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# REVIEW OF CIVIL CONTINGENCIES IN WALES

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# 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Up until very recently UK legislation provided Welsh Ministers very limited powers with respect to civil contingencies. This has changed after the Welsh Ministers (Transfer of Functions) Order 2018 came into force. This order transfers functions from Ministers of the Crown to Welsh Government Ministers and provides Wales with an opportunity to provide a better-defined constitutional platform from which to develop preparedness response and recovery across all agencies and strengthen resilience against growing risks.

Welsh Government has used the Transfer of Functions Order as an opportunity to revisit the governance structures for civil contingency planning. The change in legislation has offered an opportunity to take a step back, reassess governance arrangements and ensure that it offers the firm foundation on which to build for the future.

Welsh Government engaged Local Partnerships to conduct a review to establish if Wales's resilience structures and groups were operating effectively in delivering multi-agency emergency preparedness and response across Wales. Our review was undertaken in line with best practice and within an established review framework. Documents such as the Transfer of Functions Order and Civil Contingencies Act Post Implementation Review were also reviewed to ensure alignment and that recommendations are achievable under the powers Ministers can exercise. Our approach comprised the following elements:

- The development and analysis of a formal questionnaire completed by stakeholders
- A limited best practice review in the form of a document appraisal to examine the governance arrangements used by other UK countries and other jurisdictions
- A series of individual stakeholder interviews
- A small number of online workshops, 1 for each Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area and 1 for pan Wales organisations.

The review team contacted 121 stakeholders over the course of the review and conducted 65 individual interviews. Findings from these, the questionnaire and the workshops were analysed and compared with the findings of the document appraisal. From this analysis fifteen specific recommendations have been identified and proposed for implementation. These are set out within section 6 of this report.

In summary, the overall findings of the review conclude that the overall governance arrangements already in place are considered fit for purpose. Some changes and additions are recommended but they are modifications rather than a wholesale restructuring. The report also recommends that Welsh Government assumes a role of 'guiding hand' over the LRFs with clearer performance management provided by the adoption of a national assurance framework. More effective partnerships are suggested, particularly between Category 1 and 2 responders and the voluntary sector and a more effective communication protocol between Welsh Government and LRFs proposed. Finally, a fundamental review of training is recommended to ensure that those involved in civil contingencies both locally and nationally have the skills necessary to address future risks and likely common occurrences rather than past lessons identified.

Detailed conclusions and recommendations are set out in section 6 of this report which also includes a table of recommendations and timescales for implementation as an outline of suggested next steps.

## 2 INTRODUCTION

UK legislation provided Welsh Ministers very limited formal powers in respect of civil contingencies until the Welsh Ministers (Transfer of Functions) Order 2018 came into force from 24 May 2018. This order transfers functions from Ministers of the Crown to Welsh Government (Welsh Government) Ministers that fall within legislative competence as a result of the Wales Act 2017. The transfer of powers presents an opportunity to provide a less ambiguous constitutional platform from which to develop preparedness across all agencies and strengthen resilience against growing risks. In August 2018, the former First Minister provided formal notification on the transfer to the members of the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) and to the Chairs of the four Local Resilience Fora (LRF). The notification explained that the exercising of the functions would be an evolving process. It also committed the Welsh Government to working closely with Local Resilience Fora, and individual responder agencies, to understand where the new powers could add maximum value.

The Transfer of Functions Order represented an important step forward towards aligning the legislative competence of the Assembly with the executive competence of the Welsh Ministers. This was part of the package of reforms to Wales's constitutional settlement under the Wales Act 2017 and included the transfer of the executive functions under Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). Powers under Part 2 of the Act will not be transferred as this part of the Act deals specifically with Emergency Powers which the UK Government reserves on a UK basis. No functions will be transferred to Welsh Ministers which will allow them to have powers over the Police or National Security under the Act. Welsh Ministers will not have the power to change the meaning of an emergency under Section 1 of the Act.

As a result of the transfer of powers, Welsh Ministers now have powers to issue guidance in relation to the civil contingency duties, monitor compliance of the duties of devolved services under the Act and to enforce duties under the Act by way of proceedings in court. Additionally, after consultation with a Minister of the Crown, Welsh Ministers will be able to make regulations, orders and directions in relation to devolved responders, and to make an order amending the list of responder organisations that fall within devolved competence.

In exercising these functions, Welsh Ministers will be able to play a more influential role in setting the direction and delivery of civil contingencies in Wales. With greater responsibility and accountability falling to Welsh Ministers, a structure is needed which will provide assurance that the duties are being carried out effectively, including response to emergencies.

The key bodies within the Welsh civil contingencies framework are:

- Wales Resilience Forum (WRF), chaired by the First Minister and the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation
- Wales Resilience Partnership Team (WRPT) takes strategic direction from the WRF in delivering specific aims, objectives and targets in resilience work on an all-Wales basis.
- LRFs are multi -agency local mechanisms operating in the four Police Force areas (North Wales, South Wales, Dyfed-Powys, and Gwent) bringing together all



Category 1 and 2 responder organisations as well as other organisations who would respond to an emergency. They all have a duty under the CCA to cooperate and share information and in the case of category 1 organisations, carry out preparations for an emergency response.

- Joint Emergency Services Group (JESG), a pan-Wales mechanism that brings together all emergency services in Wales including the NHS, Welsh Government, and armed forces at the most senior level contributing to civil contingencies and counter terrorism in Wales.

The Welsh Government has a statutory role to play in the introduction of regulations and guidance which relate wholly or partly to Wales. Ministers of the Crown are required to consult Welsh Ministers. The principle mechanism for co-operation between Category 1 and 2 responders under the Act is the LRFs. Each LRF considers its own membership and subgroup structures subject to requirements for cooperation and information sharing as outlined under the CCA.

The table below outlines the Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales as set out in the CCA.

Category 1 Responders	Category 2 Responders
Police forces	Utilities (Electricity and gas distributors, water and sewerage undertakers, telephone service providers incl fixed and mobile)
British Transport Police	Transport providers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Network Rail</li> <li>• Train Operating Companies (passenger and freight)</li> <li>• Airport operators</li> <li>• Harbour authorities</li> </ul>
Fire & Rescue authorities	Met Office
Maritime and Coastguard Agency	Coal Authority
Local Authorities	Health and Safety Executive
Port Health Authorities	
A National Health Service trust established under section 18 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 - Ambulance Services	
Hospital accommodation and services in relation to accidents and emergencies, or Public Health Wales (Services in relation to public health). A Local Health Board established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006	
Natural Resources Wales	

In Wales, the detailed risk assessment process is currently undertaken at LRF level where Community Risk Registers (CRR) are produced and maintained. To support this work the Wales Risk Group (WRG) brings together the chairs of the LRF Risk Groups.



## The Role of Welsh Government and Devolved Responsibility under the Act

Chapter 11 of Emergency Preparedness states that Welsh Government works with UK Government to develop civil protection policy, consult and exchange information on civil protection planning and response, and consult as early as possible on policy proposals relating to emergencies which affect, or may affect Wales.

Responsibility for local civil protection arrangements under Part 1 of the Act in England and Wales remains, in general, the responsibility of the UK Government. However, devolved functional responsibilities in relation to health, the environment, animal health and welfare, local government, economic development, the fire and rescue authorities, road networks and rail services enable the Welsh Government to engage in aspects of civil protection work and, as a consequence, play an important co-ordinating role.

The Welsh Government will be involved as soon as possible in the development of regulations, orders, directions and guidance under Part 1 of the Act where this action directly affects Welsh Category 1 and 2 responders, or where there are significant cross border implications. Any action taken by UK Government under Part 1 of the Act applying to the areas which the Welsh Government has functions requires the consent of Welsh Ministers.

When requesting information from Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales, the UK Government will consider the case for using the Welsh Government to co-ordinate the process of gathering information on a pan-Wales basis. In other cases, the UK Government will consider on a case-by-case basis the need to inform the Welsh Government of any request by it for information from:

- individual Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales which fall within devolved responsibility (eg. the Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust);
- Category 1 and 2 responders in Wales which fall outside devolved responsibility (e.g. the police)

In chairing the WRF in October 2018, the then Cabinet Secretary for Local Government and Public Services, stated that in order to build upon the solid foundation which currently exists, and to continue to strengthen preparedness for the challenges ahead, he would reiterate his support to revisiting the governance structures which have been in place in Wales for a number of years to ensure they remain fit for purpose. A full review of Wales's resilience structures and groups was proposed in order to identify the most effective model for delivering multi-agency emergency preparedness and response across Wales.

The civil contingencies arrangements have been used as a critical part of the response to a number of events including the COVID-19 pandemic and Operation Yellowhammer. The Welsh Government want to understand and implement the lessons learned from this and other experiences through a review of the governance arrangements. Civil contingencies arrangements and their governance have to be fit for current and emerging risks in Wales and the proposed model must work for both physical and non-physical incidents (for example a flooding incident or a cyber incident).

Welsh Government engaged Local Partnerships to conduct the review to establish if Wales's resilience structures and groups are operating to the most effective model of delivering multi-agency emergency preparedness and response across Wales.

The specific objectives were:

- To review all areas of civil contingencies and emergency planning across Wales, this includes areas where the policy is reserved but the response to incidents in areas in or affecting Wales is still the responsibility of the Welsh Government and Welsh responders. The review to include, but not be limited to a review of the governance structures, working groups, terms of reference, membership, interoperability, risk identification, mitigation, and planning.
- To engage with the key stakeholders in the civil contingencies arena. This will include any responders that are named under Part 1 of the CCA, those that are linked to the LRFs, relevant third sector agencies and any other relevant stakeholders that can contribute to incidents.
- To consider all current legislation and relevant guidance, specifically the CCA, its accompanying regulations, the statutory guidance (Emergency Preparedness) and non-statutory guidance (Emergency Response and Recovery) and its implementation in Wales (Pan Wales Response Plan). This should also include the UK Government led review of the CCA and the National Resilience Strategy, which was due to be published in Spring 2022. The UK Government Resilience Framework was published outside of the review time period and was therefore not consulted as part of this review.
- To deliver a set of five workshops within the LRF areas in Wales to consult on final recommendations with key stakeholders prior to publication of the final report.
- To produce a final report of recommendations that utilise both the engagement evidence from stakeholders, research of models used in other jurisdictions and ensures alignment with all current and reviewed legislation and statutory and non-statutory guidance.

Our review was undertaken in three phases as follows:

- Stage 1: Stakeholder survey and interviews
- Stage 2: Review of all areas of civil contingencies and emergency planning across Wales, and review models used in other jurisdictions
- Stage 3: Workshops with LRFs and pan Wales organisations



### 3 METHODOLOGY

Engagement with all key stakeholders specified was carried out in order to identify good practice examples, identify any perceived gaps in current civil contingencies legislation and guidance, and identify key lessons.

The methodology for our engagement with stakeholders was based on the Local Partnerships Gateway© Review process owned by the Cabinet Office and used under licence by Local Partnerships. The review process is used to review projects, initiatives, and governance arrangements across the public sector in the UK and is based on a number of key principles as detailed in Appendix 1.

Stage 1 of the review involved a thematic survey of 121 stakeholders followed up with 65 in depth interviews. Key themes for the questions put to stakeholders were developed in consultation with the Welsh Government Civil Contingencies and National Security (CCNS) Division. CCNS specified which stakeholders were to be surveyed and/or interviewed. We expanded on this by inviting all stakeholders to an interview to both maximise inclusion and support the achievement of a 360 degree system wide view from as many dimensions as possible.

The first phase of the review included a survey comprising of 33 individual questions. issued on a 'Smart Survey' platform. The questions encompassed all aspects of civil contingency governance and sought to capture key themes and issues from a wide a range of stakeholders as possible. The survey was distributed to 121 Category 1 and Category 2 participants representing 55 public and voluntary sector organisations across Wales. The survey aimed to collect views on civil contingencies structures currently in place across Wales, and canvas views on potential improvements moving forward. These survey findings then drove the contents and themes of the detailed interviews and the workshops which followed.

Of the 77 responses received 74% were from Category 1 and 4% were from Category 2 organisations. The remainder were from non-category organisations with an involvement in civil contingency planning.

Each stage 1 interview lasted 45 minutes and were undertaken on a non-attributable basis. They explored the key themes identified by the questionnaire in more detail. Interviewees included both operational staff and strategic leaders and comprised of both Category 1 and 2 organisations and other participants. During stage 2 of the engagement the review team reviewed all current legislation and guidance relevant to all areas of civil contingencies and emergency planning across Wales. In researching models used in other jurisdictions we considered Northern Ireland, Scotland, the European Union, the United Nations, Canada, New Zealand. Where the review team considered particular examples of good practice were demonstrated they are highlighted within this report.

The final stage of the engagement involved a series of five workshops, 1 for each of the LRFs and one targeted at pan Wales organisations. The workshop structure, content, and themes were agreed with the CCNS team.

## 4 STAKEHOLDER FINDINGS

This section details the corroborated findings from stages 1 and 3 of the review, the survey, interviews, and workshops with key stakeholders. The key stakeholders with whom the review team engaged are listed in Appendix 2.

### 4.1 Survey Results

Overall, respondents felt that, civil contingency structures in Wales were fit for purpose. However, 70% of respondents felt that there was still potential for improvement in how it was structured and implemented.

