



Cabinet Office

The National Resilience Strategy

A Call for Evidence

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Alternative format versions of this document are available on request from resiliencestrategy-cfe@cabinetoffice.gov.uk.

About this call for evidence

To:	<p>The Government invites anyone in the United Kingdom with an interest or views in the subject to engage with this consultation.</p> <p>Where specific questions are deemed suited to a certain audience (e.g. research organisations, business owners and professionals, or Category 1 and 2 responders), this is indicated.</p> <p>Respondents are not obliged to answer all questions apart from the About You and Vision and Principles sections and may select which other questions/sections to answer.</p>
Duration:	<p>From 13 July 2021 to 27 September 2021</p>
Enquiries to:	<p>Email: resiliencestrategy-cfe@cabinetoffice.gov.uk</p>
How to respond:	<p>To respond to this call for evidence please fill in the online survey on GOV.UK or, by exception, email resiliencestrategy-cfe@cabinetoffice.gov.uk including any supporting documents. The closing date for evidence is 27 September 2021. All responses must be received by the Department before the closing date, otherwise they will not be considered.</p> <p>Postal submissions will not be considered.</p>
Response paper:	<p>A response to this consultation is due to be published by 27 December 2021 on the Cabinet Office website.</p>

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Foreword by the Paymaster General



*In March, the Government published our vision for the UK's role in the world over the next decade: **'Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy'**. It describes the safety and protection of UK Nationals as the Government's first duty. A crucial part of this is an increased focus on building national resilience.*

The UK, like all countries, is facing a range of complex and geographically diverse risks. Recently we have experienced the effects of extreme weather, terrorism and pandemics. We have seen cyber attacks on critical systems, geopolitical instability, and accidents. We have also seen just how quickly issues arising overseas can impact us here in the UK.

We must prepare for a future in which we could be impacted by all of these risks and more. We need to anticipate the threats posed by rapid technological advances, antimicrobial resistance and biodiversity loss. Our approach needs to be broad: forestalling risks where possible, adapting to uncertainty, mitigating the impacts of risks that we cannot prevent, and recovering quickly so that we are always ready to rise to the next challenge.

We have strong foundations on which to build. Our current resilience is based on vital contributions from across society, from world-class emergency services, to the voluntary sector, to our flexible and responsive armed forces. We are safer as citizens because of the dedication of those who work towards our resilience.

But the pandemic has challenged us all to consider whether that is enough. Change is required. We need to be better able to deal with 'whole-system' emergencies, and we need to foster a whole of society approach to both preparedness and response. All parts of the UK must work together, with better cooperation between all levels of government. We must work with businesses and industry to strengthen the resilience of our systems and infrastructure. We must energise and empower UK citizens and communities who can make a real contribution to the national resilience effort. We must strengthen international collaboration to address shared global challenges. Everyone has a part to play, and only by working together will we harness our potential.

This Call for Evidence is the start of a national conversation on how this can be delivered in practice, and what role we all could and should play. To that end, we want to understand and incorporate as many of your views as possible. Your engagement with the questions in this Call for Evidence will help the Government develop plans to build a safer and more prosperous UK. I encourage you to take the time to consider the issues at stake here, and I thank you in advance for your contribution on this vital piece of our national security.

The Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP

Executive Summary

- The Covid-19 pandemic and other recent crises have stretched governments around the world. This has demonstrated the importance of a resilient society with well developed plans and capabilities, along with flexible response structures that can adapt and respond to the unexpected. We know there will be more major challenges in the future. We need a National Resilience Strategy to help us prepare for these challenges.
- This Call for Evidence seeks public engagement to help inform the development of a new Strategy that will outline an ambitious new vision for UK National Resilience and set objectives for achieving it.
- Our proposed vision for the National Resilience Strategy is to make the UK the most resilient nation. In delivering this vision, we will be guided by a series of core principles:
 - We should understand the risks we face, including the impacts they could have, and our exposure to them.
 - We should invest in preparation to better prevent, mitigate and recover from risks.
 - We should energise and empower everyone who can make a contribution.
- Our vision for 2030 is that we will have a strengthened ability to assess and understand the risks we face. Our suite of systems, infrastructure and capabilities (including international systems) for managing those risks should become more proactive, adaptable and responsive; and there should be fewer regional inequalities in our resilience. As a result, our local communities, businesses, and the UK as a whole, will be more cohesive, resistant to shocks and stresses, and ultimately more adaptable to future threats and challenges.
- Questions in this Call for Evidence focus on six broad thematic areas:
 - **Risk and Resilience:** Strengthening our ability to manage an evolving risk landscape depends on improving our ability to both predict and adapt to identified and unexpected challenges.
 - **Responsibilities and Accountability:** It is fundamentally important that all those involved in building resilience have a clear understanding of when, where and how to apply tools, processes and relationships effectively.
 - **Partnerships:** Resilience is not solely a government or public sector responsibility. Other parts of society play an essential role in building our collective resilience.
 - **Community:** A whole-of-society approach will be central to strengthening the UK's resilience, with a revived effort to inform and empower all parts of society who can make a contribution.

- **Investment:** The challenge of where to place investment in the risk cycle is one that affects the public and private sectors alike. As government, individuals and businesses, we face choices around what, and how much, to invest.
 - **Resilience in an Interconnected World:** UK resilience is closely entwined with the wider global context. Challenges and opportunities are frequently experienced on a global scale.
- This Call for Evidence seeks to understand current perceptions of risk and resilience, gather evidence on where improvements could be made, and gauge the UK's appetite for change. Views are welcome from anyone with an interest in the subject.
- Included in the Call for Evidence are specific questions on the Civil Contingencies Act. This Act provides a legislative framework for emergency management and response in the UK. Evidence gathered in this section will help to inform the scheduled review of the Act, which is due to be completed by March 2022.
- The consultation will run for a period of eleven weeks, and will be complemented by a series of wider engagement events with relevant stakeholders and target groups. To participate in this Call for Evidence, please use <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/national-resilience-strategy-call-for-evidence>. The consultation will close on 27 Sept 2021.

The Resilience Strategy Call for Evidence

1. Resilience has long been an integral part of the UK's approach to national security and crisis management. We have well-tested risk assessment, risk management, and response and recovery measures in place to cover a wide range of scenarios.
2. However, the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted that there are elements of our approach to national and local resilience that we need to strengthen. When tested by the wide-ranging and systemic impacts of the pandemic, they did not always deliver and our preparedness was less complete and coherent than it could have been. The pandemic highlighted areas where roles, resources and responsibilities of those involved in response could have been clearer, and areas in our systems where we could consider a different approach or further investment. It highlighted the importance of considering our domestic resilience in a global context.
3. Covid-19 also presented opportunities to learn and find new ways to respond. For example, it required us to ask a far wider range of individuals and organisations to take part in the response. We saw military resources deployed, huge numbers of people volunteering to support the NHS, and furloughed workers filling other key roles.
4. All of these lessons reflect the ambition outlined in the Integrated Review to increase our national resilience by developing a National Resilience Strategy.

The Integrated Review

5. In March 2021, the UK Government published *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy*. The Review looks at the threats and opportunities the UK faces and will face over the next decade. It considers the ways that national and international security must adapt and evolve in line with the rapidly changing global environment, and outlines where a global UK should focus aid and diplomacy work to have the greatest life-changing impact in the longer term. The Review sets out the Prime Minister's vision for the UK in 2030 and defines the UK's position in the world. It also asserts a need for greater national resilience to **threats** and **hazards** in the physical and digital worlds, both at home and overseas.

A New National Resilience Strategy

6. A core part of the Integrated Review is an increased focus on building national resilience. The safety and protection of UK Nationals is the Government's first duty, reflected by an increased commitment to strengthening national security, and reducing our **vulnerability** both to natural hazards and to threats from other states, terrorists and organised crime. It also commits the Government to consider strengthening the role and responsibilities of **Local Resilience Forums** (LRFs) in England, the multi-agency partnerships that bring together organisations involved in risk management and response (e.g. emergency services, local authorities etc.).

