Cabinet Office

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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BDG	Border Delivery Group	
BSIG	Borders and Supply Impact Group	
BUKIG	Beyond the UK Impact Group	
C3	Command, Control and Coordination	
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat	

CONOPs	Concept of Operations
DA	Devolved Administration
DExEU	Department for Exiting the EU
DOC	Departmental Operation Centre
EDS	Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
FOC	Full Operating Capability
HR	Human Resources
IG	Impact Group
IGLO	Impact Group Liaison Officer
IOC	Initial Operating Capability
LIG	Local Impact Group
LO	Liaison Officer
ND	No Deal
NDDG	No Deal Delivery Group
NI	Northern Ireland
PAs	Planning Assumptions
PMO	Project Management Office
RD	*ResilienceDirect* platform
RICE	Reach, Impact, Confidence and Effort assessment framework
SCS	Senior Civil Service
SitRep	Situation Report
SBIG	Sectors and Businesses Impact Group
SRIG	Security Related Impact Group
TO	Territorial Office
XO	EU Exit (Operations)
XS	EU Exit (Strategy)
YH	Operation YELLOWHAMMER
YH2	Referring to Operation YELLOWHAMMER in the run-up to 31-OCT-2019
YHB	YELLOWHAMMER Board
YR	Exercise Yellow Rehearse

1. Executive summary

1. Operation YELLOWHAMMER TWO (YH2) included the review and updating of planning assumptions and contingency plans, refreshed training and exercising and more regular Ministerial engagement through the EU Exit (Operations) (XO) Committee. Any lessons report will identify shortcomings and areas for improvement, and while those set out here are important and need attention, they should not obscure the very substantial achievements of the programme and the people involved.

2. This review has been delivered in three weeks, partly as planning and work on operational readiness need to start again now, and partly as this builds on a more

in-depth lessons process undertaken in May 2019. The review draws on inputs from all Departments and Impact Groups, as well as workshops and interviews with multiple colleagues. A list of events and interviews is included at Annex A.

3. Two sorts of lessons are covered here:

    a) Operational issues relating to the C3 system

    b) Issues relating to contingency planning and policy development

4. Longer term issues arising from or revealed by YH that may relate to broader considerations are being captured separately and will be combined with the broader lessons identification process.

5. On page 16 is also a full list of recommendations but the major themes arising from the review are:

    a) Generally the programme and operational systems were deemed effective and appropriate.

    b) Staff resourcing was and remains a concern for January 2020 for the majority of Departments, DAs, IGs and the central secretariat, including CCS.

    c) The C3 system was generally felt fit for purpose, but with a number of areas for improvement including: greater clarity on respective roles of IGs (and some DOCs) on some cross cutting issues; greater clarity on the roles and skills of Impact Group Liaison Officers (IGLOs); improved qualitative reporting and metrics in some areas for SitReps and to inform policy.

    d) Exercising and training was seen as positive with Yellow Rehearse deemed to have met its objectives. There is some desire for more training on the C3 system and risk specific plans, and a more comprehensive approach to the generation of exercise injects.

    e) The planning assumptions and contingency planning processes are deemed appropriate but some greater clarity on roles in some cross cutting areas (e.g. maritime risks, member state engagement) is required. There was endorsement for the 7 focal areas for further planning identified by CCS.

    f) Further work is required to confirm information flows through the C3 system, to avoid duplication and ensure an accurate picture. There is also a need to further develop metrics for key policy areas.

    g) A small number of longer term lessons have been identified including strategic consideration of reliance on the short straits and HMG resilience capacity. These are being captured separately and will be combined with wider lessons.

2. Scope, Objectives and Method

Scope and objectives

6. Following the stand-down of Op YH2 on 28 October 2019, Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) commenced work on capturing lessons to identify and understand things that could have been done better, and also good practice for the future. Given the length of the extension, previous exercising and lessons identification, this was a rapid process focussed on system improvements and the operational level that can be implemented before January and in the longer term rather than very significant re-design of processes or structures.

7. The scope of the work encompassed all relevant parts of UK Government and Devolved Administrations and Overseas Territories.

