (approach, findings and conclusions).

6.57.   Identification of critical activities is essential to prioritise the areas that need to be focused on. In basic terms, an organisation's critical activities are those that would have the greatest impact in the shortest time.

6.58.   Risk assessment is vital in evaluating threats, and risk should be understood in respect of the organisation's critical activities. By utilising recognised risk techniques, a scoring can be achieved. Guidance on conducting risk assessments can be found in Chapter 4 of this guidance. Annex 4F sets out a risk matrix that can be used to score impacts.

6.59.   Having identified those areas where the Category 1 responder is most at risk, a decision has to be made as to what approach is to be taken to protect the operation. This decision along with a documented list of key products and services, the business impact analysis and the risk assessment should be signed off by top management to ensure that the work is a true reflection of the organisation.

6.60.   As Annex 4F explains, the nature of the risk - defined in terms of its likelihood and impact - will determine which business continuity strategy is appropriate and what, if any, action is required. At one end of the spectrum, disruptions that are low likelihood and low impact may require no specific action, and may merely be dealt with through generic arrangements. Risks that are high impact and high probability, on the other hand, may point to the development of specific plans and risk mitigation strategies.

6.61.   A number of the strategies that could be adopted are given below:

- o   **do nothing** - in some instances top-level management may consider the risk to be acceptable;

- o   **change, transfer or end the process** - such decisions to alter business process must be taken with regard to the organisation's key objectives and statutory responsibilities;

- o   **insure** - may provide some financial recompense or support but will not aid the organisation's response and will not meet all losses (e.g. reputation and other non-financial impacts, human consequences);

- o   **mitigate loss** - tangible procedures to eliminate or reduce risk within the business; and

- o   **plan for business continuity** - an approach that seeks to improve the Category 1 and 2 responders' resilience to interruption, allowing for the recovery of key business and systems processes within the recovery time frame objective, while maintaining their critical functions.

6.62.   Any strategy must recognise the internal and external dependencies of the organisation and must have general acceptance by the management functions involved. The continuity strategies adopted here will shape the ability of a Category 1 responder to perform its critical functions in the event of an emergency, and it is important that these decisions are taken by the appropriate officers in the full light of the facts.

6.63.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to assess the risk of emergencies occurring ("emergency risk assessment") and use these assessments to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning (see Chapter 4).[18] The development of community risk registers will mean that Category 1 responders have access to up-to-date information about risks in their area. Contingencies that seriously disrupt the activities of the community may also limit the ability to respond to them effectively.

Stage 3: Determining business continuity strategy

6.64.   Category 1 responders should look at strategic options for its critical activities, while bearing in mind the most appropriate strategy will depend on factors such as: the maximum tolerable period of disruption, cost, and consequences of inaction.

6.65.   Strategies should be considered for the following areas:

- o   **people** - e.g. multi-skill training; separation of core skills; use of third parties; succession planning; and knowledge retention and management;

- o   **premises** - e.g. alternative premises/locations; working from home and remote sites;

- o   **technology** - e.g. geographical spread; holding emergency

[18] s.2(1)(a),(b) and (e)

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replacement, such as old equipment and spares, additional risk mitigation for unique or long lead-time equipment; remote access; third-party;

- o **information** - e.g. confidentiality; integrity; availability; and currency;

- o **supplies** - e.g.: storage of contingency stock at additional location; third part arrangements; assessing the BC capability of your suppliers; dual sourcing and; contractual and service level agreements; and

- o **stakeholders** - e.g. protect the interests of key suppliers and good relationship management.

6.66.   Senior managers should sign off documented strategies.

Stage 4: Developing and implementing a BCM response

6.67.   Business continuity planning is at the heart of the BCM process. The business continuity plans provide the framework in which the Category 1 responder mobilises its response to a BCM challenge in the event of an emergency. Plans normally consist of an Incident Management Plan, a Business Continuity Plan and a Business Recovery Plan.

6.68.   In developing all plans, consideration should be given to:

- o **keeping it short, simple and user-friendly** - it will need to be read and understood in challenging and pressured circumstances;

- o **ensuring the assumptions contained are realistic** – e.g. numbers of staff directly affected by the incident, the effect of the 'backlog trap' (i.e. the impact of the accumulation of tasks left uncompleted on recovery);

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- o **references to other sources of information and supporting documentation** – e.g. guidance, databases, lists of key contacts, resources and suppliers;

- o **action plans and checklists** – what should be provided

- o **ownership of key tasks** - these should be reflected in job descriptions;

- o **pro-formas** - giving templates and model documentation;

- o **version control** - the need to implement document management procedures, including a list of all plan holders, which has to be maintained, together with a distribution and change control process; and

- o **communications** - effective communication with stakeholders and, where appropriate, the media is crucial to an effective response

6.69.   The structure, content and detail of the BCPs will depend on the nature of the Category 1 responder, the risk and the environment in which it operates. In particularly large or complex organisations, it may be necessary to have departmental plans which integrate into one high-level plan. Further advice on plan presentation can be found in Chapter 5.

6.70.   The method by which an incident management, business continuity or business recovery plan is invoked should be clearly documented. As part of this, the individual(s) that have the authority to invoke them should be recorded along with: how to mobilise the team(s); rendezvous points; and command centre locations.

6.71.   Each incident management plan, business continuity plan and business recovery plan should set out prioritised objectives in terms of: the critical activities to be recovered; the timescales in which they are to be recovered; and the recovery levels for each critical activity.

6.72.   The purpose of a business continuity plan is to enable an organisation to recover or maintain its activities in the event of disruption. Invocation supports the critical activities of an organisation; plans may be invoked in whole or part and at any stage.

6.73.   **An Incident Management Plan** is a clearly defined and documented plan-of-action for use at the time of an incident. It should typically cover: task and action lists; emergency contacts; people activities; media response; stakeholder management; and locations. Other useful information to consider: contacts; mobilisation details for relevant agencies; log templates; maps, charts, plans and photographs.

6.74.   **A Business Continuity Plan** will typically contain: action plans and task lists, for example: how the BCP is invoked, who is responsible, the procedure, who does what when and where, services available, communications; resource requirements, for example: people, premises, technology, information and supplies; responsible person(s) and; forms, templates and annexes.

6.75.   **A Business Recovery Plan** aims to support the recovery and resumption of operations to a "normal" state. However, with some incidents it may not be possible to define what "normal" looks like until some time after an incident. Category 1 responders might, therefore, wish to ensure that BCPs are capable of extended operation, giving time for the development of recovery plans.

6.76.   The below diagram provides an illustration of how these three sorts of plan will come into play during a disruption.

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Figure 6.2: Incident Timeline

BS 25999:2006 BRITISH STANDARD Business Continuity Management Part 1: Code of Practice [19]

Stage 5: Exercising, maintaining and reviewing BCM arrangements

6.77.   The Regulations require Category 1 responders to put in place arrangements to exercise BCPs to ensure they are effective.[20] An organisation's business continuity and incident management arrangements cannot be considered reliable until exercised.   Exercising is essential to developing teamwork, competence, confidence and knowledge, which is vital at the time of an incident. Arrangements should be verified through exercising, and a process of audit and self-assessment, to ensure that they are fit for purpose.

6.78.   When developing a BCM exercise programme, Category 1 responders will need to consider the:

- o   **focus** of the programme;
- o   **types** of exercise to be used

- o **involvement of senior management** in developing, executing and quality-assuring the programme;

- o **process** for delivering exercises; and

- o **relationship** between the BCM exercise programme and the exercising of emergency plans.

6.79.   Exercises should focus on impacts and test capabilities. While there is an infinite number of scenarios and possible responses, the list of impacts and capabilities is limited.

Figure 6.3: Types and Methods of Exercising BCM Strategies [21]

| Complexity	Exercise	Process	Variants	Good Practice Frequency [1]
Simple	Desk check	Review/ amendment of content Challenge content of BCP	Update/validation Audit/verification	At least annually Annually
Medium	Walk-through of plan Simulation Exercise critical activities	Challenge content of BCP Use 'artificial' situation to validate that the BCP(s) contain both necessary and sufficient information to enable a successful recovery Invocation in a controlled situation that does not jeopardise business as usual operation	Include interaction and validate participants' roles Incorporate associated plans Defined operations from alternative site for a fixed time	Annually Annually or twice yearly Annually or less

[21] Regulation 4(4)(b), 4(7)

Complexity	Exercise	Process	Variants	Good Practice Frequency
Complex	Exercise full BCP including incident management	Building-/ campus-/ exclusion zone-wide exercise		Annually or less
The frequency of exercises should depend upon both the organisation's needs, the environment in which it operates, and stakeholder requirements. However, the exercising programme should be flexible, taking into account the rate of change within the organisation and the outcome of previous exercises. The above exercise methods can be employed for individual plan components, and single and multiple plans.				

6.80. Exercising can take various forms, from a test of the communications plan, a desk-top walk-through, to a live exercise (See Figure 6.3 above). In all cases though, exercises should be realistic, carefully planned, and agreed with stakeholders, so that there is a minimum risk of disruption to business processes.

6.81. The exercise programme should have the full support of the executive lead for business continuity issues. But the involvement of senior management should not be limited to defining the structure of the programme. In addition to taking part in exercises, senior management should be involved in quality-assuring the exercise programme and endorsing the outcomes.

6.82.   Figure 6.4 suggests a process for carrying out an exercise programme. Exercising is not about 'passing' or 'failing', it is all about learning lessons. There should be a debrief after each exercise in order to capture the experience of all the participants. What is important is that the captured data is recorded and considered as part of the post-exercise analysis.

Figure 6.4: Exercising your BCP – the learning cycle

6.83.   Every exercise should have clearly defined aims and objectives.   A post-exercise debriefing and analysis should be undertaken which considers the achievement against these.

6.84.   The post-exercise analysis is usually undertaken individually by the exercise manager or as a meeting of the exercise-planning group. A post-exercise report should be produced that contains recommendations and a timetable for implementation.

6.85.   This report must be submitted to the executive lead for business continuity within the Category 1 responder organisation for approval of the recommendations.

6.86.   Once approval has been obtained, the changes to the BCP can be implemented. This should drive changes to the BCM and will be tested as part of any future exercising programme by the business continuity managers. This process provides the audit trail of BCP maintenance and testing.

6.87.   When exercising a specific part of a plan it may be more appropriate for the output to be a simple memorandum detailing the part tested. For example, for a call-out cascade exercise that tests the contacts listed within the plan for activation, a memo to the organisation's executive lead for business continuity that the test took place, was completed satisfactorily, and that all the contacts listed in the BCP are correct, would be sufficient to create the audit trail of that aspect of plan testing.

6.88.   It is important that business continuity planning and exercising are not done in isolation from wider emergency planning work. In part, BCPs are in place to ensure that Category 1 responders are able to deliver their emergency response function in the event of an emergency. Category 1 responders should not forget the close synergies between emergency plans and BCPs when learning the lessons of exercises and making changes as a result. Post exercise reports may have implications for both.

6.89.   The purpose of this exercise programme is to test the robustness of BCPs in the event of an emergency - will it enable the Category 1 responder to cope effectively with disruptions to the provision of critical services? One such critical function must be the emergency response function itself.

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6.90.   The Act specifically requires Category 1 responders to maintain BCM plans to ensure that they can continue to deliver key services in the event of an emergency. It is essential that Category 1 responders must not only put plans in place, but also ensure that they are regularly reviewed and kept up-to-date.

6.91.   Plan maintenance should therefore be an ongoing process. It is good practice to undertake a comprehensive review of the state of the plan periodically.

6.92.   A process should be established whereby the BCM team is informed of relevant changes and developments, and that these are incorporated into the plan. Effective version control procedures should be implemented to ensure that relevant members of staff are working from the correct edition of the plan.

Stage 6: Embedding BCM in the organisation's culture

6.93.   Documenting the BCP is one element of developing a BCM strategy. Its success, however, depends upon:

- o **implementation** of the recommendations made, across the entire organisation;
- o a programme of **training** for those directly involved in the execution of the plan; and
- o an **education and awareness programme** to ensure understanding and adoption of the plan in relevant parts of the organisation - this applies to both internal and external stakeholders (e.g. employees and suppliers).

6.94.   Category 1 responders should deliver a programme of training and awareness to ensure that the relevant parts of the organisation are confident and competent concerning the plan. All parties must appreciate the importance of BCM to the operation's survival and their role in this process. This means that business continuity should be 'mainstreamed' in emergency management and should be a core element of the emergency planning culture the Act establishes.

6.95.   As the first part of this chapter notes, the Regulations require Category 1 responders to give appropriate training to those involved in implementing BCPs.[23] This section of the chapter also sets out the objectives of such training programmes and what they should cover.

6.96.   Training will need to be done on a rolling basis to cover staff turnover. BCM co-ordinators should establish a training database to monitor the take-up of training opportunities.

6.97.   It is also important to ensure that awareness of BCM issues is raised throughout the organisation, to ensure that all relevant staff have confidence in its ability to manage in a crisis, and know how they should respond in the event of a disruption. For example, some organisations distribute 'z-cards' to all staff, setting out what they should do in the event of a range of contingencies (e.g. details of secondary sites or evacuation points). The box overleaf sets out some of the key messages and the means of getting them across.

Box 6.1: The Business Case for BCM

Part of embedding a 'continuity culture' within an organisation is to convince senior staff of the business case for BCM. It makes sense to put in place BCM arrangements because they help to:

- o **protect the reputation of the Category 1 responder.** The community expects continuity of critical services, even in the most challenging of circumstances. They expect you to be fully in control, and to be seen to be in control - your organisation's reputation is at risk if you are not. Maintaining the reputation of statutory services in an emergency is a vital element for public reassurance;

- o **produce clear cost benefits.** Identifying, preventing and managing disruptions in advance can reduce the costs to an organisation in terms of financial expenditure and management time. The demands of the insurance market have also increasingly become an important driver;

- o **protect the organisation, ensuring that Category 1 responders can help others in an emergency.** For Category 1 responders to help others, they first have to be able to keep themselves going in the face of a disruption. BCM will help ensure that they can mobilise the capabilities they need to deal with the emergency. It will also help ensure that the impact of the emergency on the day-to-day functions of the Category 1 responder is kept to a minimum, and that disruptions to vital services do not deepen the impact of the emergency on the wider community;

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o **ensure compliance and corporate governance.** Category 1 responders are - to varying degrees - subject to performance standards, corporate governance requirements and, in some cases, specific requirements to do BCM (e.g. NHS Trusts). Establishing BCM arrangements pursuant to the requirements of the Act will help ensure compliance with this wider framework of responsibilities and expectations; and

o **develop a clearer understanding of how the organisation works.** To ensure the continuity of an organisation, you first have to understand how it works. The process of analysing the business can yield sources of increased operational effectiveness and efficiency.

6.98.   To be truly effective, BC must form part of the culture in an organisation. This can be achieved by: leadership from senior personnel; assigning clear responsibilities; awareness raising; skills training; and exercising plans.

6.99.   Category 1 responders should extend their awareness-raising activities to those third parties upon whom the Category 1 responder depends in both normal and crisis operations. They need to be aware of how the response will develop when a BCM event occurs, and what this will mean for them.

6.100. Category 1 responders also have an interest in ensuring that their suppliers and contractors have in place robust BCM arrangements. To ensure the resilience of operations, it is necessary to ensure that other aspects of the delivery chain are resilient too. It is important to build BCM into procurement and contract management processes. The Office of Government Commerce provides detailed advice on these issues which is freely available on its website: http://www.ogc.gov.uk.

6.101.   Business continuity as part of Civil Protection is very much a multi-agency activity, where Category 1 responders must work together - and understand each other's capabilities and vulnerabilities - if they are going to be effective.

6.102.   In the emergency planning area, it is essential for Category 1 responders to be aware of each other's plans. BCM arrangements underpin emergency management capabilities - it is important that Category 1 responders have an awareness of the continuity issues facing their partners in the event of an emergency. Which functions will be discontinued? How will functions be scaled down or up in the event of an emergency? Where are partners' contingency sites?

6.103.   The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) provides a framework for dialogue about business continuity issues. Category 1 responders should consider using the LRF process as a means of raising mutual awareness, ensuring that plans dovetail, developing frameworks for mutual assistance, and sharing best practice.

6.104.   The Act requires Category 1 responders to publish aspects of their BCPs in so far as this is necessary or desirable for the purposes of dealing with emergencies.[24]

6.105.   The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that Category 1 responders make relevant information available to the public about what will happen in the event of an emergency. There are three principal classes of information which Category 1 responders should consider communicating to the public:

      o   a descriptive account of the business continuity plans they have in place for the purposes of reassuring the public;

[24] s.2(1)(f)

o information about the implications of emergencies for the continuity of a Category 1 responder's ordinary operations – e.g. possibility of service suspensions or adjustments. Proactively publishing this sort of information in advance of an emergency allows the public to think about their preparations. For example, parents might find it useful to know under which circumstances schools might be closed in the event of severe weather;

o sources of information and advice about service continuity issues that the public could consult in the event of an emergency.

6.106.   This communication can take place through a variety of means, including websites and other publications. This could also be achieved by integrating business continuity issues within mission statements, statements of service and other public information brochures, relating either to the organisation as a whole or to individual services.

6.107.   Responders can get further guidance and support from the following website http://shop.bsigroup.com/. In particular, the British Standard on business continuity, BS25999 parts 1 and 2, will be useful along with PB25666: Guidance on exercising and testing for continuity and contingency programmes.

6.108.   The International Standards Organisation (ISO) are in the process of producing a requirements and guidance document on business continuity; ISO22301 and ISO22313. Publication of these two documents has not been agreed. Early indication is however that if published, there will be nothing substantially different to the British Standard BS 25999, parts 1 and 2. Therefore, alignment with the British Standard will not only provide a good basis for BCM but at this stage would also appear to align with the forthcoming international standards.

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CabinetOffice

Chapter 7 Communicating with the Public

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 7 (Communicating with the Public) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

- **Summary**

  Category 1 responders' duties to communicate with the public under the Act are based on the belief that a well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency and to minimise the impact of the emergency on the community (*paragraphs 7.6*).

- The Act includes public awareness and warning and informing as two distinct legal duties for Category 1 responders - advising the public of risks before an emergency and warning and keeping it informed in the event of an emergency (*paragraphs 7.1*).

- Arrangements for warning and informing the public complement emergency planning arrangements (*paragraphs 7.26*).

- Category 1 responders need both to plan their communications and to test their communications arrangements to ensure they are effective (*paragraphs 7.28*).

- In the same way that Category 1 responders must ensure that their emergency plans are appropriate for the scale and type of risks involved, communications arrangements should be appropriate for the message and the targeted audience (*paragraphs 7.32*).

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

7.1.   There are two aspects of the duty in relation to communicating with the public. The first is that the public be made aware of the risks of emergencies and how Category 1 responders are prepared to deal with them if they occur. The second is that arrangements are made to warn the public and that the public be provided with information and advice as necessary if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred.

Arrange for the publication of assessments and plans

7.2.   The duties to assess risks and to prepare plans (covered in Chapter 4) are followed by a further duty on Category 1 responders to arrange for the publication of all or part of risk assessments and plans they have made, where publication is necessary or desirable to prevent, reduce, control, mitigate or take other action in connection with an emergency.[1]

7.3.   Arranging for publication means that the Category 1 responders do not necessarily have to publish these documents themselves but they must arrange for them to be published.

7.4.   The duty is not necessarily to arrange to publish the whole of a risk assessment or a complete plan but only those parts which it is necessary or desirable to publish where this will add value in raising public awareness and would assist in dealing with an emergency.

7.5.   Category 1 responders meet these requirements by publishing a Community Risk Register (CRR), which provides an agreed assessment of the risks affecting a local area and an agreed position on the planning and resourcing priorities required to prepare for those risks.

[1] s. 2(1)(f)

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7.6.   The more information the public has access to, and the better educated they therefore become before an event, the more open they are likely to be to the warnings and advice they are given at the time of an emergency. A well informed public is better able to respond to an emergency and this will minimize the impact of an emergency on the community.   Responses to a number of emergencies over recent years have highlighted the need to encourage individuals and communities (including businesses) to be better prepared and more self reliant during emergencies. This allows the authorities to focus on those areas and people in greatest need.

7.7.   The duty to make the public aware of the risks of emergencies does not extend to a requirement to assist individuals/organisations in developing community resilience or to promote community resilience.   However, responders should recognise the benefits of engaging with the community and promoting individual and community resilience.

Avoid alarming the public unnecessarily

7.8.   At the same time, when publishing assessments and plans, the Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to the need not to alarm the public unnecessarily.[2]

7.9.   There is a similar duty to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily when making arrangements to warn, inform and advise them.[3]

Sensitive information

7.10.   Where risk assessments or plans contain sensitive information,[4] then only edited or summary versions of all or part of the document should be published.

[2] regulation 27
[3] regulation 30
[4] See regulation 45 and the discussion in Chapter 3

Joint discharge of functions and other forms of collaborative working

7.11.   The duty to arrange for the publication of all or part of assessments and plans falls on all Category 1 responders but the Regulations permit them to collaborate with others in delivering the duty. It should be noted that voluntary sector and community groups may help responders to fulfil this duty but cannot discharge it on their behalf. Private sector organisations should also be encouraged to provide necessary advice and information where relevant (see also *paragraph 7.25*).

7.12.   There are several options for Category 1 responders in deciding how best to discharge their responsibility. They may decide to undertake the task:

    o   on their own;

    o   collaboratively, by agreeing with partners to act under the leadership of a lead responder; [5]

    o   jointly, by making arrangements with another Category 1 responder;[6] or

    o   by delegating the task to another Category 1 responder.[7]

7.13.   They may also support collaborative arrangements with the use of protocols.[8]

Maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public

7.14.   Category 1 responders are required to maintain arrangements to warn the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred. In addition to warning, they must also have arrangements to provide information and advice to the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred.[9]

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[5] regulations 9-11
[6] regulation 8(a)
[7] regulation 8(b)
[8] regulation 7
[9] s.2(1)(g)

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7.15.   The Act places a duty on Category 1 responders to maintain arrangements to warn. This reserves decisions about when, how, what and to whom warnings should be issued, to the local Category 1 responders themselves (see *Figure 7.1*). Plans, processes and protocols can be co-ordinated through the relevant warning and informing groups within the Local Resilience Forums. At the same time, there is a clear expectation that the arrangements to warn will be utilised where an emergency has occurred, making it necessary for responders to take action collectively to ensure a consistent message

Identification of Category 1 responder with lead responsibility

7.16.   Confusion would be caused, if more than one Category 1 responder were to plan to warn the public about the same risk at the same time and to the same extent. To avoid duplication, the Regulations effectively support flexibility by requiring those Category 1 responders whose functions are affected by an emergency to co-operate for the purpose of identifying which organisation will take lead responsibility for maintaining arrangements to warn in regard to that particular emergency.[10]

7.17.   If agreement cannot be reached, each of them must maintain these arrangements separately, but should be mindful of the potential consequences of conflicting information. (Further guidance can be found later under "Who" – lead responder *paragraph 7.94*)

7.18.   The Regulations envisage two ways in which a lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public may be chosen:

- o   by identification before an emergency;[11] or
- o   by adopting a procedure to be followed at the time of emergency.[12]

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7.19.   In addition, a procedure may be adopted by which the role of lead responder may be changed from one Category 1 responder to another during the course of an emergency, including the recovery period.[13] Co-operation to identify the lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public must identify which of these procedures has been chosen in relation to the particular emergency and include hand over protocols.

7.20.   Arrangements must ensure that at the time of an emergency, the Category 1 responder which has accepted the lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising the public:

   o   is able to contact the other Category 1 responders whose functions are exercisable in relation to that emergency;[14]

   o   informs those Category 1 responders of the actions it is taking;[15] and

   o   is able to collaborate with those Category 1 responders in warning, informing and advising the public.[16]

7.21.   The Regulations clearly envisage that the Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising the public will collaborate with its partners in fulfilling its role. There is no question of the lead responder assuming sole responsibility for carrying out the task. The Regulations place a reciprocal responsibility on those Category 1 responders which are not the lead responder, but which also have a duty to warn, inform and advise the public in relation to a particular emergency. They must maintain arrangements to:

   o   consult with the lead responder in relation to that emergency on a regular basis;[17] and

[13] regulation 32(3)(c)
[14] regulation 33(2)(a)
[15] regulation 33(2)(b)
[16] regulation 33(2)(c)
[17] regulation 34(a)

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o   inform the lead responder of the actions they are taking, and
    proposing to take, in relation to warning, informing and advising
    the public.[18]

7.22.   The critical element in the effective delivery of information to the public will be the
        partnership established between the responder bodies involved and the sharing of
        information between them to ensure consistency.

Joint discharge of functions

7.23.   Category 1 responders may also decide to deliver their responsibility to maintain
        arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public by:

o   making arrangements to operate jointly with another
    Category 1 responder;[19]

o   delegating the task to another Category 1 responder.[20]

These collaborative arrangements, including the identification of a lead Category 1
responder for warning and informing, may be supported with the use of protocols.[21]

Category 2 responders and other bodies

7.24.   Category 1 responders are not the sole responder bodies likely to be involved in
        arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public. The Regulations recognise
        that some Category 2 responders, such as utilities, have a duty under their own
        regulatory frameworks to provide warning, information and advice in certain
        circumstances when their services are interrupted. Similarly, the Meteorological

[18] regulation 34(b)
[19] regulation 8(a)
[20] regulation 8(b)
[21] regulation 7

Office, the Food Standards Agency and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which are not covered by the Act, also provide a warning service for a number of events including, for example, severe weather emergencies. Accordingly, the Regulations require that Category 1 responders in performing their duty to warn, inform and advise:

- o should have regard to these arrangements;[22] and

- o need not duplicate them unnecessarily. [23]

7.25. It is important that responders consider how the CCA duty to communicate with the public interfaces with the duties contained in other site specific legislation such as the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH) (as amended 2005 and 2008) and the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001 (REPPIR). Where possible, Category 1 and 2 responders as well as site operators should develop joint arrangements for communicating with the public. Further guidance on "The Fit with Other Legislation" can be found in Chapter 19.

Have regard to emergency plans

7.26. Warning, informing and advising the public is not a stand-alone duty. The Regulations require that a Category 1 responder in carrying out its duties in this respect must have regard to its emergency plans.[24] As with any other part of planning for the response to an emergency, the communications strategy - either direct with the public, or via the media - should be fully integrated into the responder's emergency plans. Equally, in maintaining its emergency plans, it must have regard to its warning and informing duties.

[22] regulation 35(1)(a)
[23] regulation 35(1)(b)
[24] regulation 28

Generic and specific arrangements

7.27.   In regard to emergency planning, the Regulations distinguish between generic and specific plans. Similarly, in relation to the duty to have arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public, the Regulations recognise that these may be generic or specific.[25] Which arrangements are chosen, will depend on the type of emergency being planned for and the particular circumstances in a locality.

Training and exercises

7.28.   Emergency plans must include arrangements for the provision of training and carrying out of exercises.[26] Similarly, the Regulations in regard to warning and informing the public also require arrangements to include provision for training and exercises.[27] It is recommended that exercises include warning and informing messages that test the public acceptance, acknowledgement and action on the messages. Simple, regular community engagement activities can assist in developing public awareness.

How the Act and Regulations apply in Northern Ireland

7.29.   Regulations 32 to 34 do not apply to Category 1 organisations in relation to the delivery of their functions in Northern Ireland. In addition, the application to the transferred functions of the Police Service of Northern Ireland would be in accordance with arrangements set out in Chapter 12.

[25] regulation 29
[26] regulation 25
[27] regulation 31

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Box 7.1: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter are further advice and case studies about communicating with the public that are not supported directly by the Act, but responders may find them useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

For more civil protection and resilience case studies go to National Resilience Extranet Case Studies Library

GSE: https://www.resilience-extranet.gse.gov.uk/casestudies or

Internet: https://www.resilience-extranet.gov.uk/casestudies

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

7.30.   The previous section has described the nature of the legislation and what it permits and requires Category 1 responders to do. This section outlines how the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice.

7.31.   Communicating with the public is an integral part of preparing for and responding to incidents and cannot be done in isolation. The timely provision of relevant information and appropriate warnings and advice is a crucial part of the effort to promote and foster resilient communities. Responders need to consider how to warn and inform in conjunction with other aspects of the CCA, such as co-operation, information sharing, risk assessment, the role of the voluntary sector and other relevant legislation. These are set out elsewhere in *Emergency Preparedness*.

7.32. At every stage of the process, the key to effective communication with the public is getting the message right for the right audience. Co-ordination between Category 1 responders is vital and every effort should be made to engage with Category 2 responders and the voluntary sector. Even when specific information has to be given by one body in a very specialist field, the others involved in the response should be aware of what is being issued, when and to whom. Arrangements to ensure that such co-ordination can take place effectively should be included in the planning process and assist in the smooth handover of responsibility if it is necessary.

7.33. Advance preparation is essential and developing an outline communication strategy to deal with incidents is vital. When an incident/emergency occurs, this rolling strategy can be quickly developed to ensure a comprehensive and co-ordinated strategic communications approach is taken. This strategy however should continue to evolve over the duration of the incident to ensure that the most effective and appropriate action continues to be taken. Where possible, there should be a range of communications specialists involved in developing the strategy so that all communication disciplines, from free to paid media, e-media to direct mail, are considered.

7.34. For the most part, public information should cover the interests of a number of different Category 1 responders involved in handling the emergency. All those with an interest need to contribute to the development of the information. Apparent conflicts of interest need to be resolved quickly. The stages in the decision-making process should be logged to provide a record which can be examined after the event to identify lessons for the future. Suitable systems should be devised as part of the planning process.

7.35. Responders should be encouraged to set out a strategy for communicating with the public before, during and after a crisis. The key principles are set out under the following themes – when, what, how, who and to whom (see *Fig 7.1*) and are described under each heading in this Chapter:

7.36.　Annex 7D provides responders with details of The Ten Step Cycle, which aims to assist responders to meet the duty to communicate by setting out a step by step process to work through. It is seen as a continuous cycle and the process can be adapted to suit local needs and aid the planning process.

Figure 7.1

COMMUNICATION PROCESS

WHY
Event trigger

WHO
Information source
Authorities/responders

WHEN
Timing/speed
of dissemination

WHAT
Message content

HOW
Communication
tools/methods

TO WHOM
Audience
Population at risk

WHEN
Timing and the speed of dissemination

Public communications timeline: what responders' plans need to achieve

7.37.　Although the duty is in two parts, there are three recognised stages to communicating with the public. There is a clear link between them and it is not always easy to separate them.

Public awareness	Public warning/alerting	Informing and advising the public
Risk communication and education	At the time of an emergency or when one is likely to occur	Immediate and long term post emergency

Public awareness: developing understanding and preparedness before an emergency

7.38. The more information the public have prior to an incident, the better prepared they are likely to be and the better able to respond appropriately to warnings and advice during an emergency. Past events and commissioned research have shown the population in the UK not to be particularly risk aware and to expect responders/ government to deal with emergencies as they occur, rather than preparing themselves to respond. Responders have a duty to make the public aware of the risks so that they can be encouraged to be more self-rescue orientated.

7.39. Raising the awareness of children can help provide the long term solution to changing behaviour. Children absorb information and influence family behaviour; they can also influence the wider community.

Case Study

Since 2005, Essex County Council (ECC) Emergency Planning Service has engaged with school children to deliver awareness training in many aspects of emergency planning through a "what if" project. The strategy was designed to engage not only children but their guardians, and to encourage the wider community to share the learning. ECC have sourced a variety of funding opportunities to enable them to develop packages suitable for many age groups as follows:

- An all hazards "What if" calendar
- Online interactive decision game on flooding
- Online reading books (4 in total)
- Online board game
- Online puzzles
- DVD
- Additionally, reading books have been produced in hardback
- Under development is an iphone App on the "what if" game.

A variety of activities has been designed and delivered to a whole range of age groups from 6 to 15 years old. These have been interactive and have taken place either in the class room or in role play in external venues. Many of the above products are available online at www.whatif-guidance.org

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Risk communication / risk perception

7.40. Effective warnings typically begin with risk communication and pre-incident public awareness campaigns that explain how individuals may receive emergency information, and actions the public can take to prepare for emergencies. Preparedness efforts also strengthen the credibility of, and compliance with, warnings and alerts.

7.41. Understanding how people perceive and view risk is important as it can help responders tailor their communications appropriately and align messages with public perception. Perceptions are likely to vary widely across different cultures and groups. Perceptions will also be informed by a number of factors such as familiarity, control, vulnerability, timing, trust in authorities and social responsibility. How individuals perceive risks, both likelihood and impact, will influence their behaviour. High levels of risk perception are associated with higher levels of intended compliance and the tendency to act appropriately to warning information. However, there is comprehensive guidance available on how best to communicate about risks to the public without causing disproportionate concern, and Category 1 responders should be familiar with this.

Public warning / alerting at the time of an emergency or when one is likely to occur

7.42. An alert or warning needs to reach as many people as possible and as quickly as possible. Key communications objectives in an emergency response are to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to the public so they feel confident, safe and well informed. Arrangements should be sufficiently flexible and extendable to address any escalation of events. Responders should alert the members of a community whose immediate safety is at risk by all appropriate means, and be mindful of using a variety of available channels and existing community resilience networks to reach community groups and vulnerable people.

Recent examples of research that considered risk perception include:

- o **Plymouth University** "factors influencing risk perception, information spread and reliability". The research sought to improve understanding of the psychological and behavioural reactions that the UK public might display following a CBRN related incident. It considered the need to design clear, comprehensible messages that meet the public's information needs and whether these messages altered behavioural intentions. There was a need to use emergency communications to correct erroneous beliefs. The research developed evidence based guidelines for design of emergency communication based on literature review and research.

- o **Kings' College London** noted that the management of incidents involving CBRN risk is often complicated when members of the public adopt unexpected behaviours or display levels of fear that seem disproportionate to the level of threat that is involved. One of the key messages from this research was that the drive to maintain family contact is strong. Therefore emergency planners need to facilitate communication following an incident – prioritise information / advice about schools and reassure parents that schools have emergency plans. Preparation goes up at times of threat so remind the public of what preparations would be most effective.

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> o   **Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) Crisis**
>   **Messaging Study** - this study considered proximity and social
>   context. Accurate understanding of perception of local risks
>   requires appreciation of social context as well as objective risk
>   assessments. Perception of man-made risks is higher than
>   natural hazards.
>
> o   **European funded research** – communicating with the public
>   about CBRN threats: state of the art. Carried out by King's College
>   London, Dialogik and Health Protection Agency.
>   http://www.pirateproject.eu/workshop.html

Speed

7.43.   Responders should issue an early warning or alert of an incident as quickly as
        possible to help to save and/or protect lives. The initial alert may be hampered
        by the possible lack of information; therefore the warning/alert will be restricted
        to a very basic message or sound such as a siren or evacuation notification. As
        the incident unfolds, more detail can be given in warning messages.

Figure 7.2

Amount of information

Number of people to reach

Alert or basic warning message

Key

Widest Population

More detail

Event Specific

Targeted Audience

Individuals

Detail

Tailored to individual needs

Informing and advising

7.44.   Responders need to provide relevant and timely information about the nature of the unfolding event and this should continue throughout the event. The demand for more and more information will increase, and the advice given will become more specific. Information should include an explanation of the immediate actions being taken by responders to minimise the risk to human or animal health and welfare, the environment or property; actions being taken by responders to assist the recovery phase, as well as the actions the public themselves can take to minimise the impact of the emergency and details of how further information can be obtained.

7.45.   It is also important for responders to communicate the end of the emergency and the return to normal arrangements. Good communication should be maintained in the recovery phase as people will require ongoing advice and information.

> **Case Study:**
>
> Lancaster University studied the long term effects of the floods in 2007 by reviewing the daily logs of residents in Hull affected by the floods. Further information relating to the hull diarists can be found at: Hull Flood Project

WHAT
What the public needs to know / message content

Awareness

7.46.   At national level, more information has been put in the public domain. The National Risk Register (http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register) explains how the government regularly assesses the natural hazards and manmade threats that could affect the UK. It explains the likelihood of a risk occurring and possible effects of an emergency if it happens.

7.47.   Generic advice to the public on how to prepare for emergencies is available as part of the Community Resilience Programme launched in March 2011. This programme aims to encourage individuals and communities to become more aware of the risks they face and think about what actions they could take

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to reduce the impacts of emergencies and to make their community more resilient. More information about the Community Resilience Programme can be found at : www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/communityresilience. From time to time, government also undertakes national campaigns through TV and press advertising.

7.48.   The DirectGov website has information for the general public on what to do to prepare for emergencies and, in the event of an emergency occurring, it can carry key messages and signpost the public to different relevant sites for further information. This can be found at www.direct.gov.uk/preparingforemergencies.

7.49.   The key central advice in the event of an incident is summarised by the phrase "Go in, Stay in, Tune in". This is targeted at those who are not involved in the incident, but are close by or believe themselves to be in danger. There will be occasions when this message is not applicable, and responders should be ready to give instruction on the best course of action to take in the circumstances.

