

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES: ROLE OF THE LOCAL TIER

INTRODUCTION


1. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the current approach to local resilience is fit for purpose in the light of current and future challenges and opportunities. The Resilience 2020 work will define an optimal set of conditions that would:
 - A. Improve local resilience with the outcome of improved risk management, or;
 - B. Achieve 'no degradation of local resilience' (maintain status-quo), or;
 - C. Accept some degradation of local resilience with tolerance of higher level of risk.

CONTEXT

2. The legislative framework that underpins civil resilience, the Civil Contingencies Act, was introduced in 2004. Although the Act has changed little in the last 10 years, the operating environment has changed significantly, especially in the last 5 years, with the greatest impact changes including:
 - A. Financial austerity on national and local resources and related policy objectives such as efficiency, reform of public services, and localism.
 - B. Closure of the Government Office Network in 2010, and establishment of the DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Management Division. Regional Resilience Forums were closed at the same time and new models of collaboration have evolved over the last 5 years.
 - C. Reduction in the local tier's emergency planning and support function. The level to which there has been a decline in capability in local resilience is not easily quantifiable, but there is some evidence of a significant decline resulting from: a net reduction in the total number of people working in the resilience field (resilience professionals) across the sector; fractionalisation of posts through merging roles; a disproportionate loss of senior and long-serving personnel, reducing corporate memory; and a decline in quality of training.
 - D. Efficiency measures implemented by responders, such as merging of services, and shared facilities, and altered organisational boundaries, structures and governance. This includes the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and NHS reform.
 - E. Local political accountability and national accountability for emergencies has shifted across the decade according to risk appetites, the scale of incidents, media coverage – including the growing influence of social media.
 - F. A shift in Ministerial positions, as evidenced by the Letwin resilience review, on risk management, with greater appetite for an approach that includes prevention.
3. Out to 2020, there are a number of issues that may influence a local response. These issues include:
 - A. Interdependencies in the systems which impact on (or detract from) improved local resilience, such as emergency services and local government collaboration agendas, and expanding and emerging models of service provision.

- B. Ongoing financial austerity will continue to shape the capacity and capability of the local tier. All sectors – including local authorities, Fire and Rescue Services, and the military – will undergo substantial reform through to 2020 and will have to reprioritise financially.
- C. Changes to service models, whether through budget pressures or policy decisions, may also lead to reduced resilience of specific services, which may become a burden for government. For example provision of home-based social care through private providers is susceptible to impacts of a range of civil emergency risks (fuel shortage, severe weather) that the local authority may not be able to easily mitigate against.
- D. A reduction in local authority and responder organisation resilience and emergency capacity may create significant additional financial costs for the government. For example, local emergencies are likely to trigger the ‘overwhelm’ subsidiarity criteria prompting central government intervention sooner, causing a greater proportion of the costs of responding to local emergencies to be transferred to central government.
- E. Local service failure may also create additional costs for central departments by generating political pressure for central intervention. It is also likely to create substantial policy and reputational risks for the government, which is ultimately held accountable for ensuring the effective delivery of civil resilience and by the public.

OPTIMUM LOCAL TIER RESILIENCE MODEL



Spider Diagram Key	
Serial	Description and Optimum Condition
A. Local governance	The ability of the local tier to co-ordinate a response. Governance arrangements robust with clear lines of accountability for resilience decisions within responder organisations for individual and collective action. High – strong; low – weak
B. Political accountability	The degree to which the local tier is responsible for deliver emergency response. Local political accountability for resilience issues through respective governance (councils, FRAs, PCCs etc), and national political accountability reserved for national policy and emergencies. High – national bias; low – low bias.
C. Resources inputted	The resource required to deliver the emergency response model. Appropriate levels of resource are delivered to achieve the desired effect.
D. Risk tolerance (across all partners)	The degree to which all stakeholders – including Central Government, Ministerial, and local tier – are prepared to tolerate identified risks. General approach to risk tolerance is appropriate and understood with suitable mitigation in place
E. National direction	The degree that central government seeks, and is able, to direct and influence emergency response. National direction and direct intervention is minimal, with high thresholds for subsidiarity. However, Central Government has the ability to intervene in high impact or wide area emergencies. High – low subsidiarity threshold; low – high subsidiarity threshold.
F. Professionalisation & standardisation	Personnel are trained for roles and the approach Appropriate level of professionalism for officials with resilience responsibilities, and ‘minimum standards’ for resilience across all LRFs and industry sectors.
G. Local partnerships	Strong local partnerships based on LRF model with commitment from all partners to all stages in the emergency management cycle and to multi-agency working. High – strong; low – weak
H. Capabilities delivered	Individual responders and multi-agency activity has sufficient resource to deliver required outputs.
I. Flexibility & adaptability	Model is sufficiently flexible to the range of challenges and issues that may emerge out to 2020. High – flexible; low – inflexible