8. The lessons process had the following objectives:
   a) to ensure that any lessons and good practice specific to Op YH generally are captured to ensure any future re-activation can be improved;
   b) to ensure specific identification of lessons and good practice relating to the operation of the CCS central secretariat in IOC and FOC; and
   c) to identify wider or systemic issues which might be addressed in the longer term.

9. Lessons work was conducted across the YH system as a whole by Departments, impact groups, DAs and Specialist Functions. The focus of this lessons exercise is on factors that relate to the operation of the YH system as a whole, or significant parts of it. Where internal issues identified in departmental lessons exercises relate only to their internal arrangements, they are not included in this report.

10. As the report focuses on the working and improvement of 'the YH system' as a whole, references to individual Departments are kept to a minimum. As most of the recommendations relate to the operation of the system as a whole they should be treated by Departments and DAs as relevant to them. Implementing these recommendations will be a collective effort, and planning for a YH3 re-activation will draw on the detailed evidence that sits behind this report.

11. All parts of the YH system have supported and informed this work with their time, insights and frank assessments of what worked, what didn't work and what needed to improve. Thank you.

Method: the lessons process

12. The YH lessons process followed established good practice, kept the approach as simple as possible, and applied a common framework to the reporting and collation of departmental returns.

13. The following guiding principles were observed in the design, conduct and reporting of the work:
   a) Comprehensive – it needs to be system-wide;
   b) Rigorous – the output needs to be defensible, something we can stand by;

c) Systematic – the approach needs to yield a coherent set of insights / actions;

d) Useful – the results should be actionable, a basis for improvement;

e) Robustness – we should not veer round issues that are difficult;

f) Just culture – the process must be respectful, individuals should not have concerns.

14. Lessons were collected from three sources:

a) Questionnaires sent to Departments, Impact Groups, Specialist Functions and DAs;

b) Deep-Dive workshops with Impact Groups;

c) Interviews with senior management.

15. Each of the sources were asked to consider three main areas Operations (C3, Information management, training, etc); Policy and Contingency Plans; and, strategic, longer term resilience lessons.

16. For each area respondents were asked what worked well, what did not work well, and what mitigations or changes are required to improve the issues identified. Respondents were asked to consider issues prior to to IOC, during IOC/FOC and post stand-down (i.e. changes required to be ready for YH3).

17. The evidence from the sources was brought together to inform the lessons and recommendations.

3. Thematic lessons

3.1 Operations

18. C3 system and doctrine

a) Generally, the C3 system and doctrine was deemed appropriate and effective and had further improved since YH1. The timing of the publication of CONOPs was much improved from YH1 and the C3 doctrine was generally accepted by Departments and worked well, with some even suggesting it could be a model for other challenges. There was praise for the nature and running of the Seniors Officials Calls during IOC and FOC as these were deemed to provide clarity, direction and coordination.

b) Some expressed challenges in the BRAG ratings being updated so close to full operations and a desire for the daily rhythm to be settled sooner to allow better staff planning. However most Departments reported feeling more confident in the SitRep system than in YH1.

c) There was a desire for CCS to more clearly define the role of liaison officers in key nodes of the C3 system and for all to ensure that liaison officers understood the role of their Departments/IGs in the system and their key policy areas.

d) Generally Departments were positive about the IOC period and saw it as a useful opportunity to train and test, however some noted the length of IOC leading to some staff fatigue. Generally though many Departments commented positively on the graduated approach taken to stand up through IOC and into FOC.

e) There were varied views on whether some IGs should be stood up virtually. Most felt this was proportionate and worked well, whilst others expressed a lack of clarity in how the SBIG in particular might operate and work across its partners in a virtual form.

f) Some parts of the C3 system found it challenging to find the right contact details for some IGs and DOCs, and reported that shift systems may have exacerbated that.

g) A number of respondents raised a lack of clarity on how departmental communications leads interacted with both YH systems and the Communications Coordination Hub, and particularly how departmental DOC leads should best interact.

