

in-depth lessons process undertaken in May 2019. The review draws on inputs from all Departments and Impact Groups, as well as workshops and interviews with multiple colleagues. A list of events and interviews is included at Annex A.

3. Two sorts of lessons are covered here:
  - a) Operational issues relating to the C3 system
  - b) Issues relating to contingency planning and policy development
4. Longer term issues arising from or revealed by YH that may relate to broader considerations are being captured separately and will be combined with the broader lessons identification process.
5. On page 16 is also a full list of recommendations but the major themes arising from the review are:
  - a) Generally the programme and operational systems were deemed effective and appropriate.
  - b) Staff resourcing was and remains a concern for January 2020 for the majority of Departments, DAs, IGs and the central secretariat, including CCS.
  - c) The C3 system was generally felt fit for purpose, but with a number of areas for improvement including: greater clarity on respective roles of IGs (and some DOCs) on some cross cutting issues; greater clarity on the roles and skills of Impact Group Liaison Officers (IGLOs); improved qualitative reporting and metrics in some areas for SitReps and to inform policy.
  - d) Exercising and training was seen as positive with Yellow Rehearse deemed to have met its objectives. There is some desire for more training on the C3 system and risk specific plans, and a more comprehensive approach to the generation of exercise injects.
  - e) The planning assumptions and contingency planning processes are deemed appropriate but some greater clarity on roles in some cross cutting areas (e.g. maritime risks, member state engagement) is required. There was endorsement for the 7 focal areas for further planning identified by CCS.
  - f) Further work is required to confirm information flows through the C3 system, to avoid duplication and ensure an accurate picture. There is also a need to further develop metrics for key policy areas.
  - g) A small number of longer term lessons have been identified including strategic consideration of reliance on the short straits and HMG resilience capacity. These are being captured separately and will be combined with wider lessons.

- d) There were challenges in reaching all staff with management messages in part due to not everyone having Apollo access outside of work and not all staff signing up to the Everbridge system.
- e) It was not clear where the rota team, internal communications function and HR sat in relation to the Operations Call during IOC and FOC. This created some confusion on routes for clearance and the best person to circulate materials to staff.
- f) The 10 VS facility provided a better working environment and better infrastructure than for YH1.

## 28. Staffing

- a) CCS went into IOC and then FOC without the total complement of people that would have enabled a sustained operation within the accepted ratios that allow for attrition and support reasonable working hours. A shortfall in volunteers was the main reason for this, with a large proportion of expressions of interest not translating into training and attendance in IOC. It is likely that CCS would have had to run a second volunteer campaign actually during YH2 to achieve the required figures.
- b) Expectations of volunteers: it appears that volunteers had some unrealistic expectations of the time commitment, shift working and other aspects of YH roles. Additionally, some line managers appeared to be unaware of the nature and magnitude of the commitment by their staff. This was by no means universal, but communications should have been clearer, more robust, and repeated.
- c) Quality of volunteers: this was variable, and where some volunteers were struggling then this imposed unexpected and unreasonable demands on those around them. Band A volunteers were a particular source of concern in this regard, and as they occupy significant leadership roles greater attention should be given to their development. Most volunteers do not want to return for YH3. There are likely to be a range of reasons for this, but they need to be properly understood, and where possible, addressed. It is acknowledged that the LIG welcomed volunteers into their ranks well, better than elsewhere, and the good practice there should be extended.
- d) Balancing BAU and YH work: in YH2 a number of people divided their time between ongoing BAU work and YH work in the months and weeks leading up to IOC. This was deemed necessary prior to the arrival of the Fast Streamers, but it did result in significant overloading of staff, and caused line managers problems in scheduling work to deadlines.
- e) Welfare and support: CCS planned to ensure comprehensive arrangements were in place to support staff welfare, but did not adequately follow these through into reality. The respective roles of the CCS ways of working team and YH people team was unclear, and workloads and matrix management meant that 1:1 'pastoral' meetings with line managers often fell by the wayside. While this is understandable, the importance of these connections needs to be re-emphasised.

## 29. Training