

Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills

RISK AND PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENTS FROM REGIONAL RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIPS

Purpose

1. To provide an update on Regional Resilience Partnerships' Risk and Preparedness Assessments, highlighting preparedness to deal with the consequences of the most likely and significant civil emergencies.

Priority

2. Routine.

Background – context, purpose and scope of RPA

3. The Risk and Preparedness Assessment (RPA) process is designed to help Regional Resilience Partnerships (RRPs) to assess the risks relevant to their region and to determine how prepared they are to deal with the consequences of these risks. Annex A provides two diagrams to describe the RPA process.
4. Category 1 Responders have duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess risk and to cooperate. The RPA process itself is not in legislation but is integral to discharging these duties; it is designed based on risk assessment best practice and the concept of integrated emergency management (planning for generic consequences, not causes). We rely on constructive relationships with RRP members and on them seeing the benefit to their partnership of investing in this process.
5. In the past, risk assessment was done differently across Scotland and was seen as an end in itself. The RPA provides consistency and asks responders to work within their RRP to consider how prepared they are to deal with the consequences of top risks. This preparedness assessment is the key to helping Scotland's resilience community to improve response to future emergencies.
6. The final stage of the RPA is communicating with the public: in late 2015, the RRP published their Community Risk Registers (CRRs)^{1,2}. These are accessible, engaging documents which summarise the top hazards to each region and which provide information to the public on how they can prepare, signposting them to sources of information.

¹ <http://www.firescotland.gov.uk/your-safety/community-risk-register.aspx>

² CRRs currently focus on natural hazards and accidents, not terrorist threats. Information on terrorist threats is publicly available in the UK National Risk Register.

7. The three RRP areas mirror the North, East and West areas established by Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service to support strategic management of their local activity. Moving to three RRP areas has created the potential for reduced bureaucracy and for economies of scale in areas such as planning, risk assessment and training and exercising. In line with this, each RRP completes one RPA.
8. The RPA process covers the key natural hazards and accidents that could affect Scotland, it does not include terrorist threats. Scotland's preparedness against these threats will be subject to a separate briefing which you will receive over the summer. We are investigating how terrorist threats can be included in future iterations of the RPA process.

Progress

9. This is the second time RRPs have completed the RPA process, enabling consistency across Scotland and providing:
 - a clearer picture of how prepared we are in Scotland,
 - RRPs with a shared multi-agency understanding of the top risks to their region and
 - RRPs with robust information to inform their business planning. The RPA process is beginning to become embedded into the RRP planning process; enabling RRPs to use the best available evidence to enhance their capability and capacity to respond to events – putting evidence at the heart of decision making.
10. We have focussed on developing good working relationships with the RRPs which are built on honesty, openness and trust. We have worked particularly closely with the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS), who have been well engaged and taken the lead in delivering the RPAs in their regions. Through challenging the previous culture of assurances that 'capability and capacity are sufficient' we are supporting the Partnerships in basing their assessments on the best available information. Feedback from the Regions on the RPA process has been very constructive and, despite the resource intensity required at the initial stages, they can see the value in the finished product.
11. The production of consistent, engaging CRRs represents a step change improvement in the way significant hazards have been communicated to the public. For the first time, all regions of Scotland have worked collaboratively, to ensure they have shared best practice and developed consistent documents with uniformity of information across Scotland. The SFRS led on this work for the RRPs.
12. In order to show our appreciation of the resource and effort that the SFRS has put into making a success of the RPA process, we have attached a draft letter for you to send to Alasdair Hay, Chief Officer, SFRS – this is attached at Annex B.

Improvement

13. We are following continuous improvement principles. Significant progress has been made to develop this trust and buy-in to the process but improvements are inevitably still needed. The quality and robustness of the information will continue to improve over time. The following strands of work will contribute to this improvement:

- **Prioritise work to reduce gaps:** Once established, the new Scottish Resilience Partnership will have a key role in overseeing the prioritization of capability and capacity gaps that Scotland should address, using information from the three RPAs.
- **Improve evidence base:** This is key to the continued improvement of the quality and usefulness of the RPAs. Once risk information is consistent (allowing for local circumstances) and robust in all three assessments, it should only need to be updated when new and emerging information arises; the focus should then be on improving preparedness. The following projects will contribute to improving the evidence base for RRP to use:
 - The Scottish Risk Assessment, once developed, will provide (along with the National Risk Assessment) an enhanced national picture of the likelihood and impact of key natural hazards and accidents that could affect Scotland; informing prevention, mitigation and preparation. The Risk Team, Resilience Division, will update you on the progress of this project in the next few weeks;
 - The National Centre for Resilience (NCR) will support RRP with risk identification and preparedness processes through knowledge sharing and capability development (e.g. practical toolkits; guidance; best practice etc).
- **Streamline the process:** The RRP Coordinator Teams, Resilience Division, are now established and will contribute to delivering and improving the RPAs, in partnership with their SFRS colleagues in the regions.