19. People

a) Challenges around staffing were a key issue across the YH programme as a whole. A total of 97% of YH C3 posts were filled by the end of October, but many staff moves happened too close to the IOC period, which degraded operational effectiveness. Whilst the operation of the Clearing Hub, with the support of cross-HMG Directors of HR, was an improvement from YH1 (particularly in the last few weeks before operation), the delays in assigning people to roles and release dates impacted Departments' and Impact Group' ability to train their staff and members.

b) There was a perception that a lack of senior buy-in in many Departments was causing delays in identifying and releasing staff, both for internal moves, and within supply Departments for transfer to demand Departments. There was understood to

be a lack of rigour amongst demand Departments in accurately and pragmatically defining requirements, and some perceived unrealistic expectations from demand Departments about the ability of the Clearing Hub to supply against sometimes very specific requirements in very compressed timeframes. A review of both demand and supply requirements and arrangements is required.

c) Substantial variability in the timeliness with which Departments were able to identify and put forward staff for training led to an inconsistency in operational effectiveness. This was particularly notable in the diverse quality of IGLOs, a critical role in the C3 system.

d) On-boarding and integration arrangements for incoming staff was reported as being poor in places, and this is likely to depress return rates where this was the case. Whilst many instances of good practice of staff support and welfare were reported, there remained significant variety in terms and conditions, with consequences for motivation and attrition rates. This was flagged as a particular concern for YH3 where strengthened support and incentivisation is likely to be required.

e) The high level of attrition between YH1 and YH2, particularly amongst volunteers, increased the challenge experienced in moving people through the clearing hub. The timing of YH3 activation relative to the Christmas period, and the fact that YH3 will be the third activation is likely to result in a higher attrition rate, requiring further work to seek a new cohort of volunteers and to train them in a very compressed amount of time.

f) Most Departments have plans in place to mitigate the risk of staff gaps, including additional and more effective communications, further training and sustained engagement via blog posts on departmental intranet. Respondents have pressed for an early start to the next recruitment campaign.

g) As in YH1, security clearance and vetting remained a challenge. Timeliness of vetting, and challenges in transferring clearances imposed unwelcome delays. However, many did talk positively of the ability to expedite security clearances in some cases.

20. Training and exercising

a) The approach to YH2 was substantially different to that in YH1. A 'ladder' of training events was co-developed with Departments, DAs and Specialist Functions to take people from foundation knowledge, through role-specific individual training, into collective training as a team, then to the whole-system exercise. There was a greater emphasis on learning by doing and learning in context. This was a successful, well-received and effective development and will be repeated as required for YH3, although a more explicit definition of learning pathways for defined roles should be developed. There was also a desire for the training regime to be communicated earlier.

b) E-learning: the uptake of the e-learning was much greater than for the equivalent in YH1 and it was judged to be engaging and effective. The practical delivery of the modules was less successful however, as conditions intended to maintain security hindered accessibility. A re-think of delivery options and the security-accessibility balance is required for YH3. Stronger linkages between the e-learning modules and

the role-specification modules should be considered for YH3, which may require some extension of existing modules or additional modules (e.g. there is demand for analytic skills training), which would also have a legacy benefit.

c) Role-specific training: training modules for IGLOs and DOC Leads and Chiefs of Staff were run. They were appropriately attended, although the degree to which they covered all those taking on such roles is unclear. It is likely that many in those roles did not receive the training, reflecting the late identification and arrival of many people into C3 roles. The timing of training and enhanced administration processes should give a more reliable flow of people into training events in YH3. There were suggestions for aspects of the training to include more on 'policy and plans'. Where such training was deployed in Departments or IGs (LIG especially) it was deemed of significant value.

d) Exercise in a box: this was the provision of materials to Departments, DAs and Specialist Functions to enable them to develop their own collective training and assessment exercises in a way that was efficient (adoption of centrally provided materials) and effective (contextualised into their specific context). While the full scale and type of use of the 'ExBox' materials across the C3 system is not yet fully understood, feedback from users was positive and the materials proved adaptable to context. Further work with Departments and DAs, involving CCS YH policy colleagues, is required to scope further development, but no significant need for change is suggested by the available evidence.