IS THE CURRENT MODEL FIT-FOR-PURPOSE OUT TO 2020?




Figure 1: illustrating the decline in local tier emergency planning and response that will take place if the current model is not adapted to the challenges of resilience out to 2020.

4. Out to 2020, the current model may not be fit-for-purpose and a failure to adapt to the 2020 context may degrade the ability of the local tier to conduct emergency planning and response. This model can continue to be relied upon to deliver outputs, but the additional risk that will be accepted as a result must be articulated and understood:
 - A. **Local governance** may be impacted by strategic alliances, mergers, and reorganisations conducted by the blue light services, which may dilute the ability of LRFs to articulate clear lines of accountability and decision-making within areas.
 - B. **Political accountability** may be impacted by local authority mergers. Cuts to Central Government funding for LAs may lead to greater tension between the local and national tiers, creating unwillingness within the local tier to follow national direction in response to local emergencies.
 - C. **Resources inputted** the local and national tiers and all category one and two responders will all experience resource pressure, resulting in declining local resources to conduct assessment, planning, and emergency response, and diminishing the ability of Central Government to engage with the local tier to offer advice and challenge.
 - D. **Risk tolerance** will increase, due to diminishing resource to conduct the tasks previously undertaken and a standardised, national process to assess risk would not be implemented.

- E. **National direction** it is unclear whether future governments will seek direct intervention in emergency planning and response, and the assumption is that national direction will decrease. However, declining local resilience resource may increase the amount of national direction offered by Central Government, with the local tier more routinely triggering the 'overwhelm' criteria.
- F. **Professionalism and standardisation** may decrease as the local tier conducts emergency planning and response from 'best effort' resources, rather than maintaining a cadre of professional planners.
- G. **Local partnerships** may be weakened as declining resources across most category one and two and organisational change impacting the geographical footprints of blue light responders leading to less frequent engagement.
- H. **Capabilities delivered** may decrease as the resource input decreases.
- I. **Flexibility and adaptability** may decrease as partners have too little capacity to adapt to changes implemented by responders.

OPTIONS TO PREVENT DECLINE AND ENHANCE LOCAL TIER EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE

- 5. There are four broad areas of improvements and enhancements that would prevent a decline in the local tier's ability to conduct emergency planning and response and may even enhance the current level of capability:
 - A. Prevention;
 - B. Economic growth and civil society engagement;
 - C. Ensuring that local arrangements correspond to local needs;
 - D. Improving the local and national relationship.

PREVENTION

- 6. Prevention involves proactively seeking to mitigate hazards before events occur. Measures that may be undertaken include: home acquisitions; developing new building standards and regulations to ensure that newly built properties can withstand emergencies; and retroactively reinforcing critical infrastructure. There are a number of benefits of prevention:
 - A. Prevention supports the evolution of resilience doctrine from enabling 'continuity' – recovery and returning to normal – to 'adaptability' – adapting to a new normality.
 - B. Preventative measures are already detailed in HMG policy for climate change¹.
 - C. Research by the US Government² estimates that for every dollar the US invests in hazard mitigation, a saving of four dollars is achieved, with mitigation programmes saving the US an estimated \$3.4Bn annually.
- 7. Further analysis is needed on how prevention could be adopted in the UK, but potential options include: incentivising local communities; direct grants to LAs; and establishing community outreach schemes to educate civil society, Local Government, and businesses, with the manner in which prevention is enacted defining the local and national resource implications. Prevention is already being adopted in the UK. The Letwin Review has

¹ The National Adaptation Programme

² US National Institute of Building Sciences' Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council

suggested a number of preventative measures for critical national infrastructure, including ports and the energy sector.