7. The Review commits the Government to improving our ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from **risks** – as well as that of our allies and partners, recognising the closely interconnected nature of our world. The Review recognises that, in an increasingly interconnected world in which we cannot predict or stop all of the challenges ahead, it is fundamental that we renew our positive, proactive approach to resilience in order to build long-term prosperity.
8. To drive this ambition forward, the Integrated Review commits the Government to developing a new National Resilience Strategy, which will outline a vision for UK resilience and lay out fundamental objectives for achieving it. This Call for Evidence sets out our initial vision for UK resilience in 2030 and the principles for achieving it.

Call for Evidence

9. Every individual citizen and organisation has a part to play in making the UK more resilient. Building nationwide resilience is a national endeavour. To develop an effective strategy for UK resilience, it is essential that we understand and incorporate a wide range of views and evidence on what our priorities should be, and how we want to approach our future resilience. Your engagement with the questions in this Call for Evidence will provide an invaluable contribution to this work.
10. Alongside this Call for Evidence, we will be conducting wider engagement with local resilience partners, businesses, academics and the public. This will help us to reach as many individuals and groups as possible.
11. This Call for Evidence also includes some specific questions on the **Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA)**. These have been included to support the scheduled review of the Act, which will be completed by March 2022.

The Case for Reform

12. Both our world and the risks that we face are changing. This makes preparing for the unknown and bolstering our resilience ever-more challenging and we must adapt to face that challenge. We cannot anticipate or stop every disruptor, whether that be a new pandemic, terrorism, cyber threats or severe weather.
13. Recent events have illustrated the scale of the challenge. The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the lives and livelihoods of everyone in some way, disproportionately affecting marginalised and vulnerable communities. It has reaffirmed just how interconnected our world is, both in terms of how quickly issues arising internationally can affect us at home, and also how problems in one sector can have severe and damaging consequences in another. What began as a health crisis triggered cascading impacts across a range of sectors, from education to the economy, transport to manufacturing.
14. The UK has been learning lessons and acting on them throughout the pandemic. Detailed analysis of how COVID-19 has affected the UK and where lessons can be carried forward will be the subject of an Independent Inquiry announced by the Prime Minister, which will begin in Spring 2022.
15. Building national resilience is not something we are starting from scratch, so we will build on the strengths and capabilities we already have. However, these systems were not always fit to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and so there is room for improvement and reform in our approach. We should seek to match existing competence with excellence in other areas, through enhanced **capabilities** and appropriate legal powers that equip us to meet rapidly changing threats. We must also reflect upon the unprecedented roles played by local partners throughout the pandemic and consider the case for strengthening these further.
16. Building on the Integrated Review, we will seek to use the new National Resilience Strategy to bolster our approach to resilience. We plan to focus on the following six areas: Risk and Resilience; Responsibilities and Accountability; Partnerships; Community; Investment; and Resilience in an Interconnected World. These are covered in more detail in the thematic sections from page 15 onwards.
17. As we begin to emerge from the pandemic, we have a window of opportunity for thinking more broadly about the potential risks and emergencies we face, and the steps we could take now to better prepare ourselves. Now is the time to capitalise on the renewed interest across the country in how we can be more resilient and build back stronger and better than we were before.

Resilience: definitions

What is resilience?

18. Traditionally, the term 'resilience' refers to an ability to withstand and quickly recover from a difficult situation. This comes hand-in-hand with the idea of 'bouncing back', of returning to 'normal', of picking up where we left off before whatever difficulty or challenge we experienced.
19. As a country, we cannot afford to be passive and wait for things to happen to us. We need to understand our vulnerabilities, pre-empt challenges before they arise, ensure we are prepared for them, and mitigate the impacts. Then, when events do occur, we should be ready to withstand and recover.

What is the proposed scope of the National Resilience Strategy?

20. We propose that the strategy will focus on the UK's ability to anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from known, unknown, direct, indirect and emerging risks. This will include all types of risk, including: environmental hazards; human, animal and plant health risks; major accidents; societal risks; and malicious attacks¹. It will encompass risks that have a domestic source, and those that have their roots overseas (but which would impact the UK). The strategy will also acknowledge that there will be unexpected risks, as well as risks which may emerge beyond the (two year) time horizon of each National Risk Register. These could include emerging risks posed by new technologies or future societal change, wherever they develop or occur.
21. Whilst the new National Resilience Strategy will not encompass HMG's approach to all long-term policy challenges, it will focus on the impacts of such challenges and where those might lead to acute crises in the future. Our definition of resilience is broad, but we also need to find a practicable approach to implementation, ensuring that organisations and individuals have clear and realistic objectives. Nevertheless, understanding and addressing long-term trends in risk (including those driven by wider social, economic, technological and environmental change) must be a central feature of our approach to risk.
22. A number of existing governmental strategies focus specifically on addressing and building resilience to individual risks. The new National Resilience Strategy will sit alongside and complement these strategies. It will consider the need for continued long-term focus and investment in addressing risks, as well as our capability to address the common causes and impacts of risks, and **systemic vulnerabilities**.

¹ Environmental hazards include flooding, heatwaves, severe space weather, volcanic eruptions, and wildfires; Human and animal health risks include pandemics and antimicrobial resistance; Major accidents include major fires, major transport accidents, and systemic financial crises; Societal risks include Serious and organised crime, bribery and corruption; Malicious attacks include terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, and disinformation.

Vision and Principles

Overarching vision and principles

23. The new Strategy is an opportunity to make the changes to our approach that the Covid-19 pandemic has made necessary, and that were highlighted in the *Integrated Review*. In line with this, our proposed vision for the National Resilience Strategy is **to make the UK the most resilient nation**. We need to build a more resilient UK together: in the future we will be better able to adapt to uncertainty, to proactively address risks, and to withstand adversity.

24. In delivering this vision, we will be guided by a series of core principles:

- **We should understand the risks we face, including the impacts they could have, and our exposure to them.** To make the right decisions we first need to take a broad view of the risk landscape, across a series of interconnected factors including:
 - pre-existing vulnerabilities and interdependencies;
 - potential risks and how they are likely to evolve;
 - how different risks may intersect (in place or time) presenting more profound or complex challenges;
 - the effectiveness of our risk and vulnerability management capabilities;
 - the range of potential impacts and consequences (including geographic and socio-economic variations);
 - the level of understanding and preparedness by the public, businesses and Government; and,
 - ensuring that the cross-sector systems are in place to take a holistic view about the risks.
- **We should invest in preparation to better prevent, mitigate and recover from risks.** To manage risks effectively we need to balance investment and effort across the whole lifecycle of risks. Practically, this means:
 - understanding previous challenges and lessons learned;
 - investing in the access to, management of and use of data to support effective, evidence based risk management decisions;
 - sharing standardised and useable data with all partners;
 - developing and maintaining effective capabilities, along with the professional skills to apply and adapt those capabilities to different circumstances;
 - seeking greater efficiency and adaptability by developing generic capabilities which can be used in many different scenarios;
 - investing in bespoke capabilities and specialised expertise, particularly in order to respond to increasingly diverse, complex and less predictable risks; and
 - providing support to the most vulnerable local communities, particularly to enable recovery after an emergency.

- **We should energise and empower everyone who can make a contribution.** To be truly resilient, all parts of society should play a role in building the UK's resilience. Accountability and responsibilities should be clear, and governments, local partners and the voluntary sector need to ensure that each contributor is able to participate through appropriate measures. Partnerships between the Government and all its partners must be strengthened. This may include:
 - enabling proportionate legislation, standards and guidance;
 - providing the necessary tools, skills and knowledge;
 - being more transparent about risks, using strategic communications mechanisms to raise awareness;
 - rigorous and frequent testing and exercising, both to model potential effects and impacts of risks, and to test local, national and international response plans;
 - strengthening the roles and responsibilities of Local Resilience Forums;
 - collaborating with voluntary, charity, faith groups and business sectors to make best use of their capability, capacity and networks, to respond to the localised effect of risk;
 - enabling individuals to volunteer and to contribute specialist skills and support communities during a crisis.

25. Building resilience is a long-term endeavour. Though the overall objectives for building UK resilience are likely to remain similar in years to come, the changing landscape will mean that our approach will need to adapt. The new National Resilience Strategy will set out a vision for UK resilience in 2030, but the endeavour of improving national resilience will stretch far beyond this timeframe.