e) CCS internal training: detailed feedback is available but the summary findings are that the training was effective in establishing the foundations, should have had clearer ownership within CCS, could have been reduced to two full days (down from three), and should have been organised in a timelier fashion to give contributors more preparation time.

f) Exercise Yellow Rehearse: The C3 exercise was developed and ran in quite a different way to Exercise Yellow Prepare in February 2019, building in a greater degree of interactivity between exercise participants, as well as a considerably wider degree of participation, exercising the full span of DOCs, DAs, IGs, Specialist Functions and the central secretariat. The exercise realised its objectives, and was widely reported to be the most effective component of the training and exercising programme. It was deemed to have provided a crucial test and upskilling opportunity, which brought the system to readiness. There was some confusion over intent and conduct of some of the exercise-build activities, and greater attention is needed to communications and facilitation of scenario workshops in particular, noting that these involve a very diverse group from across the C3 system, and varying levels of prior experience. Exercise Yellow Prime was also generally felt to have achieved its objective of exposing Ministers to the ways of working and giving them exposure to different levels of decision making.

g) Training records: Departments, DAs and Specialist Functions were given the responsibility to maintain an accurate record of training and exercising undertaken by their people, but it is not clear the degree to which this was done in practice.

21. Information flows

a) Information sharing processes were generally fit for purpose and effective, but there were challenges in some parts of the C3 system. Flow was generally better upwards; several Departments reported challenges with the information flow from CCS to DOCs, for example around stand down. Communication between DOCS could be improved, often relying on interaction at IGs and not necessarily communicating directly with each other.

b) The development of the CCS dashboard was viewed positively, but it wasn't always kept as swiftly up to date as it could be.

c) CCS and IGs highlighted the need for better provision of qualitative reporting and data visualisation in SitReps. IGs and DOCs appeared to have these abilities 'in-house' but were not always bringing it through into SitReps.

d) Reporting from Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) was often limited in its utility, due to the fact that they did not consider cross-cutting impacts of the issues that they were reporting on. Training on this by MCHLG colleagues would be a potential solution.

e) Engagement with the local level was not well coordinated. For example, Kent LRF was having to liaise with a number of Government Departments. This would benefit from a single relationship owner, particularly for Kent to manage engagement and share communications.

22. DAs and Crown Dependencies

a) Knowledge of different devolution settlements, arrangements and priorities within DAs, including how devolved policy issues are managed, was improved from YH1. The use of co-located IGLOs and training workshops greatly helped Departments interact with DAs confidently. The LIG's education sessions on DAs and issues received positive feedback.

b) Departments engagement with DAs on their contingency planning was improved, although tensions remained with some inevitably flowing from differences in view beteween different Governments.

c) There needs to be greater consideration of how IGs and key DOCs use liaison officers or interact with the NI Hub for issues relating to Northern Ireland.

d) There was a lack of cross-government knowledge and understanding of Crown Dependencies, including who is responsible for what aspects and other government Departments' roles in engaging CDs remained poor.

23. Specialist Functions

a) Regular communication from CCS and invites for specialists to meetings from an early stage were welcome – but further education for IGs and some DOCs on the role of Specialist Functions and when to engage would be helpful so that advice can be provided in time for resolution of the issue is needed. Most Departments reported lack of clarity on the Specialist Functions' remits.

b) Specialist Functions also suffered challenges from staffing issues and found operational shift working initially difficult. This had impacts within IGs, who were not sure if they would or should have specialist function representatives co-located with them.

3.1.1   Departmental operations

24. Departmental responsibilities

a) Departmental and IG responsibilities in some areas were not always clear during IOC. This made dealing with some cross-cutting issues (e.g. traffic management, fisheries) difficult and could hinder situational awareness, the delivery of advice and actions. All parts of the C3 system should ensure that they have a common understanding of how all foreseeable cross-cutting impacts and issues would be reported, managed and coordinated within and between Departments, DAs, IGs, Specialist Functions and the Central Secretariat.