Box 7.2: Public information produced by central government and national bodies

The Government produces general advice to the public through a number of sources. This covers a variety of types of emergency, including terrorist-related emergencies:

o   http://www.direct.gov.uk/preparingforemergencies

o   http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience

o   http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/CrimeJusticeAndTheLaw/Counter terrorism/

o   http://www.mi5.gov.uk

o   travel advice on http://www.fco.gov.uk

o   business continuity advice on http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk

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> o   severe weather warnings from the Meteorological Office on
>
>   http://www.meto.gov.uk
>
> o   flood warnings and advice from the Environment Agency on
>
>   http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk

7.50.   Once Category 1 responders have identified the emergencies that will trigger their public communication duties through the risk assessment process (Chapter 4), they should consider what information is already in the public domain. This will help them determine what additional information from the risk assessments and plans they have made they should publish to meet the requirements of their duties.[28]

7.51.   The generic material is likely to be supported by the Community Risk Register (CRR) and Category 1 responders' generic planning arrangements. Specific plans, prepared in relation to specific risks and also supported by the CRR, are likely to include a requirement for much more detailed advice to the public on what may happen.

Awareness-raising: what the public should do in an emergency

7.52.   The Act requires information to be published about the risks and plans. Under the Act, plans describe the actions the Category 1 responders themselves will take in the event of an emergency. However, in practice, Category 1 responders may also want to attach to their plans details of possible useful actions that the public could do to help themselves. These may include obtaining in advance useful protective or preventive materials or other items to ensure community resilience in an emergency. It makes

28 s. 2(1)(f)

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sense for public awareness messages to include what the public should do in the face of the risk of emergency, to complement the actions that the Category 1 responders themselves propose to take. More information and advice is available through the Community Resilience Programme at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/communityresilience.

7.53.   Many local authorities and other bodies have websites and literature which provide either generic advice on emergencies, or detailed advice specific to their own areas of responsibility.

7.54.   Each decision will clearly have to be based on a balance of assessment. Two types of publication may be found to be necessary

- o   generic advice referring to the risks of emergencies in the locality; and
- o   specific advice linked to particular risks and plans.

The information should be designed to encourage members of the public to be prepared for the risks that they are most likely to face.

Case Study

At the annual Great Yorkshire Show in Harrogate, North Yorkshire, a range of emergency planning professionals from North, West and South Yorkshire Local Authorities, the emergency services and various other Category 1 and 2 responders contribute to an awareness stand. Branded 'R U Prepared?' the stand promotes community resilience, personal awareness and preparedness to all those who visit. A range of activities and promotions draw people to the stand where they are offered help and advice on how they can become more resilient and prepare themselves for emergencies. More information can be found at the North Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum Website: www.emergencynorthyorks.gov.uk

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Box 7.3: Examples of locally produced or topical Information

o Environment Agency local flood material:

http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/default.aspx

o Birmingham Resilience

http://www.birminghamprepared.gov.uk/news/resilience-goes-digital/

o Lincolnshire Community Risk Register

http://www.lincolnshireprepared.co.uk/

o Thames Valley Local Resilience Forum "Are you ready?" booklet

http://www.thamesvalleylrf.org.uk/

o Local authority material, for example Surrey Alert information:

http://www.surreyalert.info

o Emergency Planning Unit websites Control of Major

Accident Hazards:

http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/comahind.htm

o Nuclear calendars: public information calendars provided by the

nuclear industry:

http://www.niauk.org

o Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 'Safety on the Sea' series:

http://www.mcga.gov.uk

o Emergency services outreach work in schools and youth groups

Crucial Crew scheme aimed at children to warn them of risks:

http://www.crucial-crew.org

o First aid material from

o British Red Cross - http://www.redcross.org.uk

o St John Ambulance - http://www.sja.org.uk

o St Andrew's First Aid - http://www.firstaid.org.uk

How much to publish

7.55. The objective of this duty under the Act needs to be kept in mind. At all stages of the decision-making process, Category 1 responders should ask themselves whether the material published will enhance the public's response in an emergency. In this regard, the mere fact of publication may have a beneficial effect on public confidence. Research suggests that people look to the authorities to 'do something', and that they will be relieved and reassured to see that plans are in place.

Unnecessary alarm

7.56. Any inclination towards full disclosure may be tempered by the requirement to "have regard to the need to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily".[29] Responders should consider the benefits of reducing the classification of sensitive information through various means to improve public understanding of risks and to establish some of the good practice highlighted in this chapter.

7.57. Information relating to events, particularly terrorist events, where the consequences would include mass fatalities and casualties could be unsettling and upsetting. However, there is a clear need to strike a balance between not causing public alarm and providing necessary information to enable people to understand the threat and respond in an appropriate manner in the event of an incident occurring. There is no evidence to suggest the public panics when receiving information. They want to feel they have all the relevant facts so that they can take informed decisions. Communication needs to be handled sensitively. Responders should use clear terminology, providing factual information which avoids sensationalism or emotive language. The content should not be overly negative or graphic, and should be as brief as possible to avoid confusing or overwhelming readers.

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Relevant research includes:

Sussex University Social Psychology

Sussex psychologist Dr John Drury has published the first social-psychological study of crowd reactions among survivors of the London bombings on 7 July 2005.

One of the key findings in the research was that – "there was no 'mass panic' and little selfishness, despite the fact that people felt in danger of death, saw little hope of escape and were mostly among strangers."

Research has found evidence that, in emergencies, rather than panic, some people have a delayed reaction to alarm signals and warning signs. To counter this, researchers have suggested that traditional alarms could be replaced by more advanced mass communication tools, such as public-address systems and LED screens, to inform the evacuating crowd of the seriousness and location of danger.

www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/index.html

NATO guidelines on psychosocial care for people affected by disasters and major incidents. www.healthplanning.co.uk/nato/

Case Study: Reservoir risk – raising awareness of risk without causing alarm

A study into the likely reaction of the public to information on reservoir flood risk was undertaken by the Environment Agency in 2009. The study examined the views of those who had experienced the effects of the potential failure of the Ulley reservoir in 2007, plus others living near reservoirs in the rest of the country. There was a relatively low awareness

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of the risk from reservoirs, but once the issue was raised, people expressed a strong desire for further information on the risk.

When asked about how awareness of the risk could be raised, people suggested that the tone and language used should be factual, informative and calm and the focus should be on the safety of the reservoirs, not the risk. It should also be made clear that awareness was being raised in the wider area or for all sites of a particular risk, rather than indicating that a particular reservoir posed an imminent risk. People suggested that they would be less alarmed about the risk if they were told about the emergency planning arrangements in place *"If you at least know that there's a plan in force and what might happen, that's less scary."*

Further information on raising awareness of reservoir risks can be found at Reservoir flood preparedness.

Public warning / alerting

What information is needed and when

7.58.   Immediately when an emergency occurs, and during the first hour, the public needs:

- o basic details of the incident - what, where, when (and who, why and how, if possible);
- o to know the implications for health and welfare;
- o advice and guidance (e.g. stay indoors, symptoms, preparing for evacuation); and
- o reassurance (if necessary).

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The public wants to know:

- o practical implications such as the effect on traffic, power supplies, telephones, water supplies, etc;
- o a helpline number; and
- o what is being done to resolve the situation.

Broadcasters will require:

- o well thought out and joined-up arrangements between the emergency services, local authority and other organisations, capable of providing agreed information at speed;
- o an immediate telephone contact; and
- o a media rendezvous point at the scene.

7.59. Responders need to take into account what the public wants to know not simply what the authorities need to say. Understanding how emergency communication will be perceived and acted upon by the public will help to achieve greater success in compliance. Responders also need to consider how technical information can be communicated in a way that the public will understand.

7.60. Responders need to consider the potential for disparity between local and national messages. Ensuring consistency and clarity of messaging in the context of potentially differing approaches and experiences is key to successful UK-wide response to emergencies. Responders should explain why national messages might differ from local messages and ensure that local media are aware of the importance of local information.

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Examples such as:

- o Severe weather – school closures are for local determination and the decision taken by individual school authorities.
- o Pandemic flu – where the disease was widespread in some geographical areas but almost non-existent in others.

7.61. There will often be a number of routes through which messages are disseminated, and to avoid inconsistent or conflicting messaging, they should be synchronised and checked to ensure that the data is correct. A common information picture should be shared at all levels. The News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will help to co-ordinate the information activities at a national level – see Annex 7A for further information on the NCC.

7.62. Category 1 responders should not release, (without consultation), information or advice which covers the areas of responsibility of partner organisations. The damage done to public confidence by the release of inconsistent or contradictory messages can be hard to repair. Similarly, great damage can be done by speculation about causes or future developments when facts are not known.

Informing and advising

7.63. It is important to maintain a flow of information and provide the public with practical information in the mid and longer term following a major incident, and signpost individuals to sources of additional support. It is essential to recognise that some communication outlets may not be available for the long term distribution of essential information to the public and alternative methods should be established.

7.64. Local authorities co-ordinate the provisions of welfare support to the community and take on a key role in the recovery phase of emergencies. Local authorities have their own websites which can provide people with information on services available. Other mechanisms include individual and public meetings; one stop shops; use of media and mailing; as well as using existing voluntary/community networks.

Case Study:

Evidence from reviews of the experience of UK nationals affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and the government lessons learned from 7 July 2005 London bombings highlighted the need for ongoing advice and information

- o long term effects of a CT crisis are profoundly negative - ongoing communication with those affected by the emergency is required
- o survivors attempt to establish support networks
- o emphasis should be on two-way communications between government and public: building trust and demonstrating transparency

The Humanitarian Assistance Unit in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport developed a series of aftercare webpages. These pages provide the public with practical information in the mid and longer term following a major incident, and signpost individuals to sources of additional support.

www.direct.gov.uk/helpafterincident

HOW
How to publish

Pre-event information

7.65.   The simplest and most cost-effective solution may be to make all or part of the relevant documents available in downloadable web format. For those who do not have internet access, paper copies can be made available on request and in the reference sections of public libraries.

7.66.   Available information should be identified clearly in the responder Freedom of Information Publication Scheme.[30]

Working with the Freedom of Information Act

- There may well be significant public interest in plans when information first becomes available, and some may want to see the detail. Where only summary or edited versions have been published, this may lead to requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to have access to all the information in the document. Those preparing published versions should be familiar with the terms of the legislation so that they can handle subsequent Freedom of Information requests quickly and accurately.

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[30] The Freedom of Information Act requires each public authority to adopt and maintain a publication scheme setting out details of information it will routinely make available, how the information can be obtained and whether there is any charge for it. A publication scheme is therefore both a public commitment to make certain information available and a guide to how that information can be obtained. All publication schemes have to be approved by the Information Commissioner and should be reviewed by authorities periodically to ensure they are accurate and up to date. More information can be found at http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk

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- In particular, the publication of generic plans may well encourage people to ask for further information to be made available under the Freedom of Information Act about plans for particular institutions in the area (schools, hospitals, old people's homes, prisons, animal shelters, zoos, museums, airports, ferry terminals, etc). Responder bodies may find that they will need to address these specific aspects in the planning process.

Case Study:

Plymouth University carried out the validation of the Ministry of Defence's *What to do in a Nuclear Emergency* public information booklet. Focus groups from the local community were used to identify potential improvements to the booklet. Working together Plymouth City Council, Cornwall Council and MOD Devonport revised the information booklet based on the research results.

This case study also illustrates the value of qualified expert communicators validating information that will go to the public.

http://www.plymouth.gov.uk/homepage/communityandliving/emergencies/regulatedhazardoussites/devonportdockyard.htm

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Design and distribution

7.67.   All material produced should look interesting and attractive enough for people to want to read it, otherwise it may be a waste of resources.

7.68.   It is a good idea to seek professional design and editing assistance. If professional support is not available, advice on good practice is available online and in published manuals.

7.69.   Once a product is available, the public will need to know about it. Unless it is going to be mailed directly to householders, people will need to be told how to get copies. This may be achieved by the conventional range of publicity methods.

7.70.   Avoiding duplication of effort is important. Good communication between responder bodies should include development of joint programmes for the production of general information material.

7.71.   It is good professional practice to evaluate the effectiveness of every information campaign. If this is done, evaluation should include research which shows how well any specialist versions have met the needs of vulnerable members of the community.

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Reaching vulnerable persons and those who have difficulty understanding the message

Case Study:

Help the Aged (now called Age UK) produces a range of free advice leaflets for older people covering financial matters, housing, home safety and health. The Environment Agency Age UK to produce a guide for older people entitled "Flooding: be prepared". www.environment-agency.gov.uk and www.helptheaged.org.uk.

7.72. The needs of vulnerable people will be evident in some areas, which have, for example, a high proportion of elderly residents who may welcome the option of a large print version of a document, or where there may be significant numbers who speak a minority ethnic language. Where vulnerable members of the community are in the care of an institution such as a school or old people's home, the most effective delivery of information will be through the management. Where vulnerable members of the community are not cared for within an institution, local responders should consider going through interest groups or voluntary sector organisations to disseminate messages. It may be that the most effective communications route is a single leaflet expressed in very simple language (or more than one language) backed up with pictures and symbols, which includes a request that the reader should share the information with family, friends and neighbours who are not able to read the information themselves. Research shows that it can be particularly effective to communicate with children, who then act as a conduit for the message to reach other family members. It should include a link to Directgov emergency pages which have useful prompts/questions to encourage people to be prepared. The Red Cross has produced a family of products and resources to inform and prepare organisations, communities and individuals to work together, at www.informedprepared.eu.

7.73.   Vulnerable groups will be a changing entity depending on the event (e.g. hard of hearing, elderly, transient population, etc) and might change during the event. Responders need to use a variety of different communication methods to help to capture these vulnerable groups. Responders should consider issues such as language and methods of communicating: mobile phones may not be used by some people, radios and televisions may not be on late at night, etc.

7.74.   Vulnerable people who live in residential homes or sheltered accommodation or attend day centres etc. are relatively easy to identify and therefore it will be easier to put arrangements in place to warn during an emergency because the establishment will be known to local authorities and other responders.

7.75.   Vulnerable people living in the community are more difficult to contact. General advice to the public to adopt a 'good neighbour' approach to help those less able to help themselves is always advisable; but specific efforts will sometimes be needed by the public authorities to deliver alerts to those vulnerable people who are known to them. Local community groups preparing for emergencies or local emergency groups (such as neighbourhood policing – Safer Community Teams) may be a useful way to identify and get information to vulnerable people.

7.76.   The Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for communicating with the public will need to be assured that these vulnerable people can be contacted. Arrangements will need to address how information and assistance can be managed by local authorities and health authorities who are in regular contact with the vulnerable individuals.

7.77.   People who have difficulty understanding the message because they use a different language may require pre-prepared print or broadcast messages in their own language.

Review and renewal

7.78.   The provision of public information should be an ongoing process. Any information that is produced should be in a reasonably durable format, whether paper or electronic, and should be available over time. It should be regularly reviewed and renewed whenever necessary in the light of changing circumstances. LRFs might want to agree a schedule for review.

7.79.   This will mean that published material will need to be looked at afresh every time the CRR or an individual risk assessment or plan changes. Only new information which is "necessary or desirable" for prevention or mitigation of an emergency will require a new version to be produced.

Case Study: National Severe Weather Warning Service – a root and branch review

The Met Office National Severe Weather Warning Service (NSWWS) was introduced in 1988. While the method of communication and display of warnings on the web had changed significantly during this time, the fundamentals of the service, that is the warning parameters and criteria, had not. During 2009/10 a review was initiated by the Public Weather Service Customer Group (PWSCG) (for more about this group see http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/about-us/what/pws/pwscg/about) to consider whether the NSWWS was meeting the needs of the public and the responder communities in the UK.


A wide-ranging consultation process was undertaken, including a series of workshops with the UK emergency responder community and, in an effort to ensure broad public consultation, a series of extended public discussion groups were conducted around the UK, at which all life stage and socio-economic groups were represented, which offered some qualitative research. Met Office Open Days were also used as opportunities to conduct some additional consultation on weather warnings, in addition to the regular feedback received from the public about Met Office services in general.

The main findings of the consultation process were used to redesign the service, including changes to the language used and graphical presentation of the information and all warnings are now impact based. Further information on the new service can be found at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/uk/guide/warnings.html.

HOW
Communication tools/methods warning, informing and advising the public - communications during and after an emergency

7.80. The methods available to deliver urgent information to members of the public are extremely varied. A mix of techniques should be utilised to maximise the chance of receipt, comprehension & effective response from the public. Some depend on the availability of power supplies or phone lines. Some may require careful consideration of the risks to human life and health, in case, at the time of an emergency, staff or members of the public are exposed to hazardous substances while they are warning or being warned. Arrangements for complementary and co-ordinated public warnings, advice and media facilities should be carefully managed between the various bodies. This will enhance public safety and information will be delivered more effectively.

7.80.   **Figure 7.3 Process for developing effective warning procedures**

Develop planning assumptions

In what circumstances will potential victims

Identify lead responder

Which organisation is best placed to provide warning?

Assess capability
Can warnings be delivered by generic methods or is something specific needed?

7.81.   The process of reaching agreement on the warning process is shown schematically in Figure 7.3.

Generic and Specific Warnings

7.82.   Some systems are defined as 'generic' arrangements,[31] in that they can be called into play in a range of scenarios. Others have only limited use, or are capable of delivering only a closely targeted message.

Warning during a malicious incident

7.83.   The police will lead in any malicious incident, including terrorist attacks, and have primary responsibility for providing effective and timely information to the public. Communication strategies will be developed for specific scenarios. There will be a need to balance rapid dissemination of warnings whilst ensuring accuracy. It is recognised there may be little specific information during the initial stage of an incident and confirmation of detailed facts will take longer.

[31] regulation 29

7.84.   When developing the warning in response to a malicious incident, the potential for any planned secondary attack should be considered in determining an evacuation route for the public. The means of delivering the message to the public also needs to be considered to ensure public safety and to avoid further potential damage. Additionally, responders should be aware of the different arrangements for media relations for such an event, as it will most likely be nationally led, with local delivery. Where credible and specific threats to national security are identified in advance, information is handled at a national level and public warnings issued by the police and/or Home Secretary. Any threat connected with international terrorism will be a national – even international – issue and information about it will be co-ordinated centrally regardless of what part of the country is under threat.

Existing publication and warning regimes

7.85.   Some organisations excluded from the Act because they have existing statutorily defined emergency procedures, also have an important role in generating public awareness about emergencies and issuing warnings when necessary. The management of emergencies on nuclear and major industrial sites, including communicating with the public, is already regulated. Site operators have well-established procedures for communicating with the public in the vicinity of their sites. The CCA legal framework does not override existing ones. It will be important to ensure that plans made by Category 1 responders do not duplicate existing arrangements. Category 1 responders may choose to cover in their communications planning the potential for an emergency to spread beyond the scope of individual site plans produced under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, Radiation (Emergency Preparation and Public Information) Regulations or pipeline regimes, but this is not an explicit requirement of the Act.

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7.86.   Consistency of message is important in an emergency situation and Category 1 responders should have regard to the early advice and information relayed to the public by Category 2 responders and site owners/operators. Category 1 responders should seek to enhance this communication.

Examples of joint working:

Plymouth City Council and Cornwall Council warning and informing services have developed joint arrangements for communicating with the public. The Informer Emergency Notification System covers CCA, REPPIR, MACR and COMAH. http://www.plymouth.gov.uk/warnandinform Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit has developed communication links with industry (COMAH Establishments, Nuclear Power Station, etc). Details can be found at: www.clevelandemergencyplanning.info

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7.87.   Category 1 responders should consider the options available in detail as part of the planning process to ensure that they have an adequate range of methods at their disposal. No single system will be the solution to all situations or achieve a wholly resilient alerting capability. A variety of methods will always be necessary to capture the largest proportion of the target audience. Different information sources appeal to different demographic groups. An individual who receives multiple but consistent messages is likely to respond favourably. Overlapping methods help to ensure a higher level of successful access to the targeted population.

7.88.   Alerting systems also need to be resilient. Much can be achieved through trusted stakeholders and low-technology solutions. Indeed, these may be the most resilient to disruption to telecommunications and power. Using trusted stakeholders (such as building managers to communicate with their tenants) allows the public to receive messages from a known (and possibly more trusted) source.

7.89.   The need for back-up staff and equipment, and the risk of warning arrangements being disrupted by the emergency itself, should all be considered in business continuity management plans.

Types of warning method

Possible public warning methods	Capability
o Mobilising officers to go round on foot and knock on doors	generic
o From car or helicopter, by loudhailer or other amplified means	generic
o National and local media (TV, radio, online)	generic or specific
o Social Media generic or specific	generic or specific
o Electronic/variable message boards, e.g. at the roadside or on motorways generic or specific	generic or specific
o Variable message signs (some authorities have protocols in place to utilise these in emergencies)	specific
o Direct radio broadcasts to shipping (in maritime incidents)	generic or specific
o PA announcements in public buildings, shopping centres, sports venues, transport systems	generic or
o Automated telephone/fax/e-mail/text messages to subscribers	specific
o Site sirens	specific

Last updated:March 2012

> **Case Study: Swine flu**
>
> During the H1N1 outbreak in 2009/10, public information and advice was extensive and difficult to miss. The "sneezing man" image and "catch it, bin it, kill it" slogan produced a clear "brand" which was recognisable throughout the pandemic. UK wide media campaigns ran on television, on radio and in print. Posters were displayed in a wide range of settings by the NHS, businesses and the voluntary sector. Information and advice were accessible on a range of government websites. An information leaflet was delivered to every home in the UK. Advice could be seen online, on bus shelters, billboards and shopping trolleys. NHS Direct provided advice, as did the special Flu Information Line and the National Pandemic Flu Service in England. Similar information was available in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales by phone.

Helplines and public inquiry points

7.90. The information delivery methods discussed so far have been based upon the Category 1 responders' decision about what information needs to be provided. However the public are likely to have all sorts of queries and perhaps offers, to direct towards the responder bodies. Responders should plan how to make best use of helplines and public inquiry points (which may be telephone, e-mail or SMS based, or multimedia) in any emergency. These can either provide a limited amount of recorded information, or connect with a call centre where people answer individual questions.

7.91. Helplines may already be in place for other purposes. Plans can be developed to take them over and provide their staff with relevant briefing or suitable recorded messages. Facilities run by other operators or companies in the area may also be co-opted into the public information effort as a result of protocols put in place in advance.

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7.92.   Setting up a dedicated call centre from scratch is a significant undertaking, but may be achieved quite quickly if suitable call-off contracts have been put in place as part of the planning process. The Police Casualty Bureau and the Consulate Crisis Group of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regularly operate effective call centres. Responders might also consider working with voluntary sector organisations, for example, through the British Red Cross to provide this function as they may have the capability. However, it is essential to ensure that the people working at the call centres are competent, fully briefed and provided with a core brief. It is important to consider the capacity of the system, and Category 1 responders should take advice from network providers to avoid the risk of overloading the telephone system.

7.93.   Such inquiry points are not a panacea. There will always be a significant proportion of dissatisfied callers, whatever the method used - callers for whom the recorded message is inadequate or unsuitable, or who cannot get answers to their particular questions, or who simply cannot get through because the lines are too busy. Planning should address the management of callers expectations, to limit irritation and disappointment, by establishing procedures to make it clear what information is available and how busy the lines are.

> **Box 7.5: The Role of the Casualty Bureau**
>
> When emergencies occur, it is a police function to consider setting up a casualty bureau. Where one is set up, planning arrangements should ensure that the contact number is publicised as widely as possible, as soon as possible. Information about a casualty bureau should make it clear that this is a way for the police to collect information about people who may have been injured or killed - it does not release information about possible casualties.

The fact that the casualty bureau does not provide information directly over the phone places an onus on Category 1 responders (for example local authorities), as part of integrated emergency management, to plan to set up a public information line. This may be achieved through the use of the British Red Cross co-ordinated support line, provided through its Memorandum of Understanding with the Association of Chief Police Officers, or through the use of the voluntary sector delivered facility referred to in *paragraph 7.91*. Such support lines do not provide information about casualties, of course, but they may be able to provide callers with a range of practical and emotional support, including the provision of travel and accommodation advice to relatives and friends who may wish to come to the area. Planning to provide public information lines will help ease the burden on the casualty bureau.

Planning should also include special arrangements in the local area to provide face-to-face information and support to those bereaved relatives who come to be close to the scene of the emergency. The police are likely to provide Family Liaison Officers who will take on all or part of this role. But special attention needs to be paid to relatives and friends trying to get information at receiving hospitals for the incident; and to those who may be taken to, or congregate at, the emergency mortuary. Rest and reception centres set up by the local authority with the support of voluntary organisations may also require regularly updated access to information and advice.

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WHO - LEAD RESPONDER
Authorities / Responders

Identifying a lead responder

7.94. It is preferable, in relation to particular types of emergency, if a lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public is identified and agreed beforehand by the Category 1 responders. Annex 7B provides an indicative list of which Category 1 responders are likely to lead in a range of examples. (The list is advisory only). Step 3 of the 10 Step Cycle (Annex 7D) offers further guidance on identifying a lead responder.

Case Study: North Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum Media and Communications Plan

The NYLRF Media, Warning and Informing group has produced a Communications and Media Plan which included a specific appendix on identifying the lead responder. The group approached this by classifying the types of risk and looking at the risk register and agreeing to focus on high and very high risks rather than the register as a whole. All parties then agreed who would generally lead on communications and/or media during that type of emergency.

The communications plan itself was very short and its focus was on the 11 appendices which had specific details and actions as well as detailing the needs of the media during an incident.

To look at the NYLRF plan or the lead responder sheet please visit www.emergencynorthyorks.gov.uk and contact the emergency planning unit emergency@northyorks.gov.uk for a username and password.

7.95. In many instances, the lead Category 1 responder for warning and informing the public will be the organisation which leads on the response to an emergency. In a number of instances, this role is likely to be filled by the police, but it should not be assumed that this will always be the case. The lead responder for the recovery phase will normally be the Local Authority. It is essential the public continue to receive appropriate information during the recovery phase.

7.96. A wide area emergency such as flooding is a good example of how responders all have to play their part. It is clear that the role of lead Category 1 responder for warning, informing and advising, is likely to fall in England to the Environment Agency, in this instance, but that does not absolve non-lead responders from playing their part. When a potential flood impinges on the functions of another Category 1 body, then it too has a duty to warn, for example, where it is likely that the flood will require a response from the local authority or the police, e.g. because the flood will impact on the delivery of education or the welfare of clients on a social services care list or, in the case of the police, because lives and property will be at risk. The Agency is also responsible for warning other responders, who must make decisions on, for example, evacuation, in the same way it does the public. In similar wide area examples, such as health emergencies, the lead Category 1 responder with responsibility for warning and informing will be a health organisation, but it will also require assistance from other Category 1 responders. Different bodies may undertake the lead Category 1 response role in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

7.97. Where identification of the Category 1 organisation taking the lead responder role for warning, informing and advising cannot be done in advance, the Regulations permit a procedure to be established for identifying at the time of an event who should be the lead responder. However, choosing this option may cause unwanted delay and confusion. A possible example where Category 1 responders might want to delay identifying a lead responder could be a severe weather emergency. Even so, in Annex

7D, it is suggested that the police should be identified in advance for the lead role in this type of wide area emergency, where the likely impact is on road traffic. They, of course, would expect to be supported by a range of other Category 1 responders.

7.98. Procedures may also be adopted for changing the lead responder with responsibility for warning, informing and advising during the course of an emergency. On land, the police, and in maritime emergencies, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency are likely to co-ordinate warning and information strategies in the early stages of many emergencies. In the later stages, the lead in distributing information and advice about longer-term issues, for example, connected to health or the environment, may be handed over to the relevant expert organisation.

Use of Protocols

7.99. Category 1 responders are likely to want to support these arrangements with protocols.[32] (A checklist of possible protocols appears at Annex 7C). These may be negotiated directly or through the LRF.

7.100. Protocols should be recorded formally and in some detail, so that they can be implemented immediately in the event of an emergency. They should describe the process which will be used to identify stages in the emergency when the lead communicator responsibility ought to be changed during the handover from response to recovery, and the point at which normal operating practices should be resumed and reviewed.

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[32] regulation 7

Role of the lead responder

7.101.   The planning arrangements of the lead responder for warning, informing and advising the public are likely to include:

- o Procedures and a capability for:
    - contacting other relevant responder organisations and informing them of action being undertaken or proposed;
    - delivering urgent emergency warnings, or ensuring they are delivered;
    - co-ordinating all communications activity at the time of an emergency, so that public information is consistent, timely and without unnecessary duplication;
    - delivering information and advice in relation to its functional areas of responsibility;
    - assisting other participating responder organisations to deliver information and provide advice in relation to their functional responsibilities.
- o Provision of:
    - a media facility;
    - a lead spokesperson to work with the media;
    - facilities for staff from different responder organisations to work together on a public information service.
- o Procedures for:
    - handing over the role to another lead Category 1 responder as determined by the course of events.

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Who delivers?

7.102. How information and advice are delivered can greatly affect how they are received. Category 1 responders should give careful thought to this ahead of any emergency, and should identify individuals who may act as official spokespeople and undertake media interviews. These individuals should receive suitable training.

7.103. If the figure is already recognised as a trustworthy and authoritative person, the message will be delivered all the more effectively. This might be because they already have a good public profile in the area or are in uniform (research shows that the public have great confidence in spokespeople from the emergency services).

7.104. In addition to those who will be taking a frontline media role, it is important that other staff who may come into direct contact with the public (receptionists, security and switchboard staff, for example) are provided with at least a basic level of information and can handle inquiries confidently.

WHOM
Audience / Population at risk

7.105. Category 1 responders are, required in the Act to make local arrangements for delivering information and advice about an emergency to the public with the purpose of mitigating the effects and aiding recovery. They should plan to be able to meet the needs of many different audiences. These can be grouped as follows :

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> **Warning the public in emergencies: audience types**
>
> **Casualties, and others affected by the emergency**
>
> Group A: Survivors - those in the immediate vicinity and directly affected, possibly as wounded casualties.
>
> Group B: Those close by who may need to take action to avoid further harm.
>
> **Local people, friends and relatives**
>
> Group C: Those in the area who may be disrupted by the consequences of the emergency and the clear-up process.
>
> Group D: Those who are not affected directly but know or are related to those who might be.
>
> **The wider audience**
>
> Group E: Those who are not affected but are concerned or alarmed about wider implications, or simply interested.
>
> Group F: The news media.

Survivors (Group A) and others affected by the emergency (Group B)

7.106. The needs of these two groups are the main focus of attention in the initial response to an incident and beyond.

7.107. Providing information to Group A is, in effect, an extension of the warning phase. Those at the scene are under direct instruction from the emergency services. Those in charge of operations are best placed to decide what advice or instructions are required, by whom and how quickly.

7.108. Group B urgently need to know what they need to do immediately - this may be a message to stay indoors and shut windows, to evacuate, to follow decontamination instructions, or to report somewhere for medical checks. Planning should address these issues. Group B may also need (and certainly will want) to know why the advice is being given.

7.109. Responders should take into account different response behaviours and tailor their messages appropriately. The majority of people need leadership and direction; some need to be controlled. Messages should focus on encouraging positive actions. Group behaviour can manifest itself positively (helping others) or negatively (endangering others), but the majority of individuals are likely to need some level of support.

7.110. In the earliest moments following an incident, vital operational decisions are often made by the first police officers, emergency workers or even members of the public at the scene. Pre-planning should ensure that decisions about the nature and timing of advice to the public have a prominent place among the urgent matters to be dealt with. If official information is not quickly communicated to the public, there is a greater risk of inaccurate information from informal sources (such as SMS text or social networking messages) becoming widely spread and accepted.

7.111. Responders are unlikely to be able to rely solely on the media to reach the Group B audience. Planning should recognise that targeting will need to be more precise than can be achieved by broadcasters. Procedures should include some form of audit trail of who has or has not been contacted. The media may be used to provide basic safety messages.

Local people (Group C), friends and relatives (Group D)

7.112. Local media can be particularly helpful in addressing Group C, providing general information about the emergency, information on how the public can help and advice on disruption in the area, e.g. traffic bulletins. It is important for communications planning to ensure that Group C, in particular, can get access to regular progress updates.

7.113. Category 1 responders should work closely with the media, especially local radio, ahead of time to prepare useful standard material. The text of announcements should, where possible, be agreed with broadcasters in advance to avoid unnecessary questions of editorial control under pressure.

7.114. Group D will usually be alerted to an emergency through the national media. The most likely first response is to phone the people they know in the area, either to find out if they are safe or to get more information.

7.115. There is evidence from past disasters that the emotional impact of watching the unfolding of events which may be affecting a close relative or friend can be very significant. Where people at a distance can be reasonably sure that a relative or friend is caught up in the incident they will be desperate for information. The Police Casualty Bureau will be a prime information tool. Communications planning must address this reality.

The wider audience (Groups E and F)

7.116. Group E are effectively 'the public at large'. Their principal source of information is news broadcasts and whatever they can find on websites.

7.117.   The media (Group F) are the sixth audience for the information provided by Category 1 responders. They can influence both the short-term handling and the long-term impact of an emergency.

7.118.   The news media (broadcasting, print and text services) remain the primary means of communication with the public. The public's picture of a crisis is largely shaped by the media. The need for information in a crisis is huge, and mass media are nearly always first and have the greatest impact. A false or inaccurate picture will be difficult to adjust later. Consequently, communication with the media has to work from the start and information from Category 1 responders should be as accurate and complete as possible.

Working with the media

7.119.   While Category 1 responders have little control over the output on news channels, it is important that plans are in place to agree what the main public messages will be, to provide the media with as much relevant material as possible and to ensure it is accurate, consistent and regularly updated.

7.120.   As part of a general information strategy, in advance of an emergency, the media can help to raise public awareness of the issues and provide information about what to do if one occurs.

7.121.   More importantly, in the wake of an emergency, the media can deliver specific advice and information to large numbers of affected people more quickly and effectively than any other means of delivery. This can take any form, from short, simple messages repeated across all formats, to explanatory interviews and extensive background material on websites. The written press can deliver complex information and advice which people need to retain over a number of days or

weeks. The media have ways of quickly reaching many different audiences with specific needs - the deaf, the blind, and those who do not speak English, for example. Radio, in particular, is the most resilient form of mass communication, available even if power and phone lines are down, via battery or wind-up portable radios and car radios.

7.122.   At the same time as providing useful advice and information to the public, the media are likely to operate in reporting mode. They may well produce round-the-clock rolling news coverage if the emergency is serious enough. It is important that Category 1 responders should have plans to play their part in providing authoritative information and spokespeople for interview, to ensure that the public gets a fair picture of how they are handling the situation, and to counter any inaccurate information, such as from informal sources like social networking websites. The needs of foreign broadcasters who work to different time zones/scales should also be considered.

7.123.   Planning should recognise that the media will seize upon any inconsistencies in presentation or message, either between responders at the local level, or between local and national responses. It is vital that Category 1 responders are equipped to liaise effectively with each other and with regional and UK bodies, otherwise the operation may appear chaotic.

7.124.   If the media do not get the information they want from Category 1 responders, they are likely to go elsewhere for footage and commentary. This may lead to a loss of messaging control for Category 1 responders, and put them in a position of having to defend themselves against unfounded criticism or inaccurate analysis. Category 1 responders should be aware that the handling of the emergency, as well as the emergency itself, will all be part of the story. No matter how positive relations are with the media ahead of an event, responders must expect to be criticised if events seem to be going badly. They should plan accordingly.

7.125. All Category 1 responders should be familiar with the media organisations and outlets in their own area and should develop good relations with them. Discussion with the media ahead of an event helps ensure that all parties can operate more effectively on the day, by preparing useful standard background material in advance, planning practical arrangements and building trust and confidence on all sides. This can be achieved through geographically based multi-forum groups (such as media emergency forums), which bring together the media and emergency planning communications specialists. In many areas, particularly those where there are long-standing known hazards, such as nuclear power stations or extensive industrial complexes, there are also local groupings with members from Category 1 and 2 responders, other organisations not covered by the Act, as well as the media. These are quite often chaired by local police representatives.

7.126. The BBC's local radio service is recognised as an emergency broadcaster for the UK and its editors can be contacted for advice and to agree contact details and processes in the event of an emergency. Planning before a crisis is key and the importance of a good pre-existing relationship between those in the media and those involved in emergency planning and work during a crisis cannot be overestimated. Editors contact details can be found via the BBC's *Connecting in a Crisis* framework.[33]

7.127. The media landscape is continuing to develop. Some of the biggest growth has been in online news services. The media, particularly the broadcast media, can expect huge demand for their online service.

7.128. Mobile phones with cameras and other similar devices mean that the public are able to publish their own content. Within seconds of a disaster, pictures can be broadcast around the world, sometimes before the emergency services have had a chance to respond.

[33] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15250977

7.129. The broadcast media are much more audience focused and their questions will reflect audience concerns. They are also aware that big emergencies attract big audiences and responders need to be prepared to deal with such large numbers.

Media planning – some essential elements

Pre-event:

- liaising with other Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not captured by the Act and media/public relations teams;

- identifying potential sites for media centres in the area

- providing media training for potential spokespeople;

- providing suitable communications equipment for press office staff to work away from the office;

- making arrangements for mutual aid to be provided to neighbouring areas; and

- providing for liaison with the appropriate press offices.