26. Our vision for 2030 is that we will have a strengthened ability to assess and understand the risks we face. Our suite of systems, infrastructure and capabilities (including international systems) for managing those risks should become more proactive, adaptable and responsive; and there should be fewer regional inequalities in our resilience. As a result, our local communities, businesses, and the UK as a whole, will be more cohesive, resistant to shocks and stresses, and ultimately more adaptable to future threats and challenges.

Questions on Vision and Principles:

1. Do you agree with the proposed **vision** of the Resilience Strategy? Is there anything you would add, amend, or remove?
2. Do you agree with the **principles** laid out for the strategy? Is there anything you would add, amend, or remove?

Thematic sections

27. Our vision for resilience in 2030 is reflected in the six thematic sections of this Call for Evidence: Risk and Resilience; Responsibilities and Accountability; Partnerships; Community; Investment; and Resilience in an Interconnected World.
28. Each section covers a different aspect of resilience building, setting out some background context before seeking input from respondents on themed questions. The cross-cutting nature of resilience means many of the issues raised will be relevant to more than one thematic area.

1. Risk and Resilience

29. Strengthening our ability to manage an evolving risk landscape depends on strengthening our ability to both predict and adapt to identified and unexpected challenges. The future global risk landscape is challenging to predict and, even when we can predict a risk, it may unfold in unexpected ways, as COVID-19 has demonstrated.
30. As a country, including local communities and individuals, we face a broad range of risks. It can often be challenging to understand what risks we are exposed to, how concerned we need to be about them and what we need to do to protect ourselves. The way we think about risk and the level of action we take to prepare ourselves ahead of time will often depend on a number of factors including how likely we are to be affected; how vulnerable we might be to any negative impacts; how much disruption the risk would cause to our lives; and what level of action we would need to take to protect ourselves. These priorities will be different for individuals, businesses, local resilience partners and Government.

Risk Assessment

31. Risk assessment allows us to better understand the risks we are facing, how likely they are to affect us and how significant their impact will be. Risk assessments help Government, businesses and local partners to plan proportionately, assessing and building the capabilities needed to handle the risk, and putting in place measures to mitigate the impacts where possible.
32. A part of the Government's responsibility for ensuring UK resilience is developing, maintaining and continually improving risk assessment. The UK Government produces and develops national-level risk assessments, and provides support to other partners responsible for producing risk assessments at the local level. These are also supplemented by risk assessments made by the devolved administrations.
33. At a national level, the Government shares its latest understanding of the most significant risks to the UK (for the next two years) through the public National Risk Register (NRR). This explains what steps the Government and its partners are taking to mitigate these challenges, and outlines the actions we can all take to help prepare for and respond to them. The NRR is the public-facing version of the Government's classified National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). The NSRA assesses the impact and likelihood of risks according to a 'reasonable worst case scenario' (the worst plausible manifestation of the risk) and enables partners to plan effectively. The NSRA and NRR are used by local partners to produce, maintain and publish Community Risk Registers, which are tailored more specifically to the risks facing local areas.
34. Neither the NRR nor the NSRA are prediction tools. No risk assessment will ever be able to identify and assess every possible risk. Unforeseen risks can materialise and

evolve in novel and surprising ways. We need to further strengthen our overall ability to deal with both known and unknown challenges by continuing to update and improve our foundational risk assessments, and ensuring that these are well communicated and understood by the relevant audiences.

35. As part of the regular cycle of updating the NSRA and NRR, the Government is reviewing aspects of the methodology that it uses to assess risk (working in partnership with the Royal Academy of Engineering and other organisations). This includes: reviewing how we account for interdependencies between different risks; the best time horizons over which to measure risks; and how we better use external inputs in our assessment. This review will ensure that the latest academic thinking and best practice is being used to assess and understand risks, so that we can be well prepared for future risks that the UK faces and communicate these to necessary audiences. The review will address all aspects of the current NSRA methodology, including how we account for cascading risks and compound risks.

Risk Appetite

36. The risk assessment process will bring about choices about how we respond to risks and, on occasion, we will have to make trade-offs. There may be some risks we choose to live with and others that we collectively judge to be intolerable. Arriving at these decisions may involve difficult choices. We should be prepared, both as Government and as a society, to have more open and honest conversations about the risks we are willing to accept, the risks that we choose to mitigate, our risk trade-offs, and the risks that we should seek to prevent above all else.

Handling catastrophic and complex risks

37. Some risks are very unlikely to happen, but would have impacts or knock-on consequences that would be so widely felt that they require bespoke planning measures. Examples of this type of **catastrophic risk** might include: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks; Artificial Intelligence risks; or widespread power outages. Learning the lessons from COVID-19, we need to build a more effective system for handling these complex risks. This should include assessing the whole range of potential impacts ahead of time, and ensuring we have sufficient oversight structures in place to assure adequate planning in place.
38. When multiple risks occur simultaneously or one after another, we face **compound and cascading risks**. These also have the potential to cause catastrophic impacts. Seemingly low impact risks can lead to more devastating effects, when they occur at the same time or affect people, infrastructure or systems that have already been hit by another risk. Globally, anticipating, preparing for, responding to and recovering from cascading and compound risks still presents a significant challenge.
39. Some other more **existential risks** (such as a large meteor strike on our planet) are statistically so unlikely that it may not be practicable for the Government to plan for them. There is nevertheless an important role for others to play in monitoring these

risks and indicating any changes in their likelihood. Such organisations include the Centre for Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity Institute.

Improving decision making through data and analysis

40. Development of new data capabilities gives us greater opportunities to understand, evaluate and manage risk.
41. We need to build further on the progress Government and partners have already made in this field, to ensure we are always equipped with the right data at the right time and that the quality of information is shared with (and accessible to) the relevant people, at both the national and local level.
42. The Government is therefore investing in a new National Situation Centre (SitCen), as a core part of the UK's crisis management framework. Working in partnership across Government and beyond, the SitCen will improve the situational awareness we need to strengthen our resilience; combining data and expertise to unlock timely insights for a safe, secure and prosperous UK. The SitCen's role will be to cover all risks, from **civil contingencies** to national security. It will add particular value where different risks intersect, and will play a vital role in bringing together what would otherwise be separate data sets, from across the Government and beyond. The SitCen will be an evolving capability, which will continue to improve over time in line with developments in data, analytics and technology.

Questions on Risk and Resilience:

1. Is there more that the Government can do to assess risk at the national and local levels? If so, what?
2. Is there more that the Government can do to communicate about risk and risk appetite with organisations and individuals? If so, what?
3. How could the Government make risk assessment and data more accessible by frontline personnel in an emergency?
4. How does your organisation assess risks around unlikely or extreme events, when there is limited or no data?
5. How could the current local risk assessment process, managed through Local Resilience Forums, be strengthened to help local partners?

2. Responsibilities and Accountability

43. The UK's resilience model is based on the principle of **subsidiarity**. This means that, wherever possible, decisions, planning for and responsibilities before, during and after an emergency lie at the lowest appropriate level (e.g. communities, local authorities, emergency responders), with coordination and collaboration at the highest necessary level (e.g. UK Government). In order to support this, we need to ensure clarity on roles and responsibilities at each tier, and better information flows between each tier.
44. In addition to clear responsibilities, it is fundamental that different levels involved in resilience building have the tools, processes and relationships in place to work together effectively. This means ensuring that work is not done in isolation, but rather through collaboration and knowledge sharing. It also means that information and data is communicated across different levels efficiently, transparently and effectively.
45. This section covers roles, responsibilities and accountability in the context of resilience and emergency management and recovery. It relates primarily to all tiers of Government - UK national, devolved and local (including businesses) - as well as **Category 1 and 2 responders** as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA), and those with academic interest.

Risk and Resilience Management in UK Central Government

46. Effective leadership of resilience is vital in the planning, response and recovery phases of emergencies. Notwithstanding the principle of subsidiarity, this means it must also remain a high priority at the centre of the UK Government.
47. The Cabinet Office will continue to create the frameworks, standards and structures for our resilience, both in terms of direction-setting (working closely with No.10) and organising the structures for central decision-making. This includes: overseeing the collaboration and information sharing between central Government and LRFs, partners and others; developing and maintaining the doctrine and plans for risk management across the risk lifecycle; activating and supporting the smooth running of the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) to drive the collective Government response in times of emergency; and delivering and hosting the UK's new Situation Centre (SitCen), to provide the best available modelling and analysis to support decision-making. The Cabinet Office will also continue to develop new national capabilities to support our resilience, such as the work to develop the new emergency text alert system which will provide warnings directly to individuals in the event of a risk to life in the local area.