Themes for further exploration during interviews and workshops were highlighted across the following key areas:

- governance and assurance
- risk management
- responsibility and accountability
- partnerships and communities
- investment and resources
- skills

#### 4.1.1 Survey Results - Governance and Assurance

51% of respondents felt that pan Wales civil contingency structures aided decision making and 40% believed the governance structures allow a pan Wales approach to be shaped and delivered by all partners. This suggests an underlying concern at the effectiveness of decision making and ability to take a truly pan Wales approach.

Respondents felt that the LRF strategic and subgroups were “well defined” or “defined”, however only a minority of respondents felt that the WRF or Wales Resilience Partnerships Team (WRPT) meeting are “defined or “well defined”. Most stakeholders were also of a view that the WRF and WRPT were not effective. This clearly indicates that stakeholders felt that the governance framework can be improved.


When asked about the effective engagement of key stakeholders at a pan Wales level, some concern was expressed with 38% of respondents of the view that this was not achieved. There was also a view that effective engagement in this regard can also be improved with LRFs.

The vast majority of respondents felt that the governance arrangements within LRFs (including LRF subgroups) and their individual organisations are effective. Many respondents also felt that the LRFs operate effectively.

#### 4.1.2 Survey Results – Risk Management

There was a strong view expressed (81%) that risks were adequately identified within LRF areas, however this fell to 61% when considering the adequacy of identifying risks across Wales using current structures. In general, the governance structures and communications associated with risk identification and management were seen as fit for purpose but in need of improvement from a pan-Wales perspective.

#### 4.1.3 Survey Results - Accountability and Responsibility



Respondents felt strongly that decision making and communications processes within individual organisations (over 90%) and LRFs (over 80%) are clearly defined. However, on a pan-Wales basis less than 30% of respondents felt that communications and decision-making processes were expressed well, with over 40% of respondents feeling that these processes were not clearly defined. The concern at the lack of definition on a pan-Wales basis is mirrored by concern also being expressed at the lack of clarity of stakeholder roles in emergency situations, where only 38% felt that roles are clearly defined on a pan-Wales basis. This contrasts strongly with the view of 83% of respondents that stakeholder roles in emergency situations within each LRF area are clear.

#### 4.1.4 Survey Results - Partnerships and Communities

Stakeholders were asked to provide views on the effectiveness of partnerships as well as the effectiveness of regulation and guidance in supporting partnerships. 65% of respondents did not feel that guidance and regulation was effective. When considering the links into policy areas, 50% of respondents felt this is ineffective.

#### 4.1.5 Survey Results - Skills

Over 80% of respondents felt that their individual organisations have effective processes in place that support continuous improvement and lessons identified processes.

The vast majority (90%) of respondents felt that appropriate training was provided within LRFs or individual organisations. However, observations were made regarding “ad hoc” capacity and resourcing and the fact that training isn’t part of a “regular and continuous process”. There was a sense that a more standardised approach to providing appropriate training opportunities was required with some perceiving a skills gap in their current role. There was also a desire to increase the amount of multi-agency training and exercising. Only 55% of respondents believed that training adequately provides the required knowledge and competencies for individuals to perform their role effectively.

The respondents indicated that the least amount of learning occurs on a pan-Wales basis. Only 8% of respondents felt that significant reflection occurs with lessons widely applied on a pan-Wales basis and 3% of respondents felt that no lessons are learnt on a pan-Wales basis.

#### 4.1.6 Survey Results – General Comments

When asked for general areas for increased focus for the review the respondents highlighted the following areas for system-wide improvement:

- Clarity of expectations and responsibilities of the different roles within civil contingencies
- Clearer arrangements for governance, particularly at national to local level, and an oversight of structures with a “with a golden thread linking all together”
- Maintaining clear communication channels with the voluntary and community sector
- The need to secure future funding to plan and support responses at a local level
- Integrated, multidisciplinary teams involved in the planning of civil contingencies “There needs to be a team of multi-agency staff on a pan-Wales basis to bring together all the planning work”
- Greater standardisation in training, resourcing and planning

- Consider functions being driven more centrally – with tighter management of the LRF structures. “There is too much inconsistency and not enough leadership / training / exercising / assurance.”

## 4.2 Interview Findings

The key findings set out below have been derived from multiple interviews and ‘triangulated’ by the review team across multiple sources. These are as follows;

### 4.2.1 Interview Findings - Governance and Assurance

The interviews supported the findings of the questionnaire that in general the majority of stakeholders are satisfied with governance arrangements. There is a view however, that the operation of these arrangements does need improving and issues such as the actual periodicity of WRF and WRPT meetings needs to be reviewed with a view to greater frequency and consistency with actual terms of reference. The review team found that the governance structures were fit for purpose with the potential for improvement.

*“The 4 LRFs work well, although it would help pan-Wales organisations if they had consistent approaches. The WRPT used to work well but has barely met for a number of years. It is difficult for pan-Wales organisations to engage efficiently and effectively.”*

The review team found that there was a general view amongst stakeholders that assurance across (and of) LRFs was weak. Concern was expressed at the lack of commonly agreed and accepted minimum standards of performance for contingency planning and that there is no agreed framework for measurement either. What ‘good’ looks like is therefore not defined clearly nor are steps taken to ensure minimum standards of excellence are attained.

The work that is undertaken via internal audits of one organisation or formal reviews by emergency services inspectorates whilst welcome, is patchy and does not give adequate satisfaction that work is being undertaken across the civil contingency ecosystem within LRFs or pan-Wales. It was suggested by stakeholders that a formal scrutiny process should be undertaken within key organisations and on a pan-Wales basis for resilience.

The review team found no evidence of effective means by which all activity that builds towards assured resilience is monitored and independently verified, within an overall resilience governance mechanism.

The suggested development of a pan-Wales assurance framework should recognise that this is connected to many other recommendations put forward in this report concerning areas such as standard guidance, structures and training. If adopted, this should be part of a coordinated ‘planned programme of implementation’ to encapsulate other recommendations herein.

The NHS in Wales undertake a process of review and reporting directly to Welsh Government. This information was offered by more than one stakeholder in the context of discussions concerning a required all stakeholder pan-Wales assurance programme.

*“Since joining the profession I have been shocked at the lack of any kind of audit process. Being completely new to the profession and being the only EPO at my agency I'm astonished that there is no formal national/regional process for ensuring my work meets a required standard.”*



The review concluded that although there was support for an assurance framework that would set standards and measure performance there was concern as to who would define these. Imposition of metrics and benchmarks by Welsh Government without consultation and agreement with the LRFs would not be viewed positively.

However, there was a strong view expressed, especially during the workshops that relation to assurance such a framework would improve current governance structures. There was also a strong view that such a framework would also support the

sharing of best practice and drive organisational learning and development.

*“There is a distinct lack of a framework for measuring performance.”*

Such a framework should:

- Establish a formal mechanism of assurance and audit, which uses any agreed resilience standards for Wales to ensure that all stakeholders contributing to resilience preparedness in Wales are carrying out their accountabilities and responsibilities. Where possible this should sit alongside and enhance existing inspection regimes.
- Develop resilience standards specific to Wales to support the formal assurance and audit mechanism recommended above.
- Establish a process for considering, reviewing and managing audit processes and findings by Welsh Government.
- Ensure that an element of the governance framework (the Welsh Resilience Board as indicated in section 5.3) be given responsibility for overseeing this Wales national assurance framework.
- Formally develop, agree, and adopt Wales minimum standards, modelled on the UK National Resilience Standards.

*“Internal audits are conducted regularly however, all agencies could benefit from the creation of an external audit body to ensure parity and best practice pan Wales.”*

4.2.2 Interview Findings – Risk Management

There was a strong view amongst stakeholders that LRFs adequately identify risks within their areas. To a lesser degree stakeholders held the view that risks were being adequately captured across Wales. Whilst this was not specifically explored during the surveying, during the interviews the review team explored this theme, and no evidence was presented to illustrate a singular risk analysis and assessment carried out across Wales.

The review team noted strong evidence that risk information is effectively communicated, however stakeholders also expressed the view that information was only partially communicated. This is supported by the lack of evidence of a singular Wales risk assessment and analysis approach to ensure that regional capability gaps are being identified and addressed. The review team noted little evidence of regional training programmes based on a central assessment of regional risks and capability gaps.

Discussion with stakeholders indicated that there is a high degree of duplication of risk identification and assessment activity across all LRFs. Stakeholders highlighted that such duplication could be reduced if greater "top down" coordination and leadership was provided by Welsh Government and the establishment of a singular Wales risk analysis and assessment, similar in approach to that adopted in Scotland.

The review team noted evidence of the effectiveness of governance structures in facilitating improved risk assessment. Stakeholders noted however that risk assessment and analysis would benefit from an increased focus on the identification and mitigation of common consequences and the development of corresponding required capabilities to mitigate the effects of these impacts across multiple risks. These should be achieved at an LRF and national Wales level.

*“You need to get away from meetings fixated by Risk and look toward consequence based meetings based on outcomes. The Emergency Services use the Welsh Civil Contingencies Network to sharpen their operational responses as JESIP demands but they have little ambition to go beyond that, we need a new broad-based approach which is inclusive and takes in the broadest picture. Example I have sat on CBRNE groups for years, very little on recovery. We have no capacity to dispose of toxic waste in Wales. A significant risk with need of mitigation.”*

the terms of reference of the WRF and WRPT are clear, there is a strong view amongst stakeholders that the terms or reference are not being met, e.g. the frequency of meetings.


There was a general lack of understanding and unfamiliarity amongst most stakeholders of the WRF and WRPT. This could be enhanced by a greater visibility of the terms of reference, organogram, processes, work plans, decisions and agreed actions. The review team found evidence to indicate that the effectiveness of the pan-Wales structures can be improved through greater strategic oversight and coordinated engagement across government.

Whilst engagement with government officials was not within the scope of this review, from the evidence reviewed it is unclear that all key Welsh Government departments are effectively engaged in the decision-making process and the coordination of work plans that involve multiple departments with CCNS. This point could not be fully explored as the engagement with government officials was not within the scope of this review.

*“Greater clarity on roles and responsibilities of Pan Wales groups and responsibilities required with CCA”*

The need for Welsh Government to establish an executive board (Wales Resilience Board) reporting to the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) and supported by the Wales Resilience Partnership Team (WRPT), with the terms of reference for the WRPT adjusted accordingly is strongly supported by evidence provided during the interviews. The evidence indicated that there should be greater interdepartmental coordination within Welsh Government and leadership/executive engagement with the LRFs. This is outlined in greater detail in section 5.3 below. This is supported strongly by the approach adopted in Northern Ireland.

The review team found evidence that civil contingency decision-making processes, communications, accountabilities, and responsibilities within individual organisations as



well as the LRFs are clearly defined. However, the review team found evidence that decision making processes and communications across pan Wales organisations and within LRFs could be better defined.

This finding is also supported by evidence that indicated that in both planning and response the roles and accountabilities of stakeholders could be more clearly defined on a pan-Wales basis.

The review team noted that stakeholders strongly indicated that the interface between Welsh Government and LRFs can be enhanced to improve operational coordination between local and regional planners, decision makers, and responders. This is supported by evidence indicating that greater clarity should be provided related to communications, roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities as outlined above.

Welsh Government should work with the LRFs and Category 1 and 2 organisations to define consistent guidance and/or processes that:

- Set clear strategic and operational expectations and measurable targets for LRFs
- Formalise and define the role of deputy LRF chair to improve continuity
- Identifies where additional guidance is required to enhance consistency and interoperability across Wales.

As noted earlier, regular changes of LRF Chair due to senior police officers normally taking on the chair role and usually being in post for a maximum of 2 to 3 years, causes disruption to the work of the LRF. There is a need to consider better guidance and briefing for LRF chairs to allow them to establish themselves quickly.


There is also a need to formalise the Deputy Chair role to ensure effective LRF continuity. This would ensure a standard approach and smooth transition between chairs.

It would be prudent to provide Welsh Government central Terms of Reference and guidance for LRF Chairs and Deputy Chairs. This will allow for a smoother and quicker handover.

The role of the LRF Co-ordinator is critical to the working and performance of LRFs. As often the only full-time person working for the LRF they are central to emergency planning. It was also clear from the review team interviews that LRFs have taken distinctly different approaches to their arrangements for LRF Co-ordinators. The review team noted that Dyfed Powys currently has two co-ordinators and aspire to have three substantive posts, two currently filled and the third being vacant since January 2018 apart from one 18 month secondment whereas the other three LRFs have one. This appears to reflect a different approach to the role.

Evidence provided during a range of stakeholder interviews, supported by discussions during the workshops indicated that Welsh Government should set up a working group with LRFs to review terms of reference for LRF Chairs, Deputy Chairs, and subgroups (pan-Wales and within LRFs). 2 key themes for consideration included:

- The possible formalisation of a role of Deputy LRF Chair to facilitate succession planning and organisational resilience, and
- Potential good practice of the leadership of certain groups being held centrally.



There was a great deal of discussion in the interviews and workshops about the partnerships between Welsh Government and the LRFs. Overall, there was a common view that it would be beneficial if Welsh Government took a stronger strategic lead. It was suggested they should be represented and active in all the pan-Wales subgroups.