14. We want future iterations of the RPA to be more consistent; to be fully regional; to contain more quantitative information, where it is available; and to be based on robust evidence, using national and regional experts appropriately: all of which will underpin well informed priorities. We will regularly meet with SFRS and the RRP Coordinator Teams to support these improvements.

15. We ask you to confirm that you are content with these improvement plans.

Key Hazards

16. The RRP identify the key hazards to their areas as:

- Influenza Type Diseases
- Severe Weather
- Flooding
- Industrial Site Accidents
- Interruption to Utilities
- Transport Disruptions
- Pollution and Contamination

17. The information on the highest priority risks (those with highest impact and highest likelihood) is used to inform the scale, duration and severity of the consequences the RRP should be planning for.

Capability Gaps 2016

18. Ensuring capability and capacity gaps are understood and are evidence-based, allows RRP to prioritise their effort to reduce these gaps – this is particularly important at the moment, as resource is tight and significant reform agendas are still bedding in (e.g. the establishment of Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service).
19. Annex C shows the 12 consequences that RRP assess in the RPA process. The RRP identified gaps in all of the 12 consequence categories. Although challenging, this assessment is positive, as it will allow all organisations responsible for improving Scotland's preparedness to work collaboratively to address the gaps. We will report to you again next year on the RPA, providing a summary of key risks, gaps and progress made to address them. As described in paragraph 13, the new Scottish Resilience Partnership will also have a key role driving forward and supporting improvements in preparedness.
20. The information in this submission should be read alongside the counter-terrorism preparedness submission sent to Ministers in February 2016 (with quarterly updates to follow from the summer onwards), together with the submission on critical infrastructure sector impact assessments due to be sent to Ministers in July. Together, these three submissions should give Ministers a picture of how prepared Scotland is to deal with the highest priority, most impactful emergencies.
21. Key capability and capacity gaps highlighted by the RRP in the RPAs were: mass fatalities, mass casualties, care for people and communications. Below we have summarised the key issues around these preparedness gaps and provided some information on the work being taken forward by a range of partners to address these gaps. If you would like further information on any of these, we can liaise with lead policy areas across Scottish Government who are responsible for setting strategies to address many of these gaps.

Mass fatalities (both intensive and extensive)

22. All areas highlight this as a capability gap. Mortuary capacity is a capability gap across the three regions. Whilst some areas would benefit from increasing their current capacity (body storage and upgrading current facilities); increasing mortuary capacity is not in itself the only solution to increasing preparedness. The availability of Forensic Pathologists and other specialists within Scotland and the rest of the UK to conduct the post mortems also needs to be considered in the planning process. Currently there are no significant concerns in Scotland with regards to the number of Forensic Pathologists available to manage day to day business.
23. The Scottish Government are engaging with the Regional Mass Fatalities Groups as they work towards a fuller understanding of their mortuary capacity and how it effects their preparedness. Scottish Government is working with partners to develop a

National Mass Fatalities Framework. The Framework will focus on developing an approach to scale up existing capacity and to establish national mutual aid protocols.

Mass casualties (both intensive and extensive – excess patients)

24. All areas are at an early stage of assessing organisational capability for various mass casualties scenarios and developing arrangements for using available collective resources effectively.
25. The NHSScotland Mass Casualties Incidents National Plan will be tested later this year and used as the basis for developing a wider multi-agency response framework. The report from the 2015 Scottish pandemic flu exercise, Silver Swan, recommended that resilience partners review surge plans to cope with increased demand.

Care for People (displaced people)

26. All areas highlight this as a capability gap for significant incidents which cross regional boundaries. Lessons from the recent severe weather events are being taken forward by the RRP's and this has highlighted the need for exercising scenarios for significant events that cross regional boundaries. At a national level we will work with partners to give consideration to how this can be taken forward in the coming year. There is currently no standard methodology for identifying vulnerable people in any area but there are many examples of good practise. The need for standard protocols and processes for recording of persons transiting through multiple support centres has also been highlighted as a gap.
27. A National Centre for Resilience (NCR) sponsored project is scoping out the development of the 'People At Risk Database' with a view to establishing a national approach to the identification and handling of people at risk, building on existing best practice from across Scotland. Through the NCR, there is also work in hand to produce a capacity development "framework" toolkit to build community resilience prior, during and after a flooding emergency. After initial testing and piloting, there is scope for the toolkit to be applied to other types of emergencies.

Disruption to Tele-communications

28. All areas highlight this as a capability gap. The more rural areas across the country have been identified as especially vulnerable due to the low numbers of (and resilience of) mobile telecommunication masts, and multiagency access to a limited number of airwave terminals.
29. The UK Telecoms Industry's National Emergency Alert for Telecoms (NEAT) allows the industry to tackle major widespread telecoms failures. Resilience Partnerships are aware of NEAT, know how to access it during a telecoms crisis and a Scottish-wide Telecoms Plan has been produced. SG is also collating information on telecoms outages (including their impacts on communities and businesses) and issues are being addressed with telecoms companies. RRP's are looking at arrangements to deal with a major electricity failure ('Blackstart') and are developing multi-agency response plans which will address how and where the resilience partnerships can conduct business during such a significant event.