On the day:

- establishing a Media Liaison Point at or near the scene of an emergency;

- establishing a Media Liaison Centre close to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group/overall incident commander; and

- liaising with other responder bodies regarding VIP and ministerial visits to the scene.

Social media

7.130.   Recent years have seen an exponential growth in the use of social media by society and, as such, it is an area that emergency responders cannot ignore; whilst having little control over it. The COI guidance Engaging through Social Media http://www.coi.gov.uk/documents/Engaging_through_social_media.pdf outlines the advantages and issues for consideration across a range of day-to-day government roles.

7.131.   The communications landscape has significantly shifted with the advent and development of social media. It has a role to play in preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies. It provides emergency responders with the capability to engage in two-way communication with the public in real-time, potentially sending messages 'virally' and, in doing so, creating a number of believable spokespersons. Analysis of social media can also aid situational awareness and better understanding of the working context.

7.132.   The benefits that social media can provide are clear. However, there are risks to its usage and these should be evaluated before deployment:

o   As an 'opt-in' service, it can be difficult to attract users in advance of events, ensuring they receive messages encouraging preparedness.

o   Messages can be altered and spoofed once transmitted which may cause the integrity of the message to be compromised.

o   Responders will want to be aware of activity on social media sites and engage where possible to counter erroneous messages. Providing links through to official websites may help to alleviate this to some extent.

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7.133.   LRFs may also wish to consider the benefits of agreeing a multi-agency social media protocol to ensure usage is consistent with both individual, and multi-organisational policy.

Examples of use of social media:

West Yorkshire Police used social media during demonstrations by the English Defence League and United Against Fascism in Bradford City Centre over the August Bank Holiday 2010. They monitored online forums and other social media to gather intelligence and identify potential partners and problems. The Police used channels such as Twitter and YouTube to update the media and spread key messages. An online forum was established through Huddle (www.huddle.com) to share materials and flag potential issues; a Daily Information Update for key partners was produced.

The use and misuse of social media was again demonstrated during the public disorder in England during the summer 2011.

- No 10 Downing Street offers a host of social media channels including Flickr, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. @number10gov
- The Highlands and Islands Strategic Co-ordinating Group (HISCG) have a Twitter page http://twitter.com/NorthernPolice and http://twitter.com/handiprepared.
- http://blog.scraperwiki.com/2010/10/21/wheres-safe-creating-a-tool-to-guide-people-in-an-emergency/
- Birmingham Resilience Team has a website which contains managed feeds: Vimeo, Flickr, Facebook and Twitter.
- www.birminghamprepared.gov.uk

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> The digital/social media world continues to grow and shift and so it is difficult to accurately reflect current best practice in published guidance. Updated case studies will be posted on the National Resilience Extranet.

Exercise and review

7.134. It is important to exercise arrangements for communicating with the public. Public communications and media planning can be effectively tested in tabletop or full-scale exercises. These should be conducted regularly.

7.135. Both the media and the public can take part in exercises. This can help to make them more realistic and will increase the challenge for participants. It will also help to promote community resilience messages.

7.136. It will often be beneficial to involve some media as players in the exercise. News organisations with a role in reporting emergencies benefit from rehearsing their arrangements too. Where the exercise scenario involves security issues, it may not be possible to achieve full media involvement. However, it should, in most cases, be possible to agree effective rules that allow the media to participate without running news stories about the event. Media contacts, especially out of hours contacts, should be updated at least twice a year.

7.137. Category 1 responders have always been sensitive to appearing to be underprepared, but with positive relations with the media established in 'normal' conditions, it should be possible to demonstrate how problems are being identified and remedied ahead of a real event.

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7.138. In tandem with these arrangements, Category 1 responders should also consider the role of exercises in building public confidence. Research shows that providing the public, through the media, with information about exercises that are taking place and showing pictures of what they may expect to happen can be extremely reassuring.

7.139. When developing exercises, responders should consider inviting local media to cover the story as observers. The ground rules should be agreed in advance, with assistance from the appropriate media groups/forums as necessary.

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CabinetOffice

Chapter 8 Business continuity advice and assistance to business and the voluntary sector

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

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Chapter 8 (Business continuity advice and assistance to business and the voluntary sector) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- The Act requires local authorities to provide advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity management (BCM) in the event of an emergency (as defined by the Act) (*paragraphs 8.1-8.8*).

- Local authorities must provide general advice and assistance to the business and voluntary sector communities at large; may provide specific advice and assistance to individual organisations; and may give advice and assistance to individual businesses in relation to the engagement of business continuity consultants (*paragraphs 8.8-8.22*).

- Not all voluntary organisations would want - or benefit from - business continuity advice. A local authority may therefore define its own voluntary sector audience, targeting efforts where they will add most value (*paragraphs 8.28-8.31*).

- Local authorities may charge for advice and assistance provided on request, on a cost-recovery basis (*paragraphs 8.34-8.35*).

- Local authorities should have regard to relevant Community Risk Registers (CRRs) when developing an advice and assistance programme (*paragraphs 8.36-8.37*).

- Local authorities may enter into collaborative arrangements with other Category 1 and 2 responders in fulfilling their duties (*paragraphs 8.38-8.41*).

- Local authorities within a Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area are required to co-operate with each other in performing their duties; other Category 1 and 2 responders within a Local Resilience Forum are required to co-operate with local authorities (*paragraphs 8.42-8.52*).

- Local authorities are required to have regard to the BCM advice and assistance provided by other Category 1 and 2 responders to business and voluntary organisations in their areas (*paragraphs 8.46-8.52*).

- This chapter also sets out the considerations local authorities should take into account when developing a programme of advice and assistance (e.g. key messages, established support networks) (*paragraphs 8.57-8.74*).

- Local authorities should consider how to use the arrangements for multi-agency co-operation established by the Act to ensure BCM advice and assistance programmes are co-ordinated and effective (*paragraphs 8.70-8.72*).

- Local authorities have been discharging the business continuity duty since its commencement in May 2006. In this time a number of different methods have been used to reach out to local businesses. Some of these have been recorded as case studies, attached as an annex to this chapter.

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

8.1.   **Scope of the duty**

The Act requires local authorities to provide advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in their areas in relation to BCM in the event of emergencies (as defined in the Act).[1] This activity is undertaken to ensure preparedness.

Rationale for the duty

8.2.   The duty on local authorities to give advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity management (BCM) is an integral part of the Act's wider contribution to building the UK's resilience to disruptive challenges.

8.3.   In the event of an emergency, Category 1 responders will give all the assistance they can, but there is merit in ensuring that communities themselves are resilient. In particular, it is important to ensure that the impact of an emergency on the continuity of commercial and voluntary organisations is kept to a minimum. This will lessen the economic and social impact of emergencies and speed up recovery.

8.4.   Establishing a source of BCM advice and assistance prior to an emergency occurring will raise business continuity awareness in the community, and help organisations to help themselves in case of an incident.

[1] s.4

8.5.   A programme of business continuity advice and assistance will help in building community resilience; it will reduce reliance on public sector bodies in the event of an emergency and enable Category 1 and 2 responders to focus their resources on the most vulnerable. It will also help improve links between Category 1 and 2 responders and the business community and voluntary sector, which are crucial to effective emergency management arrangements.

Advice and assistance duty in context

8.6.   As Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates, the business continuity advice and assistance duty is closely related to other duties in the Act, and should not be seen as a stand-alone duty. Developing and exercising emergency plans may require close liaison with organisations that carry out commercial or voluntary activities - for example in the preparation of city centre evacuation plans. There is a clear link between this work and the duty to give BCM advice and assistance to businesses, in many ways, it is a logical extension of this work.

8.7.   In fulfilling their duty to assess risks in their area and collaborate in the preparation of the Community Risk Register, local authorities will have a good overview of the risk profile in an area. Furthermore, emergency planning work - and co-operation with other Category 1 and 2 responders through Local Resilience Forums (LRF's) - will leave local authorities well-sighted on the arrangements that are in place to deal with emergencies (see Chapters 2 and 4).

8.8.   There is also a strong relationship with the warning and informing duty (see Chapter 7). This requires Category 1 responders to publish aspects of risk assessments and contingency plans, and to maintain arrangements to issue advice, information and warnings in the event of an emergency. The section 4 duty builds on this work, by requiring local authorities to provide information, advice and assistance targeted at organisations that carry out commercial activities and voluntary activities.

Box 8.1: Further advice and information

> Also included in this chapter is further advice about business continuity promotion and information that is not supported directly by the Act, but responders may find it useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one

Generic advice and assistance

8.9.   The Regulations specify that local authorities have a duty to provide generic advice and assistance to the business community at large[2]; but its duty regarding voluntary organisations is to provide advice and assistance to those organisations it considers appropriate and in a way it considers appropriate.[3]

8.10.   While the Act imposes a duty on local authorities to offer advice and assistance, it does not impose a corresponding obligation on those organisations to act upon it.

8.11.   In complying with this duty, local authorities must demonstrate that they have taken reasonable steps to promote BCM advice in their areas. This will involve developing a strategy that:

  o   identifies what organisations need to know;

  o   selects appropriate means of delivery; and

  o   targets the message at its audience.

[See the case studies at Box 8.3 for examples of how some local authorities have undertaken this.]

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[2] regulation 39(3)(a)
[3] regulation 40(2) and 40(3)

8.12.   As a result of local authorities' generic awareness-raising work, individual firms may turn to the local authority for specific advice and assistance in relation to BCM. The Regulations permit local authorities to provide specific BCM services to organisations or groups of organisations, but do not oblige them to do so.[4]

8.13.   Local authority officials can undertake this type of work themselves if they have the experience and competence to do so. Local authorities can work with individual organisations or other local authorities to establish the nature of the risks they face and the steps they can take to manage these risks. This might include, for example:

- o   assistance with risk assessment;
- o   provision of information and advice about local civil protection arrangements;
- o   support in the development and validation of plans.

8.14.   With local authorities wishing to ensure value-for-money, it is reasonable that this applies in the area of promoting business continuity. Since the duty to advise and assist was introduced, local authorities, working in conjunction with partners such as police and fire services, have produced some good work that has made significant steps in building resilience in their communities. The result is that we now have a body of knowledge and experience within local authorities that can be used by others to discharge this duty in a cost effective way that has delivered demonstrably greater uptake.

Signposting third party advice

8.15.   Alternatively, the local authority may give advice and assistance to individual organisations to facilitate the engagement of a business continuity consultant, who may be better placed to provide the support required. However, undertaking this work is discretionary, and is not a requirement of the regulations.[5]

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[4] regulations 39(3)(b) and 40(3)(b)
[5] regulations 39(3)(c) and 40(3)(c)

8.16.   Outside large organisations, most of the people responsible for business continuity are not professionals, and may require guidance when purchasing business continuity advice, services or facilities.

8.17.   Where it chooses to go down this path, the local authority must remain impartial and take steps to ensure firms are referred to practitioners that have the competence and experience to advise them.[6] Failure to do so could, in certain circumstances, give rise to legal challenge.

Definition of an emergency

8.18.   BCM arrangements can be put in place to manage the risks associated with the full range of business interruptions, which could comprise anything from minor supplier or technology failure through to the potentially catastrophic effects of terrorism or natural disaster. BCM is a flexible framework designed to help organisations develop resilience to the full spectrum of events. However, the Act imposes a duty on local authorities to give advice and assistance to commercial and voluntary organisations on developing arrangements to deal with a much narrower range of disruptive challenges.

8.19.   The duty applies only to those events or situations defined as an emergency in the Act.[7] It does not extend to the wider range of day-to-day disruptions which can threaten the smooth running - or even the very existence - of an organisation. The Act does not require local authorities to give advice and assistance in managing risks that are purely internal to the organisation (e.g. technical, commercial or financial aspects of running the organisation). Nor does it require local authorities to give advice on dealing with smaller-scale incidents (e.g. minor fires or theft).

[6] regulations 39(4) and 40(4)
[7] s.1

8.20.   An emergency is likely to affect a number of organisations, which may in turn threaten to seriously disrupt the effective functioning of the community at large. Advice and assistance to the business and voluntary sector community at large should therefore focus on generic disruptions that affect a significant part of the community. In this respect, the BCM duty will enhance community resilience by encouraging a local business climate able to withstand the disruptions caused by an emergency.

8.21.   A key objective of the BCM duty is to help organisations to link in with practical emergency planning arrangements put in place by Category 1 responders. Local authorities will be particularly well placed to give advice and assistance to organisations in preparing for events or situations whose scale and impact require assessments of risk to be made and emergency plans to be prepared by Category 1 responders.

8.22.   However, organisations that recognise the value of BCM planning for emergencies are unlikely to confine their forward thinking to this type of risk only.

Audience

8.23.   A key objective of the BCM advice and assistance duty under the Act is to minimise the economic impact of emergencies on the local community. It delivers this by requiring local authorities to encourage greater preparedness among organisations that carry out commercial activities, and providing advice and assistance in improving their resilience.

8.24.   Commercial organisations are those private sector businesses operating for a profit. Charities are, by definition, voluntary organisations which carry out their activities on a 'not for profit basis'. However, some charities have separate trading arms, and companies operating under these are classified as commercial organisations, whereas a 'charity shop', operated by the charity itself, is defined as a voluntary organisation. Building societies and credit unions carry out commercial activities, and although not privately owned, operate as a business and generate financial benefits for their members.

8.25.   The Regulations state that the duty to provide BCM advice and assistance only applies to businesses carrying on commercial activities in the local authority area.[8] The duty will also extend to activities that operate in the area on a non-permanent basis e.g. music festivals or major construction projects. In many cases, the local authority will be aware of the presence of such activity in its area, for example through planning consents for construction projects, or through the local authority/emergency services Safety Advisory Groups set up to give advice and guidance to event organisers.

8.26.   The Act also requires local authorities to give advice and assistance to voluntary organisations in their communities, many of whom will not undertake commercial activities.[9] Voluntary organisations play a critical role in local civil protection arrangements; they also deliver a wide range of services that are crucial to the effective functioning of communities (e.g. providing advice, social care, cultural and spiritual services). Demands on their services are likely to increase in the event of an emergency, and, if they are unable to continue functioning, this could exacerbate its effects.

8.27.   Providing business continuity advice to voluntary organisations will help build the resilience of the wider community, and help limit the impact of emergencies on its ability to function effectively.

[8] regulation 39(2)
[9] s.4

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8.28.   However, the voluntary sector is large and diverse, and not all voluntary organisations would want - or indeed benefit from - business continuity advice. A large number of voluntary organisations, for example, do not employ staff or maintain premises. Given the large number of voluntary bodies (c. 600,000) - and the difficulty of reaching out to some of them - it is unrealistic to expect local authorities to proactively provide (even generic) advice and assistance to them all.

8.29.   The underlying principles of BCM are common to all organisations. In many instances - particularly where messages are made publicly available via websites - the costs to the local authority of extending their advice to all voluntary organisations will be minimal.

8.30.   However, when deciding how to prioritise when taking forward a proactive programme of advice and assistance, local authorities may need to take decisions about which voluntary organisations to approach, and where to target resources.

8.31.   The Regulations therefore permit a local authority itself to determine its target audience within the voluntary sector.[10] The Regulations provide that, in so doing, local authorities should have regard to a range of factors,[11] including:

  o **Role in relation to emergencies:** A large number of voluntary organisations play a direct role in preventing or responding to emergencies. In order to help others, they will need to be able to keep themselves operating in the event of an emergency.

[10] regulation 40(2), s.4
[11] regulation 40(5)

o **Contribution to the effective functioning of the community:** In the event of an emergency, some organisations will be critical to the health and welfare of communities.

o **Economic importance:** Staff numbers and turnover will also be an important consideration in determining target audiences. These will give an indication of an organisation's importance to the local economy, and the likely value of business continuity planning adding value to an organisation.

o **Geography:** It would not generally be appropriate for a local authority to give BCM advice to a voluntary organisation which does not carry out activities in the area for which the local authority is responsible.

Charging

8.32. The Regulations permit local authorities to make a charge for business continuity advice and assistance provided on request, where this is appropriate, but do not oblige them to do so.[12]

8.33. It is unlikely that local authorities will be able to charge for promotional materials or awareness-raising materials supplied, which in many cases will not have been requested. However, local authorities may wish to make a charge for a number of activities including:

o attendance at local authority organised events;

o membership of business continuity forums;

o provision of specific information (e.g. aspects of risk assessments);

o provision of advice on an ad hoc basis (e.g. development or review of firms' own plans); and

o provision of an established BCM service.

[12] regulation 44

8.34.   The Regulations also provide that local authorities may only charge for BCM advice and assistance on a cost-recovery basis.[13] Local authorities may charge for the full cost of all the resources used in carrying out activities for which a charge is to be made, and a reasonable share of any research or documentation that underpins this service. The regulations do not permit local authorities to seek to make a profit from activities in this area.

8.35.   Further guidance on charging policy can be found in the HM Treasury Fees and Charges Guide (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk); however, local authorities will also want to consider the impact of their charging policy on the take-up of their advice and assistance.

Risk assessment

8.36.   The BCM programme should reflect the risk profile of the area. When developing a BCM promotion strategy and materials, the officer responsible should ask: What possible disruptions do organisations need to know about? What impacts might they have? Are there any locations or firms that are particularly vulnerable?

8.37.   The Regulations require local authorities to "take into account" the Community Risk Register (CRR) agreed by the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) when developing a business continuity promotion programme.[14] It may also be necessary to consider risks outside the area that could impact upon businesses in a local authority area (e.g. major chemical plant in a neighbouring area), hence the requirement to have regard to "any relevant risk register".

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[13] regulation 44
[14] regulation 38

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Developing collaborative arrangements

Collaboration with other local authorities

8.38.   The duty to provide advice and assistance in relation to BCM falls on all local authorities. The Regulations permit local authorities to enter into collaborative arrangements with other Category 1 or 2 responders (e.g. a Fire and Rescue Authority) in delivering the duty.[15]

8.39.   There are a number of options open to authorities in deciding how best to discharge their responsibility. This permissive approach gives local authorities the flexibility to decide how to make the best use of the skills, expertise, networks and resources available in an area. Working collaboratively could help ensure that efforts are co-ordinated and that economies of scale are achieved. There are a number of case studies with contacts contained in this guidance, at Box 8.3, which detail some of the ways that local authorities have discharged this duty in a cost effective and beneficial way to local businesses. This has been demonstrated by a measurable increase in website activity and engagement.

8.40.   However, it remains the responsibility of each authority to ensure that the programme is delivered effectively, and its statutory duties are fulfilled. Whichever option - or mixture of options - is chosen, each authority should ensure that:

   o   roles and responsibilities are clear;

   o   clear review and evaluation mechanisms are in place;

   o   the programme adequately reflects the diverse business needs and risk profile within an LRF area; and

   o   elected members and senior officers are brought into the process where necessary.

Box 8.2: Delivering BCM in partnership

Business continuity management and promotion has become an integral part of the Local Resilience Forum structure within the Northumbria area. Responsibility for promotion lies with the five councils of Tyne and Wear and Northumberland Emergency Planning Department and is discharged by the Tyne and Wear Emergency Planning Unit who coordinates activity on behalf of the Tyne and Wear Councils. The Business Continuity Management Promotion Strategy is focused on maximising business resilience within the Northumbria LRF by facilitating the coordination of promotional materials and events.

On a day to day basis, responsibility includes the Tyne and Wear Emergency Planning Unit providing a comprehensive resilience planning service to all five councils in the Tyne and Wear area as well as work on specific business continuity initiatives. This includes:

- o Provision of advice and guidance.
- o Training of staff earmarked with business continuity roles within procurement.
- o Speaking at seminars.
- o Facilitating workshops.
- o Supporting internal business promotion days.

Promotional aspects have included the recent Business Continuity Conference (March 2010) and current involvement includes the organising and management of business continuity Information events which will be taking place during Business Continuity Awareness week in March 2011.

> The provision of support to address business continuity collaboratively within the Northumbria LRF area has enabled good practice and lessons learned to be shared between the five councils and other key stakeholders.
>
> However, please be aware that these arrangements are currently subject to review.

8.41.   Delegation, or the appointment of a lead authority, does not absolve the local authority of the duty, but merely transforms the mode of delivery. The local authority remains under a legal duty to ensure the programme is delivered, even when a third party is contracted to complete the work.

Partnership working in BCM promotion

- o **Separate programmes:** Local authorities deliver BCM programmes separately, while ensuring the coherence of the message and means of delivery.
- o **Delegation:** All or some local authorities in an LRF area delegate the duty to a single authority, which then delivers the duty on their behalf. Delegation can be to any Category 1 or 2 responder not just to a local authority.
- o **Joint working:** This would involve a single programme being delivered jointly by a number of local authorities.
- o **Appointing a "lead authority":** This involves giving one or more partner authorities a leading role within the delivery of the programme, with other authorities fulfilling a lesser, supporting role. The lead authority could, for example, co-ordinate the content and production of promotional material for others to deliver.

> o **Outsourcing:** As in other areas of local authority business,
> the duty could be contracted to a third party on a commercial
> basis, either by an individual authority or collectively.

Co-ordination of BCM promotion programmes

8.42. The Regulations require local authorities within an LRF area to co-operate with each other when performing their duties under section 4 of the Act.[16] The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that local authorities within an LRF area deliver a coherent programme of advice and assistance to organisations undertaking commercial activities in their communities.

8.43. This co-operation may take place bilaterally or within a single forum. Whatever form this co-operation takes, authorities will need to take steps to ensure that:

> o the message they are giving out is consistent;
> o the means of delivery are co-ordinated where appropriate;
> o external partners are not unduly burdened; and
> o lessons are identified and learned and best practice is shared.

8.44. The BCM promotion programme in an LRF area should be driven by the needs of local organisations, not local authorities' administrative boundaries. Organisations in an LRF area will often operate across local authority boundaries, hence the importance of delivering a co-ordinated message with promotional or awareness-raising work.

8.45. Local authorities will also want to consider the need to adopt a coherent approach to the provision of specific advice and assistance where this is requested.

[16] regulation 41(1)

Co-ordination with other Category 1 responders' work

8.46. The duty to provide advice and assistance in relation to BCM falls on local authorities, but this does not mean that other Category 1 responders should not support these programmes.

8.47. A number of other Category 1 responders are already engaged in providing BCM advice. This work should be supported and encouraged by local authorities as part of the wider promotion programme under the Act.

8.48. The Regulations require local authorities to have regard to the business continuity assistance work other Category 1 responders are doing in the community.[17] In practice, this means that local authorities are required to develop an awareness of the business continuity work other Category 1 responders undertake with organisations, and consider the implications of this work for their own business continuity advice and assistance programmes.

8.49. This will help local authorities to ensure that programmes complement other work. Local authorities should take steps to ensure that their BCM advice and assistance programmes dovetail with work undertaken by other Category 1 responders, that synergies are exploited, and that they work collaboratively where possible. The Regulations additionally provide that local authorities need not unnecessarily duplicate the work done by other responders with local organisations.[18]

[17] regulation 43(1)
[18] regulation 43(1)(b)

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8.50.   Furthermore, BCM awareness material will address public sector response arrangements and risk profiles, which will require the collaboration of other Category 1 responders. It is, therefore, important that local authorities have access to the right information and advice to inform their promotion strategies, and that the assumptions they make about other Category 1 responders' response arrangements are accurate. The Regulations impose a duty on all Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate and share information on request pursuant to local authorities' duties under section 4 of the Act.[19]

8.51.   This co-operation may take place bilaterally, as required, or via a subgroup of the LRF.

Other Category 1 Responders' work with commercial organisations

> **The Police**
>
> The police work with the business community on continuity-related issues in a number of ways:
>
> - o **Crime prevention advice:** Most large police stations have dedicated officers proactively providing crime prevention advice to local businesses on crime prevention and security issues (e.g. CCTV). Contact your local police service for further information about the work done in your area.
> - o **Counter-terrorism advice:** Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) provide advice on demand to the business community on preventing and mitigating the effects of acts of terrorism.
>   They are not resourced to give advice to individual businesses, but may be willing to give advice to groups of businesses, such as a business continuity forum.

Crime Their work is co-ordinated by the National Counter Terrorism and Security Office (NACTSO), which published the *Expecting the Unexpected* document (https://vsat.nactso.gov.uk/SiteCollection Documents/OurServices/expecting-the-unexpected.pdf) in conjunction with London First and the Business Continuity Institute. CTSAs can be contacted via local police headquarters.

o **Advice on emergency response procedures:** Police services seek to raise awareness among local businesses about emergency response procedures (e.g. evacuation procedures, cordoning in the event of an incident). Project ARGUS (http://www.nactso. gov.uk/OurServices/Argus.aspx) is a NACTSO initiative, which takes businesses through a simulated terrorist attack and identifies prevention, handling and recovery measures. Project Griffin (http://www.projectgriffin.org.uk/) was developed by the City of London Police as a joint venture between the City and Metropolitan police forces. Its remit was to advise large public and private sector organisations on security, counter-terrorism and crime prevention issues. It is increasingly being adopted by other police forces.

Fire Authorities

Since 1947, fire authorities have been under a duty to provide, on request, information about fire prevention and mitigation. The Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004 conferred a new duty on fire authorities to make provision for actively promoting fire safety within their area. This involves the provision of advice and assistance to local businesses. They work with occupiers/owners in the business community to offer advice over a broad range of topics - proactively and on request.

This work will be undertaken in different ways according to the priorities in the area.

In Hereford and Worcester, specialist Fire Safety Inspecting Officers receive technical training so that they can offer advice and assistance to commercial organisations on issues such as:

- o arson reduction;
- o business continuity; and
- o community fire safety.

Fire-fighters reinforce this proactive approach to fire prevention by taking forward aspects of this approach in their day-to-day work. They may work closely with other enforcement agencies and bodies providing business continuity advice to explore opportunities for partnership working.

Maritime and Coastguard Agency

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is committed to preventing loss of life, continuously improving maritime safety, and protecting the marine environment. Various aspects of this work involve BCM promotion.

In addition to enforcing contingency planning requirements, the Agency undertakes a range of educational initiatives with the shipping, fishing, and offshore oil and gas industries, as well as with those who visit the sea or coast for leisure. Further information can be found at: http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/.

8.52.   Local authorities must observe the limits on sharing sensitive information set out in the Regulations when taking forward their programme of advice and assistance. Local authorities may have access to - or be asked for - personal data or information that relates to national security or public safety. Even where this would assist the local authority in its BCM advice and assistance work, this information should not be disclosed, unless appropriate consent has been obtained or the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests of the organisation or individual concerned. The same applies to commercially sensitive information, which must also be treated appropriately. Chapter 3 sets out in more detail the limits on dealing with sensitive information. [See also case studies 3 and 5 in Box 8.3]

How the Act and the regulations apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

Scotland

8.53.   The Regulations made by the Minister which relate to the promotion of business continuity do not apply to local authorities in Scotland. The Regulations made by the Scottish Ministers make provision as to how local authorities in Scotland should exercise their duty to provide advice and assistance in relation to business continuity.

Wales

8.54.   The Act and the Regulations apply in Wales in the same way as they apply in England.

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Northern Ireland

8.55.   The duty to provide advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity does not apply to local authorities in Northern Ireland.

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

8.56.   This section outlines how the Government believes the duties described may best be carried out. It describes good practice. Category 1 responders must have regard to this guidance.[20]

Why should organisations put BC plans in place?

8.57.   Whilst the duty to promote BC is founded on the wider contribution to national resilience, to use this reason as a way to encourage businesses to take up business continuity may not encourage businesses to take that step and make that investment.

8.58.   For the majority of commercial businesses, any decision to adopt a system or activity will focus on 'business benefits'. It is therefore imperative that when promoting business continuity, the arguments used resonate with those responsible for making these decisions. These should promote the financial benefits that can be accrued by:

   o   conducting a business impact analysis to evaluate the critical activities to a business (e.g. the processes for producing and selling those products that have the highest profit margin);

   o   demonstrating processes in place to deal with disruption to existing and potential new customers;

[20] s.4(8)(b)

o reduction of costly downtime, through alternative arrangements such as dual-sourcing and contingency measures;

o reduction in insurance premiums for policies such as 'business disruption' when demonstrating resilience measures;

o the ability to retain, and possibly gain new contracts and customers through being able to deliver when others can't.

8.59. The following information will be useful to local businesses in assessing the need to develop business continuity plans:

o the **kinds of disruption** which could occur, and

o the **impacts** they may have (e.g. loss of utilities or access to premises);

o the arrangements that Category 1 responders have in place to assess the risk of, prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies, and their implications for the business community (e.g. evacuation or recovery plans);

o **the steps individual organisations can take** to prepare for, or mitigate the effects of, an emergency (e.g. implement BCM); and

o sources of **warnings, information and advice** in the event of an emergency.

8.60. Levels of BCM awareness and activity will vary considerably between organisations. In some cases the challenge will be to get BCM on the agenda, and in others the challenge will be to sell the concept or help organisations already doing BCM to refine their plans.

Delivering a programme of advice and assistance / discharging the duty

8.61. Since 2005, local authorities have developed various means of discharging the duty: providing a service to the communities and contributing to national resilience. Some believe they have achieved real value in this area. Some of these are included as case studies at Box 8.3. They have been generously provided by local authorities, whose contact details can be found at the foot of each case study.

8.62. Practical advice in delivering the duty to provide business continuity advice and assistance is set out below.

Ways to give generic advice and assistance

The web

Local authorities could use their own websites as a reference tool for the promotion of business continuity in their area, or set up a dedicated website with local partners.

Surrey County Council produced a website www.surreycontinuity.org that is simple to use, easy to follow but contains all the relevant information that a local business needs to adopt a business continuity programme. With the site as the nucleus of business continuity promotion in Surrey, it is kept up-to-date and actively promoted within the local authority area. [See case study 1 in Box 8.3.]

In addition to specific advice on business continuity, a website can be used to direct businesses to other sources of information about civil protection issues, including the CRR and other Category 1 and 2 responders' sites and to reference other sites offering guidance on the development of business continuity arrangements.

Press releases

Articles in appropriate publications can raise awareness of business continuity issues, or to direct readers to relevant materials. Local authorities publishing an annual business or voluntary sector directory can use them to publicise the message. References in publications issued by partner organisations (e.g. business or social action representative groups) can also be useful.

Mailings

Local authorities have various means, e.g. business rate letters, of disseminating guidance to the business and voluntary sector, this might include existing reference materials on BCM, available from a wide range of sources, including the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Federation of Small Businesses and the Business Continuity Institute.

Participation in seminars/events

Existing events/seminars targeted at businesses or the voluntary sector, whether organised by the Local Authority Economic Development Department or other local partners, can be used to communicate the

message on BCM promotion and to publicise sources of information on BCM, either provided by the local authority or by a third party.

Facilitating or hosting events

Local authorities may choose, individually or in collaboration with others, to organise their own BCM events, e.g. regional or local business continuity fairs or seminars. A seminar or fair could be used to launch a new BCM forum. The costs incurred by local authorities might be met by charging a small attendance fee, inviting firms to sponsor such events, or by seeking collaboration from business or voluntary sector representative bodies. (See Box 8.2 for a short case study of similar activity undertaken by Tyne and Wear Emergency Planning Unit.)

Establishing a business continuity forum

The formation of business continuity forums, facilitated by local authorities, can encourage members of the business community to participate. These forums can promote business continuity management, and help to consolidate a local network, within which businesses can learn from each other and liaise with Category 1 and 2 responders.

Local authorities and the emergency services are often already engaged with the business and voluntary sector communities, for example, in planning for evacuation in the face of a threat of flooding or terrorism or the fire prevention work undertaken by the Fire and Rescue Service. These links provide a strong basis for developing a business forum looking at BCM or emergency planning issues in the round. Forums can be used to strengthen the links between businesses and LRFs. (See also the case studies 2 and 5 in Box 8.3.)

Specific advice

8.63.   Whilst local authorities are more likely to achieve value for money through events and promotion activities that reach out to a wide audience, there is nothing to prevent the provision of specific advice as part of the method of discharging the duty. However, this is likely to be more time consuming and the following paragraphs should be noted.

8.64.   Whichever approach local authorities take to the provision of specific information and advice to businesses or voluntary organisations requesting further support, they should consider developing a documented policy statement, in order to manage the expectations of local organisations and ensure consistency and fairness.

8.65.   Local authorities should also be aware of professional liability issues when giving specific advice and assistance. In order to reduce the risk of claims of negligence or breach of contract, local authorities should:

  o   only become involved in areas where they are competent and experienced enough to give advice and assistance;

  o   be clear about the status and limits of advice;

  o   clearly flag up areas of uncertainty or assumptions that have been made; and

  o   consider the use of disclaimers where appropriate.

8.66.   However, liability issues should not deter local authorities from giving detailed advice and assistance. If managed correctly, the risk of legal challenge is limited, and far outweighed by the demand from organisations for support, and the possible benefits in terms of community resilience.

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Referring organisations to a third party

8.67. The local authority should avoid giving definitive recommendations, or endorsing individual consultants. Its role is to direct firms to organisations that could assist them, and suggest the criteria for selecting a service provider. These could include:

- o professional qualifications/certification;
- o membership of a professional organisation;
- o experience in relevant aspects of BCM;
- o track record of completing similar tasks; and
- o adequate professional indemnity insurance.

8.68. The Business Continuity Institute (BCI) (http://www.thebci.org) provides a certification scheme for business continuity professionals. It publishes a list of consultants it deems to be experienced, qualified and competent in particular areas, and operates a code of practice for members. The Continuity Forum also provides a service designed to help connect consultants with clients: Consultancy Signpost lists individuals and organisations who provide consultancy services covering business continuity and its related disciplines. It is publicly available via the front page of the Continuity Forum's website http://www.continuityforum.org. The BCI and the Chartered Management Institute are useful sources of advice on commissioning consultants. The local authority can also facilitate the sharing of feedback on consultants by maintaining records of the organisations who have sought its advice about the engagement of a third party.

8.69. Nonetheless, the local authority will need to make it clear to firms that the choice of consultant is their sole responsibility, and that the local authority shall not be liable for any damage or loss suffered as a result.

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BCM advice to the community and the LRF process

8.70.   The arrangements for multi-agency co-operation established by the Act will establish a framework for delivering joined-up and effective civil protection. BCM promotion is an integral part of the wider package of civil protection activity, and requires multi-agency co-operation and information-sharing to be effective.

8.71.   Local authorities will want to consider how they use this wider framework to deliver the co-ordination and buy-in required for effective BCM advice and assistance activity. Much can be achieved through informal working-level contact, but there may be some merit in formalising this co-operation. This could take the form of:

   o   regular discussions at working-level liaison groups;

   o   establishing a community resilience subgroup of the LRF; or

   o   discussion at LRF meetings.

8.72.   The approach taken will depend, in large part, on the nature of the local authorities' programmes, the means used to deliver the message, and the extent of the involvement of other agencies in the process. It is good practice for the full LRF to be given a chance to discuss BCM promotion work once each year.

Identifying and engaging other external partners

8.73.   Local authorities should consider engaging partner organisations in the process of providing information, advice and assistance to organisations that carry on commercial activities and to voluntary organisations. This should prove useful in communicating with firms and gaining their buy-in, providing support in organising events or forums, and as a source of BCM expertise.

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Figure 8.1: Network of BCM promotion partners

8.74.   Figure 8.1 shows a range of organisations in both the public and private sectors that may be willing to collaborate with local authorities in this work. These are:

- o **Within local authorities:** Local authorities themselves have established links with the business community, which can be utilised when promoting BCM (e.g. Economic Development Units, City Centre Management Units and Community Safety Teams). Local authorities also have close links with voluntary organisations, which are often engaged as partners in service delivery.

- o **Representative groups:** There are a number of groups that represent the business community or sections of it (e.g. Confederation of British Industry, British Chambers of Commerce, and Federation of Small Businesses). Councils for Voluntary Service (CVS) are voluntary organisations which are set up, owned and run by local groups to support, promote and develop local voluntary and community action. CVS support their members by providing them with a range of services

and by acting as a voice for the local voluntary and community sector. They provide a useful way to identify the local voluntary sector community. There is a CVS working in almost every district and city in England, and they usually work within the same geographical boundaries as the local authority. To find your local CVS visit http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/

o **Education bodies:** Higher education institutions and colleges of further education may be effective partners in the promotion of BCM through their business courses. A number of higher education institutions also offer BCM qualification courses which may be useful to local authorities seeking to develop their competence in this area.

o **Professional bodies:** There are a number of organisations that exist to promote the take-up and standards of business continuity in the business community, including the Business Continuity Institute and Continuity Forum. There are also professional bodies or institutes with a wider remit - including the Chartered Institute of Management and British Institute of Facilities Management - which can provide a way into the business community in an area.

o **Agenda groups:** There are a range of bodies that can act as a conduit for BCM promotion work (e.g. Local Strategic Partnerships, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships).

o **Commercial BCM providers:** Commercial organisations providing a range of BCM services may be willing to sponsor business continuity initiatives or events.

o **Individual businesses:** Experience has shown that gaining the support of larger firms is important in taking forward a BCM promotion programme. Larger firms are more likely to be familiar with the discipline of BCM, and may already have established relationships with Category 1 and 2 responders. They may provide useful support in establishing business continuity seminars and companies - or large

well-established voluntary bodies - in their area. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also crucial to the UK forums, and give assistance in raising the profile of BCM within the business community (e.g. through supply-chain leadership, membership of associations). Professional services firms (e.g. banks, accountants) may be willing to distribute information through their websites. (See case studies 3 and 5 in Box 8.3.)