Areas which were identified that needed a lead by Welsh Government included the consideration of strategic risks. Welsh Government should take the lead in interpreting the UK National Risk Register and adapting it for Wales. This would include taking the lead on horizon scanning. It was also suggested there were some risks which should be retained and managed by Welsh Government rather than delegating down to the four LRFs.

The review team found that most stakeholders were held a view that Welsh Government could take a greater leadership role in driving and the civil contingency structures and setting the operational tempo during “peacetime” operations. This requirement is also reflected in the section above, ‘Governance and Accountability’.

#### 4.2.4 Interview Findings - Partnerships and Communities

As noted earlier in this report there are strong relationships which have been built up between and the Category 1 and 2 organisations in each LRF. This has allowed Strategic Co-ordinating Group’s (SCG’s) to come together quickly and work together very effectively. However, we note that interviewees commented that there is a very heavy reliance on the Police to provide significant resources during incidents. This was confirmed in the workshop sessions. Senior staff in most Category 1 organisations have undertaken Gold command training. However, we were advised during this review that non-Police Category 1 organisations are often reluctant to take lead roles and chair SCGs due to a lack of internal resource available and in some cases a perceived lack of the necessary experience. A view was expressed during the interviews that the Gold Command training is not currently sufficient to develop the necessary confidence leading SCGs and experience shadowing at incidents and leading on exercises would help build confidence.


Whilst there was a strong consensus expressed in the interviews and workshops that LRFs are very effective, there was also a view that the four Welsh LRFs are distinctly different in their operational arrangements in a number of ways. Several interviewers observed that this makes it more difficult for pan Wales organisations to work efficiently across the four LRFs. It was generally accepted by those interviewed and confirmed in the workshops that it would be helpful if more standardisation of LRF working practices were adopted across all four LRFs, whilst accepting that there are always going to be necessary and understandable local differences. A more standardised approach would also be beneficial with any joint working between the Welsh LRFs.

One of the areas it would be useful to standardise would be the LRF subgroups. Currently there are some subgroups such as Risk which are common to all LRFs. It would be helpful if Welsh Government supported the establishment a core of subgroups for all LRFs with agreed ToR’s. This would not preclude LRFs establishing additional 1s needed for their specific area.

As noted above we were advised that some of the Welsh LRFs have established strong links with English LRFs to co-ordinate on areas of common interest. it will be important to be mindful of these working relationships when establishing standard approaches.

The Welsh Government Volunteering Policy, “Supporting Communities, Changing Lives” was published in 2015 and sets out a framework for volunteering in Wales.. It confirms





that Welsh Government will seek to promote and influence best practice and advocates that other bodies working with and supporting volunteers adopt the principles of this document.

Some voluntary organisations have long standing relationships with Welsh LRFs . However, some of those interviewed expressed reservations about the wider use of volunteers due to concerns around safeguarding, insurance, and staff availability issues.

Some of those interviewed suggested the Welsh Government should establish a national register of volunteers. However, it was generally accepted in the interviews that more work was needed by Category 1 and 2 organisations and LRFs to bring the third sector into the civil contingencies arena and make use of this largely untapped potential resource and expertise. It was suggested in the interviews that it will be important to build on the COVID-19 experience and increase efforts to register volunteers. To do this Category 1 and 2 organisations will need to work with LRFs to address safeguarding, training and exercising issues which are currently limiting the use of volunteers.

Whilst some Category 1 and 2 organisations advised they have volunteer registers others advised they do not actively seek to maintain their volunteer registers. Welsh Government needs to encourage all Category 1 and 2 organisations to maintain active lists to allow people to register their willingness volunteer. This needs to capture the skills of volunteers. It will also be essential to provide the necessary core training and insurance to prepare volunteers to take part in incidents.

To promote better closer co-operation between LRFs, Category 1 and 2 organisations and the third sector Welsh Government should facilitate a joint session between LRFs and third sector organisations (such as the Red Cross and/or Council for Voluntary Service) to develop an engagement framework between the relevant organisations, setting out how best the voluntary sector can input into both contingency planning and emergency response.

A strong view emerged across a number of interviews (supported during the workshops) that third sector organisations can be more effectively bound into the civil contingency structures and processes. The experience of engagement with the third sector during the pandemic and the desire to build on this was cited on many occasions. During the workshops clear views to ensure that assurance safeguarding, insurance, and availability risks were effectively mitigated. There is a clear need for Welsh Government to promote closer co-operation between the Third Sector organisations and LRFs, Category 1 and 2 organisations.

#### 4.2.5 Interview Findings - Investment and Resources

There was an almost unanimous recognition amongst those interviewed of the resource and effort now invested in civil contingencies by Welsh Government. This was viewed as a positive step and although some expressed a desire to see additional funding at LRF level many recognised the restraints within which the Welsh Government is working and welcomed its leadership and commitment to driving the sector forward.

Given the pressure on resources and the challenges many organisations felt in fulfilling their obligations to civil contingency planning, the review revealed several examples where current governance arrangements and business process resulted in perceived inefficient use of resource. These were often associated with the strategic and operational



interfaces between LRFs and Welsh Government. It was the view of many stakeholders that by addressing these issues the effect of limited resources could be mitigated.

The review revealed that operational interfaces between Welsh Government and LRFs are often muddled and confused due to poor communication and the lack of effective structures. The view from local stakeholders was that they can often receive duplicate or conflicting information and/or requirements from government giving the impression that they themselves are working in a 'siloes' fashion. Examples were provided of the same information being requested from multiple individuals at different times and in slightly different formats. Stakeholders expressed the view that requests for clarification often resulted in long delays because of the need for clarifications required by the originators of the requests. The review suggested that resource efficiency could be improved significantly by rationalising and formalising these operational interfaces and removing the potential for duplication.


The need for Welsh Government to review its current communications plan (or develop a new one) is strongly supported across the survey, interviews, and workshops with evidence provided of duplicated requests for similar information emanating from different government departments during response. Response during the pandemic was cited as an example in this regard.

The definition of what is strategic information for use by the Welsh Government and operational information for use by LRFs is sometimes unclear. Examples were provided, particularly around planning for the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, where it was decided that information held by the Welsh Government could not be shared and consequently needed to be duplicated at local level. The rationale for this decision was not provided by Welsh Government, with the opinion held by the LRF that resource was wasted duplicating a task already undertaken at Welsh Government level.

The role of the LRF co-ordinator, and how they facilitate the interface between government and LRFs, was highlighted as particularly significant by the review. As the only role dedicated to (and funded by) the LRF this role is seen to be critical to the efficient and effective operation of the forum. However, the specifics of the role and the amount of coordination resource available varied significantly for each LRF area. Three of the four have only one available whilst the remaining LRF has three. No rationale could be offered as to why this was the case. The review revealed that on a simple cost benefit ratio investment in additional co-ordination resource could be worth consideration. Improved co-ordination between LRF partners and the with the Welsh Government in particular was thought to offer potential for improved performance and potentially better use of LRF and Welsh Government resources.

A stronger overall governance system and assurance process will require a means of ensuring it is operating effectively. The LRF coordinator concept, possibly with extra support would be one means of ensuring identified lessons are learned. It could also include improvement findings after scrutiny (audits/inspections) have been undertaken. The LRF coordinator may work with Welsh Government officials to maintain improvement logs that may be developed. This is an essential element of 'Governance and Assurance', as discussed above.

The lack of support for LRF coordination resources across survey responses and interviews emerged as a recurring theme. There was systemwide recognition of the criticality of coordinators but also a recognition that they were often constrained due to insufficient support. Themes such as demand-based allocation of resources and the pooling of coordination resources without compromising local knowledge were also raised.



Welsh Government and LRFs should consider developing a business case to justify this additional co-ordination resource.

The operation of LRFs and the development of common business processes and performance standards was an issue raised by the review. Overall responses from those interviewed were split between those who saw the value in LRFs remaining bespoke organisations, reflecting the specific history, economy, and risks of their region and those who saw value in them operating in a more standardised fashion. Some pan Wales stakeholders in particular spoke of their frustration in dealing with four sometimes very different organisations and highlighted the additional resources required to do this.

A key positive learning point from the review was the active response from communities and the voluntary sector during the COVID-19 pandemic. This saw Category 1 and 2 responders supplemented by significant numbers of members of the public engaged in a variety of supporting roles during the crisis. The provision of supplemental resource through public engagement was viewed positively by both LRF partners and third sector organisations during the review. However, it became apparent that several key obstacles remain in place which prevent the realisation of its full potential in the strategic planning phase.

To help address these impediments to closer cooperation the British Red Cross have commissioned a piece of research in the form of a report 'Framework for Co-ordination of Volunteers in Emergency Response Situations (Wales)'. A draft copy of this report was submitted to the review team and has been included in our document review. The Red Cross have distributed the document as draft for stakeholder comment and are currently awaiting feedback from individual LRFs. The findings of the report are entirely consistent with those established during this review. However, some specific areas were highlighted during interview phase which included the following.


Individual voluntary sector organisations find it difficult to navigate the individual LRF organisational structures to establish who the most appropriate person is to contact. Publicly available information was described as 'opaque' and when contact was made it very rarely progressed beyond an initial conversation.

Although good relationships exist between individual LRFs and the voluntary sector there is often no formal mechanism in place for them to contribute to strategic planning. A small number of stakeholders suggested that a change in legislation (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004) would be required to broaden the definition of Category 1 and 2 responders to include voluntary organisations. However, the majority believed greater collaboration could be encouraged within the current legislative framework through local initiatives and the development of shared best practice.

#### 4.2.6 Interview Findings - Skills

The interviews revealed that the management and delivery of civil contingency planning in Wales is undertaken by a highly skilled and motivated group of people. There are a broad range of experiences on which to draw and a willingness amongst those involved to share knowledge with colleagues in their own organisation, their LRF and across Wales. This is a sector with an extensive and active informal network of relationships which is leveraged regularly and very productively. There is compelling evidence gained by the review that if there is something they do not know or unsure of, individuals feel very comfortable contacting colleagues to ask

Pressure on public sector finances and its impact on resources was an issue raised by a very large number of interviewees. This was found to be particularly relevant in large



multi-service organisations such as Local Authorities where the demand for resources to cover statutory services continues to be a challenge. Even amongst the emergency services civil contingency planning was often only a small part of someone's job role and balancing priorities between them was a common problem for many people. The impact of these resource pressures manifested itself in several ways.

The ability for LRF members to respond to emergent issues identified by Welsh Government (such as dealing with an influx of Ukrainian refugees) was often impaired. Requests for information to be provided at pace for example could often not be fulfilled simply due to the lack of available personnel to put it together.

*"We don't as yet have a recognised set of competencies for practitioners at any level."*

Pressure on middle and senior management resources in many organisations has led to a high turnover of staff allocated to civil contingencies. This was found to be particularly relevant in the fire and police services who traditionally fill the role of LRF Chair. A constant 'churn' of senior staff was felt to inhibit the performance of the LRF in particular, with the constant need to re-establish new relationships with Welsh Government and other key stakeholders a particular problem.

Another issue is the churn of staff in CCNS which was highlighted by multiple stakeholders. Stakeholders indicated that this caused issues with staff often having to learn their roles on the job. Allocating a dedicated member (or group) of staff from CCNS to each LRF may help this. LRFs are where a critical component of the work is done, hence concentrating staff and resource at this level, including from CCNS, would add value.

Similarly, workload pressure on senior staff has often led to attendance at LRF meetings and relevant subgroups being delegated to more junior officers who often did not possess the delegated authority or confidence to make decisions. This was often thought to impair the effectiveness of these meetings if decisions were required as any approval needed was sought afterwards outside the meeting.

The need to review the frequency and attendance of LRF meetings with a view to reducing the requirement for senior attendees such as Council Chief Executives, Assistant Chief Constables, and Chief Fire Officers where specialist attendance was more appropriate was supported strongly by the survey evidence. This evidence suggested that decision makers were sometimes absent from strategic meetings where their attendance was more appropriate, and specialists were absent from meetings requiring subject matter experts. This position was confirmed during the stakeholder interviews.

The points raised above suggests that there is a general need to review required and actual attendance at strategic/decision making meetings and specialist meetings.

The various sub-groups that sit below the LRF require leadership and contribution from the relevant participating authorities. The review indicated that many of these groups work very well and contribute significantly to the strategic planning activities undertaken by the LRF. There are others however whose contribution is impaired significantly through lack of resource either meeting very infrequently or not at all.

The review team found that required minimum standards levels of competence, skills, qualifications, and or experience were not defined across Wales for civil contingency professionals. In conjunction with this the review team found limited evidence of succession planning, and structured professional development based on defined required levels of skills and competencies. The review team believes there is an opportunity for



Welsh Government to promote the value of a civil contingency profession whilst assuring a degree of competence across the system by supporting a greater degree of professionalisation across the sector. This can be achieved through the central establishment of clear expectations of competence and coherent management of professional development.

A view was expressed amongst those interviewed that training provision is retrospective in nature, looking back at avoiding past failings rather than forward to what risks Wales will be required to address in the future. Anecdotal evidence was provided of instances where an internal investigation had recommended improvements to the emergency response through improved training. This was seen as valuable but only in tandem with a horizon scanning element which explored what training needs were required in future. This is particularly the case in technically complex risks such as cyber security.