Recommendation

30. We ask you to:

- approve the letter attached at Annex B;
- confirm you are content with our improvement plans; and
- note the top hazards and key consequence gaps highlighted in this submission. If you would like further information on any of these, we can liaise with lead policy areas across Scottish Government.

Name Redacted



Risk Team Leader, Resilience Division

Irrelevant & Sensitive

Copy List:	For Action	For Comments	For Information		
			Portfolio Interest	Constit Interest	General Awareness
Deputy First Minister	X				
DG Learning and Justice			X		
Director Safer Communities			X		
Deputy Director and Unit Heads, Resilience Division			X		
Name Redacted			X		
Health Resilience Unit					
Name Redacted in and Name Redacted			X		
Counter Terrorism Unit					
Name Redacted			X		
Name Redacted Senior Regional Resilience Coordinators					
Name Redacted Mass Fatalities & Care for People Policy			X		
Name Redacted Telecommunications Resilience Policy			X		

ANNEX A

The Risk and Preparedness Assessment³ Cycle and Flow Diagram



³http://www.readyscotland.org/media/1132/rs-rg-risk_and_preparedness_assessment_-_guidance.pdf

ANNEX B – Letter to Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Chief Officer, Alasdair Hay

Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills
John Swinney MSP



Irrelevant & Sensitive

E: dfmcse@gov.scot

Chief Officer Alasdair Hay
Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Headquarters
Westburn Drive
Cambuslang
G72 7NA

Our ref: SFRS contribution to the Risk and Preparedness Assessments

XX 2016

Dear Chief Officer Hay,

I am writing to thank you for the effort that your colleagues in the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service put into supporting the Regional Resilience Partnerships (RRPs) in completing their Risk and Preparedness Assessments (RPAs).

The RPAs are the process that RRP use to assess and prioritise risks to their regions, to consider the consequences of these risks and to assess how prepared their partnership is to respond to these consequences.

These assessments are used to inform:

- RRP's priorities and business plans;
- public risk communication initiatives; and
- Ministers on how prepared Scotland is to respond to emergencies.

They will form an essential part of the evidence base the new Scottish Resilience Partnership will rely on to provide advice on national priorities; enabling the resilience community to work collaboratively to improve Scotland's preparedness.

The team of Station Managers and Civil Contingency Officers, headed up by Bruce Farquharson, Response and Resilience Group Manager, work hard to ensure evidence is at the heart of resilience decision making and resource prioritisation.

Thank you for this commitment to improving the safety and security of the people of Scotland.

Yours sincerely,

«Signature»

JOHN SWINNEY

ANNEX C

The Consequence Categories RRs prepare for

<p>1. Human Fatalities – Extensive: Human fatalities which are not generally localised and where the general circumstances of the deaths are often already known, such as widespread disease.</p>
<p>2. Human Fatalities – Intensive: Human fatalities which are a result of a single or a related group of incidents such as an industrial accident or a criminal attack. They are generally localised and usually require investigation to assess criminality or negligence.</p>
<p>3. Human Casualties – Extensive: Human casualties which are not generally localised and are usually associated with widespread disease.</p>
<p>4. Human Casualties – Intensive: Human casualties which are a result of a single or a related group of incidents such as an industrial accident or a criminal attack. They are generally localised and usually require investigation to assess criminality or negligence.</p>
<p>5. Displaced People: The evacuation or movement of people from an affected area to a place of safety. If applicable, consideration should be given to incidents that may result in an influx of non-resident British Nationals to the UK.</p>
<p>6. Loss of Staff: Any negative impact of the ability of an organisation's staff to attend their place of work – both public and private sector.</p>
<p>7. Damage to Property and Places: Any impacts related to damage to property or places. This includes: structural damage and economic damage to an area. Consideration should be given to responder or government buildings in the area that could be affected and how this would impact response. Planning should take into account that rubble and debris may affect the response site.</p>
<p>8. Disruption to Transport: Any negative impact on transport infrastructure.</p>
<p>9. Disruption to Financial Services, Food, Water, Energy or Fuel Supplies: Any negative impact on the supply of money (payment, clearing and settlement systems; markets and exchanges; public finances) food, water, electricity, gas, fuel or any other type of energy supplies.</p>
<p>10. Disruption to Communications: Any incident which may impact negatively upon communications infrastructure. This includes telecommunications, postal services and broadcast.</p>
<p>11. Contamination of Land, Water or Air: Any contamination of land, water or air. This can be as a result of biological, chemical or radio-active matter.</p>
<p>12. Disruption or Destruction of Plant Life or Animal Life: Any negative impacts on plant or animal life.</p>