Targeting advice

Size of organisations

8.75.   BCM arrangements are crucial to the sustainability of all organisations. Local authorities should not assume that business continuity is well established in the large national or multi-national companies - or large well-established voluntary bodies - in their area. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also crucial to the UK economy, accounting for some 99.9% of the UK's 4.8 million businesses. They account for 59.8% of the number in employment in the private sector and generate 49 per cent of private sector turnover. In total, turnover in SMEs is estimated to be £1.589 billion (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, October 2010 http:// www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/statistics/docs/b/bpe_2010_stats_release.pdf).

8.76.   Local authorities should ensure that materials used are appropriate to the needs of businesses, which may vary considerably. While the underpinning principles remain the same, the approach taken when approaching a small owner-managed firm will be different to that taken with a large, well-established firm. Local authorities will need to be proactive in engaging the SME community, and ensure that materials are pitched at the right level.

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8.77.   It may be helpful to think of the business community in terms of the following definitions used by the Department for Business Industry and Skills:

- o   Micro firm: 0-9 employees
- o   Small firm: 10-49 employees
- o   Medium firm: 50-249 employees
- o   Large firm: Over 250 employees

8.78.   Where it is not possible to engage smaller businesses directly in a community resilience initiative, it may be possible to include them through a variety of umbrella groups that can disseminate information and advice. This can be achieved through groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, Business Link, The Federation of Small Businesses and Local Retail Initiatives. Voluntary organisations can be reached through local Voluntary Service Councils, Social Councils, Volunteer Bureaux and other local umbrella bodies. (See case studies 4, 5 and 6 in Box 8.3.)

Added value

8.79.   Local authorities may wish to focus on organisations that are well placed to give support to the programme by helping to raise awareness or by offering practical support (e.g. venues). Local authorities may also wish to target organisations that are able to provide help or resources to other organisations or Category 1 responders in the event of an emergency, or organisations whose activities are crucial to the effective functioning of the wider community (e.g. food suppliers).

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Maintaining a BCM advice and assistance programme

8.80.   In order to ensure that they continue to fulfil the requirements of the business continuity advice and assistance duty, local authorities will wish to undertake a continuous cycle of assessing the content and delivery of the promotion programme against the requirements of the legislation, assessments of risk, needs of the audience, and resources and support mechanisms available. This is likely to involve:

- o **Developing objectives and message:**
  - Clear objectives should be established in consultation with partners in the LRF, and the message and target audience should be defined with reference to the CRR. Are proposed approaches coherent and will they be effective?

- o **Reviewing promotion materials:**
  - There is a wide range of existing materials illustrating the importance of BCM and how to develop business continuity arrangements. Is there a need to develop further materials tailored to local circumstances? And what form might these take (e.g. printed, web-based, etc)

- o **Reviewing the means of delivery:**
  - Choose means of delivery in the light of available resources and support from partners. Publicise events and services offered, and publicise any charging policy.

o **Delivery:**

- The case studies contained in this chapter will give authorities guidance on ways in which the duty is delivered in other areas. The details of those responsible can be found at the end of the individual case studies and should be contacted with any questions?

o **Evaluate and review programme:**

- Gathering feedback along the way is a useful way to judge if the programme met its stated objectives? Has feedback been positive? How could it be improved or extended? What lessons can be learned from experience elsewhere in the country?

Box 8.3: Business continuity advice and assistance to business and the voluntary sector: Case studies

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(Additional examples of case studies are available in the 'best practice' folder on the NRE at https://www.resilience-extranet.gse.gov.uk/AtlasApps/Pages/Collaborate/DocumentStore/DocumentStore.aspx?folderid=113699 or https//www.resilience-extranet.gov.uk/AtlasApps/Pages/Collaborate/DocumentStore/DocumentStore.aspx?folderid=113699)

Case Study 1 – Surrey County Council

The 'surreycontinuity' website was launched in September 2009 with the support of the Surrey Local Resilience Forum, local authorities and Surrey and Woking Chambers of Commerce. This case study outlines the strategy that was adopted from the initial concept, to the development stages and through to delivery

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Background

In May 2008, a decision was taken by the Planning and Environment Committee to focus on business continuity; in particular, how small to medium size enterprises and charities could best cope with emergency situations both within their own company and on a wider scale.

A business continuity sub-committee was formed involving representatives from Woking and Surrey Chambers of Commerce, local businesses, Woking Borough Council, and Surrey County Council. The sub-committee provided a steer on developing a strategy and this led to a series of meetings, discussions and presentations on how this could best be delivered to local business.

By early 2009, a draft proposal was in place to develop a website to act as a business continuity hub in order to help local businesses understand the basic principles of BCM together with signposting them to find additional information if required. Woking Borough Council and Surrey County Council agreed to part fund this, with the Surrey Local Resilience Forum agreeing to co-sponsor the initiative and provide additional funding to develop the project.

The sub-committee put out to tender and a company was short-listed and commissioned to deliver the website. The company has an innovative way of delivering the website using panoramic views summarising phases of the business continuity process, case studies featuring local business incidents and an interactive quiz.

Conclusion

Although Surrey delivers business continuity advice through traditional methods such as leaflets, conferences and local forums, surreycontinuity helps promote other local initiatives such as Project ARGUS and GRIFFIN.

Surreycontinuity has been kept simple and is able to be used by those with no previous experience of business continuity. This gives it the flexibility to target a generic audience within the community such as small to medium enterprises, independent care providers and schools, also reaching a global audience.

Detailed weekly and monthly web traffic reports are providing useful in validating the success of the website. Although limited in determining the type and exact location of the organisation accessing the website, they do provide detail of number of hits, method of access and global location. The most popular part of the site is the case studies.

The results have certainly raised the profile of the county; and the work of the Surrey Local Resilience Forum; and proved that engaging and working in partnership can deliver benefits to the local community.

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Case Study 2 – Milton Keynes Council

Milton Keynes Council is a unitary Council with approx 220,000 citizens. The concept of a Milton Keynes Business Resilience Forum (MKBRF) was initially proposed by Milton Keynes Council at the local BCI Forum in June 2006. It was seen to be the best way to promote BC to local businesses and encourage the involvement of local businesses. Following the first MKBRF event, an independent lead team was established consisting of, and chaired by, voluntary representatives from local businesses. The MKBRF was established to promote the benefits of effective business continuity by:

- o   providing information and advice;
- o   sharing experiences between members;
- o   holding business continuity and incident management exercises;
- o   sharing threat and opportunity data (horizon scanning);
- o   provide informal mentoring;
- o   create a networking opportunity for local organisations and BC practitioners; and,
- o   providing mutual help and support.

Currently the membership of the MKBRF stands at over 300 local organisations, predominantly from the Milton Keynes area, but several from further afield. There is also an active LinkedIn forum which does not require MKBRF registration.

In addition to developing and facilitating events, Milton Keynes Council, in conjunction with the MKBRF, provides a website BC toolkit and an informal mentoring scheme. The website receives on average 1500 hits per month.

Analysis of feedback received following exercises and events, as well as key topics of the moment and market research carried out by the MKBRF lead team during 2010, drive the requirement for the next event. Attendees are also asked to suggest topics for future activities which ensures that the needs of the audience are consistently met.

All events have been free of charge. Milton Keynes Council has been supportive of all events and gained sponsorship from businesses based in Milton Keynes to assist with the costs.

Timeline of events

1st February 2007

MKBRF launched

Conference – "Secure in the Knowledge" and formal launch of the Milton Keynes Business Resilience Forum. Contributors included Health Protection Agency, NaCTSO, IBM Business Continuity and Resilience Services

15th May 2007

Project Argus – Milton Keynes Council were an integral member of the planning team supporting the National Counter Terrorism Security Office – focussing on the retail sector

17th October 2007

"Keeping your business going through an emergency" conference and business continuity development day. Contributors included Thames Valley Police, Abbey (now Santander), PCT and the Fire Service

14th May 2008

Exercise Phoenix – an interactive workshop focussing on the emergency response and incident management phases of an major incident. Representation and support from BSI, ambulance, fire and police services.

23rd March 2009

Radio broadcast – first in the series of daily radio broadcasts on BBC Three Counties to coincide with Business Continuity Awareness Week – totalling 50 minutes air time – promoting various aspects of business continuity

17th September 2009

Business2Business Exhibition – presentation and discussions with exhibitors to promote the MKBRF and it's forthcoming events. Distribution of MKBRF registration forms to local businesses in attendance.

21st October 2009

"Pandemic Flu Game" – closed invitation to existing MKBRF members to an adaptation of the NHS business continuity flu game – focussing on the potential impacts on local businesses. Representation from MK Hospital and NHS to respond to direct concerns.

25th January 2010

"Exercise Midwinter" - an interactive workshop focussing on resilience in the supply chain. Key speaker Dr Helen Peck, Cranfield University. Involvement of MK College students as part of their media course to have input to the technology for the event.

3rd March 2011

"Business Continuity and the Threat Environment" – a breakfast briefing held at Bletchley Park, the home of the computer, focussing on Cyber Threats, exploring what business aspects are vulnerable in terms of both technology and people.

7th April 2011

"Crisis Communications: Business Continuity and the Media" a highly interactive workshop to look at business continuity from the perspective of media strategies, featuring speakers from former BBC, ITN and Daily Mirror correspondents

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Study 3 – Leicestershire County Council

Promoting business continuity in Leicester, Leicestershire & Rutland

Leicestershire County Council (LCC) accepts that, for many businesses, the issue of developing a good business continuity management (BCM) framework is not seen as a high priority. Managers within these organisations are often very busy with other demands. However, some organisations have made a start on BCM, sometimes triggered by external factors, such as:

- o they have suffered a disruption or;
- o they have been requested to provide evidence of Business Continuity for a tender application, bank or insurance purposes or;
- o they have been asked to provide Business Continuity assurance in terms of their contract with the County Council.

The most difficult hurdle to overcome is getting organisations to consider business continuity. Part of the County Council's strategy is not to promote business continuity using 'scare tactics' but rather promote the benefits of practical and effective contingency planning. The County Council believes that good business continuity is good business.

Furthermore, the County Council accepts that not everyone would be interested in, or understand, the relevance of BS25999 to their organisation, so decided against promoting the standard in its entirety. We do, however, actively promote its methodology and the benefits of adopting the Standard as good practice. As an organisation's business continuity programme matures, with minimal effort it will become more aligned with the standard.

The Council's initial approach to promoting business continuity was linked into the embedded procurement and supply-chain processes. This enabled us to prioritise and assess the levels of resilience in place for key suppliers/providers and, if necessary, provide them with guidance, support and assistance so that they were able to meet the Council's supplier requirements in terms of business continuity practice.

Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland (LLR) have an active, Local Resilience Forum (LRF). In early 2010, the LRF established a business continuity subgroup – called the Business Continuity Practitioners Forum (BCF). This group, as part of its remit, aims to promote business continuity good practice across all business sectors in the LLR region.

During Business Continuity Awareness week 2010, the BCF published a one-page supplement in some of the regions newspapers and their related websites which generated a substantial interest and response from the business community.

The BCF and County Council have combined their business continuity planning and exercise workshops and these have now been rolled out as a LRF initiative across the region. Separate planning and exercise workshops are run on a monthly basis. The BCF has –

- o strong links into all the regions Trading Standards teams as well as other business networks e.g. Federation of Small Businesses and Chamber of Commerce;

- o started to develop initiatives with its partners (police and fire) to further promote business continuity (e.g. Emergency Response Planning for Schools and Residential Care Providers); and

- o launched the LLR Business Continuity Working Group for businesses, regardless of sector and size, in the region. This free, one day workshop, introduced the business community to the LRF business continuity advisors who are available to assist organisations in developing their own practical resilience programmes. The working group will meet on a regular basis (every 8 weeks) to share and develop good practice amongst businesses across the region. The service is provided free of charge to all business sectors.

The County Council and the LRF accept that the aims may not be achieved overnight, but remain optimistic that, over time, their approach will become embedded as one of the key support services offered in the LLR region.

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Mondy Holliday, Business Continuity Manager,

Leicestershire County Council 0116 305 5400; businesscontinuity@leics.gov.uk

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Case Study 4 – Cardiff Council

Cardiff Council has adopted a unique approach by attempting to embed business continuity promotion as a key strand of its EVAC Cardiff initiative. EVAC Cardiff is a multi-agency service which combines a number of statutory duties and national policing initiatives under one brand. The initiative was a finalist in the 2008 Wales Innovation Awards where it was commended for combining different strands of Cardiff's resilience programme delivered by using clever technology and strong easily distinguishable branding.

The business continuity element of EVAC Cardiff has been delivered in three specific ways, these are –

o   electronically via a BCM promotion website – The website has been developed to be eye catching and easy to navigate. The site delivers key messages using simple language with an emphasis on selling the positives rather than focusing on the negative reasons for undertaking this work. It uses different technologies such as video/flash and many downloadable templates and tools. It also links to other sites and a feedback questionnaire which also gathers important statistical data on which sectors and size of business are using the website: http://www.nonverba.com/admin/ cardiff/welcome.htm

EVAC Warden training – The training is aimed at any business irrespective of their size or sector. It covers risks specific to Cardiff, how the scheme works and the importance of business continuity, signposting businesses to the promotion website for advice and guidance. Businesses also have the ability

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of booking their staff on to EVAC warden training via the promotion website.

Cardiff has developed its own Area Risk Register which is published on the website. The register has been developed by a multi-agency group and also co-opting specific sector specialists to ensure that the register reflects Cardiff's issues and also to cross reference current plans are adequate enough.

The Council managed to negotiate the site development as part of a deal it brokered for internal business continuity software. The only small costs incurred are when updates are required but these very small. Using technology also reduces the amount of officer time as businesses can `help themselves` to whatever resources they choose to use from the website. E-mail has been used to send promotional information to businesses in Cardiff by tapping in to distribution lists from the Council's economic development department which has proven to be an effective and free way of raising awareness of the website.

The strength of the brand locally has made it easier for Cardiff to get buy in from local businesses. The initiative is supported by all the emergency services and this has enhanced the Council's relationship with partners and in particular the business community.

Reaching every business in Cardiff is a challenge and indeed not all businesses have access to the internet in order to benefit from the resources on the website. SMEs are more difficult to engage for a variety of reasons but the Council is always looking to `piggy back` onto other local initiatives as an opportunity to promote the key messages.

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Cardiff Emergency Management Unit

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Case Study 5 – Manchester City Council

Manchester's partnership approach to delivering Business Continuity Advice and Assistance

Manchester City Council delivers its business continuity advice and assistance programme via the Manchester Business Continuity Forum (MBCF), which has a membership or nearly 400 organisations. The Council has provided resources (staffing and financial) to support the MBCF's work programme. It remains an equal partner with the other MBCF member organisations. The MBCF is increasing the resilience of Manchester based organisations, through cross-sector collaboration and partnership working. It aims to:

- o improve the resilience of Manchester's communities, businesses and voluntary organisations; encouraging them to respond effectively to internal or external threats of disruption, thereby lessening the economic and social impact of emergencies and speeding up the subsequent recovery; and
- o contribute to Manchester's prominence as a leading economic hub by showcasing its ongoing commitment to building safe, sustainable and resilient communities by continually increasing the resilience of the city.

MBCF has a number of notable features:

- o activities and priorities for the MBCF are always member coordinated, led and driven

- o recognition of the part every organisation has to play in ensuring Manchester has 'Business Continuity Whatever the Disruption'
- o firm commitment to building on and facilitating the sharing of BCM knowledge and expertise already present in Manchester
- o commitment to partnership with leading professional bodies, academia and complementary networks
- o real opportunities for a wide range of organisations to learn from each other, share good practice and experience and opportunities to work together to increase the resilience of Manchester
- o willingness to share the learning and successes of MBCF outside of Manchester – regionally, nationally and internationally.

The MBCF's accountability to its members is demonstrated by the existence of a Steering Group, which consists of member organisations working to terms of reference and overseeing the delivery of a formal work plan for MBCF.

To help reflect the needs of the City and the ability to provide a wide range of general and specific business continuity advice and guidance, the Steering Group is made up of representatives from a variety of organisations and subject matter experts in the field of resilience. Current Steering Group representation includes senior representation from large blue chip companies, Third Sector organisations, business networks, including the Chamber of Commerce, universities, and the emergency services.

Crucially, Manchester City Council has facilitated the creation of a clear and individual identity for the MBCF to ensure that it is an independent and successful initiative, rather than being identified as a city council project. The membership reflects the diversity of the organisations within the city.

MBCF is dedicated to achieving tangible outcomes including regular educational and awareness seminars, mentorship programme, networking events, scenario based testing and exercise opportunities, publications and consultation activities some of which are described below:

Buddy Scheme

The MBCF is particularly keen to support small and medium enterprises in the city, as well as third sector organisations, by the creation of a mentorship programme. The MBCF Buddy Scheme has been designed so that representatives from organisations with well-developed business continuity arrangements can 'buddy up' with representatives from organisations that would benefit from extra support in this area.

MBCF Network group

The idea behind the MBCF Network Group is to provide an informal space for MBCF members to discuss 'BCM in action' with a very practical focus to help members help each other, by sharing good practice, experience and lessons learned from BCM incidents.

Events and seminars

The MBCF has hosted a variety of events, including a large launch event, which helped shape the direction of the Forum's activities based on direct feedback. Most of the events are aimed at any member of the Forum; however 'Keep Calm and Carry On' was aimed at people from Third Sector organisations specifically, designed to give an introduction to business continuity management. There are plans to hold the event as an annual initiative. In addition to the large scale events, there have been a number of smaller breakfast seminars, focusing on topical issues such as Pandemic Flu preparedness and Counter Terrorism issues.

MBCF publishing

The MBCF has created on-line support, which includes signposting to existing good practice for BCM as well as creating templates and other 'how-to' guides.

City wide exercise

In late summer 2010, the MBCF ran the city's first public-private collaborative exercise, which aimed to exemplify best practice in collaborative exercising. Several businesses participated with representation from emergency services, the council and Manchester University. The participants explored how their various business groups would react individually, collectively and in partnership.

This was one of the first such exercising initiatives in the UK. The objective was to see how the main parties would react to an incident. The exercise was not an emergency services exercise but rather a simultaneous exercise for a large number of major employers and significant companies within the Manchester City Centre area. It ensured that all parties' responses and plans were exercised as they would be in reality.

Further interest:

Internet: www.manchester.gov.uk/MBCF

Alternatively please contact –

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Case Study 6 – Shetland Islands Council

Shetland Islands businesses learn how to stay afloat if disaster strikes

When Shetland Islands Council decided to review the way it delivered business continuity (BC) advice to the community, it recognised the need to engage the widest possible audience and overcome the often low take-up of seminars, lectures and other forms of traditional BC support.

"In the past we used to run business continuity workshops and hold seminars for voluntary groups and emergency services," said Ingrid Gall, the council's emergency planning and resilience officer. "But we'd had limited success, often with quite minimal attendance."

The Council took an innovative approach to addressing these challenges. Following a tender process, it appointed a Glasgow-based firm of business continuity consultants to devise an online programme of presentations - www.shetlandcontinuity.co.uk - and an accompanying workbook, all inspired by island life.

"We needed to overcome the common attitude that insurance companies would take care of any disasters," said Ingrid. "What businesses often didn't consider was, if their business had to temporarily close due to a disaster, would they find an alternative supplier, would they lose customers, and would they lose staff? These are the themes that the new training aims to develop."

Such issues are particularly important in the Shetland Islands, which has seen more than its share of commercially damaging incidents in recent years, from storms to maritime disasters. Working closely with the consultants, the Council recognised the vulnerability of the islands to natural and man-made catastrophes, and was keen to make this factor a key component of the online campaign.

The course uses a series of tailor-made online video and audio presentations to help business owners understand the practical relevance of BC to their businesses and to their local environment. As the presentations are online, users can view them at their own pace, and then complete a workbook and a series of contingency checklists to help them develop their own BC plan.

The course begins with a 'newsreader' highlighting some of the perils of island life and of coastal climates. The checklists use specific examples of local industries. For instance, the section covering asset protection cites creel boats and lobster pots as key assets to protect. And the island's unique logistical challenges are also explored, addressing the potential absence of the ferry service in times of severe weather and rough seas.

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For Ingrid, this practical, local focus, and the ability for users to dip in and out at their own pace, is key to overcoming business apathy when faced with generic BC information, or one-off seminars, "The website is very practical, easy to work through, and means people can have a full contingency plan of their own within a matter of hours. It's short, sharp and, above all, specifically relates to the businesses and challenges we have here on the islands."

After the initial start-up costs, the website has proved to be a cost-effective way for the Council to meet it business continuity responsibilities – a statutory duty of all local authorities.

"Running seminars can be quite expensive, especially if you don't get many people attending," explained Ingrid. "Now the website's active, it is pretty much self-sustaining and won't need much updating. We're going to further address business continuity at the Shetland Business Gateway for new businesses, and we're also linking it to the Shetland Emergency Planning Forum – so it all forms part of a rolling programme."

Feedback has so far been excellent for the www.shetlandcontinuity.co.uk website. Since its launch in November 2010, take-up has exceeded expectations and many users have contacted the council requesting experts to come and talk to them about other benefits of emergency planning.

For further details contact:

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CabinetOffice

Chapter 9 London

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 9 (London) of Emergency Preparedness, Revised Version

Summary

- In most respects, the frameworks and duties set out under the Act and the Regulations apply to London in the same way that they apply everywhere else (*paragraph 9.1*).

- As in other areas, London's Local Resilience Forum (LRF) will be based on police areas, but in London, this will incorporate the Metropolitan Police Force and the City of London Police Force area (*paragraph 9.2*).

- The Regulations establish one pan-London LRF which, like other LRFs, will be responsible for multi-agency co-operation on a pan-London level (*paragraph 9.2*).

- Like other areas, the revised Regulations require the London LRF to include the Chief Officer Group that meets at least every six months; however, the London LRF is also required to maintain, in respect of each local authority area, a Borough Resilience Forum (BRF). The BRFs will be responsible for multiagency emergency planning at the local level as determined by borough risks and needs (*paragraph 9.4*).

- The membership of BRFs and any other subgroups of the LRF and their membership will be determined by Category 1 members of the LRF itself (*paragraph 9.4*).

- Unlike other areas, London's local authorities will be supported in discharging their duties under the Act by the fire and rescue authority - in this case, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) (*paragraph 9.5*).

- In the event of a serious emergency, LFEPA will support arrangements to ensure that a single local authority chief executive is able to speak on behalf of pan-London local authorities. They will also put in place and maintain arrangements for the establishment of an effective control centre (*paragraph 9.6*).

- LFEPA will support the development, maintenance and exercising of emergency plans for relevant Category 1 responders and training of their staff (*paragraph 9.6*).

- To maintain a strong link between the BRFs and the LRF, an intermediate multi-borough tier will need to be maintained. Category 1 responders in the LRF will be responsible for determining the membership of these multi-borough sub-groups (*paragraph 9.19*).

- As the elected leader of London's regional government, the Mayor of London plays a full part in supporting the effective implementation of the Act and improving the preparedness of the capital. The Greater London Authority is a Category 1 responder as stated in Schedule 1 of the Act and currently provides the secretariat to the London LRF (*paragraphs 9.22 and 9.24*).

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

9.1. In most respects, the frameworks and duties set out under the Act and the Regulations will apply to London in the same way that they apply everywhere else. In terms of the respective functions, Category 1 and 2 responders in London are no different from those in other parts of the country. However, London has particular patterns of public service provision and government which mean that some aspects of civil protection have to be organised differently. As London is the capital city, the effects of any incident can be felt right across the UK and potentially internationally.

Local Resilience Forum in London

9.2. London has the same need as elsewhere for multi-agency co-operation at the local level. To achieve multi-agency co-operation at this level, the Regulations establish one pan-London LRF covering all of London[1], incorporating the Metropolitan Police and City of London Police areas.

9.3. The LRF will operate in much the same way as LRFs elsewhere, working to the model set out in Chapter 2.

Borough Resilience Forums (BRF)

9.4. As elsewhere, the LRF will maintain a Chief Officer Group, however, there are very distinct areas in London, each with specific emergency planning considerations which will require planning at a more local level than that of pan-London. For this reason, the revised Regulations specify that the London LRF must include, in respect of each borough, a BRF that meets at least once every six months.

[1] This is the area comprised of "the areas of the London boroughs, the City and the Temples" and defined as Greater London in s2(1) London Government Act 1963

The BRFs will primarily facilitate co-operation and information sharing at the operational level between local authorities and the emergency services, and should not duplicate the work of the LRF. They may refer issues to the LRF multi-borough tier, as appropriate.

The role of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

9.5.   Unlike other areas, the Regulations provide that London's local authorities will be supported in discharging their duties under the Act by the Fire and Rescue Authority - in this case, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA).[2] LFEPA will take on a number of distinct tasks which might otherwise have been taken on by local authorities.

9.6.   LFEPA will carry out certain emergency planning activities. In particular, LFEPA will support pan-London local authority arrangements:

> o   **Local authority 'Gold':** In the event of the most serious emergencies in London, local authorities would need to work closely together and operate in a consistent way. To deliver this, they have agreed to pool decision-making authority and place it with a single chief executive who will speak for local authorities as the pan-London response is managed. LFEPA will maintain these arrangements, keeping them updated through review and revision.

> o   **Control centre:** In order to support local authority 'Gold', planning will have to be maintained to deliver an effective control centre. Should local authority 'Gold' arrangements be required, the centre would collect and disseminate information, and facilitate the collective decision-making process. LFEPA will put in place and maintain these arrangements.

2 regulation 55

o **Provision of training to support pan-London arrangements:**
Certain elements of plans maintained under the Act will be consistent
across all London boroughs, and this in turn leads to a consistency of
training need. This need will be met by training programmes provided
on request by LFEPA.

o **Provision of exercising of pan-London arrangements:** Pan-London
local authority plans need to be validated through exercising. LFEPA
will design and deliver an annual programme of exercises to test
these arrangements. This programme will include both local
authority-only exercises, and multi-agency exercises in which local
authority activities are engaged.

9.7.   LFEPA is funded separately for this work, with funding top-sliced from London
local authorities.

9.8.   London boroughs will retain responsibility for discharging all other duties under the
Act. However, LFEPA will continue to make an informal input into wider planning
work within the framework of multi-agency co-operation. Should boroughs so
wish, they may negotiate to delegate further functions to LFEPA.

9.9.   In discharging its responsibilities as set out above, LFEPA will also need to work
closely with those Category 1 responders that are not local authorities. This has
long been a matter of standard practice in London, but the Regulations reinforce
this point by requiring co-operation between Category 1 responders and LFEPA at
the latter's request.[3] This obligation is limited to that co-operation necessary for
LFEPA to carry out its own obligations in relation to co-ordination of pan-London
local authority planning.

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[3] regulation 56

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

Sub-groups of the Local Resilience Forum

9.10. Apart from the Chief Officer Group and the maintenance of BRFs, the London LRF's make up will be determined by the Category 1 responders represented at the LRF, as set out in chapter 2. The LRF will determine which sub-groups are required for their particular area.

9.11. While the Regulations set out that the London LRF must include, in relation to each borough, a BRF held once every six months, they do not specify which responders must attend them as they do for the LRF. Category 1 responders at the London LRF must therefore review and recommend which Category 1 responders should form the core membership for each BRF. As a group of the LRF all responders must consider whether to attend the BRF for any borough in which they exercise functions. In making this decision, those responders that have been identified by the London LRF as appropriate to form the core membership of a particular BRF must take this recommendation into account.

9.12. Given its unique makeup and London's role as the capital city, the London LRF will need to maintain a tier of multi-borough sub-groups of the LRF. These will consist of groups of boroughs, drawn up to reflect existing mutual aid groupings. This will assist emergency planning at the local level, bringing together those boroughs with particular issues and bridging the gap between the local level and the pan-London level. Previously these "sub-regional" LRFs have been set out in Regulation and therefore some groupings are already in place. The Category 1 members of the LRF will review and agree the groupings.

9.13. The new Regulations create a pan-London LRF, which includes Borough Resilience Forums, and this statutory guidance sets out the need for multi-borough LRFs as sub-groups of the London LRF. This creates a three tier structure to emergency planning in London, with each tier having a very specific role to play in London resilience.

Local Resilience Forum

9.14. The role of the LRF is to provide strategic, senior level direction for co-ordinated and effective multi-agency emergency planning in London; bringing together national government (via the London Government Liaison Team in DCLG), the Mayor of London, London's emergency services, other key public services and the business, faith and voluntary communities.

9.15. The LRF will ensure that London is fully prepared to deal with the consequences of a wide range of disruptive incidents, from terrorist attacks through to the impact of climate change or a pandemic.

9.16. The LRF will:

o agree joint strategic and policy approaches relating to London's preparedness and response;

o produce and maintain a Risk Register for London, ensuring that it provides a robust basis for planning and reflects the current risks that are affecting the capital. This was formerly a duty carried out by LFEPA on behalf of the six multi-borough groupings but has now moved from this level to the pan-London level through the LRF. The regulations allowed for a transitional period of up to a year to facilitate this move;

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- o provide a mechanism for information on threat, hazard and risk management, flowing in both directions between local, sub-national and national organisations;

- o ensure that appropriate pan-London multi-agency plans, procedures, training and exercises necessary to address the identified or foreseeable local and wider area hazards are in place and outstanding gaps identified;

- o improve co-ordination across the capital by supporting cross-boundary working, mutual aid agreements and information sharing;

- o improve co-ordination with other areas;

- o review and recommend the core membership of each BRF;

- o review and agree the groupings of boroughs that comprise the multi-borough tier of emergency planning.

Borough Resilience Forum

9.17.   Borough Resilience Forums will be responsible for multi-agency emergency planning at the local level as determined by borough risks and needs. They will also contribute to emergency planning for London, as directed by the London LRF. They will facilitate co-operation and information sharing between resilience partners at the local authority level and the London LRF.

9.18.   The LRF will:

- o agree on joint strategic and policy approaches relating to the area's emergency preparedness and response;

- o approve the Risk Register for their area, ensuring it provides a robust basis for planning and records both borough level and relevant London wide risks;

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o   co-ordinate the individual approaches and responsibilities of each organisation to ensure that they complement each other and dovetail with partners' arrangements; and

o   have regard to the implications of legislation and national initiatives and undertake its activities in accordance with strategic decisions agreed by the London LRF for the Borough Resilience Forum.

Multi-borough sub-groups

9.19.   The multi-borough sub-groups of the LRF will support effective emergency planning by facilitating communication between member boroughs as well as communication between BRFs and the London LRF. The Category 1 responders of the LRF will review and agree from time to time whether the current groupings remain appropriate. These sub-groups will have a key role in driving up performance in emergency planning, ensuring comprehensive and consistent approaches are taken by BRFs in response to risks identified at the London LRF, as well as priority risks identified by member boroughs.

9.20.   Multi-borough sub-groups will:

o   establish mechanisms for ensuring a consistent approach to emergency planning at borough level around key and relevant risks identified by the London LRF and BRFs; and

o   establish mechanisms for ensuring that the London Resilience Forum emergency plan is delivered at the borough level;

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Duty to assess risk

9.21. BRF members, as Category 1 responders, have a duty to assess risk (see also Chapter 4). However, given that many of the risks in London are common to most boroughs, it is recommended that BRFs produce a Borough Risk Register. The requirement for a Community Risk Register will lie with the pan-London LRF and this should be used by BRFs to inform their risk assessment and emergency planning. Equally, the findings of BRF risk assessments will feed into the pan-London risk assessment.

The Mayor of London / Greater London Authority (GLA)

9.22. As the elected leader of London's regional government, the Mayor of London plays a full part in supporting the effective implementation of the Act and improving the preparedness of the capital.

9.23. In particular, the Mayor/GLA

- o is closely engaged in high-level discussions and decisions relating to the management of emergencies in London;
- o (or an appointed deputy) is currently Chair of the LRF;
- o contributes as necessary to the pre-informing of Londoners about the content of emergency plans, the correct behaviour in an emergency and good practice in terms of preparedness in the home, as part of initiatives organised both locally and at the UK level;
- o prepares to play a key role in warning and informing the public during an emergency in London; and
- o takes responsibility for civil protection issues in connection with the management of Parliament and Trafalgar Squares.

9.24.   The GLA is a Category 1 responder under the Act and as such has the same responsibilities as other Category 1 responders. However, there are a number of duties that the GLA currently takes on in relation to London that are additional to other Category 1 responders.

9.25.   In particular, the GLA:

   o   is responsible for the secretariat of the LRF;

   o   is responsible for producing and maintaining a pan-London risk assessment; and publishing all or part of it in line with regulations; and

   o   is responsible for the planning and exercising of pan-London emergency plans.

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Chapter 10 Scotland

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 10 (Scotland) of *Emergency Preparedness,* Revised Version

Summary

• Part 1 of the Act applies to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish Ministers if they relate to devolved matters. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a devolved matter and therefore the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, certain responders in Scotland operate in reserved areas, with Regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers (*paragraphs 10.1-10.4*)

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

10.1.   The Act applies to a range of bodies in Scotland. However, responsibility for making Regulations and guidance on how responders in Scotland perform their duties under the Act is split between the Scottish Ministers and Ministers of the Crown. While the majority of responders exercise functions which fall within devolved competence (and so are subject to Regulations and guidance made by the Scottish Ministers), there are three responders which exercise functions that are largely reserved on a UK-wide basis. These bodies are subject to this guidance and to the Regulations made by a Minister of the Crown. These bodies are:

   o   the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (included as a Category 1 responder);

   o   the British Transport Police (included as a Category 1 responder); and

   o   the Health and Safety Executive (included as a Category 2 responder).

Additionally, three industries among the Category 2 responders are reserved matters:

- o gas distributors;
- o electricity distributors; and
- o telecommunications companies.

It is for Ministers of the Crown to issue guidance and Regulations to the companies concerned.

10.2. The Regulations and this guidance apply to these Category 1 and 2 responders in much the same way as they apply to Category 1 and 2 responders elsewhere in the UK. The Regulations require these Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate with other Category 1 and 2 responders in Scotland in the performance of their duties under the Act in much the same way as they are required to co-operate with other Category 1 and 2 responders in England and Wales. In particular, the Regulations require these Category 1 and 2 responders in Scotland to participate in Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (the equivalent of English and Welsh Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) and related activities, including compilation of a Community Risk Register.

10.3. Chapters 2 to 8 explain in more detail how each duty under the Act is to be performed by Category 1 and 2 responders in Scotland that fall outside devolved competence.

10.4. Regulations and guidance made by the Scottish Ministers detail how Scottish Category 1 and 2 responders, exercising functions within the devolved competence in Scotland, should perform their duties under the Act.

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10.5.   In an emergency affecting Scotland, the lead Government department will be a UK Government department or the Scottish Government depending upon whether it primarily relates to a reserved or devolved matter. Where the emergency involves reserved functions the Scottish Government is very likely to be involved as well since there will almost certainly be consequences in devolved matters.

10.6.   The Scottish Government or Scotland Office, depending on the subject matter, are represented on the key committees and forums within central government relating to civil protection at both official and Ministerial levels. They work closely with relevant UK departments to ensure Scottish needs are catered for in UK planning and in policy development.

10.7.   The Scottish Government and UK departments act to ensure that they are aware of, and can play a complementary part in, the response to emergencies that affect Scotland.

10.8.   *Preparing Scotland* brings together, in one place, statutory guidance on the implementation of the Regulations, non-statutory guidance on good practice, and the integration of national and local planning for emergencies in respect of devolved functions. It is published at www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/06/12094636/1

Scottish bodies over which Scottish Ministers have regulation-making powers in relation to devolved matters:

Category 1

- o   local authorities
- o   police authorities (excluding the British Transport Police)
- o   fire authorities
- o   Scottish Ambulance Service
- o   Scottish health boards
- o   Scottish Environmental Protection Agency

Category 2

- o   Scottish Water
- o   Common Services Agency of the NHS Scotland
- o   railway companies
- o   airport operators
- o   harbour authorities

The following Category 1 and 2 responders exercise reserved functions in Scotland and regulations are therefore made by UK Ministers

- o   Health and Safety Executive
- o   Maritime and Coastguard Agency
- o   British Transport Police

The following Category 2 companies operate in reserved areas and regulations are therefore made by UK Ministers

- o gas distributors
- o electricity distributors
- o telecommunications companies

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Chapter 11 Wales

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 11 (Wales) of *Emergency Preparedness,* Revised Version

Summary

- The arrangements set out in Part 1 of the Act apply in Wales. However, there are some differences in the requirements which the Regulations place on Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales because of the unique administrative arrangements in Wales (*paragraphs 11.1–11.5*).

- While functions under Part 1 of the Act have not been transferred to the Welsh Ministers, the Welsh Government has significant interest in this area and is primarily responsible for a number of Category 1 and 2 responders (*paragraphs 11.6–11.14*).

- Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations are engaged in response work together with the Welsh Government to address large-scale civil protection issues in Wales. The Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) promotes good communication and the enhancement of emergency planning across agencies and services in Wales by providing a forum for Chief Officers to discuss with Welsh Ministers strategic issues of emergency preparedness. The WRF is not a statutory body nor does it have powers to direct its members, Local Resilience Forums or individual Category 1 or 2 responders as defined under the Act. The WRF provides collective strategic direction to the Wales Capabilities Programme and individual member leadership to the various capabilities sub-groups co-ordinated through a Wales Resilience Partnership Team (*paragraphs 11.20–11.32*).

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WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

11.1. The duties in Part 1 of the Act apply in the same way in Wales as they do in England. Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales are subject to the Regulations and guidance made by a Minister of the Crown after liaison with the Welsh Ministers. The Welsh Government has a statutory role to play in the introduction of regulations and guidance which relate wholly or partly to Wales. When a Minister of the Crown issues a risk assessment to a Category 1 responder exercising functions in Wales, the Regulations require the Minister of the Crown to consult Welsh Ministers.

11.2. In addition, there are some differences in the requirements which the Regulations place on Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales because of the unique administrative arrangements in Wales.

Co-operation

11.3. As in England, the principal mechanism for co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders under the Act is the Local Resilience Forums (LRFs). Each LRF considers its own membership and subgroup structures.

Risk assessment

11.4. In Wales, the detailed risk assessment process is undertaken at the LRF level where Community Risk Registers (CRR) are produced and maintained in the same way as in England. To support this work the Wales Risk Assessment Group (WRAG) brings together the Chairs of the LRF Risk Assessment Groups to facilitate the sharing of best practice and consistency of approach across the four Groups. The WRAG produces a Wales Risk Register on an annual basis which provides a summary of

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the risks in Wales and which is based on information from the Community Risk Registers and the National Risk Register.[1]

11.5.   The Regulations under the Act allow the UK Government to issue risk assessments to Category 1 responders. This information is disseminated, via the Welsh Government to Category 1 responders in Wales. The Welsh Government is then able to issue risk assessments in Wales where it is appropriate for it to do so, subject to the consent of the UK Government.[2]

The role of the Welsh Government

11.6.   The UK Government and the Welsh Government work together on the development of civil protection policy. Both parties consult with each other and exchange information on civil protection planning and response in a timely and constructive manner. The UK Government consults the Welsh Government as early as possible on any policy proposals (eg. strategic guidance and national frameworks) relating to emergencies which affect, or may affect, Wales.[3]

Devolved responsibility under the Act

11.7.   Responsibility for local civil protection arrangements under Part 1 of the Act in England and Wales remains, in general, the responsibility of the UK Government. However, functional responsibilities in relation to health, the environment, animal health and welfare, local government, economic development, the fire and rescue authorities, road networks and rail services enable the Welsh Government to engage in aspects of civil protection work and, as a consequence, play an important co-ordinating role. This points to the importance of ensuring good communications between the UK Government and the Welsh Government.

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[1] regulation 14(5)
[2] regulation 14(3)
[3] s.16(1-4)

11.8.   Part 1 of the Act confers a number of delegated powers on Ministers of the Crown. In particular, the content of the Regulations, orders, directions and guidance made by them under Part 1 of the Act have a significant impact on the preparation for, and handling of, emergencies. The Welsh Government will be involved as soon as possible in the development of Regulations, orders, directions and guidance under Part 1 of the Act where this action directly affects Welsh Category 1 and 2 responders, or where there are significant cross border implications.[4]

11.9.   Where action is taken by the UK Government under Part 1 of the Act i.e (making regulations or orders, giving directions, issuing guidance or taking enforcement action), which applies to bodies in relation to which the Welsh Government has functions, the UK Government must seek the consent of the Welsh Ministers. In other cases where such action applies to Wales, the UK Government must consult the Welsh Ministers.[5]

11.10.   Should further functions be devolved to Welsh Ministers, agreement to 'consult' will be adjusted to a 'consent' agreement where appropriate. The consent of Welsh Ministers is required for the addition, removal and movement of local responders in Wales listed under the Act for which the Welsh Government has responsibility. In cases where local responders in Wales are not within devolved competence, Welsh Ministers will be consulted.

11.11.   When requesting information from Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales under Section 9(1) of the Act, the UK Government will consider the case for using the Welsh Government to co-ordinate the process of gathering information on a pan-Wales basis. In other cases the UK Government will consider on a case-by-case basis the need to inform the Welsh Government of any request by it for information from:

[4] s.16(1-4)
[5] s.16(1-4)

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o individual Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales which fall within devolved responsibility (eg. the Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust); and

o Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales which fall outside devolved responsibility (eg. the police).

11.12. Where appropriate, the Welsh Government will work with Category 1 and 2 responders in developing pan-Wales plans. In developing plans, the Welsh Government will be able to offer advice to Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales in terms of consistency with pan-Wales and pan-UK plans.

Communication with the UK Government

11.13. The Welsh Government or Wales Office, depending on the subject matter, is represented on the key committees and forums within UK government relating to civil protection at both official and ministerial levels. They work closely with UK government departments to ensure that UK civil protection policy and planning is tailored to Welsh needs. The UK Government works with the Welsh Government to ensure that it is kept informed and copied in to all information which will assist it in carrying out its responsibilities under the Act.

Concordat between the Welsh Government and the UK Government

11.14. A Concordat between the Welsh Government and the UK Government provides clarification as to how both sides see the role of the Welsh Government being delivered in practice under the Act. This guidance addresses this issue exhaustively in relation to Part 1 of the Act ("local arrangements for civil protection") and therefore the Concordat focuses exclusively on Part 2 ("emergency powers") issues. The Concordat is published on UK Resilience website: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience

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HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

Co-operation

11.15.   Generally, the models of operation and representation as set out in Chapter 2 will apply in Wales. But there are differences because Wales has a devolved administration and because of different NHS structures.

11.16.   The Welsh Government is represented on all four LRFs in Wales in an observer capacity. Local responders should also seek to engage the Welsh Government on wider issues, including notifying the Welsh Government of the appointment of a lead responder in any of the four LRFs.

11.17.   Welsh NHS organisations are engaged in civil protection at every level. Health Boards and Trusts progress this work individually and collectively through local health emergency planning co-ordinating groups and through the all-Wales Health Emergency Planning Advisory Group. The NHS is also appropriately represented on multi-agency groups including the strategic LRFs. The Health Protection Agency is linked into health emergency planning arrangements in Wales and provides specialist advice during both the planning and response stages. The Welsh Government's Health and Social Care Department provides health emergency planning policy guidance to the NHS and works with the Department of Health in reviewing and developing health resilience.

Information sharing

11.18. Where appropriate, the WRF will play a part, in co-ordinating the request for information between Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales. In this way, the WRF can be used as a vehicle for consideration of information sharing issues which affect a range of responders across Wales.

Business continuity management

11.19. As in England, Category 1 responders in Wales will maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency, so far as is reasonably practicable.

Welsh civil contingencies framework

Pan-Wales planning

11.20. Two discrete types of planning are undertaken at the pan-Wales level. The first type of planning supports emergency preparedness through capability development; the second supports response arrangements at the Wales level.

Wales Resilience Forum (WRF)

11.21. The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation at the Wales level is the WRF.

11.22. The WRF has senior representation from the Welsh Government, Cabinet Office, local authorities, the emergency services, the armed forces, the Environment Agency Wales, NHS Wales, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Health and Safety Executive. The forum considers planning and preparation matters and it functions in

a similar way to multi - LRF groupings in England but with a higher level of political involvement as a consequence of devolved responsibilities.

11.23. The WRF works alongside other elements of the multi-agency civil protection framework at the local and UK government levels. However, this framework is not a hierarchy. LRFs in Wales are not subordinate to the WRF. Communication and co-ordination flow in both directions. The LRFs operate in a similar way to their counterparts in England.

Wales Resilience Forum business plan

11.24. The strategic framework for capability development in Wales is set out in the Wales Resilience Forum Business Plan which is produced on an annual basis. The primary objective of the Business Plan is to clearly identify the relationship between planning for emergencies at the local, Wales and UK levels and to co-ordinate this work. The Business Plan ensures that co-ordination work at the pan-Wales level adds value to work being undertaken at other levels. At the core of the plan is a Wales Resilience Partnership Team, established to co-ordinate civil protection work in Wales.

Local Resilience Forums

11.25. As in England, the Act necessitated a restructuring of joint-agency planning in Wales resulting in the creation of LRFs in South Wales, Gwent, North Wales and Dyfed-Powys Police Force areas. The LRFs are supported by co-ordinating groups, sub-groups or task and finish groups established to develop various capabilities or set specific targets in strengthening local resilience through multi-agency collaboration.

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Joint Emergency Services Group

11.26.   The Joint Emergency Services Group brings together all the emergency services and armed forces in Wales to consider how to meet their duties collectively under the Act, and how to take forward their contribution to civil protection in Wales. The group has jointly funded the post of an Emergency Services Civil Contingencies Co-ordinator for Wales, to co-ordinate the work of the emergency services in all aspects of civil protection.

Welsh Borders Resilience Group

11.27.   To facilitate co-operation and information sharing between Wales and the border areas of England, a group has been formed which brings together the Welsh Government with the Department for Communities and Local Government, Resilience Emergency Division (DCLG (RED)). The group meets on a regular basis to discuss issues of mutual interest in civil contingencies and to help foster links at both the regional and local levels.

Welsh Government Civil Contingencies Group

11.28.   In recognition of its functional responsibilities and its territorial role, the Welsh Government has adopted a collegiate approach to civil protection in Wales. The Welsh Government has established a Civil Contingencies Group (CCG), led by a Director-General, dedicated to supporting multi-agency co-operation in Wales and engaging with the UK Government on all issues relating to civil protection and emergency preparedness. This CCG is supplemented by a wide variety of subject matter experts, based on the Welsh Government's functional responsibilities, who support planning and response arrangements in Wales. For example, such support is provided by the Health Emergency Planning Unit and specialists in environmental

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health, health, environmental science, animal health, and flood and coastal erosion risk management. This approach ensures that the Welsh Government is well placed to support Category 1 responders on civil protection matters and on specific resilience issues.

Welsh Government Emergencies Branch

11.29.   The Welsh Government's Emergencies Branch works in partnership with Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations engaged in civil protection in Wales. The Branch fosters and maintains links with emergency planners in local authorities, emergency services and utilities companies, in order to co-ordinate civil protection planning in Wales. It also maintains links with UK Government Departments and other devolved administrations to share best practice and undertake joint-working.

11.30.   To maintain the Welsh Government's co-ordination role the Branch provides the secretariat support to the Wales Resilience Forum, the Wales Resilience Partnership Team and various pan-Wales sub-groups.

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Chapter 12 Northern Ireland

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 12 (Northern Ireland) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- Civil protection in Northern Ireland is largely a devolved matter, with functions being exercised by the Northern Ireland departments. Some functions are not devolved and are delivered in Northern Ireland by bodies that fall within the remit of the UK Government (*paragraphs 12.1-12.5*).

- The Civil Contingencies Policy Branch in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister promotes civil contingencies preparedness in Northern Ireland and maintains arrangements for strategic crisis management in serious and catastrophic emergencies (*paragraphs 12.13-12.14*).

- Sub-regional and local co-ordination is achieved by a variety of arrangements, including those involving the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the district councils (*paragraphs 12.23-12.24*).

- Some Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland are subject to Part 1 of the Act and the Regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers - the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and telecommunications providers (*paragraphs 12.1-12.5*). The Police Service of Northern Ireland is also a Category 1 responder and is subject to Regulations, directions and guidance issued by the Department of Justice in relation to certain emergencies (*paragraph 12.2*).

- The Northern Ireland Office has responsibility for national security matters. It maintains crisis management arrangements to govern the strategic response to such emergencies (*paragraph 12.7*).

- Arrangements are in place to ensure information exchange and co-ordination in the event of emergencies which cross the border with the Republic of Ireland (*paragraph 12.24*).

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

12.1.   The duties in the Act apply only to a limited number of organisations which deliver functions that are not transferred or which were not transferred at the time the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 was made. These organisations are:

- o   the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) (included as a Category 1 responder);

- o   the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) (included as a Category 1 responder); and

- o   telecommunications operators (included as Category 2 responders).

12.2.   As these organisations do not represent the full spectrum of response agencies in Northern Ireland, the Regulations treat these organisations in a slightly different way. The following principles apply to those Category 1 and 2 responders which operate in Northern Ireland:

- o   The Regulations which relate to how individual Category 1 and 2 responders should perform their duties apply to Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland in the usual way, but with some adjustments for the Northern Ireland situation.

- o   The provisions which rely on bilateral co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders apply to Northern Ireland.[1]

- o   The provisions in the Regulations relating to the Local Resilience Forum and its activities, including the production of a Community Risk Register, do not apply to Northern Ireland.

- o   Category 1 responders in Northern Ireland should have regard to the activities of other bodies in Northern Ireland that are engaged in civil protection (including Northern Ireland departments, the Northern Ireland Office, the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service and relevant utilities) and, where appropriate, may rely on or adopt those activities.[2]

- o   Category 1 responders in Northern Ireland may delegate their functions to, or exercise their functions jointly with, other bodies in Northern Ireland who are engaged in civil protection.

1 regulation 6
2 regulation 57, 58

Last updated:October 2011

o   The Northern Ireland Department of Justice has the full range of Ministerial responsibilities in relation to the police's delivery of its duties under the CCA in relation to events or situations which threaten serious damage to human welfare and/or which threaten serious damage to the environment.[3] This Guidance therefore applies to the PSNI only in relation to emergencies arising from war or terrorism threatening serious damage to the United Kingdom. The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may issue separate guidance for the PSNI in respect of other emergencies to which the Act applies.

12.3.   In practice, the PSNI, MCA and telecommunications operators in Northern Ireland undertake their individual and co-operative duties under the Act, but relate to the other public service bodies listed in the Regulations[4] in line with the arrangements in the *Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework*, and by participating in Northern Ireland co-operation, co-ordination and crisis management machinery.

12.4.   The Northern Ireland organisations have a reciprocal requirement under the *Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework* to co-operate with the PSNI, MCA and telecommunications operators in the discharge of their duties under the Act.

12.5.   Chapters 2 to 8 explain in more detail how each duty under the Act is to be performed by Category 1 and 2 responders in Northern Ireland.

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3 See sections 1(4A), 2(6) to (9) and 3(6) CCA as amended by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Devolution of Policing and Justice Functions) Order 2010, Schedule 3, paragraphs 94 to 977.
4 regulation 57

Civil contingencies in Northern Ireland

12.6. Civil contingencies are largely a devolved matter with responsibilities lying with Northern Ireland government departments. Overall policy and strategy co-ordination falls to the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). The Northern Ireland Executive has oversight of civil contingencies arrangements for transferred functions.

12.7. The Northern Ireland Office has responsibility for national security matters. It maintains crisis management arrangements to govern the strategic response to such emergencies.

12.8. The lead government department principle applies in Northern Ireland where the lead Northern Ireland department is the department with day-to-day policy responsibility for the subject in question.

12.9. In Northern Ireland many functions which are delivered elsewhere in the UK by local authorities are delivered directly by Northern Ireland departments, or by their agencies or non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). This means that some activities which in Great Britain are covered by duties under the Act are in Northern Ireland carried out under lead department arrangements.

12.10. Lead departments in Northern Ireland are broadly similar to those at the UK level in terms of roles and responsibilities. Details of lead departments can be found www. cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience. Information on Northern Ireland arrangements can be found in *A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland* www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/aguidetoemergencyplanningarrangements.pdf

12.11.   The Northern Ireland devolved administration or Northern Ireland Office (NIO), depending on the subject matter, is represented on the key committees and forums within UK central government relating to civil protection at both official and Ministerial levels. They work closely with UK departments to ensure Northern Ireland needs are catered for in UK planning and policy development.

12.12.   In an emergency affecting Northern Ireland, the devolved administration will be involved because of its territorial role and its responsibilities for impact management, although lead responsibility will depend on the nature of the emergency and the devolution settlement.

The Civil Contingencies Policy Branch

12.13.   The Civil Contingencies Policy Branch (CCPB) is located within the OFMDFM. Its role is to:

- o   co-ordinate information and advice to the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the Executive on civil contingencies planning and policy;
- o   promote civil contingencies preparedness across NI departments through provision of information and guidance and maintenance of effective civil contingencies policies;
- o   facilitate co-ordination of contingencies preparedness across NI departments and the wider public sector when issues are cross-cutting;
- o   maintain the NI Central Crisis Management Arrangements (see Chapter 12 in *Emergency Response and Recovery*).

12.14.   The CCPB provides information and expertise to planners within organisations and facilitates co-ordination of planning between organisations through formal and informal structures and dialogue. Its customers are primarily government

departments and agencies but the emergency services and other public service bodies are also engaged. The CCPB also represents Northern Ireland interests in policy discussions at UK and international levels.

Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework

12.15. The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework sets out the principles of policy and practice which will be adhered to by Northern Ireland public service organisations in their civil contingencies activities. The principles in the Framework are derived from existing Northern Ireland arrangements and structures and from the underlying principles of the Act and other UK policies. The Framework is supported by guidance documents, including *A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland* www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/aguidetoemergencyplanningarrangements.pdf and *A Guide to Risk Assessment* in Northern Ireland www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/guide_to_risk_assessment_in_northern_ireland_-_january_2010-2.pdf

12.16. The Framework requires Northern Ireland public service organisations to co-operate with those organisations in Northern Ireland which have duties under Part 1 of the Act.

The Civil Contingencies Group, Northern Ireland

12.17. The Civil Contingencies Group, Northern Ireland (CCG(NI)) is a pan-Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. In addition to its policy role, the CCG(NI) supports strategic co-ordination of emergencies as part of the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements in a serious or catastrophic emergency.

12.18. The CCG(NI) meets on a regular basis (at least two to three times per year) to review strategic issues. The CCG(NI) may also establish subgroups or working groups to deal with development of policy and good practice guidance on particular topics or areas of concern.

12.19. The specific functions of the CCG(NI) are to:

- o undertake periodic review of civil protection policy in government departments and public bodies in Northern Ireland as appropriate, and will seek and gain agreement on policy principles and standards;

- o maintain liaison among government departments, the emergency services, other key public service bodies and District Councils;

- o disseminate information to and within member organisations on civil protection policy, current issues and risks and the response to emergencies; and will provide briefing on particular issues or emergencies;

- o collect and collate the information necessary to inform policy development or the response to emergencies and provide briefing on particular issues or emergencies;

- o establish standing or ad hoc sub-groups or working groups to develop policy for, or report on, particular issues or functions; and

- o discuss and co-ordinate the non-emergency service responses to emergencies which require a multi-agency strategic approach but which do not require the attention of Permanent Secretaries or Ministers.

12.20.   The group is chaired by a senior official from the OFMDFM. Its membership includes senior representatives from the bodies listed in Box 12.1.

Box 12.1: membership of the CCG(NI)

CCG(NI)	• Civil Contingencies Policy Branch (CCPB)	• Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service
	• 12 Northern Ireland departments	• Local Government Emergency Management Group (LGEMG)
	• Northern Ireland Office (NIO)	• Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
	• Executive Information Service	• Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
	• Food Standards Agency Northern Ireland	• Northern Ireland Ambulance Service

12.21.   As well as representing their immediate organisations, members also represent the interests of associated regional, sub-regional and local public service organisations.

12.22.   Various other co-ordination arrangements exist for planning and responding to specific situations. These are set up as needed by the key organisations involved. There are, for example, groups for flooding, overseas nuclear accidents and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear issues.

Local arrangements

12.23.   Co-ordination at the local level may be facilitated by a range of organisations, depending on the nature and outcome of particular emergencies. The PSNI and the district councils have key roles to play in co-ordination at local level.

Cross-border arrangements

12.24.   At local level, the emergency services have arrangements for co-ordinating the response to incidents at, or near, the border. Other arrangements are in place for co-ordinating information and efforts in areas such as public health emergencies and the response to nuclear accidents. These arrangements supplement national-level arrangements for co-ordination and co-operation through agencies such as the European Union.

Further information

12.25.   Further information can be found in the CCPB document *A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland*. This, and other documents on civil contingencies arrangements mentioned in this chapter, are available from the CCPB website.www. ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/making-government-work/civilcontingencies.htm

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Chapter 13 Support and challenge

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

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Chapter 13 (Support and challenge) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- UK Ministers may require information and explanation of responders' activity and delivery of their duties under the Act (*paragraph 13.1 - 13.4*).

- The application of sound performance development principles and practice is essential. No individual inspectorate is responsible for monitoring delivery of the duties under the Act. This is done through Category 1 and 2 responders performance monitoring or regulatory regimes (*paragraphs 13.4 - 13.13*).

- Timely, proportionate action should be taken at a local level, in the first instance, to address issues identified through monitoring (*paragraphs 13.8 - 13.29*).

- The Act assigns UK Ministers and Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland power to monitor performance of the civil protection duties (*paragraphs 13.5 -13.7*).

- The Act enables Category 1 and 2 responders and Ministers to take enforcement proceeding in the Courts and the High Court or the Court of Session has powers to grant any relief or make any order, as appropriate (*paragraphs 13.37 - 13.40*).

- The Act requires these Ministerial powers to be exercised in a way that is consistent with the various devolution settlements (*paragraphs 13.42 -13.45*).

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

Monitoring by the Government and by local responders

13.1.   The Act gives a Minister[1] powers to require:

- o   the provision of information about actions taken by a Category 1 or 2 responder in the performance of its Part 1 duties[2]; and

- o   an explanation as to why the responder has not taken action to comply with its duties under Part 1 of the Act.[3]

Box 13.1: How monitoring powers might be used

The Government would be most likely to use its monitoring powers to probe perceived systemic failures in the operation of the Act. For example, if a particular class of Category 2 responder is not sharing information about its local sectoral arrangements, Category 1 responders would be likely to bring this to the attention of their representative bodies. Those representative bodies would then pass this concern on to the Government.

The Government might then use these powers to request from all Category 1 and 2 responders in that particular sector details of the nature and volume of the information requests they had received under the Act, and how they had responded. The material provided would allow the Government to judge whether the sector was avoiding its obligations, or whether it was being put under unreasonable pressure, or whether there was some form of blockage in the system that could be removed. The Government could then take action, from adjusting the guidance so as to change expectations through to taking action in the courts

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1 'Minister of the Crown' or 'Minister' refers to the most appropriate Minister in the given situation.
2 S 9(1)(a)
3 S 9(1)(b)

Last updated:March 2012

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13.2.   The Government relies on current good practice in performance management and on established audit and regulatory bodies across the Category 1 and 2 organisations to assess performance.

13.3.   However, where the Government has reason in a particular case to require more information about responder compliance with the duties, and to seek an explanation for non-compliance, these monitoring powers may be used.

13.4.   The powers will usually be exercised by the Minister with lead responsibility for civil contingencies. However, all proposals to exercise these powers would be developed in close collaboration with relevant lead government departments, and the Devolved Administrations, and agreed between departments and administrations with an interest.

The role of Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland

13.5.   The Act [4] gives Scottish Ministers powers to require:

  o   the provision of information about actions taken by Scottish Category 1 or 2 responders [5] in the performance of its Part 1 duties; and

  o   an explanation as to why the responder has not taken action to comply with its duties under Part 1 of the Act.

13.6.   The Act [6] gives the Northern Ireland Department of Justice powers to require:

  o   the provision of information about actions taken by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) [7] in the performance of its Part 1 duties in relation to its devolved functions ; and

[4] S 11.
[5] Sch1 p 2 & 4
[6] S 9 as amended by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Devolution of Policing and Justice Functions) Order 2010.
[7] The Act assigns responder status to the Chief Constable.

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o an explanation as to why the responder has not taken action to comply with its duties under Part 1 of the Act in relation to its devolved functions.

13.7. Powers in relation to non-devolved functions of the PSNI would be exercised by a Minister of the Crown.

Local arrangements for assurance and accountability

13.8. Regulations require that specific and generic emergency plans drawn up by Category 1 organisations include provisions to test and exercise those plans.[8]

13.9. The government relies on:

o all Category 1 responders, as members of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), taking ownership and responsibility for their performance and supporting their members and partners. By ensuring that:

- responders fulfil their roles within this framework and, where appropriate, issues are escalated or de-escalated; and

- members are committed to ensuring the partnership is strong and they can promote high consistent standards and make effective, efficient use of resources.

o current good practice in performance management within responders and forums;

o locally driven reviews of plans and risk assessments to provide assurance as part of the Big Society agenda and Localism Bill[9]; and

o established audit and regulatory bodies across the Category 1 and 2 organisations to assess performance.

8 Reg 25
9 Regulations also require Category 1 responders to publish community risk registers. It is likely that many responders will be subject to locally driven accountability through the localism agenda, which empowers communities to take decisions about their area and the delivery of public services

13.10.   A forum could become aware of its collective, corporate strengths and weaknesses, or those of an organisation, through communication from organisations, whistle-blowers, regulators, government departments and agencies, the media, inquiries, de-briefs, or complaints from members of the public.

RESPONDERS WORKING TOGETHER TO SUPPORT AND CHALLENGE

13.11.   Category 1 and 2 responders need to assure themselves that their arrangements and plans are robust. Those that have legal responsibilities (under the Civil Contingencies Act and other legislation) need to be constantly vigilant to ensure that they are meeting their responsibilities.

13.12.   Responders should ensure their systems, plans and processes in relation to emergency preparedness are fit for purpose. Periodic reviews of these, using the suggested methods and guidance in *paragraphs 13.13 - 13.14* will help them identify their strengths and weaknesses and provide external assurance, where required, to such bodies as:

  o   Partners in the wider resilience community ;

  o   Peer groups;

  o   Local resilience forums;

  o   Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED);

  o   Scottish Government;

  o   Welsh Government ;

  o   Northern Ireland Executive;

  o   Regulators and inspectorates;

  o   Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat; and

  o   The local community.

13.13. Responders work together identifying strengths and weaknesses to support and challenge each other within local resilience forums or the wider resilience community to:

- o develop knowledge, skills, attributes and capacity;
- o identify capability gaps or emerging issues; and
- o resolve issues by sharing lessons, focusing on improvements and improving transparency to demonstrate improvements in relation to local assessments.

ASSESSMENT TOOLS

13.14. Public and private sector organisations have a clear understanding of their business, what they want to achieve, how to achieve it and whether they are achieving it. The organisation, its managers and its staff must understand what is expected of them and what they can expect of others in all areas of their work. Systems and processes which help achieve this, and external validation and assurance, include:

- o business plans;
- o risk assessment assurance processes;
- o internal audit and quality assurance systems;
- o performance and line management activities;
- o periodic testing and exercising;
- o peer review;
- o plan validation;
- o joint exercising of plans (including debriefing);

- o local authority scrutiny powers (LA scrutiny powers enable local councillors to represent the views of citizens on local services).
- o learning lessons from exercises and incidents;
- o Civil Protection Self Assessment Tools (CPSAT), a voluntary online tool designed to help responders monitor and assess how they deliver their responsibilities for civil contingencies in their areas;
- o *Expectation Set and Indicators of Good Practice for Category 1 and 2 responders* aims to clarify what is expected of Category 1 and 2 responders in England and Wales in relation to:
  - the duties within the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004*; [10]
  - the associated Contingency Planning Regulations 2005 (Regulations) and guidance; [11]
  - the National Resilience Capabilities Programme (which is the core framework through which the government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the United Kingdom; and
  - *Emergency Response and Recovery* http://www.cabinetoffice. gov.uk/content/emergency-response-and-recovery, which aims to establish good practice based on lessons identified from responding to and recovering from emergencies, both in the UK and internationally. It accompanies *Emergency Preparedness* which provides guidance on how to implement the CCA regime; and

[10] www.statutelaw.gov.uk provides details.
[11] See above

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o   *The Role of LRFs: A Reference Document* highlights some of the key aspects that demonstrate robust compliance with the duties under the CCA and Regulations. The principal aim of this document is to encourage and support LRFs in learning and continuous development, taking forward their capabilities in civil contingencies, emergency preparedness and elements of response and recovery. It is for use individually and collectively by organisations that constitute an LRF or contribute to its work. Assurance agencies may also use this document in guiding their assessments of engagement among local agencies in their collective LRF responsibilities and in supporting the agencies' efforts to manage and develop their individual and collective effectiveness.

13.15.   Different arrangements apply in Northern Ireland and Scotland; details on the Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework can be found on: http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/ ni_civil_contingencies_framework_-_refreshed_september_2011-2.pdf and for Scotland at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/06/12094636/3

Sharing the load

13.16.   The Civil Contingencies Act also empowers responders to:

o   jointly discharge duties;

o   identify a lead responder; and/or

o   delegate delivery of their responsibilities to another organisation.

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13.17. However, when discharging or delegating duties, the partners involved must determine the arrangements that are best suited to their local circumstances and service users needs. Those that opt for these approaches still retain overall responsibility for their duties under the Act. They can delegate but not abdicate (Chapter 2 of *Emergency Preparedness: Co-operation* explains this in further detail). They must ensure they are effectively represented at LRFs. It is, therefore, vital that when jointly discharging or delegating functions, organisations:

- o actively engage in resilience work
- o actively support and challenge each other
- o ensure high performance standards

Support from Local Resilience Forums

13.18. Local Resilience Forums are not legal entities and the duties rest with responders. This does not mean that a forum and its members are powerless to intervene to develop its members' performance. A forum's strength rests in the co-operative and team working nature of the relationships between organisations and the trust that the members have built between them. Collectively, forums can give leadership and bring considerable peer pressure and support to bear.

13.19. The forums can help their member organisations to:

- o develop knowledge, skills, attributes and capacity;
- o share best practice;
- o identify issues;
- o resolve issues;
- o support the compilation of the community risk register;
- o plan for emergencies;

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- o develop systematic, planned and co-ordinated approaches to delivering resilience functions;
- o work beyond the LRF boundary; and
- o support the preparation of multi-agency plans.

13.20. They can support their members by encouraging and fostering team-working, co-operation, and bi-lateral arrangements between the member organisations. Forums can also help to broker bi-lateral arrangements.

Peer challenge

13.21. Peer review involves the evaluation of an organisation or individual's work by others working in the same field. Peer challenge takes this a step further. Formally challenging an individual or organisation, can damage relationships, impede co-operation and/or result in those who are challenged becoming defensive or disengaged. Handling of the approach should be proportionate and diplomatic.

13.22. It is important to identify whether the difficulty lies with the organisation or with the individual. For example, an organisation's representative may not have the seniority, or the support from the organisation's senior management, to commit resources or direct strategy. (Chapter 5, *Emergency Preparedness*, provides guidance on senior management engagement). Some responders may need help in engaging their senior managers.

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13.23.   When earlier attempts to support an organisation have been rebuffed, a Local Resilience Forum may need to challenge rather than support that organisation. However, representatives of the LRF must take care to ensure that their approach is not counter-productive; an approach based on influencing and persuading is likely to be more effective than one based on a command and control approach as the relationship is essentially one of co-operation. See *paragraphs 13.24 and 13.25* for information about escalating issues.

Formally requesting action on behalf of the LRF

13.24   Sometimes a more formal approach is needed, particularly when urgent action is needed to resolve issues and when less formal support and challenge has failed. The members of the LRF can do this collectively through the chair or secretariat.

13.25.   If a formal approach, usually in written form outlining what action is required and by when, proves necessary, the LRF members will set a deadline for action to be taken and monitor the response to the request and the response's impact. This will inform the next steps and the decision on whether it needs to de-escalate the issue, intervene further, or escalate the issue.

Triggers for escalating and de-escalating issues

13.26.   It is important that issues are addressed at the most appropriate level. All members of the resilience community must take responsibility for ensuring that an issue is referred to the appropriate person, team or organisation in a timely proportionate manner.

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Support from Department of Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) in England

13.27.   The Resilience and Emergencies Division helps responders identify for themselves the risks they face, mitigate those risks, and manage the impact of risks that materialise, including through liaison with central government departments. See Chapter 16: *Collaboration and Cooperation between Local Resilience Forums in England*

13.28.   The Resilience and Emergencies Division will:

- o   act as a critical friend, question rationales, suggest alternatives, share good practice and support local planning activities;

- o   provide a support mechanism – helping local partners develop an appropriate response capability, brokering advance mutual aid agreements between areas;

- o   make links between local responders and the lead government departments;

- o   supporting cross boundary strategies, protocols and procedures whilst ensuring a close fit with both the needs of Government in a national emergency and the needs of the local responders; and

- o   support local and national exercising - helping to ensure lessons learnt are effectively shared across the relevant partnership.

Support from Welsh Government Resilience Team in Wales

13.29.   The Welsh Government Resilience Team fulfils a similar role in Wales to that undertaken by DCLG RED in England. Additionally, the team:

- o   supports local and cross-LRF activities and leads on all-Wales co-ordination;
- o   acts as a link between LRFs through representation on the forums and their supporting co-ordinating groups;
- o   facilitates all-Wales capabilities groups which bring together the relevant LRF sub-group Chairs;
- o   works in conjunction with the joint emergencies services groups and LRFs to delivery pan-Wales training and exercising; and
- o   acts as a link with Cabinet Office, other Whitehall departments and other devolved administrations.

Role of the regulators and inspectorates

13.30.   In addition to the self monitoring processes outlined within this guidance, the Government relies upon regulatory and inspectorate bodies across the range of responder organisations to support self assessment in relation to responders meeting their responsibilities under the Act. Regulators have an important role to play and can help responders in a number of ways through:

- o   undertaking governance or diagnostic interventions to highlight organisational strengths and weaknesses and follow up as necessary;
- o   reducing the bureaucratic burden on responders by accepting evidence from self assessment and peer reviews as part of their inspection regimes;

o   highlighting and validating good practice for organisations to build upon;

o   sharing knowledge and good practice within and between organisations;

o   contribute to Government work in producing self assessment tools and guidance.

13.31.   Outputs from regulatory reviews or inspections can provide responders with a rich source of information upon which to produce and implement plans to improve and fill identified capability gaps.

13.32.   Bodies which oversee performance of public service provision by Category 2 responders operating under license arrangements such as Ofcom for the telecommunications industry or Ofwat for the water industry, impose sector specific standards relating to the provision of services and are responsible for monitoring performance and taking remedial action when standards fall below expectations.

Role of the national tier

13.33.   The Government has established a framework to support national emergency planning in a linked and structured way. This is now well established and embedded. Parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the Government is ongoing and the National Audit Office audits departmental accounts and reports to Parliament. The Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat provides cross-cutting oversight and co-ordination of resilience activity at the national level. All the current duties of Category 1 and 2 responders are reflected and shadowed by activity co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) at the national level. Similar activity is undertaken in lead government departments. This activity and attendant responsibilities are driven and/or monitored via:

- o the National Resilience Capabilities Programme (NRCP) (see paragraph 13.34);

- o the Lead Government Departments Expected Capabilities, this amplifies guidance in *CONOPs and The Lead Government Department and its role – Guidance and Best Practice* – https://update.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/lead-government-departments-role.pdf

- o *Central Government's Concept of Operations* (CONOPs);

- o National Capabilities Survey;

- o the Resilience sub-committee of the National Security Council. NSC oversees all aspects of the UK's security. Government departments with key security related functions are all represented on the National Security Council. NSC (THRC) is a Ministerial sub-committee of NSC. Its remit is to consider threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies strategy; and

- o Ministerial departments are required to develop and publish business plans, which show how they will deliver their services and objectives. They are judged against their delivery of these and ministers are required to report publicly on them.

13.34.   The cross-Government National Resilience Capabilities Programme is co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office. It brings together work stream lead departments. Each of these departments has particular responsibility for one or more aspects of emergency response at the national level, for example the Department of Health has responsibility for the national tier of emergency response in the event of pandemic flu. To assess the level of preparedness and capability nationally, the programme uses the National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPAs) which set out the baseline capability necessary to respond to, and recover from, specific risks as set out in the annually updated National Risk Assessment (NRA).

MINISTERIAL POWERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

13.35. All Secretaries of State are accountable to Parliament for the performance of their department and may be called to account by the relevant Select Committees. There is a constitutional expectation that ministers will co-operate across government. Resilience activity is co-ordinated across Government by NSC (THRC)(R). This is shadowed by an officials committee NSC (THRC)(R)(O).

13.36. The aim of NSC (THRC)(R) is to develop the resilience of the UK to withstand disruptive events (both malicious threats and non-malicious hazards), ensuring that (inter alia):

- o government at all levels identifies and assesses emerging short/medium term risks and vulnerabilities;
- o specific contingency capabilities are in place where specific risks are in sight; and
- o there is rigorous evaluation of UK resilience.

ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 via Category 1 and 2 responders

13.37. A Category 1 or 2 responder may itself take court action, in respect of a failure by another responder body to comply with its main duties under the Act.[12] Examples of the cause for such an action might be where one responder is unreasonably:

- o withholding information from another; or
- o failing to be represented at an LRF meeting.