*“The core skills required to perform Civil Contingencies roles are not routinely taught, but are usually acquired through experience and vocational courses, often over many years. There is a clear gap in upskilling staff who work in civil contingencies roles, and this impacts the whole process of delivering the role.”*

The need for Welsh Government to develop and centrally manage a training regime to assure Wales-wide preparedness is strongly supported by evidence provided during the stakeholder interviews. The apparent lack of a training and exercising regime based on a pan-Wales assessment of risk and capability gaps was a recurring theme during the stakeholder interviews. The need to professionalise the sector to support succession planning, continued professional development, underpin the value of civil contingency leadership and expert roles.

## 5 CURRENT AND GOOD PRACTICE

During stage 2 we reviewed documentation describing practice within Wales and other jurisdictions and institutions to identify elements of practice judged to be good by the review team and potential application across civil contingency structures in Wales. The review team's judgement of good practice was based on experience of carrying out numerous Gateway© based governance reviews for public sector organisations. Appendix 3 lists the information considered. The review also assessed information that was not publicly available were provided by other jurisdictions. The jurisdictions were chosen in consultation with Welsh Government based on examples of practice elsewhere in the UK as well as examples of strong international practice. The other jurisdictions/institutions reviewed included:

- Northern Ireland
- Scotland
- Canada
- New Zealand
- the United Nations
- the European Union

Where the above jurisdictions contained examples of good or strong practice, this section sets out current and good practice identified in relation to:

- Governance and assurance
- Risk management
- Responsibilities and Accountability
- Partnerships and Communities
- Investment and Resources
- Skills


Whilst practice within the European Union was reviewed, the review team judged the strongest examples of good practice were found in the other jurisdictions indicated above.

### 5.1 Governance and Assurance

The six jurisdictions reviewed in this section all recognise the importance of good governance in ensuring effective emergency management and contingency planning and have appropriate structures in place. In Wales, the existence of the WRF and the WRPT provide the pan-Wales strategic overview, with the four LRFs providing local-level coordination of activity. However, whilst the review has indicated that the basic governance structure is sound there is a need for clearer definition of the roles and responsibilities for each element in Wales.

Our research into other jurisdictions has shown that there is little *publicly available* information concerning formal assurance and scrutiny review of emergency preparedness. There are however mechanisms available in other formats such as ISO 9001 which can support the development of an effective assurance process within an appropriate governance system. This includes governance, accountability, standards (doctrine), management review, scrutiny (audit) and continuous improvement, as elements of an overall system.

In Wales the review team found great willingness by LRFs and partners to ensure the effective management of emergency planning and the response to emergencies.



However, the current governance arrangements, principally the LRFs, have been in place since the CCA came onto the statute book, and therefore a review of current structures is timely.

The UK government has already undertaken a Post Implementation Review (PIR) of the CCA. Theme 2 'Assurance' considers the gap between accountability and activities undertaken. The PIR identifies that there is no universal assurance system in place, although certain organisations have inspection regimes e.g. His Majesty's Inspectorates of Police and the Care Quality Commission for health activities. This is illustrated within recommendations under the Assurance theme of the PIR, i.e. recommendation B which recognises a need to go further than voluntary assessment and public reporting. It also recognises that there is a demonstrable gap in assurance of multi-agency preparedness and interoperability. Recommendation C considers the need for the National Resilience Standards (NRS) to be put on a formal footing. It also suggests the need to develop what it calls an 'assurance framework'.

The UK National Preparedness Commission developed a report on the efficacy of the CCA. The report, 'An independent review of the CCA and supporting arrangements' has come to similar conclusions as the PIR concerning resilience assurance activity and provides more depth and discussion of the current UK position than the PIR.

## 5.2 Risk Management

In **Northern Ireland** the JESIP principles are used through all phases of operations and are not just for use by the emergency services. This requires a joint understanding of risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards to agree potential control measures.

Civil Contingencies Policy Branch (CCPB) (on behalf of the Civil Contingencies Group (CCG)) acts as the focal point for National Security Risk Assessment and Northern Ireland Risk Register. The CCPB leads the engagement between stakeholders to establish a common understanding of risk and maintain Northern Ireland's input in the UK National Risk Register.

The CCG consists of members from the Executive Office, all government departments, and Category 1 organisations, as nominated in Northern Ireland.

In **Scotland** risk assessment is led at a regional level by the Business Coordination Group (BCG) (on behalf of the Regional Resilience Partnership).

There is a risk assessment process based on a national agreed approach alongside the UK NSRA. In Scotland 20 risk consequences (planning assumptions) have been identified that drive top line capability requirement development.

"Regional Resilience Partnerships' Risk Preparedness Assessment" (RRP RPA) is provided by BCG and provides a detailed standard methodology for risk assessment and management. The RRP RPA is accompanied by a "Practitioner's Toolkit" providing additional background and understanding of how to complete the RRP RPA.

**New Zealand** has a clear strategy in place based on the identification and monitoring of risks, taking action to reduce existing levels of risk, minimising the amount of new risk created, and ensuring effective information availability and tools to enable effective decision making about resilience. This is supported by measurable objectives set in the following areas:

- Identification and understanding of risk scenarios
- Put in place structures and identify necessary processes to understand and act on reducing risks
- Build risk awareness, risk literacy, and risk management capability, including ability to assess risk
- Address gaps in risk reduction strategy
- Ensure development and investment practices are risk aware, taking care not to create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk
- Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and need for investment in resilience and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities

The review team found evidence that indicated each LRF in Wales has its own risk assessment process and corresponding risk register. There appeared to be a degree of duplicated effort in developing risk assessments which would benefit from central/regional coordination.

### 5.3 Responsibilities and Accountability

The review team found that the LRFs and their component individual organisations each have clearly defined roles and accountabilities. Whilst there may be variation between the structures and subgroups within LRFs, there is a clear understanding within the LRFs of how the structures work. This underlines the effectiveness of the governance approach within each LRF.


A review of overseas jurisdictions highlighted that **Canada** adopts a similar approach to the UK having introduced the Emergency Management Act 2007 which is very similar to the CCA. Canada has the Emergency Management Framework which replicates the governance elements of the UK Emergency Preparedness document and the UK concept of operations. Similarly with the UK, it emphasises 'All hazards and 'integrated emergency management'. The base management structure is central government linking to regional offices related to the provinces which in turn link to local communities.

Canada offers a good example of regional emergency management governance based on regional emergency management frameworks, such as the Emergency Planning Framework for Ontario. Such an approach may add value to LRF operations by setting out a framework for each LRF.

The need for Welsh Government to work with LRFs to develop guidance to more clearly define the operational links (e.g. communications) between Welsh Government, the LRFs, and Category 1 organisations, facilitate consistency and efficient operations, and promote best practice was strongly supported by survey response and interview evidence. As well as the issues related to duplicated communications highlighted above, themes related to the lack of transparency of management structures within Welsh Government and relatively high (turnover of) personnel leading to a lack of clarity of roles and operational interfaces.

The review team's assessment of good practice also highlighted that in some jurisdictions there is a proactive approach to placing government staff into the lower levels of governance to support specific work. The review team believes this approach could add value to the operations of the LRFs, support the LRF coordinators, and strengthen the links with Welsh Government.





A common difference between the jurisdictions studied and that of Wales is the presence of an additional executive body that exercises a corporate and operational governance function for civil contingencies preparedness at a regional level. Such an approach is best illustrated by the governance framework in **Northern Ireland** with particular reference to the Civil Contingencies Group.

The need for Welsh Government to establish an executive board ( such as a Wales Resilience Board) reporting to the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) and supported by the Wales Resilience Partnership Team (WRPT), with the terms of reference for the WRPT adjusted accordingly is supported by evidence provided during the interviews. The evidence also indicated that there should be greater interdepartmental coordination within Welsh Government and leadership/executive engagement with the LRFs, and Category 1 organisations. This is supported strongly by the approach adopted in Northern Ireland.

Several LRFs have established a Deputy Chair role which has allowed smoother transition and improved continuity when there is a change of LRF chair. There are regular changes of LRF chairs due to senior Police officers, who normally take on the chair role, being in post for a maximum of 2 to 3 years.

#### 5.4 Partnerships and Communities

There is a strong consensus within the Welsh civil contingencies community that 1 of its major strengths is working relationships established between Category 1 and 2 organisations when in response mode. The review team found strong evidence of this partnership working throughout the four LRFs. Well established working relationships have been forged which has allowed LRFs to respond very effectively to incidents when they occur. There is also evidence of effective collaboration when assessing risks both in the LRFs risk groups and the pan-Wales sub-groups. More broadly within Wales there are good relationships between Welsh Government and the LRFs, Category 1 and 2 organisations.

We also evidenced several examples of joint working between LRFs within Wales and across the border into England. North Wales LRF has established strong links with their English cross border counterparts to share information.

The report “Framework for Co-ordination of Volunteers in Emergency Response Situations (Wales)” was produced by the British Red Cross and Richard Newton consulting in July 2022. This has attempted to “develop and standardise the co-ordination and utilisation of volunteers in responding to civil emergencies across Wales”. This report makes some excellent recommendations which we were advised are currently being examined by Welsh Government.

A number of voluntary organisations have long standing relationships with LRFs such as the Red Cross and Mountain Rescue are regularly involved in exercises and the response to incidents. We were advised that a number of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU's) have been established between voluntary organisations and Category 1 responders in some LRF areas, although this is not consistent across all LRF areas.

**Scotland** has established a dedicated website "[Ready Scotland](#)" which is was judged to be an excellent method of communicating complex messages to the wider community by numerous civil contingency stakeholders in Wales. It provides clear information on the civil contingencies landscape in Scotland providing a source of advice to people on the sensible measures they can take and how they can volunteer if they so wish.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS

This section provides a summary of the key narrative points and sources of evidence associated with each recommendation. The criticality of each recommendation is also indicated to provide an indication of next steps to support a future programme of work. The implementation of the recommendations outlined herein must take account of the nuances of devolved and reserved powers. The ownership of many recommendations is attributed to Welsh Government. The doctrine of subsidiarity in Civil Contingencies and ensuring that actions are taken forward at the most appropriate level within the Civil Contingencies structures in Wales must be considered to defining the owner of each recommendation.

### 6.1 Governance and Assurance

The conclusion of the review is that the governance arrangements which encompass civil contingencies and emergency planning in Wales are fundamentally sound. However, the frequency of the relevant meetings, such as the Wales Resilience Forum should be reviewed to ensure strategic decision making is made in a timely manner. Modifications and changes will be necessary over time to accommodate national priorities and the nature of risks, but the view of stakeholders is that an emphasis on evolution rather than revolution should be the approach adopted.

There was a strong view amongst stakeholders that LRFs performed well and discharged their responsibilities under the Act effectively. It was conceded however that this statement is anecdotal rather than evidence based, and no formal measurement of performance occurs or benchmarks for acceptability established. A strong view was expressed, especially during the workshops that an assurance framework would support the sharing of best practice and drive organisational learning and development.

**Recommendation 1: A national assurance framework for Wales should be developed with monitoring to be managed by the Wales Resilience Board.**

### 6.2 Risk Management.

The current approach to risk management in Wales does not necessarily ensure that the most appropriate risks attract sufficient attention.

**Recommendation 2: WG and LRFs should work in partnership to interpret the UK National Risk Register and adapt UK level risks to Wales, working together to identify upcoming and potential risks that would significantly impact Wales, e.g. led by a Wales Resilience Board (WRB) detailed in section 4.3.**

The review of documentation provided by the LRFs provided limited evidence of a focus on the avoidance of common consequences of the occurrence of risks. Evidence provided during the interviews and workshops supported the need for an increased focus on this during risk assessment and management processes.

**Recommendation 3: Welsh Government should promote, the approach of common consequences planning to emergency plans for risks, and the development of the required capabilities to mitigate against the effects of these impacts across multiple risks.**



### 6.3 Responsibilities and Accountability

Evidence provided during the interviews indicated that there should be greater interdepartmental coordination and leadership/executive engagement with the LRFs, and Category 1 organisations Consistent with the point raised at section 5.3 above. This is supported strongly by the successful approach adopted in Northern Ireland.

It is therefore recommended that a new executive board be created (the Wales Resilience Board) in order to:

- Provide senior corporate governance, assurance, and audit leadership at an all Wales (regional) level
- Set strategic objectives and expectations
- To provide strategic coordination and leadership
- Set regional training, exercising, capability building, and lessons identified priorities and develop regional programmes
- Define and deliver an agreed work programme
- Drive the risk management processes and define a Welsh Government risk assessment
- Set standard processes and procedures to encourage consistency and interoperability
- Develop civil contingency policy and arrangements
- Facilitate the efficient and transparent sharing of information across the civil contingencies' ecosystem
- Ensure that comprehensive decision and action logs and maintained at all levels
- Produce all national and regional guidelines, toolkits, standard processes and practices
- Coordinate all strategic activities with LRFs
- Develop a media and communications strategy for use nationally and regionally
- Report to the WRF on all activities identified above

The above approach would apply a similar approach to that in Northern Ireland. Core membership of the WRB would include:

- Chaired by DG (Civil Contingencies and National Security)
- Deputy Chaired by Director (CCNS)
- Directors from all government departments
- LRF Chairs and Coordinators
- Welsh LGA
- Police Forces
- Fire and Rescue Services
- Ambulance Service
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency
- Met Office
- Food Standards Agency

There was a strong desire to see greater coordinated leadership from Welsh Government with a higher operational tempo focused on driving pan-Wales programmes and priorities. The following recommendation is strongly supported by evidence provided during the stakeholder interviews.