8. Prevention is sufficiently flexible that it could be adapted to and enhance any future resilience model. It is assumed that prevention would reinforce the principle of subsidiarity, as the majority of preventative measures would be small-scale and addressed at specific problems articulated in Community Risk Registers. LRFs would bring local understanding of identified risks and ensure that planning is effective. Central Government would be responsible for: fostering prevention, by amending legislation and providing grants for preventative measures; establishing priorities and eligibility criteria for grants; and offering direction to LRFs on the degree to which prevention should be balanced with response planning.




Figure 2: Prevention model would strengthen subsidiarity approach to resilience and may allow provide better use of limited resources. National direction, political accountability, and standardisation would decrease

9. Further research and analysis required:
 - A. Research on prevention undertaken by EU member states and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction’s Resilient Cities programme.
 - B. Look at lessons learnt and economic analysis from the EA’s preventative flood defence work.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT

10. Emphasising economic growth implications of civil resilience and engaging with the voluntary sector have been considered together as both rely on micro-level local tier partners, deal with personal resilience, and the ability to adopt either will depend on the success of similar methods, such as community outreach and awareness campaigns. Both elements also have interdependencies with wider policies that aim to foster localism, including giving local authorities greater autonomy over how public money is spent in their areas; giving people

more power over what happens in their neighbourhoods; and bringing people together in strong, united communities.

11. **Encouraging civil society and businesses to consider resilience.** Too little emphasis has previously been placed on encouraging Local Government, civil society, and businesses to recognise the link and implement mitigating measures between economic growth and prosperity and civil resilience. Anticipated budget cuts for Local Authorities through to 2020 increases the importance of encouraging the private sector and civil society to protect its own interests through prevention and contingency planning. Current HMG economic growth and prosperity policies, such as improving transport infrastructure, and increasing housing stock, have civil resilience considerations and measures should be taken to ensure that policies for economic growth, emergency response planning, and climate change deliver consistent messaging on the importance of resilience to all sectors.
12. International best practise³ offers a number of steps – all of which are firmly rooted in the principles of localism and subsidiarity – that would help to encourage Local Government, businesses, and civil society to consider resilience challenges and understand why it is in their interest to seek to mitigate them:
 - A. Broaden thinking about resilience and its consequences, so that all parts of civil society and local government understand the potential impact of natural hazards and factor them into planning, which includes designing outreach programmes to provide training and awareness campaigns.
 - B. Improve economic performance through Provide better information, including accurate risk assessments and forecasts, to allow businesses
 - C. Factor ‘losses avoided’ that result from preventative measures into cost benefit analysis conducted into new projects, rather than simply focussing on the upfront cost and economic benefits of new schemes.
 - D. Introduce incentives for risk reduction; for example encouraging local businesses to reduce the cost of sustainable building supplies through credit schemes, or encouraging utility companies to promote resilience to its customers.
13. It is unlikely economic growth-based policies will be used in isolation. Instead, they will be used alongside prevention and emergency response planning to adapt and enhance any future resilience model.
14. Further research and analysis required:
 - A. Consider lessons learnt from similar programmes that attempt to encourage civil society and local business participation.
15. **Voluntary Sector.** Making use of voluntary sector resources represents an opportunity that LRFs can draw on to increase capacity and capability. At present, over half of LRFs rely on the voluntary sector for emergency response provisions in connection with vulnerable residents⁴, and similar a uptake of voluntary may increase LRF capacity and capability in other areas, which would be of benefit as LRFs listed ‘lack of funding’ as one of their top three concerns in the NCS 2014. However, use of volunteers must be weighed against a range of factors, including: whether the level of assurance of the support that can be provided is sufficient for emergency response plans; and ‘multi-hatting’ of voluntary sector resource by a number of LRFs means that wide-area emergencies may overwhelm capacity.

³ UN's Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) toolkit, *'Making Cities Resilient'*

⁴ National Capability Survey (NCS) 2014

Further work would need to be conducted on enhancing voluntary sector professionalisation and establishing supply chain considerations to understand the reliance of a number of LRFs on some organisation and how to mitigate and de-conflict emergency response planning.




Figure 3: Civil Society and Economic Growth places the emphasis on the voluntary sector, businesses, civil society, increasing resources and local partnerships, but increasing the risk appetite & decreasing national direction & standardisation.