The Devolved Administrations

48. The partnership between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations, reflecting the devolution settlements, is a vital part of the UK's resilience as many risks cut across geopolitical boundaries. Governments in all four nations of the UK have responsibility for providing public services and for supporting aspects of our individual and collective resilience. This includes areas such as policing, justice, health, education and transport in particular, according to the relevant devolved powers.
49. The new National Resilience Strategy will encompass an all-risks approach, from matters of national security in which powers are reserved to the UK central Government, through to all aspects of civil contingencies which affect communities within and between all parts of the UK. This can only be achieved through close partnership between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations, including sharing and learning from best practice across each part of the country.

Local Partners

50. Local authorities and responder agencies play an integral part in the planning for, response to, and recovery from any emergency, whatever the scale. The local tier must continue to be the fundamental building block for UK resilience.
51. Our strength as a country in preparing for, responding to and recovering from crises is heavily reliant on the skill and efforts of the numerous local-level organisations who work on the front line of crises. These organisations come together in multi-agency partnerships² called a Local Resilience Forum (LRF) in England and Wales. In Northern Ireland, these are referred to as Emergency Preparedness Groups, while Scotland has Regional Resilience Partnerships supported by Local Resilience Partnerships. Elected Members (local mayors, MPs, Council leaders, police and crime commissioners), civic leaders, as well as the courts, prisons and probation services, also have a role to play in supporting resilience, including the discharge of their various powers and budgets, communicating with the public and supporting recovery efforts. These local partners have played a critical role in our pandemic response and many will play key roles in the recovery. We have therefore committed to consider strengthening the roles and responsibilities of LRFs.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004

52. It is important that we also consider the legislative framework as part of our wider national resilience strategy. **The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA)** is the primary legislation which provides the framework for preparing for and responding to emergencies, informing the UK Government Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for

² These partnerships are not legal entities but have a collective responsibility mandated in the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) to ensure joined-up emergency management in their respective areas.

emergency response. It is also the mechanism for making emergency regulations (as set out in part 2 of the Act). The CCA therefore has a central role in how we deliver greater resilience across the whole of the UK.

53. Part 1 of the CCA sets out the framework for civil protection at the local level. By dividing responders into categories (1 and 2), the CCA places specific duties upon them, and creates a basis for LRFs to organise how they plan, prepare and respond to a civil emergency.

54. A review of the CCA is scheduled for March 2022. In considering this statutory underpinning of our resilience, we need better to understand the effectiveness of the current roles and responsibilities set out in the CCA and where improvements can be made. This includes the legal status and categorisation of local responders; the 'Triple Lock' test for use of the CCA's emergency powers; the appointment of regional coordinators; and the potential addition of legal responsibilities around recovery to the Act.

55. Detailed questions on the CCA can be found in Annex A.

Questions on Responsibilities and Accountability:

1. Do you think that the current division of resilience responsibilities between Central Government, the Devolved Administrations, local government and local responders is correct? If not, why?
2. How can the UK Central Government, DAs, local and regional forms of government and local responders better collaborate on resilience?
3. What role, if any, should the UK Central government have in assuring that local areas are effectively carrying out their resilience responsibilities, whilst also respecting local responsibilities?

The primary legislative basis for emergency management is the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). Specific questions on the CCA are covered in Annex A. There is also legislation covering specific risk areas including, for example, the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Climate Change Act 2008, amongst others.

4. What do you consider the advantages and disadvantages of the current legislative basis for resilience?

3. Partnerships

56. Resilience is not solely a government or public sector responsibility. Other parts of society play an essential role in ensuring our collective resilience. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted more than ever the importance of public-private sector partnerships and collaborative working between Government, businesses, business organisations and the research community to achieve shared goals. For example, many manufacturers adapted their production processes to make vital supplies like hand sanitiser and face masks. The pandemic also highlighted just how quickly the operation of businesses can be disrupted in the event of an emergency. It is crucial that we empower and enable all businesses to put in place arrangements to ensure that critical parts of business can continue during periods of disruption..
57. We also depend on a range of local partnerships, including LRFs, Community Safety Partnerships, Counter Terrorism Boards and Event Safety groups, amongst many others. Further strengthening these partnerships and drawing on innovative resilience approaches outside Government will increase our overall resilience. To achieve effective partnerships, all parties must feel empowered to play a role in resilience building, and have the means, tools and knowledge to do so. We must ensure that our efforts are complementary, and there is a clear communication and a shared understanding of what it means to be resilient.
58. This section includes the role of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors, wider critical sectors and of academia in building resilience. Questions related to local response arrangements, including the role and responsibilities of LRFs, are included in the Civil Contingencies Act questions in Annex A.

Critical National Infrastructure

59. **Critical National Infrastructure**³ (CNI) refers to those assets which are crucial for keeping the UK running, and providing the essential services upon which we rely every day. It also includes infrastructure which, if disrupted, could have a significant impact on our national security and/or defence. Disruptions to CNI services can have major and wide-ranging impacts. For example, national infrastructure could be targeted by cyber criminals or terrorists for financial gain or to cause disruption. CNI may also be affected by hazards such as flooding or storms, which could, for example, lead to power outages or water supply disruption.
60. The resilience of our CNI, therefore, is vital. It is fundamental that CNI sectors have robust business continuity plans in place ahead of time to ensure that where disruption does occur, the provision of these critical services can continue. There is also more that can be done to ensure consistency across all CNI sectors, and to ensure that all sectors and their operators are reaching the same set of high standards. We need to ensure our expectations of, and offer to CNI businesses, is

³ There are 13 Critical National Infrastructure sectors: Chemicals, Civil Nuclear, Communications, Defence, Emergency Services, Energy, Finance, Food, Government, Health, Space, Transport and Water.

clear and robust, as emphasised in the 2020 Resilience Review by the National Infrastructure Commission.

Wider critical sectors and supply chains

61. As the UK has become progressively globalised, and more dependent on the internet and its technologies, our understanding of critical sectors has shifted and expanded to encompass a much wider range of sectors as well as supply chains. Other critical categories include (but are not limited) to: incident-critical infrastructure; sensitive technologies; and critical supply chains. Data and internet infrastructure now also play a vital underpinning role across many sectors. These types of critical businesses play a uniquely valuable role and the Government needs to consider whether a different kind of partnership with them is needed.
62. The Government itself also has important partnerships with a range of contractors, where the security and resilience of these companies and their supply chains is essential to the smooth running of central and local government. We need to make sure existing partnerships are as effective as possible, and identify how best to form new partnerships in these sectors.
63. The Government has already begun to further strengthen its partnership with sectors involved in a range of critical sectors and key supply chains. This includes ongoing work through the Finance Sector Cyber Collaboration Centre and on supply chains through the National Security and Investment Act. It also includes partnerships such as the Security and Resilience Industry and Suppliers Community (RISC) and legislation such as the Climate Adaptation Reporting power, which invites CNI providers to report on the action they are taking to adapt to a changing climate. Options are also being considered for a new College for National Security and for a Civilian Reserve of trained experts which can be called on to support national and local resilience work in times of need. Both of these would support partnerships between the Government and businesses, as well as with academia.

Business Continuity

64. Emergencies can impact businesses and organisations in a number of ways, whether that be due to the unavailability of a building, staff shortages, or disruption to supply chains or equipment. The UK's dependence on a wide range of sectors, services and supply chains means that any disruption can lead to significant and far-reaching impacts for businesses themselves, their suppliers, and UK citizens. It is therefore fundamental that all critical businesses and industries put in place arrangements to ensure the continuity of their services during emergencies. Advance business continuity planning will enable the continued provision of key services, thereby reducing impacts and allowing businesses to return to normal as quickly as possible.

Research and academia

65. Academia and research organisations play an important role in shaping the Government's understanding of resilience, working with Government departments to assess and identify short term priorities and longer term strategic issues. This includes scientific collaboration, in particular. For example, the Health Protection Research Unit at King's College London provided vital independent advice during the COVID-19 pandemic; the Government is improving partnerships with academia on security and resilience through the Joint Security and Resilience Centre; and UK Research and Innovation are jointly leading the UK Climate Resilience Programme with the Met Office.