**Recommendation 4: Welsh Government should establish an executive board (Wales Resilience Board) reporting to the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) and supported by the Wales Resilience Partnership Team (WRPT), with the terms of reference for the WRPT adjusted accordingly.**

Strong evidence was provided during a range of stakeholder interviews and supported during the workshops that responsibilities across LRFs and pan-Wales groups should be reviewed. 2 key themes for consideration included:

- The possible formalisation of a role of Deputy LRF Chair to facilitate succession planning and organisational resilience, and
- Potential good practice of the leadership of certain groups being captured and held centrally.

**Recommendation 5: A working group should be established to review Terms of reference and any associated guidance notes for LRF Chairs, Deputy Chairs and an Wales sub-groups.**

The review highlighted themes related to the lack of transparency of management structures within Welsh Government and a lack of clarity of roles and operational interfaces. The following recommendation was strongly supported by survey response and interview evidence.

**Recommendation 6: Welsh Government should work with LRFs to develop guidance to more clearly define the organisational interfaces between Welsh Government and the LRFs, facilitate consistency and efficient operations, and promote best practice.**

#### **6.4 Partnerships and Communities**

The review also found that senior staff from other Category one responders outside 'blue lights' are often reluctant to take on gold or silver command roles in the event of an emergency. The review indicated that despite the relevant training many felt ill equipped to step into the role and additional competency-based leadership training may be required before they may wish to do so.

**Recommendation 7: When LRFs set up exercises they should encourage non-Police Category 1 responders to chair SCGs, and build up experience and confidence, where the scenario would dictate this.**

A further conclusion of the review was that stakeholders recognised the potential of LRFs to work more closely and share common working practices and examples of best practice. It is considered an opportunity to improve performance whilst at the same time retaining their independence and local focus.

**Recommendation 8: A working group should be established to develop guidance notes for LRFs to promote best practice and standard working practice templates.**

A strong view emerged across a number of interviews (supported during the workshops) that third sector organisations can be more effectively bound into the civil contingency structures and processes. The experience of engagement with the third sector during the pandemic and the desire to build on this was cited on many occasions. During the

workshops clear views to ensure that assurance safeguarding, insurance, and availability risks were effectively mitigated.

**Recommendation 9: Welsh Government should promote closer co-operation between the Third Sector organisations and LRFs, Category 1 and 2 organisations. Voluntary organisations should also be encouraged to:**

- **Maintain registers of volunteers to allow people in Wales to offer their services to support emergency incidents in Wales.**
- **Ensure that registers of volunteers adequately address safeguarding, insurance, and availability issues where possible.**
- **Have a coordinated approach to MoU's with Category 1 and 2 organisations.**

Scotland has established a dedicated website called "Ready Scotland" Coming together to prepare as a community. This was considered to be an excellent method of communicating complex messages to the wider community on civil contingencies and could be replicated easily in Wales.

**Recommendation 10: Welsh Government should establish ready and easy access to complex messages and communications for communities effectively using all available digital communication channels.**

## **6.5 Investment and Resources**

A common source of frustration highlighted by stakeholders was the issuing of duplicate requests for information to LRFs from multiple sources from across the Welsh Government. This seems to have been the case particularly during the COVID-19 epidemic and was highlighted as an issue in both the questionnaire and the individual interviews.

This often took the form of duplicate requests from several individuals or requests for slightly different information perhaps in a different format. Evidence was provided of such requests originating from different parts of Welsh Government who had clearly not co-ordinated their requests before submitting them. Communication was also very often 'one way' with requests for clarification or explanation unheeded by Welsh Government and the LRF then left to respond.

As a consequence, LRFs expend significant resource acceding to these requests a significant number of which they perceive as unnecessary. These issues are likely to reduce over time once the new Welsh Government team become established and working relationships develop. However, the review concludes that the development of a communication plan setting out clear communication channels and key points of contact would be a prudent action.

**Recommendation 11: Welsh Government should review its current communication plan (or develop a new one) to ensure consistency of communication. The review should consider rationalising current communication channels to ensure duplicated or contradictory requests for information are avoided.**

The role of co-ordinator was revealed by the review to be critical to the successful functioning of each LRF. It was shown that they bring together the various disparate elements of a virtual organisation, facilitate communication between the various parties



and act as a source of 'corporate knowledge' on the LRF's behalf. The role varies slightly from across the four LRFs but the core element remains the same.

The views from both the interviews and workshops confirmed the importance of these roles but also suggested that greater co-ordination may be required as the risk environment becomes more complex and the interaction between participants more complicated.

Many interviewees, particularly those from the health organisations expressed a clear desire for more co-ordination support in discharging their responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act whilst others would be happy to support further resource should an argument for funding be made. The review also explored the possibility of additional co-ordinators being held jointly by 2 or more LRFs and allocated to each as the work dictated. All though the concept was viewed positively by some it was felt that the 'local focus' of the role made sharing resource across geographies complex. Evidence from the review revealed that additional resources to plan and co-ordinate LRF activity would be of benefit. The Welsh Government and LRFs should test that assertion with an evidence-based approach and act accordingly.

**Recommendation 12: Further work should be undertaken to consider the current and future scope of LRF coordination activity and options for resourcing accordingly.**

## 6.6 Skills

The review highlighted that the effectiveness of LRF meetings can often be hampered by the absence of senior members who nominate a deputy in their place. This issue was raised during the interviews by other LRF members who took a view that these proxies did not have the delegated authority to undertake the role or did not feel confident in making the relevant decision. This was regarded as a major impediment to the functioning of the LRF and an issue requiring resolution.

It was however recognised that participation in civil contingencies planning is almost always on top of a senior operational role within the participating organisation. It is perhaps unrealistic to assume that attendance is always possible, and some form of deputy will be necessary. Under these circumstances it the review concluded that it would be prudent to ensure that the individual is familiar with their brief and empowered to make the relevant decision.

Wherever possible attendees at LRF meetings should reflect the decisions they are required to make. LRF sub-groups for example should include subject specialists, operators, and practitioners. Attendees at the full LRF meetings however should have senior attendees commensurate with the decisions they are required to make.

**Recommendation 13: Regional risk assessment should be used to define a regional training and exercise regime to address Wales-wide capability gaps or development needs.**

**Recommendation 14: The frequency of and attendance at LRF meetings should be reviewed with a view to reducing the requirement for senior attendees such as Chief Executives, Assistant Chief Constables etc. Attendees for those meetings**



**that still require strategic management attendance should then be of sufficient seniority or alternates empowered to make the relevant decisions.**

The review found that the approach to civil contingencies training/exercising and professional development across Wales was ad-hoc and lacking in strategic focus. Both the questionnaires and the interviews revealed that training was often too 'emergency event' focussed with the majority of senior staff in particular undertaking 'silver' and 'gold' management training at the expense of contingency planning and risk management. The training and exercising regime requires further consideration of its scope and subject matter.

A view was expressed amongst those interviewed that training provision is retrospective in nature, looking back at avoiding past failings rather than forward to what risks Wales will be required to address in the future. Examples were provided of instances where an internal investigation had recommended improvements to the emergency response through improved training. This was seen as valuable but only in tandem with a horizon scanning element which explored what training needs were required in future. This is particularly the case in technically complex risks such as cyber security.

The individual interviews also revealed a strong desire to 'professionalise' the sector and ensure that roles in civil contingency planning were fulfilled by individuals who were adequately trained and possessed the right skill set. Again, anecdotal evidence was provided by a number of interviewees who expressed concern that they in the past had been required to undertake a role for which they had no prior preparation for. A structured training package or development framework would have assisted their assimilation into their new role.

**Recommendation 15: Welsh Government should work with LRFs to develop and centrally manage a training & exercising regime with associated activity. Scope and functions should include:**

- **The development of a deeper cadre of Gold/Silver/Bronze leadership capacity across all Category 1 and 2 organisations**
- **Enhance individual learning, exercising, and leadership development below Gold/Silver/Bronze through more effective and continuous training and exercising**
- **More systematic capture of identified lessons from pan-Wales exercises for the benefit of LRFs**
- **Welsh Government establishment of minimum standards for competency, skills, qualifications, continued professional development, and/or experience throughout the system.**
- **Welsh Government establishment of minimum standards for subjects and required elements in training, exercising, development, including indications of type and frequency for LRF, inter-LRF, and pan-Wales preparedness. Based on agreed guidance and best practice.**
- **The continuous improvement of LRF best practice and consistency in processes, standards, and desired outcomes.**
- **Welsh Government development and management of a regime of accreditation and registration of civil contingency professionals complementing existing regimes.**

## 6.7 Priorities and Next Steps

The table below summarises the fifteen recommendations and assigns a suggested prioritisation these are intended to assist Welsh Government in developing a programme of work.

Ref	Recommendation	Critical /Essential / Recommended
	<b>Assurance</b>	
1.	<b>A national assurance framework for Wales should be developed with monitoring to be managed by the Wales Resilience Board.</b>	<b>Critical</b>
	<b>Risk</b>	
2.	<b>WG and LRFs should work in partnership to interpret the UK National Risk Register and adapt UK level risks to Wales, working together to identify upcoming and potential risks that would significantly impact Wales, e.g. led by a Wales Resilience Board (WRB) detailed in section 4.3.</b>	<b>Essential</b>
3.	<b>Welsh Government should promote, the approach of common consequences planning to emergency plans for risks, and the development of the required capabilities to mitigate against the effects of these impacts across multiple risks.</b>	<b>Essential</b>
	<b>Responsibilities and Accountabilities</b>	
4.	<b>Welsh Government should establish an executive board (Wales Resilience Board) reporting to the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) and supported by the Wales Resilience Partnership Team (WRPT), with the terms of reference for the WRPT adjusted accordingly.</b>	<b>Essential</b>
5.	<b>A working group should be established to review Terms of reference and any associated guidance notes for LRF Chairs, Deputy Chairs and pan-Wales sub-groups.</b>	<b>Essential</b>
6.	<b>Welsh Government should work with LRFs to develop guidance to more clearly define the organisational interfaces between Welsh Government, and the LRFs, facilitate consistency and efficient operations, and promote best practice.</b>	<b>Essential</b>
	<b>Partnerships and Communities</b>	



7.	<b>When LRFs set up exercises they should encourage non-Police Category 1 responders to chair Strategic Command Groups (SCGs) and build up experience and confidence, where the scenario would dictate this.</b>	Recommended
8.	<b>A working group should be established to develop guidance notes for LRFs to promote best practice and standard working practice templates.</b>	Essential
9.	<b>Closer co-operation between the Third Sector organisations and LRFs, Category 1 and 2 organisations should be promoted. Consideration should be given to:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Maintain registers of volunteers to allow people in Wales to offer their services to support emergency incidents in Wales.</b></li> <li>• <b>Ensure that registers of volunteers adequately address safeguarding, insurance, and availability issues where possible.</b></li> <li>• <b>Have a coordinated approach to MoU's with Category 1 and 2 organisations.</b></li> </ul>	Recommended
10.	<b>Welsh Government should establish ready and easy access to complex messages and communications for communities effectively using all available digital communication channels.</b>	Recommended
	<b>Investment and Resources</b>	
11.	<b>Welsh Government should review its current communication plan (or develop a new 1) to ensure consistency of communication. The review should consider rationalising current communication channels to ensure duplicated or contradictory requests for information are avoided.</b>	Essential
12.	<b>Further work should be undertaken to consider the current and future scope of LRF coordination activity and options for resourcing accordingly.</b>	Essential
	<b>Skills</b>	
13.	<b>Regional risk assessment should be used to define a regional training and exercise regime to address Wales-wide capability gaps or development needs.</b>	Essential
14.	<b>The frequency and attendance of LRF meetings should be reviewed with a view to reducing the requirement for senior attendees such as Council Chief Executives, Assistant Chief Constables, and Chief Fire Officers. Attendees for those meetings that still require strategic management attendance</b>	Essential



	<b>should then be of sufficient seniority or alternates empowered to make the relevant decisions.</b>	
15.	<p><b>The development of a centrally managed training and exercise regime should be considered. Scope and functions should include:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>The development of a deeper cadre of Gold/Silver/Bronze leadership capacity across all Category 1 and 2 organisations</b></li><li>• <b>Enhance individual learning, exercising, and leadership development below Gold/Silver/Bronze through more effective and continuous training and exercising</b></li><li>• <b>More systematic capture of identified lessons from pan-Wales exercises for the benefit of LRFs</b></li><li>• <b>Establishment of minimum standards for competency, skills, qualifications, continued professional development, and/or experience throughout the system.</b></li><li>• <b>Establishment of minimum standards for training, exercising, development, including indications of type and frequency for LRF, inter-LRF, and pan-Wales preparedness</b></li><li>• <b>Continuous improvement of LRF best practice and consistency in processes, standards, and desired outcomes.</b></li><li>• <b>Development and management of a regime of accreditation and registration of civil contingency professionals complementing existing regimes.</b></li></ul>	<b>Essential</b>

**Critical (Do Now)** - It is of the greatest importance that action is taken immediately

**Essential (Do By)** - Action should be taken in the near future

**Recommended** - There should be a benefit from the uptake of this recommendation.

Appendices

Not government policy

## Appendix 1: Research Methodology

Engagement with all identified stakeholders was carried out in order to identify good practice examples, identify any perceived gaps in current civil contingencies legislation and guidance indicated from engagement, and provide evidence and key lessons learnt.