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12 S 10(1)(b)–(c) and S 11(1)(b)–(c)

13.38. It is not anticipated that these powers will be used frequently. Where they are used, the Act also gives the High Court or the Court of Session powers to grant any relief or make any order as it thinks appropriate.[13]

Enforcement by Ministers

13.39. In a particular case, the Government may not be satisfied with the information received from a Category 1 or 2 responder, about the performance of its duties, or with the explanation given for non compliance. In these circumstances, the Minister may choose to take enforcement proceedings in the High Court or Court of Session.[14]

13.40. As with the powers to monitor performance, court proceedings will usually be taken by the Minister with lead responsibility for civil contingencies. However, all proposals to do so would be developed in close collaboration with relevant lead government departments and the Devolved Administrations and agreed between departments and administrations with an interest.

Enforcement under other legislation

13.41. Other resilience legislation is monitored and enforced under the terms of that legislation. See Chapter 19 on The Fit with Other Legislation.

Liaison with the Devolved Administrations

13.42. The Act requires a Minister of the Crown to consult Welsh Ministers before making any legislation, issuing any guidance, issuing any direction or bringing any proceedings in relation to a Category 1 or 2 responder in Wales.[15] The Act also requires a Minister of the Crown to obtain the consent of Welsh Ministers

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before undertaking such action in relation to a Category 1 or 2 responder which has functions that are devolved.[16]

13.43   The Act requires a Minister of the Crown to consult the Scottish Ministers when making legislation in relation to Category 1 or 2 responders in Scotland.

13.44.   The Act requires a Minister of the Crown to consult the Northern Ireland Department of Justice when making regulations or an order in relation to the PSNI.   A Minister of the Crown may only make regulations in relation to the non-devolved functions of the PSNI. Where the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland proposes to make regulations or an order in relation to the devolved functions of the PSNI, the Act requires that it consult a Minister of the Crown.

13.45.   Ministers of the Crown will consult the Devolved Administrations when considering monitoring and enforcement action.

Cabinet Office

Chapter 14
The Role of the Voluntary Sector

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 14 (The Role of the Voluntary Sector) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- The voluntary sector has an important role to play in supporting the statutory services in the planning, response and recovery phases of most emergencies (*paragraph 14.1*).

- Category 1 responders who include the voluntary sector in their local planning arrangements will make the overall response more accessible and effective throughout the community. This is not just good practice: the Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to the contribution of the voluntary sector. This includes considering how the voluntary sector can be involved at every stage, including training and exercising to respond to emergencies (*paragraphs 14.4-14.8*).

- There are four models suggested for Category 1 responders to follow when engaging the voluntary sector effectively in order to discharge their duties at the local level (*paragraphs 14.11-14.15*).

- Responders should be aware of the extent and range of services the voluntary sector can offer before making plans to involve them (*paragraphs 14.16-14.18*).

- It is essential that volunteers from the voluntary sector are trained and that they are supported by the responding organisations they are helping (*paragraphs 14.24-14.26*).

- The way Category 1 and 2 responders work with the voluntary sector at the local level is supported by consistent arrangements at other levels (*paragraphs 14.27-14.30*).

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WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

14.1.   In some circumstances, emergencies can overstretch the resources of the emergency services, local authorities and other local responders during the response and recovery phases of an emergency. The value of involving the voluntary sector at every stage in order to provide additional support has been demonstrated on many occasions. The delivery of their services, and their role as a link between communities and Category 1 responders, may also enable them to support the development of community resilience activities.

14.2.   The voluntary sector in the United Kingdom is very large and diverse. The skills and expertise available from the voluntary sector vary from place to place. Experience shows that advance planning enables voluntary sector activity to be more integrated and effective.

14.3.   The Regulations require Category 1 responders to have regard to the activities of certain voluntary organisations in the course of carrying out their emergency and business continuity planning duties.[1] Category 1 responders must have regard to those voluntary sector bodies which carry out activities in the geographical area[2] for which the responder is responsible. Further explanation of the term 'have regard to' can be found in *paragraphs 14.5 and 14.6.*

14.4.   Voluntary sector organisations are those bodies whose activities are carried out not for profit and which are not public authorities or local authorities. Under the Regulations, they become relevant voluntary organisations if they carry on any activities for the purpose of preventing emergencies, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies, or taking other action in connection with emergencies.[3] This is a broad definition that will capture charities and other voluntary organisations.

[1] regulation 23(1)
[2] Details of the devolved areas and England can be found in Chapter 2 Cooperation.
[3] regulation 23(2)

Last updated: October 2011

14.5.   This does not mean that Category 1 responders should work only with those voluntary sector organisations established solely for the purpose of working in the field of civil protection. Few voluntary sector bodies are established for the sole purpose of responding to emergencies. Most will have a partial interest tangential to their main business, for example, this may include faith organisations. Nevertheless, these voluntary sector organisations must be factored into local civil protection arrangements where they may have a contribution to make or a role to play in planning for, or responding to, or recovery from, an emergency.

14.6.   This obligation is intended to ensure that Category 1 responders actively consider and engage the voluntary sector during the planning process, rather than at the end or not at all. As such, simply sending copies of plans to voluntary organisations is not sufficient, nor is including voluntary organisations in plans without consulting them. Instead, Category 1 responders must consider and discuss with relevant voluntary organisations, the capabilities that those organisations within their area have to offer, and whether those capabilities should be built into response and recovery plans. Agreements reached should be captured in plans and signed off by all affected parties.

14.7.   The requirement to have regard to the activities of relevant voluntary sector organisations covers both emergency plans and business continuity plans (BCPs). In the case of the former, voluntary sector capabilities such as search and rescue or humanitarian support may be built into the response arrangements agreed between the statutory services. In the case of the latter, the voluntary sector may, in the course of everyday business, already deliver certain services on behalf of a statutory provider that would need to be maintained (such as 'meals on wheels'). In addition, certain BCPs may use voluntary organisations to backfill functions that would be undermined by the diversion of resources to deal with the direct consequences of an emergency or major incident. For example, with

ambulances diverted to the scene of a large emergency, an ambulance trust might have an agreement with the local St John Ambulance (*paragraph 14.17*) for the organisation to carry out routine patient collection. However, responders should be aware that the voluntary sector may need more support during a sustained response. This should be considered when planning for longer term responses such as swine flu.

14.8.   The Act also requires local authorities to provide business continuity advice to those voluntary sector bodies which it considers to be appropriate.[4] Advice on how to discharge this requirement is set out in Chapter 8. Nevertheless, local authorities may find it useful to consider how their engagement of the voluntary sector in the planning process might dovetail with work to meet that specific requirement.

Box 14.0: Further advice and information

Also included in this chapter is further advice about the voluntary sector and information that is not supported directly by the Act, but responders may find it useful in fulfilling their duties under the Act. These sections of text are distinguished by inclusion in a text box like this one.

HOW THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT

Engaging the voluntary sector at the local level

14.9.   By establishing the appropriate organisational framework, the voluntary sector can be properly factored into the planning process. This will ensure that the voluntary sector have the capability to carry out duties and are not used to replace statutory authorities and statutorily funded capabilities. Sound co-operation through

4 s. 4

the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) processes and directly with individual Category 1 responders should be based on an agreed framework. This structure needs to suit local circumstances, be understood by all concerned and have clearly identified points of contact. These contact arrangements must be kept up to date by regular formal and informal dialogue between each of the participants at local level.

14.10. There are several different models that can be applied at the local level. None is mandatory, but these models, either individually or in combination, can help Category 1 responders to discharge their duties under the Act.

Model 1: Engagement through the LRF

14.11. At the local level, each LRF should consider including a voluntary sector representative. The representative should be able to speak on behalf of all the major voluntary organisations operating in the area, as well as any smaller, local voluntary organisations.

Model 2: Establishing a voluntary sector subgroup of the LRF

14.12. Setting up a voluntary sector co-ordinating group at local level can help co-operation between the statutory services and local voluntary organisations. A representative from the local authority civil contingencies team will normally chair such a group. The group can bring together representatives from the voluntary sector organisations with an interest in civil protection which are active in the LRF area. The principal advantage of such a group is that it should enable all Category 1 responders to have a good understanding of the strengths and limitations of local voluntary sector organisations, and to consider including them in their planning to an extent that is realistic.

Model 3: Bilateral links on the basis of functions

14.13.   One method of involving voluntary organisations in civil contingency planning is to group them where appropriate on the basis of their functions, and link them with the Category 1 responder responsible for those functions. This functional grouping can clarify the contributions which individual voluntary organisations can make. It can prevent duplicated demands on their services and enable Category 1 responders and voluntary organisations to make the best use of the voluntary contribution. Voluntary organisations can also be involved in functional planning and response matters by giving them representation at working groups associated with LRFs and wider groupings.

14.14.   In some cases, there will be one Category 1 responder and one voluntary organisation linked to a specific function, for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI). In other cases, where a voluntary organisation performs a range of functions, it would need to be associated with more than one Category 1 responder and represented on all the relevant functional groups. In all cases, local civil protection personnel should be fully aware of the level of voluntary sector support available and the arrangements for its provision in a co-ordinated manner.

Model 4: Bilateral links on the basis of capabilities

14.15.   A related method is to distinguish between the operational role of voluntary organisations when they directly help in the response to an emergency, and their support role, for example when they provide refreshments for the emergency services. An LRF-level multi-agency plan should list which services are offered across the range of voluntary organisations. A key principle of the plan is to avoid double-counting by indicating which Category 1 responder has first call on (or priority need for) any particular voluntary contribution and to define a co-ordinated call-out system.

Box 14.1 Lincolnshire case study on co-ordinating the voluntary response (including 'convergent volunteers') during emergencies

To plan for the potential resource challenges of coastal flooding, emergency planners needed a clear understanding of the capability and capacity of the voluntary sector to help statutory agencies respond and recover during a large scale, wide area and prolonged emergency.

A two-day conference was held for the voluntary sector, which included discussions around a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and its implications. The conference also provided an opportunity to invite larger voluntary sector organisations to assist with joint training initiatives and, for example, assure the ability of the British Red Cross (BRC) to operate at the levels required.

The voluntary sector was promoted in a positive and helpful way, increasing senior managers' and emergency responders' awareness and understanding of their capability. Voluntary sector organisations appreciated the fact that their contributions were valued and respected. The conference led to the formal development of a collectively agreed MOU in Lincolnshire, allowing:

- co-ordination of the voluntary sector response in the county on behalf of the LRF (including convergent volunteers) by British Red Cross;
- voluntary sector representatives to work alongside the unified rescue cell as part of the command support functions that are established during an emergency response;
- assessment of volunteer and convergent volunteer capabilities;
- identification of a focal point for LRF requests for deployment; and

- contact with other voluntary agencies to determine whether they are able to deploy into the county during an emergency.

The development of the voluntary sector MOU demonstrated and built on the high regard in which these organisations are held. The impact within the LRF has been considerable. Statutory agencies now have a better understanding of the voluntary sector role, and the voluntary sector has enjoyed the chance to prove itself, energising relationships, and providing a foundation for future work.

There is still more work to be done to establish an improved database of all voluntary groups, agencies and organisations, and to encourage the recruitment of more volunteers with skills and enthusiasm.

David Powell, County Emergency Planning Officer, Lincolnshire

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Box 14.2 Case study of good practice in local voluntary sector engagement in Derbyshire

In Derbyshire, the voluntary sector is closely involved in local civil protection work. There is no voluntary sector representative on the LRF, the LRF and voluntary organisations have opted for the model of a voluntary sector subgroup.

The subgroup is chaired by a representative from the local authority civil protection team, and its membership includes the British Red Cross, St John Ambulance, WRVS, Samaritans, Salvation Army, RAYNET, the National Voluntary Civil Aid Service, a Derby radio amateur group, Mountain Rescue, RSPCA and representatives of religious groups.

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Individual voluntary sector organisations are then brought into the detail of planning through bilateral relationships with Category 1 responders on the basis of their capabilities and functions, ensuring full interconnectedness between the voluntary and statutory sectors. Voluntary sector organisations also take part in some other LRF subgroups, are offered training and take part in exercises.

"By establishing a voluntary sector subgroup of the LRF, we ensure that the statutory responders have access to a clear picture of the voluntary sector's capabilities in Derbyshire."
Ian Shuttleworth, Chief Emergency Planning Officer, Derbyshire.

"The statutory services in Derbyshire have adopted a flexible but well-organised approach to our voluntary sector involvement. This careful engagement at the planning phase has proven its worth in the response phase, and we have successfully supported the statutory services when emergencies have stretched their resources."
Moya Wood-Heath, Chair - Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum

14.16.   **Capabilities of the voluntary sector**

Those preparing emergency plans should be aware of the extent and range of operational and support activities and services provided by the voluntary sector at all stages, from planning through to the response and recovery phases of emergencies in the United Kingdom.

> o   There are established organisations such as the British Red Cross, WRVS, Salvation Army, St John Ambulance (or St Andrew's First Aid in Scotland) that provide a range of services and activities;

o   Many individual volunteers have particular skills, but are

not necessarily members of recognised voluntary organisations: for

example interpreters or representatives from the faith communities.

o   Certain organisations contribute specialist skills in various types of activity:

- search and rescue organisations, such as the British Cave

  Rescue Council (BCRC), coastguard response teams (HM

  Coastguard's Auxiliary branch), the Mountain Rescue Council

  (MRC), the RNLI, the International Rescue Corps (IRC),

  Sky Watch, search and rescue dog teams;

- groups of doctors, such as the British Association for

  Immediate Care Schemes (BASICS);

- in London, the London Air Ambulance provides an emergency service;

- voluntary radio operators, such as the Radio

  Amateurs' Emergency Network (RAYNET);

- Organisations which specialise in providing emotional

  support and counselling, such as Cruse Bereavement Care, the

  Samaritans and Victim Support; and

- other non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

14.17.   The voluntary sector can provide support at every stage of emergency planning,

response and recovery in a number of generic areas:

o   practical support and welfare;

o   social and psychological aftercare;

o   medical support, properties and essential supplies;

o   search and rescue;

o   transport;

o   communications;

o   documentation;

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o   training and exercising; and

o   signposting to other organisations.

14.18.   Annex 14A sets out examples of the extent and range of support activities and services that volunteers can provide and of the statutory organisations with which they frequently work.

14.19.   It is important to be precise on the accountability of volunteers to a professional agency because of issues of legal liability, including statutory requirements under the Children Act 2004, and because of insurance indemnity issues. Agencies working with voluntary sector organisations will need to consider the health and safety of volunteers. They may wish to use a Service Level Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding or some other form of protocol to establish arrangements to identify the level of insurance cover provided by the voluntary organisations, the training provided to voluntary sector personnel, or the use of Personal Protective Equipment. Further information on establishing these protocols can be found in the Voluntary Sector Engagement Guidance Note at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ sites/default/files/resources/engaging_voluntarysector.pdf

14.20.   It is of vital importance that, if an emergency occurs, the voluntary sector should be able to contribute what has been mutually agreed and written into local plans. Voluntary agencies have therefore to be able to demonstrate their capabilities and that their support is reliable, consistent and sustainable to the required standard. A record of available local voluntary resources should be maintained, where appropriate, as part of an LRF-level multi-agency plan.

14.21.   The statutory and voluntary sectors should be clear about their respective roles in an emergency. They each have their own structures and constraints. Voluntary

organisations must appreciate that the Category 1 responders bear the responsibility for the overall emergency response. Equally, the statutory services must develop an understanding of the voluntary sector as a rich resource for personnel, professional skills and equipment. They should also recognise that the voluntary sector may have the capability to work with local individuals who are not members of a voluntary organisation and wish to contribute to the response or recovery phases as convergent volunteers, building capacity, individual and community resilience. Individuals are likely to come forward irrespective of whether they are needed. Responders should work with voluntary agencies to formalise a process and procedure for the use of convergent volunteers.

14.22. Plans should include effective procedures for alerting or calling out voluntary organisations, or putting volunteers and organisations on standby (and ensuring stand down) to ensure the optimum response. Early alert is desirable because of the lead time needed for contacting and assembling teams in organisations other than the emergency services. Contingency arrangements should reflect this. It is usually the responsibility of the voluntary sector to organise the initial call-out and briefing of volunteers such as setting out points of contact and how voluntary agency staff might liaise with volunteers and Category 1 or 2 responders. These roles should be reflected in the plans.

14.23. A Memorandum of Understanding should be in place describing any bilateral or multilateral agreement between responders, including financial arrangements. For example, consideration should be given to arrangements for payment of petrol costs to 4x4 drivers in emergency situations such as heavy snow fall. There should be agreement and effective plans on the use of volunteers, the decision-making process leading to their call-out and the method of call-out. Plans should determine who will organise, manage and brief volunteers. Debriefing should be included as part of plan maintenance procedures. Planners also need to establish that volunteers receive refreshment and are appropriately clothed, identified and equipped.

Training and exercising

14.24.   When considering the particular contribution that the voluntary sector can make, it should be noted that established voluntary organisations and volunteer groups will usually have their own training arrangements. They should be able to demonstrate their effectiveness to the Category 1 responders.

14.25.   Additionally, the Category 1 responders and voluntary agencies should aim for joint training and exercising (including involving the community/volunteers where possible). It is very important that voluntary organisations understand the management framework of the response and how they should be positioned and integrated into the response as a whole. There will be some overlap between the functions and capabilities of different voluntary organisations. Joint exercising will identify any problems, ensure plans and procedures are up to date and foster working relationships.

14.26.   Effective communication, planning and training between responders and the voluntary sector should aim to identify opportunities for sharing heavy workloads and providing mutual support. General issues of training and exercising are further discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

The voluntary sector at national level

14.27.   At the national level, the voluntary sector has developed a co-ordinated approach to planning its contribution to civil protection, and all responders should aim to fit into this framework.

14.28. A Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Working Party and Forum have been convened by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the British Red Cross. The aim of the Working Party and Forum is to identify and maximise the voluntary sector contribution to UK civil protection arrangements. This includes informing and influencing policy, testing and challenging strategic and practical guidance and facilitating the exchange of information. There are currently 20 voluntary organisations with a national or UK-wide civil protection role that are members of the Forum. The Forum provides links between the voluntary sector, central government and statutory authorities. The Working Party supports the Forum.

14.29. There is a further national level standing committee, the National Voluntary Aid Societies' Emergency Committee (NVASEC). NVASEC may be used to co-ordinate the auxiliary role of the three Voluntary Aid Societies (VASs): the British Red Cross, St John Ambulance and St Andrew's First Aid, to support military medical services in times of conflict and war.

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Annex 14A

EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY SECTOR ACTIVITIES AND SERVICES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS.

The voluntary sector has the capacity and capability to undertake the following activities and services. The volunteers should receive appropriate training that is recognised by the responding organisation seeking their support for every stage of an emergency, from planning, through response and recovery, to resilience building.

Welfare

- o Staffing rest centres, family and friends reception centres, survivor reception centres and humanitarian assistance centres
- o Feeding
- o Provision of clothing and other essential items
- o Advice on entitlements, grants, loans, claims
- o Resettlement of victims, evacuees, etc
- o Support and comforting
- o Providing information and advice
  - • Support Lines
  - • Drop in centres

in support of:

- o Local authority social services
- o Children Services Departments
- o Local authority housing department
- o Police family liaison officers
- o Emergency services

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Social and psychological aftercare

- o   Listening skills, welfare support and comforting

- o   Befriending

- o   Providing longer-term support

in support of:

- o   Local authority social services

- o   Local authority educational psychologists

- o   National Health Service (NHS)

Medical support

- o   Support to Ambulance Service (including provision of air ambulances)

- o   First aid and medical aid posts

- o   First aid and medical aid support in casualty clearing stations,

    reception and rest centres

- o   Emergency feeding

- o   Auxiliary roles in hospitals

- o   Welfare

in support of:

- o   NHS Ambulance Service

- o   NHS hospital trusts

Search and rescue

o   Mountain, cave, tunnels and shafts, cliff, moor, inland waterways, coastal rescue, coastal or inland flooding, etc.

o   Supervision of other searchers (e.g. youth organisations)

o   Loan of equipment

in support of:

o   Emergency services

o   Lowland and urban search and rescue

Transport

o   Transport and escort of homeless, outpatients, next-of-kin, etc, to and from airports, railway stations, hospitals, mortuaries, rest centres, hostels, etc.

o   Assistance with evacuation to places of safety

o   Transport by 4x4 vehicles

o   Disabled passenger vehicles

in support of:

o   Local authority social services or housing departments

o   Emergency services

o   NHS

Communications

- o   Providing radio and telephone communications and operators
- o   Vehicles
- o   Messengers
- o   Interpreters and translators
- o   Use of voluntary agencies to distribute resilience information

in support of:

- o   Emergency services
- o   Local authorities
- o   Utilities
- o   Voluntary organisations

Documentation

- o   Tracing people nationally and internationally
- o   Assistance at Casualty Bureau in some local areas
- o   Logging/diary procedures
- o   Computer support

in support of:

- o   Emergency services (especially police)
- o   Local authority social services or housing departments
- o   NHS

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Financial aid

o   Advice and provision of appeals, disaster funds

in support of:

o   Local authorities

Training and exercising

o   Analysis of training needs and capabilities

o   Devising instructional programmes

o   Joint planning and conduct of multi-agency exercises, including
    call-out arrangements and debrief

o   Formulation and dissemination of good practice

in support of:

o   Emergency services

o   Local authority departments

o   National utilities

o   NHS

Building individual and community resilience

- o Promoting resilience messages and materials

- o Individual and community resilience building

- o Encouraging local participation in resilience activities

- o Developing individual resilience through duty service delivery

in support of:

- o local authority departments; and

- o emergency services

Note: The emergency services may call on assistance from the armed forces, particularly military search and rescue resources. Voluntary organisations may therefore sometimes find themselves working with the armed forces.

The above is not an exhaustive list of examples. Regular engagement with the sector/organisation is needed to build up the necessary relationships to determine if other activities could be offered.

Cabinet Office

Chapter 15

Other sectors that should be involved in Emergency Planning

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Chapter 15 (Other sectors that should be involved in Emergency Planning) of *Emergency Preparedness*, Revised Version

Summary

- A principal aim of the Act is to bring into a single statutory framework those organisations which are most likely to be involved in most emergencies. However, not every organisation that may need to be involved in emergencies is covered by the Act (*paragraphs 15.1-15.2*).

- The fact that civil protection has a statutory basis should not be a reason to exclude organisations which do not have a duty under the Act (*paragraph 15.3*).

- Category 1 responders should encourage organisations which are not covered by Part 1 of the Act to co-operate in planning arrangements (*paragraphs 15.4-15.21*).

15.1.   A principal aim of the Act is to bring into a single statutory framework those organisations which are most likely to be involved in most emergencies (Category 1) and those likely to be heavily involved in some emergencies (Category 2). Further advice and useful information about the voluntary sector can be found in Chapter 14 of *Emergency Preparedness*.

15.2.   However, it was not appropriate to capture in the Act every organisation that may have some involvement in emergencies. For a variety of reasons, particular organisations with an important role to play - such as the armed forces, the broadcasting media and the insurance industry - have not been included in Schedule 1.

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15.3.   Even so, organisations which are not required to participate under the Act should be encouraged to take part in forums and co-operate in planning arrangements wherever this is appropriate. The statutory nature of the framework is not a consideration which in itself should imply their exclusion.

15.4.   There are many organisations which fall into this category, including:

- o   the armed forces
- o   retail companies, including supermarkets
- o   the Food Standards Agency
- o   insurance companies
- o   bus and road haulage companies
- o   taxi firms
- o   airlines
- o   shipping companies and ferries
- o   media companies
- o   private communications networks dedicated to public safety users
- o   offshore oil and gas industry
- o   security firms
- o   internal drainage boards
- o   general practitioners and chemists
- o   the operators of other services or infrastructure that are critical to your area

This list is not exhaustive, and organisations that are relevant to particular emergency plans but have not been referenced within this chapter, should still be included within the preparation process where appropriate.

15.5.   **The armed forces**: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) can be sought to support the civil authorities when they have an urgent need for help to deal with an emergency arising from a natural disaster or a major incident. However, assistance is provided on an availability basis and the armed forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. It is therefore essential that Category 1 and 2 responders do not base plans and organise exercises on the assumption of military assistance. The Joint Regional Liaison Officer from the local Regional Brigade Headquarters will be able to give advice and should be contacted in the first instance.

15.6.   **Retail companies, including supermarkets**: Food stocks and other goods held by private retail companies are sometimes not seen as resources likely to be called upon in emergencies. However, in widespread and prolonged emergencies where shortages of foodstuffs occur, or where individuals are unable to access food supplies due to transport disruption, localised flooding, etc., Category 1 responders may turn to the private sector, such as supermarkets, for practical and logistical assistance, and some will build this into their planning arrangements. Such arrangements already exist in some cases between local authorities, supermarkets and other organisations to assist the local community if a major incident were to occur, but it is important that new links and arrangements with other Category 1 responders are established and in place before any emergency occurs to avoid further disruptions at the time. This should be arranged locally, regionally or nationally with the relevant retailers/wholesalers. More common are agreements with wholesale firms for the provision of, for example, building materials, and the identification of suitable private sector buildings as rest centres.

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15.7. The **Food Standards Agency**: The (FSA) has statutory objectives 'to protect public health from risk which may arise in connection with the consumption of food' and 'to otherwise protect the interests of consumers in relation to food'. The FSA therefore has a role to play during any emergency that has the potential to affect food safety. The FSA is a UK-wide body, with its main office in London, and offices in York, Aberdeen, Cardiff and Belfast. The response to food incidents is managed by the Agency's Incident Unit, based in London, with smaller equivalent Incident Teams based in the devolved administrations. The FSA does not have representatives at the local level; however, it will provide information and support to LRFs and may attend meetings if input to specific food safety issues is required which cannot be dealt with through correspondence.

15.8. **Insurance**: There is a strong case for building the insurance industry into planning arrangements. Often insurance staff, such as loss adjusters, will attend at the scene of an emergency as quickly as journalists. The Association of British Insurers provides insurance information and advice to members of the public who have suffered loss or damage as a result of an emergency. They have the capability to set up an advice service close to the scene of an emergency and can provide contacts to act as liaison points with local responders.

15.9. **Bus companies and road haulage**: Bus companies may be included in plans to assist with evacuations. Arrangements for diverting and maintaining bus services in the event of a major central area evacuation may also require planning. Accidents involving the movement of chemicals by road are a key hazard which requires specialist knowledge and equipment. The Fire and Rescue Service is greatly assisted in response to such incidents by the Chemical Industries Association.

15.10.   **Taxi firms and coach companies**: In some areas, and where local authority social services and NHS ambulances are unable to manage the movement of all people who may need transport in an emergency, agreements have been reached with local taxi firms to assist in the transportation of these people. It may be possible to reach similar agreements with local coach companies.

15.11.   **Airlines**: The Act brings airports into a formal arrangement as Category 2 responders [1] to co-operate with the emergency services and other Category 1 responders in preparing for emergencies. But plans for responding effectively to the needs of distressed friends and relatives at the terminal building require the co-operation, too, of airline companies. It is usual to invite their representatives to play a part in these arrangements.

15.12.   **Shipping companies and ferries**: As with airports, harbour authorities are included as Category 2 responders under the Act.[2] Planning for emergencies at sea and in ports is likely to include the main shipping and ferry companies, which are not covered by the Act.

15.13.   **Media companies**: Media companies are not included in the Act, partly because it is accepted that their independence as reporting organisations should not be compromised. However, they have a key role in providing information to the public and are likely to be heavily involved in communications planning, which is dealt with in Chapter 7.

[1] Schedule 1 paragraph 26.
[2] Schedule 1 paragraph 27.

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15.14. **Private communications networks dedicated to public safety users:** The emergency services and other public safety agencies may rely upon private communications networks that are not listed as Category 2 responders in order to carry out their duties. These organisations will want to ensure that the relevant communications providers are included in multi-agency planning for incidents.

15.15. **Offshore oil and gas industry:** The Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Health and Safety Executive work closely with these companies and will want to ensure that they are included in multi-agency planning for incidents at sea or at oil and gas terminals. They will also be involved in planning for fuel shortages.

15.16. **Security firms:** Security firms have staff protecting premises of all types who are contactable by the police and may be useful during emergencies. They have a particular role in evacuations from shopping centres and sports grounds.

15.17. **Internal drainage boards:** Internal drainage boards have powers to undertake works on defined watercourses within their geographical area. These may include operating pumps and other structures to alleviate the effects of flooding. They may be involved in the response to an emergency and should be included, where relevant, in emergency plans.

15.18. **General practitioners[3] and chemists:** General practitioners may be called to the scene of an emergency to provide direct medical assistance or to certify deaths. Access to medication and medical services may be required for people displaced by an incident. In addition, during periods of disruption, such as severe weather, access for the public to general practitioners and chemists may be required. Considerations such as these need to be included in Category 1 responders' planning arrangements.

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[3] The role of General Practitioners may change with NHS Reforms

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15.19.   **Private sector representative bodies**: In addition to central and local Government, private sector representative bodies such as Confederation of British Industry, Federation of Small Businesses, British Chambers of Commerce, Business Continuity Institute, Emergency Planning Society as well as sector-specific representative bodies such as the Association of Train Operating Companies, British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation, Food Storage and Distribution Federation, British Hospitality Association, Institute of Grocery Distribution and the Federation of Wholesale Distributors, Water UK and energy sector equivalent, can be helpful in providing information and advice to members of the business community on economic recovery, following loss or damage as the result of an emergency. They can also provide advice on business continuity planning, further details of which can be found on their websites, and also in chapters 6 and 8 of *Emergency Preparedness.*

15.20.   **Private Veterinary Surgeons**: Private vets may be called to the scene of an accident or emergency to provide emergency veterinary assistance to relieve pain and suffering and to protect animal welfare. Access to veterinary care may also be required for companion animals displaced, along with their owners, by an incident. Considerations such as these, including any necessary contractual arrangements, need to be included in Category 1 responders' planning arrangements. Private vets, appointed as Official Veterinarians, may also be called on to assist Government vets in responding to large-scale exotic disease outbreaks. Category 1 responders should also consider the need for training for veterinarians who may be called upon to assist in large animal rescues. This would enhance the effectiveness of joint working as illustrated in the national Incident Command protocols and national animal rescue guidelines. Details of the training, which is available from providers recognised by the Chief Fire Officers Association National Animal Rescue Practitioners Forum (CFOA ARPF), can be obtained from, and in some cases through, the Fire and Rescue Service. This training is endorsed by the RSPCA and veterinary associations, namely the British Equine Veterinary Association and British Cattle Veterinary Association.

15.21.   Other sectors that may be considered within the emergency planning process are:

- o   accommodation facilities, such as hotels, bed and breakfast

    services and student residences

- o   motor assistance companies

- o   conference/leisure centre facilities which could provide short

    term shelter

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Chapter 16 Collaboration and Co-operation between Local Resilience Forums in England

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

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Chapter 16 (Collaboration and Co-operation between Local Resilience Forums in England) of *Emergency Preparedness*

Summary

- The United Kingdom's approach to civil contingencies is based on the principle of subsidiarity where decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level (individual, community, locality, or national) and co-ordination is at the highest necessary level (*paragraphs 16.1-16.5*).

- Local Resilience Forums are the principal mechanism for multi-agency collaboration and co-ordination.

- Category 1 and 2 responders are encouraged to work together across Local Resilience Forum boundaries to address civil protection issues that cross local resilience areas or which could overwhelm a locality. There are many benefits to co-operation including pooling of resources and reduced duplication of planning activity (*paragraphs 16.6-16.12*).

- LRF partners are free to design new and flexible approaches to working together collaboratively, as best suits their risks and needs. This could be across geographical boundaries or around specific risks. Government support to multi-LRF collaboration is provided through the DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division (*paragraphs 16.13-16.16*).

16.1.   The United Kingdom's approach to civil contingencies is based on the principle of subsidiarity; the principle by which decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level with co-ordination at the highest necessary level.

16.2.   Local Resilience Forums are the building block for emergency planning activities with Strategic and Recovery Co-ordinating Groups acting as the local mechanisms which are engaged during the response and recovery phases of emergencies.

Opportunities to collaborate and co-operate at a multi- LRF Level

16.3.   Planning for, and responding to, large-scale emergencies cannot be done in isolation in each LRF. Mechanisms for cross-boundary working and relationship building are essential as some emergencies will overwhelm localities' resources and/or boundaries.

16.4.   Collaboration and co-operation between localities in England is a well-established and critical way of working in civil contingencies. It is a mechanism:

- o   for enabling pooling of resources to achieve agreed mutual aims and outcomes;
- o   for avoiding duplication of work between neighbouring LRFs or avoiding activity by an LRF that may be counter-productive to a neighbouring LRF;
- o   to support planning and exercising for emergencies that cross local resilience areas or which could overwhelm a locality; and
- o   that enables individual responders, local forums and central government to work together to address large-scale civil protection issues.

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16.5.   Cross locality working is undertaken on a permissive basis and neither civil protection legislation nor guidance seeks to impose structures on local areas or limit how they choose to collaborate and co-operate. LRFs are free to create flexible multi-LRF mechanisms and processes to best suit their risks and needs.

16.6.   In some circumstances, it might be more efficient for national organisations and those organisations which operate across local boundaries (such as utilities companies, transport operators, and government agencies) to share information using multi-LRF groupings. Indeed, some of these organisations will struggle to find the resources to duplicate work at the single LRF level. For further guidance Chapter 2: Co-operation and Chapter 3: Formal information sharing are available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/emergency-preparedness

16.7.   Regional Resilience Forums formerly provided a uniform system for LRF collaboration within that region. There is no continuing requirement to work on regional boundaries, and responders may now replace these regional forums with more flexible structures for multi-LRF working.

16.8.   A range of different geographically based multi-forum groupings are possible. These include Civil Protection Forums, LRF Secretariat /LRF Chair Forums and multi-responder strategic alliances incorporating health and local authority partners. These forums may cover varying geographical areas and may encompass, for example, working with the Devolved Administrations. Responders may also retain existing groups on previous geographical boundaries such as the Media Emergency Forum, Mass Fatalities Groups, Capabilities, Risk and Working Groups, or establish other suitable mechanisms to enable cross-locality collaboration and co-operation. Other theme based multi-LRF groupings have been established to allow joint planning around shared risks such as East Coast and Reservoir Flood Planning groups. The national resilience extranet (NRE) is a source of information and case studies about multi-LRF groups.

16.9.   Local responders should decide whether to maintain any former regional plans such as a generic response plan. Responders and LRFs are encouraged to put in place arrangements and plans that suit local needs, and to conserve, utilise and build on the good practice that is contained in any existing plans.

Government support for multi-LRF collaboration and co-operation

16.10.   The DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) works directly with LRFs, supporting collaboration and co-operation in planning for wide-area high-impact events affecting more than one locality. RED has allocated Resilience Advisers to each LRF so that LRFs have named contacts with which to build working relationships. Resilience Advisers support and challenge the LRF in a constructive, proportionate manner through:

- o   simplifying and reducing duplication of central government interaction with local responders;
- o   facilitating the co-operation and sharing of information between responders and LRFs to ensure risks are fully understood (e.g. implementation of the National Emergency Plan for Fuel);
- o   identifying good practice and facilitating its sharing;
- o   facilitating opportunities for peer reviews;
- o   actively participating in training and exercising alongside LRFs, when appropriate, i.e. for wide area or high impact incidents where Government is part of the response machinery; and
- o   facilitating discussions around mutual aid arrangements

Last updated:March 2012

More information on RED's role and the contact details for resilience advisors are available on the national resilience extranet (NRE).

16.11.　Support for LRF collaboration is a key part of the RED adviser role. Successful cross locality working enables responders and local resilience forums to manage large-scale emergencies, and partners involved must have effective working relationships based on good communication, and effective, efficient information sharing. This will enable them to assess and agree who is best placed to address an issue. (see para 2.3)

16.12.　DCLG RED plays an active part in increasing resilience: supporting preparedness enhancement and providing assurance to central government that the necessary capabilities are in place at the local level to meet national planning requirements.

16.13.　Resilience Advisers within DCLG RED have been allocated liaison roles for each of the work streams in the National Resilience Capabilities Programme. RED will liaise with Lead Government Departments; LRFs and other relevant emergency responder organisations on current and planned LRF and multi-LRF capabilities.

16.14.　RED's ability to engage with LRFs and, in particular, hold dialogue with multiple-LRFs, complements the existing governance and information sharing arrangements in place between work stream lead Departments and local responders. This is achieved by:

- o　access and insights into the national capability requirements;
- o　the ability to provide a richer picture of capabilities on the ground; and
- o　facilitation and promotion of cross-boundary working between LRFs.

For further details on the National Resilience Capabilities Programme, see Chapters 4 and 13 and http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/capabilities-programme

Cabinet Office

The Fit with Other Legislation

**Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*,
Chapter 19**

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Chapter 19 (The Fit with other Legislation) of *Emergency Preparedness* Revised Version

This guidance has been developed to complement Emergency Preparedness, the statutory guidance which supports the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA).

Summary

- As responders fulfil their duties under the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004* and accompanying regulations, *The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005* (the "Regulations"), it is important that they consider how this interfaces with their duties under other civil protection legislation. As outlined in *Emergency Preparedness* (*paragraphs 1.37 – 1.38*), 'responders may use the Act regime to support or supplement these separate regimes where they consider this appropriate. For example, if Category 1 responders wish to include COMAH risks in the Community Risk Register, this is acceptable. They can also make information requests under the Regulations to support the COMAH duties.' However, the CCA does not supersede pre-existing sector-specific civil protection legislation which was brought in before 2004 to deal with specific hazards, some as a result of European Directives. Nor does it take precedence over, and/or negate the requisite of site specific requirements under legislation other than the CCA.