66. However, there is more we can do in this area to ensure that academia and research organisations - from the public, private and tertiary sectors - have increasingly open and productive conversations with Government about resilience, and to encourage the prioritisation of resilience research, and increased collaboration.

Questions on Partnerships:

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) owners and operators:

1. Do you think that the resilience of CNI can be further improved? If so, how?
2. Do you think the introduction of appropriate statutory resilience standards would improve the security and resilience of CNI operators? Why?
 - a. How would such standards define the necessary levels of service provision?
 - b. Are there any risks associated with implementing such standards?
3. What do you think is the most effective way to test and assure the resilience of CNI?
 - a. To what extent do you think regulators should play a role in testing the resilience of CNI systems and operators?
4. During an emergency, what do you think should be the role of the operators of CNI in ensuring continued provision of essential services (e.g. water, electricity, public transport)?
 - a. How can the Government support CNI owners or operators during an emergency?

Wider critical sectors

5. What role, if any, does your business or sector play in national resilience?
6. What are the risks that your business is most concerned about?
7. What information, tools or guidance could the Government provide to help your business better assess or prepare for these types of risk?
8. What is your business' approach to building resilience in any key supply chains that your business is part of?

6. How useful have vehicles such as Local Enterprise Partnerships, Growth Hubs and other local business support services been strengthening your organisations' resilience? Why?

Academic and research organisations

7. What can the Government do to make collaboration between academic and research organisations more effective?
8. Are there areas where the role of research in building national resilience can be expanded?

4. Community

67. In this section, ‘communities’ refers to *individuals* (e.g. members of the public and households), *individual organisations* (e.g. businesses or voluntary, community and social enterprise groups), *individual community groups* (e.g. local neighbourhood groups), and *associations and networks* (e.g. local community, faith or business networks).
68. The Integrated Review set out that a **whole-of-society** approach will be central to renewing the UK’s resilience, with a revived effort to inform and empower all of society and support greater community responsibility and resilience. This approach recognises that, although some emergencies require a national response, most emergencies occur locally and are dealt with first and foremost by local emergency responders and communities.
69. Emergency services and volunteers train and prepare to respond to an emergency, but other members of the community can also be involved. Responding to any emergency is complex and it is important that everyone works together to achieve the best outcomes - and whether an emergency is national or local, everyone has a role to play to help themselves and their communities.
70. The questions in this section seek to understand: what communities understand about local emergencies; and what more could be done to inform communities about emergencies, to help everyone be better prepared.

The role of the public

71. Local emergency responders such as the police, fire, ambulance, and local authorities have a duty to plan for emergencies and respond to them when they happen. But responsibility for being prepared for emergencies goes wider than that and everyone should take some self-responsibility. Communities have a vital role to play, and there are clear benefits when communities are able to respond and recover effectively and use their skills and resources to support themselves.
72. The capacity of communities to support each other has been seen throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as during other emergencies such as severe weather and flooding events, when people and organisations across the UK volunteered their time and resources to help the most affected in their communities.

Public information and communications

73. Most of us worry about immediate risks to the safety of our family and friends. Some risks and the steps we can take to prevent them are clear; individuals understand the impact they could have and feel well-equipped to take protective action (examples might include domestic fires, or severe weather events such as heavy snow). But it is more difficult for individuals to recognise and prepare for other types of risk which

may cause wider harm. This could include infrequent events with considerable impacts, such as pandemics or major floods, or more malicious threats such as terror attacks.

74. Regardless of the nature or scale of the risk, some communities and individuals are more vulnerable. Some might be more likely to be affected by a particular risk or have greater difficulty responding to or recovering from an emergency. Everyone has a role to play in ensuring resources are focused on those most in need.
75. Providing clear and timely information to the public can help raise awareness and inform communities about the types of emergencies that are likely to affect them and the actions they can take to better prepare and respond.
76. National governments communicate with the public about risk in a number of ways. For example, public information campaigns give tailored advice on things like: actions to take during a health pandemic; preparing for severe weather; or how passengers can report suspicious behaviour on public transport. Government websites also provide wide-ranging advice for the public about how to prepare for different risks. At the local level, emergency responders provide advice and information in a variety of ways. For example, Community Risk Registers hosted on local government websites provide advice on local risks, as well as social media posts, blogs and local campaigns (where door knocking is often used as a direct means of communicating with the public). Community groups and organisations also help raise awareness of local risks and can help responders identify vulnerable people in their communities and help them to access support.
77. Individual volunteers, community groups and organisations, and the voluntary, community and social enterprise (VCSE) sector already play a strong role in communities. Local volunteers and VCSE organisations can provide support to emergency responders during an emergency and can bring an understanding of those who are vulnerable or may be in need of help. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers across the UK offered their time during the COVID-19 response, undertaking simple local tasks right through to delivering the national vaccination programme. However, it is not just structured volunteering that can make a huge difference. Everyone can play a part in supporting emergency responses by being prepared, supporting their neighbours and communities to be more resilient.

Questions on Community and local resilience:

1. Do you agree that everyone has a part to play in improving the UK's resilience? If not, why not?
2. Do you understand the types of emergencies that might impact you and other members of your community?
 - a. What would help you better understand the risks that could affect your community?

- b. Do you know where to access information about emergencies that could affect you?
- 3. Have you considered the actions you might take to prepare for or during an emergency?
 - a. What has motivated you to plan or make preparations?
 - b. What has stopped you from planning or making preparations?
 - c. What would help you to be able to make a plan or prepare?
- 4. Have recent emergencies (e.g. COVID-19 pandemic, flooding, terrorist attacks) made you think differently about risks or changed the way you prepare for emergencies?
- 5. Are there any barriers in accessing local volunteering schemes or finding community groups that discuss local emergency planning? If so, what are the barriers?

5. Investment

78. Events over the last decade have demonstrated that the cost of responding to and recovering from disasters can be significant, often outweighing the cost of preparing for or preventing such events. Greater targeted investment upfront in preparing for risks would help us in the longer term, not only to make financial savings, but also to reduce the impacts on people's lives and shorten recovery times.
79. The challenge of where to place investment in the risk cycle is one that affects the public and private sectors alike. As individuals and businesses, we face choices around what, and how much, to insure. By recognising the risks that we are directly vulnerable to, we can better tailor our investment and ensure that our efforts are directed at the activity that is most likely to increase resilience. As part of this, we should examine public sector funding models and how we can ensure that the tools and skills that we invest in are adaptable for managing the widest possible range of risks.
80. Questions in this section are intended to help the Government understand current levels of investment in resilience (by businesses in particular) and what investment opportunities could be considered going forward.

Public sector funding models

81. The ownership of risks and their impacts is spread across government, local authorities and the wider public sector. This has been demonstrated very clearly by COVID-19, with significant financial impacts across health and social care, education and transport amongst many others. Whilst the overall model of public sector funding being allocated to individual government departments will not change, there may be a case for a more holistic view of funding for resilience and the management of risk by the public sector. This could include, for example, flexible funding models which could be used by government departments to manage emerging or previously unidentified risks.
82. Decisions about costs and benefits might also benefit from clearer frameworks for assessing the 'insurance' effects of investment, or the case for focusing spend on prevention, or the effects of efficiency on the resilience that comes from spare capacity within systems.
83. We should also maximise our ability to respond by prioritising investment in adaptable capabilities that allow us to manage the widest possible range of risks, whilst ensuring that we maintain sufficient specialist capabilities that may be needed to respond to specific challenges as well. Examples of adaptable **capabilities** include: contingency planning and regular exercises involving the Government, the emergency services, other local responders and industry; and making use of military personnel in supporting domestic national security priorities. Examples of specialist capabilities would include: the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL);

and those that have supported the incredible progress in vaccine development over the last year.

84. In recent years the Government has provided some 'exceptional' funding to LRFs in England to help local responders collectively prepare for and respond to challenges posed by COVID19 and EU Exit preparations. Following the commitment in the Integrated Review to "consider strengthening the role and responsibilities of LRFs in England" the Government has launched an LRF funding pilot for the financial year 2021-22, the findings of which will inform both the National Resilience Strategy and the CCA review.