The methodology for our engagement with stakeholders was not based on academic research principles but was based on the Gateway© Review process owned by the Cabinet Office and used under licence by Local Partnerships. This a methodology supported by Assurance Wales. The review process is used to review projects, initiatives, and governance across the public sector in the UK and is based on the following principles:

- As inclusive and open an approach as possible
- Secure a 360-degree system wide view from as many dimensions as possible
- Disclosure of engagement scope and methodology to stakeholders
- Transparency of reporting timeframe
- Confidential and non-attributable basis of all engagements and strict data protection
- Themes to be addressed in the report will have been triangulated with other interviewees and/or documentation reviewed
- Regular feedback to client of emerging themes and issues
- Regular debriefs within the review team to:
  - Identify and validate issues
  - Confirm triangulation of validated issues
  - Management of analytical bias

Stage 1 of the review involved a themed survey of all stakeholders followed up with in depth interviews. 121 surveys were issued, and 65 interviews took place. Key themes for the questions asked to stakeholders were developed in close consultation with Welsh Government and considered the governance aspects of the following themes:

- Governance structures - do governance structures support the best flow of information, accountability and risk assurance in planning and response? Do these structures need differences in rising tide responses, such as COVID to those needed for sudden impacts? Are current LRF areas appropriate? How can stakeholders work consistently but also consider differences in local areas?
- Responsibilities and accountability – are stakeholders clear who does what in emergency situations?
- Understanding of risk – do stakeholders have the appropriate understanding of risk as it impacts Wales and do structures support this underpinning all work? How do stakeholders effectively get all communities to understand their part in resilience?
- Partnerships – are memberships of the LRFs correct and how can resilience be strengthened in the wider community across Wales? Are there areas that require more regulation or guidance to support key partnerships? How can the third sector be best partnered with to aid response and recovery?
- Investment and resourcing – how can the most be made of the funding and available resources to do the best possible for resilience in Wales?
- Interconnectivity – how do we ensure we have supportive and effective links into all policy areas of Welsh Government and UK Government where needed? How do we ensure supply chains are equitable and effective across Wales?
- Powers – how best could the powers from the transfer of functions be utilised?

All stakeholders to be surveyed were identified Welsh Government's Civil Contingencies and National Security Division (CCNS). All stakeholders identified by CCNS for surveying were also invited for interview to both maximise inclusion and support the achievement of a 360-degree system wide view from as many dimensions as possible.

The survey questions were developed by the review team supported by LP's analytical team in close consultation with the CCNS team. Questions focused primarily on governance and were developed to address the following additional specific areas specified by Welsh Government:

- Risk
- Responsibilities and Accountabilities
- Communities
- Partnerships
- Resources and Investment
- Skills

Local partnerships analytical team and CCNS's appointed subject matter expert reviewed the survey responses to identify and validate themes highlighted within the survey responses. This was complemented by the detailed review of individual survey responses by each member of the review team to define interviewee specific themes and agenda for discussion during interviews. Throughout the process the review team carried out periodic meetings to ensure a balanced approach as well as confirming and validating themes and emerging findings.

Consistent with the Gateway© review methodology the following principles and approach was adopted for the interviews:

- a. A minimum of 2 interviewees to ensure balanced interpretation
- b. The confidential and non-attributable basis of the interviews and methodology was set out to interviewee beforehand
- c. Triangulation and validation of themes with other interviewees
- d. Periodic review team meetings to ensure a balanced approach as well as confirm themes and emerging findings

The review team applied a mixed methods approach encompassing a representative survey of LRF members, pan Wales and partner organisations and key stakeholders. This was designed to ensure views and experiences are gathered from across all four fora, and account for different levels of seniority and type of member (i.e. whether from local authority, emergency service, or third sector). Welsh Government has provided a list of key stakeholders. The stakeholders included Category 1 and 2 responders, third sector organisations, LRF/Strategic Coordinating (SCG) Chairs, previous SCG Chairs, LRF Coordinators, Recovery Coordinating (RCG) Chairs, emergency planning leads and liaison officers, health sector executive leads for civil contingencies, health sector emergency planning leads, and Local Authority emergency planning leads. Whilst the intention was to carry out follow up semi-structured interviews with a sample of survey respondents in order to consider the broad findings of the survey in more depth and detail, the review team invited all survey respondents to interviews to ensure comprehensive representation, a fully inclusive process, and richness and depth of information capture.

During stage 2 of the engagement the review team reviewed documentation to review all areas of Civil Contingencies and emergency planning across Wales, and review models used in other jurisdictions. The other jurisdictions and institutions considered included Northern Ireland, Scotland, European Union, United Nations, Canada, New Zealand. Documents reviewed including items provided by Welsh Government, the LRFs, and key

stakeholders. The documentation reviewed is listed within Appendix 3. The documents reviewed permitted the review team to identify examples of good practice that could add value to arrangements in Wales.

The final stage of the engagement involved a series of five workshops, 1 for each of the LRFs and pan Wales organisations. The workshop structure, content, and themes were agreed with the CCNS team. All stakeholders identified in Appendix 2 were invited to the workshops. The review team also invited additional stakeholders as requested by Welsh Government, the LRFs, and the pan Wales organisations.

All stakeholders were invited to participate in a workshop facilitated by the review team to discuss the context for the key themes emerging from the Review to date and to gather additional thoughts/ideas to further inform the review process including recommendations for Welsh Government.

Discussions during the workshops covered key themes including:

- Governance, responsibilities, and accountabilities
- Partnerships and communities
- Risk
- Capacity and capability
- Skills.

To ensure that the Review was informed by a robust evidence base representative of all those involved in civil contingencies in Wales the review team was keen to ensure that stakeholders at all levels from all organisations attended a workshop.

Workshops were held on dates across September and October. Findings from the workshops, alongside the other elements of the Review have informed the contents of this report.

## Appendix 2: List of Participant Stakeholders

Representatives from the following organisations participated in the review:

Gwent Police	British Transport Police
North Wales Police	Animal and Plant Health Agency
South Wales Police	South Wales Trunk Road Agent
Dyfed Powys Police	North Wales Trunk Road Agent
South Wales Fire and Rescue Service	Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council
Mid and West Wales Fire & Rescue Service	Bridgend County Borough Council
North Wales Fire & Rescue Service	Caerphilly County Borough Council
Gwent Local Resilience Forum	Cardiff County Council Cyngor
North Wales Local Resilience Forum	Carmarthenshire County Council
South Wales Local Resilience Forum	Ceredigion County Council
Dyfed Powys Local Resilience Forum	Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board	Monmouthshire County Council
Cardiff & Vale University Health Board	Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council
Cwm Taf University Health Board	City & County of Swansea
Digital Health and Care Wales	Newport City Council
Hywel Dda University Health Board	Pembrokeshire County Council
Powys Teaching Health Board	Powys County Council
Swansea Bay University Health Board	Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council
Public Health Wales	Torfaen County Borough Council
Velindre University NHS Trust	Vale of Glamorgan Council
Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust	North Wales Councils - Emergency Planning Service
Welsh Blood Service	Wales Council for Voluntary Action
Food Standards Agency	Red Cross
Military	Dwr Cymru
Natural Resources Wales	Western Power
Welsh Local Government Association	Wales & West Utilities
Maritime and Coastguard Agency	National Association of Funeral Directors
Joint Emergency Services Group	
Met Office	

### Appendix 3: Documents reviewed

1. Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004
2. Cabinet Office CCA Post Implementation Review 2022
3. National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) 2020
4. Emergency Preparedness, Statutory guidance
5. Emergency Response and Recovery, Non-statutory guidance
6. Pan Wales Response Plan 2019
7. A Report into the D20 stand up of the ECC(W)
8. Civil Contingencies in Wales - A Forward Look (presentation)
9. Wales Resilience Partnership Team - Terms of Reference 2018
10. Wales Resilience Forum - Terms of Reference (revised April 2015)
11. Civil Emergencies in Wales, National Assembly for Wales, Public Accounts Committee, July 2013
12. Framework for Co-ordination of Volunteers in Emergency Response Situations (Wales), July 2022
13. Dyfed Powys LRF Community Risk Register
14. Dyfed Powys LRF Infrastructure Preparedness Assessment, December 2016
15. Dyfed Powys LRF Partnership Team Interim Review Report, September 2020
16. Gwent LRF Learning and Development Prospectus 2022-2023, May 2022
17. Gwent LRF Risk Assessment Process
18. Gwent LRF Constitution and Business Plan, March 2022
19. Gwent LRF Learning and Development Group, Training Needs Analysis, April 2022
20. North Wales LRF Group Structure, October 2021
21. North Wales LRF Terms of Reference, 2022
22. North Wales LRF Constitution and Business Plan (Draft), October 2021
23. South Wales LRF Terms of Reference (Draft),
24. South Wales LRF, Management of Major Incidents Guidance (Draft), 2022
25. Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework
26. Improving Civil Contingencies Planning, Audit Scotland, August 2009
27. Emergency Management Framework for Canada, May 2017
28. Public Safety Canada, Internal Audit of Emergency Management Planning: Leadership and Oversight, January 2014
29. Emergency Management Framework for Ontario, October 2021
30. New Zealand National Disaster Resilience Strategy, 10 April 2019
31. UN Resolution, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030





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Not government policy



## 1.1 Survey Details

A key component of the Welsh Government’s Civil Contingencies Review was the Stakeholder Survey that was distributed to 121 Category 1 and Category 2 stakeholders representing 55 public sector organisations across Wales. The survey aimed to collect views and opinions on civil contingencies measures currently in place across Wales, and suggestions for improvements moving forward.

The survey was distributed to stakeholders on the 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2022 and remained open for stakeholders to complete until the 19<sup>th</sup> of September 2022, at which point we had received 77 responses from 61% of the total respondents.

## 1.2 Survey Design

Local Partnerships designed the survey in collaboration with the Welsh Government. The survey consists of 59 questions set out across 9 sections. The Table below provides an overview of the survey design:

Table 1: Overview of Survey Structure

Section	Section Name	Total # Questions	Report Section
1	Organisation Details	2	1.4
2	Structures for Civil Contingencies	2	1.5
3	Governance of Civil Contingencies	18	1.6
4	Decision Making, Roles, Responsibilities, Accountabilities	9	1.7
5	Partnerships, Interconnectivity, Interoperability	3	1.8
5	Assurance and Related Mechanisms	5	1.9
6	Skills and Competencies	5	1.10
7	Risk Management	8	1.11
8	Learning	5	1.12
9	Comments	2	N/A

## 1.3 Summary Analysis Details

The following sections (1.4 through 1.12) provide a high-level analysis and summary of the results from the Stakeholder Survey. It is important to note that the purpose of this analysis is to provide an overview of the key themes coming out of the survey responses. It does not include complex analysis such as cross-tabulation, text analysis and the use of external data. These elements will be considered in the final report.

## 1.4 Organisation Details [Q1 – Q2]


The *Organisation Details* Section of the Stakeholder Survey contains two questions that seek to profile the Stakeholder’s organisation. Participants are asked to identify themselves as either a Category 1 or Category 2 stakeholder, and which organisation they are completing the survey on behalf of.



Question 1 notes that approximately 74% of respondents considered themselves to be a Category 1 Stakeholder. The remaining respondents identified as Category 2 (4%) or an 'Other' organisation that is neither Category 1 nor Category 2 (22%).

Question 2 asked participants to identify the organisation they are responding from. We have chosen not to display all the organisations in this report for practical reasons, however it is envisaged that a deeper analysis of the responding organisations will be in the final report.

*Question 1 – Which of the following best describes the organisation you work for, and in what context you are responding?*




### 1.5 Structures for Civil Contingencies [Q3 – Q4]

In this Section, survey participants are asked to assess whether they believe that civil contingency structures are fit for purpose in Wales. Participants responded with caution to this question, with the majority (70%) suggesting that civil contingency measures are only partially fit for purpose. That said, only 3% of participants noted that structures are not fit for purpose, with the remaining 27% suggesting that they believe structures are fit.

Following Question 3, participants were asked to suggest improvements in relation to civil contingency structures in Question 4. This responses from this question will be considered in the final report.

Question 3 - Are current Civil Contingencies structures In Wales fit for purpose?



### 1.6 Governance of Civil Contingencies Structures [Q5 – Q22]

The governance of civil contingency structures contains 17 questions and is the largest section of the survey. Due to the number of questions, this Section has been divided into three parts:


1. Questions relating to 'pan-Wales' [Q5 – Q11]
2. Questions relating to 'Local Resilience Fora' (LRF) [Q12 – Q18]
3. Questions relating to 'Organisations' [Q19 – Q22]

#### Pan-Wales Questions

Participants were asked a series of questions regarding governance of civil contingency structures within a 'pan-Wales' context. The graphics below provide a snapshot of the key themes identified.

The first two questions (Questions 5 and 6) are considered jointly in the figure below. Participants were asked the following:

- Q5 - Do you think the current governance structure allows for a pan Wales approach to be shaped and delivered by all partners?
- Q6 - Are the current Civil Contingencies structures designed and defined in a way that aids decision making?