3.1.2   Impact Group operations

25. Impact Groups

a) Locating some of the Impact Groups in the same building as the Central Secretariat was generally regarded as beneficial, providing opportunities for face-to-face discussion and the ability to talk through interdependencies.

b) Co-location with other departmental liaison officers in Impact Groups was considered critical in terms of understanding the interdependencies within a policy issue, and swiftly communicating decisions that involved HMG partners. However, there were sometimes challenges in this co-located system in some staff not being clear which liaison officers to interact with.

c) There was insufficient clarity on the relationship between the BUKIG, the DExEU run NDDG and Cabinet Secretariat with respect to the coordination of Member State engagement.

d) The interactions between IGs was significantly improved on YH1. The establishment and running of the 'Impact Group Working Group' prior to IOC was beneficial in inculcating the Daily Rhythm, and setting expectations for the number and frequency of meetings.

e) However IGs (as well as other functions of the Central Secretariat) needed to better understand the scope of work conducted by the Operations Cell, and what should reasonably be expected of this in relation to responding to water leaks, alarms and last-minute tasking for external meetings.

f) There was great variability in the understanding of IG systems by their members. The LIG and BUKIG appeared to have greater numbers of staff with an understanding of how they work compared to other IG's. Whilst LIG CONOPs was robust there needs to be further development on how it interacts with the central secretariat.

26. **Impact Group Liaison officers**

   a) The experience and expertise of departmental and CCS IGLOs varied significantly. Most were well equipped for their role as IGLOs, but there were some concerns around some staff who were not informed sufficiently on departmental policy areas, plans and their roles as IGLOs.

   b) There could have been greater clarity on the purpose of CCS LOs into IGs and what their expected level of policy expertise would be. The allocation of CCS LOs to IGs on a shift by shift basis made it challenging for IGs and individuals to build relationships and expertise. Several IGs were keen to integrate CCS LOs into their training for the next iteration of Yellowhammer, and potential host introductory seminars and other briefings on Departments' roles and responsibilities.

   c) Departmental IGLOs were often shared with other IGs due to staff shortages, which resulted in meeting clashes or lack of representation. This was compounded by an overlap in policy issues across IGs. This was part of a broader problem of inconsistent allocation and attendance of IGLOs both in IOC/FOC and YR. It should be noted that there were not enough IGLOs across the system, should we have gone into a full response.

   d) The 'spreading thin' of IGLOs across the piece was a significant factor in their becoming isolated from their DOCs, as their capacity to plug into multiple pieces of the C3 system was diminished.

3.1.3 Civil Contingencies Secretariat operations

27. **Transition and Stand-up**

   a) Generally there was a sense that the CCS team were better prepared and with better systems than for YH1 and much of that is down to the PMO function and the leads for the establishment of the various CCS cells. Whilst there are areas for improvement generally the team felt able to deliver their roles and were motivated.

   b) The IOC and FOC periods exposed challenges in experienced staff stepping out of their existing roles into a shift structure and new staff having to be on-boarded. This led to some lack of clarity on roles both within cells and between them (for example, at what point the Operations Cell would take over the setting up of meetings, invites and other schedulers from the Policy Cell and Situation Centre). Some of the core disciplines such as inbox monitoring and actioning of messages could also have been better.

   c) Perhaps reflected in the rapid turnover of staff, was the length of handover between shift. Handover meetings, in which Function leads assigned roles and participants were briefed on their shift could take a fair amount of time. This was despite the handover documents produced being detailed and comprehensive. On the other hand, holding a cross-cell stand-up after each shift allowed staff members to better understand interdependencies across the operation and was generally viewed positively.

d) There were challenges in reaching all staff with management messages in part due to not everyone having Apollo access outside of work and not all staff signing up to the Everbridge system.

e) It was not clear where the rota team, internal communications function and HR sat in relation to the Operations Call during IOC and FOC. This created some confusion on routes for clearance and the best person to circulate materials to staff.

f) The 10 VS facility provided a better working environment and better infrastructure than for YH1.