ENSURING THAT LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS CORRESPOND TO LOCAL NEEDS

16. Enhancing Legislation. Giving LRFs legal status may enhance their ability to offer clear local governance, increased professionalism and standardisation, and because of this increased standardisation and accountability, there may be increased national direction over an emergency response. Although the government has not formally responded, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security has made several far reaching recommendations on civil resilience governance and legislation, including:

‘Local Resilience Forums [should be] given a legal status, with the power to direct members and funding taken from savings made through merger of fire and ambulance services. LRFs should assume the functions of Strategic Coordinating Groups and be renamed Civil Contingencies Units. The quality of planning by these units should be independently assured; options include central oversight by a beefed up CCS and peer review.’⁵

17. There are a number of arguments against giving LRFs a legal status and the power to direct members, including that doing so may muddle political accountability as all constituent organisations already report through local political structures (e.g. local Councils, Fire & Rescue Authorities, Police and Crime Commissioners). In addition, the strength of LRFs

⁵ *Improving Efficiency, Interoperability and Resilience of our Blue Light Services, an Occasional Report* published by the APPG on Homeland Security (Session 2013-14, June 2013)

comes from the effective local partnership, based on collective commitment and consensus at a senior level by constituent members and would contradict the spirit of the Civil Contingencies Act, which based firmly around the concept of co-operation.

18. The Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme concluded in 2012 that no significant legislative changes were required. This should be considered again as part of the next legislative review, with a specific objective to consider the options for strengthening the governance of individual responder organisation and collective (LRF) local resilience.




Figure 4: Giving LRFs legal status may provide clear governance, increase professionalism and standardisation, and national direction, but to the detriment of political accountability and local partnerships

19. Further research and analysis required:

- A. Formal consideration of the introduction of explicit duties to respond for category one and two responders.
- B. The role of PCCs, responder mergers, and changes in organisational boundaries to assess the political context in which local responders operate.
- C. How to promote collaboration between the civil authorities and the voluntary sector, utility companies, regulators, the insurance and banking sector.
- D. The difference between a counter terrorist and non counter terrorist response and the implications for legislative reform.

20. **Strategic command competence.** There is a strong argument for continuing efforts to increase levels of strategic command competence across the sector through training and exercising, as has recently been implemented for emergency services operational and tactical commanders through the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP). Further efforts should be made to improve the competence of strategic commanders across the local resilience sector, including consideration of increasing training and exercise opportunities, and the introduction of mandatory command qualifications, where applicable; for example, for the emergency services. Although resource has been

focussed on blue light responder SCG chairs, there has too little emphasis on training local authority chief executives to fulfil the SCG chair role, which may be a greater skills gap, as emergency responders will be able to draw on wider emergency response management training and expertise.

21. **Resourcing.** LRFs most commonly (69%) cited funding amongst their top three challenges in the NCS 2014. There is a growing evidence base, including two enquiries from LRFs made to DCLG Ministers in 2014, that the diminution of individual responder organisation resources is reducing the ability for LRF members to contribute funds to support a dedicated secretariat / business management function or to support multi-agency workstreams.
22. All responder organisations are funded for their resilience duties and there is an expectation that they will pool funding for multi-agency working as deemed to be appropriate at the local level. There are numerous different funding models in place across LRFs for the provision of secretariat and business management functions. There are also several notable examples of LRFs implementing joint civil contingencies units, aimed at delivering an improved service and efficiency savings amongst LRF members.
23. Given the growing evidence base of diminished resources affecting the ability of some LRFs to undertake collaborative work, it would be prudent to consider options for LRF funding arrangements, alongside the promotion of innovative solutions. A range of options should be considered, from a light-touch promotion of good practice, such as pooled resourcing models, through to Incentivisation, for example through grants, and innovative solutions, such as the adoption of joint Civil Contingency Units. These options need to be considered in light of the wider emergency services, local government collaboration and innovation agendas, and funding streams. Resilience initiatives are unlikely to realise significant efficiency savings due to the relatively small size of resilience budgets. However, investing in resilience can lead to significant savings in the event of an incident occurring. Any funding model would need to account for this aspect of efficiency benefits.
24. Further research and analysis required:
 - B. Assess how many attendees on the Emergency Planning College's *Introduction to Civil Protection* course are in full-time posts compared to those undertaking resilience posts in addition to other duties.
 - C. Research resource requirements of different funding models and implications for responder reform.
25. **Assurance and accounting for risk in local level resilience.** The concept of Central Government assurance sits uncomfortably with the principles of localism and subsidiarity, as well as the non-statutory status of LRFs. However, LRFs have indicated that they would like a degree of assurance that goes beyond the current arrangements, such as the assurance systems of individual partners, for example, EA reporting to DEFRA; peer review and scoring against national guidance; and anecdotes and observations from resilience advisers. Assurance options include:
 - A. Compulsory assurance, against agreed standards for elements such as LRF structure, risk assessment process, and response appraisal.
 - B. Regular programme audit by an external body.
 - C. Professional accreditation of LRF co-ordinators.
 - D. Greater central government direction; issuing best practise and support documentation, and encouraging more rigorous self-assessment.