Roughly half of the participating stakeholders believe that civil contingency structures are effectively designed in a way that aids decision making. The remaining respondents either believed that structures were inadequately designed (30%) or were unsure (19%).

Further to this, 40% of stakeholders responding to Question 7 noted that governance structures effectively allows for a pan-Wales approach. Stakeholders were generally less confident about structures in relation to Question 7 compared to Question 6, with 40% noting that they believed structures were inadequate. Some respondents commented to say they had not interacted with or were unsure as to the definition to some of the structures and how they operate, with one stating “They don't currently seem to be operating at all which makes how well their purpose is defined almost irrelevant.” With regards to WRF and WRPT groups.

#### Question 7


Question 7 considers how well-defined participants believe several groups are relating to civil contingencies in Wales. The LRF Strategic groups are believed to be the best defined, with 55% of stakeholders noting that they are clearly defined, and 84% of participants noting either ‘Defined’ or ‘Clearly Defined’.

LRF Sub-groups also scored positively, with 48% of participants believing that they are ‘clearly defined’, and a further 25% suggesting they are ‘defined’.

In contrast, stakeholders appear to have some concerns about the definition of the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) and Wales Resilience Partnership Team (WRPT). Only 8% of respondents believed that they WRF was clearly defined, and 16% of stakeholders noted that it was not defined at all. Similarly, only 5% of respondents consider the WRPT to be clearly defined. This was reflected in the free form answers provided by respondents with several expressing an unwillingness to comment on the purpose due to a perceived lack of clear definitions or an unfamiliarity with the groups “I think a more visible and documented process for all of these different groups is needed, so that all Civil Contingencies practitioners, whether old or new know what each group is for, how they work and how they can join them if they need to/wish to.” There were some who


understood the purpose but felt their application was inconsistent but would welcome more engagement from other government departments operating within this area.

Detailed results from Question 7 can be observed in the graph below:



Not government


Question 8 - Please rate the following structures in terms of their effectiveness.



In Question 9, stakeholders were asked to consider how effective they believe the current Pan-Wales structures are in meeting civil contingency requirements in Wales. Approximately 35% of stakeholders responded noting that they believe structures were effective (including 5% for very effective and 30% for somewhat effective). However, 25% of respondents said they believe the structures were ineffective (including 8% for not effective at all and 17% for somewhat ineffective). Some respondents noted “delays in sending out information through staff absences” and “Appears (to be) a disconnect” and ...” appearing to be a bit of duplication and over complication at times”. However, this was also paired with a sense that there is value in the structures, there just needs to be a more effective, proactive “joined-up” approach, particularly with LRFs. Some respondents perceived that the effectiveness was hampered by a “lack of proper strategic oversight from a designated lead who has a clear and holistic view of the many facets of the presenting problem.”



Question 9 - How effective are the current pan-Wales Structures in meeting Civil Contingency requirements in Wales?




Question 10 and 11 are considered together in the figure below. Participants were asked the following:

- Q10 - Are all key stakeholders effectively engaged at the right levels (in relation to organisational hierarchy) in the current pan-Wales governance arrangements?
- Q11 - Can the current governance structures facilitate consistency across Wales but also reflect differences in local areas?

The results from Question 10 suggest that 45% of stakeholders believe that current governance structures facilitate consistency across Wales but are also able to reflect differences in local areas.

For Question 11, a further 29% of respondents believe all stakeholders are effectively engaged at the right levels in the pan-Wales arrangements. However, 38% of participants answered 'no' to the question, indicating that this is some general concern about these arrangements.

Question 10 and 11 - Summary of Results




**Local Resilience Fora (LRF) Questions [Q12 – Q18]**

Questions 12 through 18 focus on governance structures within LRF. The outputs from each question in this Section are considered below.


In Question 12, Stakeholders were asked to consider how effective they believed governance was within their own LRF. Stakeholders responded positively in regards to their LRF, with over 82% of respondents noting that governance within their LRF was either 'very effective' (42%) or 'somewhat effective' (40%).

Question 12 - How effective is governance within your LRF Structures?




Stakeholders were subsequently asked to consider several criteria relating to their LRF and its overall effectiveness. The criteria included effectiveness, efficiency, managing geographies, membership and escalation. Once again, stakeholders responded positively with regard to their LRFs across all criteria. Stakeholders providing a positive response (ie. noting 'very effective', or 'somewhat effective') ranged between 79% and 86% for the criteria considered in this question. Overall effectiveness received the highest positive score (85%), whilst membership / participation & managing the geographical areas scored the lowest positive score (79%).

Question 13 - Please indicate the performance of your Local Resilience Fora (LRFs) against the following criteria




Following on from Question 13, stakeholders were asked to consider the same criteria, but this time in relation to their LRF sub-groups. Once again, stakeholders responded positively across the board, indicating that there is a good degree of confidence in the way that LRFs and LRF sub-groups are currently set up across Wales. Very few stakeholders voiced concerns about their LRF sub-groups. (ie. answering 'not effective' or 'somewhat ineffective'). Membership / participation provided the highest concern, however only 8% of stakeholders believed their LRF sub-groups were somewhat ineffective in this area.

Question 14 - Please indicate the performance of your LRF Sub-Groups against the following criteria



Question 15 considers the total number of LRF sub-groups that apply to the participant. Nearly 40% of stakeholders noted their LRF maintained more than 10 sub-groups.

Question 15 - Please provide details regarding how many sub-groups are in your LRF area:



Question 16 and 17 are considered together in the figure below. Participants were asked the following:


- Q16 - Are all key stakeholders effectively engaged at the right levels (in relation to organisational hierarchy) in the current LRF governance arrangements?
- Q17 - Is your LRF able to appropriately escalate any issues within the civil contingencies structures including escalating issues within the organisations of its membership?

56% of respondents agreed that stakeholders are engaged at the right levels within their current LRF governance arrangements. A further 19% disagreed with the Question 16's statement, and 23% were unsure or unable to answer.

Stakeholders are generally happy with their ability to escalate issues within their LRF, with 78% of stakeholders confirming that this mechanism is available to them. Only 3% of participants noted an inability to escalate issues.




Question 16 and 17 – Summary of Results



Finally, stakeholders were asked to consider how they would expect their LRF to perform in a several types of adverse events. Stakeholders were generally noted that their respective LRFs could cope with events threatening human welfare (86%), serious damage to the environment (83%), and rising tide events (82%). Stakeholders' views on their LRFs ability to cope with acts of war and terrorism were considerably lower than the other types of events (52%).


Question 18 - In relation Civil Contingencies governance are LRFs able to cope with the following types of emergencies?



### Organisational Questions (Q19 – Q22)


Questions 19 through 22 relating to governance structures at an organisation level. 86% of stakeholders believe that civil contingencies governance is effective in their organisation. Only 3% of stakeholders disagreed, noting that they thought governance relating to civil contingencies was not effective. The responses provided a detailed sense of the governance structures and processes, particularly within Emergency Planning, with stakeholders praising the major incident plans and the response to covid. "WLGA stood up a team of officers at the beginning of covid. This was the first time it has happened. There is now a template for the future."; "Lots of lessons learnt and much stronger ownership buy in since COVID strategically. Learning embedded allowing for identification of risks. i.e. more training at tactical level."

Question 19 - Are there effective Civil Contingencies governance within your organisational structure?



Over 80% of stakeholders consider civil contingency governance to be effective within their organisation. This includes 43% who believe they are 'very effective' and 38% who answered 'somewhat effective'.

Question 20 - How effective is Civil Contingencies governance within your organisational structure?




Question 21 and 22 are considered together in the figure below. Participants were asked the following:



- Q21 - Are there effective escalation processes within your organisation to deal with Civil Contingencies?
- Q22 - Are all key stakeholders effectively engaged at the right levels (in relation to organisational hierarchy) in your current organisational governance arrangements?

Over 80% of stakeholders believe their organisation’s escalation processes are effective in dealing with civil contingencies. Similarly, 79% of stakeholders believe stakeholders are effectively engaged at the right level within their organisation’s governance arrangements.

Question 21 and 22 – Summary of Results




## 1.7 Decision Making, Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities [Q23 - Q31]

In this Section, stakeholders were asked to provide a response to eight questions relating to definitions, roles, decision making processes, and emergency situations.

Question 23 asked stakeholders to consider how clearly defined civil contingencies decision making processes and communications are within their own organisation. Stakeholders responded positively to this question, with 93% believing their communication processes were clearly defined, and 91% noting that decision making processes are clearly defined.




Question 23 - Are Civil Contingencies decision-making processes within your organisation clearly defined?



Question 24 supplements Question 23, by asking stakeholders to consider communications and decision-making processes, but this time in relation to their LRF. Once again, stakeholders responded positively, with 87% believing communications were clearly defined, and 81% believing decision making processes were clearly defined. Whilst these results show a high degree of confidence in LRFs, the responses are still relatively lower than what was observed on an organisation level. The difference could be as a result of genuine operational differences, or it could be as a result of optimism bias due to participants self-assessing their own organisations.




Question 24 - Are Civil Contingencies decision-making processes within your LRF clearly defined?



Question 25 considers whether communications decision making processes relating to civil contingencies are clearly defined on a pan-Wales basis. Stakeholders were relatively less confident answering this question, with only 26% agreeing that communications are well defined, and 22% for decision making. Stakeholders generally did not agree that processes were well defined on a pan-Wales basis. 42% of stakeholders answered 'no' in relation to communication processes, whilst a significant 46% of stakeholders noted that decision making processes were not clearly defined.



Question 25 - Are Civil Contingencies decision-making processes on a Pan-Wales basis clearly defined?




Questions 26 and 27 focus on the roles of stakeholders within emergency situations and whether these roles are clear. The questions in consideration are noted below:

- Q26 - Are the roles of stakeholders in emergency situations at a pan-Wales Level clear?
- Q27 - Are the roles of stakeholders in emergency situations at an LRF area clear?

For these questions we once again observe a notable difference between the assessment of LRFs and Pan-Wales. Stakeholders are generally more positive and confident in the ability of their LRF and share some concerns when considering the same question on a Pan-Wales basis. If we consider the roles of stakeholders in emergency situations, we note that 84% of stakeholders believe roles are clear within their LRF, whereas only 36% of stakeholders believe roles are clear on a pan-Wales basis.

Question 26 and 27 – Summary of Results



Questions 28 to 31 asked stakeholders to consider how clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities are in relation to different geographies (LRF and pan-Wales) and different contexts (emergency situations / Senior leaders planning and response).

The results for Questions 28 to 31 are detailed separately in the following two Tables. The first Table considers how well stakeholders believe responsibilities are defined. During emergency situations, approximately 51% of stakeholders believed that their LRF had 'clearly defined' responsibilities. This compares to only 13% answering in the same way on a Pan-Wales basis. Similarly, 49% of stakeholders believe senior leaders responsibilities are clearly defined in relation to planning and response, whilst only 8% believe those roles are clearly defined on a Pan Wales basis.

Question 28 - 31 – How clearly defined are **responsibilities** in emergency situations and for senior leaders

Question	Geography	Clearly Defined	Defined	Partly Defined	Not at all
<b>Emergency Situations</b>					
Q28	Pan Wales	13%	19%	53%	16%
Q29	LRFs	51%	30%	19%	0%
Difference		38%	11%	-34%	-16%
<b>Senior Leaders (Planning &amp; Response)</b>					
Q30	Pan Wales	8%	42%	19%	27%
Q31	LRF	49%	29%	19%	3%
Difference		41%	-13%	0%	-24%

Nearly half of stakeholders believe that accountabilities are clearly defined within their LRF in emergency situations, compared to only 13% believing the same on a pan-Wales basis. The results are similar for senior leaders category, with 44% believing accountabilities are clearly defined for their LRF, whilst only 8% believe accountabilities are clear on a pan-Wales basis.

The results from Questions 28 -31 once again demonstrate how stakeholders appear to have more confidence in their LRF in relation to clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities.

Question 28 - 31 – How clearly defined are **accountabilities** in emergency situations and for senior leaders

Question	Geography	Clearly Defined	Defined	Partly Defined	Not at all
<b>Emergency Situations</b>					
Q28	Pan Wales	13%	13%	58%	17%
Q29	LRFs	46%	33%	17%	4%
Difference		33 %	20 %	-41 %	-13 %
<b>Senior Leaders (Planning &amp; Response)</b>					
Q30	Pan Wales	8%	20%	44%	27%
Q31	LRF	44%	31%	17%	3%
Difference		36%	11%	-27 %	-24 %


### 1.8 Partnerships, Interconnectivity, and Interoperability [Q32 – Q34]

This Section of the stakeholder survey contains three questions that seek to gather stakeholder views on the effectiveness of partnerships, interconnectivity, and interoperability.

Stakeholders were asked to indicate how effective they believe regulation and guidance is in supporting partnerships for several different contexts. The results from this Question are detailed in the Figure below. Stakeholders answered positively in relation to training and skills development, collaboration with partner organisations, understanding risk, responsibilities and accountabilities, and governance, with the majority of respondents indicating either ‘somewhat effective’ or ‘very effective’.

There was a slight exception when stakeholders considered regulation and guidance within the context of effective investment and resourcing, with only 35% of stakeholders indicating ‘somewhat effective’ or ‘very effective’. This option also triggered the largest negative response, with 33% of stakeholders believing regulation and guidance is either ‘not effective at all’ or ‘somewhat ineffective’.