28. Staffing

a) CCS went into IOC and then FOC without the total complement of people that would have enabled a sustained operation within the accepted ratios that allow for attrition and support reasonable working hours. A shortfall in volunteers was the main reason for this, with a large proportion of expressions of interest not translating into training and attendance in IOC. It is likely that CCS would have had to run a second volunteer campaign actually during YH2 to achieve the required figures.

b) Expectations of volunteers: it appears that volunteers had some unrealistic expectations of the time commitment, shift working and other aspects of YH roles. Additionally, some line managers appeared to be unaware of the nature and magnitude of the commitment by their staff. This was by no means universal, but communications should have been clearer, more robust, and repeated.

c) Quality of volunteers: this was variable, and where some volunteers were struggling then this imposed unexpected and unreasonable demands on those around them. Band A volunteers were a particular source of concern in this regard, and as they occupy significant leadership roles greater attention should be given to their development. Most volunteers do not want to return for YH3. There are likely to be a range of reasons for this, but they need to be properly understood, and where possible, addressed. It is acknowledged that the LIG welcomed volunteers into their ranks well, better than elsewhere, and the good practice there should be extended.

d) Balancing BAU and YH work: in YH2 a number of people divided their time between ongoing BAU work and YH work in the months and weeks leading up to IOC. This was deemed necessary prior to the arrival of the Fast Streamers, but it did result in significant overloading of staff, and caused line managers problems in scheduling work to deadlines.

e) Welfare and support: CCS planned to ensure comprehensive arrangements were in place to support staff welfare, but did not adequately follow these through into reality. The respective roles of the CCS ways of working team and YH people team was unclear, and workloads and matrix management meant that 1:1 'pastoral' meetings with line managers often fell by the wayside. While this is understandable, the importance of these connections needs to be re-emphasised.

29. Training

a) The CCS provided, internal training pre-IOC was generally well received, and linked effectively with the exercise and ongoing integration of augmentees with CCS staff. The shadow shifts system during IOC/FOC complemented the augmentee and CCS refresher training well.

b) It was recommended that the CCS internal training could have been reduced to two full days (down from three), and should have been organised in a timelier fashion to give contributors more preparation time.

c) The training of CCS LOs needs to be strengthened, and arrangements for ensuring access to policy expertise should be re-considered. IGs noted a lack of complete understanding of the CCS liaison roles from the officers themselves. In addition, the shift rotations and mix of CCS to augmentee staff meant there was mixed policy expertise available at any given time. Off shift experts were not always contactable, and there was some conflict over contacting individuals in Departments for advice rather than filtering requests via the DOCs.

3.2 Policy and Contingency Plans

30. In questionnaires, workshops and interviews, participants were asked to identify lessons relating to policy activity and contingency plans. There was a general expression of confidence from respondents in the planning assumptions process and bulk of contingency planning, in particular in that development undertaken since March 2019. The following more detailed points were made:

31. **Planning assumptions**
   a) Generally the processes around this were considered robust however there was a desire to be able to share these with appropriate colleagues more readily to aid national and local planning. All agreed planning assumptions would now need to be reviewed, with suggestions of a new assumption concerning commercial risks potentially needed. Some Departments reported not fully understanding the role of the central case assumptions.

32. **Contingency Plans and policy areas**

   a) Generally Departments felt contingency plans had been improved since but a number of areas for improvement were suggested.

   b) Feedback highlighted that a better understanding of UK government and sectoral exposure to data risks and corresponding contingency impacts is required. SRIG also highlighted the national security connotations of data access as an area they would engage in more fully.

   c) Further work is required to clarify the capability requirements for mitigating maritime risks.

   d) Several Departments noted the significant improvements and operational readiness delivered in areas like ferry capacity and borders management. Though the need for

BDG to be confident of a full set of assured plans in relation to borders was noted. There was also a desire for briefings on key plan areas such as Operation Brock.

e) Several respondents suggest that further modelling of traffic flows at non-short strait ports is required. This would help to better understand risk associated with people and goods being disrupted on these routes, and drive the development of associated contingency plans.

f) Much progress has been made in recent months on developing measures to manage business failure and distress, but there is a need to continue this and exercise such measures and plans. There needs to be greater departmental awareness of which sectors they have policy ownership for in this regard. Linked to this though there could be a clearer set of mitigations relating to potential impacts on vulnerable groups.

g) Several respondents indicated a lack of understanding about the scope and operations of Operation Kingfisher. Whitehall Departments would benefit from some information on the details of Operation Kingfisher. There were also some concerns that there is not the capacity, particularly at the local level, to respond to business failures at scale.

h) Some Departments may benefit from a better understanding of what the military could potentially deliver (and not deliver) in relation to their areas of responsibility and the processes to access that support.