26. The introduction of a British Standard for Business Continuity (BS25999) in 2007, superseded by international standards ISO 22301 and ISO 22313 led to a transformation of the standard of business continuity in place within the UK public and private sectors. This is now a widely adopted standard within the private and public sectors, and there is a mature industry in implementation, training, accreditation and auditing against these standards which has greatly enhanced performance management and assurance. One of the strengths of this approach is that it is community and professionally generated rather than being based on government issued direction. British Standards in crisis management and organisational resilience should be more widely promoted and embedded across the local resilience sector.
27. The most significant initiative to provide local and national assurance of local resilience arrangements was delivered by the CCS led Olympic Resilience Project in advance of the 2012 Olympic & Paralympic Games. This approach required a small central team working with dedicated posts in each of the LRFs due to host Games competition venues. This collaborative approach delivered planning assumptions, undertook risk assessment, gap analysis, and then developed capabilities deemed to be lacking in advance of the Games. Replicating this approach on a national scale would offer a suitable model for enhanced national-local capability development and management, and the provision of robust assurance. Consideration should be given to introducing a model of local resilience assurance, introducing gap analysis and capability development processes based on the extant risk assessment and planning assumption tools. This approach runs contrary to the localism approach to emergency response planning and the substantial additional resource relied upon for assurance for the Olympics could not be provided without reprioritising resource from other resilience activities.
28. In a period of constrained resources, assurance offers an opportunity to ensure that shortfalls in planning are effectively identified and targeted, and low Ministerial risk appetites may be partially mitigated through assurance that LRFs and category one responders are delivering against their obligations, enhancing professionalisation and standardisation. However, more stringent assurance may mean that LRF governance processes need strengthening to provide a clear internal assurance process, supporting the argument for placing LRFs on a statutory footing, with central resource for LRF secretariats.




Figure 5: Greater assurance will decrease risk tolerance and will increase professionalism and standardisation, but resource will be required to deliver it and the strength of local partnerships will be a decisive factor in effective assurance

29. Further research and analysis required:

- A. Investigate comparable assurance processes, such as those carried out by LRF partner organisations.
- B. Test whether accredited training providers – College of Policing, Emergency Planning College, and Fire Service College – believe that formal qualifications and standardisation can be introduced.

IMPROVING THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL RELATIONSHIP

30. **National and Local Liaison.** The UK’s approach to civil resilience is grounded in the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, with planning and response conducted at the local level. Following the closure of the Government Office Network in 2010, the DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Management Division (RED) was set up to: enable resilient localities; ensure preparedness for emergencies; discharge DCLG’s responsibility as the lead government department for particular emergencies; and provide government support when emergencies occur. Overall local-national liaison has already been impacted in the period from 2010 – 2014 by responder transformation, with the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, Local Health Resilience Partnerships, and Emergency Service reforms and mergers. It is anticipated that following assumptions may impact local-national liaison out to 2020:

- A. Financial pressure will lead to continued responder transformations and mergers, and cuts to non-essential services.
- B. The national tier and Ministers will continue to demonstrate a low tolerance of risk.
- C. Prevention is adopted into the UK’s emergency response planning doctrine.