85. Investment in resilience does not only refer to physical security, but also to cyber and digital security too. The Integrated Review commits us to building a resilient and prosperous digital UK. We must capitalise on advances in digital capabilities, data and information which enable us to reap further efficiencies.

Private sector spending on resilience

86. The private sector shares responsibility for building resilience. In common with the public sector, businesses do not have infinite time, resources or money to invest - particularly following the economic damage caused by COVID-19. Some businesses, particularly those in CNI sectors, invest significantly in the resilience of their organisation, assets and services, but others do not (or may not be able to). There is a question around how far all businesses (and most particularly those considered CNI or in critical sectors) should take an "insurance approach" and seek to invest more to mitigate and manage systemic risks which could directly affect them and the customers and society they support.

Questions on Investment:

1. How does your organisation invest in your approach to the risks outlined in this document? Is your investment focussed on particular stages of the risk lifecycle (for example, on prevention)?
2. Has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the way your organisation is investing, or will invest, in preparing for these risks? If so, how?
3. Are there models of successful resilience investment? If so, to what extent could they be adopted in the UK?
4. Are there examples of where investment (whether by the Government, by businesses or by individuals) has driven improvements in resilience?

6. Resilience in an interconnected world

87. We cannot consider our national resilience in isolation from the rest of the world. This interconnectedness means that both challenges and opportunities are more frequently experienced on either a transnational or global scale. These challenges cannot be managed by the UK in isolation, but rely on concerted international collaboration.
88. The Integrated Review sets out an ambition for the UK to be at the forefront of global leadership on security and resilience, strengthening our science and technology power, remaining a world leader in climate change and biodiversity, and continuing our work in international diplomacy and development. This section seeks views on how and where we might further leverage and strengthen international capabilities to support our collective resilience and that of our citizens at home.

Global risks

89. Global interconnectedness places us within a flourishing network of open societies and economies worldwide, which in turn strengthens our own national economy and society. At the same time, it connects us with societies and economies which are not so open, but which benefit us economically. However, as we have seen from the COVID-19 pandemic, population mobility and the increasingly interdependent and interconnected nature of the world's economy means that impacts from challenges emerging in one country can very quickly spread globally.
90. Climate change, conflict which creates conditions where trans-national serious and organised crime can flourish, terrorism, mass displacement of people driven by humanitarian crises, and global health all have direct impacts on our domestic resilience. We need partnerships and international systems that can anticipate and tackle these transnational risks.

International connectivity

91. Across much of the world, the COVID-19 pandemic and its fallout led to border and export restrictions, a reduction in manufacturing outputs, and demand spikes in certain goods. The combination of these impacts led to some significant challenges in the global supply chains which the UK relies upon for critical goods.
92. The Government's starting position when building resilience in critical supply chains is to take a market-first approach. We prosper from an open economy, and openness itself confers resilience. The respective roles the Government and the private sector play in building resilience vary by supply chain and will depend in part on whether the critical supply chain is directly procured by the Government.
93. There are four areas where we can strengthen the resilience of global supply chains. Firstly, a focus on diversification of supply through international trade would enable a

balanced supply base for critical goods and creating protection against local shocks. Secondly, we can use partnerships and collaboration with international partners to promote a rules-based free and fair global trading system and mitigate against protectionism, trade barriers, bribery and corruption. Thirdly, the creation of strategic reserves of critical goods, supporting infrastructure, and pre-agreed sourcing frameworks would contribute to overall resilience of supply chains. And finally, expanding UK production for certain critical commodities would also make a substantial contribution to the resilience of critical supplies..

94. In addition to our physical interconnectedness with the rest of the world, we need to manage risks to our digital connectivity. An accessible and interoperable global internet is critically important to the UK economy. The Government's forthcoming National Cyber Strategy will continue to protect the right for all to share information and communicate freely and safely. And we will also need to protect the physical infrastructure which supports our increasingly data-driven society and economy.

International partnerships

95. Greater resilience is essential to thriving open societies and economies. The UK already has strong global relationships, bilaterally and through multilateral institutions. We should continue to build on these relationships, learning from the successful approaches taken by other countries to strengthen resilience and sharing knowledge and learning. We should also continue to enhance our international presence and partnerships in ways that can support a global community that is more resilient overall.
96. Our own resilience is dependent on our international alliances and action. For example, building on our domestic commitment to reach net zero by 2050, the Government will work through alliances and partnerships to accelerate the transition to a zero-carbon global economy, protect and restore biodiversity, and support adaptation and resilience – particularly for the most vulnerable worldwide.
97. The UK's commitment to resilience internationally through development and humanitarian investments allows us to leverage our international networks, identify risks, prepare effectively and act early to protect global and UK resilience. This supports UK crisis response efforts and enables strategic partnerships to build global stability. It also helps us to support communities and societies to recover from successive climate and conflict-fuelled humanitarian crises and address the drivers of vulnerability, as a way of preventing future conflict and displacement, which in turn impacts stability in the UK. The roles of International Financial Institutions and the UN are crucial for providing an international system that protects our collective resilience.
98. The Government is also committed to building health resilience at home and at the international level, recognising the interconnected nature of our global health system. In particular, the Government will bolster efforts to improve pandemic preparedness – taking a One Health approach – and to reform the WHO, applying the lessons of COVID-19. One Health also includes animal and plant health - and how they interact.

Questions on Resilience in an Interconnected World:

1. Where do you see the UK's resilience strengths?
2. Are there any approaches taken by other countries to resilience that you think the UK could learn from?
3. Which of the UK's international relationships and programmes do you think are most important to the UK's resilience?
4. What international risks have the greatest impact on UK resilience?
5. How can the UK encourage international partners to build resilience to global risks?

About you

This section is mandatory for anyone responding to this call for evidence. Questions seek to gather some basic personal information about the respondent. Please see Privacy Notice at Annex B for information on how your personal data will be handled.

1. **Name**
2. **Email address**
3. **In what context are you responding (please select all that apply):**
 - a. As an individual (and acting in a personal capacity)
 - i. What is your occupation?
 - b. As an employee or volunteer involved in emergency preparedness or resilience work
 - i. Do you work for an organisation defined as a Category 1 or 2 emergency responder (as set out in the CCA)?
 - ii. In your role, do you primarily operate at the Strategic, Tactical or Operational level?
 - iii. Please give the name of the organisation you are involved with
 - c. As a representative of a business, firm or trade body
 - i. Please give an indication of the size of the organisation (approximate no. of employees)
 - ii. With which sector is the organisation most closely related?
 - iii. Please give the name of the business, firm or trade body
 - d. As a representative of an academic or research organisation
 - i. Please give the name of this organisation
 - e. Other (please specify)
2. **Which of the following most closely describes your level of knowledge of risk and resilience related issues? (please select one of the following):**
 - a. Expert understanding of resilience or risk management
E.g. Category 1 or 2 responder; COMAH site operator; Academic focussing on resilience; Risk manager, insurer, risk modeller.
 - b. Good insight into some aspects of resilience or risk management
E.g. Business owner with experience of risk assessment.
 - c. General interest
E.g. Member of the public

Contact details and how to respond

For information about how we treat your personal data when you respond to the questions in this consultation, please see the Privacy Notice at Annex C.

Responses should be submitted by 27 September 2021 to:

Email: resiliencestrategy-cfe@cabinetoffice.gov.uk

Complaints or comments

If you have any complaints or comments about the consultation process you should contact the Cabinet Office at the above address.

Confidentiality and Data Protection

If you want the information that you provide to be treated as confidential, please explain to us why you regard the information you have provided as confidential. We will take full account of your explanation, but we cannot give an assurance that confidentiality can be maintained in all circumstances. An automatic confidentiality disclaimer generated by your IT system will not, of itself, be regarded as binding on the Cabinet Office.

For information on how we treat your personal information when you respond to this call for evidence, please see the Privacy Notice at Annex C.

Annexes

Annex A: Civil Contingencies Act

Summary:

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ('CCA') was passed to set out a regulatory framework for preparedness and response to civil emergencies particularly at the local level (Part 1) and to provide for emergency regulations to be deployed in specific circumstances (Part 2). More detailed requirements for local preparedness under Part 1 are contained in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005. The Government is legally obligated to review these Regulations every five years. However, in accordance with previous practice, we are using this opportunity to review the operation of the CCA as a whole. The last review, undertaken in 2017, found the CCA to be fit for purpose. The current review will be completed in 2022 and will take into account subsequent changes to the risk landscape such as the COVID-19 response and EU exit preparations. This call for evidence will inform the current review.