33. **General policy working**
   a) Some Departments indicated that the speed and nature of XO commissions sometimes led to challenges in how Departments could effectively work together on cross cutting policy issues.

4. Recommendations

34. The thematic lessons above and the recommendations below are relatively high-level. They are derived from analysis of a great deal of detailed evidence, and addressing them will require appropriate use of that evidence. Identifying and learning lessons are of course different things and getting from 'identified' to 'learned' through implementation will require those lessons to be *actively* managed, through a process of oversight, tracking and assurance.

35. There are three broad types of recommendations:

    i. Those which are well-defined and contained in scope, where 'good' can be readily agreed and which can be resolved in a readily limited effort and with few or no additional resources.

    ii. Those which are understood in general terms, where there is a high level of consensus about what 'better' looks like and what can and should be achieved, although realising that will require dedicated resource and collective effort.

    iii. Those which are understood and agreed in general terms but where achieving 'better' is contingent on factors outside of the YH programme.

36. C3 System and Doctrine

    a) Consideration should be given to the purpose and duration of IOC, taking account of factors such as required training, system testing and resource burdens.

    b) The relationships and interactions between DOCs, departmental communication teams and the communications hub should be clarified.

    c) CCS, DCMS and Specialist Functions to provide more clarity around the role of Specialist Functions and advisory groups, reinforced through training workshops to establish clarity of individuals' roles for YH3.

    d) Departmental and IG responsibilities and roles on sectoral responsibilities and cross-cutting issues such as fisheries protection and traffic management should be resolved, with clarity on leadership of those issues. This should also consider how issues can best be transferred between IGs.

    e) The process for EU (Member State and Commission) engagement during YH, including the role of the BUKIG and DExEU NDDG and the tasking of posts, should be confirmed, exercised and shared with relevant stakeholders ahead of YH3.

37. People

    a) Demand Departments and DAs should be able to demonstrate a rigorous assessment of the need for existing (YH2 levels) and any additional staffing requirements for YH3 posts.

    b) Demand Departments and DAs should be able to demonstrate that they have, with support at Permanent Secretary level, re-prioritised work and re-allocated people internally to meet requirements as far as possible, before seeking any additional external moves through the clearing hub.

   c) Supply Departments and DAs should release both previously matched (in YH2) and newly matched (for YH3) people in line with agreed Civil Service Human Resources (CSHR) policy, and in sufficient time for them to be trained and integrated into their YH3 roles.

   d) Where possible, further work should be done to more effectively match volunteers with roles based on required skills and experience to ensure individuals are not allocated to roles they are unsuitable for.

   e) CSHR should exercise comprehensive oversight and robust scrutiny of demand and supply data and arrangements, and arbitrate rapidly where problems are experienced.

   f) CSHR should prepare options for incentivisation to mitigate the risk of shortfalls and attrition in YH3 roles and publish this as soon as possible to inform individuals.

   g) CSHR, CCS and the Brexit Readiness Unit should collaborate on contingency planning for significant shortfalls in YH3 roles.

   h) CSHR to review cross HMG approach to staff welfare and working for out of hours arrangements.

   i) CSHR and Government Security Group to facilitate a more effective and flexible approach to transfers of security clearances and access to buildings and areas.

   j) All CCS functions and DOCs to assign a dedicated volunteer contact manager to manage relations with volunteers, regularly engage with them and their managers and curate their contact details.

