Module 5 ‘In Brief’ summary – Procurement

Report and Recommendations In Brief

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry is an independent public inquiry examining the response to, and impact of, the Covid-19 pandemic and to learn lessons for the future. Its terms of reference were set by the then Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

The scale of the pandemic was unprecedented; the Inquiry has a huge range of issues to cover. The Chair of the Inquiry, Baroness (Heather) Hallett DBE, decided to address this challenge by dividing its work into separate investigations known as modules. Each module focuses on a different topic with its own public hearings where the Chair heard evidence.

Following hearings, recommendations for change are developed and put into a Module Report. These reports contain findings from the evidence collected across each module and the Chair’s recommendations for the future. Reports for Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4 have already been published.

The fifth module considers the procurement and distribution to end-users across the four nations of the United Kingdom of key healthcare-related equipment and supplies.¹ This includes personal protective equipment (PPE), ventilators and testing equipment.

The Module 5 report contains a chapter that sets out the Inquiry’s findings on the evidence it received relating to PPE Medpro Ltd. This chapter cannot be published on 14 July 2026 as it is covered by a Restriction Order. The Order was granted by the Chair to ensure that ongoing criminal investigations are not undermined. It continues until the conclusion of any criminal proceedings in relation to PPE Medpro Ltd or unless the order is varied or revoked pursuant to section 20 of the Inquiries Act 2005. This chapter will be published once the Order has been lifted and should be read together with Chapter 5.

Future reports will focus on the following areas:

• Module 6 – The care sector
• Module 7 – Test, trace and isolate programmes 
• Module 8 – Children and young people 
• Module 9 – The economic response to the pandemic
• Module 10 – The impact on society

Module 5: Procurement – findings

The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in a global race to purchase vital supplies of PPE, testing equipment and ventilators, as governments around the world sought to protect their populations. International demand skyrocketed, global supply chains came under strain and prices rose uncontrollably. 

The stockpile of PPE and other equipment for the UK was inadequate to meet demand, with the UK government and devolved administrations wholly unprepared to increase rapidly the scale and speed of their emergency procurement and distribution operations. Across the UK, had ministers and officials been better equipped with appropriate information and systems to respond, procurement decisions would have been easier and fairer. There would have been less waste, more trust and greater confidence in the system. 

The Inquiry found several major flaws in the systems responsible for emergency procurement and distribution of key healthcare equipment and supplies, including:

• The pandemic stockpile of PPE was not subject to an adequate system of management and oversight. 
• The organisations responsible for emergency procurement and distribution across the UK were not ready for a pandemic. There were inadequate plans to increase the speed and scale of their responses. The plans that did exist had not been stress-tested in pandemic response exercises.
• The structures established by the UK government to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic did not sufficiently integrate procurement and distribution. Vital inventory, usage rates, procurement and distribution data were not easily available to procurement teams. Procurement systems were unduly complex, inefficient and unable to cope with the large quantities of information they had to process.
• Healthcare equipment is subject to a complex system of regulation, which is poorly suited to an emergency. 
• There was no strategy for increasing international trade and domestic manufacturing resilience for a pandemic. The UK’s supplier base was too concentrated in a single country, China, and the capabilities of domestic manufacturers had not been adequately considered in planning. 
• There was not a sufficient number of officials within the UK government and devolved administrations with the skills, expertise and experience specifically in the emergency procurement of healthcare equipment.
• There was inadequate planning for the use of external advisers and businesses in an emergency procurement and distribution response.
• Public confidence in the emergency procurement system was undermined by the lack of transparency, the lack of adequate processes to control spending and the unfairness of the High Priority Lane which tended to favour suppliers with a connection to the UK government. 
• The technology and data systems for emergency procurement and distribution were outdated and did not allow adequate sharing and analysis of procurement and distribution data.

Challenges and consequences

• Due to a lack of planning, ministers and officials were forced to improvise quickly to establish new, untested emergency procurement and distribution systems. 
• The lack of plans and infrastructure meant officials could not respond with sufficient speed and efficiency to fundamental problems, such as which and how much equipment to buy, at what prices, and how it should be distributed.
• There were risks of waste caused by overbuying, resulting in the loss of large sums of public money, and the buying of substandard equipment that jeopardised health and social care workers. 
• The total expenditure by the UK government and devolved administrations on PPE, ventilators and testing equipment between 1 January 2020 and 28 June 2022 was approximately £42.3 billion. Of the approximately £15 billion of PPE purchased, almost £10 billion was wasted.
• The establishment of the High Priority Lane embedded unfairness in the UK government’s emergency procurement system. It was a misguided attempt at prioritisation, caused by a fundamental lack of readiness rather than ill-intention. The High Priority Lane should not have been set up and should not be repeated.
• Mistakes were made under pressure, leading to:
  • allegations of cronyism and corruption
  • waste of public money
  • a lack of transparency about contract awards as officials, understandably, prioritised getting healthcare equipment to health and social care workers.

Positive aspects of the response

• UK embassies and trade missions successfully used their contacts and expertise globally to identify suppliers.
• The response from the public and businesses, who were invited to help source, manufacture, and supply critical equipment, was enthusiastic.
• The effective collaboration between the public and private sectors should serve as an example of how governments should respond to future pandemics.