WHAT THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS REQUIRE

19.1. This guidance considers how key duties under the CCA link with those contained in other site specific legislation concerned with industrial emergency planning legislation and safety at sports grounds and events. It also aims to raise awareness of the following key considerations when aligning activity under different legislative regimes:

- o Extendibility of Plans;
- o Warning and Informing the Public; and
- o Command and Control.

19.2. The guidance covers these main areas at a high level but does not provide detailed information on the requirements of other legislatory regimes. It does however provide extensive reference to the other websites where further information can be found.

19.3. A separate section, 'Generic Considerations' is also included and is intended to remind emergency planners of the need to consider the Human Rights Act 1998, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, and the Working Time Regulations 1998 in their work.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and Other Site Specific Legislation

19.4.   This section of the guidance deals with the following legislation regarding industrial emergency planning and safety at sports grounds and events:

- o *Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH) (as amended 2005 and 2008)*
- o *Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001 (REPPIR)*
- o *Nuclear Installations Act 1965*
- o *The Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999*
- o *The Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR)*
- o *The Energy Act (Carbon Capture and Storage) 2008*
- o *Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975*
- o *Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987*
- o *The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974*
- o *The Flood and Water Management Act 2010*

Duties Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Fit with Other Site Specific Legislation

Risk Assessment

Requirements Under the CCA

19.5.   Risk assessment is the first step in the emergency planning and business continuity planning processes.

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The CCA and associated Regulations place duties on all Category 1 responders listed in the schedule to the Act to:

- o   assess the risk of an emergency within, or affecting, a geographical area for which each Category 1 responder is responsible;[1]

- o   co-operate with each other and with Category 2 responders through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) in maintaining a Community Risk Register (CRR);[2]

- o   update the CRR "from time to time" or "as often as necessary;[3] and

- o   publish thier risk assessment.[4]

19.6.   Chapter 4 of Emergency Preparedness gives guidance on the risk assessment duty.

Requirements Under other Legislation

19.7.   Under COMAH,[5] PSR[6] and REPPIR,[7] site operators are required to undertake risk assessments when proposing new developments or changes to existing arrangements.   The appropriate regulatory authority and the site operator are required to ensure that any changes to on-site risk assessments that impact on off-site emergency planning arrangements, are notified to the appropriate organisations (mainly Category 1 and 2 agencies).   In addition, event managers and sports ground management are also required to undertake risk assessments and to consult the relevant authorities.[8]

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[1] CCA s. 2 (1) (a)-(b), Regulation 13
[2] CCA Regulation 15
[3] Paragraph 4.8 of Emergency Preparedness
[4] CCA s. 2 (1) (f)
[5] Regulation 7 Safety Report
[6] Regulation 23 Risk Assessment
[7] Regulation 5 Risk Assessment
[8] See Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, 3.3e and The Event Safety Guide, paragraph 41.

Category 1 and 2 responders should note that for nuclear sites, in addition to REPPIR, the activities within the site boundary are regulated under the Nuclear Installations Act by the HSE's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII). The NII has a specific role/function in the event of a nuclear accident.

Aligning Risk Assessment Activity

19.8. When preparing and updating risk assessments, all responders need to consider the potential for major incidents to occur at COMAH, REPPIR and PSR sites, as well as at sports grounds and event sites. Risk assessments should take into account the potential impact on the wider community. This can be achieved by considering site safety reports and site specific risk and impact assessments produced under other regimes as part of the community risk register assessment process for the LRF area. Sites may be noted in the Risk Assessment of the Generic Risks, and risks recorded in the CRR, alongside the control measures needed. It should be noted that risk assessments for fixed nuclear sites are reviewed periodically by HSE's NII to ensure that the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) remains relevant in the light of any change to the potential hazards on the site.

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Role of HSE's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate:

The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) is that part of HSE's Nuclear Directorate which is responsible for regulating nuclear safety. In the event of an emergency, NII is responsible for monitoring the activities of the operators and advising the Government Technical Advisor and central government and Devolved Administrations. Using its statutory powers, NII would inspect and review the activities of the operators to ensure that they are taking all reasonable steps both to restore the plant to a safe state and to minimise the risk to the general public. On being notified of an emergency, NII would send inspectors both to site and to the appropriate off site facility who would monitor the situation and the steps taken to restore control. If the accident occurred at a nuclear power station site, an NII team would also go to the operators Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) at Barnwood Gloucester. The Inspectorate would set up its own Incident Suite at Redgrave Court Bootle to provide a technical assessment capability and to support the Chief Nuclear Inspector and the NII inspectors on the site, at the off-site facility or at the CESC. This would allow NII to make independent assessments of the likely course of the accident and its consequences, and to consider any implications for other nuclear installations. These assessments would be passed by telephone or otherwise transmitted to the Chief Nuclear Inspector at the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room located in Whitehall at the Offices of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), or if a Scottish Site at the Scottish Government Resilience Room in Edinburgh. The Chief Nuclear Inspector would act as advisor to central government in nuclear emergencies and would give advice based on NII's assessments to government departments, devolved administrations, HSE, and the operators as appropriate.

19.9.   Risk assessments should respond quickly to changes in the risk environment and, in line with the regulatory requirements under CCA, and those regulations mentioned in *paragraph 3.7*, should be regularly reviewed. The recommendations in the Buncefield report and the Pitt Review illustrate the importance of regularly reviewing risk assessments for COMAH sites and areas that frequently flood. Climate change is now a major concern, given the predicted increase in the range of future extremes of weather (as reflected in the Pitt Review recommendation 1 and the Government's response).

19.10. In addition to looking at the requirements under the legislation, when preparing risk assessments you should refer to *Chapter 4* of the statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness*, and you may find it helpful to refer to the following:

  o *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders* which provides a further checklist of mandatory requirements for individual Category 1 and 2 responders;

  o *National Risk Register (NRR)*;

  o *Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)*;

  o Government Threat statements;

  o *Event Safety Guide*;

  o *Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds*;

  o *The Government and the Competent Authority Response to Buncefield Incident*;

  o *Sir Michael Pitt's Review of the Summer 2007 Floods*;

  o *Approved Code of Practice and Guidance for the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999*;

- o   *A Guide to the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 Emergency Planning*;

- o   *UK Resilience pages of Cabinet Office website*.

Emergency Planning

Requirements Under the CCA

19.11.   The chief requirement of the CCA in regard to emergency planning is for Category 1 responders listed in the schedule to the Act to maintain plans for preventing emergencies; reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies; and taking other action in the event of emergencies.[9] The Regulations require an emergency plan to include provision for carrying out exercises and training staff, or other people, to ensure the plan is effective.[10] The plan should also contain a statement about the nature of the training and exercising to be provided and its frequency.[11] *Chapter 5* of *Emergency Preparedness* provides guidance on the emergency planning duty.

Requirements Under other Legislation

19.12.   There is a requirement under COMAH,[12] REPPIR,[13] PSR,[14] the Safety of Sports Grounds Act, 1975, and the Event Safety Guide[15] (which brings together information to satisfy the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) to produce on-site and off-site emergency plans and procedures.   Each legislative regime has its own testing and exercising requirements.

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[9]   CCA s. 2 (1) (d)
[10]   CCA Regulation 25
[11]   *Emergency Preparedness, paragraph 5.41*
[12]   Regulation 9 On Site Emergency Plan, Regulation 10 Off Site Emergency Plan, Regulation 11 Testing.
[13]   Regulation 7 – On-Site Emergency Plan, Regulation 9 – Off-Site Emergency Plan, Regulation 10 – Review and Testing of Emergency Plans, and Regulation 13 – Implementation of Emergency Plans.
[14]   Regulation 25 Emergency Plans
[15]   Chapter 1, Planning and Management

Aligning Emergency Planning Activity

19.13.   This section includes consideration of both the extendibility of plans and Command and Control.

Extendibility of Plans

19.14.   Emergency response and recovery plans should interface with the requirements of each regulatory regime; site specific on and off-site plans, developed under industrial emergency planning legislation or under the guidance for Safety at Sports Grounds and Event Safety Planning guidance, should link with multi-agency emergency plans required under the CCA. This is because a scenario or incident may develop beyond the pre-designated areas (e.g. Public Information Zones (PIZs) in the COMAH regulations, Detailed Emergency Planning Zones (DEPZs in REPPIR), sports stadia or event sites). Off-site plans prepared under other legislation should, in addition to dealing with pre-designated areas, link in to other multi-agency plans prepared under CCA to provide a framework for the scalability of the response to deal with consequences of the emergency that go beyond the site and the pre-designated area.

19.15.   DECC has produced a guidance document, *Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group: Consolidated guidance*, which includes a Chapter on Extendability (*Chapter 9*). This chapter provides guidance on the extent of extendability planning that is deemed necessary in the nuclear sector and what factors should be considered. Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations are encouraged to adopt this approach when preparing extended plans for COMAH sites and emergency plans prepared under the PSR.

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Such plans should address the:

- o responsibilities and functions of the organisations which would respond would respond to an emergency;
- o arrangements for the provision or receipt of aid from neighbouring emergency services and local authorities (for further guidance, see *Mutual Aid – A Short Guide for Local Authorities*);
- o arrangements for communication between organisations involved in the response, including a register of all communications facilities and equipment;
- o warning and informing the public;
- o arrangements for media handling;
- o community information – population, transport availability, hospitals, schools;
- o reception centres; and
- o recovery plans, which should dovetail into off-site plans.

19.16. By considering and including all of the above in off-site emergency planning, COMAH emergency planning arrangements can transpose into the wider Major Incident Plans of responding agencies as the scenario or incident unfolds. This framework may also usefully complement the *Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds* and the *Event Safety Guide*.

19.17. Under the COMAH regulations, local authorities can make a charge on a company for the preparation of off-site plans. It is not possible to make an additional charge to site operators for additional work to extend the plan beyond the requirements of the COMAH regulations.

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19.18. Many local authorities have established multi-agency event safety planning groups which prepare advice and consider emergency preparedness arrangements for proposed major events. Similarly, as part of the requirements of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (SSGA), many stadia have multi-agency stadium or ground safety advisory groups. The primary purpose of the sports ground safety advisory group is to provide specialist advice to the local authority so that it may effectively discharge its functions under the SSGA. In practice, it also provides a valuable forum within which the local authority and other agencies can develop a corporate approach, while each exercising their own responsibilities. Appointing local authority Emergency Planning Officers to these safety planning groups will help to ensure the interface between site safety plans and multi-agency emergency plans developed under the CCA.

19.19. Extended plans will, of course, require testing to check the interface between on-site and off-site plans, as well as with multi-agency plans prepared under the CCA. This may be achieved as an additional component of the exercising and testing regime of the appropriate regulation or guidance. Clearly there will be efficiencies to be achieved by testing and exercising on-site and off-site components of emergency plans alongside extended emergency plans which have been produced as part of this guidance.

19.20. In addition, cross boundary emergency plans should reflect the interface between any different neighbouring LRF (Strategic Co-ordinating Group) command and control structures. This will ensure a more resilient response to cross boundary incidents including a greater understanding of joint response and recovery plans. Such emergency plans should also link with the national emergency plans.

Command and Control

19.21. Whilst command and control structures should operate within the framework outlined in the *Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance* the interface between CCA and off-site emergency plans should reflect local operational procedures and culture. This means that it is vital in local arrangements for there to be <u>ONE</u> agreed Command and Control structure for responding to emergencies which all Category 1 and 2 responders, industry and voluntary agencies understand, and can agree. This agreed command and control structure should be consistently stated in all off-site emergency plans prepared under these different regimes. There is further advice and information available on command and control contained in *Chapter 4 of the Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance*.

19.22. You should refer to *Chapter 6* of the statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness*, and may find it helpful to refer to the following when undertaking emergency planning:

  o *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders* which provides a further checklist of mandatory requirements for individual Category 1 and 2 responders;

  o *Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance*;

  o *Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group: Consolidated Guidance*;

  o *A Guide to the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations;*

  o *2001 Mutual Aid – A Short Guide for Local Authorities*;

  o *Event Safety Guide*;

  o *Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds*; and

  o *UK Resilience pages of Cabinet Office website*.

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Business Continuity (Including Promotion of Business Continuity)

Requirements Under the CCA

19.23. The CCA requires Category 1 responders listed in the schedule to the Act to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency 'so far as is reasonably practicable'.[16] There is a further duty on local authorities to provide advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity management (BCM) in the event of an emergency. [17] *Chapters 6* (Business Continuity Management) and *8* (Advice and Assistance to Business and Voluntary Organisations) of *Emergency Preparedness* provide guidance on these duties.

Requirements Under other Legislation

19.24. It is considered good practice for site operators, event and ground safety operators to have business continuity plans in place. In addition, the Newton report (Buncefield Fire) and Sir Michael Pitt's review of the 2007 Summer Floods strongly recommend this approach. The position in the nuclear sector is monitored and regulated under the Nuclear Installations Act by the HSE's NII.

Aligning Business Continuity Activity

19.25. It is important that appropriate Category 1 responders understand the potential impact of an incident on business continuity. Local Authorities should seek to promote the benefits of BCM to site operators. The production of such plans

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[16] CCA s. 2 (1) (c)
[17] CCA s. 4

will ensure that each agency and member of the business community, i.e. site operators involved in contingency planning arrangements, are able to maintain a level of response to incidents at all times, taking note of other relevant legislation and the activities of other duty holders.

19.26.   When considering BCM, you should refer to *Chapters 6* and *8* of the statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness* and may find it helpful to refer to:

- o   *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders* which provides a further checklist of mandatory requirements for individual Category 1 and 2 responders;
- o   *UK Resilience pages of Cabinet Office website*; and
- o   *Business Link Website*.

Co-operation and Information Sharing

Requirements Under the CCA

19.27.   The CCA and associated Regulations place a duty on all Category 1 and 2 responders listed in the schedule to the Act to co-operate and share information within their LRF area. [18] *Chapters 2* (Co-operation) and *3* (Information Sharing) of *Emergency Preparedness* provide guidance on these duties.

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[18] CCA s. 2 (5) (h)-(i); parts 2 and 8 of the Regulations.

Requirements Under other Legislation

19.28. In COMAH, REPPIR and PSR, there is a requirement to share information between site operators and Category 1 and 2 responders in order to fulfil the requirements of the duty for risk assessment, warning and informing the public and the preparation of on-site and off-site emergency plans. [19] In addition, under REPPIR and COMAH, it should be noted that the local authority has a duty to prepare the off-site plan and to consult with the local community or their local representatives who may be affected by the implementation of the off-site plan.

Aligning Co-operation and Information Sharing Activity

19.29. Co-operation and information sharing between site operators and Category 1 and Category 2 responders will ensure that emergency plans prepared under different regulations are 'fit for purpose'.

19.30. When considering these duties, you should refer to *Chapters 2* and *3* of the statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness*, and may find it helpful to refer to:

- o *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders* which provides a further checklist of mandatory requirements for individual Category 1 and 2 responders;

- o *Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders*;.

- o *Security Vetting and Protective Markings: A guide for Emergency responders* (available on a restricted basis); and

- o *Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group Consolidated Guidance*.

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[19] CCA s. 2 (5) (h)-(i); parts 2 and 8 of the Regulations Under REPPIR it is Regulations 7(6), 8(7), 9(12) and 11.

Communicating with the Public

Requirements Under the CCA

19.31.   Under the CCA, Category 1 responders listed in the schedule to the Act are required to:

> o   arrange for publication of all or part of the risk assessments and plans they have made;[20] and
>
> o   maintain arrangements to warn the public and provide advice and information to the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred.[21]

19.32.   Within this requirement, the wider risk to the whole community should be considered as well as the individual risk.

Requirements Under other Legislation

19.33.   Under COMAH,[22] there is a requirement for site operators to provide information to people living in the area (Public Information Zone) about their operation and any potential incidents that may arise. Under REPPIR, there are similar requirements for site operators to ensure the public are properly informed and prepared in the unlikely event of an emergency occurring,[23] as well as a duty on local authorities to ensure that those members of the public actually affected by a radiation emergency are informed promptly of the facts and the measures to be taken for their health protection.[24]

[20] CCA s2 (1) (f)
[21] CCA s2 (1) (g)
[22] Regulation 14 public information.
[23] Regulation 16
[24] Regulation 17

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19.34. The HSE has also produced an interim guidance note relating to carbon capture and storage.[25] Those involved in the development of such schemes are required to give compliance demonstrations as CO_2 is classified as a dangerous substance/dangerous fluid under the COMAH and PSR regulations.

Aligning Activity to Communicate with the Public

19.35. It is important that all Category 1 and 2 responders at LRF and multi-LRF level, as well as site operators, develop joint arrangements for communicating with the public. This is to avoid conflicting advice being published and to ensure that key messages are transmitted to the whole community, including transient populations such as tourists, and not just those in designated areas or sites. These arrangements should be regularly exercised and tested in accordance with the appropriate regulations and /or LRF exercise programme.

19.36. Where possible, agencies' websites should be effectively linked to provide public information before, during, and after the emergency. This is crucial, especially when the emergency involves a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), and central government response to public information.

19.37. When preparing plans to communicate with the public, you should refer to *Chapter 7* of the statutory guidance, *Emergency Preparedness*, and you may find it helpful to refer to:

   o *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders* which provides a further checklist of mandatory requirements for individual Category 1 and 2 responders;

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25 *http://news.hse.gov.uk/category/carbon-capture-storage/*

    o   *Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group Consolidated Guidance*;

    o   *The Ten Step Cycle – an informal guidance note*; and

    o   *UK Resilience pages of Cabinet Office website*.

Generic Considerations

19.38.   When undertaking emergency planning activity as part of fulfilling duties under the CCA, Category 1 and 2 responders should consider their duties under the following legislation:

    o   *Human Rights Act 1998*

    o   *Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007*

    o   *Health and Safety at Work Act 1974*

    o   *Working Time Regulations 1998*

19.39.   This guidance draws out particular areas for consideration in emergency planning. When planning for emergencies, Category 1 and 2 responders should obtain their own legal advice if they are concerned about the compatibility of their proposed actions with this legislation.

Human Rights Act 1998 (HR Act)

19.40.   Where responders are public authorities, they need to have regard to their general duties under the HR Act and ensure that their actions are compatible with individuals' rights under the Act.

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19.41. Human Rights are fundamental rights and freedoms that belong to all individuals regardless of their nationality and citizenship. The HR Act provides for 16 basic human rights (also known as Convention rights). They are concerned with matters of life and death, what a person can say or do, their beliefs, right to a fair trial, and similar basic requirements. The HR Act provides for different categories of rights: absolute rights, such as the right to life; limited rights, such as the right to liberty; and qualified rights where a balance may need to be struck between the rights of the individual and the needs of the wider community or state interest, for example, the right to have your private and family life respected.

19.42. Rights that may be of relevance for responders may include:

- o Article 2: the right to life;
- o Article 3: the right to protection from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment;
- o Article 4: prohibition of slavery and forced labour;
- o Article 5: right to liberty and security;
- o Article 8: right to respect for private and family life;
- o Article 9: freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- o Article 10: freedom of expression;
- o Article 11: freedom of assembly and association;
- o Article 14: right to enjoy Convention rights and freedoms without discrimination; and
- o Article 1 of the First Protocol: protection of property.

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19.43.   It is not possible, nor appropriate in this document, to cover every aspect of the HR Act, nor to consider the detailed aspect of each of the above rights. However, responders may find it helpful to consider the following areas when fulfilling their duties under the CCA and any duties under the HR Act:

- o   Risk Assessment: Contextualisation [26] - what risks are there that human rights may be contravened?

- o   Emergency Planning: Vulnerable people, people affected by the emergency, survivors, family and friends.[27]

- o   Communicating with the Public (Warning and Informing): Vulnerable people and those who have difficulty understanding the message. [28]

- o   Information Sharing: Personal information,[29] Data Protection and Sharing Information.[30]

19.44.   It is important to remember though that in respect of a number of the Convention Rights, especially qualified ones, interference with an individual's rights may be justified where it is in the general public interest to do so. This is an important consideration where emergencies and issues of public safety are involved.

Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA)

19.45.   The CMCHA creates an offence where organisations can now be convicted of manslaughter if, in general terms, the way in which their activities are managed or organised causes a person's death and there has been a gross breach of a duty of care to the deceased.

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[26] *Emergency Preparedness, paragraph 4.30*
[27] *Emergency Preparedness, paragraphs 5.98 to 5.106* & Chapter 6 Emergency Response and Recovery guidance
[28] *Emergency Preparedness, paragraph 7.40* and The Ten Step Cycle for Communicating with the Public
[29] *Emergency Preparedness, paragraph 3.17*
[30] Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders

19.46.   It is not possible, nor appropriate in this document, to consider the detailed effect of the legislation, but in carrying out their functions, responders will need to bear the provisions of the Act in mind, although there are exemptions where management actions involve wider questions of public policy for example, strategic decisions about spending public money or military operations. Other functions, such as police operations and the response of the emergency services are also exempt, other than in respect of duties of care owed by these organisations to employees or in relation to premises they occupy.

Human Resources

19.47.   In the planning phase for emergencies, unrealistic expectations may be placed on management and personnel. It is important that all Category 1 and Category 2 responders build proper consideration for the welfare of employees into emergency plans. When identifying human resources requirements as part of the emergency response, responders should consider their duties under the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 and Working Time Regulations, 1998.

Health and Safety at Work Act 1974

19.48.   Employers have a duty to manage the risks to their employees that arise from their work. This includes those employees whose work includes responding to emergencies.

19.49.   Managing risks means assessing the significant risks to employees (and others who might be affected by their work) and identifying suitable measures to control those risks. Such measures might include setting out safe systems of work which

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specify appropriate control measures, including the equipment to be used and the competences that workers are required to have. The risk control measures identified as necessary should be put in place. The findings of the risk assessment, and the control measures implemented, should be communicated to employees.

19.50. Risk assessments do not need to be overly bureaucratic but they should be robust, carefully considered, and their findings effectively implemented.

Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTRs)

19.51. The WTRs relate to the number of hours that an employee can work during a single week, unless a workforce agreement is sought. During an emergency event, responders may need to make use of the special measures and the full flexibilities contained within the WTRs.

19.52. It may be that some of the extra work pressure can be absorbed by inviting relevant groups of workers to enter into an opt-out agreement which would permit the normal weekly maximum working time of 48 hours to be exceeded (permitted under Regulations 4 and 5 of the WTRs). However workers cannot be forced to sign an opt-out. Without any further special measures (as below), this would allow a 78 hour maximum (allowing for 11 hours rest per day x 6 days and a weekly rest of 24 hours per week = 168 hours – 90 =78 hours).

19.53. Regulations 21 and 24 of the WTRs give a degree of flexibility where the worker's activities are affected by special circumstances.

Regulation 21 makes special provisions, generally for less serious situations, allowing the non-application of rights to:

- o restrictions on length of and protections connected with night work;

- o daily rest (normally 11 hours per day);

- o weekly rest periods (24 hours per week or 48 hours per fortnight); and

- o rest breaks (at least 20 minutes per six hours)

19.54. The circumstances in which these provisions might be brought into play during an emergency include where:

- o a worker's activities are located distantly from his place of residence (for example, specialist teams might be deployed at locations in the UK far from their home addresses - see regulation 21(a));

- o a worker is engaged in security activities requiring a permanent presence to protect persons or properties (for example, where security requirements arise because of an emergency, e.g. security around quarantine sites or around sensitive or vital public buildings or locations – see regulation 21(b)); and

- o there is a need for continuity of service or production due to the emergency in one or more of the following activities:

    - hospitals;

    - transport; and

    - civil protection services (e.g. police, fire service, ambulance service).

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o where workers' activities in Category 1 and 2 response organisations, government departments (and supporting industries as appropriate) are affected by:

- an occurrence due to unusual and unforeseeable circumstances beyond the control of the worker's employer;
- exceptional events, the consequences of which could not have been avoided; or
- an accident or the imminent risk of an accident.

19.55. Regulation 24 of the WTRs provides that where normal rest entitlements have been abridged or lost, the worker should be allowed to take compensatory rest. Compensatory rest is normally a period of rest the same length as the period of rest, or part of a rest period, that a worker has missed. This means that the worker gets their rest entitlement later than normal.

19.56. Regulation 24(b) provides that there may be **exceptional** circumstances where it is not possible to grant such rest periods. In these circumstances, the employer should still take steps to safeguard the worker's health and safety.

19.57. Under Regulation 18 (2) of the WTRs, some provisions under the WTR, including the 48 hour maximum and the various rest periods (e.g. daily, weekly and breaks at work), may be excluded where the armed forces, the police and certain civil protection activities (i.e. ambulance service, fire service and other Category 1 and 2 responders) are engaged in a manner that will "inevitably conflict with the provisions" of the WTR. In the event of a full scale national emergency, these services might have to be deployed free of these legislative burdens.

19.58. For further information please contact the Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme team: ccact@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk

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Annex 7 A: Communicating with the public: News Co-ordination Centre

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

7A.1.   The scale and nature of any emergency will dictate the level of national involvement in the handling of it, particularly on the communications side. If ministerial involvement becomes necessary, then the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will be set up in Whitehall by information staff within Cabinet Office. The NCC will function alongside the government department leading the response[1] and liaise closely with staff from the Central Office of Information News and Public Relations[2] at the scene of the emergency, if outside London.

7A.2.   The NCC will help to co-ordinate the information activities of the various government departments and agencies involved, by pulling together briefing from the different expert bodies for ministers and ensuring that interview bids for ministers are handled appropriately. They will work closely with the national and international media and monitor the output of major broadcasters, in order to correct inaccuracies and spot subject areas where additional material would provide better balance in coverage. It can be up and running within 90 minutes and can operate 24 hours a day as required.

7A.3.   The NCC will have responsibility both for meeting the needs of the news agenda and managing the delivery of public information and safety advice at a national level. It will be manned by staff from the various affected departments, to ensure effective co-ordination of activities. Where necessary, it may invoke standing protocols with the media to issue Public Safety Information either nationwide or in particular regions.

[1] http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/list-lead-government-departments-responsibilities explains more about the role and responsibilities of the
[2] lead government department
More information about the Central Office of Information News and Public Relations can be found at www.coi.gov.uk

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7A.4.   Robust communications links will be established with those at the scene and in charge of operations to make sure that strategic and high-level political decisions are based on accurate, up-to-date information. The NCC, or the Assembly Press Office in Wales, may send someone from the team to the site of the incident as a contact point, who can keep those on site in touch with central, political activities and interests.

7A.5.   The NCC will not be directly involved in operational decisions on site about media arrangements. However, the central operations team that manages the NCC has, in close co-operation with central government, the devolved administrations, local government, emergency services, utilities and other operators, produced detailed protocols. These cover many logistical aspects of dealing with the sort of massive influx of media organisations into an area which would be generated by a national-level catastrophe.

CabinetOffice

Annex 7 B: Lead responsibility for warning and informing the public

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

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Arrangements for warning, informing and advising the public, including identification of the lead responder

7B.1.   The range of emergencies listed in the first column of the table at the end of this annex, matches the main classification of emergencies in Annex 4B of chapter 4: Local responder risk assessment duty. The remaining columns deal with the following:

7B.2.   Suggestions as to the Category 1 responders likely to have a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in relation to particular emergencies.

7B.3.   Suggestions as to which of those Category 1 responders should take the lead on behalf of the Category 1 responders in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the initial stages of an emergency. Responsibility may of course transfer from one Category 1 responder to another as the emergency situation develops.

7B.4.   Category 1 responders must of course make their own decisions about identifying which will take the role of lead responder in the light of local conditions. They may wish to make a more detailed breakdown of responsibilities, as suggested by the detailed classification of types of hazard in Annex 4B.

7B.5.   It is important to recognise that the lead Category 1 responder will not necessarily take the lead overall in warning, informing and advising the public. This role may in certain circumstances fall to a Category 2 responder or an organisation which is not a responder. This is dealt with in column 3 of table 7B. Column 2 suggests which Category 1 responder might be the most appropriate to take the lead on behalf of Category 1 responders within these overall arrangements.

7B.6.   Suggestions of non-Category 1 responders who, in particular circumstances, may play the lead role, or a significant role, in arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public.

7B.7.   The Act imposes a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public on Category 1 responders only. In practice, Category 2 responders and the Met Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), or the Food Standards Agency (FSA) will have a significant role in these arrangements in relation to particular emergencies. In some cases, it will even be appropriate for a Category 2 responder or the Met Office, Defra and the FSA to take the lead role. Included in column 3 of table 7B are organisations which are relevant in this way.

7B.8.   The Regulations provide that Category 1 responders must have regard to the arrangements maintained by these bodies in performing their duty under the Act. The Regulations also provide that Category 1 responders need not unnecessarily duplicate the arrangements maintained by these bodies.

7B.9.   Suggestions of other organisations which will have an important role in arrangements to warn, advise and inform the public and with whom Category 1 responders may wish to liaise.

7B.10.   In addition to Category 2 responders and the Met Office, Defra, and the FSA, there are other organisations which will play an important role in communicating with the public. These bodies are unlikely to play such a significant role that it is appropriate for Category 1 responders to be required to have regard to their activities under the Regulations. Nonetheless, there will often be merit in Category 1 responders considering the role that these bodies will play in communicating with the public in an emergency and in liaising with them in the planning phase.

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GENERIC HAZARD OR THREAT	1. Category 1 responders likely to have a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public	2. Suggestions of Category 1 responders from whom a lead responder to maintain arrangements to warn etc may be identified	3. Organisations, not Category 1 responders, which may also play a lead or a significant role in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public	4. Other organisations, which may have an important role in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public
Industrial accidents and environmental pollution	Police, Fire, Environment Agency, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, local authorities, NHS Trusts, HPA	Police, Fire, Environment Agency or Maritime and Coastguard Agency	Operators of facilities covered by the Control of Major Accident, Hazards, Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) and Pipeline Safety Regulations	Highways Agency, utilities and Met Office
Transport accidents	Police, British Transport Police, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, local authorities, NHS Trusts	Police, British Transport Police or Maritime and Coastguard Agency	Airport or port operator, train operating companies, Highways Agency, Network Rail	Airlines, shipping companies
Severe weather	Police, Fire, Environment Agency, local authorities, HPA, NHS Trusts, Maritime and Coastguard Agency	Police, Fire or Environment Agency	Met Office, utilities, transport, including Highways Agency	
Structural hazards	Police, Fire, local authorities	Police, Fire, local authorities	Utilities, including water companies	Owners and operators of structures
Human health	Police, Health Protection Agency, NHS Trusts, Port Health Authority, local authorities	Health Protection Agency	Food Standards Agency	Utilities, Strategic Health Authority

GENERIC HAZARD OR THREAT	1. Category 1 responders likely to have a duty to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public	2. Suggestions of Category 1 responders from whom a lead responder to maintain arrangements to warn etc may be identified	3. Organisations, not Category 1 responders, which may also play a lead or a significant role in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public	3. Other organisations, which may have an important role in maintaining arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public
Animal health	Police, local authority, Port Health Authority	Police or local authority	Defra	
Plant disease	Police, Port Health Authority	Police	Defra, Food Standards Agency	
Public protest	Police, local authority	Police		
Industrial action	Police	Police		
Industrial technical failure	Police, local authority	Police, local authority	Utilities	

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Annex 7 C: Checklist of suggested protocols

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Checklist of suggested protocols for warning, informing and advising the public:

o To agree the identity of lead responders to warn, inform and advise the public on those scenarios which can reasonably be anticipated.

o To agree the process to be used to identify the lead responder to warn, inform and advise the public on any other type of emergency.

o To agree joint working procedures and allocation of responsibilities in support of the lead responder for warning, informing and advising.

o To agree the trigger points for the handover of the lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising from one responder body to another, and the procedures to achieve this.

o To agree how services or products for warning, informing and advising (eg equipment for media centres) will be sourced.

o As appropriate, to agree with local companies and organisations the circumstances in which their facilities or resources (eg premises, call centres), may be made available to the responder bodies, to help deliver advice and information to the public in the course of an emergency.

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Annex 7 D: Duty to communicate with the public – The Ten Step Cycle

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The Ten Step Cycle – Guidance Note

The following Ten Step Cycle has been designed to assist Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in implementing the Communicating with the Public duty, as laid down in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).

The CCA states that Category 1 responders should:

- o   maintain arrangements to warn, and provide information and advice to, the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred;
- o   put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters.

The Ten Step Cycle can be used by LRFs in a number of ways. The following are examples:

- i)   LRFs can work through the Ten Step Cycle step-by-step, in the same way LRFs approach the Risk Assessment duty.
- ii)   put LRFs can choose to use the Ten Step Cycle, alongside the Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice for Category 1 and 2 responders, as a guide and barometer, dipping in and out at various steps as required.

Ultimately, LRFs will reach the final step, and will have taken a big stride towards implementing a full set of warning and informing arrangements, which are fit for purpose and in line with the risks, set out in their Community Risk Register (CRR). This process will help local communities better understand the risks they face, and the actions they need to take in the event of an emergency. At that stage, as in all aspects of emergency planning, LRFs will find themselves back at

the beginning, and following a review of the work carried out previously, will be ready to start the Ten Step Cycle once more.

The Ten Step Cycle for Communicating with the Public

Step 1

a) Establish a Public Warning Task Group as a subgroup of the LRF General Working Group.

The LRF will need to set up a multi-agency task group to take this work forward, ensuring that it has a representative from all Category 1 responders - the duty applies to all of them. The LRF should consider inviting emergency planning officers, communications professionals, members of local and regional media, as well as appropriate Category 2 responders. Not only will this enhance partnership working and governance, but will allow the LRF to explore all possible solutions in making recommendations on possible control measures in this area.

b) Establish an audit process – rationale for decisions made

This is obviously important with any emergency planning process but the LRF should establish an auditing process to log all decisions that are taken, and processes followed throughout this cycle. This will help the LRF to review progress, answer Freedom of Information (FOI) enquiries and any other queries received, as well as helping to support any post-incident reviews.

Step 2

Use the Community Risk Register as the task group's starting point:

o **What is the Emergency Risk Management Context for the LRF area?** Is the LRF area urban or rural in nature? Consider the geographical profile of the landscape in the LRF area. What hazards do the LRF need to manage – are there main rivers prone to slow-onset riverine flooding, for example, or streams that are prone to flash flooding? What is the infrastructure like – motorways or B-roads? Do the LRF have large international communities where English may not be the first language? Asking such questions about the Emergency Risk Management Context will enable the LRF to set the background against which the task group will work, and allow the LRF to identify the most appropriate control measures for the area, the hazards, and the public.

o **What are the timescales and impact for each risk?** Assess the warning and informing timescales for each hazard, using the outcome descriptions from the CRR as a guide – what are the warning periods for each, or does the hazard have no-notice characteristics? Identifying these factors will also assist the task group to identify the most appropriate control measures against each hazard.

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o **What are the priorities identified within the CRR?**

The task group should familiarise itself with those hazards which require the most urgent risk treatment to be carried out on them in relation to warning and informing control measures. This will obviously have a bearing on any future recommendations to the LRF regarding proposed control measures.

Step 3

Identify and agree the lead responders for each risk in the Community Risk Register

o **Purpose of appointing lead responders**

Why do LRFs need to identify lead responders? Firstly, the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) states that LRFs are required to identify those Category 1 responders who will take the lead in maintaining arrangements to warn and inform and educate the public, and educate the public about risks and other civil protection matters, for each risk identified in the LRF Community Risk Register (CRR).

However, in communicating with the public, there is a need to avoid causing confusion during an incident, and in the absence of a lead responder, every Category 1 responder would be obliged to issue warnings, thereby increasing the potential for confusion. Identifying lead responders also helps to avoid duplication of effort – there is no sense in all agencies using valuable resources to issue the same warning and / or information.

In short, selecting lead responders to maintain arrangements for warning and informing the public helps the LRF to ensure that the public receives consistent and agreed safety information from a lead source only. This can play a significant role in mitigating the impact of an emergency on a community.

- o **Regulations require Category 1 responders to have in place a mechanism for selecting lead responders either (a) in advance, or (b) at the time of an incident.**

The ideal scenario is that the LRF will select lead responders in advance (i.e. before an emergency occurs). This will not only save the multi-agency tactical command valuable time during a major incident, but will also smooth the path to full implementation of the duty as a whole. Agreeing lead responders in advance for each risk in the CRR will enable the LRF to put in place a minimum number of warning protocols, thus keeping the process as simple as possible. Crisis management can be challenging enough without having to go through the process of choosing a lead responder at the same time.

However, if the LRF cannot agree on lead responders in advance, or indeed would prefer to leave it until the response phase of an incident, mechanisms must be put in place to allow that decision-making process to take place effectively when it is required.

- o **Regulations permit Category 1 responders to have a mechanism for changing the lead as the emergency evolves.**

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As an incident proceeds through the response phase to recovery and beyond, the lead responder for warning and informing may need to change, and the Civil Contingencies Act allows for mechanisms to be established enabling these changes to be made. For example, at the conclusion of the response to a flood incident, the police may pass management of the incident to the relevant local authority (as was the case during the Carlisle floods in 2005). This might also be the appropriate time to change the lead responder for warning and informing the public, in this case from the police to local authority.