31. The following options could be undertaken to sustain effective local-national liaison:

- A. National-local liaison function – Maintain a liaison function, conducted by a network of resilience advisers within a single Government Department. The government department that fulfils the role would depend on the future departmental responsibilities, such as whether the emergency services are co-located within a single government department. The current resource requirements for RED's liaison network could not be decreased significantly without impacting the ability of the network to deliver its objectives. There are challenges for this model in that it cannot fully influence the local tier's professionalism and standardisation if a reduction in local tier funding for resilience leads to resilience planning being conducted from 'best effort' rather than dedicated resource.
- B. Localisation of resilience functions – Push further resilience functions to the local level, with little or no Central Government oversight for planning, although central government would retain responsibilities for deploying a government liaison officer in the event of an incident and maintaining centralised capabilities, such as mass fatalities. There are a number of disadvantages to this approach, including weakening national direction for high impact and wide area events and only giving the national tier few levels to tackle deficiencies in local tier planning and response.
- C. Increased Geographical Footprint Resilience Forums – With the aggregation and merger of responders leading to the formation of resilience organisations that are larger than the current police force level LRF model. Based on merged police forces boundaries, revised FRS boundaries, or PHE boundaries, a larger unit of resilience may offer economies of scale; reduced budgets; increased capacity; greater interaction from category two responders; and risk assessment and mitigation driven on the basis of top-down priorities, rather than each LRF having to join up a number of plans at the local level. However, increasing the geographical footprint of resilience forums may impact local government accountability; local partnerships, reducing local insight into planning and response; and flexibility and adaptability, with the unit of resilience that was implemented heavily dependent on the reforms introduced by responders.




Figure 6: illustrating the impact of different models of national and local liaison and engagement.

32. Further research and analysis required:

- A. The difference between a counter terrorist and non counter terrorist response and the implications local and national liaison.
- B. Assessment of anticipated responder reforms and mergers to determine whether they will influence liaison models.

33. **Balance between nationally and locally-held capabilities.** There is no blanket approach to determine the balance between local and national capabilities. However, there are a number of national capabilities have been deployed or developed to augment local tier capabilities, including:

- A. Resilience Telecoms: High-Integrity Telephone System (HITS).
- B. Fire & Rescue Service (FRS) New Dimension Programme: High Volume Pumps, Detection, Identification & Monitoring, Mass Decontamination
- C. Military assistance: such as helicopters, additional manpower, and imagery analysis capabilities.

34. The balance between a local and national capability will be affected by multiple factors, but typically national assets are held where the risk profile, in terms of probability and impact, dictates that a response would be beyond the capability or capacity of a local response, because the threat or hazard will affect a wide area, is high impact in nature, or low likelihood in nature and it would be unrealistic to expect the local tier to invest in the capability.

35. Capability gaps in the local tier are identified through the National Resilience Capability Assessment. Further work could be undertaken on the basis of the National Resilience Planning Assumptions to look at the thresholds at which nationally-held capabilities are developed. It is unlikely that new money will be allocated for national assets and therefore it is a question of which resilience activities would no longer be undertaken. It is understood that the response to wide area high impact emergencies will always be dealt with at ‘best effort’ and ensuring that blue light mutual aid arrangements and military aid to civil authorities arrangements are robust may offer benefit.
36. Increasing the range of national assets or changing the thresholds so that more nationally-held assets were developed would offer greater resource to emergency responders, decrease risk tolerance, increase professionalism and standardisation, but would decrease local governance and political accountability for a response. Greater use of nationally-held assets may also increase the susceptibility of emergency response to be impacted by reforms to responders and the military, as declining blue light or military resource will diminish the ability to rapidly deploy national capabilities to emergencies.




Figure 7: Greater reliance on nationally-held capabilities would potentially offer greater resource, but at a substantial resource cost and would decrease local political accountability.

37. Further research and analysis required:
- A. Whether the threshold between local and nationally-held capabilities is appropriate and the implications of move the threshold for nationally-held capabilities to higher probability or lower impact risks.

CONCLUSIONS

38. Out to 2020, the current model may not be fit-for-purpose and a failure to adapt to the 2020 context may degrade the ability of the local tier to conduct emergency planning and

response. This model can continue to be relied upon to deliver outputs, but the additional risk that will be accepted as a result must be articulated and understood.

39. There are a number of options that could be implemented, either individually or in conjunction, which to differing degrees will change the way that civil resilience is delivered.

NR

- I have avoided drawing conclusions before I had your input on the paper. Do you think that we have looked at and put forward the correct areas and options? Are there any options that you definitely want to strike out?

DRAFT