Part 1 of the CCA sets out the arrangements for civil protection at the local level. By dividing responders into categories (1 and 2), the CCA places specific duties upon them, and creates a basis for local resilience forums ('LRFs') to coordinate how they plan, prepare and respond to a civil emergency.

Part 2 of the CCA provides for the making of temporary special legislation ('emergency regulations') and the conditions under which they may be used (sometimes known as the 'triple lock'). Emergency regulations have never been used, but remain available as a last resort. The 'triple lock' provides a safeguard on the use of these powers, determining that they may only be used under three conditions:

- An emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur;
- It is necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency;
- The need for provision referred to in point 2 is urgent.

The emergency regulations must also be an appropriate and proportionate response to the emergency. Where possible, the Government's policy is always to pass legislation through the standard Parliamentary process and to incorporate emergency powers into relevant sector legislation.

The Government considers that the CCA is a robust piece of legislation that has led to the development of local resilience structures and provided an overall basis for UK emergency planning and resilience. As such, any changes to it would need to be supported by clear reasoning, evidence and analysis of the costs of benefits (and would need an Act of Parliament to implement). It is however worth noting that since the introduction of the CCA, there have been significant changes to the risk landscape in the UK. In answering these questions you should therefore consider whether it continues to provide the Government (both local and national), local responders and other stakeholders with the tools they need to prepare for, respond to and recover from civil emergencies.

The legislation is available to view here :
<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/contents>

Guidance for completing the questions:

- You are not obliged to answer all the questions below. If you do not wish to answer or comment on a particular question please skip to the next question you wish to answer.
- When filling out an answer using free text, please only address the relevant question(s).
- Where you are proposing to change existing definitions or provisions within the Act please provide clear evidence as to why the change should be considered.
- Please note that not all of the questions below are applicable to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. There is a dedicated section for comment on how the CCA specifically affects each devolved administration.

Questions

Part 1 of the CCA:

This section covers Part 1 of the CCA, which provides the statutory framework for civil protection at a local level. We particularly invite responses from Category 1 responders, Category 2 responders, and those involved in emergency planning, response and recovery at the national, regional and local levels.

Definition:

The CCA (section 1) defines an emergency as:

- (a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom,
- (b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or
- (c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.

1. Does the above definition reflect your understanding of an emergency, and if not how does the definition need to be expanded within the CCA? Y/N + Free text

Included parties:

2. Is the current designation of Category 1 and 2 responders appropriate? If not, what would be the merits of changing the identities and/or status of responders within the CCA?
Y/N + Free text

3. Are there gaps in critical representation of responder organisations?
Y/N + Free text
4. Should elected local figures (e.g. Council Leaders, MPs, Metro Mayors, Police and Crime Commissioners) have greater involvement in emergency planning and preparative exercising, response and recovery and in what way?
Y/N + Free text

Duties:

5. Are the current duties on Category 1 and 2 responders, as described in the CCA, appropriate?
Y/N
6. If not, please list the duties which should be added, adjusted or removed?
Free text
7. Does the framework set out in the CCA provide sufficient clarity of the different roles and responsibilities of Category 1 and 2 responders?
Y/N
8. If the answer to the above question is no, how could this be made clearer within the CCA?
Free Text

Oversight and assurance:

There are currently no provisions for collective oversight and assurance of resilience organisations within the CCA as they are reviewed by independent or organisational audit regimes.

9. Are existing mechanisms for oversight and assurance of organisations involved in resilience adequate?
Y/N
10. If the answer to the above question is no, please explain why this is the case, providing evidence to support where possible
Free Text
11. Should the CCA mandate review of local contingency plans covering a range of risk scenarios?
Y/N
12. If you answered yes to the question above (Please rate the options below based on how appropriate they are 1 = not appropriate, 10 = highly appropriate):
 - Peer review (e.g. LRF to LRF)
 - Independent review
 - Lead Government Department review
 - Other - please specify
13. Do the arrangements as set out in the CCA provide the LRF Chair and Secretariat with sufficient means by which they can effectively coordinate contingency planning of Category 1 and 2 responders in their area?
Y/N + free text

Enforcement:

Enforcement remains an option under the CCA but would only be used as a last resort. We expect all public bodies and local responders to meet the highest standards in performing their duty, these standards are routinely upheld by their own organisational rules and processes.

14. A Minister of the Crown may use High Court or Court of Session proceedings to enforce duties under Part 1 of the CCA upon a Category 1 or 2 responder. Is this the right way to enforce obligations under the CCA if duties are not met?

Y/N + Free text

Additional issues:

15. Does the CCA sufficiently consider recovery arrangements? If not, how could this be improved?

Y/N + Free text

16. Are the responsibilities related to information sharing and cooperation sufficient for ensuring an effective multi-agency response?

Y/N + Free text

17. How could we improve the effectiveness of LRFs (non legislatively)?

Free text

18. Are LRFs/Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs)⁴ fulfilling a sufficient role in terms of planning, response and recovery? If not, what are the barriers to this?

Free text

19. Should specific duties be placed upon central government in Part 1 of the CCA, and if so, what would these be?

Y/N + Free text

20. Would you like to note anything in regards to Part 1 of the CCA that is not captured by the questions above.

Free text

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland:

The CCA applies to the whole of the UK, but with some variations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Part 1 is applicable to the equivalent organisations in Scotland and Wales, but applies only to a limited number of organisations in Northern Ireland. The CCA extends to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in accordance with their devolution settlements and civil contingency arrangements.

21. Are the responsibilities and duties set out in the CCA fit for purpose for Northern Ireland?

22. Are the responsibilities and duties set out in the CCA fit for purpose for Scotland?

⁴ The LRF is required to establish and test its collective arrangements to form a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) at the time of an emergency. The purpose of an SCG is to enable multi-agency cooperation and communication during an emergency, lead the response activities and where necessary, work with central government.

23. Are the responsibilities and duties set out in the CCA fit for purpose for Wales?

Y/N + Free text

Part 2 of the CCA:

This section focuses on Part 2 of the CCA, which provides for the making of special temporary legislation ('emergency regulations') to deal with the most serious of emergencies, and the conditions under which they may be made (known as the 'triple lock'):

- An emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur;
- It is necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency;
- The need for provision referred to in point 2 is urgent.

The emergency regulations must also be an appropriate and proportionate response to the emergency.

In the event that emergency regulations are made, Part 2 also requires a senior Minister of the Crown to appoint a Regional Nominated (or Emergency) Coordinator who is not a servant or agent of the Crown, to oversee the coordination of response efforts in each area where the emergency regulations are made, at the regional level and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

24. The CCA sets out strict conditions which must be met for emergency regulation to be made - this is known as the 'triple lock'. Are these conditions still appropriate and, if not, how could the 'triple lock' be improved?

Y/N + Free text

25. Should the regional coordinator role be retained? If yes, why is this the case, and who should be eligible to fill the position?

Y/N + Free text

26. Would you like to note anything in regards to Part 2 of the CCA that is not captured by the questions above?

Free text

Statutory Guidance questions

The statutory guidance is available to view here:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness>

27. Are there institutions and positions that have come into existence after this CCA was developed which should be included in the statutory guidance? For example, Police and Crime Commissioners and Combined Authority Mayors ('Metro Mayors'). Y/N + Free text

28. Would you like to note anything in regards to the statutory guidance of the CCA? Y/N + Free text

Annex B: Glossary

Terms listed in the glossary are **in bold** text throughout the document.