38. Training and exercising

   a) There should be another exercise of similar scale to Exercise Yellow Rehearse, but with more engagement from DOCs and functional leads on injects and scenarios. This should also consider included a National Security element.

   b) CCS, IGs and DOCs training should include content on departmental cross-cutting issues (e.g. traffic management, fisheries), in addition to a comprehensive description of the thematic roles and responsibilities of each impact group.

   c) CCS to provide role-specific learning pathways, setting out the training available, and expected to be offered, and share this with DOCs and IGs.

   d) The training regime should be communicated earlier, with the timing to consider when people will be arriving in role, to ensure more reliable flow of people into role specific training.

39. Information flows

   a) DOCS and IGs, working with CCS, should further develop their ability to capture and communicate metrics for SitReps and their data visualisation capabilities.

   b) CCS and Departments to explore how to improve and facilitate easier communication between DOCs.

40. DAs and Crown Dependencies

a) The understanding of DAs should be further developed through training, using the LIG process as best practice.

b) There should be further consideration of how IGs and key DOCs engaged with NI hub and / or the LIG for NI issues.

41. Impact Groups

a) CCS should continue to run the IG working group to maintain the effective working relationships developed in YH2 and further develop understanding of IG remits and boundaries.

b) CCS should provide clarity of the IGLO roles through training and doctrine, including the skill level and knowledge base required.

c) DOCs should ensure they have sufficient IGLOs to be able to service all IGs they are a member of.

42. CCS Operations

a) CCS Functional leads should plan the transition from BAU to IOC, including how and when BAU work will transfer into the cells or be stopped.

b) CCS to consider how to ensure volunteers and surge staff can develop greater policy understanding of key areas and how best to ensure policy understanding and continued grip in a fast moving shift system.

c) CCS should ensure support managers to maintain pastoral 1:1s, encouraging teams to maintain personal development records.

d) More detailed lessons for CCS relating to small operational improvements are captured in internal reports.

43. Policy and contingency plans

a) The Yellowhammer planning assumptions should be reviewed and shared with key stakeholders in a timely manner to support planning.

b) The XO Committee was effective, but should ensure sufficient time is given to Departments to develop advice particularly on cross cutting issues.

c) DExEU and CCS to collaborate on joint communication to Departments on the purpose of the central case assumptions and how they relate to YH assumptions.

d) CCS should lead further work with Departments on the identified cross-cutting issues, including data, maritime security, borders, including non-short strait ports, business failure, supply chains, refineries and Northern Ireland risks.

Annex A: List of Events and Interviews

Event	Date
SRIG Deep-Dive	5.11.19
Operations Cell Deep-Dive	5.11.19
Situation Centre Deep-Dive	5.11.19
LIG Deep-Dive 1	5.11.19
Policy Cell Deep-Dive	6.11.19
Operations Cell Deep Dive 2	6.11.19
LIG Deep-Dive 2	6.11.19
BSIG Deep-Dive	7.11.19
LIG Deep-Dive 3	7.11.19
SBIG Deep-Dive	8.11.19
Emma Ward Interview	11.11.19
Emma Churchill Interview	11.11.19
Name Redacted Interview	12.11.19
Gareth Davies Interview	12.11.19
Clara Swinson Interview	15.11.19
Paul Lincoln Interview	15.11.19
Sarah Gawley Interview	20.11.19

Annex B: List of Written Returns

Returns
Departments and DAs
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Department for Education
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Department for Existing the European Union
Department for Health and Social Care
Department for International Trade
Department for Work and Pensions
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
Her Majesty's Treasury
Home Office
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
Ministry of Justice
Northern Ireland Office
Northern Irish Civil Service
Office of the Secretary State for Wales

Impact Groups
Beyond the UK Impact Group
Borders and Supply Impact Group
Local Impact Group
Sectors and Business Impact Group
Security Related Impact Group

Internal Functions
Cabinet Office Legal Advisors

INQ000100183_0021

CCS Internal Communications
CCS Operations Cell
CCS People
CCS Policy Cell
CCS Situation Centre
CCS Training and Exercising
Government Commercial Function
Government Digital Service

INQ000100183_0022