Question 32 - How effective is regulation or guidance in supporting key partnerships in the following aspects?






Questions 33 and 34 are considered together in the Figure below. Stakeholders were asked the following:

- Q33 - How effective are links into policy areas of the Welsh and UK Governments?
- Q34 - How effective are local and pan-Wales structures in carrying out their resilience responsibilities in providing guidance and advice between government, local responders and organisations?

Question 33 provides a broad mix of responses, with most stakeholders believing that links are either not at all effective (27%), or somewhat ineffective (23%). This compares to stakeholders answering 'very effective' (3%) or 'somewhat ineffective' (23%).

Opinion was once again divided in relation to Question 34, which considers how effective structures are in carrying out resilience responsibilities. The split between stakeholders answering positively (ie. 'very effective' / 'somewhat effective') versus those answering negatively ('somewhat ineffective' / 'not at all effective') is remarkably close. Approximately 35% of stakeholders answered positively, and 28% answered negatively.

*Question 33 and 34 – Summary of Results*




**1.9 Assurance and Related Mechanisms [Q35 – Q39]**

This Section relates to assurance and the mechanisms used to provide assurance from a pan-Wales approach and at an organisational level.

**Pan Wales (Q35)**

Question 35 asks stakeholders to comment on whether they believe current arrangements are relevant across resilience building activities. Only 12% of stakeholders felt arrangements were sufficient, compared to 55% of stakeholders who thought arrangements were insufficient. Despite the high proportion of those who answered 'no' only 17 provided further detail. Some of the responses provided gave the sense that current assurance arrangements required or were currently going through the process of review. Three noted additional capacity or resourcing would be required to maintain excellence.

Question 35 - Are the current arrangements sufficient at all levels for sustaining excellence and continuous improvement in all current resilience-building activities?



#### Organisational (Q36 – Q39)


Stakeholders were asked several questions relating to assurance within their respective organisations.

Question 36 asks stakeholders to rate the level of clarity that exists around civil contingencies policies, processes, and procedures with specific reference to accountability and assurance.

In general, stakeholders believed that civil contingencies policies, processes and procedures had high levels of clarity in relation to accountability (49%) and assurance (46%). Very few stakeholders reported limited or no clarity in either category.




Question 36 - Do your organisation's Civil Contingencies policies, processes, and procedures provide sufficient clarity on accountability and assurance?



Stakeholders were asked to provide an overall assessment of their organisation's quality assurance procedures in relation to civil contingencies. The majority of stakeholders hold their organisation's assurance procedures in high regard, with very good (30%), somewhat good (32%) being the two most popular options selected. No-one noted their assurance processes as 'very poor', and only 7% considered them to be 'poor'.

Question 37 - Please rate the effectiveness of your organisation's quality assurance of Civil Contingencies procedures:




Question 38 and Question 39 consider how effective processes are within the stakeholder's organisation in relation to operational improvement and continual learning. These Questions are considered jointly in the figure below. Stakeholders were asked the following:


- Q38 - Do your organisation's current processes and procedures aid performance and continual operational improvement through a lessons identified process?
- Q39 - How effective are your organisation's current processes and procedures in aiding performance and continual operational improvement through a lessons identified process?

For Question 38, 81% of stakeholders believe that the necessary processes and procedures are in place to ensure continual improvement via a lessons learned approach.

In Question 39, 44% of stakeholders believe their processes to be 'very good' and a further 32% of stakeholders believe their organisation's processes are 'somewhat good'. Very few people responded noting poor procedures. Respondents provided details of some of the processes and structures in place to aid operational improvement referencing SIP, NHSE EPRR Core Standards and reporting to gold.

*Question 38 and 39 – Summary of Results*






### 1.10 Skills and Competencies [Q40 – Q44]

This section relates to the skills and competencies of those involved in the civil contingency profession.


Question 40 considers whether stakeholders believe they have arrangements in place (at either their organisation or LRF) that provide appropriate training. Nearly 90% of stakeholders confirmed that appropriate training arrangements are in place.

Question 40 - Are there current arrangements in place within your organisation and / or your local LRF to provide training on Civil Contingencies and are they easily accessible?



Following on from Question 40, Stakeholders were asked to confirm if they had previously undertaken any civil contingencies training. Nearly all Stakeholders (97%) had undertaken some form of training for civil contingencies. On accessibility stakeholders stated having undergone internal training themselves but also stressed the importance of Civil Contingencies training being multiagency. Additionally, resourcing seems to be crop up as a barrier to ensuring a structured, standard approach for training respondents noting "Whilst training takes places it isn't embedded into a regular and continuous process." And "Arrangements are a little ad hoc and capacity/resourcing is an issue."

Question 41 - Have you previously undertaken any Civil Contingencies training or exercising?




Stakeholders were asked to report what level of skills and competencies they need to fulfil their role. With reference to civil contingencies, most stakeholders require a high degree of competency, with 54% noting 'Leader / Strategic' and a further 36% noting 'co-ordination / tactical'. It is the same story for emergency planning, with 51% requiring 'Leader / Strategic' level competency, and a further 38% requiring 'co-ordination / tactical' expertise. The number of stakeholders citing general awareness, introductory and operational levels are insignificant.

Over half (54% the respondents of participants noted 'Leader / Strategic' level, with a further 36% noting 'co-ordination / tactical level'. Whilst respondents had undergone a variety of skills training, there was a sense that a more standard approach to providing appropriate training opportunities was required with some perceiving a skill gap in their current role "Current role is strategic, but as a practitioner, skills and competencies at Operational and tactical are also required and are essential components."




Question 42 - What skills and competencies in Civil Contingencies do you need to carry out your role(s), and to what level?



As per Question 43, 77% of organisations have arrangements in place to ensure civil contingencies training is conducted regularly and is continuous in nature. Only 11% of stakeholders believe that regular civil contingencies training is not occurring within their organisation, with a further 12% noting they are unsure.


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Question 43 - Are there arrangements in place within your organisation to ensure Civil Contingencies training is a regular and continuous process?



Stakeholders were asked in Question 44 whether their training includes recognised elements and an understanding of a national approach to civil contingencies. 55% of stakeholders believe that training adequately provides the required knowledge and competencies for individuals to perform their role effectively.

Question 44 - Is there a recognised/common understanding of a national approach to Civil Contingencies training in order for all individuals to achieve a minimum standard to undertake their role?



### 1.11 Risk Management [Q45 - Q52]

In this Section, Stakeholders were asked to consider several Questions relating to risk management. Question 45 and 46 are considered together in the Figure below. Stakeholders were asked the following:


- Question 45 - Does your LRF adequately identify risks within its area?
- Question 46 - Are risks adequately identified and captured across Wales by the current structures at a national, regional and local level?

81% of stakeholders believe that their LRF adequately identifies risk within its area. However, only 61% of stakeholders felt that risks are being adequately captured across Wales by the current structures.






Question 45 and 46 - Is this risk information communicated to partners across Wales effectively in order for them to have a shared understanding and awareness of their part in resilience?




In Question 47, Stakeholders were asked to consider how effectively risk information is communicated to partners across Wales for the purpose of resilience. Stakeholders generally responded positively, noting that risk information is 'very well communicated' (16%) and 'Communicated' (38%). Only 4% of respondents believed that information was not communicated effectively, although 24% of respondents did share some concern by noting that information is only 'partially communicated'.

Question 47 - Is this risk information communicated to partners across Wales effectively in order for them to have a shared understanding and awareness of their part in resilience?




Stakeholders were asked to specify how supportive their organisation's governance approach is to risk identification and management. Participants responded positively to this question, with 39% of respondents citing their organisation's governance approaches were 'very supportive' and a further 41% citing they were 'somewhat supportive'. Only a total of 2% of stakeholders noted their governance as 'does not support at all' or 'somewhat unsupportive'.

Question 48 - Does your organisations governance approach support the identification and management of risks, which include capturing the impacts, mitigating actions and used to inform future improvements?




Following on from Question 48, 26% of survey participants noted their governance structures to be 'very effective' in facilitating improved risk assessment. A further 42% of participants cited their governance structures as being 'effective' for improving risk assessment, which means that a combined 68% of participants answered positively to this question. Only 14% of stakeholders raised concerns about their governance structures in relation to risk assessment.

Question 49 - How effective are your organisation's governance arrangements in facilitating improved risk assessment?



In Question 50, Stakeholders were asked how robust they felt their organisation's crises management structures were in coping with multiple risks. The two most frequent responses to this question were 'very effective' (27%) and 'effective' (45%), indicating that stakeholders generally feel that crises management structures are sufficient. 7% of stakeholders noted their organisation's crisis management structures were somewhat ineffective. No participants noted that their structures were 'not effective at all' and therefore this option is not shown in the graphic below.

Question 50 - How robust are your organisation's crisis management structures and processes in their ability to cope with multiple interacting risks (chronic and acute), threats, and hazards?




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Question 51 asks Stakeholders to report their organisation’s relative understanding of the importance of civil contingency **risks** and **interdependencies**. In terms of risks, 26% of stakeholders claim their organisation has a ‘high degree of understanding’, with a further 51% of stakeholders suggesting their organisation has a ‘solid understanding’. When considering interdependencies, 28% reported a ‘high degree of understanding’ within their organisation, and 44% noted a ‘solid understanding’.

Very few stakeholders consider this to be an area of concern, with no-one citing ‘no understanding at all’ in relation to either risks or interdependencies. This category has therefore been excluded from the graphic below.

*Question 51 - Does your organisation understand the importance of civil contingency risks and interdependencies?*




**1.12 Learning [Q53 – Q57]**

Participants were asked to consider to what degree does learning occur across their organisation, LRF and on a pan-Wales basis. The results from this Question follow a similar trend that can be observed generally through this survey, being that people largely believe their organisation and LRF to be relatively more effective in the space of civil contingencies, when compared pan-Wales. In this Question, the percentage of stakeholders that responded ‘Significant reflection occurs with lessons widely applied’ is 36% at an organisational level, 31% for LRFs and only 8% on a pan-Wales basis. No-one reported ‘No lessons are learnt’ for their organisation or LRF, however, on a Pan-Wales basis, 3% of stakeholders cited this option.




Question 53 - To what extent does your organisation and the wider LRF and pan-Wales Groups learn from their experiences and identify best practice within the wider civil contingencies' community?




In Question 54, Stakeholders were asked whether their organisation or LRF has a formal process of capturing and managing learning. 89% of stakeholders noted that these processes existed in either their organisation or LRF. Only 4% replied negatively to this question, indicating this as another area of strength for Wales and their contingency planning.

Question 54 - Do you have a formal process to capture and manage learning within your LRF or organisation?



Following on from Question 54, participants were asked to state how often learning is captured within their LRF or organisation. Nearly 75% of stakeholders cited their organisation or LRF formally captures learning 'very often' (20%) or 'often' (54%).

*Question 55 - How often is this learning formally captured within your LRF or organisation?*




Question 56 considers whether the stakeholder believes that their organisation or LRF has appropriate processes in place to capture lessons. The majority of stakeholders (86%) believe that their organisation and/or LRF have such processes, with only 3% noting that their organisation and/or LRF did not possess such processes.






Question 56 - Are there any processes in place within your LRF or organisation to capture lessons identified to ensure they become lessons learned?



And finally, Stakeholders were asked to comment on whether they believed a system was in place that allowed other stakeholders to constructively challenge weaknesses. Stakeholders noted 'significant challenge' (19%) and 'some challenge' (46%) as their top two options to this question.

Question 57 - Is there a system in place to allow stakeholders the opportunity to constructively challenge and/or share weakness or deficiencies?





*58. What are the two key areas you feel the Welsh Government Civil Contingencies Governance Review should focus on and why?*

Questions 57 and 58 provided an open question and opportunity to allow stakeholders to freely voice their opinions. Some of the key area's responses highlighted were clarity of expectations and responsibilities of the different roles within civil contingencies. Clearer arrangements for governance, particularly at national to local level, and an oversight of structures with a "with a golden thread linking all together". Some of the recommendations provided by respondents stressed the importance of maintaining clear communication channels with the voluntary and community sector, noting the support and pivotal these organisations could play at a local level to support civil contingencies in meeting the needs of communities during times of emergency, as highlighted by "the sector's insights into hidden needs and vulnerabilities, and often unique ability to tap into the resources and assets within a community". Responses also stated the need to secure future funding to plan and support responses at a local level "Funding to be increased to bolster future planning and response. Lack of importance and consistent cuts in funding have diminished teams"; "Emergency Planning funding to local authorities needs to be ring-fenced and used solely for Civil Contingencies". Further responses referenced the desire to see integrated, multidisciplinary teams involved in the planning of civil contingencies "There needs to be a team of multi-agency staff on a pan-Wales basis to bring together all the planning work.". A perceived need for greater standardisation in training, resourcing and planning was expressed by some stakeholders, particularly referencing LRF subgroups "LRFs and subgroups are reliant on individuals at member agencies undertaking additional work on top of their day-to-day work programme, the LRF is not a legal entity as a result local resourcing and capacity can cause challenges in moving work forward." And "As the devolved administration, perhaps consider the functions being driven centrally - with tighter management of the LRF structures. There is too much inconsistency and not enough leadership / training / exercising / assurance.".



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