Term	Definition
Acute risk	Time-bound, discrete events, for example a major fire or a terrorist attack. Contrast with Chronic risks .
Capabilities	In this context, capabilities means the organisations, tools, data, legislation or resources required to respond to risks. There are both specific capabilities, which are needed to manage specific risks, as well as generic ones which can be used to respond flexibly to multiple risks. Specific capabilities could include specialist equipment used to pump water or measure water speed during flood events. Generic capabilities include evacuation and shelter capability, and the emergency services.
Cascading risk	This term refers to the knock-on impacts of a risk that cause further physical, social or economic disruption. For example, severe weather could cause flooding, which then causes damage to electricity infrastructure, resulting in a power outage which then disrupts communications service providers (and so on).
Catastrophic risk	Those risks with the potential to cause extreme, widespread and/or prolonged impacts, including significant loss of life, and/or severe damage to the UK's economy, security, infrastructure systems, services and/or the environment. Risks of this scale would require coordination and support from central Government. Examples include: the widespread dispersal of a biological agent, severe flooding, or the detonation of an improvised nuclear device.
Category 1 and 2 Emergency Responder	<p>The Civil Contingencies Act divides those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level into two groups (Category 1 and Category 2 responders), each with different duties.</p> <p>Category 1 responders are those at the core of most emergencies and include: the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies.</p> <p>Category 2 responders are representatives of organisations less likely to be at the heart of emergency planning but who are required to co-operate and share</p>

	information with other responders to ensure that they are well integrated within wider emergency planning frameworks. They will also be heavily involved in incidents affecting their sector. Category 2 organisations include: the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies.
Chronic risk	Continuous challenges which gradually erode our economy, community, way of life and/or national security (e.g. money laundering; antimicrobial resistance). Contrast with Acute risks .
Civil contingencies	Planning and preparation for events or incidents with the potential to impact ordinary citizens and their interests.
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA)	The framework for civil protection in the UK. The CCA identifies and establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. It also allows for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious of emergencies.
Compound risk	When two or more events coincide (either in the same place, or at the same time) causing impacts greater than the sum of the individual risks. An example could be flooding impacting an area that is already experiencing a peak in COVID-19 infections.
Crisis	An event or series of events that represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security, or well-being of a community or other large group of people usually over a wider area.
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)	National Infrastructure is those facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks and processes, necessary for a country to function and upon which daily life depends. It also includes some functions, sites and organisations which are not critical to the maintenance of essential services, but which need protection due to the potential danger to the public (civil nuclear and chemical sites for example). Critical National Infrastructure is a subset of National Infrastructure which, if damaged, would have major impacts on a national scale.
Emergency	An emergency is defined as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare, or to the environment; or • war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage

	to security
Hazard	Hazards are non-malicious risks such as extreme weather events, accidents or the natural outbreak of disease. Contrast with Threat .
Local Resilience Forum (LRF)	<p>Multi-agency partnerships with a collective responsibility to coordinate planning and response efforts to localised emergencies. LRFs are comprised of representatives from the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations involved in emergency preparedness.</p> <p>The CCA and the Regulations provide that responders, through the Local Resilience Forum, have a collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-agency environment."</p>
Local Responder, Local authorities and responder agencies	Local responders and local responder agencies include: the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies. In the context of the devolved administrations, this can also refer to national agencies such as the Scottish Police, Welsh ambulance service and Northern Ireland fire service
Malicious risk	Risks characterised by deliberate human intent to cause harm or disruption. These risks can come from individuals, groups or States. Examples include: terrorism; serious and organised crime; and hostile activity by foreign states.
Non-malicious risk	Risks characterised by natural or accidental causes. Examples include: industrial accidents; extreme weather; and human and animal disease.
Resilience	The UK's ability to anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from natural hazards, deliberate attacks, geopolitical instability, disease outbreaks, and other disruptive events, civil emergencies or threats to our way of life.
Risk	An event, person or object which could cause loss of life or injury, damage to infrastructure, social and economic disruption or environment degradation. The severity of a risk is assessed as a combination of its potential impact and its likelihood. The Government subdivides risks into: hazards and threats .
Risk appetite	The amount of risk an individual, business, organisation or government is willing to tolerate.

Risk-agnostic	Describes the ability of a capability, process or response to address 'common' impacts of risks (i.e. those impacts that occur across multiple scenarios). For example, major fires, terrorist incidents and flooding are all likely to produce mass casualties; developing capabilities to handle mass casualties is, therefore, a risk-agnostic approach.
Risk life cycle	A conceptual model that breaks the management of a risk down into stages at which different preparatory actions can be taken. The Government is using six stages: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery.
Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs)	Some disruptive events or emergencies require strategic multi-agency co-ordination at the local level (e.g. a major flood event). This is carried out by a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), which can be activated by any responder organisation represented on the LRF. The SCG takes overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the incident and establishes a strategic framework within which lower levels of command and coordinating groups will work. SCGs are usually chaired by the Police.
Subsidiarity	The principle whereby decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level. In practice this means that most incidents are handled within the capabilities of local agencies and responders, without central involvement.
Systemic vulnerability	Economic, societal, environmental and infrastructural factors that make a system more prone or vulnerable to the impacts of hazards or threats.
Threat	Malicious risks such as acts of terrorism, hostile state activity and cyber crime. Contrast with Hazard .
Upstream risk	Risks occurring in or affecting other countries, or in ungoverned spaces (including the oceans, space and cyberspace), which may then evolve to affect the UK.
Vulnerability	The quality or state of being more prone or exposed to the impacts of hazards or threats. Vulnerabilities could affect individuals, communities, assets or a whole system and may be caused by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes.

Annex C: Privacy Notice for Cabinet Office consultations

This notice sets out how we will use your personal data, and your rights. It is made under Articles 13 and/or 14 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Your data

Purpose

The purpose for which we are processing your personal data is to obtain the opinions of members of the public, parliamentarians and representatives of organisations and companies about departmental policies, proposals, or generally to obtain public opinion data on an issue of public interest.

The data

We will process the following personal data: name, address, email address, job title (where given), and employer (where given), as well as opinions.

We will also process additional biographical information about respondents or third parties where it is volunteered.

Legal basis of processing

The legal basis for processing your personal data is that it is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the data controller. In this case that is consulting on departmental policies or proposals, or obtaining opinion data, in order to develop good effective policies.

Sensitive personal data is personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation.

The legal basis for processing your sensitive personal data, or data about criminal convictions (where you volunteer it), is that it is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest for the exercise of a function of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown, or a government department. The function is consulting on departmental policies or proposals, or obtaining opinion data, in order to develop good effective policies.

Recipients

Where individuals submit responses, we may publish their responses, but we will not publicly identify them. We will endeavour to remove any information that may lead to individuals being identified.

Responses submitted by organisations or representatives of organisations may be published in full.

Where information about responses is not published, it may be shared with officials within other public bodies in order to help develop policy.

As your personal data will be stored on our IT infrastructure it will also be shared with our data processors who provide email, and document management and storage services.

We may share your personal data where required to be law, for example in relation to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Retention

Published information will generally be retained indefinitely on the basis that the information is of historic value. This would include, for example, personal data about representatives of organisations.

Responses from individuals will be retained in identifiable form for three calendar years after the consultation has concluded.

Where personal data have not been obtained from you

Your personal data were obtained by us from a respondent to a consultation.

Your Rights

You have the right to request information about how your personal data are processed, and to request a copy of that personal data.

You have the right to request that any inaccuracies in your personal data are rectified without delay.

You have the right to request that any incomplete personal data are completed, including by means of a supplementary statement.

You have the right to request that your personal data are erased if there is no longer a justification for them to be processed.

You have the right in certain circumstances (for example, where accuracy is contested) to request that the processing of your personal data is restricted.

You have the right to object to the processing of your personal data where it is processed for direct marketing purposes.

You have the right to object to the processing of your personal data.

International transfers

As your personal data is stored on our IT infrastructure, and shared with our data processors, it may be transferred and stored securely outside the European Union. Where

that is the case it will be subject to equivalent legal protection through the use of Model Contract Clauses.

Contact details

The data controller for your personal data is the Cabinet Office. The contact details for the data controller are: Cabinet Office, 70 Whitehall, London, SW1A 2AS, or 0207 276 1234, or publiccorrespondence@cabinetoffice.gov.uk.

The contact details for the data controller's Data Protection Officer are: Data Protection Officer, Cabinet Office, 70 Whitehall, London, SW1A 2AS, or dpo@cabinetoffice.gov.uk.

The Data Protection Officer provides independent advice and monitoring of Cabinet Office's use of personal information.

Complaints

If you consider that your personal data has been misused or mishandled, you may make a complaint to the Information Commissioner, who is an independent regulator. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at: Information Commissioner's Office, Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF, or 0303 123 1113, or casework@ico.org.uk. Any complaint to the Information Commissioner is without prejudice to your right to seek redress through the courts.

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