NOTE: It is important to note that the lead responder is not expected to carry out the maintenance of warning and informing arrangements in isolation. The communicating with the public duty falls to all Category 1 responders. The lead responder concept steers LRF partners to provide support, advice and guidance to those agencies designated as lead responders throughout all stages of the disaster cycle. Partnership working is critical to success in implementing this duty effectively by assessing procedures against the risks identified in your CRR. This will help to ensure that the right messages are issued to the right people at the right time and help to promote a co-ordinated approach to communicating with the public.

Choosing the LRF's lead responders

The following steps provide LRFs with a simple process for selecting lead responders for warning and informing the public. Although this may seem a challenging task at first, it can actually be relatively straight forward if task groups follow the simple steps below:

o   Call together a specific 'Task & Finish' session for the LRF Public Warning Task Group, ensuring that all Category 1 responders are present – over the course of the next couple of hours, the task is to assign a lead responder agency against each of the risks contained in the LRF's CRR.

o   Ensure that copies of the CRR are available with an additional column added, so that task groups can insert the agreed lead responder for each incident phase as the process develops.

o   Now, with one task group member taking the lead, 'walk through' each risk scenario, analysing every phase of the disaster cycle, and deciding which agencies have a role as lead responder as the scenario / incident evolves. These agencies should then be inserted into the amended CRR table. The task group will also have to identify trigger points for the handover of the lead responsibility for warning, informing and advising from one responder body to another, and the procedures to achieve this (see Annex 7C).

However, the task group, where possible, should attempt to select one overall lead responder to take the lead against each risk, to ensure arrangements are maintained, and most importantly, to issue warnings during the immediate aftermath of an incident being declared (no-notice), or in the period prior to a potential incident (notice), to prevent imminent danger to life and property. This agency is the lead responder for both the planning, and immediate emergency response phase. As stated above, they should expect the full support of all Category 1 responders in undertaking this role.

The following scenarios are provided as examples – one notice type scenario (Flooding – major fluvial), and one no-notice (toxic release).

Notice type scenario: Flooding – major fluvial

o **Outcome description (taken from CRR):** Sustained period of heavy rain for two weeks; rising river levels over all regions; thousands of properties affected for 7 to 21 days; some risk to life; impact on roads and rail infrastructure.

o **Pre-flood:** right up to the point where the water is about to breach the river banks, the Environment Agency (EA) will have issued a series of warnings to the public and other key stakeholders (i.e. Flood Watch, Flood Warning, and Severe Flood Warning). Therefore, the EA as the lead responder at this stage is the agency best placed to issue an alert in the run-up to the incident.

o **Flood response:** once the multi-agency response is activated, and the emphasis changes to consequence management, the Police will coordinate all public safety messages, to ensure that a common message is being transmitted. In addition, all other Category 1 responders will be communicating with stakeholders that are specific to their own individual organisations (e.g. local authorities will communicate with their internal services, the voluntary agencies, schools, residential care homes, and elected members). Once the flood situation has receded, the EA will then issue an 'All Clear' message. At this stage, as the incident enters the recovery phase, the lead responder role will probably change from police to local authority.

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o **Outcome?** In this example there are three major changes in lead responder for this scenario: Environment Agency – police – local authority. However, from a preparedness perspective, the task group may wish to select one agency to take the lead. Its role would be to lead on the preparations for (a) maintaining arrangements to warn and inform, and (b) to educate the public about risk. However, as indicated above all other Category 1 responders would have a duty to assist that lead agency in completing these tasks.

No-notice type scenario: Toxic release

o **Outcome description (taken from CRR):** Toxic chemical release, up to 3 km from site, resulting in a number of fatalities and casualties.

o **Pre-incident and response:** There are three types of scenario considered here: the first is where the site is known, and is operated by a company governed by the COMAH, REPPIR, or PSR Regulations. The second involves a site that is not known, and is not governed by the aforementioned Regulations.[1] And finally, the third is a 'mobile incident' – in other words, a tanker, ship, and rail carriage – an incident that can occur anywhere and at any time.

Consider scenario 1. The site operator/ pipeline owner has a duty under COMAH / REPPIR/ PSR to provide safety information to the public working in, living in, or passing through its Public Information Zone (PIZ). This frequently takes the form of calendars and/ or letters. The site operator / pipeline owner also has a duty under the above legislation to warn the public of a major accident when they occur. However, the task group still needs to designate a lead responder(s) to ensure that warning and informing arrangements are maintained – this might involve site visits, assessment of existing warning infrastructure, and provision

[1] Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (2001) (REPPIR); Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (1999) (COMAH); Pipelines Safety Regulations (1996) (PSR).

of safety information outside of the PIZ. Again, the task group should walk-through the scenario – in the pre-incident phase, all Category 1 responders could theoretically take a lead role.

As an example, Cheshire LRF has agreed that the police will be the lead responder agency for several scenarios involving COMAH, REPPIR, and Major Accident Hazard Pipelines. In that case, the task group agreed that the police would be the lead responder for warning and informing during the response phase, as local arrangements require that agencies coordinate all safety messages issued to the public for these types of incident (whether supplementary to the operator's initial warning, an initial warning as a result of an operator's failure to warn, and / or subsequent safety action information, such as 'Go In, Stay In, Tune In'. In the recovery phase, the lead responder changes to the local authorities, with key input from healthcare agencies.

     o   **Outcomes?** In this example, there are two major changes in lead responder for this scenario: police – local authority / health agencies. Again, from a preparedness perspective, the task group may wish to select one agency to take the lead. Its role would be to lead on the preparations for (a) maintaining arrangements to warn and inform, and (b) educating the public about risk. And as indicated above, all the other Category 1 responders would have a duty to assist that lead agency in completing these tasks.

It is likely that, as the task group assesses through each hazard sub-category, they will find that a natural rhythm develops within the task group, with patterns emerging as they proceed. The key factor to remember is that this is very much a partnership exercise with support flowing from all partners involved in managing communications in an emergency. Even if a particular Category 1

responder is assigned more lead responder tasks than another, it should expect to receive the full support and cooperation of all other responders.

The selected lead responders need to be recorded on the LRF's adapted Community Risk Register.

Step 4

Carry out a gap analysis:

- o **What systems and arrangements are already in place in the LRF area?**
- o **What level of capability is in place already and what are the limitations?**
- o **Where are the gaps in local capability?**

To develop effective plans and deliver suitable warning and informing arrangements, it is important to assess the existing capabilities and limitations for communicating with the public against the risks that have been identified in the LRF area. By carrying out this analysis the LRF will be able to establish a baseline set of existing control measures to compare against the risks identified in the CRR which can then be built upon further into this cycle.

After mapping out existing capability, the task group should make a considered judgement as to the gaps in the control measures for warning and informing the public against the risks identified in the CRR – this will be re-assessed following Step 5.

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Step 5

o   Identify the target audiences for each risk in the CRR. Where

   are they located?

o   Identify vulnerable groups. Has the gap analysis changed as a result?

At this stage the task group should have completed the following:

o   Consideration and agreement of emergency management risk context;

o   Selection of Lead Responders against all risks identified in the CRR; and

o   A gap analysis of all existing and proposed warning, informing,

   and education arrangements in the LRF area.

So, what's next? The LRF will now need to identify the target audiences against each risk in the CRR. Who are they? Where are they? Will the chosen method of communication change depending on the time of day or night? What safety action do they need to take for each risk, according to the risk characteristics and timescales outlined in Step 2?

What about vulnerable groups and people in the LRF area? Are there any residential care homes or schools? Are there any members of the community with hearing or sight impairments? How will the LRF engage vulnerable people? These groups, and their warning and informing requirements, need to be addressed not only from a site specific perspective, but generically as well.

The LRF now need to re-assess the gap analysis by adding the target audiences into the equation. How effective are the existing systems in the light of this re-assessment? Where are the gaps now against each risk in the CRR?

Step 6

Consult the public in the LRF area, discuss the partnership's work with neighbouring LRFs and seek out examples of good practice.

The task group will now be approaching the stage where it will need to consider making recommendations to the LRF in order to fill the gaps in the warning, informing, and education arrangements to meet with both elements of the communicating with the public duty established in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).

However, before continuing, there are a few more actions that the LRF need to take:

a) Consult the public in the LRF area

What do the communities want to see put in place? What problems have they faced in previous incidents? For example, could they hear the off-site sirens? Do they understand the meaning of various siren tones? How would they like to be kept informed? Consultation could be carried out through door-to-door or postal surveys, websites, and consultation with elected members, public meetings, or setting up a stall in the local supermarket or shopping centre.

b) Talk to the neighbouring LRFs and other practitioners

What arrangements do neighbouring LRFs have in place? Talk to each other, and come to an understanding about the best way forward for the whole community. There are obvious advantages to partnership working. Joined-up arrangements across administrative boundaries can enhance the resilience of control measures and can help to improve the effectiveness of what would otherwise be 'stand-alone' arrangements.

c) Seek out and take advantage of examples of good practice

There are 42 LRFs in England and Wales, the key members of which are required to carry out this duty. As a result, there is already a range of good working practice in this area. Seek it out and let neighbouring LRFs know about the ideas that the task group has developed. Be prepared to be influenced also. As is often said in emergency planning circles, 'don't re-invent the wheel' – if one sees a good idea working in another area, adopt it for the LRF, and pass it on.

Step 7

a) LRF to decide what is sufficient – set the standard.

The Task Group is now at the stage where it needs to develop and agree recommendations to present to the LRF, on the basis of the work above. When doing so, consider the following factors:

- o Ensure that the LRF have consulted with all stakeholders, including other LRF task groups - be inclusive.

- o Put 'address resilience issues' in the task group's recommendations: what resilience does the package of proposals have? For example, are the task group recommending any back-up systems should loss of power be experienced? Could the package be affected by staff shortages?

- o Is the recommended package multi-layered? It is very unlikely that one system will be sufficient to provide coverage for all 'at-risk' communities. Consider how the LRF would communicate with the public (i) at different times of the day (or night) and (ii) who are living and working in different locations. Take this into account when designing the solutions package. Remember to design adaptability into the package, so that it can be enhanced in the future, be that as a result of changes to Public

Information Zones around COMAH sites, or changes to a particular risk's characteristics.

o What are the risks that need the most urgent attention from a 'communicating with the public' duty perspective? This may influence the task group's recommendations.

o Give the LRF a number of options to consider, including the task group's favoured package. Additionally, avoid recommending only a 'deluxe' option – be expansive, and provide a variety of solutions, with supporting business cases where necessary. All options should have community safety and resilience at the forefront.

Present the task group's recommendations to the LRF. The LRF will now need to decide which of the recommendations it is prepared to endorse, in line with the duties members have as Category 1 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). This will probably require resourcing (both financial and human), initiation of projects, and time.

The LRF will need to decide what level of control measures it is willing to implement against the risks presented in the CRR. Throughout its deliberations, the LRF should focus on the legislative duties, and a duty to keep their communities safe.

b) Implement LRF agreed control measures

Devise and initiate a work programme to implement those recommendations approved by LRF.

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Step 8

Implement a comprehensive training and exercising regime, to test the LRF's warning and informing arrangements.

When discussing this element as a task group, members need to ask the following questions?

- o How will the LRF ensure the warning and informing arrangements within multi-agency plans are effective?
- o How will the LRF test systems to ensure that they deliver what they are designed to deliver while at the same time avoiding alarming the public unnecessarily?
- o How will the LRF train and maintain the required skills of key staff?
- o What training needs exist?

Step 9

Ensure that all stakeholder communities are informed on a continuous basis through the design and implementation of a regularly updated education and awareness raising campaign.

Recommendations for an enhanced public education programme need to be presented to the LRF in conjunction with the proposed package of warning and informing solutions. These recommendations should address not only the issues of required safety actions and details of how the public will be warned and informed, but should also inform them of the risks they face, and how they can help to mitigate, prepare for, and respond to those risks.

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Recommendations should also provide a focus for annual, site, and subject specific risk awareness raising programmes.

Note: The above awareness raising programmes should be started as early in the Ten Step Cycle as possible – task groups do not need to wait until reaching Step (9) to implement these types of initiatives.

Step 10

Measure the effectiveness of the implemented control measures, review, and adjust as appropriate.

As with any emergency planning process, it is important that all arrangements are reviewed on an annual basis, (or in line with agreed CRR priorities), to assess and monitor their effectiveness. These reviews should include not only internal LRF assessments and technical analysis, but also community perspectives; are the arrangements working for them? Could they be improved? All results should help improve the arrangements for the future, and in doing so help keep the LRF's communities safe and minimise the impact of emergencies.

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Further Reading

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The purpose of this section is to signpost selected documents and resources that set out the strategic context for *Emergency Preparedness*, and provide more detailed information on specific areas contained within this document. A fuller list of documents is currently being compiled and will be available on the NRE in due course.

Strategic framework

Cabinet Office (2011). Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Strategic-National-Framework-on-Community-Resilience_0.pdf

HM Government (2010). The Strategic Defence and Security Review - Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-age-uncertainty

HM Government (2010). A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/national-security-strategy.pdf

HM Government (2010). National Risk Register
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-risk-register

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Core multi-agency guidance

Cabinet Office (2010). Civil Contingencies Act

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/civil-contingencies-act

Cabinet Office (2010). Central Government's Concept of Operations

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/conops-2010.pdf

Cabinet Office (2010). Emergency Response and Recovery. Non statutory guidance
accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act (2004)

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/emergency-response-
recovery_0.pdf

Cabinet Office (2010). Departments' Responsibilities for Planning, Response, and
Recovery from Emergencies

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/lead-government-
department-march-2010.pdf

Cabinet Office (2004). The Lead Government Department and its role – Guidance
and Best Practice

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/lead-government-
departments-role.pdf

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Selected thematic guidance

Association of Chief Police Officers (2009). *Guidance on Emergency Procedures*

www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2009/200904UNGEP01.pdf

Cabinet Office and Home Office (2005). *The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines*

interim.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132745/faith_communities.pdf

Cabinet Office and Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (2007). *Voluntary Sector Engagement: Guidance Note*

interim.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/153326/engaging_voluntarysector.pdf

Cabinet Office (2008). *Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis: Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/vulnerable_guidance.pdf

Cabinet Office (2008). *Mutual Aid: A short guide for local authorities*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/mutual_aid.pdf

Cabinet Office (2009). *Logistic Operations for Emergency Supplies: Guidance for Emergency Planners*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/logistic-operations_0.pdf

Cabinet Office (2009). *Guidance for Local Resilience Forums' Telecommunications Sub-Groups*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/local-resilience-forums-telecoms.pdf

Cabinet Office (2011). *Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for communities*
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/PFE-Guide-for-Communities_0.pdf

Cabinet Office (2011). *Resilience of Infrastructure from Natural Hazards*
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/infrastructure-resilience

Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2011). *Humanitarian Assistance strategic guidance - Building capability to look after people affected by emergencies*
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132793/ha_rolesandresponsibilities.pdf

Department of Energy and Climate Change (2011). *Nuclear emergency planning liaison group: consolidated guidance*
www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/nuclear/safety_and_sec/emergency_plan/neplg/guidance/guidance.aspx

HM Government (2006). *Evacuation and Shelter Guidance: Non-statutory guidance to complement Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response & Recovery*
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/evac_shelter_guidance.pdf

Home Office and Cabinet Office (2004). *Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies*
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/fatalities.pdf

Ministry of Defence (2007). *Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience (2nd Edition)*
www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4F984DE3-6CA0-42D9-8BFF-FC90A07C04BF/0/jdp02_2nd_edition.pdf

National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public. (2007). *The Ten Step Cycle for Communicating with the Public*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/10_step_cycle.pdf

National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public. (2007). *Civil Contingencies Act (2004) Duty to Communicate with the Public Choosing your Lead Responders – An easy to follow Guide*

interim.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132838/lead_responder_protocol.pdf

Lexicon of UK civil protection terminology

Cabinet Office (2011). *Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/cplexicon

Tools and reference documents

Audit Scotland (2009). *Improving Civil Contingencies Planning*

www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/docs/central/2009/nr_090806_civil_contingencies.pdf

Cabinet Office (2010). *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/expectations-and-indicators-good-practice-set-category-1-and-2-responders

Cabinet Office (2010). *Civil Protection Self Assessment Tool User Guide*

www.cpsat.info/cpsat/UserGuide.html

Cabinet Office (2011). *The role of Local Resilience Forums:*

A reference document

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Role-of-an-LRF-A-
Reference-Document.pdf

Cabinet Office (2011). *The National Resilience Extranet*

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/national-resilience-extranet

Good practice guidelines

British Continuity Institute (2010). *Good Practice Guidelines*

www.thebci.org/gpg.htm

Higher Education Funding Council for England and Association of University
Chief Security Officers (2008). *Planning for and Managing Emergencies: a good
practice guide for higher education institutions* http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/
media/132802/hei_emergencyplan_aucso_guide.pdf

Inquiry reports and lessons identified

Anderson, Iain (2002). *Foot and Mouth Disease: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report*

webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/fmd/fmd_report/report/index.htm

Anderson, Iain (2008). *Foot and Mouth Disease 2007 – A Review and Lessons Learnt*

webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304133657/http://archive.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/fmdreview/documents/fmd_2007_review_full.pdf

Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (2007). *Recommendations on the Emergency Preparedness for, Response to and Recovery from Incidents*
www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/preparedness.pdf

Department of Communities and Local Government (2008). *Facing the Challenge: The Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser's review of the operational response by the Fire and Rescue Service to the widespread flooding in England during 2007*
www.communities.gov.uk/documents/fire/pdf/725360.pdf

Environment Agency (2010). *Delivering Benefits through Evidence – the Cost of the Summer 2007 Floods in England*
publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/SCHO1109BRJA-E-E.pdf

Hallett, Lady Justice (2011). *Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of July 2005* 7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/

Local Government Association (2010). *Weathering the Storm II – Improving UK Resilience to Severe Winter Weather*
www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/12588760

Pitt, Sir Michael (2008). *The Pitt Review: Lessons learned from the 2007 floods*
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CabinetOffice

Glossary

Revision to *Emergency Preparedness*

Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme

March 2012

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This glossary contains terms that relate to Emergency Preparedness. For a more comprehensive list of terms, including those that relate to response, recovery and civil protection and resilience, please consult the Civil Protection Lexicon at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/cplexicon

(The) Act

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 established a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom. Part 1 of the Act establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for Local Responders; Part 2 of the Act establishes emergency powers.

Bellwin Scheme

Discretionary scheme for providing Central Government financial assistance in exceptional circumstances to affected local authorities (e.g. councils, police authorities) in the event of an emergency.

Note: The Bellwin Scheme does not apply in Northern Ireland. In Wales the equivalent scheme is the Emergency Financial Assistance Scheme. For further information, please see: www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/localgovernmentfinance/bellwinscheme/bellwinscheme201112/

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Bronze

The tier of command and control within a single agency or multi agency (below gold level and silver level) at which the management of 'hands-on' work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas.

Note: The bronze level is also known as the operational level.

Business continuity forum

Grouping of organisations to share and co-ordinate business continuity plans.

Business continuity management (BCM)

Holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation and the impacts to the business operations that those threats, if realised, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organisational resilience with the capability for an effective response.

Business continuity plan (BCP)

Documented collection of procedures and information developed, compiled and maintained in readiness for use in an incident to enable an organisation to continue to deliver its critical activities at an acceptable pre-defined level.

Business impact analysis

A method of assessing the impacts on business functions that might result from an incident and the levels of resources and time required for recovery.

Capabilities programme

A programme to develop a range of capabilities that underpin the UK's resilience to disruptive challenges. These capabilities are categorised as being structural (e.g. local response), functional (e.g. mass casualties) or relating to essential services (e.g. financial services).

Capability

A demonstrable ability to respond to, and recover from, a particular threat or hazard.

Capability gap

The gap between the current ability to provide a response and the actual response assessed to be required for a given threat or hazard. Plans should be made to reduce or eliminate this gap, if the risk justifies it.

Capability status

Assessment of the level of capability in place.

Capability target

The level of capability required by the planning assumptions and elaborated in the capability development plan.

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Catastrophic emergency

An emergency which has an exceptionally high and potentially widespread impact and requires immediate central government direction and support.

Category 1 responder

A person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These bodies are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies. As such, they are subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act.

Category 2 responder

A person or body listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These are co-operating responders who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to co-operate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.

(The) Civil Contingencies Group Northern Ireland

A Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. CCG(NI) also has a role within the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) in a serious or catastrophic emergency.

Civil protection

Organisation and measures, under governmental or other authority, aimed at

preventing, abating or otherwise countering the effects of emergencies for the protection of the civilian population and property.

Command

The exercise of vested authority that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives.

Command and control

The exercise of vested authority through means of communications and the management of available assets and capabilities, in order to achieve defined objectives.

Note: Command and Control are not synonymous terms – see the separate glossary entries.

Community engagement

Mechanisms for identifying community views and the channels for understanding engagement. Developing such mechanisms and channels entails building infrastructure and capacity amongst community groups.

Community resilience

Communities and individuals harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency services.

Community Risk Register (CRR)

A register communicating the assessment of risks within a Local Resilience Area which is developed and published by a Local Resilience Forum as a basis for informing local communities and directing civil protection work streams.

Consequences

Impact resulting from the occurrence of a particular hazard or threat, measured in terms of the numbers of lives lost, people injured, the scale of damage to property and the disruption to essential services and commodities.

Control

The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives.

Control centre

Operations centre from which the management and co-ordination of response by each emergency service to an emergency is carried out. A control centre can be, for example, multi agency or an internal, single agency centre.

Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended 2005), Northern Ireland 2000 (COMAH)

Regulations applying to the chemical industry and to some storage sites where threshold quantities of dangerous substances, as identified in the Regulations, are kept or used.

Co-ordination

The integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives.

Cost-recovery basis

A formally agreed situation under which an organisation can charge another organisation for providing a service, to ensure that the providing organisation does not make a financial loss in providing the service. It is usually agreed that no surplus or profit can be made by the organisation providing the service.

Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA)

Police officers who provide advice on preventing and mitigating the effects of acts of terrorism.

Critical function

A service or operation the continuity of which a Category 1 responder needs to ensure, in order to meet its business objectives and/or deliver essential services.

Critical Infrastructure (CI)

A term used to describe **Critical National Infrastructure** and other infrastructure of national significance as well as infrastructure and assets of local significance.

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Note: the loss or damage of critical infrastructure may have impacts in additional or different part of the country from where it is situated. Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) differs from Critical Infrastructure only in the scale of its impact when lost or compromised.

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

Assets that the Government has identified within the nine **National Infrastructure** sectors (energy, food, water, government, transportation, communication, emergency services, health care and finance) as being of strategic importance to essential service delivery. The loss or compromise of these assets would lead to severe economic and / or social consequences and / or to loss of life across significant parts of the UK.

Cross-border co-operation

Co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders across boundaries with devolved administrations.

Cross-boundary co-operation

Co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders across the boundaries between Local Resilience Areas.

Data Protection Act

An Act that requires organisations which hold data about individuals to do so securely and only for specific purposes. The Act also gives individuals the right, with certain exemptions, to see personal data that relates to them.

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Delegation

A formal agreement under which it is established that one organisation's functions will be carried out by another. This agreement does not absolve the organisation of any legal duty to provide that function, merely re-designating the form of delivery.

Emergency

An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK or to the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. To constitute an emergency this event or situation must require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder.

Emergency management

See Integrated Emergency Management.

Emergency Plan

A document or collection of documents that sets out the overall framework for the initiation, management, co-ordination and control of personnel and assets to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of an emergency.

Emergency planning (EP)

Aspect of Integrated Emergency Management concerned with developing and maintaining procedures to prevent emergencies and to mitigate the impact when they occur.

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Emergency planning cycle

A continuous process of assessing the risk of and preparing for emergencies, supported by procedures to keep staff in readiness, and to review and validate plans, revising them, if necessary, following emergency exercises or response operations.

The Energy Act 2008

The Energy Act updates energy legislation to reflect the availability of new and renewable technologies, as well as the UK's changing requirements for secure energy supply. It also aims to protect the environment and the tax payer as the energy market changes.

Environmental Information Regulations

Statutory information (SI 2004 No. 3391) providing right of access to environmental information held by UK public authorities.

Essential services

The fundamental services that underpin daily life and ensure the UK continues to function, both socially and economically. Within the **National Infrastructure**, nine sectors have been identified as providing essential services: energy, food, water, transportation, communications, emergency services, health care, finance and Government.

Exercise

A simulation designed to validate organisations' capability to manage incidents and emergencies. Specifically exercises will seek to validate training undertaken and the procedures and systems within emergency or business continuity plans.

Note: while exercises will provide an opportunity to develop staff competences, they must not be regarded as a substitute for training and staff development.

Exercise Directing Team

The team that assists in designing an exercise and then directing the exercise play.

Exercise Director

The individual who is charged with designing and directing an exercise.

Exercise Programme

Planned series of exercises developed by an organisation or group of organisations to validate training and plans.

(The) Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987

The Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act provides for a system of safety certification by local authorities for certain covered stands - known as "regulated stands" - at sports grounds, and for subsequent inspections. This Act applies to all outdoor sports grounds, whatever their use, where there is a covered stand (i.e. with seated or standing accommodation) which can accommodate at least 500 spectators.

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(The) Flood and Water Management Act 2010

The Flood and Water Management Act provides comprehensive management of flood risk for people, homes and businesses. It promotes the use of measures to manage both the probability and the consequences of flooding and erosion; minimises flood risk and provides a higher level of protection to the public from the operation of reservoirs.

(The) Freedom of Information Act

The Freedom of Information Act 2000 allows the public access, regardless of nationality or country of residence, to information held by public authorities or anyone providing services for them, subject to certain exemptions.

Generic local risk assessment

An assessment provided by central government to Category 1 responders via the Local Risk Assessment Guidance, containing information on the likelihood and impact of generic threats and hazards.

Generic (emergency) plan

A single emergency plan developed to enable an organisation's response to emergencies arising from a wide range of risks. Generic plans are usually specific to individual organisations, but in some cases they will be developed as multi-agency plans to enable a joint response for use by a range of emergency responder organisations.

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Geographical Information System

Computer-based system that supports the capture, management, analysis and modelling of geographically referenced data.

Gold

The strategic level of command and control (above silver level and bronze level) at which policy, strategy and the overall response framework are established and managed for individual responder organisations.

Note: the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, the multi-agency strategic co-ordinating body, may colloquially be referred to as the Gold Group, but not simply as Gold.

Hazard

Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e. non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or to economic, social and political structures.

Hazard assessment

A component of the civil protection risk assessment process in which identified hazards are assessed for risk treatment.

Hazard identification

A component of the civil protection risk assessment process by which potential hazards are identified. This can also be carried out by business as part of their BCM process and/or locally during the process of developing a community risk register.

(The) Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act 1974

Primary piece of legislation covering occupational health and safety in the United Kingdom. The Health and Safety Executive is responsible for enforcing the Act and a number of other acts and statutory instruments relevant to the working environment.

Impact

The scale of the consequences of a hazard or threat expressed in terms of a reduction in human welfare, damage to the environment and loss of security.

Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)

Multi-agency approach to emergency management entailing six key activities: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery.

(The) Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999

Regulations which establish specific requirements for the protection of employees and the public from radiation.

Joint- or Multi-Emergency Service Group (JESG)

A steering group for two or more agencies working between the emergency services.

Joint working

Collaborative working between a number of organisations to achieve common, defined objectives.

Lead government department (LGD)

Department of the United Kingdom Government or Devolved Administration designated as responsible for overall management of the Government response to an emergency or disaster. There are LGDs identified for both the response and recovery phases of an emergency. For a list of designated responsibilities visit: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/list-lead-government-departments-responsibilities

Lead organisation

Organisation appointed by a group of organisations to speak or act on their behalf or to take the lead in a given situation, with the other organisations' support. The exact role of the lead organisation depends on the circumstances in which the lead role is being operated.

Lead responder

A Category 1 responder charged with carrying out a duty under the Act on behalf of a number of responder organisations, so as to co-ordinate its delivery and to avoid unnecessary duplication.

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Liaison officer

Generic term for a person within one organisation who liaises with other organisations and co-ordinates their own organisation's staff at the scene of an incident.

Local Resilience Area

Area within which category 1 and 2 responders co-operate, principally but not exclusively through the mechanism of a Local Resilience Forum. Each local resilience area (with the exception of London) is based on a police force area.

Local Resilience Forum (LRF)

A process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a Local Resilience Area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act.

Local responder

Organisation which responds to emergencies at the local level. These may include Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act and other organisations not covered by the Act.

Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)

A document provided by central government with information on generic hazards and threats to assist Category 1 responders in performing their local risk assessment duty under the Civil Contingencies Act.

Major incident

Event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services' major incident plans.

Note: while an 'emergency' as specifically defined under the CCA and 'major incident' are not synonymous, they are both significant events with serious consequences. It does not automatically follow from the declaration of a major incident that it will meet the criteria for a CCA-defined emergency, but the definitions and criteria overlap and in many cases an emergency will be a major incident and vice versa.

Media plan

A plan for ensuring co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders and the media in communicating with the public during and after an emergency.

Minister (of the Crown)

Government Minister with power to act under the Civil Contingencies Act, usually relating to the issuing of guidance and regulations, but also including urgent powers of direction (for example, in times of catastrophic emergency or to deal with newly arising risks) and monitoring powers.

Multi-agency plan

A plan for the coordination and integration of the response to an emergency by a number of organisations.

Note: a multi-agency plan is usually prepared and maintained by a lead responder on behalf of the other organisations.

Multi-level plan

A plan for co-operation between more than one level of government and Category 1 and 2 responders.

Note: the plan will usually be initiated and maintained by central government.

Mutual aid

An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency.

National Infrastructure

A mix of networks, systems, sites, facilities and businesses that deliver goods and services to citizens, and supports our economy, environment and social well-being.

National Resilience Extranet (NRE)

Secure web-based infrastructure to enable multi-agency information sharing at the planning stage and which has a specific information function during emergency response and recovery.

Note: the NRE can store protectively marked documents up to and including RESTRICTED.

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News Co-ordination Centre (NCC)

A Cabinet Office unit working with the Lead Government Department to co-ordinate media and provide public communications support during an emergency.

(The) Nuclear Installations Act 1965

The Nuclear Installations Act makes provision for ensuring the safety of workers and the public on a nuclear site. Under the relevant statutory provisions, a site cannot have nuclear plant on it unless the user has been granted a site licence by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). This licensing function is administered on HSE's behalf by its Nuclear Directorate.

Outcome description

An indication of the scale of a generic type of event (e.g. flooding) in terms of its intrinsic or immediate characteristics (e.g. rainfall or area flooded). Outcome description is to be distinguished from impact.

Outsourcing

Where a service is contracted to a third party on a commercial basis, either by an individual organisation or collectively.

(The) Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996

Regulations, enforced by the Health and Safety Executive, to ensure that major accident hazard pipelines in Great Britain, territorial waters, and the UK continental shelf are designed, constructed and operated safely.

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Plan maintenance

Procedures for ensuring that emergency plans are appropriate, up to date and kept in readiness for emergencies.

Plan validation

Measures to ensure that an emergency plan meets the purpose for which it was designed. Validation may include a range of measures, including various forms of emergency exercises and tests.

Planning assumptions

Descriptions of the types and scales of consequences for which organisations should be prepared to respond. These will be informed by the risk assessment process.

Preparedness

Process of preparing to deal with known risks and unforeseen events or situations that have the potential to result in an emergency

Public awareness

A level of knowledge within the community about risks and preparedness for emergencies, including actions the public authorities will take and actions the public should take.

Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR)

REPPIR lays down the basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation.

Readiness level

An assessment of the extent to which a capability meets the agreed capability target.

Recovery

The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community, both physically and socially, following an emergency.

Recovery time objectives

Identifies the time by which critical functions and/or their dependencies must be recovered.

Resilience and Emergencies Division (Department for Communities and Local Government)

A division of the Department for Communities and Local Government, which has responsibility for resilience between the local and national level, at multi-LRF level.

Rendezvous point

Point to which all vehicles and resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue and deployment.

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Resilience

Ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.

Response

Decisions and actions taken in accordance with the strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by emergency responders. At a high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality.

Rest centre

Building, which may include overnight facilities, designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees.

Risk

A measure of the significance of a potential emergency in terms of its assessed likelihood and impact.

Risk appetite

Willingness of an organisation to tolerate a defined level of risk.

Risk assessment

A structured and auditable process of identifying potentially significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and action.

Risk management

All activities and structures directed towards the effective assessment and management of risks and their potential adverse impacts.

Risk priority

The relative importance of the treatment(s) required for the management of the risk, based on the risk rating and the additional capabilities required to manage risk.

Risk rating matrix

Table showing the likelihood and potential impact of events or situations, in order to ascertain the risk.

Risk treatment

Process of determining those risks that should be controlled (by reducing their likelihood and/or putting impact mitigation measures in place) and those that will be tolerated at their currently assessed level.

Safety Advisory Group (SAG)

Multi-agency group set up to provide advice on safety matters for a specific event, or events, such as a major sporting event or a concert held in a stadium.

(The) Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975

The Safety of Sports Grounds Act addresses the safety of spectators at sports/football stadia where large numbers of people attend. Under the Act stadia which have accommodation, whether seated, standing or a combination of the two, for more than 10,000 spectators require a General Safety Certificate from the appropriate local authority.

Scottish Category 1 responder

A person or body listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Act. These responders are subject to Regulations and guidance issued by Scottish Ministers.

Scottish Category 2 responder

A person or body listed in Part 4 of Schedule 1 to the Act. These responders are subject to Regulations and guidance issued by Scottish Ministers.

Serious emergency

Second highest level of emergency requiring central government direction.

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Sensitive information

Information which, if disclosed to the public would, or would be likely to (a) adversely affect national security, (b) adversely affect public safety, (c) prejudice the commercial interests of any person; or is information that is personal data, within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, disclosure of which would breach that Act.

Significant emergency

Lowest level of emergency requiring central government support through a nominated lead government department.

Silver

The tactical tier of command and control within a single agency (below Gold level and above Bronze level) at which the response to an emergency is managed.

Note: multi-agency co-ordination at the tactical level is undertaken by the Tactical Co-ordinating Group which may be referred to as the Silver Group.

Small or medium-sized enterprise (SME)

A business with less than 250 employees.

Specific (emergency) plan

Plan by one or more category 1 responder(s) that relates to a particular risk not adequately addressed by a generic emergency plan.

Strategic Co-ordinating Group (1)

Multi-agency body responsible for co-ordinating the joint response to an emergency at the local strategic level which may be referred to as the Gold Group.

Strategic Co-ordinating Group (2)

In Scotland, Strategic Co-ordinating Groups are the principal local forum for multi-agency cooperation in civil protection. The groups have a role in both preparation and response to emergencies. As such, SCGs in Scotland effectively combine the role in England of Local Resilience Forums in preparing for emergencies and of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in responding to emergencies.

Subsidiarity

The principle by which decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level.

Tactical Co-ordinating Group

A multi-agency group of tactical commanders that meets to determine, co-ordinate and deliver the tactical response to an emergency.

Note: the TCG may also be known as the Silver Group.

Threat

Intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create adverse consequences to human welfare (including property and the supply of essential services and commodities), the environment or security.

Threat assessment

A component of the civil protection risk assessment process in which identified threats are assessed for risk treatment.

Utilities

Companies providing essential services, often categorised as water, energy and telecommunications, although this can sometimes include other infrastructure sectors such as transport.

Validation

Measures to ensure that plans, procedures and other emergency response measures meet the purpose for which they were designed.

Verification

To review and evaluate documents, plans, requirements and specifications . This can be done using a checklist, walkthrough or inspection.

Voluntary sector

All voluntary organisations, regarded as a group, involved in any aspects of the response to an emergency. Also known as the third sector.

Vulnerability

The susceptibility of individuals or a community, services or infrastructure to damage or harm arising from an emergency or other incident.

Vulnerable establishment

An institution housing vulnerable people during the day or at night.

Wales Resilience Forum (WRF)

A multi-agency group providing the mechanism for national multi-agency co-operation and strategic advice on civil protection and emergency planning in Wales.

Walk through

A structured event to inform participants of a new plan or procedure, allow consultation on the future development of a plan or introduce individuals and/or organisations to a new or proposed role within a plan.

Note: may also be known as a Talk through

Warning and informing the public

Arrangements to make the public aware of risks and for responders to warn, inform and advise the public when an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred, and to provide them with information and advice.

Welsh Government Civil Contingencies Group

A Welsh Group dedicated to supporting multi-agency co-operation in Wales and engaging with the UK Government on all issues relating to civil protection and emergency preparedness.

Welsh Government's Emergency Branch

The Welsh Government's Emergencies Branch fosters links with emergency planners in order to co-ordinate civil protection planning in Wales. It also maintains links with UK Government Departments and other devolved administrations to share best practice and undertake joint-working.

Welsh Borders Resilience Group (WBRG)

The Welsh Borders Resilience Group brings together the Welsh Government and the DCLG Resilience Team to facilitate co-operation and information sharing between Wales and the border areas of England.

Z-Cards

A patented format for publishing information, in which up to an A3-sized page can be folded down to credit card size.